In light of growing concern about the rising qualitative and quantitative capacity of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the now well documented limitations of the US industrial base, the Hudson Institute has outlined a shift to reinvigorate US sea power.
As the global centre of geopolitical and strategic focus pivots away from the traditionally land-locked Western and Central European theatre toward the broad-spectrum maritime dominated Indo-Pacific, decades of low-intensity, uncontested operations have taken their toll on the United States Navy.
Meanwhile, across the vast expanse of the Pacific, Beijing has continued to modernise the qualitative and quantitative capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), now the largest navy in the world, shifting the once second rate, “brown water” navy, to become an increasingly capable “blue water”, global navy.
In stark contrast, the US Navy and its supporting industrial base, once the unassailable leader and security guarantor for much of the world and the global economy is a shadow of its former might — following decades of low intensity, counter-piracy and freedom of navigation operations without a peer competitor have left the fleet seemingly rudderless.
Further hollowed out by extensive rounds of sequestration during the Obama years, the US Navy and its global partners, including Australia face an increasingly uphill battle to field a range of next-generation capabilities ranging from hypersonic weapons, through to advanced surface and submarine capabilities.
In response to these challenges, writing for the Washington DC-based Hudson Institute, senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology Bryan Clark has issued a major challenge to the US Congress and defense leadership to shift gears and dramatically reshape the US Navy in order to prepare it to better face down the growing capability of the Chinese fleet.
This proposal also issues a challenge to allied navies, like the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Navy, both in a similar position, embarking on major recapitalisation and modernisation programs, not just of their surface fleets, but also their strategic submarine capabilities and the supporting defence industry infrastructure which delivers, maintains and upgrades these important capabilities.
More ‘Death Stars’?
The post-Cold War US Navy has become synonymous in some circles with budget overruns and delayed delivery for next generation and often highly experimental platforms like the disastrous Littoral Combat Ship program, the Zumwalt Class destroyers, the Seawolf and early iterations of the Virginia Class submarines and even the next-generation of supercarrier, the Gerald R Ford Class which have had a dramatic impact on the US Navy’s capacity to keep existing platforms at sea and on station.
These costly “Death Stars”, as they are referred to by the Hudson Institute, serve as a double-edged sword in many respects. While they present serious challenges for adversarial decisionmakers, they equally have also had an impact on the capability, structure and flexibility of the US Navy. Doing so has necessitated a root and branch review of the ways in which the fleet is structured and prepares to face down a peer competitor, while leveraging the qualitative advantages, despite a quantitative deficit.
Drawing on his experience as a US submariner, Bryan Clark details the predicament the US and its global allies now find themselves facing, stating, “The US submarine fleet, now the front line of US power projection against well-armed adversaries like China, cannot simultaneously fight off enemy undersea forces. Although effective sub-hunters, P-8A Poseidons – big, un-stealthy planes based on the Boeing 737 – will depend on vulnerable bases and face enemy fighters above the Western Pacific chokepoints that are their best hunting grounds.”
Some Ferraris and some Falcons?
Clark goes further in his thesis emphasising the impact the US qualitative edge can have at key tactical and strategic points, stating, “One way to adapt to this new reality is by building “Death Stars” whose defenses will be more costly to defeat that the enemy is willing to spend. This path, represented by the future DDG(X) destroyer concept, may be appropriate to protect something like an aircraft carrier that can deliver significant firepower from long range.”
This approach does, however, present some challenges for the US Navy, with lessons for Australian consideration as well. Clark’s analysis of these growing cost versus unit number is having a dramatic impact on the capacity of the fleet to respond to major challenges.
Clark explains, “concentrating shipbuilding dollars on Arleigh Burke destroyers and oversized frigates, it will have too few ships that are too expensive to risk hunting submarines, clearing mines, or fighting close-range missile battles with Chinese warships. Countering these threats and controlling the seas will depend on a more diverse surface force that includes uncrewed vessels, small combatants, civilian vessels, and airborne drones alongside traditional large combatants”.
This analysis is particularly timely given growing media speculation around the future composition of the Royal Australian Navy in the coming decades and the viability of some of the Navy’s big-ticket items, like the Hunter Class frigate program and just how the nuclear-powered submarine feet will take shape, or the most contentious discussions around the potential acquisition of additional Hobart Class destroyers and a reshaped order for the Arafura Class offshore patrol vessels.
Clark also identifies the growing role uncrewed platforms will play in supporting and expanding the range of capabilities that can be brought to bare in traditional freedom of navigation operations and high-intensity combat in contested environments. Clark details the scope of this future force structure, explaining, “For example, crewed US warships will need to continue carrying weapons and on-scene commanders, but they will require the greater reach of new missiles – such as Maritime Strike Tomahawk, SM-6, or the HALO hypersonic weapon – to avoid counterattack and disperse their operations. Finding targets for those weapons at long range, degrading enemy sensors, and suppressing undersea threats will require uncrewed vessels, which will also be essential for defending allies in highly contested areas like the Taiwan Strait.”
Further consideration
The growing realisation that both the United States and allies like Australia will need to get the balance of its naval capabilities just right, not just to support the US as part of a larger joint task force, but to ensure that the Royal Australian Navy can continue to operate independently and complete its core mission reliably and responsively.
This emphasis on a “high-low” mix will ensure that the Royal Australian Navy’s high-end capabilities, like frigates and destroyers, are capable of serving as part of larger allied formations, while up gunned offshore patrol vessels can serve a key role in securing sea lines and long-range constabulary patrols, while strategic force multipliers like the proposed nuclear submarines serve as key strategic game changers.
Today, strategic sea lines of communication support over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost effective and reliable nature of sea transport. Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea (SCS) and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually.
The Indian Ocean and its critical global sea lines of communication are responsible for more than 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade in critical energy supplies, namely oil and natural gas, which serve as the lifeblood of any advanced economy.
Australia is not immune to these geopolitical and strategic factors and as an island nation heavily dependent on sea transport — with 99 per cent of the nation’s exports, a substantial amount of its strategic imports, namely liquid fuel, and a substantial proportion of the nation’s domestic freight depending on the ocean — it is a necessity to understand and adapt, and introduce a focus on maritime power projection and sea control.