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01 Jul 25. German Premiere With Live Flight Demo: German Industry Team Showcases Electromagnetic Combat from the Air. Airbus, bKEC, HENSOLDT, IBM, MBDA, PLATH, Rohde & Schwarz, and Schönhofer have demonstrated live in Germany for the first time how military aircraft can fly unhindered missions in a crisis area with active air defense systems using electromagnetic jamming measures. In the live flight demonstration in Manching, the team of German defense companies simulated a scenario close to real operations in front of numerous representatives of the German Armed Forces: the evacuation of German citizens from a crisis area equipped with comprehensive air defense systems. A Pilatus PC-12 turboprop aircraft, a simulated Airbus A400M military airlifter, a SHARCS technology demonstrator serving as an unmanned remote carrier, and an SA-8 air defense missile system representing the enemy’s air defense were used. The PC-12 was equipped with an electromagnetic surveillance and jamming system. It acted as a stand-off jammer, or jamming aircraft, which detected and classified the SA-8 system from a safe distance, jammed it with electromagnetic countermeasures, and rendered it incapable of combat. Without functioning enemy air defenses, the simulated A400M was able to fly into the crisis area undetected, land, and evacuate citizens. The SHARCS remote carrier, equipped with a stand-in jammer, provided support by simultaneously suppressing communications, thereby delaying a response from enemy forces. The seamless communication between friendly forces, the exchange of reconnaissance and effect data, and the processing and AI-supported analysis of the data took place in a secure cloud. The demonstration showed how effectively forces of electromagnetic combat (EC) can operate and protect friendly forces during missions. Since EC operates without ammunition and is non-kinetic, there is also no damage. The capability demonstrated in the demonstration is an essential component of the German defense project “luftgestützte Wirkung im elektromagnetischen Spektrum” (Airborne Effects in the Electromagnetic Spectrum), or luWES for short, in which the German Armed Forces are building up EC capabilities. Developing the technologies for this is the declared goal of Airbus, bKEC, HENSOLDT, IBM, MBDA, PLATH, Rohde & Schwarz, and Schönhofer. Under the motto “EC made in Germany for Germany,” they want to enable the German Air Force to deploy these capabilities independently and sovereignly. Following the flight demonstration, the next step will be to further develop the individual luWES components. luWES will form a “system of systems” consisting of complementary and modular subsystems that provide electromagnetic protection from the air for armed forces. The stand-off jammer operates from a great distance and enables enemy radar and communications systems to be jammed outside their direct range. This not only protects friendly forces, but also increases their effectiveness, as enemy sensors are suppressed before their area of operation is entered. The escort jammer operates alongside manned mission platforms. It actively protects them in enemy territory by continuously jamming enemy radar and missile systems. The stand-in jammer penetrates directly into the enemy’s effective range. It suppresses enemy air defense systems at close range, protecting friendly weapons and thus increasing their effectiveness and assertiveness. (Source: ASD Network)
01 Jul 25. Thales Alenia Space to Develop SOLiS Very-high-throughput Laser Communications Demonstrator. Thales Alenia Space, the joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), has been selected by the French space agency CNES, as part of the space component of the France 2030 program launched by the French government, to develop a very-high-throughput laser communications demonstrator. Called SOLiS — for Service Optique de Liaisons Spatiales Sécurisées (secure optical space link service) — this project aims to demonstrate the technical and economic viability of an optical communications service relying on geostationary satellites. Such a service is designed to make intercontinental networks more resilient at a time when there is a growing number of acts of sabotage targeting land and undersea optical fiber links. Geostationary satellites offer an effective and cost-effective solution for ultra-secure transfers of large amounts of data between two users on Earth, delivering very high data rates of up to one terabit per second despite distances and atmospheric disturbances. SOLiS harnesses technologies developed through the government-backed Optical Communications (CO-OP) project led by CNES and a group of 17 SMEs and large primes, and draws on the outcomes of demonstrations delivered for the VERTIGO project funded by the European Commission. Thales Alenia Space will lead the SOLiS project consortium, composed of large industry primes and mid-tier firms (Safran Data Systems, Bertin Technologies, Exail, Keopsys), SMEs (Cedrat Technologies), startups (OGS Technologies, Reuniwatt), and a research center (ONERA), most of which have already worked on the CO-OP project. SOLiS plans to develop an optical communications payload and a pilot ground station designed to demonstrate very-high-throughput laser communications. In accordance with a memorandum of understanding between Thales Alenia Space and operator Hellas Sat signed in 2024, this payload will be flown on the Hellas Sat 5 geostationary communications satellite, while the pilot ground station will be set up at the operator’s teleport in Cyprus. This station will communicate with CNES’s FROGS station already operating at the Côte d’Azur Observatory on the Mediterranean coast. Building on the accomplishments of the CO-OP project, SOLiS will put French manufacturers — large primes, mid-tier firms, SMEs, and startups — at the forefront in space communications for the 2030s as they strive to address the challenges of security, resilience, fast data rates, and multi-orbit interoperability (between the ground, constellations, and geostationary satellites).
“We are delighted to be starting development of the payload for the optical communications system, marking a crucial step toward establishing a secure, very-high-throughput optical network,” said Alcino De Sousa, Executive VP, Telecommunications at Thales Alenia Space. “Satellite laser communications projects like SOLiS are set to usher in a new era in telecommunications services, driving development of multi-orbit communications networks.” (Source: ASD Network)
02 Jul 25. Global: Increased cyber criminal, state-sponsored convergence points to heightened security risks. On 30 June, the cyber security company Proofpoint reported that cyber criminal and state-sponsored cyber threat actor activity is increasingly overlapping. In February, the company detected several cyber espionage operations that it attributed to the financially motivated threat group ‘TA829’. While it is unclear whether TA829 has any connections to the Russian state, the group notably conducted cyber espionage operations against Ukraine following the onset of the war in that country in February 2022. It typically employs tactics associated with cyber criminal activity, likely in a bid to enhance detection evasion and to complicate attribution efforts. In the same month, Proofpoint also uncovered another activity cluster (‘UNK_GreenSec’) that used similar tactics to TA829 to target organisations in North America. However, UNK_GreenSec used different infrastructure and deployment methods compared to TA829. We assess this further showcases the complications stemming from the increasing convergence between cyber criminal operations and state-sponsored activity, which is in turn heightening security risks for global businesses. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jun 25. Textbook SEAD. For at least the past two decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has expended considerable propaganda capital waxing lyrical on the potency of its air defences. Videos depicted imported, as well as home-grown, surface-to-air missile batteries on bombastic parades, and deployed in the field. Targets were never missed, air defenders were professional and everything was perfectly choreographed. The message was clear; launch an air war against Iran and your airpower will be decimated. It did not really work out like that. Just before midnight local time on Friday 13th June, an ironic date to be sure, the Israeli military commenced Operation Rising Lion. Airstrikes were unleashed by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and politico-military targets in north and western Iran. Domestic sabotage operations, presumably executed by Israel’s feared and respected Mossad intelligence service, were activated simultaneously. Individual scientists working on Iran’s WMD programme, and senior Iranian military officials, were killed. Within 48 hours, Israel was claiming air superiority over Tehran. Just over a week later, strike packages of United States Air Force (USAF) and US Navy combat aircraft hit three Iranian nuclear weapons facilities. By 23rd June, Iran and Israel had agreed a ceasefire. US President Donald Trump declared that Iran’s nuclear weapons programme had been “obliterated”. The extent to which the combined Israel-US strikes have set Iran’s WMD programme back is being hotly debated, but one thing is certain: The IAF performed a textbook air defence suppression effort as part of its wider offensive counter air mission. Armada understands that cyber and electronic attacks initially wrought havoc with the command, control and communications Iran’s Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) relied on. Ground-based air surveillance and fire control/ground-controlled interception radars were jammed. With radars blinded, IAF strike packages could then hit IADS targets kinetically, permanently taking them out of the fight. Jammed, smashed and hacked Iran’s IADS was in no position to challenge Israeli or American mastery of the skies. Further, similar attacks ensured that the USAF B-2A Spirit stealth bombers hitting Iran’s deeply buried nuclear facilities could do so unmolested. Alongside a plethora of locally produced systems, Iran relied on Russian-furnished ground-based air defence systems to protect her skies. Judging from the lack of crewed aircraft losses suffered by Israel and the US, Russian-supplied SAM systems performed abysmally. From Iraq to the Balkans and Libya, Soviet/Russian air defences have a habit of disappointing. They are simply no match for a disciplined, well-planned SEAD effort. Iran is one of five nations, including Russia, that acquired the latter’s flagship S-400 Triumf (NATO reporting name SA-21 Growler) long-range, high-altitude SAM system. Russian air defence systems are increasingly looking like a waste of cash. (Source: Armada)
18 Jun 25. SEAD Force Tour de Force. Sobashi radar station was struck by the Israeli Air Force early in Operation Rising Lion. The destruction of the two structures most likely housing the radars, and their radomes, is clear in this before and after picture. It is likely that this facility was home to Iranian ground-based air surveillance and/or fire control/ground-controlled interception radars. The Israeli Air Force appears to have rapidly secured air superiority over Tehran, and possibly northwestern Iran, in the two countries’ latest round of hostilities, through tried and tested air defence suppression tactics. Israel commenced Operation Rising Lion in the early hours of 13th June against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), politico-military leadership and military bases in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The military action by Israel was the culmination of years of tension between the two countries. The Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made no secret of its desire to prevent Iran from acquiring WMDs. Iran’s sponsorship of militant Islamic insurgent organisations has been a similar irritant. Hamas in the Gaza Strip, western Israel and Hezbollah, active in southern Lebanon and Syria, have both attacked targets in Israel. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has led the offensive hitting numerous targets in Iran. The force appears to have executed a textbook Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) campaign. The United States Air Force (USAF) defines OCA as actions “to dominate enemy airspace and prevent the launch of threats, resulting in greater freedom from attack and increased freedom of action.” The definition continues that OCA employs four means to “achieve specific counterair effects: attack operations, SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences), fighter escort, and fighter sweep.” OCA is integral to winning and sustaining air superiority as a prelude to winning and sustaining air supremacy. The USAF defines air superiority as “that degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats.” Air supremacy is “that degree of control of the air wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference within the operational area using air and missile threats.” Both conditions can be temporally and spatially limited in terms of duration and geographical footprint. As of the time of writing (17th June), the IAF’s OCA approach appears to have paid dividends. No Israeli warplanes are thought to have been lost so far. On 16th June, the IAF declared air superiority over Tehran. Furthermore, it is likely that the IAF may have secured air superiority across much of western and northwestern Iran.
Initial strikes
Much remains unknown regarding the specifics of the IAF’s airstrikes on targets in Iran. Nonetheless, some interesting information regarding the IAF’s OCA battle has come to light. Israel has hit numerous Iranian air defence sites in the west and northwest of that country. This article will concentrate on the electronic warfare aspects of this battle, notably against fixed site Iranian ground-based air surveillance radars. It seems likely that the IAF has employed several vectors to attack Iranian radars: Individual aircraft may have jammed systems using their own integrated self-defence systems. Radars may have been engaged by powerful escort jammers equipping combat aircraft. One example of such kit is the Rafael Advanced Defence Systems’ Sky Shield jamming pod. Sky Shield is believed to be in IAF service onboard its McDonnell Douglas/Boeing F-15 series combat aircraft. Although details remain classified, it is likely that Sky Shield can engage radar threats across a waveband of at least two gigahertz/GHz to 18GHz. Kinetic effects such as Israel Military Industries’ Delilah series of anti-radiation missiles may have engaged some of the radars. Delilah is likely to prosecute radar threats in similar wavebands to Sky Shield. The missile is known to be deployed by IAF General Dynamics/Lockheed Martin F-16I Soufa fighters. Conventional air-to-surface stand-in and stand-off weaponry is also likely to have been used against these targets. Open source media reports have noted that some Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defence Force (IRIADF) radar operators experienced their systems being jammed shortly before the IAF strikes commenced. The IRIADF is responsible for the country’s Integrated Air Defence System (IADS). Radars covering the IAF’s planned ingress and egress routes may have been heavily jammed to shield incoming strike packages of IAF aircraft. These aircraft then used kinetic effects against the radars to take them permanently out of the fight. Meanwhile, cyberattacks could have been launched against the IADS’ computerised command and control systems. The IAF is no stranger to using cyberattacks against IADS, having adopted similar tactics during a raid on a nuclear reactor in eastern Syria on 6th September 2007. The IAF’s OCA battle rhythm appears to have initially focused on targeting IRIADF long-range Over-The-Horizon (OTH) radars such as the Ghadir system. The Ghadir is a high frequency (HF: three megahertz/MHz to 30MHz) radar transmitting on frequencies of 28MHz to 29.7MHz with a maximum range of circa 594 nautical miles/nm (1,100 kilometres/km), according to open sources. Other sources state that Ghadir may transmit in very high frequencies of 30MHz to 300MHz. OTH radars may be tasked with covering a large swathe of Iranian airspace and providing early warning of incoming aircraft hundreds of nautical miles from Iran’s border. Given the comparatively low frequencies these radars use, they can detect air targets with low radar cross sections. The radars cannot do this with sufficient accuracy to guide a surface-to-air or air-to-air missile towards a target. Nonetheless, they can give useful indications of the general location of air targets. It would have been imperative for Israel that such radars were destroyed early in the conflict.
Reading the SEAD battle
According to analysis performed by the Institute for the Study of War, the IAF is thought to have destroyed the Ghadir radar near Tabriz, northwestern Iraq, during the first wave of Israeli air strikes on 13th June. This radar’s destruction would have helped cleanse Iranian airspace for IAF aircraft striking other WMD and military targets in these areas. It appears that a similar Ghadir radar, this one located in Qods in the southwestern suburbs of Tehran, may have been struck shortly afterwards. Hitting the radar in Tabriz would have deprived the Iranian IADS of early warning of IAF aircraft approaching the northwest of the country. The loss of the Ghadir outside Tehran may have had a similar effect for the airspace over the Iranian capital. An additional four IRIADF radars have been identified as destroyed by the IAF between 13th June and 16th June. These include systems located at Sobashi radar station, northwestern Iran; Khatam ol Anbia radar station and Hamadan airbase, both in Hamadan province, and at the Piranshahr military base also in northwestern Iran. Ascertaining the type and model of these radars is difficult at best. Given that they appeared to have been mounted in relatively large radomes it is reasonable to assume they maybe L-band (1.215 gigahertz/GHz to 1.4GHz) or S-band (2.3GHz to 2.5GHz/2.7GHz to 3.7GHz) ground-based air surveillance or fire control/ground-controlled interception radars. Based on general figures for such systems, L/S-band radars usually provide instrumented ranges of circa 216nm (400km). It is possible that these radars send their Recognised Air Picture (RAP) upwards to higher IRIADF echelons. There, the regional and national ‘Super RAPs’ are composed by converging disparate local recognised air pictures. The radars may also be used to aid tactical air battle management. This article has only discussed the loss of radars reported in the Institute for the Study of War’s analysis, and by reliable media outlets like the British Broadcasting Corporation. It is all but certain that other IRIADF radars have been destroyed. Shahryar Pasandideh, an open-source researcher and analyst, and an expert on the Iranian military, told Armada that “seemingly every stationary early warning radar site in western Iran and other sectors, appear to have been targeted through one means or another.” Mr. Pasandideh’s extensive analysis of the Iranian military can be found here. Radars will continue to be a high priority for the IAF as it continues its air strikes in Iran. The force has secured air superiority in a comparatively short time at least over Tehran, and possibly over northwestern Iran. This is testament to the Israeli Air Force’s adherence to tried and tested SEAD methods to win air superiority as part of the wider OCA fight. Whether Iran’s air defences can recover is another question entirely. (Source: Armada)
04 Jun 25. The Spectrum’s Coalition of the Willing. The new Electronic Warfare Capability Coalition will not only intensify EW support for Ukraine, but will also inform the electronic warfare postures and capabilities of the initiative’s member nations.
“The electronic warfare capability coalition is in place to fill critical gaps, train forces and establish effective policy and doctrine.”
This was how a senior member of the newly formed European Electronic Warfare Capability Coalition (EW CAPCO) describes three of the key missions for this new grouping. The new Capability Coalition (CAPCO) was under discussion at this year’s Association of Old Crows EW Europe conference and exhibition. The event was held in Rome on 7th and 8th May. News emerged in mid-May that several European nations would band together to improve their collective EW capabilities. A key goal of the coalition is to intensify electronic warfare support for Ukraine as she continues her efforts to expel Russia’s occupation of her lands. Nonetheless, as conference discussions underscored, the coalition’s work will have significant relevance beyond the Ukrainian theatre. Ukraine is one member of the coalition alongside Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Poland and the United Kingdom. It was stressed during conference discussions that Ukraine is not involved in the coalition solely as a passive partner. The nation is taking an active role in feeding lessons learned into the coalition, and detailing the EW capabilities she needs. All the nations involved in the initiative have the same status within the coalition. Spinning up the initiative required an initial letter of intent and a subsequent multinational contract. The next steps developed the coalition’s Terms-of-Reference (TORs) and established ‘battle rhythm’. The latter has been vital in ensuring the coalition is as responsive as possible to the electromagnetic battle in Ukraine. The TORs provide the framework for the coalition’s deliverables. These include the supply of appropriate EW capabilities to the Ukrainians, training Ukrainian personnel and developing unified EW strategies, policies and doctrines. EW CAPCO sources say the group has a ‘shopping list’ from Ukraine regarding specific systems. Efforts are ongoing to shape these requirements into capabilities as opposed to solely addressing specific EW demands with kit.
Organisation
A German two-star officer is the EW CAPCO’s director with two subordinate secretaries also from Germany. The CAPCO then divides into three distinct working groups covering procurement, training and education, and policy and doctrine. The EW Capability Coalition is not the only such grouping in this ‘coalition of the willing’ of European nations pledging their support to Ukraine’s ongoing fight. Other CAPCOs cover air defence, airpower, armour, artillery, demining, information technology, sea power and uninhabited aerial vehicles. Sources continued that all these groupings have “EW issues” and depend on the electromagnetic spectrum in some shape or form. As a result, the EW CAPCO can perform cross cutting work across the other groupings providing assistance and advice as and when required.
Post Conflict
How the Ukraine War will conclude remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the EW CAPCO’s thoughts are turning to how EW capabilities will fit into Ukraine’s wider post-conflict force structure. Beyond Ukraine, “exchanging lessons learned is crucial for the future,” the sources noted. These lessons are not only relevant for Ukraine, but germane to the wider EW CAPCO membership. Additional nations may join the initiative in the future. The group’s officials are keen to stress that EW CAPCO is neither a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation nor European Union initiative. Nonetheless, the EW CAPCO’s activation marks an important sharpening of the continent’s current and future electronic warfare posture and capabilities. (Source: Armada)
05 Jun 25. Hold that door. The RAF’s Tekever AR3 UAV equipped with the StormShroud electronic attack payload can mimic crewed aircraft to sow confusion in the minds of air defenders. The RAF’s new StormShroud stand-in jammer represents another arrow in the force’s electronic attack quiver to help it defeat today’s and tomorrow’s air defences. The Royal Air Force’s (RAF’s) Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities have evolved once more with the revelation that the service has taken delivery of its new StormShroud stand-in jammer. The news was announced by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence on 2nd May. The announcement was made by the UK’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer during a visit to Leonardo’s facilities in Luton, southeast England. StormShroud’s electronic attack payload has been developed by Leonardo. The payload is carried by a rail-launched Tekever AR3 Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV). StormShroud will be the responsibility of the RAF Regiment’s 216 Squadron.
Concept of Operations
Speaking at the 2025 Association of Old Crows Electronic Warfare Europe conference and exhibition held in Rome on 7th and 8th May, Leonardo officials provided Armada with more details on StormShroud. Primarily, the system will help crewed aircraft operate in heavily contested airspace. For example, StormShroud UAVs could fly into the engagement footprint of a Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) battery. The aircraft’s integral BriteStorm payload could be programmed to emit Radio Frequency (RF) signals. These signals could simulate an incoming strike package of aircraft. This could help distract the SAM battery’s air defenders while an actual strike package is doing its work elsewhere. The UAV would, in effect, ‘hold open the door’ for the crewed aircraft to fly unchallenged through the battery’s engagement footprint. In fact, the UAVs could represent so many false targets that real potential targets could be mixed within the cacophony of confusion. Conversely, BriteStorm payloads could be used to unleash heavy jamming. Electronic attacks such as these could prevent the battery’s ground-based air surveillance and fire control radars from seeing the actual threats. BriteStorm uses a Digital Radio Frequency Memory is programmed to compose and deploy the desired electronic effects in support of the mission. It is understood that the payload can engage threats transmitting on frequencies of zero megahertz to 20 gigahertz. Joining StormShroud is the electronic attack functionality of Leonardo’s ECRS Mk.2 X-band (8.5 gigahertz/GHz to 10.68GHz) fire control radar. The company’s BriteCloud expendable decoy provides individual aircraft protection against radars and radar-guided threats like SAMs and air-to-air missiles. The ECRS Mk.2 can attack radar threats with jamming within its field-of-view. The ECRS Mk.2 will equip all new Typhoon FGR Mk.4 combat aircraft and can also furnish legacy Typhoon marques in service with the RAF. Although not yet funded, MBDA’s SPEAR-EW (Select Precision Effects at Range – EW) loitering EW system could be added to this mix. It is possible that SPEAR-EW could be deployed as a stand-off or escort jammer, with StormShroud providing stand-in jamming, and BriteCloud and ECRS Mk.2 affording individual aircraft protection. (Source: Armada)
05 Jun 25. June Spectrum SitRep. The Simulate, Emulate, Stimulate, Calibrate and Operate approach to electronic warfare training pioneered by MASS was launched at this year’s Association of Old Crows EW Europe exhibition and conference.
GNSS Jamming Detection for ATAK
An electronic intelligence system developed by Zephr is garnering interest in the United States. It was reported in October 2024 that the company had developed a networked signals intelligence system. The system exploits local cellphone networks to detect Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming. By networking cellphones and cellphone towers together, this architecture can act as a giant distributed antenna. The phones and towers will detect GNSS interference and its source. Zephr has developed the system for deployment in Ukraine. In February, the company was awarded a contract worth $1.7 m from the US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). The work will develop real time GNSS jamming and spoofing detection and geolocation techniques. Reports have stated that, over the long term, the US Department of Defence (DOD) is interested in this functionality for the AFRL’s Android-based Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK). ATAK will integrate “Zephr’s jamming/spoofing detection and localisation capabilities,” the company said in a written statement. “(T)he capability will not require any additional hardware beyond the existing Android phones it will run on.” The contract’s duration is for two years. Zephr’s work with the AFRL in this regard is currently at Technology Readiness Level Seven (TRL-7). According to US DOD definitions, this denotes that a working model or prototype has been demonstrated in an operational environment. The company continued that the contract should help advance the technology to TRL-8 vis-à-vis ATAK. TRL-8 denotes that the system has been qualified through test and evaluation: “One of our motivations for doing real world testing in active conflict zones (such as Ukraine) is to build a battle-ready technology that we are confident can help both the warfighter and civilian users,” the company added.
MASS Unveils SESCO
MASS launched its new SESCO (Simulate, Emulate, Stimulate, Calibrate and Operate) Electronic Warfare (EW) training methodology at this year’s EW Europe conference and exhibition. The show was hosted by the Association of Old Crows global EW advocacy organisation, and held in Rome on 7th and 8th May. Company representatives told Armada at the event that the SESCO methodology takes a holistic approach to EW training. Personnel with no, or limited, electronic warfare experience will, stage-by-stage, acquire the knowledge and acumen they need to ensure they are ready for operational spectrum challenges when deployed. A key aspect of SESCO is that it involves the company’s NEWTS training system. NEWTS allows students to experience an accurate electromagnetic environment without the trainers emitting any RF (Radio Frequency) signals. Students experience the electromagnetic challenges they may face operationally. However, trainers do not need a range, or permissions to emit, that the use of actual RF signals would otherwise entail. In fact, the students will experience a simulated RF environment until they reach the ‘Calibrate’ stage of their training. Simulated RF signals work directly with the equipment and capabilities students will use operationally. MASS representatives added that the SESCO methodology is under trials to enable the most modern RF threats to be detected and decoded/demodulated in real time.
We Practice to Deceive
Roke’s new EM-Vis Deceive electronic warfare system has been designed to incorporate open standards easing the integration and upgrade path for the system during its service life. Roke also took advantage of the EW Europe conference and exhibition to launch the company’s new EM-Vis Deceive portable Electronic Warfare (EW) system. EM-Vis Deceive is designed to help land forces detect, track and engage hostile communications, uninhabited aerial vehicle Radio Frequency (RF) links and other RF signals. The company says the new product has been realised using the Standards for Integrated Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare (STICS). The STICS suite of open standards is designed to assist command and control; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and EW system interoperability. EM-Vis Deceive can be carried by a single soldier and used by an unskilled operator. John Bottomley, Roke’s senior cyber and electromagnetic activities engineer, told Armada that the system can detect, track and jam threats emitting on frequencies of 20 megahertz up to six gigahertz/GHz. He added that the company is working on antenna arrays that could extend this waveband to 18GHz. Work commenced on the EM-Vis Deceive two years ago. The company “has completed initial deliveries, with further shipments scheduled for early 2026.” Those initial deliveries “enable our current user communities to trial, deploy and feedback into Roke prioritisation of applications as we spirally enhance EM-Vis Deceive to continually address the challenges our users face,” Mr. Bottomley continued.
03 Jul 25. Silvus Technologies Launches Spectrum Dominance 2.0 Next Generation EW Defenses. Silvus Technologies, Inc., a global provider of advanced wireless networking solutions, has announced the launch of Spectrum Dominance 2.0 – the next evolution of its EW-resilient communications capabilities. Available as a software licensable extension to Silvus’ battle-proven MN-MIMO waveform, Spectrum Dominance 2.0 is adds new features including Wake on Wireless and Dual Frequency Link to an ever-expanding suite of Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection (LPI/LPD), Anti-Jam (AJ) and Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) capabilities that provide secure and protected mesh network communications in the most contested RF environments. Together, they enable StreamCaster MANET radios (AN/PRC-169) to perform in congested and contested environments – empowering their operators with robust, mission-critical communications solutions to achieve their mission objectives even under electronic attack. Building on years of real-world operational deployment and mission success, Spectrum Dominance 2.0 takes a layered approach to EW defense, forcing an adversary to penetrate all layers before disrupting communications. Spectrum Dominance 2.0 offers modular flexibility – enabling users to deploy features independently or combine them into a tailored EW defense profile to enhance mission performance and achieve RF spectrum overmatch. Silvus is the only tactical MANET provider that delivers Spectrum Dominance without sacrificing range, throughput, robustness, or scalability.
“Spectrum Dominance 2.0 is the direct result of field-driven innovation from the front lines of today’s EW battlespace,” said Jimi Henderson, Vice President of Sales at Silvus Technologies. “Our unique multi-layered approach for LPD and AJ resilience provides the warfighter with tools to outmaneuver even the most sophisticated EW threats.”
“Our mission is to equip the warfighter with next-generation communications that deliver decision dominance and RF spectrum overmatch across today’s dynamically changing battlespace,” added Babak Daneshrad, Silvus Founder and CEO. “With Spectrum Dominance 2.0, we’ve elevated EW resilience to a new standard – delivering the reliable performance users expect from StreamCaster MANET radios – even when operating in EW contested environments.”
Spectrum Dominance 2.0 – Key Capabilities:
LPI/LPD: Delay or Deny Adversarial Detection
- MANET Power Control (MAN-PC): Automatically minimizes the RF footprint of StreamCaster MANET radios – dynamically throttling power to the minimum amount necessary to maintain network connectivity
- Wake On Wireless: Enables StreamCaster MANET radios to receive data without emitting control traffic to gather intelligence without revealing position. A radio in Stealth Mode can be activated via Wake on Wireless, either remotely or locally.
Anti-Jam: Mitigate Electronic Warfare Attack
- MANET Interference Cancellation (MAN-IC): StreamCaster MANET radios automatically perform real-time interference monitoring. At the onset of jamming, MAN-IC employs sophisticated spatial signal processing techniques to nullify the offending interfering signal.
- MANET Interference Avoidance (MAN-IA): StreamCaster MANET radios dynamically scan and monitor the RF spectrum for interference across multiple user-defined channels. At the onset of jamming, MAN-IA moves the entire mesh network to the cleanest frequency without user intervention.
- Dual Frequency Link: Enables StreamCaster MANET radios to transmit on one frequency channel and receive on a different frequency channel – enhancing jamming resilience in distributed operations.
Advanced Threat Protection: Waveform Resilience
- MANET Protected Waveform (MAN-PW): When MAN-PW is enabled, the MN-MIMO waveform is hardened for increased resilience.
The Spectrum Dominance 2.0 expansive suite of capabilities can be downloaded onto existing Silvus StreamCaster MANET radios via simple firmware updates, extending their operational value. Certain capabilities are available exclusively to U.S. Government customers or subject to ITAR-control. Some features are non-ITAR controlled and commercially available to all Silvus customers.
Mission Critical Solutions
Spectrum Dominance 2.0 is fully interoperable across Silvus’ family of StreamCaster (both the 4000 and upcoming 5000 Series) MANET radios. Available in handheld, mounted, and OEM module formats, StreamCaster MANET radios deliver optimized output power (1–80 Watts effective, thanks to TX Eigen Beamforming), up to 100 Mbps data rate, industry leading frequency agility with over 30 single/dual frequency band options (300-6000 MHz) and advanced encryption including AES-256, and FIPS 140-3 Level 2 validation – the U.S. Government’s latest security requirements of cryptographic modules to protect sensitive data. At the heart of every StreamCaster MANET radio is Silvus’ battle-proven MN-MIMO waveform that creates a self-forming and adaptive mesh network – capable of connecting hundreds of nodes with unmatched range and data throughput in complex, multi-path, and non-line-of-sight environments. (Source: UAS VISION)
30 Jun 25. Russia’s Weaponisation of AI for Disinformation.
“Generative AI is no longer a concern of the future but an active component of ongoing Russian-aligned influence operations.”
This is the view expressed in a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Emerging Insight report by Claudia Wallner, with Simon Copeland and Antonio Giustozzi, titled Russia, AI and the Future of Disinformation Warfare.
Drawing on primary-source material from Russian-linked online communications, the research shows how a wide range of actors – including those linked to the Wagner Group, hacktivist collectives, and pro-Russian influencers – are actively using artificial intelligence to transform both the form and function of Russian disinformation strategies and contributing to emerging security threats in the European digital domain. Far from being a distant risk, the research shows how AI is already central in Russian disinformation operations for its ability to scale, and personalise disinformation, generate content automatically, and reduce attribution risks. The report offers a unique lens on how generative AI is being used to automate propaganda production and shape strategic thinking, recruit tech-literate operatives, and refine narratives about Russia’s geopolitical role. The research highlights the urgent need for policymakers and civil society to understand and respond to these evolving dynamics.
Key Findings
- AI is a Force Multiplier for Influence Operations. The report says: “Generative AI is already being integrated into Russian disinformation operations… automating content production, overwhelming adversaries, and further blurring the boundary between truth and fabrication.”
- Strategic Use by Wagner. “Channels affiliated with Wagner on Telegram and other semi-public platforms reveal significant engagement with generative AI technologies. They position these technologies as tools to undermine trust in Western institutions, sow discord among populations in the West, and frame any Russian cyber activities as defensive responses to perceived Western aggression.
- Use in Cyber Attacks by Hacktivists. “The hacktivist group NoName057(16) exemplifies the convergence of AI and cyber operations. Since emerging in early 2022, NoName057(16) has openly discussed AI as a force multiplier for DDoS attacks, misinformation campaigns, and reputational sabotage.”
- Disillusionment with Russia’s own AI Infrastructure. “The monitored online communities also expressed substantial criticism and frustration regarding the limitations of Russia’s domestic AI platforms, primarily Sberbank’s GigaChat and YandexGPT. These criticisms reflect broader anxieties about technological autonomy, ideological biases, and operational constraints, as well as suspicions regarding the political loyalties of major Russian tech firms. Pro-Russian actors’ dissatisfaction with domestic AI has led to a continued preference for Western tools, which undermines the Kremlin’s narrative of building a successful autonomous and ideologically aligned AI infrastructure.”
Key Recommendations
- Monitor Actor-Level AI Discourse. The report says: “The decentralised and multilingual nature of Russian-aligned influence networks highlights the importance of monitoring actor discourse, rather than just focusing on outputs. Without this, the ability to anticipate emerging tactics and narratives is significantly reduced.”
- Support Civil Society Resilience Against AI-Enabled Threats. “There is also a need to support civil society and media ecosystems that are directly targeted by these operations. Aside from protecting them from AI-enabled attacks, this includes investment in digital literacy and resilience programming against synthetic content and manipulated narratives.
- Advance Cross-Sector Countermeasures. “AI is reshaping, but not replacing, the mechanics and logic of Russian disinformation. It acts as an amplifier, enabling greater reach, faster response, and more dynamic narrative adaptation. But it also introduces new vulnerabilities, contradictions, and frictions within Russian influence networks themselves. Understanding and engaging with these internal dynamics will be important to inform future policy design and the development of effective countermeasures.”
- Develop AI Governance Frameworks to Prevent Abuse. “The fusion of AI and influence operations reinforces the need for AI governance frameworks that explicitly address malign use cases … Coordination between governments, platforms, researchers, and journalists must also happen at a larger scale … sharing insights on observed tactics and uses of AI tools.”
Conclusion
The research shows how generative AI is no longer merely a tool – but is an ideological and operational centrepiece reshaping the mechanics, narratives, and strategic cultures of Russian disinformation. While Russian influence actors prize AI for its ability to scale, anonymise, and personalise propaganda, they also voice deep concern over the Western monopoly on high-performance AI tools and the ideological unreliability of domestic alternatives. By highlighting actor-level conversations, recruitment efforts, and operational applications, the report offers a rare window into how Russia’s digital influence ecosystem is evolving in real time and how competing narratives – of empowerment and vulnerability – are fuelling an information arms race, where the ability to manipulate perception and shape narratives through technology is becoming just as critical as traditional warfare capabilities. The findings underscore the necessity for renewed vigilance in AI governance and disinformation strategy, not only to understand how AI tools are used, but how they are discussed, imagined, and embedded in adversarial worldviews. Responding effectively will require a whole-of-society effort — combining regulation, threat monitoring, and public education — to defend against a new, algorithmically enhanced era of information warfare.
27 Jun 25. Cyber Update Key points.
- The increased distribution of artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content on social media underscores elevated mis- and disinformation risks amid regional conflict in the Middle East (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 23 June 2025).
- A social engineering campaign against US-based academics and critics of Russia underscores heightened security risks from the suspected Russian state-sponsored group ‘UNC6293’ (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 24 June 2025 and our Technical analysis below).
- The continued expansion of the ‘Androxgh0st’ botnet underscores the increased security and financial risks facing global businesses (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 25 June 2025).
- A long-term cyber intrusion campaign against organisations across the US and East Asia points to sustained security risks from Chinese actors (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 26 June 2025).
- Activity from a new ransomware group (‘Dire Wolf’) highlights sustained operational and financial risks to global firms (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 27 June 2025).
Technical analysis of weekly stories
The suspected Russian state-sponsored group UNC6293 has been targeting prominent academics and critics of the Russian authorities in the US via a social engineering campaign since at least April. The group distributes spear phishing emails impersonating the US State Department as an initial attack vector. The emails contain additional fake email addresses in the carbon copy (CC) recipient line, impersonating other State Department employees; they are also sent during typical working hours in the capital Washington DC to enhance credibility. This step of the attack likely required extensive research and preparation, underscoring the premeditated nature, sophistication and resources of this campaign. The language used throughout the emails also does not display any grammatical errors and is general in tone, suggesting that UNC6293 may have possibly used AI to draft the content. The content invites victims to join a private online consultation centred around the victim’s area of expertise to trick them into following instructions to create an application-specific password (ASP). Notably, the group exchanges several emails with victims before coercing them into creating the password, marking a departure from traditional Russian social engineering techniques that typically rely on urgency. Victims then share the password with UNC6293 under the pretence that it will be used to log them into a government-controlled guest tenant account and subsequently a private online meeting platform. However, UNC6293 then uses the ASP to hijack victims’ email accounts and subsequently exfiltrate sensitive information. The group will likely manipulate and release the stolen information at a later stage as part of an influence operation based on previous operations’ modus operandi (MO).
Non-exhaustive recommendations to mitigate against these threats include:
- Monitor devices and networks for suspicious activity
- Add available Indicators-of-Compromise (IoCs) to your organisation’s security systems to detect potentially malicious samples on the network; configure firewalls to block outbound communications to malicious IP addresses associated with any known malware
- Adopt behaviour-based end-point detection and response (EDR) solutions, prioritising the detection of the initial stages of a compromise
- Conduct cyber hygiene awareness courses for users, enabling them to recognise and report phishing and other types of social engineering
Our cyber word(s) of the week: Application-specific password (ASP) (Source: Sibylline)
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