While I was very pleased whilst away in Berwick-on-Tweed for a couple of days to read that the long-awaited MOD commissioned report of the ‘Armoured Cavalry Programme Lessons Learned Review’ written and conducted by Clive Sheldon KC had finally been published and which essentially concluded what are now being termed “systemic and institutional procurement failures that lay at the heart of the botched Ajax fighting vehicle programme “ – the cost of which damage is probably incalculable – how typical it was that the MOD should attempt to bury the contents and appalling findings from this independently assessed and written report behind separate events that are shaming former PM Boris Johnson. That the old ‘good day to bury bad news’ adage is still alive and well within the MOD is a reminder of what we are up against in supporting the need for strong defence.
The Sheldon Review makes a total of 24 recommendations. These do not aim to achieve a wholesale re-configuration for the delivery of major programmes. None is a magic bullet. Rather, they represent relatively small improvements, which cumulatively should help the MOD avoid similar problems in future. 2.4.3. Of these: four are aimed at improving the working relationship between DE&S and Dstl [Recommendations 2-5]; five are aimed at improving the support and information provided to the SRO [Recommendations 6-10]; five are aimed at improving the processes for holding to account and assurance [Recommendations 11-15]; and eight are aimed at improving information flows and escalation [Recommendations 16-23.
The report has much to commend it and particularly because it identified a failure by those within the relevant branches of the MoD and the army to listen to dissenting voices involved in delivering the Ajax armoured vehicles. It went on to highlight what it called a reticence to alert the chain of command to problems – such as issues with noise and vibration that ended up injuring soldiers who tested the tanks and triggered huge delays. This was apparently because of a “leave it with me” attitude in order to fix problems at a lower level of the command process and a “cultural sense that elevating problems was a sign of failure”.
In addition, the report identified an “optimism bias” that meant increasingly impossible timelines to deliver the tanks into service were clung on to instead of being reset, while ministers were frequently given a “positive spin” rather than a reality check on the state of the programme – the report emphasises that this was the “same ‘glossing’ and optimism were seen in evidence provided to parliamentary select committees,.
For information purposes and as a reminder, the UK arm of the US defence company General Dynamics was awarded a £5.5bn contract in 2010 to deliver 589 armoured vehicles to the army. The first Ajax Infantry Fighting Vehicles were supposed to have come into service by June 2020, with full operating capability reached by 2025. Now it will likely be into the 2030’s before that is fully achieved.
But for all the admission of failure highlighted in what in all other respects is a good report, I am somewhat disappointed that the report author, Clive Sheldon KC, chose not to attribute any of the blame to specific individuals. With a list of possible contenders, many of whom long ago left the UK military and then joined General Dynamics either in the UK or at its parent company, that could well be blamed for their part in this disgraceful mess, it appears that once again no one is going to accountable for what in this case is regarded by many as the worst example of how not to do military procurement.
This is a worthy document that is well worth detailed reading – recommendations made can be found in the Annex. The full report is below:
HCDC Chair Tobias Ellwood Warns on UK Military decline
Tobias Ellwood, Chairman of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee issued yet another stark warning regarding the parlous state of the UK’s armed forces and defence readiness during remarks in Parliament on 14 June 2023.
Having been away for a few days and in the knowledge that former PM David Cameron will be giving evidence in front of the COVID Inquiry on the matter of our readiness to cope with a pandemic should it appear (I can only but guess that the answer to the question of how if at all we were prepared can only be that we were not prepared at all but we will wait and see!) this made me think that it is probably high time that the Defence Select Committee extended the work already done in regard of defence preparedness and readiness further.
Starting his address in the House of Commons Mr. Ellwood said “I pay tribute to the Minister for his opening remarks and join him in paying tribute to the valiant work that our armed forces do.” He praised the armed forces for ensuring the security of the nation in an increasingly complex world but suggested that the Minister could have summarised the situation by saying, “We are busy, and we are getting busier.”
Mr. Ellwood raised concerns about the global trend of diminishing international cooperation and the rise in isolationist policies, which he sees as being detrimental to Britain’s economy and security. “Globalisation is slowly dying,” he said noting that the retreat of nations into more siloed and protectionist stances, particularly post-COVID, exposes the UK both economically and security-wise.
Reminding that when global security deteriorates, our economy suffers,” he referred to the impact of the situation in Ukraine on oil, gas and food prices and quite rightly he criticised the approach taken by HM Treasury to defence spending suggesting that it was:
“baffling to hear the Treasury continue to say, ‘Yes, we will spend 2.5% on defence when economic conditions improve,’ not realising the obvious connection that our economy and international security are directly related.”
Mr. Ellwood then moved to the so-called “Integrated Review Refresh” of the defence and security policy by suggesting “I have never seen such strong language in a Government paper before.” He was in fact citing paragraph 8 in the IRR which stated:
“There is a growing prospect that the international security environment will further deteriorate in the coming years, with state threats increasing and diversifying in Europe and beyond. The risk of escalation is greater than at any time in decades.”
Mr. Ellwood went on to highlight the significant reduction in the UK’s military capabilities since the Gulf War in 1990, emphasising the need for investment and upgrades to the armed forces. He did not mince his words when he suggested:
“It is a grim state of affairs when our armed forces are not shaped to meet the threats, but trimmed to meet the budget.”
He went on to remind with a detailed comparison showing that at the time of the Gulf War, the Royal Navy had 51 frigates and destroyers, whereas now it has only 18; the RAF had 36 fast jet squadrons, now just seven; and the British Army’s capabilities have significantly diminished. In doing so he specifically called out the Treasury, saying, “It is the Treasury that needs to appreciate this,” acknowledging that the Defence Ministers understand the gravity of the situation.
He also mentioned cuts to the Type 32 frigate programme, the reduction in the E-7 Wedgetail ISTAR planes, and the decrease in the armed forces’ manpower from 82,000 to 72,000 and called the current state of the armed forces “a real kick in the teeth.”
Concluding, he suggested that: “Sadly, we are neither ready for war, nor any longer, have the ability to project a viable conventional deterrent to maintain the peace,”
CHW (London – 19th June 2023)
Howard Wheeldon FRAeS
Wheeldon Strategic Advisory Ltd,
M: +44 7710 779785
Skype: chwheeldon
@AirSeaRescue