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Military And Security Developments
May 30.
- Syria-US: Removal of terrorism sponsor designation will improve socio-economic health. On 29 May, the US special envoy to Syria claimed that US President Donald Trump will soon announce the removal of Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST). The removal of Syria from the SST list will allow the lifting of further sanctions, facilitating defence exports and sales; it will also allow the lifting of certain controls over exports of dual-use items and miscellaneous financial restrictions, among other limits. This will likely further improve Syria’s socio-economic prospects, incentivising other countries to lift sanctions against Syria. However, Syria has been designated as an SST since 1979, and a US congressional approval will be needed to remove this designation. Furthermore, one condition for the designation’s removal is evidence that the government will not support acts of international terrorism in the future, which we assess is likely to remain a challenge. As such, the removal of the designation remains unlikely in the coming two months.
- Syria: IS attack against army underscores elevated risk of resurgence. On 29 May, Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for its first attack against the new Syrian government. During the attack, the group detonated a remote-controlled landmine against an army patrol, killing one soldier and injuring three others in al-Safa, a rural area in Suwayda governorate. The attack underscores the elevated risk of an IS resurgence in Syria, particularly in its central desert regions where Damascus still does not enjoy full territorial control. We assess that IS is highly likely to conduct similar attacks against governmental patrols and checkpoints in rural areas of Homs, Rif Dimashq and Suwayda governorates in the coming weeks, exploiting the security vacuum. However, increased security co-ordination between Damascus and the US-led coalition will hinder any attempts to establish IS autonomous zones in the Syrian desert. Nevertheless, sporadic IS attacks against minorities in major cities, including the capital Damascus, remain possible in the coming weeks, augmenting bystander risks near religious sites and government facilities.
May 29.
• The deployment of laser interceptors against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is likely to increase Israel’s air defence capacities, though the laser interceptors are currently unlikely to replace kinetic interceptors fully, limiting the cost reduction in the short term.
• Strikes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on Sanaa International Airport (SAH, Yemen) are unlikely to reduce the rate of Houthi attacks against Israel meaningfully, sustaining regional air travel disruption.
• A new IDF operation in the West Bank focusing on money laundering and terror financing will likely elevate the risk of attacks and domestic unrest.
• A planned Pride parade in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on 5 June will likely act as a flashpoint for ethno-religious tensions and possibly attacks.
POLITICAL FORECAST
• Although the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) has begun aid distribution operations, humanitarian conditions in Gaza remain critical, sustaining the risk of looting and violence targeting NGO staff.
• Despite a new ceasefire proposal from US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, tensions between Israel and Hamas will sustain the risk of deadlock.
• A substantial uptick in protest activity in Israel underscores sustained operational disruption risks amid intensifying anti-government sentiment.
• The Israeli government has authorised the expansion of numerous settlements in the West Bank, increasing the risk of intercommunal violence.
• In Israel, intensifying tensions between the judiciary and the executive will increase protest and supervision quality risks in the coming weeks.
• US-Iran nuclear negotiations continue at pace, underscoring the increasing prospects for an agreement in the coming months.
• The deployment of laser interceptors against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is likely to increase Israel’s air defence capacities, though the laser interceptors are currently unlikely to replace kinetic interceptors fully, limiting the cost reduction in the short term. On 28 May, the IDF revealed that it had officially deployed laser interceptors after months of testing and development. According to the IDF, the new system (identified as a solution to tackle UAVs) has already managed to intercept 30-40 drones launched from Lebanon and other fronts. The system is separate from the ‘Light Shield’ laser interceptor, which is a longer-range asset that is more focused on addressing rockets and missiles (it will enter into service later in 2025). The new system will not replace Israel’s Iron Dome in the foreseeable future; however, in the long term, it will likely reduce the costs of interceptions (a laser interceptor costs around 10% of a current Iron Dome interceptor). However, as the new system comprises components manufactured by a foreign defence company, it is possibly vulnerable to shortages in the event of sanctions. Regardless, the new system is unlikely to resolve the persistent threats posed by shrapnel, sustaining latent physical security risks across Israel.
• IDF strikes on Sanaa International Airport (SAH, Yemen) are unlikely to reduce the rate of Houthi attacks against Israel meaningfully, sustaining regional air travel disruption. On 28 May, the IDF conducted strikes against SAH, hitting the facility and a passenger plane on the runway. The strikes follow a recent uptick in Houthi attacks targeting Israel in recent weeks. Israeli strikes targeting Houthi infrastructure, including dual-use infrastructure such as maritime ports, are likely to continue over the coming month, sustaining elevated bystander security, supply chain disruption and energy security risks in Houthi-held territory. Houthi attacks on Israel are also likely to continue, sustaining operational disruption and elevated security risks in the coming month; they will also likely drive sporadic regional air travel disruption. Houthi attacks are likely to halt in the event of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, even if such a ceasefire is temporary.
• A new IDF operation in the West Bank focusing on money laundering and terror financing will likely elevate the risk of attacks and domestic unrest. On 27 May, the IDF launched an operation focusing on confiscating funds and closing businesses suspected of money laundering and terror financing in the West Bank. The IDF confiscated approximately ILS 7 million (USD 2 million) that was allegedly being used to pay 30 terror suspects. The operation will likely exacerbate the risk of radicalisation among Palestinian communities in the West Bank in the coming days, elevating the risk of attacks within the territory, particularly during the Shavuot holiday (1-2 June).
• A planned Pride parade in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on 5 June will likely act as a flashpoint for ethno-religious tensions and possibly attacks. The annual parade and related events across Jerusalem traditionally elevate ethno-religious tensions between secular and ultra-orthodox populations. The IDF will likely augment its security posture throughout the city, including in Jerusalem’s Old City, elevating travel disruption. The parade will also likely act as a target for attacks (especially stabbing and car-ramming incidents) near planned routes, driving direct risks for staff and possibly exposure to cross-fire during resultant security operations.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Although the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) has begun aid distribution operations, humanitarian conditions in Gaza remain critical, sustaining the risk of looting and violence targeting NGO staff. On 26 May, the GHF began delivering aid supplies to four newly established distribution sites in the al-Bureij and western Rafah areas, reportedly handing out around 15,000 packages from two distribution points by 28 May. Since aid deliveries into Gaza resumed on 19 May, approximately 890 trucks have entered via the Kerem Shalom border crossing; however, at least 400 trucks remain within the crossing facility at the time of writing, as critical security conditions continue to disrupt the passage of NGO delivery trucks to the facility. On 28 May, dozens of individuals looted an aid convoy moving through the Nuseirat area, underscoring the critical threats to locally engaged NGO staff, particularly during overland movement. More broadly, the risk of looting and violence targeting aid distribution facilities themselves remains particularly elevated as food insecurity persists. On 27 May, hundreds of Palestinians overran a GHF distribution site in western Rafah, resulting in several injuries; on 28 May, thousands of Palestinians broke into a World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse in Deir al-Balah in central Gaza, looting hundreds of bags of flour. Palestinian media reports indicate that gunfire killed at least two civilians during the latter incident. However, the IDF claims there were no deaths. In the coming weeks, efforts to deliver and distribute aid within Gaza are highly likely to continue facing critical disruption, sustaining widespread food insecurity conditions. The risk of violence and looting targeting aid distribution facilities will almost certainly remain elevated, increasing the risk of clashes with IDF personnel and staff exposure to crossfire. High-fatality incidents will also increase the risk of pro-Palestine protests in the wider region, as well as in Australia, Europe and North America, particularly against Israeli-linked entities and installations, such as embassies and consulates.
• Despite a new ceasefire proposal from US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, tensions between Israel and Hamas will sustain the risk of deadlock. Earlier on 29 May, Wikoff delivered a ceasefire proposal to Israel and Hamas amid ongoing efforts to break the long-standing deadlock. Under the proposal, Hamas would release ten living hostages and 18 deceased hostages in exchange for a 60-day ceasefire, which would include a partial IDF withdrawal from recently captured territory. Hamas confirmed that it received the proposal on 29 May, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly convened a ministerial meeting to discuss the matter. While there is a realistic possibility that the proposal will trigger renewed engagement in negotiations and bolster prospects for an agreement in the coming weeks, we assess that negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to deadlock. On 29 May, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich threatened to withdraw his Religious Zionism party from the government coalition if Netanyahu approves the deal. Concerns over government stability will increase the risk of further delays to Israel’s engagement in negotiations, elevating the likelihood of the talks breaking down in the coming weeks.
• A substantial uptick in protest activity in Israel underscores sustained operational disruption risks amid intensifying anti-government sentiment. On 28 May, thousands of protesters attended demonstrations throughout Israel to mark 600 days since the 7 October 2023 attacks. The largest demonstrations occurred in Jerusalem, Herzliya and Tel Aviv (both Tel Aviv district; see Figure 1). Although demonstrations calling for hostage releases remained broadly peaceful nationwide, dozens of participants temporarily blocked the Ayalon Highway in Tel Aviv, underscoring the sustained risks of periodic travel, supply chain and operational disruption, particularly during anniversaries relating to the 7 October attacks and the Israel-Hamas war. Following rallies in Tel Aviv, dozens of anti-government demonstrators protesting against alleged links between several of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s aids and pro-Qatar lobbying firms broke into the Likud party headquarters (Metzudat Zeev) and clashed with mounted police; this resulted in at least 57 arrests. Amid intensifying anti-government sentiment related to the government’s failure to secure hostage releases and numerous corruption scandals, there is a realistic possibility of further such incidents, increasing collateral risks for proximate installations. Additionally, on 27 May, the Israeli police arrested two protesters attempting to block trucks carrying humanitarian aid from exiting the Port of Ashdod facility (Southern district). The individuals were reportedly members of the hard-right and anti-aid group Tzav 9; further such demonstrations are highly likely in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of supply chain disruption via the port facility. Possible clashes between anti-aid protesters, counter-protesters and/or the police will also increase threats to staff, particularly drivers and vehicle security personnel.
• The Israeli government has authorised the expansion of numerous settlements in the West Bank, increasing the risk of intercommunal violence. On 29 May, the defence ministry confirmed that the government had approved the construction of 22 settlements in the West Bank; this includes nine existing settlement outposts and two previously evacuated settlements in Nablus governorate. The expansion is highly likely to increase ethno-religious tensions in the vicinity of planned settlements, elevating the risk of intercommunal clashes and violence in the short-to-medium term. Numerous construction projects will also reportedly centre around the section of Highway 443 which links Jerusalem and Modi’in-Maccabim-Re’ut (Central district). Clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinian communities will elevate bystanders’ exposure to arson, stone throwing and shooting attacks during overland movement via the thoroughfare. In the coming weeks, the authorisation will likely embolden expansionist settlers to construct additional outposts, compounding security risks in proximity to settlements throughout the West Bank. Such efforts will increase the risk of states like Canada, the EU and the UK sanctioning Israeli settlers and settlement entities in the coming weeks, increasing compliance concerns for locally engaged firms, particularly in the agriculture, construction and financial sectors.
• In Israel, intensifying tensions between the judiciary and the executive will increase protest and supervision quality risks in the coming weeks. On 21 May, the High Court of Justice ruled that Prime Minister Netanyahu’s efforts to dismiss Ronen Bar, the head of the Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security service), were unlawful and that he has an outstanding conflict of interest in appointing Bar’s successor due to the agency’s ongoing investigation into the ‘Qatargate’ scandal. Subsequently, the Attorney General temporarily barred Netanyahu from appointing Bar’s successor and indicated he should delegate the decision to a cabinet minister. However, on 25 May, Netanyahu announced that Major General David Zini would succeed Bar when he vacates his position on 15 June. Given the dispute, it is more likely that Bar’s deputy will assume leadership of the Shin Bet in an interim capacity. Disputes over Netanyahu’s authority to appoint Bar’s successor will likely continue in the coming week, elevating the risk of deadlock and anti-government protests in major cities, particularly around government buildings in Jerusalem’s Government Quarter and its Rehavia neighbourhood. In the long term, efforts to resolve the dispute over Bar’s appointment will likely compound tensions between the executive and the judiciary. This will increase supervision quality concerns related to the dismissal and appointment of high-ranking civil servants, such as the head of the Shin Bet, the Attorney General and the head of the Bank of Israel.
• US-Iran nuclear negotiations continue at pace, underscoring the increasing prospects for an agreement in the coming months. On 24 May, the US and Iran concluded a fifth round of nuclear negotiations in Italy; talks primarily centred on Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities. The US has frequently called for Iran to cease all enrichment activity, while Iran has characterised enrichment as critical to its civilian nuclear programme. Local media reports indicate that US Special Envoy Witkoff proposed that Iran pause enrichment activity for at least six months to demonstrate goodwill and to moderate the risk of the talks stalling. Amid continued engagement, negotiations will likely continue in the coming weeks; the US and Iran will likely reach an interim agreement in the coming months.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Resumption of Gaza aid is unlikely to improve humanitarian conditions. On 28 May, thousands of Palestinians broke into the World Food Programme (WFP)’s warehouse in Deir al-Balah in central Gaza; the WFP has since reported two unconfirmed deaths. This follows an incident on 27 May in which an aid distribution centre run by the US and an Israeli-backed group called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) was also overrun by crowds, prompting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to open fire; according to the UN, 47 people were allegedly injured. While Israel restored the movement of aid into Gaza after a two-month blockade, the humanitarian situation remains dire. We assess that bottlenecks and security lapses around distribution hubs and convoys will continue in the coming weeks, sustaining elevated food security risks and humanitarian concerns. Furthermore, the crowding of aid deliveries will likely continue, elevating security risks for staff, particularly those operating at aid distribution and collection hubs. Worsening humanitarian conditions and food insecurity in Gaza will likely increase international condemnation of Israel, elevating reputational and compliance risks for businesses affiliated with Israel.
• Saudi Arabia: Risk of stampedes, heat-related deaths will significantly increase during Hajj. Earlier on 28 May, the Saudi authorities announced they had arrested 26 individuals (including locals) for taking 83 pilgrims to Mecca (Mecca province) to perform the Hajj without a permit. This comes amid an ongoing nationwide crackdown on illegal pilgrims and travel agents/companies. It is highly likely that the security forces will adopt an elevated posture before and during the Hajj (4-9 June); increased scrutiny over visas and travel documentation will elevate the risk of arrest and arbitrary detention, not only in Mecca but also in Medina (Medina province), the capital Riyadh and Jeddah (Mecca). As such, an augmented security presence in the aforementioned locations will partially disrupt travel along provincial highways connecting Mecca to Jeddah and (particularly) Medina due to an increased number of checkpoints. In Mecca itself, the influx of millions of visitors will almost certainly trigger mobility disruption and elevate the risk of major stampedes and lethal heat strokes. We assess the prevalence of infectious diseases will also remain a substantial risk during the Hajj despite cautionary measures employed by the authorities.
May 28.
*Iraq: Lawsuit against KRI will increase socio-economic health, domestic unrest risks. On 26 May, an Iraqi official confirmed a lawsuit was filed against the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) after it signed oil development deals with US companies last week. The Iraqi government maintains that deals relating to natural resources and their development, including in the KRI, need to pass through the Iraqi federal government. The issue was previously disputed in Iraqi courts, which ruled in favour of Baghdad, forcing oil exports from the KRI through Turkey to halt in 2023. The subject remains an unresolved flashpoint between Baghdad and Erbil, with the former withholding the KRI’s share of the budget at several points. In the coming three months, we assess there is an elevated risk of Baghdad once again withholding budget dispersals from the KRI. This would likely impact the salaries of public sector and oil sector employees, worsening socio-economic conditions and increasing the risk of domestic unrest in the KRI, particularly near oil fields.
*Syria: Assault on judge underscores fragile governance, security environment. On 26 May, officers at the Salhine police station in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate) reportedly detained and assaulted a local judge who was conducting a murder investigation. The judge was released on the same day after the justice ministry intervened and filed a formal complaint with the interior ministry. Also on the same day, local lawyers staged a sit-in at Aleppo’s Justice Palace to denounce the incident. While investigations are underway, the incident highlights the elevated human rights risks emanating from Syria’s new police force, which mainly comprises former members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other affiliated Islamist factions. The incident also underscores Damascus’ limited command and control over rogue security members who often pursue their own local agendas in their respective provinces. As such, the risk of sporadic attacks against government officials, judges and lawyers will remain elevated, particularly for those who had ties with the former Assad government and/or oppose the current Islamist government, augmenting security risks through 2025.
May 27.
• Iraq: Deteriorating socio-economic health will sustain elevated domestic unrest risks through 2025. On 25 May, protests erupted across several Iraqi governorates over socio-economic grievances. In the capital Baghdad, protesters gathered outside the National Pension Authority, calling for an increase in their monthly pensions and the disbursement of back payments. In Najaf (Najaf governorate), locals blocked the Karbala-Najaf highway to protest against severe power outages amid rising temperatures, while in Basra (Basra governorate), graduates conducted demonstrations demanding access to jobs in the energy sector. Deteriorating socio-economic health in Iraq will sustain elevated domestic unrest risks throughout 2025, particularly during the summer months, with the above-mentioned cities likely to be the most impacted by protests. Clashes with the security forces outside town halls and government buildings are possible during protests, further elevating bystander risks in the vicinity of these locations, particularly during weekends. In Basra, we assess there is a realistic possibility that protesting graduates will attempt to disrupt oil field operations to pressurise the government to abide by their demands, elevating the risk of sporadic and short-term disruption in the coming months.
• Lebanon: Disarmament of Palestinian camps will elevate security, domestic unrest risks. On 26 May, President Joseph Aoun confirmed that the disarmament of Palestinian refugee camps will begin in mid-June. Armed Palestinian factions have managed internal security across 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon for decades. The initiative follows a meeting between Aoun and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas as the Lebanese government seeks to consolidate control over weapons. The disarmament will initially cover three camps in the capital Beirut (Bourj el-Barajneh, Mar Elias and Shatila) before expanding to other sites, such as Ain al-Hilweh (South governorate). The process is likely to face moderate resistance from Palestinian factions; we assess there is a realistic possibility of sporadic armed clashes triggered by Lebanese security operations. Any such breakouts would elevate bystander security risks and the likelihood of localised domestic unrest in and around these camps in the coming weeks. We do not assess these risks will extend beyond these areas. (Source: Sibylline)
29 May 25. Israel Confirms Use of New Iron Beam Laser Defense System to Down Hezbollah Drones. Israel has confirmed that its air defense forces successfully used a prototype of its new Iron Beam laser system, known as “Magen Or” (Light Shield), to intercept and destroy dozens of enemy aerial threats, including Hezbollah drones.
In a statement on Wednesday, Israeli authorities said the system used during the fighting is a smaller version of the Iron Beam high-powered laser interceptor, which is expected to be delivered to the IDF later this year.
Developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in coordination with the Defense Ministry’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development (MAFAT), Israeli authorities said the system’s deployment was accelerated in response to the growing drone threat from Hezbollah, which launched over 300 explosive-laden drones at Israel during the conflict in the north.
“During the war, the Air Force… deployed the laser system, and led to particularly high interception achievements that saved civilians and defended national assets,” said a joint statement from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Ministry of Defense (MOD).
Rafael confirmed the system’s use in a post on X, stating: “Rafael’s laser interceptors were successfully deployed by the IAF’s (Israeli Air Force) Aerial Defense Array, neutralizing enemy threats with speed, precision, and zero cost per shot.” The statement was accompanied by a video showing the laser system shooting down drones.
While specific capabilities were not disclosed, defense officials stated that the laser system, part of Israel’s layered air defense network, enhances existing missile defenses by offering a faster and more cost-effective method of intercepting threats.
“Israel is the first country in the world to showcase a large-scale operational laser interception capability,” said Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Daniel Gold, head of MAFAT. “The vision of the laser was demonstrated during the war with immense operational and technological success.”
Brig. Gen. Gilad Beran, commander of the IDF’s Air Defense Array, said the laser systems’ success in intercepting Hezbollah drones during the conflict is a point of national pride.
“This achievement is the result of hard work by many exceptional people determined to do everything possible to protect the homeland,” he said.
“We are very proud of this operational and technological breakthrough,” said Rafael chairman Dr. Yuval Steinitz. “Iron Beam will be a game-changer that will have an unprecedented impact on the modern battlefield.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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