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04 Jan 24. Deliberate Interference?
A screen grab of alleged Russian jamming of the synthetic aperture radar of the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 posted on Twitter. The assertions of the post illustrate how rapidly inaccurate information can proliferate on social media sites.
Allegations have emerged that Russian electronic warfare systems are deliberately jamming the ESA’s Sentinel-1A Earth observation satellite as it flies over Ukraine. Are they true?
The European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1A satellite carries a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) transmitting on a C-band frequency of 5.405 gigahertz/GHz. Reports emerged in November that the satellite’s SAR payload had experienced deliberate interference when flying above parts of Russia’s southern border with Ukraine. As shown in pictures accompanying this article the alleged jamming manifests itself as oblong, coloured strips. The presence of these strips obscures the territory beneath them. Incidents were recorded when the satellite was overflying Sevastopol and parts of the Crimea peninsula in southern Ukraine. These areas are under occupation by Russian forces following Moscow’s second invasion of the country in February 2022.
Social Media quickly saw momentum develop regarding allegations that Russian land forces were deliberately using Electronic Warfare (EW) systems to jam the Sentinel-1. However, one voice did encourage caution before jumping to conclusions. The respected ‘Radio and Nukes’ account on Twitter (@HamWa07) was “not convinced the signals we are seeing in Sentinel-1 are from C-Band jamming.”
Is it possible that Russian land forces are responsible for the Sentinel-1 SAR interference either deliberately or otherwise? C-band radars tend to transmit on frequencies of 5.25GHz to 5.925GHz. Armada has yet to learn of any Russian ground-based EW system which jams such frequencies. Details of Russian land forces EW systems we have identified as having been deployed to Ukraine can be found here.
Patriot Games
Could something else be causing the problem? Interference experienced by the Sentinel-1’s SAR has been documented before Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine. Several academic papers have been published noting that the satellite’s radar transmissions have experienced interference when overflying certain areas. Previous articles blamed the interference on C-band ground-based air surveillance radars. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation’s Swathi C-band weapons-locating radar was blamed as one culprit. Raytheon’s AN/MPQ-53/65 series ground-based air surveillance radar equipping the company’s MIM-104 Patriot medium-range, high-altitude surface-to-air missile system was blamed as another.
Nuno Miranda and Henri Laur, the ESA’s Sentinel-1 mission manager and head of mission management and product quality respectively, told Armada that “it is not infrequent to have Sentinel-1 radar data contaminated by interferences from ground-based radars and other C-band radar satellite missions.” They added that such interference is likely in an area of conflict where ground-based radars are used intensively: “It happened several times over the current Ukrainian-Russia conflict, as it happened in the past with other conflicts involving different belligerents.” C-band radars “are perfectly legitimate to operate in the same frequency band as that used by the Sentinel-1 radar.” The interference is not considered to be a deliberate act.
The radar theory received further corroboration in 2022 from the Bellingcat investigative journalism website. Bellingcat noted patterns of Sentinel-1 SAR interference across the Middle East with the blame pinned on AN/MPQ-63/65 radars deployed in the region equipping Patriot batteries there. Why the interference appears as a stripe on the imagery was explained by Bellingcat. If the satellite is passing overhead when the radar is switched on, it receives both the echoes from its own radar pulses and the pulses transmitted by the radar. The interference is shown as a stripe perpendicular to the satellite’s path. The stripe covers an area measuring 135 nautical miles/nm (250 kilometres) by 2.7nm (five kilometres).
Russian Land Forces deploy a plethora of SAM systems to protect their formations. The only C-band radar Armada has identified as being deployed by Russian land forces to Ukraine is the 96L6 (NATO reporting name Cheese Board) ground-based air surveillance radar. The Cheese Board equips S-400 long-range/high-altitude SAM system battalions. A Russian S-400 battalion typically possesses two S-400 batteries, with two S-400 battalions comprising an S-400 regiment. It would not be surprising if the S-400, considered a theatre-layer air defence system, had been deployed to Crimea. A single system could provide air defence across all of Crimea, much of the surrounding area and unoccupied parts of Ukraine. Given the 96L6’s circa 162nm (300km) range, this radar could cover an area of 282,743 square nautical miles (969,783 square kilometres).
Spurious Events
The ESA has taken some measures to mitigate the interference through filtering, “however, spurious events remain visible like the recent ones over the Ukrainian-Russian conflict area,” say Messrs. Laur and Miranda. Fortunately, “these spurious events are not jeopardising the Sentinel-1 primary mission objective.” Russia and Ukraine have energetically contested the electromagnetic spectrum and continue to do so. However, the interference experienced by the Sentinel-1 appears to be one instance where this is not deliberate. Instead, it seems most likely that it is a consequence of 96L6 transmissions. (Source: Armada)
03 Jan 24. Beware of Imitations. Award-winning innovation could help the US Army significantly improve the protection of its deployed tactical networks.
Troops from the US Army’s 3rd Infantry Division had cause for celebration in early November. Two of their comrades, Captain Christopher Flournoy and Staff Sergeant Michael Holloway, won the annual Dragon’s Lair competition. Dragon’s Lair was initiated in 2020 and is supported by Army Futures Command. In its own words, the programme works to foster “creative thinking” across the US Army. The goal is to “spur innovation to better quality of life and improve the service as a whole.” Any soldiers from any career field or background, and members of their families, can enter.
The competition’s format will be familiar to anyone who has watched Shark Tank or Dragon’s Den style television shows. Ideas are fielded and these are narrowed down to several finalists who submit their proposals with a winning idea chosen. Capt. Flournoy and Staff. Sgt. Holloway were this year’s victors with their Electromagnetic Warfare Decoy Emitter (EWDE).
Hiding in Plain Sight
Like most great ideas, the EWDE is beautifully simple. The decoy is designed to protect soldiers from being detected in the electromagnetic spectrum. The EWDE does this by mimicking and transmitting the Radio Frequency (RF) signature of a tactical transceiver with the decoy also doubling up as a frequency jammer.
At first blush, it may appear that the EWDE was a solution in search of a problem. Tactical radios on the battlefield employ a host of Communications/Transmission Security (COMSEC/TRANSEC) protocols. These protocols are intended to protect radios, and their networks, from discovery, jamming and traffic exploitation. However, as Capt. Flournoy notes, COMSEC/TRANSEC cannot always protect a radio, and hence its user, from discovery: “While a tactical radio is capable of encrypting data being sent through the spectrum, there is no way to hide these emissions. The only current method to hide radio waves is by not using them at all.”
Capt. Flournoy told Armada that a signals officer had highlighted the problem of red forces being able to “identify and direction-find friendly units based on emissions from our communications equipment” in November 2022. The first step occurred in January 2023 when 3rd Infantry Division soldiers and researchers established an innovations workshop. “The idea was developed to create an emitter to obfuscate the battlefield with emissions.” This ‘hiding in plain sight’ approach “would prevent the enemy from being able to differentiate legitimate communications emissions from fake emissions,” says Capt. Flournoy. Development of the EWDE continued into the middle of 2023 before it was tested that September. In less than one year, Capt. Flournoy, Staff Sgt. Holloway and their colleagues had answered the signal officer’s need. Ease of use was “one of the biggest selling points for our emitter,” Capt. Flournoy stressed. Should the EWDE go into production “it needs to be simple for anyone to use.”
Developing the EWDE was no easy task: “The most challenging aspect was ensuring the frequencies emulated looked like legitimate emissions as well as getting the approval to use an experimental emitter.” The emitter consists of a control device using custom software developed for the EWDE’s emitter. The latter comprises an analogue synthesizer which emits custom frequencies. Instructions are sent from the control device to the emitter using LoRa (Long Range) spread spectrum radio communications protocols. Capt. Flournoy continues that the EWDE is currently at Technology Readiness Level-4 (TRL-4). According to US Department of Defence definitions TRL-4 denotes that the design has been validated in laboratory conditions.
What Next?
With the technology proven, the next step is to make the EWDE available to tactical formations. “There are several efforts across the army to make this type of capability a programme of record,” says Capt. Flournoy. “Most of the early development of this capability has come from government efforts but an industry partner would be needed to mass manufacture the emitter as well as maintain the emitters over time.”
As the US Army’s march towards Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) continues secure communications will be paramount. Ensuring the intra- and inter-force connectivity of all deployed assets and personnel demands a breadth and depth of networking never seen before. These networks will be imperative for the flow of information around the battlefield to improve the army’s quality and pace of decision-making. Yet MDO may deepen the network’s vulnerability as a centre-of-gravity. The realisation and deployment of the EWDE could help significantly improve army COMSEC/TRANSEC. (Source: Armada)
04 Jan 24. Frequent Flyers. The French Ministry of Defence has lifted the veil on its ASSYDUS (Autonomous System for Decoying Using Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Swarms) initiative.
It is no secret that the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is renewing its focus on the Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) mission. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, and neither side’s ability to secure air superiority or air supremacy, is concentrating minds. Flying aircraft into contested airspace to fight Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) and accompanying Ground-Based Air Defences (GBAD) is arguably one of airpower’s most dangerous missions. Yet controlling the sky depends on neutralising these hostile assets. The less people that must be put in danger when performing this mission, the better.
Workshare
France’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) unveiled the ASSYDUS project in late November. The initiative is being led by Thales and the University of Bordeaux’s LABRI (Laboratoire Bordelais de Recherche en Informatique/Bordelais Information Research Laboratory) in western France. The MOD says the ASSYDUS project focuses on using swarms of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). These swarms could be flown in such a way as to provide a Radar Cross Section (RCS) mimicking that of a conventional aircraft. Replicating these platforms has an obvious tactical advantage when inhabited aircraft are attacking IADS/GBAD targets.
Using swarms of UAVs to resemble conventional aircraft approaching a radar from one direction could provide a useful diversion. With the radar fixated on the fake ‘aircraft’ it could then be struck kinetically or electronically from another unexpected direction. The MOD’s literature says the swarms of UAVs could also deploy sensors across a large area. This approach could be used for the mass collection of electronic intelligence on hostile radars. Moreover, individual UAVs maybe difficult to detect by radar on account of their small physical size and hence small RCS.
Architecture
Thales told Armada in a written statement that LABRI is focusing on the swarming aspect of the initiative with the former working on radar decoying and RCS simulation. The company is also ASSYDUS’ software architect and integrator.
The ASSYDUS concept uses multirotor drones capable of carrying a six-kilogram (13.2-pounds) payload. Thales’ statement said that the payloads included communications, obstacle avoidance systems, radar reflectors and on-board computers. Nonetheless, the company stressed that “the developed solution is not limited to these types of drones … Platforms with a small enough RCS are particularly interesting, because they can be almost undetectable while spaced out.”
The UAV swarm can “mimic various sizes of helicopters, jet and propeller aircraft.” The UAVs will fly significantly slower than these aircraft. Nonetheless, Thales said the swarm can replicate the flight profiles of such platforms, including their velocities, but how these speeds can be mimicked “cannot be disclosed.”
Thales added that work on ASSYDUS is expected to be completed by April 2024. The key aspect of the programme was to demonstrate the ASSYDUS proof of concept. To this end, the architecture has been developed to Technology Readiness Level-4 (TRL-4). European Union definitions denote that TRL-4 means the technology has been validated in the laboratory. The next step of the project “will include both other drones and other payloads possibilities, in order to improve the decoying solution and to collect operational data.” Expect further developments of the ASSYDUS architecture in the coming years. (Source: Armada)
04 Jan 24. January Spectrum SitRep. Armada’s monthly round-up of all the latest electronic warfare news in the product, programme and operational domains.
COALESCE is More
BAE Systems announced a contract win from the US Navy’s Office of Naval Research in early November. The contract, worth $5 million, will see the company work on the COALESCE programme. COALESCE is an abbreviation for Common-Architecture Amplifier for Low-cost, Efficient, Size, Weight and Power-Constrained Environments. BAE Systems’ FAST Labs research and development organisation will develop Gallium Nitride (GAN) Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuits (MMICs) for the COALESCE undertaking. BAE Systems’ press release announcing the news says the programme aims to “to develop the world’s highest efficiency high power amplifier module in its frequency band.” The long-term objective, the press release continued, is to employ these electronics in US Navy systems, notably Electronic Warfare (EW) applications. Ben McMahon, BAE Systems’ subject matter expert, told Armada he expects the GAN MMICs to reach Technology Readiness Level-4 (TRL-4) by early 2025. US Department of Defence TRLs define TRL-4 as components and/or electronics breadboards having been demonstrated in a laboratory environment. These electronics will then be developed into a modular form which Mr. McMahon expects to occur by the end of 2026. He added that the improvements heralded by GAN MMIC components could yield “higher radio frequency power density with high efficiency (to enable) active sensors to effect farther and platforms to endure longer. The RF power output efficiency growth to be gained … will enable power and thermally limited systems to perform more effectively.”
Lightning Reflexes
In late November Textron revealed it had received a $50 million purchase order to support the Lockheed Martin F-35A/B Lightning-II combat aircraft flown by the Italian and Norwegian air forces. Lockheed Martin’s purchase order will see Textron’s Advanced Architecture Phase Amplitude and Time Simulator (A2PATS) support the F-35 Norway Italy Reprogramming Lab (NIRL) being modernised. The laboratory is involved in the testing of F-35 capabilities for both nations. According to a Textron press release A2PATS systems in the NIRL laboratory will be upgraded to “an enhanced frequency range capability (with) additional interfaces to support simulation and test” capabilities. This work, the press release continued, relates to the F-35 Block-4 configuration. Steve Mensh, Textron Systems’ senior vice president for electronic systems, told Armada the company expects to deliver the A2PATS to the NIRL in 2025. Once delivered, A2PATS “will be used to test and evaluate” the aircraft’s electronic warfare and radar systems. The apparatus also supports the “reprogramming of the aircraft (for) both communications and strike missions.” He added that A2PATS “can simulate any real-world environment with many threat emitter scenarios to identify friendly (emitters) and enemy threats, and how they may be received in a mission scenario.”
Aussie Army EW Training
Mellori Solutions has been contracted by Raytheon’s Australian subsidiary to provide electronic warfare training as part of the Australian Army’s Project Land 555 Phase 6. A Mellori Solutions press release said the company will provide training services for the army to support the Force Level Electronic Warfare System (FLEWS). FLEWS is being installed on several army Thales Bushmaster wheeled protected mobility vehicles. These vehicles will serve with the force’s 7th Signal Regiment. David Devine, Mellori Solutions’ general manager, told Armada training will be delivered at 7th Signal Regiment facilities in Cabarlah, Queensland, northeast Australia. Training materials are currently being prepared with an anticipated start date for the instruction in the second quarter of 2025. (Source: Armada)
03 Jan 24. AtkinsRéalis made defence prime for UK DIPS cybersecurity
AtkinsRéalis have been appointed a prime contractor for cybersecurity under the Defence and IT Professional Services (DIPS) Framework.
AtkinsRéalis announced on 3 January 2024, that it has been appointed a prime contractor to the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the provision of capabilities through the Digital and IT Professional Services (DIPS) Framework, covering a range of cybersecurity services that protect digital assets and improve the resilience of services.
DIPS is a four-year framework within the MoD’s Digital Strategy of Defence, running until November 2027, intended to deliver IT specialist services and accelerate a digital transformation for UK Armed Forces worldwide. Within the DIPS Framework, AtkinsRéalis has been appointed a prime contractor for 3 lots relating to solution architecture, cyber security and project management. The company will also be a subcontracting partner for 2 lots relating to system design and intelligence services.
Across 6 lots and 17 suppliers, DIPS has potential value of up to £1.2bn ($1.51bn). According to the GlobalData ‘Cybersecurity in Defense’ report, the global cyber security revenues are predicted to experience strong growth throughout he first half of the 2020’s reaching $198bn by 2025, with a focus on security intelligence and management, expected to achieve a compound annual rate of growth of 17% over the time period.
“This framework will ensure that the MOD has access to a breadth of expertise and capability that will be essential to modernise its digital landscape at pace and take early advantage of emerging technologies,” said Dave Clark, AtkinsRéalis market director for Aerospace and Defence. “Together with our multi-disciplinary partner companies, we will work collaboratively and alongside MOD colleagues to help continue the transformation of its digital and cyber capabilities.”
The relationship between AtkinsRéalis and the the MoD has included contracts within similar projects, such as the £40m deal under the Design as a Service (DaaS) framework for Defence Digital, from November 2017 to March 2020, and orders worth £1.5bn over 5 years under the MoD’s Engineering Delivery Partnership through its Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) function. (Source: naval-technology.com)
03 Jan 24. UK: Attempted attack against nuclear waste entity points to growing risks facing critical sectors. On 31 December 2023, international news media sites reported on an unsuccessful cyber attack conducted via LinkedIn targeting the UK’s Radioactive Waste Management (RWM). RWM is currently spearheading a project to construct an underground nuclear waste repository in the UK. Unknown threat actors attempted to establish a rapport with RWM employees via LinkedIn before sending a malicious download to infect the organisation. Although the attack was unsuccessful, it highlights the growing risks facing critical sectors. These risks are becoming especially acute as more countries look to adopt alternative energy sources while trying to manage hazardous waste. Threat actors, including state-sponsored actors like North Korea’s ‘Lazarus’ group, often use LinkedIn to establish long-term rapports with possible targets before conducting malicious activity. The RWM incident underscores the persistent security and exploitation risks facing global firms whose employees actively use social media platforms such as LinkedIn. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 24. Bittium Develops the Finnish Defence Forces a New IP Routing Protocol to Enable Very Large Networks for Tactical Communications. Bittium has received a purchase order from the Finnish Defence Forces for the development of an IP routing protocol for tactical communications. It is an advanced routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) where the connections are made without base stations and can be either wired or wireless. The new routing protocol will enable forming very large MANET networks with Bittium Tactical Wireless IP Network™ (TAC WIN) systems, Bittium Tough SDR™ radios, and Bittium Tough Comnode™ devices supplied to the Finnish Defence Forces. With the new routing protocol, the seamlessly formed networks can contain up to 1,000 nodes and the networks can be combined to form a network containing thousands of routing devices. This enables a cohesive, even more extensive, and flexible communications network to support real time situational awareness and effective command and control of troops on the battlefield. The value of the purchase order is approximately EUR 5.5m and the development work will be carried out during the years 2024 and 2025.
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Spectra Group (UK) Ltd
Spectra Group (UK) Ltd, internationally renowned award-winning information security and communications specialist with a proven record of accomplishment.
Spectra is a dynamic, agile and security-accredited organisation that offers secure Hosted and Managed Solutions and Cyber Advisory Services with a track record of delivering on time, to spec and on budget.
With over 15 years of experience in delivering solutions for governments around the globe, elite militaries and private enterprises of all sizes, Spectra’s platinum and gold-level partnerships with third-party vendors ensure the supply of best value leading-edge technology.
Spectra was awarded the prestigious Queen’s Award for Enterprise (Innovation) in 2019 for SlingShot.
In November 2017, Spectra Group (UK) Ltd announced its listing as a Top 100 Government SME Supplier by the UK Crown Commercial Services.
Spectra’s CEO, Simon Davies, was awarded 2017 Businessman of the Year by Battlespace magazine.
Founded in 2002, the Company is based in Hereford, UK and holds ISO 9001:2015, ISO 27001:2013 and Cyber Essentials Plus accreditation.
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