BATTLESPACE Updates

   +44 (0)77689 54766
   

NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

————————————————————————-

Military And Security Developments

Dec 15.

  • IDF clearing operations in Gaza continue, with intense clashes in Jabalia, Shujaiya and Zaytoun (northern Gaza). The IDF has announced the completion of the takeover of Hamas’ Shujaiya battalion’s headquarters. In Jabalia, the IDF provided footage of an attempted ambush, in which Hamas had used a number of life-sized dummies which broadcast crying voices and Hebrew over speakers to act as bait. Over the past 24 hours, the IDF announced it recovered the bodies of three hostages held by Hamas and were known to be kidnapped alive. In Beit Lahiya (northern Gaza) the IDF announced it arrested 70 militants in the vicinity of Kamal Adwan Hospital after they surrendered. The IDF has continued advancing into Khan Yunis.
  • Tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border remain elevated despite a slight decrease in cross-border strikes in the past 24 hours. On 15 December, Lebanese reports claimed the IDF spread leaflets in southern Lebanon at Kfarchuba and Kfarhamam, warning against co-operation with Hizballah. Despite the reduced hostilities, IDF continued to strike Hizballah’s positions and infrastructure overnight and on the morning of 15 December, with Hizballah retaliating with anti-tank guided missiles and rockets. As a result, escalation risks persist, as well as security and bystander risks in the vicinity of the Israel-Lebanon border.
  • The IDF operation in Jenin, northern West Bank has concluded, resulting in dozens arrested, at least 11 Palestinians dead and numerous injuries.  Additionally, Palestinian sources reported an IDF UAV strike on a Vehicle in Balata (Nablus governorate) as a failed assassination attempt with no injuries or deaths reported. Sporadic demonstrations broke out in Hebron and Nablus after Friday prayers, though without significant incident.
  • Overnight and on the morning of 15 December, Iranian-backed Houthis attacked two Liberian-flagged ships passing near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. One of the vessels was hit by a projectile, likely a drone, causing a fire but no injuries, while the other was targeted by two ballistic missiles, one of which made impact, causing a fire. Additionally, presumed Houthis instructed two other vessels passing near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait to change their course, claiming they were not allowed to enter the Red Sea.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Volume of aid delivery into Gaza is likely to increase, moderately addressing humanitarian concerns though critical water and food insecurity persist. Over the past 24 hours, the Kerem Shalom and Nitzana border crossings have inspected approximately 200 aid trucks which subsequently passed into Gaza via the Rafah border crossing. On 15 December, the Israeli security cabinet will also vote on allowing aid to pass directly into Gaza via the Kerem Shalom crossing and will likely approve this proposal. The opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing will likely further increase the rate and volume of aid deliveries, reducing risks of bottlenecks and/or logistical issues at the Rafah crossing disrupting the delivery and distribution of aid. While there is a realistic possibility that such deliveries will improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza, critical food, water, health and energy insecurity will persist over the coming weeks, particularly as IDF operations expand into Khan Yunis and Rafah.
  • Arrests of Hamas-linked individuals in Germany underscore elevated risks of attacks and violence targeting Jewish and Israeli civilians. On 14 December, German authorities arrested four Hamas-linked individuals suspected of planning attacks against Jewish institutions throughout Europe. There is a realistic possibility that these arrests are linked to the terror-related arrests made in Denmark and the Netherlands also on 14 December. These arrests highlight elevated risks that transnational terror networks will attempt to conduct attacks targeting civilians, particularly in western Europe. Over the coming weeks, the risk of attacks, primarily targeting Jewish and/or Israeli individuals and locations, will remain elevated, facilitated partly by radicalisation via online platforms. However, while attacks remain a realistic possibility, a heightened security posture will likely mitigate these risks.

FORECAST

Over the coming days, increasing pressure on the Israeli government to engage in ceasefire negotiations will likely result in an intensification of operations in Gaza. Amid US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s visit to Israel, the US has continued to pressure Israel to conclude the current phase of operations in Gaza within three weeks to establish a more stable environment for ceasefire negotiations. Given this pressure, the intensity of operations in Gaza will likely increase over the coming days as the IDF attempts to achieve key strategic and tactical goals before engaging in negotiations. IDF efforts to advance in Khan Yunis, strike Hamas border infrastructure in Rafah and conduct clearing operations in northern Gaza will almost certainly trigger intense clashes with militants therein. Escalating clashes and IDF operations will drive threats of further disruption to the delivery of humanitarian aid, sustaining critical food, water and energy insecurity. Additionally, intensifying IDF operations will likely divert Gaza-based militants’ resources away from rocket launches targeting central and southern Israel. Even so, there is a realistic possibility of sporadic barrages targeting civilian population centres continuing over the coming days, sustaining elevated physical security and bystander risks.

Cross-border clashes between the IDF and Hizballah are highly likely to continue at pace over the coming days, sustaining elevated bystander risks. Sporadic rocket fire is likely to continue over the coming 72 hours, sustaining elevated physical security and bystander risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, particularly in proximity to the border. Although a major escalation remains unlikely over the coming days, continued cross-border air and artillery strikes will sustain risks of target misidentification or miscalculation from both parties. Air, rocket and artillery strikes resulting in civilian casualties will likely trigger a short-term uptick in cross-border clashes. Over the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility of the IDF intensifying operations in southern Lebanon and expanding the range of airstrikes in the Nabatieh and South governorates, elevating bystander risks and increasing the likelihood of further Hizballah attacks on population centres in Israel’s Northern district.

The uptick in attacks on shipping routes in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait will increase the likelihood of focused, immediate retaliation by US-led task forces towards fire locations. These will likely further elevate regional tensions and escalation risks. Furthermore, attacks on ships allegedly on their way to Saudi Arabia will also elevate regional tensions between the Saudis and the Houthis and their Iranian backers. Houthi operations are likely to continue affecting ship travel in the Arabian Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea, sustaining supply chain risks, including transit delays and added costs.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • • The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

*Iran: Attacks in Sistan-Baluchistan will likely continue through 2024, spiking around major protests. In the early hours of 15 December, suspected members of the Jaish al-Adl Sunni militant group killed at least 11 police officers in an attack against a police station in the town of Rask (Sistan-Baluchistan province). Witnesses allegedly heard an explosion in the vicinity of the station, as well as a prolonged small-arms engagement. Jaish al-Adl, which claims to fight for greater rights and living conditions for the marginalised and largely Sunni Baluch ethnic group, has conducted several other lethal attacks against the Iranian security forces in the past year, including in Zahedan (Sistan-Baluchistan’s capital) in July. Tehran’s sustained repression of minority communities will continue to drive sporadic attacks by Jaish al-Adl across Sistan-Baluchistan through 2024. Such attacks will likely primarily target the security forces, but will also present elevated threats to civilian bystanders. Any spike in nationwide anti-government protests will also likely act as flashpoints for an escalation in attacks by Jaish al-Adl.

Dec 14.

  • Intense clashes continue to take place in northern Gaza amid ongoing clearing operations in Shujaiya and across Gaza City, with IDF operations expanding into central Khan Yunis. The IDF is currently engaged in clearing operations in Khan Yunis’ eastern districts where it is engaging militants armed with explosively formed penetrators, IEDs and rocket-propelled grenades. On 13 December, Hamas published a video showing militants engaging IDF forces in a school in Khan Yunis, despite repeatedly claiming that it does not use civilian infrastructure for militant purposes. In the past 24 hours, the IDF has called for all residents of central Khan Yunis to evacuate, indicating the likely expansion of operations in the coming days and underscoring extreme physical security and bystander risks throughout the city.
  • Despite a moderate decrease in the intensity and frequency of cross-border clashes, physical security and bystander risks remain elevated along the Israel-Lebanon border. Over the past 24 hours, the frequency of rocket launches conducted by Lebanese Hizballah has decreased, though rocket fire continues to target IDF positions in Manara, Malkia, Ramya, Shomera and Zuhair. Similarly, while the frequency and intensity of IDF air and artillery strikes have also moderately decreased, shelling targeting Taybeh (Nabatieh governorate) triggered a power outage in several nearby population centres on 14 December. As cross-border clashes continue, elevated bystander and physical security risks will persist throughout border regions.
  • In the West Bank, intense security operations are continuing; the IDF also conducted a drone strike in Jenin during a three-day operation. Since 11 December, the IDF has been conducting a high-intensity operation in eastern Jenin, with the security forces arresting hundreds of suspected militants, levelling numerous buildings and restricting movement throughout the city. The IDF also conducted two drone strikes amid intense clashes; these reportedly resulted in at least 11 casualties. Throughout the West Bank, Israeli security personnel continued conducting arrests in Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah.
  • An ongoing hijacking attempt in the Red Sea underscores the significant risks facing global shipping routes amid elevated Houthi activity. On 14 December, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that the Hong Kong-flagged Maersk Gibraltar cargo ship was targeted by missile fire while traversing the Bab al-Mandab strait. While the vessel was not struck, reports indicate at the time of writing that it has been ordered to alter course for Yemen, indicating a likely hijacking attempt by the Yemen-based Houthis. The vessel, which was en route from Salalah (Oman) to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), has no demonstrable links to Israel and has not recently docked at any Israeli ports. The incident underscores the substantially elevated risks of harassment, missile fire and hijacking attempts facing vessels travelling through the Red Sea (regardless of their origins) amid elevated Houthi activity and the challenges involved in identifying ships effectively.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Israel is reportedly seeking to resume ceasefire talks with Hamas, increasing the likelihood of negotiations advancing in the coming weeks. On 13 December, Israeli negotiators reportedly contacted Egyptian officials to request mediation in ceasefire negotiations with Hamas. Qatari officials have also reported that Hamas are seeking an additional round of negotiations, while stating their intention to continue facilitating diplomatic engagement. Consequently, there is a realistic possibility that ceasefire negotiations will resume in the coming days, almost certainly centring on establishing a temporary ceasefire in Gaza, as well as further releases of hostages, prisoner releases in the West Bank and increased aid deliveries into Gaza. Negotiations will likely protract in the coming weeks and remain highly fragile due to numerous sticking points and a significant sensitivity to spoiler violence.
  • Calls for demonstrations in the West Bank will elevate risks of disruption to overland movement and localised clashes. In recent days, Hamas has circulated material in the West Bank calling for a march opposing IDF operations in Gaza on 15 December. Amid intense IDF operations in Jenin, there is a realistic possibility of high participation levels, particularly in urban centres throughout the West Bank. As such, the risk of disruption to overland movement through the West Bank will remain elevated during the march. While there is a realistic possibility of localised clashes between demonstrators and security force personnel, widespread violence remains unlikely.
  • The passage of the amended Israeli government budget will sustain elevated tensions with the US, while also underscoring the low risks facing government stability. On 14 December, the Knesset voted to adopt the amended 2024 budget, which increases security and defence spending while also releasing coalition funds for Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Amid an uptick in attacks perpetrated against Palestinian communities by Israeli settlers, the Israeli government’s continued support and funding of settlement efforts has moderately increased diplomatic tensions with the US. To date, the Biden administration has sanctioned West Bank settlers involved in violence and is reportedly seeking to delay the delivery of a shipment of assault rifles to Israel amid concerns that the weapons will be distributed to settlers. While tensions over settler activity in the West Bank will likely sustain low-level disputes between the US and Israel in the coming weeks, substantial changes to the US’ military and political support for Israel remain highly unlikely.
  • Terrorism-related arrests in Denmark and the Netherlands highlight the elevated risks of attacks targeting Israeli and Jewish individuals. On 14 December, Danish police announced that three individuals in Denmark and one in the Netherlands had been arrested on suspicion of preparing a terror attack. While the police did not indicate the suspects’ motivation or intended targets, supplementary statements outlining plans to increase security around Jewish sites and community centres in Denmark indicate that the attacks likely sought to target these locations. Elevated ethno-religious tensions driven by the Israel-Hamas war will sustain elevated risks of violence and attacks targeting individuals and/or locations associated with Judaism and Israel in the coming weeks.

FORECAST

The increasing prospects for the resumption of a ceasefire and hostage release negotiations will likely dilute the risk of significant conflict escalation in the coming weeks.  Amid reports that both Israel and Hamas are seeking to re-engage in mediated negotiations, there is a realistic possibility that rocket launches from Gaza towards Israel and clashes on the Israel-Lebanon border will reduce in frequency and intensity to facilitate a more stable negotiating environment. Nonetheless, rocket fire is highly unlikely to cease entirely, sustaining physical security and bystander risks throughout Israel. The possibility of spikes in conflict and target misidentification will sustain risks of a broader temporary escalation in hostilities, particularly along the Israel-Lebanon border.

Continued attacks in the Arabian and Red seas will accelerate the formation of a US-led maritime coalition task force, elevating regional tensions. Amid rising threats to global shipping routes, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on 13 December, likely indicating that the US is seeking Saudi Arabia’s approval for a coalition formation. A maritime task force would likely focus on securing shipping routes by intercepting and deflecting attacks, including missile launches and boarding attempts made by Yemen-based Houthis. However, retaliation to the source of fire (and particularly pre-emptive strikes) are unlikely, with coalition parties likely aiming to prevent further escalation and moderate rising regional tensions. Nevertheless, shipping companies, particularly those with demonstrable links to Israel, will likely prioritise re-routing vessels away from the Red Sea and Suez Canal, possibly through the Cape of Good Hope. This route, which generally doubles the journey time required for vessels to travel from Asia to Europe compared to routes passing through the Suez Canal, will almost certainly increase operational costs for shipping firms given the greater fuel requirements. Consequently, risks of supply chain disruption and rising shipping costs will likely remain elevated in the coming weeks, even if a maritime task force is established.

Calls by Hamas for a march in support of Gaza in the West Bank will elevate risks of sporadic clashes, though mass civilian mobilisation remains unlikely. However, elevated efforts by the IDF to clamp down on militant activity in hotspot locations in the northern West Bank such as Jenin, Qalqilya and Tulkarm will increase tensions and the likelihood of larger-than-usual participation in the march. As such the demonstration threatens to drive elevated security and bystander risks due to the realistic possibility of clashes with the Israeli security forces. Such clashes are likely to elevate the risk of attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem in the coming days, particularly near transport hubs, religious sites and IDF positions.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

*Iran: Parliament rejection of budget bill reflects socio-economic concerns, domestic unrest risks. On 12 December, the Iranian Parliament rejected the outline of the 2024 budget bill submitted by President Ebrahim Raisi’s administration with a margin of 28 votes. The rejection was likely driven by numerous financial discrepancies, particularly concerning the government’s inflated revenue estimates. Despite the government agencies projecting a USD 9 billion deficit, a report from the Parliament Research Centre estimated the deficit at approximately USD 22 billion. The rejection highlights lawmakers’ growing concerns about Iran’s deteriorating socio-economic conditions, which would almost certainly intensify with such a deficit. Amid persistent inflation, rising food insecurity and concerns over utility shortages, there is a realistic possibility of increased domestic unrest over the coming weeks. Fractures between the Raisi administration and the Parliament are likely to widen ahead of the scheduled Parliamentary election in March 2024, heightening policy and government stability risks.

Dec 13.

  • IDF operations in Gaza continue, with intense fights in Shujaiya and reports of the IDF starting to pump seawater into Hamas tunnels in Gaza. On 12 December, the IDF confirmed the retrieval of the bodies of two Israeli hostages from Jabalia, northern Gaza, and the death of two soldiers during the operation. Though authorities have not confirmed when the operation took place, one of the soldiers confirmed killed in the operation was announced dead on 7 December. Additionally, on 12 December, The Wall Street Journal published claims by US officials that Israel has begun pumping seawater into Hamas underground tunnels in Gaza. In Shujaiya, nine IDF soldiers died during a fight and an ambush inside a building complex connected to an underground tunnel. The Israel Navy continues to operate within the Gaza Strip and the surrounding waters, reporting on 12 December it destroyed several remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) belonging to Hamas. The IDF conducted a tactical pause of operations in Shaboura camp, east of Rafah, in southern Gaza between 1000hrs and 1400hrs (local time).
  • Clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and affiliated militants along the Israel-Lebanon border continue at pace. Over the past 24 hours, there was a slight increase in drone incursions into Israel, activating sirens in Israel’s north-west area close to the Israel-Lebanon border on three occasions. Additionally, one residence in Baram was directly hit by a rocket on 12 December, causing structural damage though no casualties were reported. On 12 December a  siren was activated in Acre (Northern district) due to concerns of incoming shrapnel from an interception, though no launches directly targeting the city were identified. The IDF continued to strike Hizballah positions and infrastructure in the Nabatieh and South governorates, with overnight shelling killing one Hizballah militant in Kafr Kila (Nabatieh governorate).
  • On 12 December, the IDF identified three rocket launches from Syria towards Israel. Two of the rockets fell within Syrian territory and one fell in an open area in Israel. In response, the IDF reportedly struck several locations in Quneitra and Rif Dimashq governorates, Syria, including a Syrian army position near Al-Rafid village (Quneitra).
  • In the West Bank, intense IDF operations continue, with the IDF reporting a 30-hour ongoing operation in Jenin. According to unconfirmed reports, Israeli security forces arrested over 70 Palestinians in Jenin and its environs on 12 December, and seven Palestinians died during clashes in Jenin in early 13 December. According to the reports, intense fighting continues specifically in Jenin’s eastern neighbourhood, with the IDF closing off entrances and exits to the area completely. During the armed clashes, the IDF reported several instances of IED detonations targeting IDF troops including roadside IEDs.
  • On 13 December, a Marshall Islands-flagged tanker, loaded with jet fuel, dodged two missiles launched from Houthi-held territory in Yemen and repelled an attack by small boats. Similarly, in a separate incident on 13 December, a Malta-flagged bulk carrier reported an exchange of fire with armed men on approaching speedboats. Both incidents took place off the coast of Yemen’s port city Al Hudaydah, near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. American officials reported they also intercepted a suspected Houthi drone during the first incident.
  • On 12 December, the IDF announced it finished the operationalisation of its fourth and final Saar 6-class corvette, confirming one is operating in the Red Sea. The Saar 6 are the most advanced vessels in the Israeli Navy and are equipped specially for securing shipping routes and defence of off-shore rigs, equipped with a C-Dome, the maritime version of the Iron Dome and are capable of carrying medium-sized helicopters, among other capabilities. The ship operating in the Red Sea is one among several other Israeli Navy ships, likely tasked with increasing the security of shipping routes and collecting intelligence on possible targets.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • While the opening of an additional border crossing into Gaza will likely improve aid delivery over the coming weeks, adverse weather continues to undermine humanitarian conditions. On 12 December, the IDF announced that the Kerem Shalom goods crossing would open for the inspection of aid deliveries into Gaza, with approximately 80 trucks inspected over the past 24 hours. Although the crossing’s opening will likely facilitate increased aid deliveries, as aid will continue to only enter Gaza through the Rafah border crossing will sustain risks of disruption to aid delivery and distribution. Humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate within Gaza, with the World Health Organisation warning that only approximately 11 of Gaza’s 36 hospitals remain partially functional, amid a significant uptick in cases of chicken pox, scabies and respiratory diseases, particularly among children. Also on 12 December, a low-pressure system began moving through Israel and the Palestinian territories, resulting in heavy rains. Over the past 24 hours, approximately 30mm of rain has fallen in Gaza, triggering flooding in northern Gaza and further exacerbating public health and humanitarian concerns for the coming days.
  • Increasing pressure from the US to moderate operations underscores elevated diplomatic tensions preceding two key visits from government officials. At a campaign event in Washington D.C. on 12 December, US President Joe Biden described airstrikes in Gaza as ‘indiscriminate’ and criticised Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s opposition to Palestinian statehood. While these comments are unlikely to substantially impact the US’s current military and political support for Israel, they highlight rising tensions and increasing US pressure on Israel to moderate its operations in Gaza. On 14 December, US national security advisor Jake Sullivan will meet with Israeli officials, while US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will meet with Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant on 18 December. Parties will almost certainly discuss IDF operations in Gaza, cross-border clashes on the Israel-Lebanon border and the potential role of the Palestinian Authority in administrating Gaza in the long term.
  • On 12 December, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, underscoring significant international pressure to resume negotiations. As UNGA resolutions are not legally binding, it is highly unlikely to result in any significant change to the IDF’s operations in Gaza. Even so, amid significant international pressure to moderate hostilities in Gaza, there is also a realistic possibility of a similar ceasefire resolution being proposed at the United Nations Security Council in the coming weeks. Although the US has previously vetoed numerous ceasefire resolutions in the UNSC, there is a realistic possibility that, depending on the resolution’s wording, the US will abstain from voting and allow it to pass. Consequently, over the coming weeks, Israel is highly likely to face rising international pressure to re-engage in ceasefire negotiations with Hamas, increasing the probability of further diplomatic engagements, likely mediated by Qatar.

FORECAST

Given elevated threats to global shipping lanes, states including Israel, France and the US, will likely continue augmenting their naval security postures and coalition-building efforts in the Red Sea. However, while the presence of the Israeli Navy in the area will provide further security, it is also likely to increase risks of escalation. There is a realistic possibility that an Israeli Navy response to an attack by Houthis will prompt further retaliation, increasing Houthi activity in the Red Sea thereby driving security and misidentification risks in the area.

US claims that the IDF has started pumping seawater into Gaza’s underground tunnels will likely further elevate domestic Israeli pressure for a hostage deal. Given substantial fears that hostages are being held in Hamas tunnels and will be harmed by flooding, the Israeli government will likely face increased criticism over a lack of progress on securing live hostage releases. There is also a realistic possibility of elevated protest activity and domestic unrest over the coming days. In the long term, should IDF operations in Gaza continue to fail to retrieve live hostages, support for further ceasefire deals and hostage release agreements will likely grow. Combined with growing US pressure and international efforts, there is a realistic possibility of Israel re-establishing ceasefire negotiations with Hamas over the coming weeks.

The extensive IDF operation in Jenin, northern West Bank, reflects increased efforts to root out militant activity in the city. The IDF is unlikely to achieve this goal in one extensive operation, and will almost certainly continue performing frequent and high-intensity operations targeting Jenin and the surrounding governorate. As such, attack risks, particularly against Israeli security force personnel and locations, including checkpoints, will likely remain elevated over the coming days. Similarly, security and bystander risks for civilians in Jerusalem will also remain elevated for as long as IDF operations continue. There is a realistic possibility that elevated IDF activity will draw militant resources and personnel away from other unrest hotspots in the West Bank, reducing the pervasiveness of militant activity. However, in the event of an escalation in IDF operations and/or significant operational progress in capturing and destroying militant facilities, militants are unlikely to remain concentrated in Jenin, migrating to other areas of the West Bank. This will sustain elevated risks of clashes and attacks throughout the West Bank, particularly in Nablus, Qalqilya and Tulkarm.

Gradual escalation along the Israel-Lebanon border is likely to continue, with Israel increasingly voicing concerns over Hizballah’s presence between the border and the Litani River. Statements rejecting Hizballah’s control of specific territory indicate an increasing possibility that Israel will conduct a gradual shift from defensive to offensive operations over the coming weeks. Hizballah and affiliated militants in Lebanon are likely to respond to such a shift by increasing the frequency of longer-range fire, deeper into Israel, elevating risks to civilians as far as south as Haifa (Haifa district). However, the intensity of escalation will depend on the extent of IDF strikes over the coming weeks, with a realistic possibility that visits by US officials scheduled for 14 and 18 December will have a cooling effect.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

*Yemen: Houthi attack against Norwegian tanker highlights elevated security risks, regional tensions. On 11 December, the Iranian-backed Yemen-based Houthis claimed an attack near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait against a Norwegian tanker (Strinda). According to reports, a missile struck the tanker, causing fire-related damage. No crew members were harmed, and the ship proceeded to a safe port. Contrasting the Houthis’ assertion that the ship was heading to Israel, the ship’s operator claimed that it was heading to Italy. The attack comes after the Houthis threatened on 9 December to expand their target set to include ships heading to Israel, regardless of their nationality. The announcement and recent attack highlight the elevated security and misidentification risks facing ships crossing the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The attack will likely drive an increase in US naval activity in the area; other foreign navies will also likely provide security along known shipping routes. Nevertheless, Houthi attacks are likely to continue, elevating the risks of retaliation and regional escalation.

Dec 12.

  • IDF ground operations and active combat with numerous militant groups continue in northern and southern Gaza. In northern Gaza, the IDF has continued conducting clearing operations in Jabalia and Shujaiya, uncovering military infrastructure and weapons caches. During clashes in Beit Lahiya, Hamas-aligned militants reportedly fired a thermobaric rocket at Israeli ground units. This is consistent with previous assessments that Gaza-based militants are likely to increasingly utilise their most sophisticated weaponry against IDF personnel amid the ongoing offensive operations. IDF units also continued to advance into Khan Yunis, clashing with militants to the north, east and west of the city. Rocket fire from Gaza-based militants continued at previously observed levels and primarily targeted locations in the Gaza envelope, though a direct hit on Holon (Tel Aviv district) on 11 December injured one civilian.
  • Clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and affiliated militants along the Israel-Lebanon continue at pace.  On 11 December, rockets fired by Hizballah militants targeted IDF positions on the border, including locations in Biranit and the Shebaa farms area, while a multi-rocket barrage damaged numerous buildings in Metula (Northern district), though no injuries were reported. On 12 November, at least two incursions by hostile aircraft were reported in the Northern district, with the IDF intercepting at least one. Over the past 24 hours, the IDF has continued conducting air and artillery strikes on locations associated with Hizballah in the Nabatieh and South governorates. The IDF killed one civilian during shelling in Taybeh (Nabatieh governorate) on 11 December.
  • In the West Bank, continued clashes with militants underscore elevated physical security and bystander risks, particularly in Jenin. Over the past 24 hours, the IDF engaged in numerous armed clashes with Palestinian militants in Jenin, performing a drone strike killing at least four militants and injuring seven. Clashes with militants also occurred in Bethlehem and Nablus, though no resultant casualties have been reported. Heightened ethno-religious tensions persist throughout the West Bank, driving clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinian communities, with clashes reported in the Merav settlement (Jenin governorate).
  • On 11 December, Iranian-backed Houthis claimed an attack on a Norwegian tanker near Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, using a naval missile. According to the Houthis, the ship was on its way to Israel and did not respond to their radio warnings to turn back. The attacks caused a fire on the ship but no harm to the crew, a US destroyer later assisted the tanker to reach a safe port. The attack underlines the elevated threats to ships heading to Israel, with further such incidents likely to elevate regional tensions.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Gaza continue to exacerbate governance concerns, while disruption to humanitarian aid delivery will sustain humanitarian concerns. On 11 December, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’s (UNWRA) Director of Communications announced that critical food, water and energy insecurity has resulted in an ‘almost a total breakdown of civil order’ in Gaza, underscoring significantly elevated criminal and governance risks. Over the past 24 hours, approximately 60 trucks of aid have entered Gaza. Despite indications that Israel will soon open the Kerem Shalom and Nitzana crossings to facilitate increased aid delivery, it is highly unlikely that aid will enter Gaza directly from these locations. Rather, aid will almost certainly be inspected at these locations before crossing into Egypt and entering Gaza via the Rafah border crossing. Consequently, aid deliveries will almost certainly face additional inspections in Rafah, sustaining current bottlenecks and delays to cross-border deliveries, disrupting aid distribution and sustaining significant humanitarian concerns.
  • Upcoming visits from US officials to Israel underscore ongoing efforts to pressure Israel to re-establish ceasefire negotiations and moderate IDF activity in Gaza. On 14 December, US national security advisor Jake Sullivan will meet with Israeli officials, while US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will meet with Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant on 18 December. These meetings reflect continued US efforts to re-establish ceasefire negotiations, amid significant domestic pressure on the Biden administration to address the humanitarian situation in Gaza.
  • Increasing international efforts to sanction Israeli settlers from the West Bank are unlikely to significantly elevate compliance risks, though underscore elevated diplomatic tensions. On 11 December, the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell announced he would propose the implementation of sanctions on Israeli settlers in the West Bank who target Palestinian civilians in violent attacks. Member states will likely adopt the proposal over the coming days, resulting in travel bans and asset freezes of affected individuals. Although the proposal is unlikely to significantly increase compliance risks for firms operating in Israel or the West Bank, there is a realistic possibility that increasing numbers of states will implement sanctions against Israeli settlers in the West Bank, increasing regional tensions with Israel.
  • Persistently elevated rates of antisemitic incidents in the US highlight ongoing threats of violence targeting Jewish individuals and communities. On 11 December, the Anti-Defamation League announced that from 7 October to 7 December, a record number of antisemitic incidents for any two-month period had been reported, including physical assault, vandalism and harassment. As the Israel-Hamas conflict persists, further instances of antisemitic violence and harassment are highly likely in the US, sustaining risks to individuals associated with Judaism and/or Israel. Developments in the IDF ground offensive will likely act as flashpoints for further instances of violence and harassment, particularly in areas with larger Jewish populations and religious institutions.

FORECAST

International pressure, highlighted by US officials’ visit to Israel, increases the likelihood of further ceasefire negotiations in the coming weeks. Prospects for successful negotiations will also depend on IDF ground advances in southern and northern Gaza, likely to be impacted by the level of pressure these operations are able to exert on Hamas. Negotiations will likely be protracted, increasing the likelihood that an actual ceasefire agreement will take several weeks beyond the official launch of talks.

The death of a Lebanese civilian during an IDF shelling in Nabatieh will further increase the risks that Hizballah intensify retaliatory strikes, elevating security risks along the Israel-Lebanon border. A large rocket barrage over Israeli population centres close to the Israel-Lebanon border remains a realistic possibility despite the continued prioritisation of IDF targets. Such a barrage, particularly if it results in harm to civilians or IDF soldiers will further elevate the likelihood that the IDF will in turn intensify its retaliation, elevating escalation risks within southern Lebanon.

Increasing Houthi attacks and threats in the Red Sea signal increased efforts to restrict imports to Israel, threatening to disrupt supply chains and increase inflation. In response to increased Houthi operations, the US has begun building a maritime coalition to provide security, while Israel has threatened to respond militarily against the Houthis. A direct Israeli attack on Houthi locations will further destabilise security in the region while likely further harming Israel’s international position. Such an attack, particularly amid US coalition-building efforts, remains unlikely. However, there is an increased likelihood of unclaimed attacks on Houthi locations in Yemen, likely performed by Israel or the US and/or aligned forces. Such attacks, while elevating regional tensions, are likely to be less disruptive to regional stability than direct operations.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

Dec 11.

  • The IDF continues its ground operations in northern and southern Gaza, focusing on Shujaiya and Khan Yunis. On 9 December the IDF announced a failed hostage rescue attempt in southern Gaza resulted in the injury of two soldiers. While the IDF didn’t specify the condition of the hostage, Hamas sources on 8 December claimed the hostage was killed during the IDF attempt. Over the past 72 hours, fighters of the IDF artillery brigade 282, entered Gaza for the first time since the start of the war, conducting direct fire on targets in Shujaiya. In Khan Yunis, the Israeli Air Force conducted its first operational airdrop since the Second Lebanon War, dropping seven tonnes of military supplies for the ground forces. Additionally, the IDF continued its daily tactical pauses for humanitarian supplies in Gaza, performing such a pause in Rafah Camp from 1000hrs to 1400hrs (local time).
  • Clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants along the Israel-Lebanon border moderately intensified over the past 72 hours. On 9 December, a Hizballah drone attack on an IDF base in Western Galilee injured six soldiers. Additionally, on 10 December, Hizballah claimed to have launched three attacks on IDF positions and bases using Burkan missiles. On 10 December, Israel’s Chief of the General Staff, commented on the escalation in the north, emphasising war as an option to achieve security, though not an IDF first choice. Similarly, a Hizballah-affiliated news channel claims that the IDF warned Hizballah that everything within 1.8 miles (3km) north of the Israel border will be considered a legitimate target. In response, Hizballah has stated it will also consider everything within 1.8 miles of the Lebanese border, whether civilian or military, as a legitimate target. This rhetoric reflects the gradual elevation of tensions and bystander risks close to the Israel-Lebanon border.
  • On 10 December, Israel allegedly struck Hizballah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) locations in Al-Sayeda Zainab and Damascus International Airport in Rif Dimashq Syria. The strikes allegedly targeted military headquarters and ammunition warehouses. These will elevate risks of small-scale retaliation in the form of sporadic cross-border rocket fire towards Israel in the coming days. However, these are unlikely to result in a major escalation in armed clashes between Syria-based militants and the IDF.
  • On 9 December, the Iranian-backed Houthis announced they would target any ships heading to Israel, regardless of their nationality. Additionally, the Houthis warned international shipping agencies against dealing with Israeli ports. Following the announcement, a French warship claimed that it intercepted two drones launched at it from Yemen on 9 December. Further attacks in the Red Sea are likely, sustaining elevated security risks.
  • IDF operations in the West Bank continue at pace, with elevated ethno-religious tensions driving clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinian communities. From 9-10 December, Hamas-aligned militants engaged in clashes with IDF personnel in Nablus, employing IEDs, Molotov cocktails and small arms. Localised clashes also took place in Bethlehem, Jenin, Jericho, Qalqilya, Ramallah and al Bireh and Tubas governorates, resulting in numerous arrests and injuries. Overnight from 10-11 December, there was an uptick in IDF raids on locations in Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Ramallah, resulting in at least 25 total arrests. Over the past 72 hours, clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians emerged in Nablus and Bethlehem, with settlers reportedly stealing and damaging properties and vehicles, highlighting significantly elevated ethno-religious tensions therein.
  • While calls for mobilisation in the West Bank are unlikely to result in civilian mass-mobilisation, risks of sole perpetrator and militant attacks will remain elevated. On 8 December, Hamas called for civilians in the West Bank to mobilise and on 10 December announced plans to escalate attacks on Israeli civilians in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Concurrently, the Lion’s Den, a West Bank-based militant group, reiterated its support for Hamas and called for further attacks on Israeli security personnel. While these announcements are unlikely to result in a large-scale mobilisation of civilians in the West Bank in the short- to medium-term, there is a realistic possibility that such announcements will drive elevated militant and sole perpetrator activity. Though attacks would likely primarily target Israeli security personnel and locations in the West Bank, attacks on civilians and crowded public places remain a realistic possibility.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • A general strike in the West Bank has significantly disrupted the operational environment therein, with some strike participation also observed in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The strike was called for by numerous Palestinian organisations to oppose the IDF’s operations in Gaza and began on 11 December. In the West Bank, government ministries, schools and transport services are non-operational, while banks and the majority of retailers have also closed for the day. Similarly, in Lebanon, government offices and schools have shut for 11 December. In Jordan and Turkey, numerous retailers and private-sector businesses are participating in the strike, though government services have not been impacted. Several organisations have called for individuals to participate in the strike in the US, though widespread disruption to public and private sector operations remains highly unlikely.
  • Delays to voting on allowing Palestinian labourers from the West Bank to re-enter the labour market in Israel underscores heightened ethno-religious tensions and persistent socio-economic concerns. On 10 December, the Israeli security cabinet delayed a vote on allowing Palestinian labourers to enter Israel from the West Bank after the proposal was rejected by the socioeconomic cabinet working group. Since 7 October, approximately 150,000 Palestinian workers holding work permits have been unable to enter Israel from the West Bank, resulting in moderate labour shortages, primarily in the construction sector. Continued delays to the resumption of West Bank Palestinian work permits will likely drive ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank as well as exacerbate labour flexibility challenges in sectors reliant on Palestinian labour, such as construction.
  • Continued efforts to pass ceasefire resolutions at the United Nations are unlikely to impact IDF operations in the short term, but reflect mounting international pressure. On 8 December, the US vetoed a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza proposed to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). On 11 December, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) scheduled an emergency session for 12 December to vote on a ceasefire resolution for Gaza. While the resolution will likely pass, as UNGA resolutions are not legally binding, it is highly unlikely to significantly impact the IDF’s operations in Gaza in the short term. Even so, there is a realistic possibility that sustained international pressure for Israel to adopt a ceasefire agreement will result in further ceasefire negotiations with Hamas in the medium term.
  • The arrest of two Iranian-linked individuals in Cyprus underscores elevated attack risks against individuals and assets associated with Israel throughout Europe. On 10 December, the Cypriot authorities, assisted by the Israeli security services (Mossad), arrested two individuals linked to Iran’s IRGC. The individuals are accused of planning attacks on Israeli and Jewish individuals in Cyprus, highlighting persistently elevated risks of violence targeting individuals and assets associated with Israel. Physical security and bystander risks will remain elevated in proximity to locations associated with the Israeli and Jewish communities in Cyprus, including hospitality and religious venues.

FORECAST

Heightened tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border will drive risks of further escalation in the coming week, elevating security risks for civilians. The IDF’s airdrop in Gaza, the first operational airdrop since the Second Lebanon War, likely reflects preparations for an escalation in cross-border clashes with Hizballah. Similarly, IDF Chief of the General Staff, Herzi Halevi, warned that if diplomatic efforts to secure the Israel-Lebanon border fail, military operations to reduce Hizballah activity remain possible. Increasingly assertive rhetoric is likely aimed to increase pressure on Hizballah to de-escalate cross-border attacks, though this remains unlikely in the short term. Rather, the currently observed trend of moderate escalation in clashes will likely continue, with a major escalation or full-scale mobilisation remaining unlikely at present. Even so, physical security and bystander risks will remain elevated in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, particularly within 1.8 miles (3km) of the border, including for civilians, over the coming weeks. There is also a realistic possibility that the IDF will increase the frequency and intensity of air and artillery strikes on locations associated with Hizballah and the IRGC in Syria in response to the elevated tensions in the Israel-Lebanon border.

Elevated Houthi activity in the Red Sea will likely trigger further increases in insurance costs for shipping firms while sustaining elevated risks of supply chain disruption over the coming weeks.  In response to Houthi threats to target vessels travelling to Israeli ports, multiple naval forces will likely further increase their security postures in the region. If non-US forces do increase naval patrols and interceptions of Houthi drones, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies will seek to target these countries’ forces stationed in the region. However, the Houthis and other Iranian-back militants and proxies in the region are likely to continue prioritising attacks on Israel and US forces. While an increased involvement of US-aligned navies in the region will challenge Houthis’ ability to conduct frequent successful attacks, an uptick in attacks remains a realistic possibility, likely driving insurance providers to raise charges.

Ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank are likely to continue gradually increasing, elevating risks of further Palestinian militant attacks as well as sole perpetrator attacks. Any delay in the resumption of work permits for Palestinian workers from the West Bank is likely to elevate socio-economic risks, subsequently elevating ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank. Together with gradually increasing Israeli settler violence against Palestinian communities in the West Bank, this will further elevate the risks of attacks and sole-perpetrator attacks, including in Jerusalem. Furthermore, calls for mobilisation, while unlikely to significantly increase Palestinian civilian mobilisation, are likely to further increase Palestinian militant activity. These will particularly increase the risks of attacks against IDF and Israeli security forces in the northern West Bank, subsequently elevating bystander security risks, particularly around more static positions such as checkpoints.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave.

*Yemen-Israel: Houthi threat will sustain elevated attack risks; likely to drive insurance costs, supply chain disruption. On 9 December, Houthi officials announced that they would target all ships heading to Israel, irrespective of their nationality, and warned international shipping companies against dealing with Israeli ports. Subsequently, the Houthis targeted a French warship in the Red Sea with two drones, both of which were intercepted by the targeted vessel. The presence of US and other western naval forces will challenge Houthis ability to significantly escalate successful attacks, however an uptick in attempts is likely. Nonetheless, the threat will sustain elevated duty of care and movement disruption risks for shipping companies using the Red Sea and will likely increase insurance costs, disrupting supply chains and increasing shipping costs. Any increase in attacks will drive the threat of US escalation, driving retaliatory violence from Iran’s proxies in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

13 Dec 23. US quickly updated Israeli F-35s after Hamas attack, officials say. The United States sped capability updates to Israel’s F-35 fighters after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, the top officer in charge of the Joint Strike Fighter program said Tuesday.

Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt, program executive officer for the F-35, declined to identify to reporters the capabilities sent to Israel in the two-plus months following the attack, noting the program strives to keep all nations flying the jet supplied with spare parts and capabilities.

But speaking with reporters after a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Schmidt confirmed the improvements rushed to Israel occurred after Hamas’ deadly attack that killed at least 1,200 people. The Palestinian Health Ministry said more than 18,000 people have died as a result of subsequent Israeli air and ground attacks in the Gaza Strip.

Bill LaPlante, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said at the hearing the F-35 program was recently able to hurry updated mission data files to a nation in a week or week and a half. Schmidt confirmed after the hearing that LaPlante was referring to Israel.

Mission data files are a “brick,” as LaPlante described them, containing the jet’s memory of threats it might encounter on an operation and other information needed for combat.

The F-35 program “is still not where it needs to be on these mission data files,” LaPlante said. But the recent rapid updating of these files is a good sign, he added, and the lessons learned from doing so will be used across the program.

LaPlante said in written remarks that Israel has 35 of its 39 F-35s operating and carrying out missions, with the help of a surge in sustainment support to maximize the nation’s aircraft readiness.

The subcommittee’s chairman, Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., said at Tuesday’s hearing the F-35 Joint Program Office “moved at a breakneck speed” to support Israel by accelerating its jets’ weapons capabilities and increasing the flow of spare parts.

Schmidt told lawmakers Israel’s F-35s have performed “absolutely outstanding” in its war to eliminate Hamas, with high rates of aircraft able to carry out their missions.

“We have added some capabilities to that airplane in a very short period of time,” he said. “Our team is doing everything we can to continue to move the ball forward there.” (Source: Defense News)

 

11 Dec 23. US State Dept approves Israeli purchase of anti-tank rounds without Congressional review.

The US State Department has waived the Congressional review requirements for the $106m deal, claiming “an emergency exists” for Israel and US national interests.

US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, waived the Congressional review of a $106m foreign military sale of 13,981 120 millimetre (mm) M830A1 high-explosive (HE), multi-purpose anti-tank rounds with tracers to the Government of Israel, a decision the Defense Security Co-operation Agency (DSCA) delivered to Congress on 8 December 2023.

A day earlier, Congress narrowly voted against a $106bn supplementary budget to provide military aid to key strategic allies such as Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel. Blinken’s recent decision to override a congressional review of such a major arms deal reflects the political divide that has torn Washington in recent months.

Issued in an 9 December DSCA press release, the agency justified the political manoeuvring by stating that “an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the Government of Israel of the above defence articles and services in the national security interests of the United States.

“The US is committed to the security of Israel, and it is vital to US national interests to assist Israel to develop and maintain a strong and ready self-defence capability. This proposed sale is consistent with those objectives,” it added.

This deal will furnish the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) as they attempt to stamp out the Palestinian militant group, Hamas, after the organisation inflicted a surprise attack against Israel on 7 October. Currently, the IDF are driving south toward Khan Yunis, in southern Gaza.

Since the beginning of the war, the Israeli Air Force carried out approximately 10,000 airstrikes, according to the IDF. The Armed Forces completed missions infiltrating and destroying Hamas’ infrastructure and weapon depots across the coastal strip.

Replacing its predecessor, the M830 munition, the M830A1 variant offers extended range for defeating dismounted infantry, breaching walls and reduced obstacles. Users can fire this anti-tank round, and its earlier variations, from the Abrams main battle tank, an infamously heavy and complex platform.

According to GlobalData intelligence, Israel’s anti-tank guided missiles and anti-air missiles sector is expected to grow with investments of $308.8m and $119.7m respectively over the period 2023–28. (Source: army-technology.com)

————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————-