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Military And Security Developments
Feb 23.
*Israel-Palestinian Territories: Local administration plan is unlikely to improve humanitarian situation. On 22 February, Israeli news outlets reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began establishing humanitarian pockets inside the Gaza Strip. The pockets are to be run by Palestinians who are not affiliated with Hamas. These local bodies will manage civilian affairs and the distribution of aid, acting as ‘testing grounds’ for post-war administration. However, the plan will likely take weeks to materialise fully due to logistical and security complexities. Furthermore, many local leaders will likely refuse to co-operate with the IDF for ideological reasons and/or fear of retribution. As such, we assess that the plan will likely face challenges and hurdles in the coming weeks, despite the IDF’s efforts to engage with local groups that have been marginalised and prosecuted by Hamas since 2007. Ultimately, the initiative is unlikely to change the worsening humanitarian situation in Gaza in the coming weeks; aid agencies’ operations will likely continue to face constraints as a result of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war.
Feb 22.
KEY POINTS
- A shooting attack on Highway 1 in Israel on 22 February will likely drive increased Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in the West Bank, elevating ethno-religious tensions and attack risks ahead of Ramadan (10 March-9 April).
- The uptick in hostilities between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah over the past week is likely to continue in the coming days, sustaining elevated risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.
- Gaza: On 21 February, the IDF launched a new clearing operation in Gaza City’s southern Zeitoun neighbourhood, revealing underground tunnels that connect the area to central Gaza. During the operation, IDF fighters were engaged by armed Palestinian militants, underscoring the return of combatants to previously cleared areas. The IDF also continued expanding its clearing operations in Khan Yunis and conducted targeted airstrikes in Rafah (both in southern Gaza).
- Israel-West Bank: On 22 February, three militants killed one person and injured 11 others in attacks on vehicles travelling between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem on Highway 1. The perpetrators, residents of Bethlehem governorate, blocked the highway by causing a traffic collision with their vehicles, then fired small arms at the trapped drivers. The attack reflects the elevated tensions in the West Bank and elevated attack risks across Israel, particularly in the Jerusalem area, with key transit routes, crowded locations and places of worship remaining the primary targets for attacks.
- West Bank: IDF operations in the West Bank remained consistent with previously observed trends, with hotspots for armed clashes remaining mostly in the northern West Bank, around Jenin and Nablus. Elevated IDF operations in the coming days are likely, particularly around Bethlehem governorate following the shooting on Highway 1 (see above).
- Israel-Lebanon: Longer range Lebanese Hizballah drone operations into northern Israel and the IDF attack in Sidon have driven an uptick in hostilities between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah in recent days. On 19 and 20 February, two Lebanese Hizballah drones travelled around 20 miles (32km) from the Israel-Lebanon border to the Western Galilee area before crashing. Following the drone incursion on 19 February, the IDF struck Lebanese Hizballah targets in the Sidon area, outside the regular range of IDF strikes. Continued tit-for-tat hostilities are likely to sustain elevated security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon in the coming days. Civilian deaths, such as the two Lebanese civilians killed by IDF strikes on 21 February, are likely to exacerbate the risk of retaliation. This dynamic will increase the likelihood of major escalation in the coming months (though we assess that such escalation is currently unlikely).
- Israel-Yemen: On 22 February, the Arrow air defence system downed a Houthi missile targeting Eilat. The incident triggered sirens in the southern city for the first time in a month and reflects the persistent threat posed by the Houthis to the region, as well as the attack risks across Israel. However, Israel’s advanced long- and medium-range air defence systems will continue to mitigate such risks in southern areas.
- Israel-Syria: On 21 February, an alleged IDF airstrike targeting an apartment in a high-rise building in Kafr Soush municipality (Damascus, Syria) killed two people. Local media reports claim the apartment was acting as a meeting place for Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hizballah operatives. However, conflicting accounts claim that the two fatalities were civilians rather than militants. Nevertheless, the strike is consistent with the broad increase in Israeli operations in Syria which followed the start of the Israel-Hamas war; it is therefore unlikely to cause a major armed escalation between Israel and Syria.
- Yemen-Red Sea: US officials have confirmed that the Houthis downed an MQ-9 Reaper drone on 19 February near the port city Al Hudaydah, likely using a surface-to-air missile (SAM). It is likely that the Houthis used the Iranian 358 missile to down the reaper. The system can reach an altitude of 32,000 feet (10km) and has an advertised range of 62 miles (100km). Iran claims the advanced version has a range of 93 miles (150km). This is the second time that a Reaper drone has been downed by the Houthis since the start of Israel-Hamas war; the first was downed in November 2023, also by a 358 missile. The incident is unlikely to escalate hostilities between the US and the Houthis significantly, though the US is likely to increase its targeting of SAM systems in Yemen. The Houthis are unlikely to use SAM systems against commercial flights without a warning, as this would constitute a significant escalation. However, security risks around Yemeni air space will remain elevated throughout the conflict.
- Yemen-Red Sea: The US Central Command (CENTCOM) has confirmed that the Houthis damaged a US-owned and Greek-flagged ship delivering humanitarian aid to Yemen on 19 February. The ship, MV Sea Champion, was transporting grain to the port of Aden (Yemen), which is controlled by anti-Houthi forces. The attack caused only minor damage to the ship, which was able to continue its journey to Aden. According to CENTOM, MV Sea Champion has delivered aid to Yemen 11 times in the past five years, indicating the vessel was likely known to the Houthis and the attack was not a case of misidentification. The attack reflects the elevated risks for shipping vessels in the region, including those delivering humanitarian aid to Yemen.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- The World Food Programme (WFP) has suspended food aid deliveries into northern Gaza, highlighting the critical risks facing humanitarian staff and assets. The WFP announced the suspension on 20 February following several security incidents in northern Gaza. On 18 February, gunfire from an unidentified source targeted an aid convoy transiting Gaza City, while several trucks in the Deir al-Balah area were looted and a driver was assaulted. Amid increasing violence and instances of looting, humanitarian organisations face significant operational risks, particularly in northern Gaza. NGO assets and staff will likely continue facing elevated exposure to targeted violence and/or attacks, increasing disruption to humanitarian aid delivery and distribution. Although there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will open the Karni border crossing in northern Gaza to increase the provision of humanitarian aid, this is unlikely to temper critical operational risks to staff and assets, delaying distribution processes.
- The IDF has begun trialling governance structures in Gaza City amid efforts to supplant Hamas as the governing authority. On 22 February, several Israeli media sources reported that the IDF has started to engage Palestinian community leaders in the Zeitoun neighbourhood to develop a governing body for aid distribution. This move underscores Israeli efforts to develop structures within Gaza that reduce Hamas’ access to humanitarian aid distribution networks and influence over the civilian population. Since 19 February, Jabalia residents have been protesting against Hamas and calling for a ceasefire, highlighting increasing challenges to Hamas’ popular support amid deteriorating governance standards. Even so, despite Israel’s plans to develop longer-term administrative structures within Gaza, we assess that a significant expansion of the programme remains unlikely in the short term, reducing prospects for political and governance stabilisation.
- Despite significant international pressure to commit to a two-state solution, the Israeli Knesset continues to support measures opposing the creation of a Palestinian state. On 21 February, 99 of 120 Members of the Knesset (MKs) voted in favour of a declaration opposing the unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. Continued opposition to recognising a Palestinian state underscores the increasing disparity between Israel and its allies, including the EU, the UK and the US, which have increasingly called for progress towards a two-state solution. While this vote does not indicate an imminent shift in diplomatic or economic relations between Israel and its allies, we assess that continued disagreements over the status of the Palestinian Territories will likely further strain bilateral relations, driving elevated regional tensions.
- Efforts to pass a ceasefire resolution in the UN Security Council (UNSC) continue, underscoring elevated international tensions and opposition to an expansion of IDF operations. On 20 February, the US vetoed a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, its third veto on a ceasefire resolution since the Israel-Hamas war began. The US is reportedly preparing an alternative resolution calling for a temporary ceasefire ‘as soon as is practicable’ and which opposes the expansion of IDF ground operations into Rafah. While the resolution highlights substantial international opposition to operations in Rafah, we assess that the vague wording relating to the ceasefire is unlikely to increase Israel’s legal responsibility to establish a ceasefire or influence its negotiations with Hamas significantly.
- Amid significant disruption to commercial shipping activity in the Red Sea, socio-economic concerns remain elevated in Egypt. On 20 February, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi stated that Suez Canal Authority revenues have dropped by 40-50% since the Yemen-based Houthis began escalating attacks on commercial vessels in November 2023. The diversion of numerous vessels via the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) has significantly disrupted revenue from fees levied on vessels travelling through the Suez Canal, which is a major source of income and foreign currency for the Egyptian government. The decrease in traffic and revenue will exacerbate mounting economic challenges in Egypt amid high inflation, a depreciating currency, elevated food insecurity and substantial socio-economic health issues.
Feb 20.
*Yemen-EU: Naval mission is unlikely to reduce frequency of Houthi maritime attacks in coming weeks. On 19 February, the EU launched its ‘Aspides’ naval mission to protect commercial vessels in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks. Belgium, France, Germany, Greece and Italy will contribute to a force that includes frigates and airborne early warning systems; these will reportedly be fully operational within the coming weeks. An EU official stated that the mission is strictly defensive, and that it will react to threats with minimum force. The development comes amid a notable uptick in Houthi maritime attacks in the last three days. On 18 February, two missiles caused severe damage to a Belize-flagged commercial vessel. There is a realistic possibility that the mission will reduce the rate of successful Houthi attacks on commercial vessels. However, it is unlikely that the Houthis will reduce the frequency of their attacks in the coming weeks. We assess that the persistent risk of strikes will likely discourage shipping companies from returning to the Red Sea, sustaining high insurance premiums.
Feb 19.
KEY POINTS
- A sole-perpetrator attack in Israel and continued incidents of Israeli settler violence in the West Bank reflect elevated ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation on both sides, sustaining attack risks across Israel.
- Frozen Israel-Hamas negotiations have increased the likelihood of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expanding its operations into Rafah (southern Gaza) during Ramadan (10 March to 9 April), elevating domestic unrest risks in regional countries.
- Gaza: On 16 February, Palestinians rioted near the Rafah crossing after the Hamas security forces killed a teen taking items from an aid shipment. Rioters allegedly set fire to the complex and clashed with the security forces, reflecting rising domestic frustration with Hamas in Gaza.
- Israel-West Bank: On 16 February, a gunmen killed two people (an IDF reservist and a civilian) and injured four others in a sole-perpetrator attack on a bus station in Reem Junction, southern Israel. The perpetrator, who has Israeli residency, was identified as Fadi Jamjoum from Shufat, East Jerusalem; they were shot on the scene by an off-duty IDF reservist. Following the attack, the IDF conducted raids in Shufat and Ras Khamis in East Jerusalem on 16 and 18 February. The incident reflects increased radicalisation among Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank and highlights the elevated risk of attacks throughout Israel.
- Israel: On 19 February, the IDF confirmed that it found remnants of a drone in an open field near a kindergarten in Arbel (Northern district). At the time of writing, it is unclear who launched the drone and from where. However, according to the IDF, it was likely launched by hostile actors. There is a realistic possibility that the drone was launched from Syria. If true, this would raise the risk of IDF retaliation strikes against Syrian army positions and militant infrastructure in the coming days.
- West Bank: Israeli settler violence against Palestinian communities in the West Bank continues to rise, elevating ethno-religious tensions. On 16 February, Israeli settlers conducted arson attacks on several Palestinian vehicles and residential/agricultural properties in Kisan (Bethlehem governorate). Additionally, in two separate incidents on 18 February, Israeli settlers set fire to Palestinian vehicles and vandalised residential properties in Huwara (Nablus governorate) and Turmus Ayya (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate).
- Israel-Lebanon: Hostilities between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah along the Israel-Lebanon border continue on trend, with a slight reduction in the intensity of attacks by the latter.
- Yemen-Red Sea: On 19 February, two Houthi missiles hit RUBYMAR, a Belize-flagged commercial vessel, in the Gulf of Aden. The crew reportedly abandoned the ship; the status of the vessel is currently unclear (though some reports claim it caught fire and subsequently sunk). The attack comes against the backdrop of continued hostilities between the US and the Iran-backed Houthis; the latter continues to target commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea. Additionally, on 17 February, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed it conducted a self-defence strike against a Houthi unmanned underwater vessel (UUV), the first observed employment of a UUV by the Houthis since October 2023. The recent attacks and the appearance of new weapons in the conflict reflect the Houthis’ willingness to escalate their attacks despite ongoing US military operations. This underscores the persistently elevated security risks in the Red Sea area.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Amid broader protest activity, demonstrations at the Nitzana border crossing continue to restrict aid deliveries into Gaza, compounding humanitarian concerns. On 19 February, Israeli protesters calling for hostage releases continued to restrict access to the Nitzana border crossing, where aid delivered from Egypt into Israel is screened before entering Gaza via the Rafah border crossing. Since demonstrations at border crossings into Gaza began on 23 January, data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs shows that the average number of aid trucks entering Gaza per day declined from 156 between 12 January and 23 January to approximately 47 between 9 February and 15 February. Restricted humanitarian access to Gaza will drive significant socio-economic challenges in the enclave, where food, water and energy insecurity remains critical.
- The Israeli government reportedly intends to restrict access to the al-Aqsa mosque compound in East Jerusalem during Ramadan, driving ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank and Israel. While no official statements have been made at the time of writing, concerns about limited access to the compound during the month of Ramadan (10 March to 9 April 2024) underscore the elevated risks of ethno-religious tensions and domestic unrest, particularly in East Jerusalem and mixed Arab-Israeli cities in Israel.
- On 18 February, Norway agreed to assist with the transfer of tax funds collected by Israel to the Palestinian Authority (PA); it also indicated that the PA is willing to accept financial transfers. The announcement comes after the Israeli cabinet agreed to resume partial financial transfers to the PA on 21 January, after their suspension on 30 October 2023. Israel will resume transferring taxes collected on the PA’s behalf to fund public sector operations in the West Bank while transferring funds earmarked for Gaza to a third-party account in Norway. Previously, the PA refused to accept financial transfers without the inclusion of funds to pay PA civil servants in Gaza, exacerbating liquidity issues and elevating socio-economic concerns in the West Bank. We assess that the resumption of financial transfers will likely temper these concerns and allow the PA to increase public sector operations, though continued restrictions on Palestinian labourers entering Israel will likely sustain broader socio-economic concerns in the coming weeks.
- Ongoing public hearings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the legal status of Israel’s practices in the Palestinian Territories underscore persistently elevated diplomatic tensions and related protest activity. On 16 February, the ICJ ruled that it would not issue additional provisional measures in the case brought against Israel by South Africa under the 1948 Genocide Convention, as previously issued measures apply throughout Gaza. Further developments in this case are unlikely before 26 February, when Israel will submit its compliance report to the ICJ relating to the 26 January ruling. However, on 19 February, separate hearings began at the ICJ on the legality of Israel’s practices and settlement activities in the Palestinian Territories and the Golan Heights. The hearings come after the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) requested in 2022 that the ICJ issue non-binding advisory opinions regarding the status of the Palestinian Territories. While the case is unlikely to result in significant legal challenges for Israel, we assess that it underscores the persistently elevated diplomatic tensions relating to the legality of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian Territories. The case will likely drive moderate protest activity in The Hague (Netherlands) in the coming week.
FORECAST
Frozen negotiations between Israel and Hamas have increased the likelihood that the IDF will expand its ground operations into Rafah during Ramadan. In a speech on 18 February, Israeli War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz highlighted the likelihood of this expansion, stating that if Israeli hostages are not returned by Ramadan, then Israel will extend the fighting into the Rafah area. Israeli officials claim that an expansion of operations into Rafah will be conducted in co-ordination with Egypt and the US to reduce diplomatic tensions and to minimise civilian casualties. However, expanding the operation during Ramadan is likely to elevate domestic unrest risks and protests in countries across the world, particularly in Muslim-majority and neighbouring Middle Eastern countries. Domestic unrest is particularly likely in Egypt and Jordan; there is a realistic possibility that unrest in Jordan will further damage Israel-Jordan diplomatic relations, further elevating risks to the continuation of their shared projects and business initiatives. Protests in regional countries will elevate bystander risks due to the heightened likelihood of clashes with state security forces.
The IDF’s reported discovery of medication for Israeli hostages in Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis will likely sustain protest activity at border crossings into Gaza, elevating the risk of disruption to aid deliveries. During operations at the Nasser Hospital, IDF personnel reportedly discovered packages and boxes of medication labelled with hostages’ names. Photographic evidence of the discovery indicates that the medication had not been opened and was therefore not distributed to the hostages. Amid significant concerns over hostages’ welfare, this discovery will likely drive further protest activity in Israel, particularly near the Nitzana and Rafah border crossings. Continued protests at border crossings and the security forces’ efforts to disperse protesters will likely sustain risks of disruption and delays to cross-border aid deliveries. There is also a realistic possibility of protesters targeting aid convoys with direct action, such as stone-throwing and vandalism. As such, we assess that NGO personnel, particularly vehicle drivers, will face moderately elevated bystander risks while crossing into and out of Gaza in the coming days. As disruption to aid deliveries continues, humanitarian conditions are highly likely to worsen, increasing the likelihood of further violent incidents close to aid depots and facilities, and driving risks for NGO staff and assets therein.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza
(Source: Sibylline)
26 Feb 24. IDF troops kill 30 Hamas terrorists in Gaza City centre. Israeli troops killed more than 30 Palestinian “terrorists” in Gaza City’s Zeitoun district over the past 24 hours, the Israeli military claimed on Monday.
Ten others were killed in the central Gaza Strip, as well as an unspecified number in the southern city of Khan Younis, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said.
Gaza City was overrun by Israeli forces in the first stages of the war and has seen renewed incursions against Hamas terrorists in recent weeks.
It came as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pushed back on the idea that having another temporary ceasefire soon would stop the planned assault on Rafah, saying that it would only delay it. Almost 1.5 million people are sheltering in the southernmost city after numerous displacements.
Foreign governments and aid organisations have repeatedly expressed fears that an invasion of Rafah, in the enclave’s south, would lead to mass civilian casualties. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
24 Feb 24. Joint Statement from Australia, Bahrain, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States on Additional Strikes Against the Houthis in Yemen. In response to the Houthis’ continued attacks against commercial and naval vessels transiting the Red Sea and surrounding waterways, today the militaries of the United States and United Kingdom, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, conducted an additional round of strikes against several targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
Today’s necessary and proportionate strikes specifically targeted 18 Houthi targets across 8 locations in Yemen associated with Houthi underground weapons storage facilities, missile storage facilities, one-way attack unmanned aerial systems, air defense systems, radars, and a helicopter. These precision strikes are intended to disrupt and degrade the capabilities that the Houthis use to threaten global trade, naval vessels, and the lives of innocent mariners in one of the world’s most critical waterways.
These strikes are in response to Houthis’ continued attacks against commercial and naval vessels that have not only endangered international seafarers but the lives of the Yemeni people, including the February 22 missile attack that struck the United Kingdom-owned M/V Islander and injured a crewmember, the February 19 missile attack that nearly struck the U.S.-owned M/V Sea Champion while delivering humanitarian aid to Yemen, the February 19 UAV attack that struck the U.S.-owned M/V Navis Fortuna, and the February 18 missile attack that struck the United Kingdom-owned M/V Rubymar and forced the crew to abandon the ship.
The Houthis’ now more than 45 attacks on commercial and naval vessels since mid-November constitute a threat to the global economy, as well as regional security and stability, and demand an international response. Our coalition of likeminded countries remains committed to protecting freedom of navigation and international commerce and holding the Houthis accountable for their illegal and unjustifiable attacks on commercial shipping and naval vessels.
Our aim remains to de-escalate tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea, but we will once again reiterate our warning to Houthi leadership: we will not hesitate to continue to defend lives and the free flow of commerce in the face of continued threats.
(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
26 Feb 24. Palestinian Prime Minister Shtayyeh resigns. Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said on Monday he was resigning to allow for the formation of a broad consensus among Palestinians about political arrangements following Israel’s war against the Islamist group Hamas in Gaza.
The move comes amid growing U.S. pressure on President Mahmoud Abbas to shake up the Palestinian Authority as international efforts have intensified to stop the fighting in Gaza and begin work on a political structure to govern the enclave after the war.
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His resignation must still be accepted by Abbas, who may ask him to stay on as caretaker until a permanent replacement is appointed.
In a statement to cabinet, Shtayyeh, an academic economist who took office in 2019, said the next stage would need to take account of the emerging reality in Gaza, which has been laid waste by nearly five months of heavy fighting.
He said the next stage would “require new governmental and political arrangements that take into account the emerging reality in the Gaza Strip, the national unity talks, and the urgent need for an inter-Palestinian consensus”.
In addition, it would require “the extension of the Authority’s authority over the entire land, Palestine”.
The Palestinian Authority, formed 30 years ago under the interim Oslo peace accords, exercises limited governance over parts of the occupied West Bank but lost power in Gaza following a struggle with Hamas in 2007.
Fatah, the faction that controls the PA, and Hamas have made efforts to reach an agreement over a unity government and are due to meet in Moscow on Wednesday. A senior Hamas official said the move had to be followed by a broader agreement on governance for the Palestinians.
“The resignation of Shtayyeh’s government only makes sense if it comes within the context of national consensus on arrangements for the next phase,” senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri told Reuters.
Israel has vowed to destroy Hamas and says that for security reasons, it will not accept Palestinian Authority rule over Gaza after the war, which broke out following a Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on Oct. 7, which killed some 1,200 Israelis and foreigners, according to Israeli tallies.
So far, almost 30,000 Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza fighting, according to Palestinian health authorities, and almost the entire population has been driven from their homes.
Reporting by Ali Sawafta in Ramallah and Nidal al-Mughrabi in Cairo; writing by James Mackenzie Editing by Gareth Jones and Philippa Fletcher
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. (Source: Reuters)
21 Feb 24. EU launches new naval mission to protect naval shipping in Red Sea. The European Union (EU) has officially launched its new maritime operation to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea from attacks by Yemen-based Houthi rebels. The new mission, dubbed Operation ‘Aspides’, was inaugurated on 19 February with the aim of providing EU naval presence to help restore and protect freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, where Houthi rebels have been attacking commercial shipping with unmanned systems and rockets since October 2023.
“With the launch of EUNAVFOR [EU Naval Force] ‘Aspides’, the European Union is responding swiftly to the necessity to restore maritime security and freedom of navigation in a highly strategic maritime corridor,” said Josep Borrell, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. “The operation will play a key role in safeguarding commercial and security interests, for the sake of the EU and the wider international community.”
Headquartered in Larissa, the operation will be led by Greek Commodore Vasilios Griparis, with Italian Rear Admiral Stefano Costantino serving as force commander. (Source: Janes)
22 Feb 24. Houthis Down Second US Air Force MQ-9 in Three Months. A U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper was shot down off the coast of Yemen by Houthi fighters, defense officials said Feb. 20. It was the second time that an Air Force MQ-9 was downed by the Houthis since November as the Iranian-backed Houthis pursue a months-long campaign against commercial shipping and naval vessels in the region with drones, cruise missiles, and anti-ship ballistic missiles.
Reapers cost roughly $30m apiece.
“Initial indications are that it was shot down by a Houthi surface-to-air missile,”
Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters.
The U.S. military believes the drone crashed into the Red Sea in the early morning hours of Feb. 19 local time. Footage circulating on social media shows the wreckage of a drone that was recovered by the Houthis, as well as video of the purported engagement released by the group.
Forces under U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) have been taking out Houthi targets in Yemen since mid-January as the U.S. and its allies seek to deter attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Singh said that she did not know if the MQ-9 that was shot down earlier this week was armed.
“These are multimillion-dollar platforms,” said Singh. “The commander’s using them to keep commercial mariners safe, to keep our U.S. service members safe in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. So, of course, there’s a risk incurred, but it’s something that we’re going to continue to do to ensure that freedom of navigation can continue to be upheld, the rule of law can be upheld, and that commercial shipping can continue, whether it be in the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden.”
Following the shoot-down of the MQ-9 on the morning of Feb. 19, a surface-to-air missile launcher was located and destroyed by U.S. forces in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen at approximately 5 p.m., CENTCOM said in a Feb. 20 statement. CENTCOM did not say if that strike was related to the downing of the MQ-9.
In addition to the drone shot down near Yemen in November 2023, the Houthis have also shot down U.S. drones in 2019 and 2017. The U.S. has lost two more MQ-9s in the past year when one was shot down over Iraq in January, and another was forced to crash into the Black Sea after being run into by a Russian fighter in March 2023.
Despite daily strikes by U.S. forces, the Houthis appear determined to keep up their attacks.
“We know that Iran is continuing to supply them with what they are continuing to launch at U.S. vessels and commercial mariners,” Singh said. “Every single day, I think our dynamic strikes or coalition strikes absolutely have an impact. But we at no point said that we’re wiping all of their capabilities off the map. We know that they have a large inventory, a large warehouse, and they’re going to continue to use it.” (Source: UAS VISION/Air & Space Forces Magazine)
20 Feb 24. US pushes for UN to support temporary Gaza ceasefire, oppose Rafah assault. The United States has proposed a rival draft United Nations Security Council resolution calling for a temporary ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war and opposing a major ground offensive by its ally Israel in Rafah, according to the text seen by Reuters.
The move comes after the U.S. signalled it would veto on Tuesday an Algerian-drafted resolution — demanding an immediate humanitarian ceasefire — over concerns it could jeopardize talks between the U.S., Egypt, Israel and Qatar that seek to broker a pause in the war and the release of hostages held by Hamas.
Until now, Washington has been averse to the word ceasefire in any U.N. action on the Israel-Hamas war, but the U.S. text echoes language that President Joe Biden said he used last week in conversations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
It would see the Security Council “underscore its support for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza as soon as practicable, based on the formula of all hostages being released, and calls for lifting all barriers to the provision of humanitarian assistance at scale.”
The United States does “not plan to rush” to a vote and intends to allow time for negotiations, a senior U.S. administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said on Monday.
To pass, a resolution needs at least nine votes in favor and no vetoes by the U.S., France, Britain, Russia or China.
The U.S. draft text “determines that under current circumstances a major ground offensive into Rafah would result in further harm to civilians and their further displacement including potentially into neighboring countries.”
Israel plans to storm Rafah, where more than 1 m of the 2.3 m Palestinians in Gaza have sought shelter, prompting international concern that an assault would sharply worsen the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The U.N. has warned it “could lead to a slaughter.”
The draft U.S. resolution says such a move “would have serious implications for regional peace and security, and therefore underscores that such a major ground offensive should not proceed under current circumstances.”
Washington traditionally shields Israel from U.N. action and has twice vetoed council resolutions since the Oct. 7 attack on Israel by Hamas militants. But it has also abstained twice, allowing the council to adopt resolutions that aimed to boost aid to Gaza and called for extended pauses in fighting.
‘WARNING SHOT’
This is the second time since Oct. 7 that Washington has proposed a Security Council resolution on Gaza. Russia and China vetoed its first attempt in late October.
While the U.S. was ready to protect Israel by vetoing the Algerian draft resolution on Tuesday, International Crisis Group U.N. Director Richard Gowan said Israel would be more concerned by the text Washington drafted.
“The simple fact that the U.S. is tabling this text at all is a warning shot for Netanyahu,” he said. “It is the strongest signal the U.S. has sent at the U.N. so far that Israel cannot rely on American diplomatic protection indefinitely.”
Israel’s mission to the United Nations in New York did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the U.S. draft.
A second senior U.S. administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the U.S. draft does not suggest “anything about the dynamics of any particular relationship, whether that’s with the Israelis or any other partner we have.”
The draft U.S. text would condemn calls by some Israeli government ministers for Jewish settlers to move to Gaza and would reject any attempt at demographic or territorial change in Gaza that would violate international law.
The resolution would also reject “any actions by any party that reduce the territory of Gaza, on a temporary or permanent basis, including through the establishment officially or unofficially of so-called buffer zones, as well as the widespread, systematic demolition of civilian infrastructure.”
Reuters reported in December that Israel told several Arab states that it wants to carve out a buffer zone inside Gaza’s borders to prevent attacks after the war ends.
The war began when fighters from the Hamas militant group that runs Gaza attacked Israel on Oct. 7, killing 1,200 people and capturing 253 hostages, according to Israeli tallies. In retaliation, Israel launched a military assault on Gaza that health authorities say has killed nearly 29,000 Palestinians with thousands more bodies feared lost amid the ruins.
In December, more than three-quarters of the 193-member U.N. General Assembly voted to demand an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. General Assembly resolutions are not binding but carry political weight, reflecting a global view on the war. (Source: Reuters)
19 Feb 24. Houthis could attack Britain’s underwater internet cables.
‘Era of seabed warfare has arrived’ as Iran-backed militia could ‘broaden’ response to conflict in Gaza, warns Policy Exchange.
Houthi rebels could attack Britain’s underwater internet cables, a new report has warned.
The Iran-backed militia have conducted drone and missile attacks against ships in the Red Sea, disrupting global shipping, in response to the war in Gaza.
A report by Policy Exchange has warned that the Houthis could “broaden” their response to the conflict by taking it “to the subsea domain” and targeting underwater cables.
Undersea cables are vital digital connectivity infrastructure, with some 500 fibre-optic cables crossing the ocean floor across the world.
British companies are among the consortia which own Red Sea cables, with British Telecom owning a stake in the major AAE-1 cable that runs from Europe through Africa to Asia.
Policy Exchange has warned that Iran-backed groups, including the Houthis and Hezbollah, have indicated on official social media channels that they could target the cables.
It further warns that the Houthis have had combat diver training and possess an array of naval mines which could “damage cables at shallower depths”.
The report said: “Whilst these groups are not thought to possess the equipment necessary to conduct sophisticated subsea warfare, Iran could provide such capabilities.
“In any case, cables passing through the shallower waters of the Red Sea are exposed to far more rudimentary methods, such as cutting and mines.”
It added: “Whilst Iran depends on this infrastructure for its own connectivity, any conflagration which threatens the regime’s survival may lead it to calculate that the cables have become a strategic target.”
The new report highlighted the importance of protecting the cables, upon which “99 per cent of the UK’s digital communications with the outside world depend”.
“Our social, economic, political and military systems are therefore entirely reliant upon our ability to police and protect the cables which run in and beyond our territorial waters,” it added. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
19 Feb 24. British ship ‘at risk of sinking’ after Houthi strike. A British-registered ship struck by the Houthis is at risk of sinking in the Gulf of Aden, the group has claimed.
The rebel group attacked the Rubymar cargo ship in the Bab al-Mandab Strait off Yemen on Sunday.
Yahya Sarea, the group’s military spokesman, said the crew was safe. “The ship was seriously hit which caused it to stop completely. As a result of the extensive damage the ship suffered, it is now at risk of sinking in the Gulf of Aden,” he added.
The UK Maritime Trade Operations agency reported on Sunday that the crew had abandoned a ship off Yemen after an explosion in apparently the same incident.
Ambrey, a British maritime security firm, said that a Belize-flagged, UK-registered and Lebanese-operated open hatch general cargo ship came under attack in the Bab al-Mandab Strait off Yemen on Sunday.
The Houthis have launched repeated drone and missile attacks against international commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait since mid-November, saying it is acting in solidarity with Palestinians as Israel wages war on Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
(Source: Daily Telegraph)
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