The conflict in Ukraine has confirmed we live in a time of multi-domain operations, an increasingly complex land domain, a time of hybrid warfare and facing adversaries who operate across a wide spectrum known as the grey zone. It is thus increasingly key to have more flexible and resilient tactical edge communications.
In this article, I lay out some comments based on experience and recent conversations on the topic with people from industry and the forces, along with recent briefings, and a host of open source material.
The context – more decentralised control in operations
In Ukraine, new technical capabilities have been added to the long-established approach of seeking a full PACE plan to step through (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency), which has been a key tenet of military communications planning for generations. Those new capabilities notably include Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite communications (satcom) and greater integration of commercial services into a more dynamic PACE approach to mitigate the increased threats to networks, including right at the tactical edge which are physically and electronically threatened.
Most commentators agreed that deployments of land forces are likely to be more widely dispersed and to operate at greater range with smaller units, massing only for a specific task and then re-dispersing. That increases reliance on robust and flexible connectivity, which can ebb and flow with these movements and create opportunities for exploitation.
More complex tasks using sophisticated systems and the cloud
More complex tasks, across any sensor to any effector, demand faster access to digital information if force elements are to achieve superiority and offset reduced mass with improved situational awareness, more rapid decision-making and focused lethality, all while operating in a more challenged electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).
Alongside these developments, all maritime, land and air forces want to implement AI-driven technologies to achieve transformative levels of automation and efficiency. Machine Learning (ML), and by extension Artificial Intelligence (AI), is playing a key role in the rapid evolution of frontline threat detection and battlefield robotics. Almost all AI advances depend on cloud connectivity, either reaching back or through tactical “combat clouds” along with “edge compute” to leverage a mass of contextual and localised data.
The growing sophistication of military systems and the need to access and share information securely, without interruption, have together rendered communications more complex. Whatever their size, forces are now hyperconnected entities demanding higher levels of resilient connectivity.
LEO and GEO in Ukraine
When the Russian cyber units attacked the KA_SAT satcom network of Viasat, on 24th February 2022, they affected wind farms and consumers along with their target of reducing Ukraine’s ability to operate effectively. It was, however, also satellite connectivity that most publicly overcame this vulnerability and enabled Ukraine to coordinate operations against Russian forces and, for example, rapidly innovate in their use of drones.
It is evident that the conflict has illustrated how essential satcom has become at the tactical edge alongside terrestrial systems. Units need more than one type of network, and they must be able to respond to network threats.
In Ukraine, Starlink has proved to be a reliable commercial solution, leveraging multiple satellites that have proved hard to jam while rapidly developing patches to mitigate threats. However, it is also apparent from conversations and media reporting that there are lessons around the assurance of service, and how services can be used and potentially restricted at critical moments. Hence the PACE plan approach is essential not just technically, but commercially, and relying on one operator or technology is to inject risk; overall systems need to be assured to be relied on.
Beyond the Starlink solution, many other satcom networks have also been widely used, both narrowband such as satphones, and broadband, leveraging LEO and GEO capacity along with terrestrial networks and meshed radio networks.
Of course, forces must avoid preparing for the last war and should focus on the next conflict, but Ukraine
is a vastly different technical and tactical environment from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operations in those theatres were in a dispersed but largely unchallenged electronic environment.
Overall, one of the key lessons coming out of Ukraine is that much of what is needed to radically improve capabilities in the short term is already in the hands of service personnel, or is available in the market somewhere.
Connectivity at the tactical edge in previous campaigns
Operations in Iraq and more notably in Afghanistan taught us all the need for robust narrowband and broadband communications at the tactical edge. My own experience, albeit some time ago, of Afghanistan during tours in 2002, 2004/5 and 2008/9 showed the critical nature of satcom right at the edge, not simply for the traditional reach-back from large headquarters.
Company groups in Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) increasingly had access to networked IT systems, full motion video (FMV) from uncrewed platforms, tactical reach-back and networks such as TacSat and L-Tac services, augmenting tactical or combat net radio systems.
Given the constant changes of bases and requirements, this took several years to establish and included satellite and terrestrial solutions with significant infrastructure on the ground. Afghanistan created expectations of being able to access these and more improved services but set into a more mobile and more challenged environment.
AI and related technologies increase the network load
Now, however, the technology of applications, augmented by AI/ML, and communications networks has moved on significantly and users at the edge expect to operate at a level where they are as well informed, if not better informed, than the best-served headquarters of the past.
Smaller units can benefit from handheld satellite connectivity and Push-to-Talk (PTT) systems alongside, or instead of, standard military radio systems. Tactical radio systems are constrained by range and terrain, requiring rebroadcast stations to match operational needs.
Rebroadcast stations, whether crewed or uncrewed, however, are points of vulnerability when military systems demand low-latency connectivity over longer distances. The advantage of satellite-based PTT networks is they can operate without this infrastructure, with the flexibility to change coverage patterns and tactical groupings in minutes.
Advances in small-form hardware and diverse connectivity
To improve resilience, units can integrate small-form satcom terminals with increasing bandwidth options. They can combine them with the ability to switch to local networks, where available, or to connect small teams on combat radio or mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET).
When one connection slows or fails, switching between different types of secure connectivity should happen automatically. Equally, units may need to remain on multiple networks simultaneously. Traffic should use the best available network depending on priority or throughput in a software-defined approach.
This all necessitates a focus on integration and the other acronym that pulls against PACE – which is SWaP (size, weight and power). More networks tends to mean more systems, more boxes and more power. When this is needed on the person, or on a vehicle or other platform, this presents a challenge.
Both users in uniform and providers from Industry concur the most likely way to solve this problem is through multiple providers. This balance of PACE and SWaP needs dialogue with end users and a greater understanding of their demands and threats and how to meet them. In my view, this is where systems integrators play a key role across multiple suppliers and multiple, but often overlapping, use cases.
Integrated maritime operations demand always-on data flows– even in the Arctic
In operational theatres at sea, forces need real-time data exchange to provide situational awareness and co-ordinated action across fleets, aircraft and satellites.
This is driven by the evolution of command and control (C2) which is moving towards the integration of data from numerous platforms such as airborne surveillance (crewed and increasingly uncrewed), uncrewed surface vessels (USV), improved sensors and onboard systems.
Similarly, the optimisation of onboard weapon, navigation and sensor systems all depends on real-time data exchange that is fully scalable.
In polar regions, which are increasingly of strategic importance, GEO connectivity is unavailable. Here, maritime force elements need seamless switchover to current and future LEO services. These provide the necessary low-latency bandwidth. Their availability also provides resilience for interruption from attacks on GEO satellite services. In addition, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) services are available and Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) services now in orbit will soon become available. This is all very welcome as they bring additional choice and resilience for maritime capabilities.
Greater use of uncrewed and autonomous vessels, for mine-hunting or surveillance for example, is necessary to counter increased threats. These vessels need to be able to sense and operate the same as crewed platforms, so again they must have resilient connectivity either to a mother ship, or a home base, to control operations. This is another area where satcom plays a key role.
Achieving always-on connectivity in these regions through secure and robust satcom demands a best-of-breed approach. This will integrate the technology and overlapping coverage, runningacross multiple bands, in multiple orbits and with integration with LTE networks, which forces can access in coastal regions.
Air operations are more complex
The air domain is also more complex and difficult – with air superiority increasingly unlikely in many scenarios and threats to airfields very real.
There are echoes here of the Cold War 1990s when Harrier Forces operated from temporary and austere air bases. The important difference is that today’s temporary bases require high-bandwidth connectivity for mission planning and support applications.
This again requires multiple satcom and other links to deliver resilience. Domains need to connect with a common operating picture and the ability to sense, decide and effect at pace across domains. For example, the timely exchange of information between a reconnaissance aircraft and a vessel could enable the ship to optimise its countermeasures against an incoming threat. Similarly, uncrewed platforms such as Loyal Wingmen or Protector Remotely Piloted Aircraft could cue other air activity, in defence or attack.
Conclusion – much of what we need we already have
There are serious lessons from Ukraine about shifts in communications and technology that forces now require. However, it is also apparent that many of the elements needed for rapid exchange of detailed information at the tactical edge are already available either fielded with allies or used elsewhere in other markets that can be readily adopted, or in some cases adapted, for defence needs and to meet PACE and SWAP challenges.
This is much less about deep research and development than iterative integration activity to meet focused user demands and to test, refine, field and scale. R&D however is clearly necessary for the longer term and to get ahead and stay ahead of our adversaries,
Multi-domain integration and information dominance are key approaches, but are no more than jargon unless they are underpinned by the necessary connectivity. Forces need to sense through crewed and uncrewed means and gather information rapidly to decide, and then connect with the right forces or systems to deliver effect. Faced with greater battlespace electronic and physical threats, they must achieve this at pace, which demands a new level of connectivity.