Sponsored by Spectra Cyber Security Solutions
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17 Aug 17. The events of the last twelve months in the theatres discussed above underscore the reality that the electromagnetic spectrum, in which friendly and hostile radars and communications operate, is a domain of warfare in its own right, as much as the oceans, the ground and the skies. Increasingly, this branch of warfare also includes the cyber domain, highly reliant as it is on digital communications. Larry Rexford, electronic warfare strategic development and marketing manager at Rockwell Collins, and an electronic warfare practitioner with over three decades of experience, sees EW in a holistic fashion: “While EW is often associated with the air, land and maritime warfighting domains and is tightly coupled to specific platforms, it actually operates within a distinct/different warfighting domain, the electromagnetic spectrum.” What this means for air operations is that controlling and dominating the EMS is essential for both air superiority, via the degradation, damage and destruction (‘jamming’) of opposing radar and communications, and also to support air power’s capability to influence the battle on the ground or at sea. “My view is that the EMS is the warfighting domain, EW is a means to conduct warfare within the EMS, signals within the EMS (both friendly and hostile) are potential targets,” says Mr. Rexford. “To achieve effects within the EMS you need capabilities to detect, degrade, deny, disrupt, destroy and exploit signals of interest, while, at the same time, protecting the spectrum for your use.” Reflecting on recent operations, Mr. Rexford argues that during the ongoing Ukrainian civil war, the Russian armed forces were able to deny the use of the EMS to the Ukrainian armed forces, during the latter’s military operations supporting pro-Russian separatists fighting the Kiev government, while ensuring that Russia’s use of the EMS remained largely protected. “As a result, the pace of Russian decision making/military operations was far superior to the Ukrainian ability to respond, similar to effect achieved during the German blitzkrieg (Lightning War through the Low Countries into France, through the combination of auftrakstaktik (mission tactics) and mechanized warfare … It is clear that the Russians not only integrated EW into their offensive planning, but that they trained in an EW environment. Conversely, the Ukrainian military forces did not possess robust EW capabilities, nor were they ready to operate in an EMS-denied environment.”
Petter Bedoire, head of marketing at Saab’s EW business unit makes similar observations. He states that, for “the last ten years, there has been a lot of focus (within the air power community) on international operations and asymmetrical warfare (notably US-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq). In those environments air superiority has been a pre-requisite, the focus being on protection against MANPADS and other types of rather unsophisticated ground-based threats.” However, the situation regarding Ukraine, and the Iraq/Syria theatres discussed in the previous article, illustrate “a clear trend that the focus is shifting back to Cold War era scenarios with BVR (Beyond Visual Range) warfare and much more sophisticated threats”, the S-400 Triumf deployment to Syria in late-November 2015, mentioned in the previous discussion being a prime illustration. These lessons are no doubt being digested not only within the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces, but also within NATO and across the world. This article will examine some of the leading programmes ongoing which are seeking to ensure that air platforms, and air operations in general, continue to remain able to protect their own use of the EMS, while denying its use to adversaries.
Growler
The United States is particularly aware of the SAM and radar