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NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 02.

KEY POINTS

  • The Iran-supported Nujaba Movement, which forms part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) announced it will continue to target US forces in the region, sustaining elevated regional tensions and security risks, particularly in Iraq and Syria.
  • Protests demanding hostage releases during the weekend will elevate mobility disruption and bystander risks throughout Israel, particularly in protest hotspots in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.
  • Gaza: Over recent days IDF fighters of the Yiftach brigade assigned to Division 99, found an underground vault room in central Gaza. The vault contained cash and bonds worth millions of dollars as well as documents detailing Hamas’ finance and trading methods. Israel and its international partners, including the US, will likely use the documents to identify business activity and money transfer routes linked to Hamas. Related entities will face elevated risks of sanctions over the coming months, increasing compliance and sanction exposure risks for firms with operations in the region, particularly financial firms and humanitarian organisations.
  • Israel: The Home Front Command has relaxed restrictions on civilian activity in certain parts of the Gaza envelope, reflecting a stabilising security risk environment. From 2 February, educational activities and size-limited indoor and outdoor gatherings will be able to resume in ‘protected’ areas of the Gaza envelope. Protected areas refer to locations with immediate access to shelters. While rocket fire will almost certainly continue targeting the Gaza envelope, the re-authorisation of certain civilian gatherings underscores a moderately stabilising risk environment in locations with immediate shelter access.
  • West Bank: IDF operations in the West Bank continued at pace, with a 16-hour raid in Husan (Bethlehem governorate) resulting in 14 arrests and the discovery of an IED manufacturing facility.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Clashes on the Israel-Lebanon border continued on trend. Lebanese Hizballah continues to primarily target IDF positions in the Northern District and the Shebaa Farms area. However, rocket fire also triggered sirens in numerous civilian population centres, including Kiryat Shmona and Metula, underscoring persistent physical security and bystander risks in northern Israel.
  • Syria: On 2 February the IDF allegedly conducted an airstrike in Sayyidah Zaynab (Rif Dimashq governorate), killing an advisor from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The strike reflects the continued presence of IRGC-affiliated members in Syria and sustained incidental and bystander risks associated with Israeli attempts to target these persons.
  • Iraq: The Nujaba Movement has announced it will continue targeting US forces in the region, highlighting the continued threat of attacks on US bases. The announcement comes after the Iranian-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) conducted a successful drone strike on a US military base in Jordan on 28 January, killing three US service members. The Nujaba Movement is the IRI’s second-largest contingent after Kataib Hezbollah, which announced on 30 January that it would suspend operations targeting US installations. These statements likely reflect efforts to increase pressure on the Iraqi government to negotiate a US withdrawal from Iraq by driving insecurity and further instances of tit-for-tat clashes and strike

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • On 1 February, US President Joe Biden sanctioned four Israeli settlers in the West Bank, moderately elevating diplomatic tensions with Israel. The individuals, who have been involved in attacks on Palestinian civilians in the West Bank, are now banned from entering the US and have had their US-based assets frozen. While this announcement highlights moderately increasing tensions between the Israeli and US governments, it is unlikely to indicate imminent or significant policy changes from the Biden administration regarding the Israel-Hamas war. Nevertheless, as the Biden administration continues to face significant domestic pressure to moderate its support for Israel, particularly ahead of the 2024 US elections, there is a realistic possibility of further, moderate policy changes relating to Israel and settlers in the West Bank.
  • A hostage incident in Gebze (Kocaeli province, Turkey) linked to a pro-Palestine activist underscores elevated threats of high-visibility criminal incidents amid heightened ethno-religious tensions. On 1 February, an unidentified Turkish gunman held seven Proctor & Gamble employees hostage in a warehouse in Istanbul for nine hours. The gunman displayed a Palestinian flag on the warehouse door during the incident and reportedly told Turkish police he wished to draw attention to ongoing hostilities in Gaza. While the hostages have subsequently been released unharmed, this incident highlights the realistic possibility of high-profile criminal incidents, including efforts to take hostages and/or storm buildings, as the Israel-Hamas war continues to drive ethno-religious tensions throughout the region.

FORECAST

On 3 February, protests calling for immediate hostage releases are highly likely throughout Israel, driving widespread mobility disruption. Numerous political and activist organisations have called for protests in locations across Israel including Beersheba, Haifa, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Rishon LeZion. While demonstrations are highly likely to remain peaceful, protesters will likely block key main roads and intersections, limiting movement through urban centres. While violent clashes are unlikely, there is a realistic possibility of police dispersal efforts triggering localised physical confrontations, moderately elevating bystander risks. Demonstrations aiming to disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza, including those at the Ashdod port and the Kerem Shalom and Nitzana border crossings are also highly likely to continue over the coming days. Continued protest activity will sustain substantial pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases during ongoing ceasefire negotiations. As such, Israeli negotiators will likely make concessions to Hamas to secure a hostage release agreement, particularly regarding the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. There is a realistic possibility that such an agreement will trigger additional protest activity around prisons releasing Palestinians, particularly in Jerusalem, and exacerbate tensions within the coalition government. Nevertheless, threats to government stability remain low and ceasefire negotiations are highly likely to proceed over the coming days.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon

• The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

Feb 01.

KEY POINTS

  • The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continue to reduce its presence in northern Gaza in line with the transition to the third phase of operations. Prospects of reduced operation intensity will increase over the coming weeks, particularly in light of advances in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations.
  • Israeli protesters blocking Ashdod Port to prevent aid deliveries to Gaza are likely to elevate business and supply chain disruption risks in the coming days, affecting the wider economy. Clashes with security forces are likely, elevating bystander security risks in the area.
  • Gaza: IDF transition to the third phase of war continues with the withdrawal of the 5th infantry reserve brigade from Gaza on 31 January. The brigade, operating under division 162, was responsible for holding the west coastline of northern Gaza. Following the withdrawal, the 646th Paratrooper Reserve Brigade, assigned under division 99 and operating in Khan Yunis, remains the only reserve brigade operating in Gaza.
  • Gaza: Emerging reports indicate that in recent months IDF fighters have begun burning down houses with a confirmed militant presence and/or weapons staches, raising the risk of international condemnation and legal risks. Local news reports alleged the Israeli censorship agency has on several occasions prevented the publication of stories on this practice, which was initially conducted by soldiers in Shujaiya due to shortages of explosives and has now expanded to other sectors. A number of senior commanders have prohibited the practice, but given its application likely reflects shortages of ammunition during intensely resisted clearing operations, there is a risk that the practice will continue regardless. This will elevate legal risks for Israel, particularly given the ongoing ICJ case and orders for Israel to ensure the preservation of any evidence relevant to allegations of genocide.
  • West Bank: IDF operations continue in line with previously observed trends, with nothing significant to report.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants remain consistent with previously observed trends. Hizballah continues targeting IDF bases along the Israel-Lebanon border and while the frequency of such strikes has increased compared to the past two weeks, this remains broadly consistent with the ongoing trend of manageable gradual escalation.
  • Syria: Officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) began evacuating from Syria. The move is likely in response to the growing Israeli strikes against IRGC targets throughout the Israel-Hamas war and fear of US retaliation for the attack against its base in Jordan that killed three US servicemen. The evacuation is likely to reduce Iran’s ability to manage proxies and co-ordinate their attacks. It is likely that this will also reduce general Iranian activities in Syria, likely prompting an associated reduction in Israeli operations in the country.
  • Yemen: Early on 1 February, US forces struck a Houthi ground control station and ten one-way Arieal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Additionally, on 31 January, US forces struck and destroyed a Houthi surface-to-air missile prepared to launch and later intercepted Houthi missiles and drones shot towards US Navy ships in the Red Sea. The strikes reflect the US’ continued proactive stance and enduring tit-for-tat dynamics between the US and the Houthis in the Red Sea. These are unlikely to moderate hostilities and security risks in the coming weeks. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that part of the US’ planned retaliation for the loss of its three servicemen in Jordan includes an increase in attacks on the Iran-backed Houthis, elevating the risk of an escalation in strikes in the coming days, driving tensions and security risks in the region.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • On 1 February, Israeli protesters blocked access to Ashdod port to prevent aid deliveries to Gaza, highlighting elevated risks to supply chain continuity amid increasing protest activity. Hundreds of demonstrators accessed the port of Ashdod as a part of a day of co-ordinated protests calling for immediate hostage releases and/or the cessation of aid deliveries into Gaza.  Similar protests have previously targeted the Kerem Shalom and Nitzana border crossings, disrupting aid deliveries. The protest at Ashdod presents a substantial threat to supply chain continuity through the port, with efforts to disperse protesters likely sustaining risks of disruption over the coming hours.
  • Two lawsuits filed in the US alleging that Iran is directly responsible for the 7 October attacks underscore significantly elevated bilateral tensions, driving risks of further sanctions. The lawsuits, which were filed in the District of Columba and the Southern District of New York, both allege that Iran directly funded Hamas and provided intelligence, training and weapons for the attack. Plaintiffs include Israeli-American survivors of the 7 October attacks and family members of those killed or kidnapped by Hamas. While the cases are highly unlikely to be resolved over the coming months, allegations of direct Iranian involvement in the attacks will drive elevated bilateral tensions with the US. As the cases proceed, there is also a realistic possibility of the US imposing further sanctions targeting IRGC and/or prominent Iranian officials, elevating compliance concerns and risks of sanction exposure.
  • On 31 January, an unidentified individual left a grenade outside the Israeli embassy in Stockholm (Sweden), highlighting elevated risks of attacks targeting Israeli government assets. The Swedish national bomb squad disposed of the device without incident. Though unsuccessful, the attempted grenade attacks highlight significant risks to physical security for individuals and assets associated with Israel, particularly with the Israeli government and/or IDF as ground operations in Gaza continue. Given elevated risks of attack, buildings and installations in close proximity to Israeli embassies will also face elevated collateral risks.

FORECAST

The US will likely continue targeting Houthi positions in Yemen, decreasing the likelihood that an Israel-Hamas ceasefire will prompt a reduction in hostilities in the Red Sea. While a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is likely to reduce regional tensions and decrease the frequency of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, a total cessation of hostilities remains unlikely (see Sibylline Special Report – Red Sea Scenarios). Furthermore, over the coming weeks there is a realistic possibility that the US will increase the frequency and/or intensity of strikes on Houthi targets, amid an increasingly assertive regional security posture following the drone attack on Tower 22 in Jordan (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 29 January 2024). This will likely further escalate regional tensions, with the realistic possibility of nullifying the de-escalatory effects of an Israel-Hamas ceasefire. Houthi targeting of US and UK naval vessels is highly likely to continue in the coming weeks, regardless of developments in the Israel-Hamas war. Consequently, the US and UK’s continued naval presence in the Red Sea will likely sustain elevated collateral risks for commercial vessels and cargo, even in the event of the Houthis reducing the frequency of attacks on commercial vessels during an Israel-Hamas ceasefire period. As such, despite prospects for a moderate de-escalation, commercial vessels will likely continue facing elevated operational risks in the Red Sea, particularly those affiliated with the US and the UK.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

KEY POINTS

  • The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continue to reduce its presence in northern Gaza in line with the transition to the third phase of operations. Prospects of reduced operation intensity will increase over the coming weeks, particularly in light of advances in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations.
  • Israeli protesters blocking Ashdod Port to prevent aid deliveries to Gaza are likely to elevate business and supply chain disruption risks in the coming days, affecting the wider economy. Clashes with security forces are likely, elevating bystander security risks in the area.
  • Gaza: IDF transition to the third phase of war continues with the withdrawal of the 5th infantry reserve brigade from Gaza on 31 January. The brigade, operating under division 162, was responsible for holding the west coastline of northern Gaza. Following the withdrawal, the 646th Paratrooper Reserve Brigade, assigned under division 99 and operating in Khan Yunis, remains the only reserve brigade operating in Gaza.
  • Gaza: Emerging reports indicate that in recent months IDF fighters have begun burning down houses with a confirmed militant presence and/or weapons staches, raising the risk of international condemnation and legal risks. Local news reports alleged the Israeli censorship agency has on several occasions prevented the publication of stories on this practice, which was initially conducted by soldiers in Shujaiya due to shortages of explosives and has now expanded to other sectors. A number of senior commanders have prohibited the practice, but given its application likely reflects shortages of ammunition during intensely resisted clearing operations, there is a risk that the practice will continue regardless. This will elevate legal risks for Israel, particularly given the ongoing ICJ case and orders for Israel to ensure the preservation of any evidence relevant to allegations of genocide.
  • West Bank: IDF operations continue in line with previously observed trends, with nothing significant to report.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants remain consistent with previously observed trends. Hizballah continues targeting IDF bases along the Israel-Lebanon border and while the frequency of such strikes has increased compared to the past two weeks, this remains broadly consistent with the ongoing trend of manageable gradual escalation.
  • Syria: Officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) began evacuating from Syria. The move is likely in response to the growing Israeli strikes against IRGC targets throughout the Israel-Hamas war and fear of US retaliation for the attack against its base in Jordan that killed three US servicemen. The evacuation is likely to reduce Iran’s ability to manage proxies and co-ordinate their attacks. It is likely that this will also reduce general Iranian activities in Syria, likely prompting an associated reduction in Israeli operations in the country.
  • Yemen: Early on 1 February, US forces struck a Houthi ground control station and ten one-way Arieal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Additionally, on 31 January, US forces struck and destroyed a Houthi surface-to-air missile prepared to launch and later intercepted Houthi missiles and drones shot towards US Navy ships in the Red Sea. The strikes reflect the US’ continued proactive stance and enduring tit-for-tat dynamics between the US and the Houthis in the Red Sea. These are unlikely to moderate hostilities and security risks in the coming weeks. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that part of the US’ planned retaliation for the loss of its three servicemen in Jordan includes an increase in attacks on the Iran-backed Houthis, elevating the risk of an escalation in strikes in the coming days, driving tensions and security risks in the region.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • On 1 February, Israeli protesters blocked access to Ashdod port to prevent aid deliveries to Gaza, highlighting elevated risks to supply chain continuity amid increasing protest activity. Hundreds of demonstrators accessed the port of Ashdod as a part of a day of co-ordinated protests calling for immediate hostage releases and/or the cessation of aid deliveries into Gaza.  Similar protests have previously targeted the Kerem Shalom and Nitzana border crossings, disrupting aid deliveries. The protest at Ashdod presents a substantial threat to supply chain continuity through the port, with efforts to disperse protesters likely sustaining risks of disruption over the coming hours.
  • Two lawsuits filed in the US alleging that Iran is directly responsible for the 7 October attacks underscore significantly elevated bilateral tensions, driving risks of further sanctions. The lawsuits, which were filed in the District of Columba and the Southern District of New York, both allege that Iran directly funded Hamas and provided intelligence, training and weapons for the attack. Plaintiffs include Israeli-American survivors of the 7 October attacks and family members of those killed or kidnapped by Hamas. While the cases are highly unlikely to be resolved over the coming months, allegations of direct Iranian involvement in the attacks will drive elevated bilateral tensions with the US. As the cases proceed, there is also a realistic possibility of the US imposing further sanctions targeting IRGC and/or prominent Iranian officials, elevating compliance concerns and risks of sanction exposure.
  • On 31 January, an unidentified individual left a grenade outside the Israeli embassy in Stockholm (Sweden), highlighting elevated risks of attacks targeting Israeli government assets. The Swedish national bomb squad disposed of the device without incident. Though unsuccessful, the attempted grenade attacks highlight significant risks to physical security for individuals and assets associated with Israel, particularly with the Israeli government and/or IDF as ground operations in Gaza continue. Given elevated risks of attack, buildings and installations in close proximity to Israeli embassies will also face elevated collateral risks. 

Jan 31.

KEY POINTS

  • The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) announced that the Atlantis system, which is designed to pump seawater into Hamas’s underground tunnels is operational. The system is likely to be already in use or to be used in the immediate term, likely driving long-term threats to Gaza’s water security.
  • Katib Hizballah (KH) has halted all its operations against US forces in the region, however this is unlikely to prevent US retaliation measures for the deaths of US personnel in Jordan which US President Joe Biden claims have already been decided, elevating security risks in Iraq and Syria.
  • Gaza: The IDF revealed that it had completed tests for a system that floods underground tunnels, codenamed ‘Atlantis’, which is operational and ready to use. The IDF is likely to deploy this system in Gaza imminently, however, it will only be used in certain locations, selected for the permeability of the ground composition. Experts have claimed that the system, which uses seawater, risks contaminating underground drinking water, exacerbating water insecurity in Gaza in the long term. However, the IDF claims that the system will be used so as not to threaten underground drinking water, suggesting targets will be selected based on the surrounding ground composition. Nevertheless, long-term risks for drinking water in Gaza are likely to persist due to risks of mistakes in the deployment of the system, particularly amid active conflict.
  • West Bank: IDF operations continue in line with previously observed levels, with nothing significant to report.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border clashes continue on trend between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah.
  • Israel-Syria: On 30 January, militants in Syria launched three rockets towards Israel which fell in open fields in the southern Golan Heights with no injuries or damage reported. In response, the IDF conducted artillery fire towards two military positions in Syria. Later on 31 January, Israel Air Force fighter jets conducted additional strikes against military infrastructure near Daraa (Daraa governorate) Syria. The rocket launches and the IDF response are consistent with previous cross-border clashes and do not signal an escalation.
  • Iraq: On 31 January, Katib Hizballah announced it would suspend attacks on US forces stationed in Iraq amid significantly elevated regional tensions. This comes after US President Joe Biden announced he had decided on a ‘response’ to the drone attack on US Tower 22 base in Al Rukban (Mafraq governorate, Jordan) on 28 January, which killed three US service members and injured 34 others. The attack was conducted by the Iranian-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), an umbrella organisation of armed Shia groups which includes Katib Hizballah. The announcement is highly unlikely to deter US retaliation over the coming days.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Despite substantial progress in Israel-Hamas negotiations, opposition from other Gaza-based militant groups poses substantial challenges to ceasefire implementation. On 30 January, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a Hamas-aligned militant group, stated that it would not release hostages unless a comprehensive and long-term ceasefire deal is reached, including an IDF withdrawal from Gaza. While this statement is unlikely to significantly derail broader ceasefire negotiations, as PIJ holds numerous hostages in Gaza, it underscores the complexity of agreement implementation and potential delays in securing hostage releases.
  • Protest activity at the Kerem Shalom and Nitzana border crossings continues to disrupt aid delivery into Gaza. On 31 January, the IDF designated the Nitzana border crossing as a closed military zone after Israeli protesters calling for immediate hostage releases blocked the crossing on 30 January.  Protest activity also continues at the Kerem Shalom border crossing, with Israeli security forces detaining 18 demonstrators on 31 January for blocking aid deliveries. Amid restrictions to UNWRA funding, delays to aid deliveries in Gaza continue to exacerbate critical humanitarian conditions throughout the enclave.

FORECAST

Demonstrations at the Kerem Shalom and Nitzana border crossings are highly likely to continue over the coming days, elevating bystander risks to NGO staff and disrupting aid deliveries. Despite the designation of both crossings as closed military zones, protesters calling for immediate hostage releases are highly likely to continue efforts to block aid convoy passage. Although aid continues to move through the Kerem Shalom crossing, continued demonstrations and efforts by security forces to disperse protesters will sustain risks of further disruption and delays. Localised clashes between demonstrators and security personnel remain a realistic possibility, particularly in the event of further arrests and dispersal efforts. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility of protesters targeting aid convoys and trucks with direct action, such as stone-throwing and vandalism. As such, NGO personnel, particularly vehicle drivers, and border crossing personnel will face moderately elevated bystander risks while crossing into and out of Gaza, though protest activity will likely subside in the event that successful ceasefire negotiations secure hostage releases.

Over the coming days, the US is highly likely to conduct airstrikes on locations linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria and Iraq, driving regional tensions and significantly elevating bystander risks. The US’ response to the attack on the Tower 22 base in Jordan will likely involve multiple air and missile strikes on locations associated with Iranian proxies throughout the region, including the Popular Mobilisation Front (PMF) and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). Targets will likely include bases, infrastructure and weapons depots in Iraq and Syria, particularly those jointly operated by the IRGC. We continue to assess however, that direct US strikes on Iran remain highly unlikely. Strikes on IRGC-linked targets in Iraq and Syria will likely be more intense than previous campaigns to signal US resolve and to degrade armed groups’ capacity by damaging key militant infrastructure. Nevertheless, given proxies’ reliance on cheap and easily replaced weaponry (such as Shahed drones) and reports of substantial militant evacuations from positions in Iraq and Syria over the past few days, the US’s response is unlikely to significantly diminish militant capacity in the long term.

Despite Katib Hizballah announcing that it will cease targeting US installations, this is highly unlikely to deter a US response from targeting IRI locations. As such, individuals and assets in close proximity to locations and/or relying on infrastructure associated with IRI activity in Iraq will continue to face significantly elevated physical security and bystander risks over the coming days. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that the KH announcement is designed to set conditions to frame US attacks as unprovoked. Doing so would allow KH to claim that further attacks on US military installations are legitimate, increasing the likelihood of further attempted missile and drone strikes on US installations in the long term. Amid the background of the Iraqi government’s condemnation of any attacks in its territory, continued clashes would likely sustain the tension between the US and the Iraqi government, amid ongoing discussions on the status and potential drawdown of US forces based in Iraq.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

Jan. 30.

KEY POINTS

  • Israeli security forces assassinated three suspected militants in a hospital in the West Bank on 30 January, claiming they were planning an imminent high-casualty attack. The operation highlights efforts by Israeli security forces to thwart militant activity amid elevated tensions in the West Bank and militant efforts to conduct attacks in Israel and/or the West Bank.
  • On 30 January, Hamas confirmed it was reviewing Israel’s proposed ceasefire agreement. There is a realistic possibility of Israel and Hamas reaching an agreed framework over the coming week, increasing the likelihood of a temporary ceasefire within the coming two to three weeks.
  • Gaza: Over the past 48 hours the IDF has conducted multiple short-term raids in northern Gaza, reflecting the operational shift to the third phase of war. Early on 29 January, IDF personnel of Brigade 5 from Division 162 (which generally operates in the West Bank), and personnel from the Nahal Brigade and the 401st Armoured Brigade raided al-Shati camp in northern Gaza. The operation lasted three hours with IDF personnel reached the al-Shifa hospital and engaging in armed clashes with Palestinian militants. Compared to previous operations in northern Gaza, this raid more closely resembles IDF operations in the West Bank, particularly in hotspots such as Jenin (Jenin governorate). As the war continues, there is a realistic possibility of IDF operations shifting towards more targeted and shorter-term raids. However, the scale and intensity of operations will likely remain dependent on the extent to which Palestinian militants re-enter northern Gaza and re-build their combat and governance capacities.
  • Israel-Gaza: Gaza-based militants launched a rocket barrage towards central Israel on 29 January, reflecting sustained security risk across Israel. The barrage was launched from southern Khan Yunis and consisted of at least 12 rockets, triggering sirens in central Israel, including in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). While no injuries or deaths have been reported, in Rishon LeZion (Central district) shrapnel damaged two cars, underscoring persistent physical security and bystander risks throughout central and southern Israel.
  • West Bank: On early 30 January, Israeli security forces assassinated three suspected militants inside the Ibn Sina Specialized Hospital in Jenin (Jenin governorate). According to CCTV footage, undercover forces dressed as civilians raided the hospital, killing Muhammad Jalamneh and two other suspected militants during the 10-minute operation. Israeli security officials have stated that Jalamneh was a Hamas operative in contact with the organisation’s overseas leadership and was planning an imminent terror attack imitating the 7 October attacks. Jalamneh was reportedly using the hospital as a hideout and was not a patient. The operation reflects the elevated tensions in the West Bank and persistent militant efforts to execute high-casualty attacks against civilians and Israeli security forces in both the West Bank and Israel.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border clashes continue on trend between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • On 30 January, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh confirmed that Hamas had received and would review the Israeli ceasefire agreement proposed on 29 January. The proposed deal likely outlines a staggered release of hostages from Gaza, beginning with young, elderly and female hostages. In return, Israel is likely to offer a multi-week ceasefire and the release of Palestinian prisoners. Additionally, on 30 January, Israel reportedly handed over to Hamas an unspecified number of bodies of Palestinians killed during IDF operations in Gaza. There is a realistic possibility that this move is part of trust-building measures aimed to facilitate progress in ceasefire negotiations, towards a preliminary agreement.
  • On 30 January, the Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir threatened to withdraw his Otzma Yehudit party from the government coalition if the Israel-Hamas deal will include a prolonged ceasefire and the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners. In response, opposition leader Yair Lapid stated that his Yesh Atid party is ready to temporarily join the coalition government instead of Otzma Yehudit to ensure the implementation of a hostage release deal. While these statements reflect high tensions within the government, they are unlikely to significantly impact government stability, ongoing negotiations or IDF operations.
  • Aid deliveries through the Kerem Shalom border crossing have resumed, though protest activity at the Nitzana crossing continues to restrict humanitarian access to Gaza. On 29 January, the IDF designated the Kerem Shalom crossing as a closed military zone, enabling personnel to disperse Israeli protesters who have blocked the crossing since 24 January; at least four protesters have been arrested at the time of writing. In response, protesters moved on 30 January to attempt blocking the Nitzana crossing between Israel and Egypt, where aid is screened before passing into Gaza via Kerem Shalom. Continued protest activity around border crossings highlights the vulnerability of aid supply chains to bottlenecks and persistent risks of disruption to deliveries amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Gaza.

FORECAST

Over the coming week, there is a realistic possibility of Israel and Hamas agreeing on a negotiation framework for a temporary ceasefire agreement. Israel has previously sought agreements to release all hostages and Hamas has rejected proposals that do not establish a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. The proposal likely outlines a temporary ceasefire in exchange for release of a certain number of hostages, reflecting more flexible negotiating stances from both parties. As negotiations continue, there is a realistic possibility of Israel and Hamas agreeing to incremental trust-building measures in the coming weeks. Such measures are likely to include increasing the volume of humanitarian aid delivered to Gaza, providing the Red Cross with access to hostages and/or releasing critically ill or elderly individual hostages. While major sticking points remain, reaching a framework for negotiations in the coming week will increase the likelihood of reaching a formal agreement within the coming three weeks. There is a realistic possibility that the deal will include two phases, with the first phase providing a fixed-term ceasefire and the release of a set number of hostages, with the second phase providing a ceasefire extension dependent on a further hostage release. If an agreement is reached, its implementation will likely coincide with the upcoming religious holidays of Ramadan (10 March – 9 April) and/or Passover (22 April – 30 April), moderating risks of clashes within Gaza and rocket launches by Gaza-based militants during these times. A ceasefire agreement would also likely moderate tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border as well as in the Red Sea, though any de-escalation in clashes would be highly vulnerable to spoiler violence, sustaining risks within these areas.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

29 Jan.

KEY POINTS

  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), a network of Iranian-aligned armed groups, killed three US service people and injured 34 others in a drone strike on a US base in Jordan, increasing the likelihood of retaliatory airstrikes on militant positions in Iraq and Syria.
  • At least 13 donor states have suspended funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) amid allegations of staff involvement in the 7 October attacks, elevating risks of humanitarian conditions significantly deteriorating over the coming weeks.
  • Gaza: IDF personnel clashed with militants in Al-Shati and Jabalia in northern Gaza, indicating militants have returned to these areas following a reduction in the local IDF presence. This trend is corroborated by a slight recorded increase in rocket fire targeting IDF personnel, emanating from locations previously occupied by the IDF in northern Gaza.
  • West Bank: IDF operations in the West Bank remain consistent with previously observed trends and over the weekend largely focused on the Northern West Bank, particularly Jenin. On 29 January, a Palestinian individual attempted to stab IDF personnel at a checkpoint near the Arab town of Tekoa (Bethlehem governorate) and was fatally shot. A recent uptick in lone perpetrator stabbing attempts targeting IDF positions in the West Bank reflects elevated tensions in the area. These will sustain heightened security and bystander risks, particularly near Israeli security positions such as checkpoints.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Throughout the weekend, there was a moderate uptick in tit-for-tat hostilities between the IDF and Hizballah in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. On 26 January, Hizballah confirmed the death of four of its members due to an IDF strike. Additionally, on the same day, the organisation claimed it targeted an IDF base near Hermon mountain, using Falaq 1 rockets, with a maximum range of 6.2 miles (10km). The uptick in attacks as well as the increasing use of sophisticated weapons (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 26 January 2024) reflect rising tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border and the resultant elevation in localised security risks.
  • Israel: A sole perpetrator seriously injured an IDF soldier after a car-ramming attack near the IDF Navy base in Haifa on 29 January. After crashing their car into the wall of the base, the perpetrator ran to the base gate armed with an axe and was subsequently fatally shot. The attack reflects elevated security and bystander risks around IDF positions throughout Israel, including within major cities.
  • Syria-Jordan-US: On 28 January, the Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) struck Tower-22, a US military base in Jordan (Mafraq governorate), killing three and injuring at least 34 US servicemen. Additionally, the IRI targeted two US bases in Syria – Al Tanf (Homs governorate) and Al Shaddadi (Hasakah governorate). The attacks reflect the IRI’s increasing co-ordination and determination to strike US forces in the region, reflecting elevated security risks around US bases.
  • Syria: Alleged Israeli strike in Sayyidah Zaynab (Rif Dimashq governorate) on 29 January, killed at least five individuals, injuring an unspecified number of others. According to initial reports, the strike targeted locations used by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hizballah, though it is unclear whether the strike killed any IRGC or Hizballah members. The strike reflects elevated security and bystander risks in Syria, in connection with increasing Israeli scrutiny of Iranian efforts to supply weapons to militants in Lebanon and the West Bank.
  • Yemen: The Iran-backed Houthis attacked a UK-linked oil tanker on 26 January, setting it on fire. The Marshall Islands-flagged Marlin Luanda was hit near the Gulf of Aden, it received assistance from French, Indian and US naval ships which extinguished the fire and defended the ship from additional attacks; no casualties were reported. Additionally, the UK confirmed that its HMS Diamond repelled a Houthi drone attack in the Red Sea on 27 January. The attacks further confirm the expansion of Houthi targeting to UK and US-linked commercial vessels following the issuing of the Houthi threat, reflecting elevated risks in the region and the ongoing gradual escalation of the conflict.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Numerous states have frozen financial contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA), exacerbating humanitarian concerns in Gaza. Amid allegations of UNWRA staff being involved in the 7 October attacks, countries including France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US have suspended funding for the agency, which constituted ~70% of UNWRA’s 2022 budget. As UNWRA operates without strategic financial reserves, it will almost certainly have to begin limiting operations in Gaza over the coming days, with a UNWRA spokesperson stating the agency would be non-operational by the end of February if funding does not resume promptly. UNWRA is the largest humanitarian operation in Gaza, distributing food, water and shelter as well as providing basic health and educational services. Amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions, disruption to humanitarian aid distribution will almost certainly exacerbate critical food, water and energy insecurity, driving risks of unrest.
  • Elevated protest activity continued in Israel over the weekend, with protesters calling for immediate hostage releases. On 27 January, anti-government demonstrations took place in several cities throughout Israel including Beersheba, Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv with participants calling for immediate hostage releases and, in some cases, a general election. Mounted police dispersed demonstrators in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, resulting in mild physical altercations and several arrests. Protest activity is highly likely to continue over the coming weeks, increasing pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases during ongoing ceasefire negotiations with Hamas.
  • Repeated calls from extremist Israeli settler organisations to expand settlement efforts in the West Bank and into Gaza highlight rising ethno-religious tensions, driving regional and domestic tensions. On 28 January, far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich attended a convention in Jerusalem calling for the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the re-establishment of settlements in Gaza, which were evacuated by the IDF during the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. Amid elevated settler activity, two children were filmed crawling under the Israel-Gaza border and attempting to plant an Israeli flag in the adjacent buffer zone during an illegal gathering in the Mefalsim (Southern district) area on 25 January. Statements regarding the expansion of settlements into Gaza are highly contentious and will likely further exacerbate domestic tensions within Israel and the unity government, while attracting international condemnation, particularly from neighbouring states.
  • Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas continue in Paris (France), with attempts to break the negotiation deadlock focusing on staggering hostage releases. Reports indicate that Israel has asked Egyptian and Qatari mediators to relay a proposed agreement to Hamas which focuses exclusively on securing the release of elderly, ill and non-combatant hostages in exchange for a temporary pause in IDF operations. The US has also reportedly drafted a two-month ceasefire agreement, which would include staggered hostage releases, reflecting continued efforts to break the deadlock over Hamas’ conditioning of hostage releases on the adoption of a permanent ceasefire and Israel’s rejection of proposals that would see IDF troops withdraw from Gaza operations.

FORECAST

The US response to the IRI attack in Jordan is likely to target Iranian proxies and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) locations in the region, elevating security risks and regional tensions in the coming weeks. US domestic pressure to retaliate directly against Iran will elevate risks of US strikes on locations associated with the IRGC throughout the region, though the likelihood of direct US strikes in Iranian territory remains low. Strikes will likely primarily target IRGC-linked locations in Iraq and Syria, and there is also a realistic possibility of further strikes against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. Nevertheless, retaliatory strikes will drive regional tensions and likely increase risks of regional escalation in the coming weeks, elevating security and bystander risks for individuals and assets in proximity to both US military positions and Iranian-affiliated locations. There is also a realistic possibility that escalating clashes will increase domestic pressure on the Iraqi government to accelerate discussions on the status and potential drawdown of US forces based in Iraq.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

Turkey: IS attack will highly likely prompt heightened security posture in Istanbul, major cities. On 28 January, two Islamic State (IS) gunmen opened fire inside Santa Maria catholic church in the Sariyer district, Istanbul (Marmara region), killing one person. It is highly likely that the security forces will augment their security posture around major churches and tourist attractions in Istanbul in the coming weeks. More checkpoints on major roads and highways in and around the city will likely be set up, elevating mobility disruption through the coming days. An uptick in arbitrary stop-and-search operations in Istanbul’s downtown areas is also likely. A similar heightened security posture will likely also be implemented in the capital Ankara and Izmir (Aegean region). (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Feb 24.  Yemen’s Houthis vow response after US, British strikes.

  • Summary
  • Houthis vow response after latest U.S., British attacks
  • Strikes came a day after U.S. retaliation in Iraq, Syria
  • Iran not interested in direct confrontation – analyst
  • Baghdad funeral march held for 17 killed in U.S. strikes
  • Oman has ‘grave concern’ over ‘continuous escalation’

The United States and Britain launched strikes against 36 Houthi targets in Yemen, in the second day of major U.S. operations against Iran-linked groups following a deadly attack on American troops last weekend.

The strikes late on Saturday hit buried weapons storage facilities, missile systems, launchers and other capabilities the Houthis have used to attack Red Sea shipping, the Pentagon said, adding it targeted 13 locations across the country.

They are the latest blows in a conflict that has spread into the Middle East since Oct. 7, when the Palestinian militant group Hamas stormed Israel from the Gaza Strip, igniting a war that has drawn Tehran-backed groups into attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets on several fronts.

The Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea said the strikes “will not pass without a response and consequences.”

“The building I live in shook,” said Fatimah, a resident of Houthi-controlled Sanaa, adding that it had been years since she had felt such blasts in a country that has suffered years of war.

The Houthis did not announce any casualties.

The Yemen strikes are running parallel to an unfolding U.S. campaign of retaliation over the killing of three American soldiers in a drone strike by Iran-backed militants on an outpost in Jordan a week ago.

On Friday, the U.S. carried out the first wave of that retaliation, striking in Iraq and Syria more than 85 targets linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and militias it backs, reportedly killing nearly 40.

The violence has added to concerns of the potential for further escalation. Iran, a supporter of Hamas, has so far avoided any direct role in the conflict, even as groups it backs have entered the fray from Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon.

Mahjoob Zweiri, Director of the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, did not expect a change in Iran’s approach even after the latest U.S. strikes.

“They keep the enemy behind the borders, far away. They are not interested in any direct military confrontation which might lead to attacks on their cities or their homeland. They will maintain that status quo,” he told Reuters.

Iran’s foreign ministry said the latest attacks on Yemen were “a flagrant violation of international law by the United States and Britain”, warning the continuation of such attacks was a “worrying threat to international peace and security”.

The Pentagon has said it does not want war with Iran and does not believe Tehran wants war either. U.S. Republicans have been putting pressure on President Joe Biden, a Democrat, to deal a blow to Iran directly.

HOUTHIS SAY WON’T BE DETERRED

The Houthis, who control swathes of Yemen, say their attacks are in solidarity with Palestinians as Israel strikes Gaza. The U.S. and its allies characterize them as indiscriminate and a menace to global trade.

Major shipping lines have largely abandoned Red Sea shipping lanes for longer routes around Africa. This has increased costs, feeding worries about global inflation while denying Egypt crucial foreign revenue from use of the Suez Canal.

The U.S. has carried out more than a dozen strikes against Houthi targets in the past several weeks.

Sarea, the Houthi spokesperson, suggested in a statement on social media that the group would press on.

“These attacks will not deter us from our ethical, religious and humanitarian stance in support of the resilient Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip,” Sarea said.

Just hours before the latest major wave of strikes from the sea and air, the U.S. military’s Central Command detailed other, more limited strikes in the past day that included hitting six cruise missiles the Houthis were preparing to launch against ships in the Red Sea.

Around 4 a.m. in Yemen (0100 GMT) on Sunday, the U.S. military also struck a Houthi anti-ship cruise missile poised to launch.

BAGHDAD FUNERAL

British Defence Minister Grant Shapps said this was “not an escalation”. “We have already successfully targeted launchers and storage sites involved in Houthi attacks, and I am confident that our latest strikes have further degraded the Houthis’ capabilities,” he said.

The U.S. strikes in Iraq were the deadliest in years.

Hundreds of people attended a Baghdad funeral procession for 17 members of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) killed in the strikes. The PMF is a state security force containing several Iran-backed armed groups.

Hadi al-Ameri, a senior Iraqi politician close to Iran, said it was time to oust U.S. forces, 2,500 of whom are in Iraq in a mission to help prevent a resurgence of Islamic State. “Their presence is pure evil for the Iraqi people,” he said.

Iraq and the United States last month initiated talks about ending the U.S.-led coalition’s presence in the country.

Oman Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad bin Hamoud Al-Busaidi said that “Oman has grave concerns over the continuous escalation in the region.”

In a statement, he criticized the effectiveness of retaliatory U.S. attacks in Iraq and Syria, noting that “such actions compromise the region’s safety, stability, and efforts to tackle challenges like violence and extremism.”

(Source: Reuters)

 

03 Feb 24. Joint Statement from Australia, Bahrain, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States on Additional Strikes Against the Houthis in Yemen.

U.S., U.K. Launch Strikes Against Houthi Targets in Yemen to Protect Red Sea Shipping.

U.S. and British forces launched a series of proportionate strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen in response to continuing attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

“These strikes are intended to further disrupt and degrade the capabilities of the Iranian-backed Houthi militia to conduct their reckless and destabilizing attacks against U.S. and international vessels lawfully transiting the Red Sea,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said in a statement released by the Pentagon.

While U.S. and U.K. aircraft hit the targets, they were supported by an international coalition. Australia, Bahrain, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and United States issued a joint statement announcing the strikes.

The international group struck 36 Houthi targets across 13 locations in Yemen in response to the Houthis’ attacks against international and commercial shipping, as well as naval vessels transiting the Red Sea. “These precision strikes are intended to disrupt and degrade the capabilities that the Houthis use to threaten global trade and the lives of innocent mariners,” the communique said.

The strikes targeted sites associated with the Houthis’ deeply buried weapons storage facilities, missile systems and launchers, air defense systems and radars, officials said.

The Houthis have launched more than 30 attacks on commercial vessels and naval vessels since mid-November. These actions constitute an international challenge, and the coalition that is protecting the sea lines of communication through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden continues to grow.

“Our aim remains to de-escalate tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea, but let us reiterate our warning to Houthi leadership: We will not hesitate to continue to defend lives and the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways in the face of continued threats,” the coalition members said in a statement.

The Houthis continue to threaten vessels in the Red Sea. Officials at U.S. Central Command noted that aircraft conducted a strike in self-defense against a Houthi, anti-ship cruise missile that was prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea.

“U.S. forces identified the cruise missile in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and determined it presented an imminent threat to U.S. Navy ships and merchant vessels in the region,” the Centcom release said. “This action will protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for U.S. Navy vessels and merchant vessels.”

In addition, the destroyer USS Carney engaged and shot down one unmanned aerial vehicle over the Gulf of Aden on Friday, Centcom officials said. Later that day, U.S. Central Command forces struck four Houthi UAVs that were prepared to launch.

Later, the destroyer USS Laboon and F/A-18 Super Hornets from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group engaged and shot down seven UAVs over the Red Sea.

The Houthis receive equipment, training, intelligence and money from Iran.

All these strikes seek to degrade Houthi capabilities “used to continue their reckless and unlawful attacks on U.S. and U.K. ships, as well as international commercial shipping in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden,” Centcom officials said.

04 Feb 24. Today, at the direction of their respective governments, the militaries of the United States and United Kingdom, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand conducted an additional round of proportionate and necessary strikes against 36 Houthi targets across 13 locations in Yemen in response to the Houthis’ continued attacks against international and commercial shipping as well as naval vessels transiting the Red Sea.

These precision strikes are intended to disrupt and degrade the capabilities that the Houthis use to threaten global trade, and the lives of innocent mariners, and are in response to a series of illegal, dangerous, and destabilizing Houthi actions since previous coalition strikes on January 11 and 22, 2024, including the January 27 attack which struck and set ablaze the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker M/V Marlin Luanda.

Today’s strike specifically targeted sites associated with the Houthis’ deeply buried weapons storage facilities, missile systems and launchers, air defense systems, and radars.

The Houthis’ now more than 30 attacks on commercial vessels and naval vessels since mid-November constitute an international challenge. Recognizing the broad consensus of the international community, our coalition of likeminded countries committed to upholding the rules-based order has continued to grow. We remain committed to protecting freedom of navigation and international commerce and holding the Houthis accountable for their illegal and unjustifiable attacks on commercial shipping and naval vessels.

Our aim remains to de-escalate tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea but let us reiterate our warning to Houthi leadership: we will not hesitate to continue to defend lives and the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways in the face of continued threats.

Statement on Air Strikes against Houthi military targets in Yemen: 3 February 2024.

On 3 February, Royal Air Force Typhoon FGR4s, supported by Voyager tankers, joined US forces in further deliberate strikes against Houthi locations in Yemen involved in their campaign targeting shipping in the Bab al Mandab and southern Red Sea.

The Typhoons employed Paveway IV precision guided bombs against multiple military targets identified by careful intelligence analysis at three locations.

At As Salif, due west of Sanaa on the Red Sea coast, our aircraft targeted a ground control station inside a defensive position. This station had been used to control Houthi drones, both attack and reconnaissance types, launched from further inland, operating over the sea against international shipping.

A second drone ground control station was confirmed to be at Al Munirah, on the same stretch of coastline. As with As Salif, the station provided direct control of reconnaissance and attack drones targeting shipping in the Red Sea, its position on the coast allowing it to maintain the line of sight data links such weapons require to target ships with any accuracy.

The Typhoons also attacked a significant number of targets at Bani. An initial group of facilities there were successfully struck by the RAF on the night of 11 January, and since then a further set of buildings at the site had been positively confirmed as involved in the Houthi drone and missile operations and were duly targeted on this occasion.

As is standard practice with such operations by the Royal Air Force, the strikes were very carefully planned to ensure minimal risk of civilian casualties, and by bombing at night, any such risks were further mitigated. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/US DoD)

 

02 Feb 24. U.S. Strikes Targets in Iraq and Syria in Response to Deadly Drone Attack. U.S. forces conducted a series of strikes today against Iran-backed militant groups in Iraq and Syria in response to last weekend’s attack in Jordan that killed three U.S. soldiers.

The strikes, which were carried out by U.S. Central Command forces, included more than 85 targets across seven facilities used by groups affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force.

Those targets included command and control centers, intelligence facilities and weapons storage facilities used by the Iran-backed militias to attack U.S. and coalition forces.

President Joe Biden said in a statement that the strikes were the first in a series of actions by the U.S. in response to the attack in Jordan.

“Our response began today,” he said.  “It will continue at times and places of our choosing.”

“The United States does not seek conflict in the Middle East or anywhere else in the world,” he said. “But let all those who might seek to do us harm know this: If you harm an American, we will respond.”

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III echoed the president’s resolve to hold the Iran-backed groups accountable.

“This is the start of our response,” Austin said.

“The president has directed additional actions to hold the IRGC and affiliated militias accountable for their attacks on U.S. and coalition forces,” he said. “These will unfold at times and places of our choosing.”

He added that, while the U.S. does not seek conflict in the region, “the president and I will not tolerate attacks on American forces.”

Today’s strikes were announced just hours after Biden and Austin attended the dignified transfer in Dover, Delaware, of the remains of the three soldiers killed in last weekend’s attack — Army Sgts. William J. Rivers, Kennedy L. Sanders and Breonna A. Moffett.

National security officials said the facilities targeted in today’s strikes were carefully selected to avoid civilian casualties and were based on clear evidence that they were connected to attacks on U.S. personnel.

“The Department of Defense is in the early stages of battle damage assessment, but we believe that the strikes were successful,” said John Kirby, National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, during a briefing following the strikes.

Army Lt. Gen. Douglas A. Sims II, director of operations for the Joint Staff, said today’s strikes employed multiple aircraft, including B-1 Lancers that flew from bases in the U.S.

“This has been in the planning since we were asked to look at it,” Sims said, adding that weather played a factor in the timing of the strikes.

“Good weather presented itself today and, as a result, this took place,” he said.

Kirby said the president was kept informed throughout the afternoon.

“As President Biden has made clear, we will not hesitate to defend our people and hold responsible all those who harm Americans at a time and place of our choosing,” Kirby said. “That began tonight—but it will not end tonight.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

03 Feb 24. U.S. Retaliates With B-1B Bombers and A-10C Warthogs, Striking 85 Targets in Iraq and Syria.

The United States has initiated a series of airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria, following the tragic loss of 3 Army Reserves personnel at a US base in Jordan known as Tower 22. The airstrikes were conducted at 4PM EST, February 2nd, and involved US B-1B “Lancer” Heavy Bombers, A-10C Thunderbolt II “Warthogs,” and other fighter aircraft under the command of CENTCOM.

In a statement released on X, (Formerly Twitter) CENTCOM announced that they have successfully targeted both Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Iranian-linked militia groups in Syria and Iraq. CENTCOM also stated that the US struck over 85 targets, utilizing over 125 precise munitions, hitting facilities such a command and control operations centers, intelligence centers, rockets, and missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicle storages, and logistics and munition supply chain facilities.

In a statement, Secretary of Defense Loyd Austin stated “This is the start of our response,” while President Joe Biden shared a similar sentiment, “It will continue at times and places of our choosing.” Previous reports and comments from US officials indicated that the US was preparing for an intensive campaign, possibly lasting multiple weeks.

18:31 EST: U.S. officials stated they were awaiting favorable weather conditions to strike Iran-backed militia targets in Iraq and Syria, “This was designed around the weather, when we had our best opportunity,” explained Lt. Gen. Douglas A. Sims II – NBC

17:55 EST: The spokesperson for the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces stated that city of Al-Qa’im, and other areas along the Syria – Iraq border “are being subjected to air strikes by United States aircraft.”

16:57 EST: There are reports that the Headquarters and Operations Base used by the 13th Brigade of the Iranian-Backed, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has been completely destroyed in Western Iraq by US Airstrikes.

(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

02 Feb 24.  Houthis say they fired ballistic missiles at Israel’s Eilat. Yemen’s Iran-allied Houthi movement said on Friday it fired ballistic missiles at targets in the Israeli city of Eilat and threatened to keep up military operations until Israel ended its offensive in Gaza.

The Israeli military earlier said its “Arrow” aerial defence system had intercepted a surface-to-surface missile in the Red Sea area on Friday.

Houthis have launched a series of attacks on shipping and other targets in the Red Sea area in what they describe as acts of solidarity with the Palestinians – stoking fears that the Israel-Hamas war could spread to destabilize the wider Middle East.

“The Yemeni armed forces will not hesitate to carry out further military operations against the Zionist enemy on land and at sea until the cessation of aggression and lifting of the blockade on the Gaza Strip,” the Houthis’ military spokesperson said.

(Source: Reuters)

 

02 Feb 24. Israel turns focus of Gaza attack to Rafah as Hamas weighs ceasefire proposal.

  • Summary
  • LATEST DEVELOPMENTS:
  • Israeli defence minister vows to move on to Rafah and ‘eliminate terror elements’ there
  • Diplomats await Hamas response to ceasefire proposal that could see 40-day pause in fighting and hostage releases

Israel prepared to advance its war on Gaza farther south, close to the Egyptian border, after claiming to have dismantled Hamas in Khan Younis, as diplomatic efforts in pursuit of a ceasefire accelerated.

Defence Minister Yoav Gallant said on Thursday that success in the fight against the Palestinian militants in the southern Gaza city of Khan Younis, where Israel launched a major ground attack last week, meant its forces could advance to Rafah on the enclave’s southern border.

More than half of Gaza’s 2.3m people are sheltering in this area, mainly cold and hungry in makeshift tents and public buildings.

“We are achieving our missions in Khan Younis, and we will also reach Rafah and eliminate terror elements that threaten us,” Gallant said in a statement.

At the same time, Qatari and Egyptian mediators hoped for a positive response from Hamas, which runs Gaza, to the first concrete proposal for an extended halt to fighting, agreed with Israel and the U.S. at talks in Paris last week.

A Palestinian official close to the negotiations told Reuters the text envisages a first phase of 40 days, during which fighting would cease while Hamas freed remaining civilians among the more than 100 hostages it still holds. Further phases would see the handover of Israeli soldiers and bodies of dead hostages.

Such a long pause would be a first since Oct. 7, when Hamas fighters attacked Israel, killing 1,200 people and capturing 253 hostages, precipitating an Israeli offensive that has laid waste to much of Gaza.

Health officials in the enclave said on Thursday the confirmed Palestinian death toll had risen above 27,000, with thousands more dead still lying under the rubble.

NO RESPONSE FROM HAMAS YET TO PROPOSAL

A Palestinian official said Hamas was unlikely to reject the proposal outright, but would demand guarantees that fighting would not resume, something Israel has not agreed to.

There was brief elation in Gaza on Thursday after remarks by a Qatari spokesman at Johns Hopkins University in Washington sparked ceasefire hopes – and a drop in the price of crude oil.

But Qatari officials in the capital Doha and Taher Al-Nono, media adviser to Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh, said the group had not responded yet.

Gaza residents said Israeli forces pounded areas around hospitals in Khan Younis, and stepped up attacks close to Rafah. Combat has also surged in recent days in northern areas around Gaza City that Israel claimed to have subdued weeks ago.

Osama Ahmed, 49, a father of five from Gaza City now sheltering in western Khan Younis, said there had been fierce resistance in the city, and relentless bombardment from air, ground and sea as Israeli tanks advanced.

“All we want is a ceasefire now,” he told Reuters by phone.

An air strike on a house in Khan Younis wounded 13 people on Thursday, according to hospital officials.

Appeals to Israel from its main ally, the United States, show little sign of having succeeded in easing the plight of Gaza’s civilians.

Washington is stepping up indirect pressure, however.

U.S. President Joe Biden issued an executive order that aims to punish Jewish settlers who attack Palestinians in the occupied West Bank in an surge of violence triggered by the war in Gaza.

Biden is also under pressure to respond to the killing of three U.S. soldiers by a drone in Jordan last week, the first U.S. deaths in an escalation of violence across the Middle East since Israel’s war in Gaza began in October.

The United States, which has said it does not want to ignite a wider war, believes the drone, which also wounded more than 40 people, was made by Iran, four U.S. officials told Reuters.

CBS News reported on Thursday that targets for U.S. strikes in Iraq and Syria in response to the killings include “Iranian personnel and facilities”, citing American officials.

The U.S. is continuing its strikes with allies against the Iran-aligned Houthi movement in Yemen, which has attacked shipping in the Red Sea in what it says is solidarity with Gaza.

The U.S. military said it had hit up to 10 drones in Yemen being prepared for launch, while a U.S. Navy ship downed three Iranian-made drones and a Houthi anti-ship missile. (Source: Reuters)

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