The ‘British Army Review’ is always a very useful and good read and the current Spring edition is no exception. One particularly interesting article stands out – ‘Mobilising The British Army’ which has been written by Major General Charles Collins who serves as the Assistant Chief of the General Staff. Sadly, I cannot reproduce the article in full but as parts of it have already appeared on social media, I can at least quote some of his words:
“WAR in Ukraine highlights the need for land forces and brings into sharp focus the current shortcomings of the British Army. The decades-long focus on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency came at the expense of training and equipping ourselves for competing in high intensity combat. The character of the war in Ukraine has exposed where the British Army is deficient: in its air defence; in long-range fires; in uncrewed aerial systems; and in electronic warfare”.
As some of you will have seen, I wrote yesterday questioning stockpiles of large precision weapons capability such as Brimstone and Paveway 1V following intense campaigns that Royal Air Force fast jet capability have been engaged over the past decade and it was quite rightly pointed out to me that I could just as well have questioned stocks of smaller but no less crucially important NLAW, STARstreak/HVM and LMM air based weapons.
In his British Army Review article Major General Collins adds:
“The rates of fire necessary to prosecute a war against a near-peer enemy reveal the shortcomings in our stockpiles, based on outdated assumptions. In this sense, we have succumbed to our own ‘long lee of Trafalgar’ by maintaining the assumption of warfighting excellence while not exercising that military muscle, and allowing the land industrial base that sustains warfighting to wither. We have been effective while ‘operating’ around the world, training at best effort within resources, and serving the requirements of the government of the day, but we have not slaved ourselves to a core purpose. CGS’s mobilisation of the Army with his RUSI speech in June 2022 makes this correction to our course, along with the affirmation of our core purpose: to protect the United Kingdom by being ready to fight and win wars on land”.
He goes on to say:
“Mobilising the Army is no small endeavour in the context of the ongoing modernisation of the Army under Future Soldier, supporting Ukraine through training (Operation Interflex) and equipment provision, and the prevailing financial climate. Our challenge in the British Army is to seek opportunity amidst challenge and thereby to accelerate our modernisation war effort directly by identifying potential equipment requirements and granting from the British Army’s own stocks.”
Other important points that he makes include “
“Mobilising the Army is more than a list of objectives. It is an acknowledgment that the return of visceral, high-intensity land warfare to Europe has thrown the Army’s core purpose – to protect the United Kingdom by being ready to fight and win wars on land – into sharp relief. The requirement for boots on the ground has been vindicated.”
“Ukraine has crystallised what machinery, technology and munitions for war fought in the 21st century look like… the use of unmanned aerial systems has created a transparent battlefield where there is no sanctuary.”
“The British Army must meet the requirements of NATO’s New Force Model in 2024. The British Army’s part of which will exploit our strengths as a modernised, expeditionary force able to bring a network of multi-domain assets to bear”.
“The Army must address its productivity, delivering value from how we train, deploy and furnish capability”.
“We must reinforce our leadership in NATO by demonstrating thought leadership in how 21st century warfare is best conducted”.
“One need not reach far into the past for a parallel, considering Stanley Baldwin’s stance in 1932 that “the bomber will always get through”, only for the role of land forces to demonstrate their enduring worth just seven years later”.
The latter comment draws immediate attention to the inextricable link between Air Power and Army strategy as expressed so coherently by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor in his excellent ‘Air Power and Armies’ treatise published as long ago as 1936 and that those with a vested interest in how air power is and should be used would, as I would, still say is as important today as when it was first written.
The full article from Major General Collins can be found on the following link.
It is extremely good to see that at long last, honesty and integrity is once again emerging as a driving force in Army thinking.
Over the years I have rarely delved far into Army strategy and thinking and in part this is because one has been forced to recognise that the Army has perhaps been poorly led and that its leaders have failed to stand up and make the necessary stance in regard of what they see and the absolute need. In saying that, I also recognise that not all the blame can be laid at the door of their political masters and that, despite ‘Future Soldier’ for too many years past Army strategy has lacked coherence and direction.
Major General Collins article emphasises that the Army today is deficient in its air defence, long range-fires, electronic warfare and UAV capability. It does not talk or attempt to reflect on Army manpower numbers although it emphasises what I will call the re-importance of boots on the ground. The latter point is very interesting because it is auto suggestive that UK policies of emphasising on future war prioritised by cyber, space, air and maritime are maybe misplaced.
There will of course be those that take a counter view to the above although I guess that it will be some months before we see such views being possibly challenged by those then charged with responsibility for air power.
It is some considerable time since I have read such a refreshing article in respect of specific strategic thinking from Army, Royal Navy or Royal Air Force leaders and that it comes just a week before the intentions of the Integrated Review refresh are likely made known and that would, at this juncture, appear likely to place greater emphasis on ‘rebuilding’ of Army capability and forward strategy.
Undoubtedly there will be some increase announced in shorter term UK defence spending next week but on current thinking, I suspect that the so-called Integrated Review ‘Refresh’ is unlikely to be anywhere near as radical as it needs to be. My fear is that we will continue to expect others within NATO to fill gaps that we no longer feel able or have the capacity to fill and that essentially, despite priority being given to the Army, promises and intentions will be restricted by cash.
That it is isn’t just the Army that needs to be strengthened and re-established as a formidable fighting force, it is the whole of UK defence is to me a given. But it won’t happen and while in part it is because defence in the eyes of this government remains a political choice and one that they continue to perceive, as evidenced by defence not even being included by the PM in his five main priorities, the public has little interest.
Perhaps if our military leaders really had done ‘strategy’ over the past decade, had they challenged and fought for what they really need for their people and in respect of manpower and equipment capability, had they stood out and told it how it was rather than be seen to so readily accept what their political masters had decided, things may have been different but sadly, we are were we are and nothing is likely to change – well not until the wolf is finally at the door.
CHW (London 8th March 2023)
Howard Wheeldon FRAeS
Wheeldon Strategic Advisory Ltd,
M: +44 7710 779785
Skype: chwheeldon