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NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 19.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The Iranian-backed Yemen-based Houthis announced on 18 January that UK and US ships are legitimate targets; this is unlikely to deter US strikes against Houthi positions, driving escalation.
  • Tri-lateral discussions between Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) point to moderate progress; the PA reportedly accepted the option of administering Gaza after the war, opening up avenues for ceasefire negotiations and a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
  • Gaza: Israeli operations continue at pace throughout Gaza, with militants continuing to attack Israeli forces in previously cleared territory. Over the past 24 hours, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) clashed with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants in previously cleared areas of Gaza City, including Jabalia, Sheikh Ijlin and Tuffah. These clashes indicate that militants are reinfiltrating locations in northern Gaza via undetected tunnel networks as the IDF shifts into the third phase of its ground operations and reduces its presence in northern Gaza. In southern Gaza, intense clashes are ongoing in Khan Yunis, where the IDF faces militants equipped with IEDs, thermobaric munitions and tandem-charged rockets. The intensity of clashes and the relative sophistication of the weaponry employed underscore the critical physical security and bystander risks facing individuals throughout southern Gaza, particularly amid an ongoing telecommunications blackout throughout the enclave (which began on 12 January).
  • West Bank: IDF operations are ongoing throughout the West Bank, with elevated militant activity continuing to impact northern governorates. Earlier on 19 December, a high-intensity IDF operation in Tulkarm ended after 45 hours. During the counter-terrorism operation, the IDF killed at least eight militants, seized numerous military hardware caches (as well as an IED manufacturing site) and conducted a drone strike against militant positions. Over the past 24 hours, the Israeli security forces have also clashed with Fatah militants in Qalqilya (Qalqilya governorate) and Zawata (Nablus governorate).
  • Israel-Lebanon: Hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border are consistent with recent trends, with aerial incursions triggering sirens in Acre (Northern district).
  • Israel-Syria: On 18 January, unidentified militants fired three missiles from Syrian territory into the Golan Heights; they landed in open space near Yonatan. In response, the IDF shelled the launch sites in southern Syria; it will possibly also conduct airstrikes against locations associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and associated armed groups in the coming days. However, we assess that this does not signal an escalation and is broadly consistent with the current conflict dynamics between Israel and Syria-based militants.
  • Red Sea: Following the US strike on 17 January, the Iran-backed Houthis announced on 18 January that UK and US vessels in the Red Sea are legitimate targets. This is consistent with threats made by the Houthis on 11 January to expand their targeting to include vessels representing countries which strike the Yemen-based group. Following this statement, the US Navy conducted an additional strike against Yemen, targeting two Houthi missiles at launch readiness. Earlier on 19 January, Belgium reportedly approved the provision of a ship to the EU mission to defend the Red Sea. These developments reflect the continued gradual escalation in the Red Sea and the possible expansion of direct threats to ships in the vicinity.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Ongoing discussions between Egypt, Israel and the PA on the administration of Gaza reflects moderate progress towards establishing plans for the enclave’s post-war civil governance. Regional media outlets claim the discussions centre on measures to establish the PA as Gaza’s governing body, as well as permanently closing the Rafah border crossing and diverting the movement of people and goods to the Kerem Shalom crossing. The PA has reportedly stated it would be willing to govern Gaza, as long as reconstruction efforts are overseen by an international oversight body. While these discussions mark moderate progress in establishing longer-term governance plans for Gaza and a moderate shift from the Israeli government with regard to the expansion of PA governance structures, negotiations are highly unlikely to alter on-the-ground conditions imminently in Gaza as IDF operations continue.
  • Egypt’s diplomatic engagement with Iran and the Iranian-backed Houthis underscores the elevated regional and domestic concerns over threats to international shipping lanes. Earlier on 19 January, local media reported that Egyptian officials have begun talks with Houthi representatives and Iranian officials to moderate tensions in the Red Sea. Since the Yemen-based Houthis began escalating their attacks against vessels in the Red Sea, numerous international shipping firms have re-routed vessels via the Cape of Good Hope, significantly decreasing the volume of trade passing through the Suez Canal. In the first week of January, the Suez Canal Authority reported a 40% drop in revenue, underscoring the elevated threats to Egypt’s socio-economic health as attacks in the Red Sea persist. Although the talks are unlikely to alter Houthi attacks against vessels significantly in the short term, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian’s visit to Egypt in the coming days will facilitate further diplomatic progress.
  • A ban on fans attending an upcoming football match in Belgium involving an Israeli team underscores the elevated risks of domestic unrest and attacks targeting events involving Israeli participants. Earlier on 19 January, the mayor of Ghent (Belgium) announced that the public will not be allowed to attend a 21 February football match between KAA Ghent and Maccabi Haifa given concerns over player safety. While we assess that an attack targeting the event is highly unlikely, the measure underscores the elevated likelihood of disruption impacting sporting events involving Israeli teams and/or athletes, including disruption stemming from demonstrations and/or acts of civil disobedience targeting these events.

FORECAST

There is a realistic possibility of increased co-ordination between Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, elevating the security risks facing US and allied forces in the region in the coming weeks. On 16 January, the Iranian-backed Houthis threatened to expand the geographic scope of their attacks in co-ordination with other actors. On 17 January, Kataib Hezbollah (KH) in Iraq announced that it would perceive any attack against the Houthis as an attack against KH. The US is nonetheless highly likely to continue targeting Houthi missiles and positions, sustaining security risks in the Red Sea. These are likely to increase additional security risks for US forces across the region, particularly those in Iraq and Syria, as well as bystander risks for staff operating within, or in proximity to, bases hosting US forces. In the event that hostilities continue to escalate, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies will shift to target non-military US interests in the region; the Houthis have already done so, as demonstrated by their threats to all UK and US vessels. This will increase the likelihood of oil fields being targeted, especially those owned by US companies.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The Iranian-backed Yemen-based Houthis announced on 18 January that UK and US ships are legitimate targets; this is unlikely to deter US strikes against Houthi positions, driving escalation.
  • Tri-lateral discussions between Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) point to moderate progress; the PA reportedly accepted the option of administering Gaza after the war, opening up avenues for ceasefire negotiations and a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
  • Gaza: Israeli operations continue at pace throughout Gaza, with militants continuing to attack Israeli forces in previously cleared territory. Over the past 24 hours, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) clashed with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants in previously cleared areas of Gaza City, including Jabalia, Sheikh Ijlin and Tuffah. These clashes indicate that militants are reinfiltrating locations in northern Gaza via undetected tunnel networks as the IDF shifts into the third phase of its ground operations and reduces its presence in northern Gaza. In southern Gaza, intense clashes are ongoing in Khan Yunis, where the IDF faces militants equipped with IEDs, thermobaric munitions and tandem-charged rockets. The intensity of clashes and the relative sophistication of the weaponry employed underscore the critical physical security and bystander risks facing individuals throughout southern Gaza, particularly amid an ongoing telecommunications blackout throughout the enclave (which began on 12 January).
  • West Bank: IDF operations are ongoing throughout the West Bank, with elevated militant activity continuing to impact northern governorates. Earlier on 19 December, a high-intensity IDF operation in Tulkarm ended after 45 hours. During the counter-terrorism operation, the IDF killed at least eight militants, seized numerous military hardware caches (as well as an IED manufacturing site) and conducted a drone strike against militant positions. Over the past 24 hours, the Israeli security forces have also clashed with Fatah militants in Qalqilya (Qalqilya governorate) and Zawata (Nablus governorate).
  • Israel-Lebanon: Hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border are consistent with recent trends, with aerial incursions triggering sirens in Acre (Northern district).
  • Israel-Syria: On 18 January, unidentified militants fired three missiles from Syrian territory into the Golan Heights; they landed in open space near Yonatan. In response, the IDF shelled the launch sites in southern Syria; it will possibly also conduct airstrikes against locations associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and associated armed groups in the coming days. However, we assess that this does not signal an escalation and is broadly consistent with the current conflict dynamics between Israel and Syria-based militants.
  • Red Sea: Following the US strike on 17 January, the Iran-backed Houthis announced on 18 January that UK and US vessels in the Red Sea are legitimate targets. This is consistent with threats made by the Houthis on 11 January to expand their targeting to include vessels representing countries which strike the Yemen-based group. Following this statement, the US Navy conducted an additional strike against Yemen, targeting two Houthi missiles at launch readiness. Earlier on 19 January, Belgium reportedly approved the provision of a ship to the EU mission to defend the Red Sea. These developments reflect the continued gradual escalation in the Red Sea and the possible expansion of direct threats to ships in the vicinity.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Ongoing discussions between Egypt, Israel and the PA on the administration of Gaza reflects moderate progress towards establishing plans for the enclave’s post-war civil governance. Regional media outlets claim the discussions centre on measures to establish the PA as Gaza’s governing body, as well as permanently closing the Rafah border crossing and diverting the movement of people and goods to the Kerem Shalom crossing. The PA has reportedly stated it would be willing to govern Gaza, as long as reconstruction efforts are overseen by an international oversight body. While these discussions mark moderate progress in establishing longer-term governance plans for Gaza and a moderate shift from the Israeli government with regard to the expansion of PA governance structures, negotiations are highly unlikely to alter on-the-ground conditions imminently in Gaza as IDF operations continue.
  • Egypt’s diplomatic engagement with Iran and the Iranian-backed Houthis underscores the elevated regional and domestic concerns over threats to international shipping lanes. Earlier on 19 January, local media reported that Egyptian officials have begun talks with Houthi representatives and Iranian officials to moderate tensions in the Red Sea. Since the Yemen-based Houthis began escalating their attacks against vessels in the Red Sea, numerous international shipping firms have re-routed vessels via the Cape of Good Hope, significantly decreasing the volume of trade passing through the Suez Canal. In the first week of January, the Suez Canal Authority reported a 40% drop in revenue, underscoring the elevated threats to Egypt’s socio-economic health as attacks in the Red Sea persist. Although the talks are unlikely to alter Houthi attacks against vessels significantly in the short term, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian’s visit to Egypt in the coming days will facilitate further diplomatic progress.
  • A ban on fans attending an upcoming football match in Belgium involving an Israeli team underscores the elevated risks of domestic unrest and attacks targeting events involving Israeli participants. Earlier on 19 January, the mayor of Ghent (Belgium) announced that the public will not be allowed to attend a 21 February football match between KAA Ghent and Maccabi Haifa given concerns over player safety. While we assess that an attack targeting the event is highly unlikely, the measure underscores the elevated likelihood of disruption impacting sporting events involving Israeli teams and/or athletes, including disruption stemming from demonstrations and/or acts of civil disobedience targeting these events.

FORECAST

There is a realistic possibility of increased co-ordination between Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, elevating the security risks facing US and allied forces in the region in the coming weeks. On 16 January, the Iranian-backed Houthis threatened to expand the geographic scope of their attacks in co-ordination with other actors. On 17 January, Kataib Hezbollah (KH) in Iraq announced that it would perceive any attack against the Houthis as an attack against KH. The US is nonetheless highly likely to continue targeting Houthi missiles and positions, sustaining security risks in the Red Sea. These are likely to increase additional security risks for US forces across the region, particularly those in Iraq and Syria, as well as bystander risks for staff operating within, or in proximity to, bases hosting US forces. In the event that hostilities continue to escalate, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies will shift to target non-military US interests in the region; the Houthis have already done so, as demonstrated by their threats to all UK and US vessels. This will increase the likelihood of oil fields being targeted, especially those owned by US companies.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

*Lebanon: Central bank sit-in will likely trigger more protests in coming weeks, elevating mobility risks. Earlier on 19 January, tens of bank account holders and depositors started a sit-in next to the Central Bank of Lebanon in the capital Beirut to demand access to their money (deposited in several national banks). Protesters burned tires and blocked al-Hamra street in front of the bank’s entrance, though no clashes with the security forces have been reported at the time of writing. Localised mobility disruption and clashes are possible near the central bank in the coming hours, though these are unlikely to extend to other downtown areas. Protests over access to banking intensified throughout 2023 after banks imposed arbitrary restrictions on their clients’ access to savings due to major insolvency issues. As such, further protests are likely in the coming weeks; they will likely exert more pressure on the government, driving sporadic localised mobility disruption and bystander risks in Beirut and other major cities.

*Egypt-Israel: New terrorist group’s threats to Israel will likely prompt Egypt to boost security in Sinai. On 18 January, a newly formed terrorist group calling itself Kataa’ib al Farouq threatened to launch attacks against Israel from Egypt’s Sinai peninsula in response to the Israel-Hamas war. In a telegram video, masked gunmen urged members of regional armed forces to take joint action against Israel. We assess that regional military personnel are highly unlikely to respond to this call. The Egyptian security forces are currently conducting investigations in the Sinai in response to a recent large-scale armed smuggling attempt from Sinai into Israel. As such, the video will likely prompt the Egyptian security forces to augment their existing Sinai operations to search for local jihadist cells. It is also likely that Egypt will continue to co-operate closely with Israel to enhance border security in the coming weeks; this will possibly disrupt movement through both the Taba and Awja/Nitzana border crossings.

Jan 18.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*Yemen-US: Redesignation of Houthis as terrorist group will possibly restrict international aid. On 17 January, the US Department of State announced the redesignation of the Yemen-based Houthi militant group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity. Physical security risks in the region will likely be sustained (especially for vessels traversing the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden) as Houthi maritime attacks continue despite coalition airstrikes. It is possible that the redesignation will exacerbate compliance risks for humanitarian organisations in Yemen, leading to the restriction of food and aid supplies in Houthi-controlled areas in the short term. This would be detrimental for vulnerable populations in north-western governorates, where food and water supplies are already critically low. Additionally, the redesignation will likely be used to justify more airstrikes against the group in the coming weeks, reducing prospects for a negotiated resolution in the medium term.

  • Lebanese Hizballah’s reported rejection of US mediation efforts is likely to prompt intensified and more frequent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes in southern Lebanon, driving escalation risks.
  • Israel’s interception of a missile over the Red Sea and air defence drills in Eilat reflect the increasing likelihood of renewed Yemen-based Houthi attacks targeting Israel, as well as the elevated security and bystander risks facing southern Israel and neighbouring countries due to debris.
  • Gaza: Intense IDF operations are ongoing in tunnels under Khan Yunis in southern Gaza. Also in southern Gaza, an Israeli Air Force (IAF) fighter jet struck a rocket launchpad site in Rafah, underscoring the fact that Israel is conducting airstrikes outside Khan Yunis; this will drive security risks facing NGO staff working in areas with no on-the-ground IDF presence.
  • West Bank: IDF operations have continued on trend. The IDF conducted a large-scale operation in Tulkarm on 17 January.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Tit-for-tat exchanges between Lebanese Hizballah and Israel have continued in line with recent trends. Hamas claimed that it fired 20 rockets from Lebanon at a military barracks on Israel’s northern coast on 17 January; no damage was reported. A targeted attack conducted by Hamas from Lebanon against IDF military positions indicates there is a realistic possibility that the group has received assistance from Lebanese Hizballah. Security and bystander risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon will remain elevated in the coming week.
  • Red Sea: Late on 17 January, the US conducted strikes against 14 Houthi missile sites where missiles were being prepared for launch. The strikes came less than four hours after the Houthis struck the Genco Picardy (a US-owned Marshall Islands-flagged cargo vessel) with a drone near the Gulf of Aden. According to reports, the Genco Picardy sustained damage but was able to continue its journey. The attacks reflect a growing tit-for-tat dynamic; the Houthis also stated that they have not yet conducted retaliatory action for the 12 January joint UK-US strikes. This dynamic will sustain elevated threats to maritime traffic passing through the Red Sea in the coming days.
  • Israel: On 18 January, an Israeli missile intercepted a suspicious aerial target over the Red Sea. Additionally, Israel has been testing its early alert systems in Eilat over the past week. These developments underscore the growing likelihood of renewed Houthi attacks targeting Eilat in the coming weeks. This will likely elevate security and bystander risks in southern Israel (particularly Eilat) and in neighbouring countries due to possible debris following interceptions. However, the risk of a successful strike in Israel will be mitigated by Israeli air defence systems, as well as the capabilities offered by the US and allied navies.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Late on 17 January, the Qatari foreign ministry announced that medical supplies had entered Gaza following an agreement between Israel and Hamas. The medical supplies, which include medicines for Israeli hostages held in Gaza, entered via the Kerem Shalom goods crossing following an inspection by the IDF. While this development represents substantial progress in Israel-Hamas negotiations, the ongoing telecommunications blackout continues to restrict humanitarian operations therein. Given the critical energy insecurity and widespread damage to communications infrastructure, telecommunications firms in Gaza have reported widespread service outages since 12 January; this has restricted communication with on-the-ground staff and sustained significant operational risks for humanitarian entities.
  • Lebanese Hizballah has reportedly declined US diplomatic proposals to moderate cross-border tensions, underscoring the likelihood of continued clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border. On 18 January, numerous sources reported that Lebanese Hizballah representatives had rejected a mediation plan presented by US special envoy Amos Hochstein to Lebanese caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati. The deal envisioned Lebanese Hizballah withdrawing its forces from the immediate vicinity of the Israel-Lebanon border. Although Lebanese Hizballah reportedly remains open to mediation efforts and diplomatic overtures, the organisation is unlikely to de-escalate current hostilities without significant progress towards an Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, sustaining elevated cross-border tensions.
  • A cyber attack against Israel’s largest petrochemical company by a Russian-affiliated threat actor has underscored the elevated likelihood of attacks targeting high-profile entities linked to Israel. On 17 January, the Bazan Group, which operates Israel’s largest oil refinery in Haifa Bay (Haifa district), acknowledged a temporary service outage following a cyber attack. The attack was claimed by Anonymous Sudan, a Russian-affiliated hacking group which has conducted numerous attacks against Israel and associated Western interests since 2022. Similarly, on 15 January, the group claimed an attack against the London Internet Exchange (LINX) following the UK-US airstrikes against Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen (see Sibylline Alert – Yemen – 12 January 2024). While neither entity’s operations were significantly impacted, the incidents underscore the increased cyber threat facing firms linked to Israel, particularly in the energy

Jan 17.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The assassination of a senior militant leader in the West Bank by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reflects increased efforts to address rising militant activity; this will sustain elevated tensions in the West Bank.
  • Confirmed US strikes against Houthi launchpads and indications of a possible redesignation of the Houthis as a terrorist group reflect an increasingly proactive US stance; this will likely drive regional tensions, persistent security risks and compliance challenges for NGOs operating in Yemen.
  • Gaza: IDF operations continue throughout Gaza, with sporadic incidents of renewed fighting in northern Gaza indicating the return of militants following a reduction of IDF activity in the area. In Khan Yunis in southern Gaza, the IDF conducted an aerial resupply mission over the past week, parachuting 16 tonnes of supplies to IDF troops. It is highly likely that this was in part practice for possible similar measures in theatres outside Israel, such as Lebanon. Over the past 24 hours, the IDF has claimed that rockets were fired from the Nasser Hospital compound in Khan Yunis against its forces in the north of the city. Further launches from humanitarian facilities in southern Gaza will elevate the likelihood of these areas being targeted in IDF clearing operations, increasing security risks for NGOs.
  • West Bank: The IDF assassinated a prominent militant leader, Abdullah Abu-Shalal, in a drone strike against Balata (Nablus governorate). Abu-Shalal was the key figure behind several recent militant attacks. According to the Israeli security forces, he was planning another imminent large-scale terror attack. The IDF conducted an operation in the area to lure him out before striking his vehicle, killing three other militants who were travelling with him. IDF drone strike assassinations are relatively unusual in the West Bank, highlighting the efforts by Israel’s security forces to underscore both their presence and their capabilities in response to an increase in militant activity in the West Bank.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Hostilities and tit-for-tat exchanges along the Israel-Lebanon border continued at their regular pace; we observed no significant incidents.
  • Red Sea: On 16 January, the US confirmed that it conducted strikes against Houthi missile launchpads in Yemen. According to a US official, the Houthis were preparing to target vessels in the region. The strikes further underscore that the US is moving to a more proactive stance in the Red Sea area, striking targets that pose an imminent threat rather than simply intercepting them. This is likely to continue elevating regional tensions in the coming weeks, sustaining security risks for passing vessels in the Red Sea.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • An agreement to deliver medical supplies to Israeli hostages in Gaza highlights that progress is being made in ceasefire negotiations, though controversy over aid inspections will threaten future deliveries. Earlier on 17 January, Israel and Hamas reached an agreement, mediated by France and Qatar, to deliver medical aid to hostages in exchange for a broader increase in medical aid deliveries to Gaza. Senior Hamas figure Moussa Abu Marzouk subsequently stated that Israel will not inspect medical supplies before they enter Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has denied authorising the non-inspection of aid, stating that decisions regarding aid inspection are made by the IDF; National Unity Party leader and cabinet member Benny Gantz has rejected this claim, stating that such a decision lies with ‘the political echelon’. IDF sources claim that they were not notified of this development. While the agreement signals progress in ongoing ceasefire and hostage release negotiations, confusion and disagreements over the aid inspection process will likely delay the delivery of medical aid to hostages and civilians in Gaza.
  • On 16 January, unidentified perpetrators detonated an IED at the offices of an Israeli shipping firm in Greece. The explosion targeted the Piraeus (Attica region) offices of Zim, Israel’s main container shipping line; it resulted in minor material damage and no injuries. The perpetrators reportedly scattered ‘Free Palestine’ leaflets at the scene. The attack underscores the elevated physical security and bystander risks facing Israeli-linked businesses. It is also possibly indicative of a shift towards the targeting of the shipping industry; this is possibly a result of the Yemen-based Houthis’ recent attacks against ships in the Red Sea area.

FORECAST

Over the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility that the US will re-designate the Yemen-based Houthis as a terrorist organisation, sustaining elevated physical security risks and regional instability. Such a move would likely reflect US efforts to further justify airstrikes against Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, both domestically and internationally. Additional airstrikes against Houthi territory are unlikely to degrade the group’s capabilities significantly in the short term, sustaining the likelihood of further attacks against commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea. Furthermore, the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organisation would exacerbate compliance risks for firms linked to humanitarian efforts in Yemen, possibly restricting the supply of aid in the medium-to-long term, particularly in Houthi-controlled territory. Given the already critical food and water insecurity levels, restricted aid deliveries would likely exacerbate the severe humanitarian crisis across Yemen, particularly in north-western governorates. There is a realistic possibility that worsening deprivation would drive the Houthis’ and allied militant groups’ recruitment campaigns, undermining the prospects for long-term stabilisation and the resolution of the Yemeni civil war.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

Jan 16.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Continue reduction of IDF forces in Gaza, despite likely presence of undiscovered weapons caches in the area, will elevate risks of an uptick in cross-border rocket fire from Gaza in the coming weeks.
  • Rising hostilities between IDF and Hizballah will elevate conflict escalation risks in the coming months.
  • Iranian strike in Iraq will elevate risks of expanding Israel-Iran shadow war, increasing regional security and cyber risks in the coming months.
  • Gaza: The IDF continue its operation throughout Gaza, slowly reducing forces as part of the transition to the third phase. The IDF confirmed that as part of the reduction of forces in Gaza, the Golani brigade left Gaza on 15 January. Currently, three divisions remain in Gaza: Division 98, operating with seven brigades in Khan Yunis in southern Gaza, Division 99 which holds the Netzarim Corridor in central Gaza, and Division 162 which is conducting short brigade raids in northern Gaza. Earlier on 16 January, Hamas fired dozens of rockets from the areas of Bureij and Nuseirat in central Gaza, which IDF Division 36 left on 15 January (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 15 January 2024). The rockets hit several locations in Eshkol Regional Council and Netivot, in the Gaza Envelope and the Southern District, causing material damage without injuries. Additionally, IDF fighters found 60 rockets ready for launch during an operation in northern Gaza.
  • Egypt: Armed clashes between the IDF and 20 smugglers on the Israel-Egypt border on 15 January injured one IDF member and killed one smuggler. Armed smuggler activity is not uncommon on the Israel-Egypt border, however, this incident was particularly large in scale. As such, the scale of this incident possibly indicates that this was not just normal narcotics smuggling but likely also an attempt to move weapons across the border. Following the incident, an Israeli delegation will visit Cairo in the coming days to discuss security co-operation on the Israel-Egypt border.
  • West Bank: IDF intensified operations in the West Bank, particularly in population centres associated with militants responsible for attacks observed over the past several days. Israel security forces arrested a total of 28 suspects on terrorism charges and stopped dozens for questioning in the past 24 hours. Increased operations around villages are likely to continue disrupting mobility in the West Bank and elevate tensions in the coming days.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Earlier on 16 January, the IDF performed intense combined artillery and fighter jet strikes in Wadi Saluki in southern Lebanon, targeting multiple Hizballah infrastructure sites. Additionally, in the past week, IDF Battalion 5030 of Infantry Brigade 228 drilled an attack in Lebanon. The drill and the continued rising intensity of IDF strikes and subsequent retaliation by Lebanese-based militants highlight increased escalation risks. While imminent major escalation remains unlikely, continued escalation in the coming months will increase the risks of an armed conflict.
  • Syria: Local news reported alleged Israeli strikes against Iran-linked targets in Aleppo, Syria on 15 January. According to reports some strikes also targeted areas adjacent to Aleppo International Airport (ALP), although there are no confirmed strikes against the airport itself. The strikes are consistent with the recent increased Israeli activity in Syria as part of efforts to degrade militant and Iranian proxy capabilities. They are unlikely to signal a significant escalation.
  • Red Sea: Elevated tensions and attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea continue to disrupt international shipping lanes. On 16 January, a Malta-flagged bulk carrier, the ZOGRAFIA was reportedly struck by a missile and sustained minor damage when transiting the Red Sea; the attack was almost certainly conducted by the Yemen-based Houthis. US Central Command also reported the interception of a vessel sailing from Iran to Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen which contained anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile components guidance systems. Amid the significantly elevated operational risk environment, the Wall Street Journal reported on 16 January that oil major Shell had suspended all shipments through the Red Sea in early January, underscoring continued disruption to international shipping operations.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Hamas released additional hostage propaganda videos on 14 and 15 January, likely aiming to increase domestic pressure on the Israeli government to engage in ceasefire negotiations. The videos contained footage of three Israeli hostages, two of whom reportedly died after filming. Hamas has claimed that the hostages were killed in IDF airstrikes, while the IDF denied conducting airstrikes against the building Hamas described as housing the hostages. Also on 14 January, Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida stated that Hamas has lost track of numerous hostages in its tunnel networks due to Israeli airstrikes. Hamas’ attempts to characterise IDF operations in Gaza as detrimental to hostage survival reflect ongoing efforts to foster domestic pressure on the Israeli government to engage in hostage release and ceasefire negotiations.
  • Continued disruption of telecommunication services in Gaza is significantly undermining humanitarian operations throughout the enclave. Since 12 January, telecommunications firms in Gaza have reported widespread service outages given ongoing IDF operations, critical energy insecurity and widespread damage to communications infrastructure. Disruption to telecommunications will almost certainly continue, impacting communication with on-the-ground staff and elevating operational risks for humanitarian organisations within Gaza. Consequently, further disruption to the delivery and distribution of food and medical aid is highly likely, exacerbating critical socio-economic conditions.
  • On 16 January, the European Union imposed sanctions on Hamas political leader Yahya Sinwar. Current EU efforts to sanction individuals associated with Hamas are unlikely to significantly increase compliance risks for firms with operations in the Palestinian Territories or the broader region. Even so, there is a realistic possibility that ongoing efforts to sanction Hamas and related entities will increase risks of sanction exposure while elevating compliance risks and due diligence requirements.

FORECAST

The reduction of military forces in Gaza over the coming weeks will increase the likelihood of a moderate uptick in the frequency and intensity of cross-border rocket fire into Israel. The withdrawal of IDF troops from parts of the Gaza Strip will likely provide militants an opportunity to access undiscovered weapon stashes and refocus these against Israeli population centres. Furthermore, the planned reduction in the intensity of IDF operations as part of the transition into the third phase is likely to enlarge the window of opportunity to conduct launches. Such launches, and the associated sirens and precautionary measures, will increase security risks and operational disruption in Israeli population centres over the coming weeks.

Tit-for-tat indirect fire and armed clashes between Israel and Lebanon will likely continue to increase in scale and intensity, raising the risks of major escalation over the coming months. The IDF continue to maintain a hostile approach to Hizballah activity and presence in southern Lebanon, including increasing evidence of preparations to expand operations in southern Lebanon. While currently, an imminent major escalation in the form of a ground offensive remains unlikely, continued intensification of hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border will elevate the risks of such an escalation in the coming months. There is a realistic possibility that such a scenario will include an extended airstrike campaign in southern Lebanon, followed by targeted IDF raids.

Hamas’ release of hostage video material will likely sustain elevated pressure on the Israeli government during ceasefire negotiations, though significant progress is unlikely over the coming days. Emotive footage of hostages held in Gaza, particularly following the commemorative events held on 14 January (the 100-day anniversary of the 7 October attacks), will likely continue escalating domestic pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases through diplomatic measures. However, Hamas has limited capacity to credibly commit to releasing hostages, given the distribution of hostages to numerous allied militant groups and ongoing disruption to telecommunication networks. Consequently, progress in negotiations will likely be limited in the short term. Even so, continued diplomatic engagement between both parties will sustain the realistic possibility of a temporary ceasefire and hostage release agreement being reached in the coming weeks, despite numerous sticking points.

There is a realistic possibility that Iran’s strike in Iraq on 15 January, harmed Israeli interests and assets in the region, increasing the likelihood of further escalation in the Israel-Iran shadow war. There is a realistic possibility of an Israeli response through elevated strikes against Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets in Syria as well as through covert operations. These will elevate security and bystander risks around military and militant positions in Syria as well as for Iranian and Israeli individuals, particularly those with significant connections to either government. There is a realistic possibility of cyber attacks targeting service providers and government systems, causing business disruption in Iran and/or Israel over the coming weeks (see Sibylline Alert – 16 January 2024).

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

Jan 15.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Uptick in attacks emanating from the West Bank, including an attempted infiltration of an Israeli settlement and a terror attack in central Israel reflect growing tensions and security risks across Israel.
  • Intensification of incidents on the Israel-Lebanon border, including an attempt to infiltrate Israel’s Har Dov area and the killing of two Israeli civilians by a rocket, is likely to elevate risks of uncontrolled escalation.
  • Gaza: IDF operations in north, central and south Gaza continue on trend. During operations in Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza, the IDF claimed to have discovered compounds used for weapon production, including artillery and rockets, hidden inside a building used by a humanitarian organisation. Throughout the past 72 hours, there was a slight uptick in rocket launches from Gaza into southern and central Israel, triggering sirens in Ashdod, Ben Zakai and Yavne.
  • Israel: At least 19 individuals have been injured in a suspected terror attack in Raanana, central district, on 15 January. According to early reports, the attack involved both stabbing and car-ramming in three different areas of the city, however, it is unclear if this was coordinated by several people or if a single assailant was regularly changing vehicles. The Israeli police have arrested two suspects from Hebron (West Bank) from the same family, with investigations ongoing for further accomplices. The on-the-ground security presence in large cities throughout Israel is likely to increase in the coming hours. There is a risk the incident will inspire further attacks, elevating security and bystander risks, particularly in cities in central Israel.
  • West Bank: There has been an uptick in attacks and violent incidents throughout the past 72 hours, particularly near Hebron (southern West Bank) with the rising tensions prompting the redeployment of the IDF’s elite Duvdevan Unit from Gaza to the West Bank. On 12 January, three Palestinians, two of whom are minors aged 16 and one 19, attempted to infiltrate and conduct a terror attack in the Israeli settlement of Adora (Hebron governorate). The three, armed with an assault rifle, Molotov cocktails, axes and knives, injured an IDF soldier on patrol. Subsequently, IDF troops responding to the incident killed the three during a shootout. Additionally, On 14 January, a Palestinian vehicle breached an IDF checkpoint near the Metzad settlement between Bethlehem and Hebron, opening fire on IDF personnel; the two perpetrators in the vehicle were pursued and at least one was shot dead. On the same day, the IDF killed two young Palestinians near Wadi al-Rim (Hebron governorate) claiming they opened fire on soldiers. Palestinian outlets disputed this account claiming the two were hunting for birds. The increase in incidents around Hebron elevates the likelihood of an IDF operation in the area, elevating security, bystander and mobility risks in the coming days.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Intensification of cross-border incidents over the past 72 hours reflects a continuation of the gradual escalation trend. On 12 January, the IDF killed three militants trying to cross from Lebanon into Israel in the Har Dov area (Golan Heights). During the incident, the militants reportedly injured five IDF soldiers. On 14 January, a Hizballah attack using anti-tank-guided missiles killed two Israeli civilians in Yuval (Northern district). These incidents reflect an intensification of cross-border clashes in line with the previously observed trend. We assess that currently, a major escalation involving the mobilisation of ground forces into Israel or Lebanon continues to remain unlikely.
  • Yemen: Despite additional US airstrikes in Yemen, Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea continue. On 13 January, the US conducted an airstrike on Houthi radar facilities in the Sanaa governorate, though these strikes are unlikely to have significantly impacted the Houthi’s capacity to conduct attacks on vessels in the Red Sea. On 14 January, US Central Command reported that an anti-ship cruise missile was fired from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen at the USS Laboon; US fighter aircraft intercepted the missile. Additionally, earlier on 15 January, an unnamed commercial vessel was struck by a missile while transiting the Gulf of Aden in what is likely an additional Houthi attack, highlighting persistent significant risks to vessels and crews operating in the area.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • On 15 January, the Israeli cabinet voted to amend the 2024 budget, with budget cuts and value-added tax increases underscoring moderately elevated policy risk. The amendments include significant budget cuts for several government ministries not directly linked to the war effort, as well as a 1% increase in value-added tax (VAT) to be implemented in 2025. Amid significantly increased military spending and an increasing deficit, the budget also releases approximately NIS 5.5bn (USD 669m) in coalition funds for religious schools and Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Cuts to government spending and VAT increases underscore moderately elevated policy risk which will likely persist as the war continues to develop. There is also a realistic possibility of domestic unrest by Israelis and Palestinians opposed to the recipients of coalition funds over the coming days.
  • On 13 January, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that his government was considering proposals to allow West Bank Palestinian labourers to re-enter Israel amid rising concerns of domestic unrest. Since 7 October, approximately 150,000 West Bank Palestinian labourers holding work permits have been unable to enter Israel for work, undermining socio-economic conditions in the West Bank and resulting in moderate labour shortages in Israel, primarily in the construction sector. Since 30 October, the Israeli government has also suspended the transfer of taxes collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority; consequently, the PA has delayed the payment of civil servants and public-sector employees, compounding socio-economic concerns. The announcement comes amid persistently elevated ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank and reflects the Israeli government’s increasing concerns over the potential for increasing economically driven domestic unrest over the coming weeks.
  • The arrest of an Israeli footballer in Turkey underscores deteriorating bilateral relations and elevated detention risks for individuals associated with Israel. On 14 January, Sagiv Jehezkel, an Israeli footballer playing for Antalyaspor, was arrested by Turkish police after referencing solidarity with Israeli hostages held in Gaza during a match in Antalya (Antalya province). Though Jehezkel has subsequently been released from custody, significantly elevated diplomatic tensions between Israel and Turkey will sustain heightened risks of security force harassment and arbitrary detention for Israeli and Israel-linked individuals throughout Turkey.
  • On 13 January, numerous demonstrations associated with the Global Day of Action for Palestine took place worldwide, disrupting movement and resulting in multiple arrests. Large-scale pro-Palestine demonstrations occurred in numerous cities including Vienna (Austria), Paris (France), Berlin (Germany), Milan and Rome (Italy), Dublin (Ireland), Amman (Jordan), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), Colombo (Sri Lanka), Edinburgh, London and Manchester (UK), Cape Town and Johannesburg (South Africa), and New York and Washington D.C. (US). While the demonstrations were broadly peaceful, on 14 January British police arrested six protesters associated with the Palestine Action Group for planning to disrupt operations at the London Stock Exchange. While the plan was reportedly non-violent, the arrests underscore elevated risks of high-visibility acts of civil disobedience driving operational disruption amid elevated protest activity linked to the Israel-Hamas war.

FORECAST

Over the coming weeks, continued socio-economic stress and elevated ethno-religious tensions will increase risks of domestic unrest in the West Bank, increasing physical security and bystander risks. The IDF’s transfer of the elite Duvdevan Unit from Gaza to the West Bank underscores concerns over the potential escalation of unrest and militant activity in the West Bank over the coming weeks. Following the car ramming and stabbing attack in Raanana, which has been provisionally attributed to irregular migrant(s) from the West Bank, there is a realistic possibility of further delays to the authorisation of Palestinian labourers re-entering Israel. Continued restrictions on Palestinian labour flexibility are highly likely to further exacerbate socio-economic concerns in the West Bank, increasing the likelihood of elevated domestic unrest over the coming weeks. Although the mass mobilisation of Palestinian civilians into militant groups remains unlikely in the short- to medium-term, elevated levels of unrest will increase the likelihood of clashes with security forces, particularly in unrest hotspots such as Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya and Tulkarm. Furthermore, continued economic stress will likely drive violent clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinian civilians, elevating physical security and bystander risks in proximity to settlements, further exacerbating ethno-religious tensions therein.

Increased tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border area elevate risks of uncontrolled escalation. Earlier on 15 January, Israeli news media reported that Division 36 of the IDF would withdraw from Gaza for a period of rest and training. The report claimed that further operational activity of the division will be decided after the training, though without discussing the nature of these operations. The 36 Division is regularly assigned to northern Israel, as such it is likely that its withdrawal from Gaza and the training period are part of Israel’s preparations for further armed escalation in northern Israel. The recent gradual escalation of armed clashes in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as hostile rhetoric, particularly from Israel, is likely to continue elevating tensions in the coming week. This will drive the risk of attacks into Israel, including further attempted low-level infiltrations, particularly during weather events such as heavy fog or rainfall. While Hizballah and affiliated militants seemingly focus their attacks on military positions and forces, the risk of misidentification persists. Persistent retaliatory violence between the two sides will further elevate security and bystander risks across northern Israel and southern Lebanon, and drive the risk of escalation. However, we continue to assess that major escalation involving the mobilisation of ground forces into Israel or Lebanon currently remains unlikely.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza

(Source: Sibylline)

 

20 Jan 24. Israeli strike kills Iranian military advisers in Syria. An Israeli air strike on Damascus on Saturday killed four members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including a senior figure in its information unit, according to reports.

Tehran media outlets reported that two high-ranking Iranian military advisers were killed in the blast.

The strike, using precision-guided missiles, flattened a multi-storey building in the neighbourhood of Mazzeh in the Syrian capital, a Syrian security source told Reuters.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said: “An Israeli missile strike targeted a four-storey building, killing five people… and destroying the whole building where Iran-aligned leaders were meeting”.

The British-based monitor, which has a network of sources inside Syria, said the targeted neighbourhood is known to be a high-security zone – home to leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and pro-Iran Palestinian factions.

The mid-morning strike, which caused a large plume of smoke to billow into the sky, was also reported by Syrian state media. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

18 Jan 24. U.S. Conducts Defensive Strikes on Houthi Missiles. This morning, U.S. Central Command forces conducted defensive strikes on two Houthi antiship missiles that were aimed into the southern Red Sea, said Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh, who spoke today at a news conference at the Pentagon. Also, last night, U.S. Centcom conducted defensive strikes on 14 Houthi missiles at over a dozen locations, she said.

On Jan. 11, USS LEWIS B. PULLER (ESB 3) intercepts the dhow and conducts a nighttime boarding. US Sailors maintained custody of the dhow until daybreak and completed an extensive search of the vessel with assistance of the US Coast Guard.

“These missiles on launch rails presented an imminent threat to merchant vessels and U.S. Navy ships in the region and could have been fired at any time,” she said.

These defensive strikes, carried out by Navy F/A-18 attack aircraft were taken because of the threat of imminent attack by the Houthis and to protect freedom of navigation, she said.

These strikes and others in past weeks were designed to degrade the Houthis capabilities to continue their reckless attacks on international and commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, Singh said.

“The U.S. and the international community call on the Houthis to cease their unlawful attacks on commercial shipping vessels and to respect the international community’s right to freely and safely navigate international waters,” she said. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/US DoD)

 

18 Jan 24. Israel Eliminates a Senior Hamas Counter-Espionage Official in Gaza. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in collaboration with the Shin Bet intelligence agency, successfully targeted and eliminated Bilal Nofal, a senior Hamas official known for his role in interrogating suspects of espionage in the Gaza Strip. The operation was executed using an Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft. Nofal was not only pivotal in conducting counter-espionage activities but also played a crucial role in advancing Hamas’ research and development processes. His responsibilities included the development of organizational learning methods, enhancing Hamas’ ability to adapt and evolve in its operational tactics. The IDF has highlighted that Nofal’s elimination significantly impairs Hamas’ capacity to develop and fortify its intelligence and operational competencies. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

18 Jan 24. Arab states are working on an initiative to secure a ceasefire and the release of hostages in Gaza as part of a broader plan that could offer Israel a normalisation of relations if it agrees to “irreversible” steps towards the creation of a Palestinian state. A senior Arab official said they hoped to present the plan — which could include the prize of Saudi Arabia formalising ties with Israel — within a few weeks in an effort to end the Israel-Hamas war and prevent a wider conflict erupting in the Middle East. Arab officials have discussed the plan with the US and European governments. It would include western nations agreeing to formally recognise a Palestinian state, or supporting the Palestinians being granted full membership of the UN. “The real issue is you need hope for Palestinians, it can’t just be economic benefits or removal of symbols of occupation,” the senior official said. The initiative comes as Israel faces mounting international pressure to end its offensive in besieged Gaza, with the US stepping up diplomatic efforts to prevent a broader conflagration and pushing for a longer-term resolution to the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. US secretary of state Antony Blinken on Wednesday described the war in Gaza as “gut-wrenching”, adding that what was needed was a Palestinian state “that gives people what they want and works with Israel to be effective”. Demonstrators in Israel call for the release of hostages still held captive in Gaza © Tyrone Siu/Reuters When Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan was asked on Tuesday if Riyadh would recognise Israel as part of a wider political agreement, he said “certainly”. “We agree that regional peace includes peace for Israel, but that could only happen through peace for the Palestinians through a Palestinian state,” he told a panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Later on Tuesday, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Washington remained focused on securing an agreement that led to Saudi Arabia normalising relations with Israel as part of its plans for the postwar era. “Our approach is and remains focused on moving towards greater integration and stability in the region,” Sullivan said in Davos. But there are multiple challenges to securing a deal with Israel. After Hamas’s October 7 attack killed at least 1,200 people, Israeli officials warned that the war in Gaza would last months, while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has ruled out working with the western-backed Palestinian Authority and rejects a two-state solution. In December, Netanyahu said he was “proud” that he had prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state, saying “everyone understands what would have happened if we had capitulated to international pressures and enabled a state like that”. The prime minister presides over the most far-right government in Israel’s history, which includes religious Zionist settlers who openly call for the annexation of the West Bank. “Given the Israeli body politic today, normalisation is maybe what can bring Israelis off the cliff,” said the senior Arab official. (Source: FT.com)

 

16 Jan 24. IDF Special Forces Are Targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have expanded their engagement with Hezbollah by carrying out multiple operations in southern Lebanon. This escalation comes in the wake of Hezbollah’s increased aggressiveness, which recently culminated in the death of two Israeli civilians and attacks on key Israeli military installations. According to a report from the Jerusalem Post, IDF special ground forces undertook operations inside Lebanon near the Ita al-Sha’ab area, neutralizing a terror threat. Additionally, the Israeli Air Force attacked a Hezbollah anti-tank launcher in southern Lebanon. These strikes were part of a broader series of aerial and artillery attacks on Hezbollah targets in the Wadi Saluki area. The IDF’s statement detailed the destruction of dozens of Hezbollah posts, military structures, and weapons infrastructure, accusing Hezbollah of exploiting the Wadi Saluki area for terrorist activities. Hezbollah-affiliated news outlet al-Mayadeen offers a different account, claiming that IDF soldiers from the Maglan commando unit attempted to infiltrate the border near the al-Raheb military site to plant surveillance devices but were noticed and aborted the mission. The IDF has not provided further details on this operation. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

17 Jan 24. Plan to send warships to Red Sea clears hurdle. As Houthi rebels in Yemen continue attacking commercial and military ships in the Red Sea, the EU is preparing a military mission to protect freedom of navigation along the crucial route leading to the Suez Canal that connects Europe with Asia. View from Madrid: Spain, which had opposed previous plans, will not block a new mission, clearing the way for the operation, people involved in the discussions told Playbook.

Economic impact: Earlier this week, Economy Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni warned that the consequences of the instability in the region “could materialize in the coming weeks,” though for the moment EU energy prices and inflation are not yet affected.

Operation AGENOR: Representatives of the 27 EU countries on Tuesday discussed plans to defend the busy waterway against Houthi attacks with anti-air destroyers, according to four people briefed on the discussions. The mission would build on an existing French-led surveillance mission, operation AGENOR, as proposed by the EU’s foreign affairs service, the EEAS. My colleague Jacopo Barigazzi first reported on the EU’s plan last week.

The EU Military Committee, the supreme military body within the Council of the EU, has been asked to provide its advice.

Spain clears a path: Spain will not block a mission along those lines, diplomats said, clearing the way for willing countries to participate — though Spain itself won’t take part. Late last December, Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez blocked the EU’s plan to send warships to the Red Sea by expanding the Atalanta mission, of which Spain is a member.

The warships: An EEAS document seen by POLITICO talks about the need for at least three anti-air destroyers or frigates for the operation, but diplomats say that it is still unclear who exactly will provide what. It will take some time to get full clarity as some EU governments will need to involve their parliaments in the process.

What’s next: EU countries want to turn the plan into action as soon as possible, but no later than by the meeting of foreign affairs ministers on February 19, diplomats said. (Source: News Now/https://www.politico.eu/)

 

16 Jan 24. Decryption of Mossad’s GSM Lines Reveals Extensive Espionage in Turkey. In a significant counter-espionage operation, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) decrypted seven GSM lines used by the Cyber Operations Center (IÇOM) of Israel’s Mossad. This breakthrough led to the discovery of Mossad’s extensive espionage network within Turkey, particularly targeting Palestinian nationals and those close to the Hamas leadership.

The investigation revealed that Mossad successfully established contact with individuals closely associated with the Hamas leadership. Notable arrest include a bodyguard for Hamas official Khalidi Almasal, and the brother of a Palestinian national working for Israeli intelligence, who served as a social media advisor for Hamas leader Ismail Heniyye.

The extensive operation spanned eight provinces and involved raids on 57 locations. Authorities issued arrest warrants for 46 suspects, some of whom managed to evade capture. The detainees are mainly foreign nationals and are suspected of engaging in reconnaissance, surveillance, and other espionage activities. Sources indicate that the operatives were recruited through vaguely described job announcements. They reportedly received payments in cash and used specially designed bags with secret compartments to evade detection at customs. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

15 Jan 24. US says it shot down anti-ship cruise missile from Houthi-controlled areas. U.S. fighter aircraft shot down an anti-ship cruise missile fired from Houthi militant areas of Yemen toward a U.S. destroyer operating in the Southern Red Sea, the U.S. military said on Sunday.

The midair interception is the latest incident in the Red Sea where the Houthis have been attacking international shipping in what they say is a campaign to support Palestinians under seige from Israeli forces in Gaza.

It follows a series of American and British airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen that have drawn threats of a “strong” response from the Iranian-backed militia.

There were no injuries or damage reported in the latest incident, according to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which released the news in a statement posted on the social media platform X.

CENTCOM said the missile was shot down near Yemen’s port city of Hodeidah.

Earlier on Sunday, the Houthis complained that U.S. aircraft were observed flying close to Yemeni airspace and coastal areas.

Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam described the activity by “enemy” aircraft as a blatant violation of national sovereignty.

Reuters could not immediately determine whether the incidents were one and the same. CENTCOM did not immediately respond to an email seeking further details about the interception.

The Red Sea crisis has added to anxieties over a wider conflict in the Middle East beyond Gaza, which Israel is reducing to rubble in what it says is a campaign to annihilate the Palestinian militant group Hamas, which rules the strip and, like the Houthis, is backed by Tehran.

Also on Sunday, pro-Palestinian activists protested at the gates of RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, angry that the British base was used as a launch pad for strikes against the Houthis.

“We are here because we condemn the complicity of the UK government and using Cypriot land for their agenda to support Israel in their onslaught of Gaza,” said Natalia Olivia of the Cyprus-based United for Palestine organisation. (Source: Reuters)

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