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16 Oct 25. The Wall.
An ‘incursion’ of Russian Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Poland on 8th September concentrated the minds of politicians and securocrats alike in free Europe. This was not the first time. Russian UAVs have a habit of landing in NATO territory. No less than 15 examples of Russian UAVs violating NATO airspace have been recorded since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2025. Most of these infringements have affected the airspace of Poland and Romania. Unsurprising then that the European Union (EU) is considering taking measures against these violations. Andrius Kubilius, the EU’s commission for defence and space, has mooted the construction of a so-called ‘drone wall’ to provide an impregnable shield against the Russian UAV menace. Exact details on the drone wall’s specifications are scant which is understandable given that the initiative has only just been announced. Mr. Kubilius did give some clues hinting that the defences would include sensors like radar and acoustic devices. Effectors would also form part of the mix. Presumably, this could include jammers to hit the radio links connecting the UAV to its pilot and blocking out global navigation satellite system signal reception. Kinetic effectors could include surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery. As can be seen, electromagnetics will be fundamental to the drone wall. Ground-based air surveillance radars which can accurately detect, identify and track a UAV will be imperative. Not all such radars can do this: UAVs have low radar cross sections on account of their small physical size and largely non-metallic construction. However, specialist systems are available which use innovative approaches like micro-Doppler processing to determine the spinning blades of a UAV, and to discriminate it from other small flying objects like birds. Secondly robust, survivable, wideband communications are a must. NATO’s Eastern Flank might not face UAVs violating its airspace in piecemeal fashion. As the incident in Poland on 8th September illustrated, multiple aircraft may test the drone wall. Sensors will need to share their imagery to populate a rich recognised radar and electromagnetic picture to assist battle management. Moreover, these communications must be secure and survivable. It is not impossible to image Russian electronic warfare assets attempting to jam NATO radio communications while airspace violations are ongoing. A good approach would be to use civilian and military communications which are already in place. Local fifth-generation cellular networks have the bandwidth necessary to share bucket-loads of data. Conventional telecommunications and fibre optics have their part to play, as do deployed military communications networks. It is likely that EU and NATO member nations will deploy their own counter-UAV defences to the Eastern Flank as part of the drone wall, and they will bring their military communications with them.
A prudent approach of the EU to the drone wall’s construction would be to use as many assets as it already collectively possesses to form the constituent parts. This will help keep costs down and send a political message that the EU and NATO take collective responsibility for the drone wall. Using existing communications, military and civilian, and deploying additional capability where necessary, should form a key part of this approach. (Source: Armada)
16 Oct 25. Emulating Everything.
The DBRE heralds a step change in the fidelity, speed and density with which radio frequency emitters can be emulated. The technology may also help DARPA develop autonomous and digital twin technologies. This August, the United States’ DARPA unveiled the Digital Radio Frequency Battlespace Emulator which will greatly enhance how the agency recreates radio emitters. The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) claims that the Digital Radio Frequency Battlespace Emulator (DRBE) is the “world’s largest high-fidelity, real-time virtual radio frequency test range”. The system generates a synthetic test range where multitudes of RF emissions can be emulated. There are important differences between simulation and emulation: Simulation, according to established definitions, focuses on the creation of a mathematical model to evaluate the behaviour and performance of a specific system. Emulation replicates a system’s actual hardware and software to effectively create a copy of it in a synthetic environment. According to DARPA’s official literature, the DRBE “offers a powerful new tool for testing (artificial intelligence) enabled (electronic warfare) capabilities and accelerating the development of next-generation RF systems”. Traditional RF test ranges have their limitations: Their physical size may restrict them to the number of emitters that can be deployed on these facilities at any one time. Governmental licensing restrictions from spectrum regulators may limit the type of signals that can be emitted and the times these emissions can be performed. Testing may also have to be organised and booked months in advance, especially if the facilities are in high demand. Furthermore, conventional test ranges can be expensive to acquire, manage and upgrade. DARPA claims that the DRBE is largely free of such strictures, promising “unachievable scale and realism in the emulation of EW scenarios”.
Dr. Anna Tauke-Pedretti, DRBE programme manager, told Armada that “(a) virtual RF environment is, broadly stated, a digital testbed. Rather than relying on outdoor ranges or physical facilities, it takes in signals from radars or other RF systems and recreates how those signals would behave in the real world”. The DRBE, Dr. Tauke-Pedretti continued, also contrasts with laboratory-based DBRE emulators: “Traditional laboratory RF emulators can typically only handle a handful of transmitters and receivers at a time, which limits the realism of testing. Outdoor ranges offer more realism, but they are costly to operate and not always practical. By contrast, DRBE can process a much larger number of inputs while providing high-fidelity emulation”.
Performance
Development and implementation of the DRBE is the responsibility of DARPA’s microsystems technology office, the agency’s literature continued. At the heart of the DRBE is a high-performance, real-time wafer-scale computing architecture which is powered by what DARPA says is the world’s largest processor. A key performance aspect of the DRBE is its low latency. Latency is the measurement of the gap in time between when a machine is instructed to perform a specific task, and when that task is executed. Radio signals travel at the speed of light; 299,274 kilometres-per-second/186,000 miles-per-second. Thus, it becomes imperative that RF emitters can be emulated with representative speeds. For example, a military tactical radio may change frequency several thousand times per second. The DRBE will need to replicate such velocities. The agency says that plans for the DRBE’s development include the use of optical connections within the emulator’s architecture. Such components will increase the bandwidth of the overall system, increasingly the spread of frequencies that can be emulated. Optical connections will also be employed to increase the quantity of wafer-scale computers yet further, helping to enhance the DRBE’s performance. DARPA’s literature says that “these enhancements will unlock the potential for even larger-scale RF scenarios”. Moreover, the improvements open “pathways for (the) DRBE’s architecture to support additional mission domains, including battlespace autonomy, materials science, and digital twins”.
Implementation
DARPA says that the United States Navy will take delivery of the first DRBE example by the end of 2025 becoming part of the Department of Defence’s (DOD) overall testing and evaluation capability. Cerebras Systems and Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory helped develop the DRBE system the US Navy will receive. Additional assistance in this regard was provided by the US Army Research Laboratory. Dr. Tauke-Pedretti added that a final demonstration is planned for the DRBE in 2026. Undoubtedly, the DRBE will provide a major leap forward in DOD RF testing and evaluation when it enters service. This will not only help system development but will enhance understanding of emitter threats in the electromagnetic environment. (Source: Armada)
16 Oct 25. Time is of the Essence.
Motorola handheld radios used by Ukrainian manoeuvre forces for tactical communications employ AES-256 encryption which may be vulnerable to Russian decryption efforts. Armada has learnt that Russian communications intelligence cadres have some restrictions on their ability to decrypt the AES-256 encryption standard. In August 2023 Armada published an article which revealed that Russian Communications Intelligence (COMINT) cadres had successfully broken the Advanced Encryption Standard-256 (AES-256) protocol. AES-256 was created by the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology. Entering service in the early 2000s, AES-256 replaced the earlier US Data Encryption Standard developed by IBM in the 1970s. The new encryption standard was used to secure US military and government classified information. AES-256 has since become a standard encryption tool for communications traffic. It is used extensively in the public and private sector as well as by military and government users. It would take a whole series of articles to clearly explain AES-256 encryption and how it works and Armada highly recommends consulting this online guide. This guide says that AES-256 is a “virtually impenetrable symmetric encryption algorithm”. The article continues that it is not impossible to crack AES encryption with “(a) combination of the perfect brains, the most powerful computer and sheer hacking talent,” although it argues such a process may take a long time. Nonetheless, powerful software does exist which can perform the necessary complex mathematics to decrypt AES-256 protected traffic. COMINT Consulting is one company that provides AES-256 decryption software, incorporating the capability into its Krypto1000 COMINT system. Decrypting AES-256 traffic is also possible should the encryption keys needed to convert the traffic being transmitted into cyphertext be compromised. Cyphertext is unreadable unless the recipient has the requisite encryption key to change this material back into plain text.
AES-256 and Motorola
It is unknown whether Russian COMINT cadres have access to AES-256 keys. Sources who are involved in actively countering Russian communications intelligence told Armada that Russian COMINT experts have devised their own software that can crack AES-256 traffic. This should rightly be a cause for alarm. The Motorola DP4400E and DP4800 ultra high frequency (300 megahertz to three gigahertz) handheld radios deployed by the Ukrainian military use AES-256 encryption according to open sources. These radios, Armada understands, are primarily used for tactical squad-level communications.
On the one hand, Armada understands that the ability of Russian COMINT cadres to crack AES-256 is a cause for concern not only for the Ukrainians, but for other forces using Motorola handheld radios with AES-256. Nonetheless, there are some important caveats regarding the competencies of the Russian communications intelligence experts in this regard. Firstly, Armada has been told that Russian AES-256 decryption does not occur in real time. It typically takes between two and three hours for encrypted traffic captured on the battlefield to be collected, processed, analysed and distributed to those who need it. The more AES-256 traffic Russian COMINT professionals must process, the longer this process takes. Even assuming the Russian military signals intelligence community has AES-256 decryption software, it has a finite quantity of COMINT operatives. Conversely, the quantity of AES-256 traffic which may be captured at any time is not fixed. Secondly, Russia’s AES-256 processing is only able to handle protected voice traffic and cannot decrypt protected data or identification traffic. Why this is the case remains unknown. Decrypting AES-256 voice traffic may also be a double-edged sword the Russian military. Knowing that the traffic can be compromised means that the Ukrainians can also sow false and misleading information into these tactical networks to fox their adversaries.
Perishable intelligence
While decrypting AES-256 protected voice traffic will be of some benefit to Russian COMINT cadres, the problem for them is that these radios are typically used for tactical communications at the tactical edge. The pace of battle dictates that tactical communications traffic can often be highly perishable. For example, knowing that a battalion will begin advancing towards its objective in 20 minutes is of limited use if it takes a minimum of two hours to decrypt the relevant voice traffic disclosing this. To paraphrase the famed US Army armoured warfare expert General George S. Patton, intelligence is like eggs, the fresher the better. Decrypting traffic which ultimately tells you about events that have long since occurred in the tactical battle can be of limited relevance.
This is not a reason to be complacent regarding Russian expertise in AES-256 decryption. While it may take several hours to decrypt the traffic, this time lag is certain to reduce assuming Russian COMINT experts continue to invest in their relevant capabilities. Should Russian COMINT cadres decrypt AES-256 protected data traffic in the future, this will be an added headache.
The key takeaway for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and allied militaries, is that AES-256’s protection can no longer be guaranteed. One should assume that any, and all, traffic using this encryption scheme can be decrypted. Alternative communications security protocols should be used where relevant. Furthermore, these same militaries should be accelerating service entry of other communications/transmission security protocols which, to our knowledge, the Russians still struggle to exploit. Reducing AES-256 reliance can only make life more difficult for Russian COMINT cadres. (Source: Armada)
16 Oct 25. Zeros, Ones, Bullets and Bombs.
The UK’s Digital targeting Web could cost over $12bn and reach a full operational capability by 2027, although some voices in the country’s Ministry of Defence have questioned whether funding will be available to meet this aggressive schedule. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence has shared more details regarding the new Digital Targeting Web recently revealed in the country’s Strategic Defence Review. The UK’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) published the country’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in early June. The document outlines the United Kingdom’s strategic priorities, the defence policies to meet those priorities and the capabilities required therein. Tellingly, the United Kingdom is moving towards becoming what the SDR calls an Integrated Force by completing “the journey from ‘joint’ to ‘integrated’”. The UK has already embraced the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) commitment to Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). NATO defines MDO as “the push for NATO to orchestrate military activities across all operating domains and environments.” The alliance adds that “(t)hese actions are synchronised with non-military activities and enable (NATO) to create desired outcomes at the right time and place”. MDO emphasises the intra- and interforce connectivity of all military assets at all levels of war for synchronous operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. The aim of MDO is to promote better quality decision-making at a more rapid pace than one’s adversaries. The ultimate goal is for the red force to seize and maintain the initiative across the battlespace at the blue force’s expense. The UK’s Integrated Force will have no fixed force design. Instead, force structures will evolve and develop as threats and technologies change and emerge. The SDR says the Integrated Force will be “underpinned by a common digital foundation and shared data”. This common digital foundation will be enabled by a “Digital Targeting Web” (DTW). This targeting web will connect sensors, deciders and effectors to create “choice and speed in deciding how to degrade or destroy an identified target across domains and in a contested cyber and electromagnetic domain”
Spinning the Web
Armada learned more details regarding the DTW’s implementation at this year’s International Defence and Security Exhibition, better known as DSEI, held in London between 9th and 12th September. The web will enable a deep synergy between UK cross-service Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities using a digital communications backbone.
Developing the digital backbone will be challenging. Information at all levels of classification will need to flow between C2 and ISR assets. Information will also need to move outwards to other government organisations which may be non-military but involved in defence and security. The UK’s domestic and foreign security services are examples of the latter. Allies will also need to connect into the DTW to send and receive relevant information. This latter point will be particularly important when UK forces are involved in coalition and/or multinational operations. For example, the UK will need to ensure the web can link with the Five Eyes’ Pegasus communications network. Five Eyes is a formal intelligence sharing and defence cooperation organisation involving Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the United States.
The DTW will share information with the Secret Cloud; a cloud computing initiative for UK land forces that can store and handle classified data. Google Cloud is currently developing the Secret Cloud, which was announced in September by the UK Ministry of Defence. Although no details appear in the public domain, Armada understands that the Secret Cloud should become operational over the next five years. Sources continued that edge computing will be imperative to manage information flows up to the cloud from capabilities like sensors to avoid information deluge.
Protection
There are understandable fears that initiatives like the DTW and the Secret Cloud could introduce vulnerabilities, particularly regarding cybersecurity, which hostile actors could exploit. MOD sources have emphasised that robust cyber protection and resilience will be integral to both initiatives. Similarly, the networks supporting the DTW must be robust against electronic attack. Parallel initiatives like UK Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) resilience will help provide alternate timing, navigation and geolocation services independent of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) constellations. Experts involved with the DTW also talked of the importance of having a decentralised construction. This means that the DTW will not have a single point of failure through any of its constituent parts.
Costs
No final figure has been publicly announced regarding the DTW’s overall cost. The initiative is expected to receive an initial $1.4 bn of funding from the MOD. The programme could then cost circa $5.4 bn annually, Armada understands. Publicly available reports talk of the DTW’s initial operational capability being declared in 2026. Full operational capability is expected one year later. Despite the funding and aggressive schedule, some senior MOD figures have expressed scepticism regarding the DTW’s cost. One told Armada that the funding for the DTW was unlikely to be available over these timelines. They dubbed the initiative a “pipe dream”. Time will tell if their prediction becomes apparent. (Source: Armada)
16 Oct 25. October Radio Roundup. October 16, 2025TERASi’s new RU1 millimetric wave radio handles traffic across a waveband of 71GHz to 86GHz. Applications mooted for the radio include uninhabited ground and air vehicles.
Armada’s monthly roundup of all the latest news in the military communications product, programme and operational domains.
MMW Gets Smaller
On 21st August, TERASi launched what the company claims is the world’s smallest and lightest Millimetric Wave (MMW), military-grade, ultra-compact radio, according to a press release. Millimetric wave radio signals typically inhabit frequencies from 30 gigahertz/GHz to 300GHz. Known as the RU1, the press release continued that the radio transmits on frequencies above 60GHz. Specifically, the radio handles frequencies of 71GHz to 86GHz, according to James Campion, TERASI’s co-founder and chief executive officer. Mr. Campion says that SpaceX’s Starlink system is using these frequencies for the company’s next high-capacity Satellite Communications (SATCOM) gateways. He expects other SATCOM operators to employ these wavebands in the future for similar high-capacity links. TERASi says the RU1 can be up to 40 times smaller and 100 times lighter than “the nearest in-class products”. Applications mooted for the RUI include the provision of MMW SATCOM links for space- and weight-constrained platforms like uninhabited air and ground vehicles. Mr. Campion continued that the RU1 generates over 55 decibels-per-milliwatt of power. RU1 customer field trials are expected to commence by the fourth quarter of this year.
Arc Ascending
AscendArc has told Armada that the company expects to launch the first of its planned communications satellites in the first half of 2027. Although AscendArc will provide commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM) using its constellation, it will also make SATCOM services available to military customers. The spacecraft will be in geostationary orbits. The company continued that commercial and military Ka-band (14 gigahertz/GHz uplink and 10.9GHz to 12.75GHz downlink) channels will be provided via the satellites. AscendArc added that it has done developmental working looking at ultra-high frequency (399 megahertz/MHz to 470MHz) and X-band (7.9GHz to 8.4GHz uplink and 7.25GHz to 7.75GHz downlink) connectivity for the United States Department of Defence (DOD). L-band (1.2GHz to 1.8GHz and 1.67GHz to 1.71GHz), C-band (5.925GHz to 6.425GHz uplink and 3.7GHz to 4.2GHz downlink) and S-band (2.2GHz to 2.4GHz) links could be facilitated on future satellites. AscendArc said that each satellite can cover a 24 m square kilometre (9.3 m square miles) area. This footprint equates to a swathe of territory roughly the size of Europe or North America. The company said that it could begin providing SATCOM services to military customers from 2028. (Source: Armada)
15 Oct 25. US: Increased botnet activity underscores short-term security risks to businesses. On 13 October, international news outlets reported that unnamed threat actors have been using a large-scale multi-country botnet to attempt to infiltrate US-based systems since at least 8 October. Reportedly, the cyber threat actors hijack administrative user accounts via brute-forcing techniques and/or scan for open ports, in order to exploit remote desktop protocol (RDP) services. The botnet then conducts two types of RDP-related attacks to steal valid usernames and to enumerate additional user accounts. We assess that the threat actors likely intend to expand the botnet’s infrastructure, though the campaign’s objective remains unclear. The botnet comprises at least 100,000 IP addresses located across approximately 100 countries, highlighting the scale of this operation. The same botnet has also previously targeted devices across Africa, East Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, suggesting that its activity is opportunistic in nature. We assess that US-based entities will face increased security risks from botnet attacks in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Oct 25. Proteus Maritime, ECU partner to enhance communication. The proposed mesh communication system will provide a network akin to Wi-Fi beneath the ocean’s surface. Proteus Maritime and Edith Cowan University (ECU), both based in Western Australia, have embarked on a collaborative project to enhance underwater communication. The partnership aims to develop an undersea mesh communication system to address the inherent challenges faced by radio-frequency communications in aquatic environments. The proposed system will provide a network akin to Wi-Fi beneath the ocean’s surface. This network facilitates real-time connectivity for devices deep in the ocean. Unlike traditional systems that depend on a single central hub, each device within the mesh can establish connections with multiple neighbouring units. This creates a “reliable web” of communication that is less susceptible to failure, according to the Western Australia Government. The practical applications are expected to enhance the operational effectiveness of submarines, subsea drones, and sensors. Moreover, it has potential benefits for scientific research and search and rescue missions. This concept was initially introduced during last year’s Exercise Western Dawn (Ex WD) Innovation Program and earned recognition as the overall winner for 2024.
Western Australia Science and Innovation Minister Stephen Dawson said: “This work by Proteus Maritime and ECU could prove to be a game changer for creating reliable pathways in undersea communications for submarines, subsea drones and sensors.”
Proteus Maritime and ECU have received a A$200,000 ($131,543) grant from the government for their project. Western Australia Defence Industries Minister Paul Papalia: “Congratulations to Proteus Maritime and Edith Cowan University for being awarded the WA Government’s A$200,000 Defence and Research Teaming grant.
“This technology will potentially give our submarines, and sea drones the upper hand with a clear line of communication even in hostile waters.
“We are proud of what our local businesses and researchers are achieving, and the State Government continues to invest in the defence sector to help it to grow.” (Source: naval-technology.com)
13 Oct 25. NATO expands command network with CAOC Bodø opening.
This new centre will also take on the Norwegian QRA responsibilities.
NATO has opened its third Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Bodø, Norway.
The new centre will boost NATO’s capacity to oversee and manage air operations throughout the Nordic region, the Arctic, and the broader territories of the political and military alliance. In conjunction with the existing CAOCs in Uedem, Germany, and Torrejón, Spain, CAOC Bodø will oversee as many as 30,000 daily aircraft movements throughout NATO’s European airspace. The establishment of CAOC Bodø is expected to increase situational awareness in the High North. It will also offer vital backup into the Alliance’s air command and control (C2) infrastructure, NATO said.
By integrating this third centre into the existing network, the alliance bolsters its ability to manage dispersed air operations from multiple locations, thus ensuring robust coordination in an increasingly challenging security landscape. This new centre will also take on the Norwegian Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) responsibilities, a task that has been a cornerstone of Norway’s defence since 1961. The QRA mission involves intercepting and identifying aircraft that have not been pre-identified, thereby securing NATO’s northern airspace. Pilots operating the F-35 Lightning II fighters will continue this vigilant tradition at CAOC Bodø, following in the footsteps of their predecessors who flew F-86 Sabre jets over 60 years ago. Although CAOC Bodø is currently in its initial operational phase, it is slated to progressively expand its missions and capabilities. Initially manned predominantly by Norwegian personnel, CAOC Bodø is expected to develop its operational capacity in tandem with its counterparts in Uedem and Torrejón. Its activation is set to augment NATO’s preparedness for integrated multi-domain operations within the Arctic and High North regions, where dynamic response and interoperability are vital for maintaining stability. The operational remit of CAOC Bodø is particularly relevant to NATO’s newest operational command, Joint Force Command Norfolk, which has jurisdiction over an extensive area stretching from Florida to Finland. The opening ceremony was attended by officials from Norway, Finland, Sweden, and NATO leadership. During this event, Norwegian Major General Tron Strand was formally appointed as the first Commander of CAOC Bodø.
“The mission task and our area of responsibility will continue to increase as the organization matures and grows. CAOC Bodø will provide the necessary contributions to the future CAOC model. We will contribute credible deterrence for the Alliance, and we will be ready to fight if necessary,” Tron Strand said.
In June 2025, the Norwegian Government committed to invest 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) towards defence capabilities. (Source: airforce-technology.com)
13 Oct 25. Supporting Connectivity for US Army Next-Gen Command and Control Objectives. Current conflicts have demonstrated the urgent need to enable on-the-move communications capabilities for warfighters downrange. Gone are the days of stopping to set up elaborate operations centers, with their tents, generators, and forward-operating base feel. The pace of war has increased to the point where stealth, avoidance, and frequent movement are the keys to surviving on the modern battlefield. The U.S. Army is actively working to modernize and transform the way that it shares information. The branch’s Next-Generation Command and Control (NGC2) initiative will “provide commanders with the ability to make more, better, and faster decisions through advanced analytics, an integrated data layer, open architecture, and robust and resilient transport.” NGC2 aims to integrate advanced technologies, improve network redundancy and resilience, and provide real-time data to soldiers on the ground, in the air, and at command and-control nodes while on the move. At the upcoming 2025 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual meeting and exposition, Viasat will be sharing its innovations that enable universal connectivity across the Army – to ensure real-time information sharing for tactical communications and decision making is available for service members on-the-move and on-the-pause. Our dedication to innovation is unwavering, and we’ve consistently proven our ability to deliver cutting-edge solutions that meet the Army’s most demanding requirements.
“Viasat’s commitment to the Army is rooted in our long heritage of fielding edge solutions designed to solve the unique connectivity challenges faced by military operations. We are proud to collaborate closely with Army leaders and soldiers to identify gaps in current systems and develop solutions that address the needs of the NGC2 initiative,” said David Schmolke, Vice President of Viasat Mission Connections and Cybersecurity.
During AUSA, our team will be highlighting solutions designed to support NGC2 objectives, including:
Mobile Network Terminal (MNT)
For more than two decades, Blue Force Tracking (BFT) transceivers have enabled real-time vehicle tracking to help with command, control, and navigation. Viasat’s Mobile Network Terminal (MNT) is a complete modernization of Viasat’s BFT capabilities, delivering modern functionality and communications flexibility to meet the needs of today’s missions and anticipated future requirements. The terminal is designed to deliver access to, and management of multiple transports, including LEO, GEO and Line-of-Sight.
The MNT is designed to be form & fit compatible with existing BFT transceiver hardware, eliminating the need to reconfigure Army vehicles to fit new terminals. MNT’s software-defined radios, mesh networking capability, and edge AI/ML applications enable intelligent orchestration to deliver on-the-move access to warfighter applications using multiple transports. The MNT is enabled by the Qualcomm Snapdragon Mission Tactical Radio (SMTR) capability. The integrated SMTR SoC delivers 15 Trillion Operations Per Second (TOPS) of on-device intelligence capability, while the Smart Mobility Architecture (SMARC) slot ensures seamless future upgradability when mission requirements evolve without hardware replacement. The SMTR hosts Viasat NetAgility SDN and includes a government-purpose software load on Qualcomm Snapdragon chipsets that allow the radio to use a library of DoW waveforms.
Additionally, the terminal is backward and forward compatible, allowing for methodical investment and installation while ensuring seamless communications between divisions which may have different hardware baselines. Ultimately, Viasat’s MNT offers a flexible and scalable solution for the Army’s command post communications and tactical vehicle needs.
NMR-50 Router
The NetAgility Mobile Router 50 (NMR-50) is a compact, rugged edge router built for small form factor applications (SOCOM MODPAYLOAD compliant). It can serve as the communications backbone inside autonomous platforms, as well as adds an additional compute and data storage capability. The Qualcomm SMTR software-defined radio solution delivers access to multiple integrated, diverse transports orchestrated through Viasat’s NetAgility SDN platform, enabling soldiers to utilize various waveforms and satellites and quickly adapt to changing mission communications needs. The NMR-50 and MNT each have a neural processing unit (NPU) capable of running AI workloads and the SMARC slot enables seamless upgrades as mission needs change.
Quicksilver Free Space Optical (FSO) Terminal
The development of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to detect, disrupt, and degrade traditional communications networks by peer and near-peer adversaries necessitates a resilient, reliable alternative for connectivity in contested environments. Viasat’s Quicksilver solution is an FSO terminal that delivers high-capacity data transmission, with increased security, and lighter infrastructure. This includes offering data rates of 10 Gbps with an operational range of 50-70km. Supporting on-the-pause communications, this quick setup solution enables low-latency communications with a Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detect (LPI/LPD) anti-jam link. With Quicksilver, customers can rapidly deploy a high bandwidth, zero radio frequency emission capability without the restrictions of obtaining spectrum clearances or licenses. Quicksilver is an expansion of Viasat’s FSOC solutions, following the introduction of the on-the-move Mercury FSOC terminal in 2023. These are just a few of Viasat’s tactical networking and communications solutions that are built to enhance Army communications and support strategic needs for future operations. (Source: ASD Network)
10 Oct 25. Cyber Update.
Key points
- A data theft attack by a well-known ransomware group (‘Clop’) highlights security and financial risks stemming from the exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-61882) in third-party services (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 6 October 2025).
- A new version of a highly sophisticated backdoor (‘XWorm’) will pose long-term data theft and financial risks to global firms (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 7 October 2025 and our Technical analysis below).
- North Korean cyber operations continue to pose long-term heightened financial and social engineering risks to global entities (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 8 October 2025).
- A ransomware attack underscores the reputational and financial risks posed by the ransomware group ‘Qilin’ to high-profile brands (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 9 October 2025).
- Pro-Russia hacktivist group ‘TwoNet’ is conducting disruptive cyber operations against Western critical national infrastructure (CNI) entities, raising operational and security risks (see Sibylline Cyber
Technical analysis of weekly stories
Threat actors have been targeting global organisations utilising a new version of the highly sophisticated backdoor XWorm since at least September. The cyber actors typically use phishing emails alongside other non-social engineering techniques to infiltrate a company’s targeted systems. Some of these techniques include disguising the malware as a legitimate file, while simultaneously using artificial intelligence (AI) themes to trick targeted individuals into deploying the malware onto compromised systems; this represents an evolution from the previous reliance on email attachments and .LNK files. The malicious file installs an executable via a multi-stage process to check whether the compromised systems have any third-party security applications, in order to evade detection. The file also ensures that any existing security services remain disabled in case of system reboots, allowing for prolonged obfuscation. Upon execution, XWorm establishes communication with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure and conducts reconnaissance to gather system information. XWorm has extensive backdoor capabilities, including collecting and exfiltrating sensitive information (such as financial and crypto currency wallet information, used for financial profit), launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and deploying additional malicious payloads. XWorm’s new variant also contains more than 35 plug-ins, enabling it to act as ransomware to encrypt systems’ files, highlighting its sophistication.
The pro-Russia hacktivist group TwoNet is reportedly targeting Western CNI entities in disruptive cyber operations. In September, TwoNet used default credentials to infiltrate operational technology (OT) within a fake water treatment facility that had been created by Western threat researchers to observe threat actors’ cyber activity (a practice known as a honeypot). The group then ran a structured query language (SQL) request to identify the system’s databases, before exploiting a cross-site-scripting (XSS) vulnerability (CVE-2021-26829) to display a pop-up alert about the attack on a compromised human-machine interface (HMI). TwoNet subsequently disabled logs, alarms and real-time updates by removing the connected programmable logic controller (PLC) from the data source list. This infiltration of a decoy target demonstrates TwoNet’s intent and capability of disrupting adversarial CNI. The incident highlights a potential shift in pro-Russia hacktivist tactics to encompass disruptive attacks on OT systems, rather than simply targeting information technology (IT) systems with low-level DDoS attacks. The group also engaged in doxxing, ransomware and other cyber operations at the same time, though it has reportedly ceased operations as of the time of writing.
Our cyber word of the week: Human-machine interface (HMI)
Definition: A piece of hardware or software that enables human operators to interact with and control industrial machines via a user interface. (Source: Sibylline)
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Curtiss-Wright Corporation (NYSE: CW) has a long history with its roots dating back to Orville and Wilbur Wright’s first flight in 1903, and Mr. Glenn Curtiss, the father of naval aviation. In 1929, the companies founded by these three great aviation pioneers, the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company and Wright Aeronautical Corporation, merged to form the largest aircraft company at the time, Curtiss-Wright Corporation.
We have continued on the path of innovation and advanced engineering, and have applied that expertise to a number of critical applications in high-performance markets. Our success has resulted in a world-renowned reputation for performance, long-standing customer relationships and significant growth and profitability in the markets in which we compete.
Today, we are a global, integrated provider of highly engineered, technologically advanced products and services. Our revenues are generated by providing our critical solutions through three segments: Aerospace & Industrial, Defense Electronics and Naval & Power, which support several of the largest, most vital industries in the world.
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