NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 26.

KEY POINTS

* The ICJ did not issue a cease and desist order in its interim ruling on 26 January, however, the ruling is still likely to complicate IDF operations in Gaza and elevate worldwide domestic unrest, including the risk of targeted attacks around International Holocaust Day on 27 January.

* Heavy rain and winter conditions in Israel throughout the weekend will elevate risks of misidentification, incursions, siren malfunctions and unintended missile trajectory in northern Israel, elevating security and bystander risks.

MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

* Gaza: IDF operations have continued throughout the Gaza Strip, focusing on Khan Yunis. On 25 January, a situation assessment was conducted in Gaza between the IDF chief of staff and senior IDF commanders, likely in preparation for the ICJ’s interim ruling. This assessment possibly indicates that the IDF is considering a small scale de-escalation of operations in Gaza. However, overnight there was an uptick in air strikes throughout Gaza as well as strikes by the Israel Navy, focusing on coastal areas in central and northern Gaza.

* West Bank: IDF operations continue in line with recently observed trends, focusing on the northern West Bank, with armed clashes with militants recorded in Jenin.

* Israel-Lebanon: Tit-for-tat border hostilities continue, with the IDF conducting further strikes in southern Lebanon, against a relative reduction in the activity of Lebanese-based militants. However, of a note, Hizballah claimed a missile successfully hit an IDF radar outpost near Rosh HaNikra. Hizballah posted a video from the missile camera, documenting the hit, confirming it possesses and can use highly precise projectiles. Furthermore, the footage from the camera showed another radar at the base had been hit in a previous attack, though the lack of a visible smoke trail suggests there may have been a long period between strikes. This increases doubt over IDF claims that the footage is old, but does not necessarily refute it.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* On 26 January, the ICJ issued provisional measures calling on Israel to prevent ‘acts of genocide’ in Gaza. This is consistent with our previous assessment that the ICJ would likely call for preventative measures, but stop short of ordering a cessation of military operations in Gaza (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 25 January 2024). The court also ruled that some acts alleged by South Africa in their case against Israel ‘appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the [genocide] convention’. While this ruling does not indicate that the ICJ has ruled in favour of South Africa’s claims of genocide in Gaza, widespread reporting and speculation to this effect will almost certainly drive protest action worldwide over the coming days.

* On 26 January, the US announced it would temporarily suspend funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA), significantly elevating humanitarian concerns in Gaza. The US announcement comes after the UN announced it would launch an inquiry into allegations that 12 UNWRA staff were involved in the 7 October attacks in Israel. The US is UNWRA’s largest donor and contributed approximately 26% of its programme budget in 2022. The suspension of US funding for UNWRA is highly likely to limit its operational capacity in Gaza, where it co-ordinates the delivery of aid and distributes food, water and shelter amid critical humanitarian conditions. Also on 26 January, Israeli protesters blocked the Kerem Shalom goods crossing for the third consecutive day, preventing the delivery of aid into Gaza, as humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate.

* On 25 January, the US and UK announced additional sanctions targeting several key Houthi figures, moderately elevating risks of sanction exposure for NGOs operating in Yemen. The sanctions, which target four high-ranking individuals in the Houthi’s military leadership, come after the Houthis ordered all US and UK nationals working for the UN to leave Yemen by 24 February (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 24 January 2024). While the sanctions are unlikely to significantly elevate compliance risks for firms with operations in the region, the additional sanctions of Houthi leaders highlight continued risks of sanctions exposure for humanitarian organisations with operations in the region. Amid significantly elevated tensions, there is a realistic possibility of the Houthis issuing further expulsion orders for US and UK nationals working in Houthi-controlled territory, which encompasses the capital Sanaa. There is also a realistic possibility of the Houthis suspending co-operation with humanitarian organisations employing US and UK nationals and/or those linked to the US or UK, elevating risks of disruption to aid distribution within Yemen, where the humanitarian situation remains critical.

*Yemen-Iran-China: Pressure on Iran to halt Houthi attacks unlikely to reduce pace of maritime incidents in short term. Media reports emerged on 26 January that China has recently asked Iran to intervene to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, stating any attack on Chinese vessels or China’s regional interests would negatively impact its trading relationship with Iran. As the Houthis have already pledged not to attack Chinese or Russian vessels, it is unlikely this warning will prompt them to reduce attacks on other targets. However, the complexity of maritime ownership structures renders these promises difficult to implement, sustaining the risk of possible attacks targeting Chinese ships. Additionally, the relationship between China and Iran is likely to be tested as the Red Sea crisis is impacting supply chains relevant to China and Chinese industrial projects in the Suez Canal Zone. To counteract the risk of aggravating China, the Houthis will likely primarily rely on diplomatic outreach in the short term, possibly seeking Russia’s mediation during their current visit to Moscow.

Jan 25.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

* Interim ICJ ruling on 26 January is likely to elevate domestic unrest risks globally and is unlikely to force a cessation of IDF operations in Gaza.

* A Houthi attack on 24 January, successfully forced commercial vessels escorted by the US Navy to turn back in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, reflecting continued, effective, Houthi pressure in the Red Sea.

* Gaza: On 24 January, a UNRWA facility in Khan Yunis housing displaced Gazan civilians was reportedly hit by IDF shelling, causing an unspecified number of casualties. In response to the report, and a rare US condemnation, the IDF issued a statement claiming that an initial investigation had ruled out that its forces struck the facility. However, the IDF has previously indicated they are operating close to civilian population centres and that Gazan militants continue operating from within UN-designated safe zones. These considerations increase the risk of target misidentification in Gaza and security risks for NGO staff operating within designated safe zones. The incident itself is likely to further elevate international pressure and scrutiny of IDF activities in Khan Yunis, particularly in the context of the interim ICJ ruling on 26 January.

* West Bank: IDF operations throughout the West Bank have continued on trend, with an overnight operation in Jenin resulting in armed clashes.

* Israel-Lebanon: Hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border remain consistent with recently observed trends. Of particular note, early on 25 January, unidentified individuals in Lebanon reportedly gathered near the Israel-Lebanon border fence in proximity to Kibbutz Hanita (Northern district). Amid concerns of an attempted border infiltration, Israeli security personnel erected checkpoints and blocked public access to roads in the surrounding Western Galilee area. While no incursion subsequently occurred, this incident highlights persistently elevated tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border and elevated physical security risks therein. Over the past 24 hours, rocket fire and drone incursions linked to Lebanese Hizballah and allied militants have also continued targeting northern Israel at pace, while the IDF continued launching air and artillery strikes into southern Lebanon on-trend.

* Red Sea: On 24 January, the US Navy intercepted Houthi missiles targeting Maersk ships transiting the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The ships were operated by the Maersk US subsidiary, carrying US military supplies and accompanied by US Navy warships. According to a statement by Maersk following the incident, the attack forced the ships to turn back. Maersk also announced it is suspending Red Sea transits by its US subsidiary. The incident highlights the continued effectiveness of Houthi operations in successfully preventing transit through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* Protesters continue to block the Kerem Shalom goods crossing, preventing aid convoys from entering Gaza for a second day. Participants are calling for the immediate release of hostages from Gaza, aiming to increase pressure on Hamas and allied militant groups by restricting the flow of humanitarian aid. On 24 January, protesters blocked 51 of the 60 aid trucks slated to enter Gaza via the goods crossing, driving significant humanitarian concerns over the risk of prolonged disruption to aid deliveries amid critical food, water and energy insecurity in Gaza.

* On 25 January, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet with senior legal and government officials to prepare for the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) ruling on military operations in Gaza. On 26 January, the ICJ is set to respond to South Africa’s petition for the court to issue an emergency order for Israel to restrict and/or cease operations in Gaza. South Africa issued the submission to the court as part of its case against Israel at the ICJ, which argues that military operations in Gaza constitute genocide. Netanyahu’s meeting with senior officials underscores significant concerns relating to the case and tomorrow’s potential ruling, particularly given rising international diplomatic pressure for the IDF to limit operations in Gaza amid significant civilian casualties.

* Rates of antisemitic harassment and violence continue to rise in Western Europe, underscoring elevated risks of violence targeting Jewish individuals and assets. On 24 January, the Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions (CRIF) released figures indicating that since 7 October, the number of antisemitic acts reported in Frane has increased by over 700% compared to previous years. Also on 24 January, the UK-based PA News Agency released data obtained from London’s Metropolitan Police which showed that 679 antisemitic offences were reported from 7 October – 7 November, compared to 50 such offences reported in the same period in 2022. As the Israel-Hamas war continues to drive ethno-religious tensions worldwide, individuals associated with Israel and/or the Jewish community will continue to face elevated risks of verbal and physical harassment, as well as targeted violent crime. Similarly, Jewish religious institutions and community centres will face elevated risks of criminal damage and arson, underscoring elevated physical security and bystander risks, particularly in France and the UK.

FORECAST

On 26 January, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will likely issue provisional measures calling on Israel to restrict military operations in Gaza. The announcement will centre on South Africa’s submission to the court to issue provisional measures to (1) protect the rights of Palestinian civilians from harm and (2) to ensure that Israel does not engage in, and prevents, genocide in Gaza. The court will likely issue measures calling on Israel to prevent genocide in Gaza, increasing international pressure on Israel to moderate operations in Gaza, particularly as the IDF expands ground operations into densely populated civilian areas in southern Gaza. However, an order to prevent acts of genocide is unlikely to result in a substantial change to IDF operations. Regardless, it would likely trigger an uptick in protest activity and domestic unrest risks worldwide over the coming days, particularly in the Middle East and in major urban centres.

Nevertheless, there is also a realistic possibility of the court issuing a more strongly-worded ruling calling on Israel to ‘cease-and-desist’ acts of genocide and/or the incitement of genocide. By inferring that Israel is already committing genocide in Gaza, such a ruling would likely trigger a significant escalation in protest activity globally, with the Israeli government facing significant international pressure to halt operations in Gaza and/or withdraw IDF personnel from ground operations. Furthermore, a cease-and-desist ruling would significantly increase domestic pressure on US President Joe Biden (particularly ahead of the 2024 presidential election) to distance the US from Israel, likely straining diplomatic relations. Facing declining US diplomatic support and significantly elevated international pressure, there is a realistic possibility of Israel making greater concessions to Hamas during ongoing ceasefire negotiations, increasing the likelihood of a temporary agreement being reached over the coming weeks. Even so, while ICJ rulings are legally binding, these rarely include specific recommendations for parties to adopt to fulfil their international legal obligations and the court cannot enforce its orders. Consequently, regardless of the ruling’s content, IDF operations in Gaza will almost certainly continue over the coming days, with differing interpretations of the ruling sustaining elevated regional tensions.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points:

* A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel

* High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants

* Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities

* Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate

* An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants

* US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level

* Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon

* The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

*Iraq: Talks to reduce US military presence will likely protract; tit-for-tat hostilities will likely continue. On 24 January, the US Ambassador to Iraq officially agreed to initiate talks to end the US-led international military coalition in Iraq. The move comes amid elevated tensions and the gradual escalation of armed hostilities between US forces and Iran-backed militias in Iraq since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. In agreeing to talks, the US has dropped its previous precondition stipulating that Iran-backed militias stop attacking its forces; this likely reflects increased pressure from the Iraqi government. However, the process is likely to take several months during which the US and its international partners will likely maintain their presence and activities in Iraq. Further tit-for-tat hostilities between US forces and Iranian proxies in Iraq will likely continue throughout the negotiation process, driving bystander risks around facilities hosting US forces.

*Yemen: Houthi’s expulsion of US, British UN workers will likely disrupt aid operations. On 24 January, the Houthi militant group ordered all British and US staff for the UN and its associated agencies to leave the country within one month. While no response from the UN has been issued yet, it is highly likely that the decision will severely disrupt UN operations in the country as its humanitarian co-ordinator in Yemen is British. While the Houthis will likely be unable to enforce the removal of staff members outside of their areas of control, there is a realistic possibility they will cease to work with agencies where British and US staff members remain in the country. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that this decision will extend to all aid organisations working in Houthi-controlled areas in the coming weeks, further elevating disruption to food aid supply and exacerbating already critical food and water security issues in north-western governates. British and US personnel remaining in Yemen beyond the deadline will possibly encounter increased harassment.

Jan 24.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Growing protests in Gaza and Israel to release hostages and end the war reflect increasing domestic pressure both on Hamas and Israel to reach an agreement, although, currently sticking points such as duration, continued Hamas control in Gaza and hostages release continue presenting challenges.
Houthi letter demanding the expulsion of UN staff of US and UK nationality reflects growing tensions in Yemen and the Red Sea area, elevating humanitarian risks and escalation risks.

MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

Gaza: The IDF continues pushing deeper into west Khan Yunis and claims to have killed at least 100 militants on 23 January. Furthermore, while engaging in armed fights, the IDF uncovered and later destroyed a 0.9 miles-long (1.5km) underground tunnel leading to an underground weapon factory. The scale of casualties reflects a vigorous defence of militant positions in southern Gaza, forcing an intensification of IDF operations in the area. This IDF is likely to continue substantial operations in southern Gaza, likely to both pressure Hamas into negotiations as well as extend the IDF’s military and operational gain before a possible ceasefire in the coming month.
West Bank-East Jerusalem: Israel security forces confirmed the arrest of two Islamic State (IS) supporters in December 2023 who planned a bombing attack on the Knesset. The two, aged 19 and 20 from Ras al-Amud, East Jerusalem planned to blow a truck full of gas cylinders outside the Israeli Knesset (parliament). The arrest, the second involving individuals planning an attack in December 2023, highlights radicalisation within East Jerusalem’s Palestinian community, elevating security and bystander risks in Jerusalem, particularly near government assets and security positions.
Israel: On 23 January, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack against Ashdod port. However, no sirens, footage, official or unofficial confirmation or any other evidence indicates this attack happened. It is unlikely that a drone launched from Iraq or even Syria or Jordan would be able to travel to Ashdod port undiscovered. However, this is not the first time the IRI has claimed involvement in the conflict, and this latest announcement reflects elevated intent and associated security risk. This is particularly in northern Israel, where attacks by the organisation are more likely.
Israel-Lebanon: Hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border remain consistent with recently observed trends. Of note, the IDF claimed on 23 January that it struck an Iranian-operated facility in Lebanon used by Hizballah. This is likely to sustain rising tit-for-tat hostilities and security risks in northern Israel over the coming days.
Red Sea-Yemen: On 23 January, the information minister of the internationally recognised Yemeni government claimed that the Iran-backed Houthis threatened to shoot down a UN plane. The minister claimed that the Houthis issued the threat to the plans via an Aviation Authority tower under their control, preventing it from landing in the Marib governorate, controlled by the internationally recognised government. The minister claimed it was the second such incident in 24 hours, although he did not provide additional information or dates. The claim is consistent with the 20 January Houthi expulsion orders to US and UK nationals working for the UN in Yemen, giving them a 30-day deadline. These will likely complicate humanitarian and UN operations in Yemen in the coming month and elevate risks of conflict escalation.
Iraq: On 23 January, the US struck Iran-affiliated militias in Iraq, including Kataib Hezbollah (KH). The strike is likely in response to repeated attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria including those conducted earlier on 23 January in Syria. It reflects the continued gradual escalation and assertiveness of US forces in the region, elevating risks of retaliation against US-affiliated assets. This threat is currently primarily concentrated against military and government targets, though there is a realistic possibility threats to commercial entities will also increase.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Amid elevated protest activity, Israeli demonstrators have blocked aid convoys from entering Gaza, while protests in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv moderately restricted overland movement. On 24 January, dozens of Israeli protesters calling for immediate hostage releases blocked the Kerem Shalom goods crossing, preventing the delivery of aid into Gaza; the demonstration is ongoing at the time of writing. While the demonstrations have remained peaceful, this incident highlights significant bottlenecks in aid delivery supply chains and the sensitivity of cross-border movement to protest-related disruption. Concurrently, hundreds of protesters gathered in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv as part of the Women’s Protest Day to demand the Israeli government secure a hostage release agreement immediately. These demonstrations restricted movement through the Dizengoff Square and King George intersection (Tel Aviv district) and the Cinema City intersection (Jerusalem). Given the elevated protest activity over the past week, further demonstrations are highly likely, sustaining risks of localised disruption to overland movement.
Reports of anti-Hamas protests in Gaza underscore rising tensions between the civilian population and Hamas-led governing authorities in southern Gaza. On 24 January, the IDF’s Arabic Media Spokesperson Avichay Adraee released footage of Palestinian protesters in Deir al Balah (central Gaza) calling for authorities to allow them to return to northern Gaza and for the release of Israeli hostages; Adraee characterised the demonstrations as anti-Hamas. While there is a realistic possibility that the demonstration was not explicitly anti-Hamas, the emergence of protest activity calling for the release of hostages underscores rising tensions between the civilian population and the Hamas-led governing authority.

FORECAST

Increasing protest activity and domestic unrest will sustain pressure on Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire agreement, though substantial sticking points will likely delay significant progress. Over the coming days, negotiations will likely continue focusing on establishing a temporary ceasefire in Gaza in exchange for staggered hostage releases, with a variety of timelines and implementation mechanisms discussed. As ceasefire negotiations continue, protest activity in Israel is highly likely to continue over the coming days, disrupting mobility through urban centres and increasing pressure on the Israeli government to make concessions to secure hostage releases. Even so, as Hamas continues to call for a permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of IDF personnel, disputes over the length of any potential ceasefire will likely delay the finalisation of a formal agreement over the coming days. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility of increasing protest activity and governance challenges in Gaza limiting Hamas negotiators’ capacity to credibly commit to potential ceasefire terms and co-ordinate hostage releases. As such, negotiations will remain highly sensitive and are unlikely to significantly proceed over the coming days, despite significant domestic and ongoing international pressure.

Increased tensions between the Houthis, the US and UK will elevate risks for humanitarian aid and NGO staff, elevating food insecurity and humanitarian risks in Yemen in the coming month. There is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will continue their targeting of US and UK nationals, stopping co-operation with humanitarian agencies employing them. Furthermore, personnel deciding to stay in Yemen after the deadline, even if not in Houthi-controlled territory will have increased security risks and exposure to harassment. Houthis are unlikely to follow through on threats to shoot down a UN plane, however, it underlines the volatility of the conflict and the risks of uncontrolled escalation due to misjudgement, further elevating security and bystander risks in Yemen and the Red Sea.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

Jan 23.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Enhanced IDF efforts to capture Khan Yunis will likely delay the IDF’s transition to the planned third phase while clearing operations in east-central Gaza reflect long-term plans to create buffer zones for Israeli settlements following the end of operations in Gaza.
Hizballah’s attack on early aerial threat identification infrastructure at Meron Air Traffic Control Base is likely to increase IDF strikes in Lebanon over the coming days.
Gaza: The IDF confirmed it has encircled, and is advancing deeper into, Khan Yunis in southern Gaza. Militant resistance will draw out the timeframe for the IDF to secure effective control of the city, delaying the transition to the planned third phase. Additionally, on 22 January, the IDF performed a clearing operation in east-central Gaza in preparation for creating a buffer zone outside the Israeli community of Kissufim. In connection with this operation, a contested attempt to demolish a building in the proposed buffer zone killed 21 IDF soldiers. Initial investigations indicate Gazan militants fired an RPG at a tank guarding the operation, killing two soldiers and wounding two others, while a likely second RPG shot set off explosives inside a building being rigged for demolition, causing it to collapse and killing another 19 soldiers. The incident is the second major casualty incident for IDF soldiers involving the unplanned explosion of an IDF-rigged building, possibly highlighting gaps in operational procedures regarding the demolition of infrastructure. Over the long-term such incidents are likely to drive domestic criticism of the war, adding pressure on the government and the IDF.
West Bank: IDF operations and clashes with militants remain consistent with previously observed trends, without significant incidents.
Israel-Lebanon: On 23 January, Hizballah attacked the Meron Air Traffic Control Base, responsible for aerial threat identification in northern Israel. The IDF has confirmed the attack caused light damage to the base though it did not harm aerial detection capabilities. There is a realistic possibility that in response the IDF will further escalate attacks in southern Lebanon.
Red Sea: On 22 January, US and UK forces conducted joint strikes against Iran-backed Houthi targets in Yemen. The strikes hit eight locations, targeting underground storage sites, missiles, and infrastructure. According to reports, Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands indirectly supported the strikes, likely providing logistical support and defence envelope to the US and the UK. The strikes reflect continued US determination to degrade Houthi capabilities, although they are unlikely to stop Houthi attacks in the coming weeks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Ashdod port will soon open to food aid deliveries for Gaza, though critical humanitarian conditions will almost certainly persist. On 22 January, an IDF spokesperson announced that the Ashdod port would imminently begin processing shipments of food aid, which will enter Gaza via the Kerem Shalom goods crossing, amid increasing international pressure to alleviate critical humanitarian conditions in the enclave. While this move will likely increase the delivery of aid (primarily of flour) into Gaza, ongoing IDF ground operations and critical damage to infrastructure will almost certainly continue exacerbating critical food insecurity, particularly in northern Gaza.
Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas continue, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly telling family members of hostages that Israel has proposed a temporary ceasefire agreement to secure hostage releases. Numerous reports indicate that on 22 January, Netanyahu discussed a proposed ceasefire agreement that would entail a temporary ceasefire of up to eight weeks in exchange for staggered hostage releases; firstly of female civilians, children and elderly hostages, secondly of female soldiers and male civilians, and finally of male soldiers and the bodies of deceased hostages. The proposed agreement also entails the release of Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners and a further de-intensification of IDF operations in Gaza, allowing the partial return of displaced civilians to areas including Gaza City. Disagreements over whether negotiations should establish a temporary or permanent ceasefire will likely delay the establishment of a formal agreement. However, combined with mounting domestic pressure, with the families of hostages storming the Knesset on 22 January, continued negotiations render such an agreement a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. Delays will sustain the risk of further bouts of unrest, however, tensions are unlikely to present a significant threat to government stability, with Netanyahu surviving a vote of no-confidence on 22 January, with only 18 votes in favour.
On 23 January, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will meet to discuss the Israel-Hamas war and the humanitarian situation in Gaza, amid elevated regional tensions. The meeting follows an emergency Arab League summit on 22 January which resulted in a call for the UNSC to adopt a binding resolution calling for a cessation of IDF operations in Gaza. While there is a realistic possibility of such a resolution being discussed at the UNSC, the US will almost certainly veto any resolution explicitly mentioning a ceasefire.

FORECAST

Israel will likely increase its strikes into southern Lebanon following the targeting of Meron Air Traffic Control Base (Yaba 506). Israel is unlikely to accept the targeting of Yaba 506 and present it as a red line demanding a strong response regardless of the success of the attack. In the past few days, Israel has continued to gradually escalate its attacks against Hizballah targets in southern Lebanon to pressure Hizballah to relocate its forces further north. Further escalation of these strikes will increase the risks of uncontrolled escalation with each party gradually intensifying its retaliation. However, currently, a major military confrontation remains unlikely, as indicated by reduced Hizballah activities in the past week.

Despite rising international pressure to adopt a ceasefire agreement and commit to the two-state solution, Israel is highly unlikely to alter its stance on recognising a Palestinian state. While there is a realistic possibility that the UAE will propose a resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza at the UNSC meeting scheduled for today (23 January) it is highly unlikely to pass, with the US likely vetoing any resolution calling for a ceasefire, whether temporary or permanent. Even so, international pressure on Israel to engage in longer-term planning for the administration of Gaza will almost certainly continue increasing over the coming weeks. Over the coming weeks, key Israeli allies including the US and the European Union will likely continue calling for Israel to commit to a long-term two-state solution, exacerbating diplomatic tensions. There is also a realistic possibility that Saudi Arabia will formally commit to the resumption of the normalisation process with Israel, conditional on Israeli pledges to recognise a Palestinian state. However, despite increasing international pressure Netanyahu is highly unlikely to commit to any recognition of a Palestinian state, particularly amid ongoing IDF operations in Gaza. Such a move would almost certainly trigger widespread domestic unrest, significantly elevate government stability risks and prompt the dissolution of the coalition government. Consequently, commitment to establishing a Palestinian state remains highly unlikely, and efforts to link such recognition to ceasefire negotiations will almost certainly delay a formal agreement being reached.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

*Yemen: Recent coalition airstrikes against Houthis unlikely to deter maritime attacks in short term. On 22 January, the US and UK conducted a new round of strikes against eight Houthi targets, with the support of Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands. The targets included missile systems and launchers, air defence systems, radars and deep underground weapons storage facilities. Notably, the scope of the recent joint strikes is the largest since the first round of strikes on 11 January; several pre-emptive strikes have been conducted against Houthis since then but were limited to a smaller number of targets. The Houthis will likely continue to attack and/or harass commercial vessels traversing the waters surrounding Yemen and will possibly resume attempted rocket and drone strikes on southern Israel. This will also likely prompt another round of coalition strikes against the group, driving continued retaliatory attacks, increasing the risk of strikes on regional coalition partner Bahrain.

*Iraq-US: Sanctions on airline will drive risks of flight delays at Baghdad’s airport in the coming days. On 22 January, the US imposed sanctions on Fly Baghdad airline and its CEO, alleging that the carrier supported the operations of Iran’s Quds force (one of the main branches of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) by delivering weapons and fighters throughout the region. The US government claimed that a range of weapons were delivered by the airline from Iraq to Iranian proxies in Syria, including Zulfiqar and Fajr missiles. Shortly after the announcement, Fly Baghdad halted all its flights at Baghdad International Airport (BGW), causing significant delays and a brief disruption to air traffic. It is highly likely that delays and travel disruption in the capital’s airport will continue in the coming days due to the carrier’s overlapping routes with other airlines, such as Iraqi Airways. The transfer of Fly Baghdad’s customers to other carriers, to and from Baghdad, will further compound reduced flight availability, threatening rapid evacuation protocols in the short term.

Jan 22.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Domestic and international pressure is mounting on the Israeli government to secure the release of the hostages increasing prospects for a temporary ceasefire in the coming weeks, though Israel is unlikely to agree a full cessation of operations in Gaza.
An alleged Israeli airstrike killing five IRGS officers in Israel has prompted threats of retaliation from Iran, underlining elevated attack risks against Israel and Israel-linked events and individuals abroad.
Gaza: IDF continued its ground operations throughout Gaza, advancing to west Khan Yunis in southern Gaza. Throughout the weekend the IDF confirmed the discovery and destruction of an empty underground tunnel in Khan Yunis which Hamas had used to hold hostages. Additionally, the reservist Yiftach Brigade conducted clearing operations in Maghazi, central Gaza, uncovering and destroying weapon factories, during which time they engaged in intense clashes with RPG-armed militants. Additionally, while IDF units in northern Gaza continue to conduct holding operations, engaging in sporadic battles with small squads of Gazan militants, the reduction of IDF forces in the region has resulted in the return of some Gazan civilians to the area. This will likely complicate IDF operations in northern Gaza and elevate the risk of collateral harm to civilians.
West Bank: IDF operations and clashes with Palestinian militants remain consistent with recently observed trends, with clashes throughout the weekend mainly focused around the Nablus governorate.
Israel-Lebanon: The IDF continued to strike Hizballah positions and infrastructure in southern Lebanon throughout the weekend, while Hizballah and affiliated militants reduced their attacks relative to last week’s uptick. In late 20 January, the IDF targeted and failed to assassinate the commander of the central sector in Hizballah, using a drone strike on a vehicle in Kafra, southern Lebanon. The attempt reflects continued IDF assertiveness against Hizballah’s presence in southern Lebanon regardless of the level of Hizballah’s kinetic activity towards Israel.
Israel-Syria: An alleged Israeli strike on 20 January, on a residential building in the Mezzeh neighbourhood in Damascus, Syria, killed five Iranian officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to conflicting reports, it is highly likely that among the dead are the IRGC head of intelligence in Syria and his deputy. The strike hit a three-story building, destroying it completely. In response, Iran threatened to retaliate against Israel. The incident highlights the elevated tensions and security risks in the region amid the backdrop of the growing Israel-Iran shadow war.
Red Sea: The US continues to perform pre-emptive airstrikes in Yemen against Iran-backed Houthi forces, targeting ready-to-launch missiles. According to the US Central Command (CENTCOM), the US performed strikes on 19 and 20 January. Additionally, on 21 January CENTCOM announced the death of two Navy SEAL fighters that went missing following an operation to disrupt the smuggling of Iranian advanced weapons to an undisclosed location, though likely Yemen, on 11 January.
Iraq: On 20 January, a large attack by the Iranian-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) on Al-Asad Airbase (al-Anbar Governorate) injured several US personnel and at least one Iraqi soldier. According to reports, air defence systems in the base were only able to intercept part of the attack, indicating the indirect fire barrage was sufficient to overwhelm these systems. The strike reflects increasing tensions between US forces and Iranian proxies in the region, as well as possibly increasing Iranian armaments supplies to increase the effectiveness of these proxies. These will continue sustaining elevated security and bystander risks in Iraq and Syria, particularly near military and militant positions.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Amid ongoing Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations, Egypt, Qatar and the US are reportedly pushing for parties to accept a multi-stage hostage release agreement. On 21 January, the Wall Street Journal reported that Egypt, Qatar and the US have proposed a 90-day hostage release and ceasefire agreement that would end IDF operations in Gaza while securing staggered hostage releases. The plan proposes three phases: firstly, Hamas would release civilian hostages in exchange for the IDF withdrawing from civilian population centres in Gaza, reducing drone surveillance and increasing the flow of humanitarian aid; secondly, Hamas would release all remaining female hostages (including soldiers) in return for releases of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons; finally, Hamas would release all remaining male hostages (including those of fighting age) with the IDF completely withdrawing from Gaza, resulting in a permanent ceasefire. The proposed agreement underscores increasing tension between the Israeli government’s stated goals of securing hostage releases and dismantling Hamas’ military and governance capabilities in Gaza through military operations. Although the Israeli government is unlikely to agree to end combat operations in Gaza in the short term, ongoing diplomatic engagement will sustain the likelihood of a temporary ceasefire agreement being reached over the coming weeks.
Over the past 72 hours several anti-government demonstrations have taken place in Israel, reflecting increased pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases. On 20 and 21 January, protests calling for the Israeli government to immediately secure hostage releases emerged in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, moderately disrupting movement through both cities though. Smaller-scale demonstrations calling for a general election continued through 21 and 22 January in Jerusalem, with participants blocking the entrance to the Knesset before being dispersed by police. In Haifa (Haifa district), a multi-organisation anti-war demonstration also occurred on 21 January, calling for an immediate cessation of IDF operations in Gaza. Amid ongoing ceasefire negotiations, continued protest activity is highly likely, sustaining significant pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases. Even so, anti-government protests are unlikely to elevate threats to government stability and violent domestic unrest remains unlikely.
On 21 January, the Israeli cabinet agreed to partially resume financial transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA), though funding for civil servants in Gaza will be held in a third-party account. Under the agreement, the Israeli government will resume transferring taxes collected on the PA’s behalf to fund public-sector operations in the West Bank, while transferring funds earmarked for Gaza to a third-party account in Norway. The Norwegian-held funds will not be released without the approval of Israel’s Finance Ministry, and will almost certainly be withheld for the duration of IDF operations in Gaza. Israel previously suspended financial transfers to the PA on 30 October, restricting its ability to pay civil servants in the West Bank and Gaza and limiting access to public services. Although the agreement will partially address rising socio-economic concerns in the West Bank in the short term, given continued internal government disputes over financial transfers to civil servants in Gaza, the likelihood of further disruption to the release of funds remains high.
Over the past 72 hours, pro-Palestine activists staged high-visibility demonstrations at several events, underscoring elevated risks of disruption. On 20 January, pro-Palestine demonstrators employed flares and smoke bombs during protests over several Israeli firms attending the Vicenzaoro tradeshow in Vicenza (Italy), clashing with police in proximity to the venue. On 22 January, a pro-Palestine demonstrator briefly interrupted the Australian Open in Melbourne (Australia) after throwing leaflets onto a tennis court during a match. These incidents underscore elevated risks of event disruption, particularly those involving Israeli participants and those receiving significant media coverage. Despite elevated risks of demonstrations disrupting event proceedings, on 22 January, the European Broadcasting Union confirmed that Israel will participate in the Eurovision Song Contents, which will be hosted in Malmo (Sweden) from 7-11 May 2024, increasing risks of protest in and around the event.

FORECAST

Iranian threats following the alleged Israeli strike, which killed five IRGC members in Syria, reflect elevated attack risks in Israel and abroad. Iran’s threat to respond in the ‘appropriate time and place’ indicates that a response is likely though not imminent. However, risks of attacks in Israel, particularly cyber attacks, including against Israeli companies abroad, will be elevated in the coming weeks, driving operational risks. While cross-border attacks from Syria are rare, the persistent risk of such attacks will remain heightened. Cross-border attacks will likely primarily target military or military-industrial facilities in the Golan Heights and are likely to involve a limited number of projectiles. Threatened retaliation by Iran and/or Iranian-linked proxies will also drive broader security risks to Israel-linked assets and individuals globally, particularly within the region and possibly also Europe. Retaliatory actions are likely to focus on assets and individuals perceived to be advancing Israel’s interests, particularly those connected to the Israeli intelligence services. These will elevate security risks around events and locations with significant Israeli and/or Jewish attendance around the world. The risk of radicalised individuals performing attacks on locations frequented by Israelis and/or Jewish individuals, with Iranian support, will also remain elevated in the coming weeks, including in Jerusalem and the wider West Bank.

IRI strike in Iraq and continued US pre-emptive strikes against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen reflect a growing US-Iran proxy conflict. It is currently unlikely that operations between the US and Iranian proxies will develop into an active war directly involving Iran. Nonetheless, the growing tensions are likely to drive a gradual escalation in tit-for-tat actions between US forces and Iranian proxies in the region, particularly in Iraq, Syria and the Red Sea. These will further elevate security risks in the proximity of bases hosting US forces as well as around militant positions in Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, this will sustain the elevated risks for vessels sailing the Red Sea presenting further escalation risks in the coming weeks.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaz

*EGYPT: Anti-West Sentiment

Key points

Rising anti-western sentiment is unlikely to result in politically motivated harassment of, or direct physical threats against, western/US travellers.
Major anti-Israel protests in the streets remain unlikely in the coming weeks, due to heavy security restrictions; any possible protests will be limited to mosques or syndicate facilities.
There is a realistic possibility that spikes in anti-western sentiment and boycott campaigns will recede over 2024, provided that the situation in Gaza does not deteriorate significantly or other Arab countries enter the war.

Context

Since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war on 7 October there has been a significant uptick in anti-western sentiment in Egypt, specifically among younger demographics. This has manifested in a wide boycott campaign targeting Western brands (primarily those from the US), and sporadic anti-Israel protests that usually take place inside major mosques, following Friday prayers. However, while the frequency of these weekly protests has waned significantly as the war has progressed, online anti-western sentiment has remained unchanged. Young Egyptians, influencers and celebrities have continued to express their anger towards what they have described as the hypocrisy and the double standards of the Western establishment (government and media) when dealing with the war in Gaza. However, to date this sentiment has largely remained restricted to the online sphere and has largely not materialised into incidents of harassment or physical threats to Western travellers in Egypt.

Forecast

Direct harassment and physical security threats to US and Western travellers in Egypt are unlikely, though risks are elevated for individuals with identifiable connections to Judaism and Israel

Despite lingering anti-western sentiment, the likelihood of politically/religiously motivated harassment or physical threats against foreign travellers remains low, specifically in major cities (i.e. Cairo and Alexandria) and other prominent tourist destinations (i.e. Luxor and Sharm El-Sheikh). Online negative sentiment is exclusively directed against Western media channels, politicians and some international organisations, not Western citizens.

Many in the Egyptian public are conscious that harassment of international travellers would threaten the domestic tourism industry, further exacerbating a mounting economic crisis. This is reflected in state efforts to enhance security and counteract any potential threats that might emanate from the conflict in Gaza. Following an incident on 8 October when a police officer killed two Israeli tourists and their guide in Alexandria, security forces have conducted significant audits of its personnel to prevent similar attacks and heightened the physical security posture around tourist hotspots.

However, there is an increased risk of harassment, including physical violence, for those with visibly identifiable connections to Judaism and Israel. Public opposition to military operations in Gaza has raised levels of antisemitism, elevating the risk of street-level harassment by members of the public. For similar reasons, there is a realistic possibility that those visiting any Jewish sites (such as synagogues and tombs) in Cairo or Alexandria will be exposed to harassment over the coming months. This threat will also be particularly acute around major mosques on Fridays, where sporadic anti-Israel protests remain a possibility in the short term.

Significant anti-Israel/ anti-western protests are unlikely over the coming months

While sporadic protest action within mosques remains a realistic possibility, major anti-Israel and anti-western protests at street level, around major squares and Western embassies are unlikely in the coming months. Notably, the frequency of anti-Israel protests started to wane by the end of October, and only two limited protests – inside the Journalists syndicate – have been recorded since then. This is primarily due to the heavy-handed tactics of the Egyptian security forces, which have restricted any protests to within the walls of major mosques and syndicates and to “controlled” protests organised by pro-regime parties largely designed to diffuse domestic anger.

Continuing to restrict potential war protests will likely remain a government priority as many officials remain wary of gatherings possibly escalating into protests against the state, particularly amid the current economic crisis which will likely worsen through 2024. Notably, in October 2023, an activist who attempted to mobilise protests outside the US embassy in central Cairo on Twitter, was immediately apprehended, forced to close his social media accounts and has remained in custody without trial. As such, security forces will likely continue banning any protests near embassies.

Anti-western sentiment will possibly wane by the end of 2024, provided conditions in Gaza do not significantly deteriorate

The current escalation in anti-western sentiment in Egypt is consistent with previous spikes in regional tensions, such as the second Intifada in 2000 and the Iraq war in 2003. In both instances, levels of hostility amongst the general public gradually receded, which remains likely through 2024. Similarly, current boycott campaigns against some Western brands will also likely wane in intensity and scope throughout 2024, reducing reputational and market access risks to Western franchises. However, commercial entities directly linked to Israel will likely face public resistance and local activism through the long term.

However, there is a realistic possibility that current levels of anti-western sentiment levels will spike further if the humanitarian situation in Gaza significantly deteriorates or other regional countries get drawn into the conflict. Nevertheless, even in this scenario, it remains likely that the majority of local criticism will remain directed against Western media outlets and governments, mitigating the risk of a significant shift in attitudes and threats against Western travellers. (Source: Sibylline)

27 Jan 24. World Court says Israel must prevent genocide in Gaza, stops short of ceasefire order.

Summary
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS:
Source says CIA chief, Israelis and Qataris expected to meet on Sunday
White House says Washington hopeful about progress in hostage talks
US notes court ruling did not make finding about genocide

The World Court ordered Israel on Friday to prevent acts of genocide against Palestinians and do more to help civilians, although it stopped short of ordering a ceasefire as requested by the plaintiff South Africa.

While the ruling denied Palestinian hopes of a binding order to halt the war in Gaza, it represented a legal setback for Israel, which had hoped to throw out a case brought under the genocide convention established in the ashes of the World War Two Holocaust that targeted European Jews.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) found there was a case to be heard about whether Palestinian rights were being denied in a war it said was causing grievous humanitarian harm. It also called for Palestinian armed groups to release hostages captured in the Oct. 7 attacks on Israel that precipitated the conflict.

The Palestinian Foreign Ministry said the decision was a welcome reminder “no state is above the law”. Senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri told Reuters it would contribute to “isolating the occupation and exposing its crimes in Gaza”.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the ICJ’s decision not to order a ceasefire, but rejected the claim of genocide as “outrageous” and said Israel would continue to defend itself.

REPORT BACK IN A MONTH

Israel had sought to have the case thrown out when South Africa brought it to the ICJ, also known as the World Court, this month under the legal principle that genocide is such a grave crime that all countries are duty-bound to prevent it.

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Pretoria accused Israel of state-led genocide in its offensive, begun after Hamas militants stormed into Israel killing 1,200 and kidnapping more than 240.

It asked the court to grant emergency measures to halt the fighting, which Palestinian officials say has killed more than 26,000 Palestinians and displaced the majority of the population in a more than three-month campaign of intensive bombardment.

The ICJ judges ordered Israel to take all measures within its power to prevent its troops from committing genocide, punish acts of incitement, take steps to improve the humanitarian situation and report back on its progress in a month.

It did not decide the merits of the genocide allegations, which could take years. Although the ruling cannot be appealed, the court has no mechanism to enforce its decision.

In reading out the decision, ICJ President Judge Joan Donoghue described the plight of Palestinians in Gaza, singling out harm to children and quoting detailed descriptions of the humanitarian emergency from U.N. officials.

This, she said, justified the court’s decision to take emergency action to prevent irreparable harm. She also read out calls from Israeli officials for a harsh campaign, which she said justified the court’s order to Israel to punish people guilty of incitement.

Israel called South Africa’s allegations false and “grossly distorted”. It says it has acted in self defence against a foe that attacked first, and goes to great lengths to protect civilians, blaming Hamas for operating among them, which the fighters deny.

South Africa called the court order a “decisive victory” for international rule of law and both it and the European Union said Israel must implement it immediately and in full.

The United States noted the ruling did not make a finding about genocide and said it aligned with the U.S. view that Israel had the right to take action in accordance with international law to prevent any repeat of the Oct. 7 attacks.

ASSAULT ON KHAN YOUNIS

On the ground in Gaza, the heaviest fighting in weeks is now taking place in crowded areas jammed with hundreds of thousands of people who fled from earlier fighting elsewhere.

Palestinians sheltering in southern Gaza said they felt let down by the lack of a ceasefire order from the court, but also hopeful the ruling would bring accountability.

“What happened was a victory,” said Mustafa Ibrahim, a human rights activist.

In Israel, Jonathan Dekel-Chen, whose son is being held hostage in Gaza, said he was encouraged by the ICJ’s call for the release of the captives, which he said reflected a largely neglected point that the Hamas assault sparked the war.

The militants released a video on Friday featuring three female hostages calling for an end to the conflict. Israel has said such videos amount to psychological abuse.

Talks on a possible temporary pause in fighting to release hostages and Palestinians held in Israel and allow more aid in Gaza are gathering pace. U.S. President Joe Biden discussed the issue on Friday in a phone call with the emir of mediator Qatar and the White House said Washington was hopeful about progress.

A source with knowledge of the matter told Reuters U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns and his Israeli counterpart are expected to meet Qatar’s prime minister and Egypt’s spy chief in Europe on Sunday for talks on a second potential Gaza hostage deal.

The U.S. and Israeli intelligence chiefs met previously with Qatari and Egyptian officials to help broker a short-lived truce in November that saw more than 100 hostages freed. The Biden administration has been trying to facilitate the release of the more than 100 remaining hostages.

Israel kept up its bombardment of the main southern city of Khan Younis on Friday, reporting “intensive battles” and strikes on Hamas fighters and infrastructure from the air and ground.

It said it had discovered some 200 tunnel shafts and destroyed more than 130 militant infrastructure sites in its latest operations.

Residents said Israeli forces blew up buildings and houses in the western part of the city as gun battles raged.

Palestinians say Israel has hampered efforts to rescue the dead and wounded as well as blockading hospitals, which Israel denies, blaming Hamas fighters for operating near them.

Hezbollah announced that four of its fighters were killed in an Israeli strike on southern Lebanon late on Friday. The group has been exchanging fire with Israeli since it launched rockets across Lebanon’s southern border on Oct. 8 in support of its ally Hamas.

It said on Friday that it had fired rockets at Israeli military targets nine times during the day, including the Burkan (Volcano), which carry hundreds of kilograms of explosives.

In a new setback for stricken Palestinians, the United States said it was pausing funding to the UN aid agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) after Israel alleged that 12 UNRWA employees were involved in the Oct. 7 attacks.

UNRWA said it was urgently investigating and “any UNRWA employee who was involved in acts of terror” would be held accountable. (Source: Reuters)

25 Jan 24. UK announces new aid support for Gaza on Foreign Secretary visit to Middle East. The UK and Qatar are working together to get more aid into Gaza. The Foreign Secretary has announced that the UK and Qatar are working together to get more aid into Gaza, with our first joint consignment containing 17 tonnes of family sized tents being flown today [Thurs 25th].

On the visit, the Foreign Secretary will witness first-hand both the UK and Qatar’s humanitarian aid being loaded onto a plane destined for Egypt, after which it will go by road to Gaza. The tents will provide critical shelter for people and are desperately needed, as more families are displaced by the conflict and a cold winter continues.

Foreign Secretary David Cameron said:

The scale of suffering in Gaza is unimaginable. More must be done, faster, to help people trapped in this desperate situation. We have trebled our assistance for Gaza, and cooperation with partners like Qatar is helping move life-saving aid and equipment over the border to those living in devastation.

But our efforts will only make a difference if aid gets to those who need it most, which is why we need more access for UN staff. As I said to PM Netanyahu yesterday, far more trucks need to be able to enter Gaza and more crossings need to open. We need an immediate humanitarian pause to get aid in and hostages out, followed by a sustainable ceasefire, without a return to hostilities.

The UK has trebled its assistance and is continuing working with partners like Qatar to provide life-saving aid and equipment.

With reports of 9 out of 10 people in Gaza living on less than a meal a day in northern Gaza, our focus must be on practical solutions to save lives.

The Foreign Secretary pushed Israeli leaders for Ashdod to be used for the delivery of life-saving aid into Gaza on his visit to the region. The UK and its partners efforts can only make a difference if they can reach those in urgent need.

Israel must take steps, working with other partners including the UN and Egypt, to significantly increase the flow of aid into Gaza including allowing prolonged humanitarian pauses, opening more routes into Gaza and fully restoring water, fuel and electricity supplies.

The Foreign Secretary’s Representative for Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Mark Bryson-Richardson, is based in the region and is working intensively to address the blockages preventing more aid reaching Gaza. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

23 Jan 24. U.S., Partners Continue Pushback Against Iranian-Backed Houthi Terrorist Group. Yesterday afternoon, the U.S. and U.K, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands, conducted strikes on eight Houthi targets in Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist-controlled areas of Yemen, the Pentagon press secretary said.

Yesterday’s strikes came “in response to the Iranian regime-backed Houthi’s continued attacks against international and commercial shipping as well as naval vessels transiting the Red Sea,” Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said during a briefing today. “The strikes were precise, proportionate and intended to further disrupt and degrade the capabilities the Houthis have been using to threaten global trade and the lives of innocent mariners.”

According to U.S. Central Command, the strike targets included missile systems and launchers, air defense systems, radars and underground weapons storage facilities. The strikes occurred near midnight, Jan. 22, Yemen time.

Within 15 to 30 minutes following those initial strikes, Ryder said, the U.S. struck an additional Houthi target — an anti-ship cruise missile — which he said was, at the time, prepared to launch and which presented a threat to vessels operating in the region.

“Our aim remains to de-escalate tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea,” Ryder said. “We will not hesitate to defend the lives and the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways in the face of continued threats.”

According to Ryder, the Defense Department assesses that since January 11, the U.S. and partners have destroyed or degraded over 25 Houthi missile launch and deployment facilities, more than 20 missiles and an additional number of unmanned aerial vehicles, coastal radar and air surveillance capabilities and weapons storage areas.

“We have been very focused on targeting the kinds of things that they’ve been employing or using to conduct attacks against international shipping and mariners,” he said. “That will continue to be our focus.”

Strikes in Iraq

Centcom also announced that the U.S. had today conducted strikes in Iraq against the Iranian-backed militia group Kataib Hezbollah. That strike was in response to attacks made by the group this past weekend, including at al-Asad Airbase in western Iraq.

According to Centcom, the strikes were against three facilities used by the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia group and other Iran-affiliated groups in Iraq.

“These strikes targeted KH headquarters, storage and training locations for rocket, missile and one-way attack UAV capabilities,” the Centcom release said.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said in a statement that the strikes had been authorized by President Joe Biden.

“I am grateful for both the skill and professionalism with which our personnel planned and conducted these strikes and the continued efforts of our troops on the ground as they work with regional partners to further dismantle and degrade ISIS,” Austin said. “The president and I will not hesitate to take necessary action to defend them and our interests. We do not seek to escalate conflict in the region. We are fully prepared to take further measures to protect our people and our facilities. We call on these groups and their Iranian sponsors to immediately cease these attacks.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

22 Jan 24. U.S., Partners Launch Additional Strikes Against Houthi Military Targets. U.S. and partner forces launched additional defensive strikes against military targets in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen yesterday aimed at further diminishing the terrorist group’s capabilities.

The joint strikes were the second round of precision strikes to be carried out by the U.S. and United Kingdom with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands in response to a series of attacks launched by the Iran-backed group against commercial ships operating in the Red Sea.

The latest round of U.S.-led strikes included eight Houthi targets, including an underground storage site and locations associated with the rebel group’s missile and air surveillance capabilities.

They follow similar joint strikes on Jan. 11 by the U.S.-led coalition targeting command and control nodes, munitions depots, launching systems, production facilities and air defense radar systems used by the Houthi’s to carry out attacks against vessels operating in international waters.

“These precision strikes are intended to disrupt and degrade the capabilities that the Houthis use to threaten global trade and the lives of innocent mariners, and are in response to a series of illegal, dangerous and destabilizing Houthi actions since our coalition strikes on January 11, including anti-ship ballistic missile and unmanned aerial system attacks that struck two U.S.-owned merchant vessels,” the partner nations said in a joint statement following the strikes.

The U.S. has also launched several unilateral strikes against Houthi capabilities posing imminent threats to vessels operating in the region following the Jan. 11 joint strikes.

In a briefing to reporters following yesterday’s joint strikes, U.S. defense officials said that while battle damage assessments were ongoing, they assess that the latest strikes were successful in further degrading Houthi capabilities.

The officials further underscored the importance of securing peace and stability in the Red Sea.

“These assaults, notably the unprecedented use of , have significantly disrupted the free flow of commerce and navigational rights in one of the globe’s most critical waterways,” an official said.

The official added that the Houthi attacks have led to more than 14 shipping companies ceasing operations in the Red Sea, severely impacting global commerce and regional economies.

“We stand ready to take further actions to neutralize threats or respond to attacks, ensuring the stability and security of the Red Sea region and international trade routes,” the official said.

Since mid-November the Iran-backed group has launched attacks against at least 33 commercial vessels. U.S. military and merchant vessels have also come under persistent threat from Houthi attacks.

The rebel group has employed a variety of weapons including anti-ship ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, uncrewed surface vessels and unmanned surface vehicles, officials said.

Those attacks have been met with broad international condemnation.

In their statement following yesterday’s strikes, the U.S. and its partners affirmed that they aim “to de-escalate tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea,” but warned Houthi leaders: “we will not hesitate to defend lives and the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways in the face of continued threats.”

In December, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III launched Operation Prosperity Guardian, an international maritime task force designed to defend against the attacks.

The defensive strikes launched against the rebel stronghold in Yemen were not associated with, and are separate from, Operation Prosperity Guardian.

Operation Prosperity Guardian brings together forces from more than 20 nations to address the challenges in the region and ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The forces operate under the umbrella of the Combined Maritime Forces and the leadership of Task Force 153, a U.S. Navy-led initiative focused on maritime security in the Red Sea. (Source: U.S. DoD)

23 Jan 24. U.S., Partners Launch Additional Strikes Against Houthi Military Targets. U.S. and partner forces launched additional defensive strikes against military targets in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen yesterday aimed at further diminishing the terrorist group’s capabilities.

The latest round of U.S.-led strikes included eight Houthi targets, including an underground storage site and locations associated with the rebel group’s missile and air surveillance capabilities.

The U.S. has also launched several unilateral strikes against Houthi capabilities posing imminent threats to vessels operating in the region following the Jan. 11 joint strikes.

The officials further underscored the importance of securing peace and stability in the Red Sea.

“These assaults, notably the unprecedented use of, have significantly disrupted the free flow of commerce and navigational rights in one of the globe’s most critical waterways,” an official said.