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01 Apr 26. Mixed Messaging. Users of the BabeSaba software application in the Islamic Republic of Iran began receiving strange messages in early March. BadeSaba is a popular religious calendar app used in Iran to alert Muslim to daily prayer times, important religious days and even has a built-in compass to help ascertain the direction of the Kabaa. The Kabaa is the considered the most sacred site in Islam. It is situated inside the Grand Mosque in Mecca, near Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast.
The United States and Israel commenced military operations against Iran on 28th February ostensibly to end Iran’s clandestine weapons of mass destruction programme and to change the regime in Tehran. The BadeSaba application warned users that “it’s time for reckoning”, according to a Reuters report, and encouraged Iran’s armed forces to revolt against the regime. Other messages warned that “the regime’s repressive forces will pay for their cruel and merciless actions against the innocent people of Iran” and that “anyone who joins in defending and protecting the Iranian nation will be granted amnesty and forgiveness”. Clearly, BadeSaba was hacked, most likely by Israeli and/or US cyberwarfare experts. Neither nation is confirming or denying action to this end.
On the one hand, hacking BadeSaba is an audacious move. The app is thought to be used by circa five million Iranians, over five percent of the country’s total population. The frequency with which the app is consulted allows cyberwarriors to continue bombarding the app with new missives. One message calling for Iranian troops to either laydown their arms, or join a popular uprising, is unlikely to have much of an effect. Continually delivering propaganda to the same phone may, over time, chip away at a person’s support for the leadership, or for its courses of action.
One month after hostilities began, the Iranian regime does not outwardly appear to show any signs of collapse. Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei was killed on the first day of operations, 28th February, most likely by Israeli airstrikes. Mr. Khamanei’s death did not precipitate a collapse; He has since been swiftly replaced by his son Mojtaba Khamenei. Mounting any kind of psychological operation against an adversary is fraught with risk. The Russian government has learned the hard way that its propaganda and disinformation efforts in Ukraine has done little to shake either that country’s resolve, or the resolve of Kyiv’s supporters.
Electromagnetically- and cybernetically-delivered psychological messaging may likewise have little effect over the long term in Iran. While significant protests over several decades since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 have rocked the country, the regime has weathered these and used appalling cruelty to crush decent. To further complicate matters it is unclear if a single figure, or collection of individuals, which Iran’s opposition could coalesce around, will emerge. Israel and the US may yet realise that it will take more than airstrikes and psychological operations to rid Iran of a leadership both nations despise.
(Source: Armada)
01 Apr 26. Wolfpacks.
US Marine Corps air defence suppression capabilities could be enhanced with the Green Wolf stand-off electronic warfare system.
L3Harris’ Green Wolf air-launched electronic warfare system, an artist’s rendering of which is shown here, is designed to work closely with the company’s Red Wolf air-to-surface missile. Both weapons could support Marine Corps’ air defence suppression missions.
In January 2026 L3Harris was awarded a $86.2 million contract to supply the company’s Red Wolf air-to-surface stand-off missile to the United States Marine Corps (USMC). Red Wolf is being procured in answer to the USMC’s Precision Attack Strike Missile (PASM) requirement. PASM will equip USMC Bell Textron AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters. Using the weapon, the gunships will be able to engage targets at ranges of circa 172 nautical miles/nm (319 kilometres/km).
Red Wolf’s acquisition may open the door for the USMC’s eventual procurement of its Green Wolf sibling. Green Wolf shares the same airframe as Red Wolf but is equipped with an Electronic Warfare (EW) payload. Armada understands that the payload will support three EW mission subsets: Green Wolf will jam and decoy hostile emitters typically ground-based air surveillance and fire control/ground-controlled interception radars. Alternatively, this EW payload can detect, identify and locate, henceforth known as process, hostile emitters. Target coordinates can be shared with the Red Wolf missiles which can then engage and destroy these radars.
EW payload
L3Harris has not shared any information regarding the frequencies that Green Wolf’s payload can process. Nonetheless, company’s Deceptor small form factor EW payload can process signals across a 30 megahertz to 36GHz waveband, depending on the configuration, according to the company’s official literature. Deceptor can be configured to have between two and eight independent transmit/receive channels. The payload weighs five pounds (two kilograms) regardless of its configuration. Alongside Deceptor L3Harris told Armada, via a written statement, that “any number of electronic warfare payloads (can be integrated on Green Wolf) to meet mission requirements”.
Although the Red Wolf/Green Wolf teaming concept is applicable to the USMC’s AH-1Z helicopters, the statement continued that Green Wolf can also be launched from ground and/or air platforms. Armada understands that Green Wolf is currently at Technology Readiness Level Seven (TRL-7). According to the US Department of Defence’s own criteria, TRL-7 denotes that a system prototype has been demonstrated in an operational environment. No additional information was supplied by the company concerning potential initial and full operational capability dates should the USMC move ahead with Green Wolf’s acquisition
Assessment
Should such a procurement take place, this could represent an important enhancement for the USMC’s Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (S/DEAD) capabilities. The force currently deploys the AN/ALQ-231 Intrepid Tiger-II electronic attack system developed by the US Navy’s Naal Air Warfare Centre Weapons division. Intrepid Tiger-II equips USMC Lockheed Martin KC-130J turboprop tankers, Bell Textron UH-1Y Venom medium-lift utility helicopters and Bell-Boeing MV-22B Osprey rotorcraft. Marine Corps General Atomics MQ-9A Reaper uninhabited combat aerial vehicles accommodate the L3Harris/General Atomics Reaper Defence Electronic Support System/Scalable Open Architecture Reconnaissance (RDESS/SOAR). RDESS/SOAR is an airborne electronic support measure which Armada understands processes emissions across wavebands of two megahertz to 40 gigahertz. USMC Lockheed Martin F-35B/C Lightning combat aircraft deploy Northrop Grumman AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range air-to-surface weapons.
Plans are also afoot to enhance the USMC’s Lockheed Martin M-142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) surface-to-surface weapon with the Precision Strike Missile Increment-2 (PRSM-2) improvement. PRSM-2 outfits these rockets with a passive radio frequency seeker to process hostile radar signals, including the threats discussed above, and signals from naval surveillance radars. According to reports, the PRSM-2 improvement is expected to reach initial operational capability in 2027. Full operational capability should follow in the 2030/31 timeframe.
Taken together, these S/DEAD capabilities will ensure that the Marine Corps can provide a robust offensive counter-air posture to other USMC units, sister US and allied militaries. Several of these capabilities, such as Green Wolf, AGM-88G and PRSM-2, provide stand-off ranges over 160nm (300km) helping aircraft remain outside the lethal range of ground-based air defences. Such ranges also to accommodate the large distances in the Asia-Pacific where any future conflict between the US and the People’s Republic of China would occur. (Source: Armada)
01 Apr 26. In-Depth Analysis: Back to Iran!
In this extended article, we examine how Israeli and US airpower systematically destroyed Iran’s remaining over-the-horizon ground-based air surveillance radar coverage from 28th February.
In December 2025, Armada published an in-depth report examining the Israeli military’s Destruction/Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (D/SEAD) campaign during the so-called ‘Twelve Day War’. Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran fought each other between 13th and 24th June 2025. We produced our report in association with MAIAR. The company provided us with significant open-source intelligence on Iranian Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) and Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) targets struck by Israeli and American airpower. The United States entered the war on 22nd June 2025 launching Operation Midnight Hammer against Iranian targets associated with the latter’s clandestine Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme.
Radar attrition
According to our assessment, the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defence Force (IRIADF), part of the Iranian Army responsible for the country’s IADS and GBAD, possessed at least 13 High Frequency (HF: three megahertz/MHz to 30MHz) Over-The-Horizon (OTH) radars as of June 2025. These Ghadir systems, with a reported range of circa 594 nautical miles/nm (1,100 kilometres/km), provided the IRIADF with the ability to detect, identify, locate and track, henceforth known as process, incoming air threats at the operational/theatre level. Of the 13 OTH radars identified, we assessed that at least seven were destroyed during the conflict. A further two were assessed as probably destroyed, and the remaining balance of four were presumed intact.
Hostilities between Israel and the United States on one side, and Iran on the other, recommenced on 28th February. According to the US Department of Defence, as of 13th March US and Israeli airstrikes had hit 15,000 targets in Iran. As per the 2025 conflict, these targets included IADS and GBAD targets. These targets were engaged in accordance with Israeli and US efforts to employ and sustain operational D/SEAD efforts as part of a wider Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) effort to win and sustain air superiority over Iran.
Sepehr targeted
Sources have informed Armada that several of the D/SEAD targets struck during renewed hostilities have included Iranian OTH radars that do not appear to have been hit during the June 2025 conflict. These radars appear to be additional Ghadir systems and Sepehr OTH examples. The key difference between the Ghadir and Sepehr is the latter’s instrumented range of circa 1,619nm (3,000km) according to Armada’s proprietary information.
The concept of operations for the two radars is for the Sepehr to perform the initial strategic processing of incoming air targets at range. These targets are then handed off to Ghadirs for processing once they fall within the instrumented range of the latter. The Ghadirs then pass these targets to tactical GBAD and fighters for processing and engagement. It appears that Israeli and US airpower has not had to contend with any air-to-air threats from the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force. The IRIADF’s integrated air defence system networks all these air defence assets and provides overarching strategic, operational and tactical command and control. The table below details the radars which are believed to have been operational before Israeli and US operations commenced on 28th February:
This map depicts the locations of Iran’s Ghadir and Sepehr over-the-horizon radars as of 27th February 2026 and the radar coverage provided by each system based on their instrumented ranges.
Information gathered by the interactive map of US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran shows that most of Iran’s OTH ground-based air surveillance radars were attacked within the first week of the renewed conflict. It is important to note that an attacked radar does not necessarily mean the radar has been destroyed. Nonetheless, we will assume, for the purpose of this analysis, that these radars have been taken out of the fight. Initial strikes targeted the Ghadir radars at Albaji, southwestern Iran and at Chabahar east of the Strait of Hormuz. The loss of both these systems would have degraded radar coverage of strike packages approaching Iran from the west and southwest respectively. Destroying the Chabahar radar would have been particularly important for US Navy aircraft operating from carriers in the Arabian Sea, notably the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford respective ‘Nimitz’ and eponymous class aircraft carriers. Long range coverage over the Persian Gulf and into the Arabian Peninsula was degraded on 1st March with an attack on the Sepehr radar at Dasht Arjan, southern Iran. This radar would have been a priority given US sorties mounted from airbases in the Arabian Peninsula.
Iranian over-the-horizon radar coverage begins to experience degradation early in the conflict as the Ghadir radars at Albaji and Chabahar are attacked.
Attentions of the D/SEAD campaign switched north and northeast from 4th March as the Ghadirs at Kuh-e Shah Nakhijir and Nur Ed Dinabad were targeted. That same day Iran’s only other Sepehr, this one located at Qarah Bolagh, was attacked. Assuming both Sepehrs were now destroyed, Iran effectively no longer possessed any strategic radar coverage. One outstanding question of the conflict is why the Sepehrs were destroyed now, and not during the conflict in 2025? Did the larger involvement of US airpower demand these systems were taken out of the fight?
By 7th March, Iranian over-the-horizon coverage may have essentially reduced to a single system in the guise of the Ghadir at Khanuj, which itself would be attacked on 22nd March.
Although Ghadir coverage of the Persian Gulf would have been badly degraded with the loss of the Ghadir at Chabahar on 28th February, further damage was inflicted on 4th March when the Ghadir at Jask, which acted as gatekeeper to the Strait of Hormuz was engaged. The attrition of Persian Gulf Ghadir coverage was all but complete by 5th March with the attack of the Ghadir radar in Bushehr. What might have been Iran’s last surviving Ghadir, the system located at Khanuj, was attacked on 22nd March.
Conclusions
It could be tempting to say that the IRIADF’s OTH ground-based air surveillance radar coverage is now non-existent, but these were conclusions that Armada reached following the end of the June 2025 war. Our assessment was that Iran effectively had no meaningful strategic and operational level radar coverage. Details which have come to light during current hostilities indicate that we were wrong in this initial assumption. Nonetheless, the attrition that Iranian radar coverage experienced during the June 2025 war will undoubtedly have influenced the conduct of the US-Israeli air campaign so far. As of 27th March, neither side has reportedly lost any inhabited aircraft to hostile action. This is arguably testament not only to the D/SEAD operations mounted by both nations during current hostilities, but also because of OCA work done during previous conflicts. (Source: Armada)
02 Apr 26. April Spectrum SitRep.
ATDI’s ICS Monitoring spectrum analysis system participated in the French armed forces’ Orion-26 military exercise and has been acquired by that country’s COMCYBER cyber command.
Armada’s monthly round-up of all the latest electronic warfare news in the product, programme and operational domains.
ATDI secures COMCYBER acquisition
ATDI’s ICS Monitoring spectrum monitoring and analysis system was deployed during the recent multinational Orion-26 military exercise which commenced in France in late February. Orion-26 will run for three months. According to a company press release, the ICS Monitoring system, which has been deployed to support the Ukrainian military in that country’s ongoing war, “enabled continuous spectrum surveillance, detected signals of interest and provided commanders with real-time spectrum data”. Signals intelligence provided by the system “supported rapid decision-making, protected operational integrity, and ensured a resilient communications environment in a contested, EW-heavy battlespace”. The exercise saw the ICS Monitoring capability connected to direction finders and broadband receivers. ATDI told Armada, via a written statement, that the system processed signals detected across a waveband of 30 megahertz to eight gigahertz. During the exercise, the ICS Monitoring capabilities were demonstrated to France’s joint COMCYBER cyber command which is responsible for cyber defence across the French military. The company continued that “ATDI was the only partner invited to showcase a spectrum monitoring capability during this demonstration”. COMCYBER has since acquired the company’s offerings, and ATDI is “proud that this technology has been selected and are honoured to support the command with tools designed to enhance spectrum monitoring and electromagnetic situational awareness”.
SNC to work on National Reconnaissance Office study
Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) announced in early March that the company had been selected for the United States’ National Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO) Commercial Radio Frequencies study. A press release revealing the news said the company will provide its Vindlér radio frequency sensing low earth orbit satellite constellation to support this work. These satellites will “detect and produce valuable signal and geolocation products that support US intelligence and defence communities” the press release continued. SNC told Armada in a written statement that the Vindlér constellation detects emissions across a waveband of 30 megahertz to 18 gigahertz. Additional signals collection will be performed by SNC’s forthcoming Vindlér-2.0 constellation which comprises three Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) satellites. These satellites are due to reach the cosmos by the middle of this year. ESPA satellites are typically launched using unoccupied space on large rockets. Although the company’s work with the National Reconnaissance Office on this study should last 30 months, SNC “aims to build a long-term partnership with the NRO”, the statement concluded.
Doodle Labs launches Sense EW
Doodle Labs revealed the launch of its Sense EW product in a press release published in mid-March. Sense EW is a capability designed to improve the resilience of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in heavily electromagnetically contested environments. The company articulated in the press release that Sense EW “delivers integrated software and hardware capabilities that strengthen communications links”. The Sense EW architecture includes radios “with adaptive link intelligence” which adjust routing priorities and network behaviour according to prevailing local electromagnetic conditions. The architecture works to reduce the likelihood that the radio communications a UAV relies on are as discreet as possible. When any jamming does occur, the architecture will adjust radio communications accordingly to ensure the link between the aircraft and pilot is maintained. Amol Parikh, Doodle Labs’ co-chief executive officer told Armada that Sense EW is primarily designed for “small, lightweight (UAV) platforms used for ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), tactical reconnaissance, loitering munitions and distributed operations”. The architecture “has completed development for its current release and is ready for operational use” Mr. Parikh continued. Moreover, Sense EW “is not a standalone, net-new system, but an evolution of Doodle Labs’ existing, fielded radio platform, which has been deployed in real-world contested environments for several years”. (Source: Armada)
02 Apr 26. Europe region: Diplomatic entities face heightened cyber espionage risks from Chinese threat actors. On 1 April, cyber security company Proofpoint reported that a known Chinese state-sponsored group (‘TA416’, also known as ‘Mustang Panda’) has increased cyber espionage operations targeting organisations across Europe. Reportedly, the group distributes phishing emails to infiltrate targeted systems by tricking victims into downloading and/or clicking on a malicious attachment. TA416 subsequently deploys a backdoor (‘PlugX’) to establish persistence within compromised systems, before downloading additional payloads, likely for reconnaissance and data exfiltration. This increase in cyber attacks on European organisations began in mid-2025, following heightened tensions over trade between China and the EU. Around this time, the cyber operation largely targeted diplomatic missions and delegations to NATO and the EU. However, in March, the group also started targeting organisations in the Middle East region amid the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war, further highlighting the nexus between geopolitical events and TA416’s cyber operations. We assess that European organisations will face heightened security and cyber espionage risks amid escalating geopolitical tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Apr 26. Silvus Technologies adds Login Authentication to StreamScape ATAK Plugin.
Silvus Technologies has just released an update to its StreamScape ATAK plugin, that brings the full power of StreamCaster MANET radios directly to any ATAK-enabled End User Device (EUD).
The free-to-use StreamScape ATAK Plugin brings the power of StreamCaster MANET radios and the intuitive StreamScape GUI directly to your handheld ATAK-enabled EUD.
Designed for mission-critical mobility, this bespoke plugin extends beyond basic ATAK functionality and puts advanced radio and network management capabilities right at your fingertips, giving you full situational awareness and control on the go — no laptop required. Whether you’re on the ground, in a vehicle, or on the move, you’ll have the tools to monitor and configure your StreamCaster MANET radio network in real time.
KEY FEATURES
- Real-Time Radio Configuration: Directly adjust network-wide configurations, radio frequency, bandwidth, link distance, transmit power, and many more parameters.
- Dynamic Network Topology Visualization: View network topology overlaid on the ATAK map, including node status and link quality (50+ nodes).
- Performance Monitoring & Diagnostics: Real-time signal-to-noise ratio reporting, interference level display, and battery voltage and percentage monitoring for all connected radios.
- Rapid Mission Reconfiguration from EUD: Instantly change Mission Profiles and other parameters directly from your End User Device.
- Login Authentication: Adds a username and password requirement to the radio. Even if the device is stolen, unauthorized users cannot access features, view settings, or retrieve encryption keys.
- PTT & Talk Group Management: Manage active and monitored talk groups and easily adjust channels and volume for connected audio devices. Pop-up notifications on the ATAK map identify active speakers.
ATAK Version Support: The StreamScape ATAK Plugin currently supports ATAK versions 4.10 through 5.5 while running StreamCaster MANET radio firmware version 5.0.1.5 or newer.
(Source: UAS VISION)
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Curtiss-Wright Corporation (NYSE: CW) has a long history with its roots dating back to Orville and Wilbur Wright’s first flight in 1903, and Mr. Glenn Curtiss, the father of naval aviation. In 1929, the companies founded by these three great aviation pioneers, the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company and Wright Aeronautical Corporation, merged to form the largest aircraft company at the time, Curtiss-Wright Corporation.
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