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Fujitsu 2016 Future of Logistics Challenge The Defence Support Network – A paper on the benefits of Supply Chain Information in the digital age with considerations for the Maritime Domain Submission by Lieutenant Gordon Clark RN

Lieutenant Clark submitted the following paper for the 8th Fujitsu Future of Logistics Challenge annual Essay Competition in 2016.  Despite not directly considering the two questions posed by the competition setters, and being largely Maritime rather than Defence or Whole Force-focused, the essay was deemed to be extremely well constructed, and the well thought out content merited wider acknowledgement.  There are issues in the paper that are applicable across other, non-Maritime domains. The paper was therefore Highly Commended by the competition marking panel, who recommended its wider publication.

 Introduction

“My logisticians are a humourless lot … they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.”  This was the opinion of Alexander the Great, someone who, even in the 4th Century BC, understood the fundamental importance of Logistics to engaging in successful warfare.  In the 21st Century, the tools and techniques in successful logistics are somewhat more advanced than those of Alexander the Great but the aim remains the same – to provide the correct amount of functioning equipment and materiel, in the right place, at the right time[1].

In this paper, some of the improvements that the Defence Support Network[2] (DSN) seeks to generate in the way that the UK Armed Forces are supplied and supported will be analysed against the backdrop of a number of significant criticisms of recent years.

With the ever increasing pace of technological change and advancement in the 21st Century, the paper will focus on the difference the technology proposed in the DSN can make.  It has the potential to provide a full spectrum view of the entire supply chain, from factory to user as well as every step in between, allowing Commanders to understand where their equipment is and thus plan and fight more effectively.  Because ultimately, the aim of logistics is to supply the equipment to allow the Armed Forces to defeat the enemy.

The data generated by the huge number of transactions throughout the supply chain must also be exploited to better understand the demand from Defence, thus allowing the supply chain to become more agile, responsive and effective.  A number of other recent technological developments will be discussed.  Although not perhaps part of the core DSN, they provide useful insight into the break-neck speed at which changes are occurring as well as offering real opportunities for defence.

All of this will be considered using the author’s experience of the maritime environment and the unique challenges that it presents and that must be considered when planning in this domain.

Joint Supply Chain to Defence Support Network

 The Joint Supply Chain was first described in the third edition of JDP 4-00 as:

“the network of nodes comprising resources, activities and distribution options that focus on the rapid flow materiel, services and information between the Strategic Base and deployed Force Elements in order to generate, sustain and redeploy operational capability”[3]

Following the introduction of the support network concept in a 2010 white paper, the subsequent edition of JDP 4-00 Defence Logistic Policy began referring to the Defence Support Network instead of the Joint Supply Chain, and defined it as:

“a flexible set of supply chains connecting points of production and use, ensuring the most appropriate and efficient use of resources across the Whole Force, maximising information and technology to assure logistic support to operational commanders”.[4]

While both definitions seem broadly similar, further detail on the Defence Support Network includes direction that the network be agile, provide end-to-end visibility and be supported by capable logistics information systems[5].  This utilisation of the latest developments in supply chain principles is what marks the Defence Support Network concept as a step forward from of the Joint Support Chain[6].

Such is the diversity and scale of defence activity, the Defence Support Network will comprise numerous organisations and stakeholders demanding, supplying and transporting materiel.  At the centre of much of this activity is the Defence Equipment and Support Organisation.

Defence Equipment and Support

Defence Equipment and Support was formed on 1 April 2007 as a merger of the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA), responsible for the acquisition of weapons systems and platforms and for managing major upgrades, and the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) which was responsible for supporting and maintaining equipment procured by the DPA, carrying out upgrades to that equipment and disposing of it at the end of its life[7].

DE&S’ mission at inception, and to this day, is “to equip and support the UK’s Armed Forces for operations now and in the future”[8] [9].  As such, it is a cornerstone of the Joint Supply Chain, the link between suppliers and customers in the Front Line Commands, but has been subject to a number of points of criticism for shortcomings over recent years across the spectrum of its activity which covers in some form every element of the CADMID[10] cycle.  A number of these criticisms relate to its support to in-service equipment and these are issues which the DSN aims to rectify.

Information Systems and the data within

In 2011, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) criticised the MOD’s ability to understand it’s inventory and supply chain.  Better understanding, the PAC said, would drive understanding of full costs, efficiencies and better, more timely and accurate supply chain performance to support the front line.  This situation is not new however.  Defence has been criticised for decades for its inability to accurately track its inventory and thus ensure front-line personnel are supplied with the equipment they need, whilst ensuring the supply-chain is timely and efficient.  As far back as 1986, MOD was having to provide assurances to Government that it was “aware of the gaps in its information and … introducing better systems to close them.  Despite these efforts, the same problems persist”[11].

Understanding of data in the supply chain environment is fundamental to efficient and effective supply to the customer.  Private enterprises have been exploiting such data to further their business effectiveness since the 1980s.  Even then, data access and sharing was encouraged beyond the single organisation level and was encouraged between manufacturers, suppliers and customers to allow end-to-end visibility of the supply chain in what is known as Supply Chain Management[12].  Thirty years on, moves are afoot in the private sector to merge the Supply Chain Management Information with Enterprise Resource Planning, a business management software system that integrates all elements of an enterprise such as Finance, HR and logistics[13].   The utility of such data in supply chain analytics allows the organisation to better exploit trends in the supply chain, increasing planning and performance capabilities[14] [15].

Industry provides a useful example of the impact of effective technology in the supply chain.  Amongst its various activities, United Parcel Service of America (UPS) is one of the largest courier services globally[16].  It delivers on a daily basis, 18.7 million packages worldwide (UPS, 2016).  In comparison, in 2010, DE&S delivered around 130,000 packages to Afghanistan over the course of 12 months.  While the environments the organisations work in are notably different, UPS is able to provide up to the minute tracking on every item within its supply chain and has been using barcodes and other methods to enable this for decades.  Package losses and delays are sufficiently low that UPS’s revenue and share price has continued to grow steadily over the last 5 years[17] [18].

It would be naïve to suggest that DE&S and the MOD could simply implement these procedures in their own operations and fit into the models employed by businesses whose strategy is based around the movement of stock between suppliers and customers[19].  Nevertheless, there are lessons that MOD could learn from those organisations.  MOD has no automated, pan-organisation scanning or receipting procedure. Instead, it relies on manually receipting all items at significant cost in terms of man-hours and higher potential for human error and mis-receipting.  That UPS and its other market leaders are able to achieve this for billions of packages yearly but the MOD has failed to introduce such a system that would improve tracking and thus reduce losses and discrepancies and save thousands of man-hours of effort annually is a clear indictment of MOD’s failure to address IT shortcomings.

The DSN Vision for Information Systems (IS)

One of the core tenets of the Defence Support Network is the use of “capable logistics information services to deliver assured logistic information… fundamental to providing visibility of, and confidence in, logistics”[20].  Introduction of an appropriate IT system that tracks all inventory across defence is therefore crucial to achieving this.  Management of the Joint Deployed Inventory (MJDI)[21] which began being rolled out in 2008 is an important and welcome step forward in achieving this solution.  It replaced a number of systems employed across the sea, land and air environments and allowed for a full picture of all stock deployed[22].  This has not been without its difficulties in the maritime domain however.  From the author’s experience, the system has proved problematic when installed in platforms that do not have constant connectivity, notably submarines.  While difficulties have ultimately been overcome, they have caused frustration and resentment towards the system from the operators onboard.  Perhaps most importantly, it is a reminder of the need to ensure that the requirements of all stakeholders in a project are considered and catered for, particularly in such diverse and wide-ranging operating environments as those experienced in the MOD[23].

Consolidating IS – FLIS

Whilst MJDI is a positive step, it is does not provide anywhere near the full picture of the defence inventory as intended in DSN.  It does not link into industry and sits alongside over 150 additional supply chain management applications still in use.  Recognising that the MJDI concept pre-dated the Defence Support Network concept, in 2010, Boeing UK was awarded an £800 million, 11-year Future Logistics Information Services (FLIS) contract.  The aim is to “improve reliability and capability of the logistic information systems and services that deliver engineering, supply chain and business intelligence information”[24].  This is a welcome and hugely necessary development; a streamlining and modernisation of the IT and information systems and ultimately, links to industrial partners that will help form the basis of a pan-enterprise domain, set up to be responsive and agile to the needs of the customer.  The contract is a partnership, an important point for both MOD and Boeing in acknowledging their commitment and close working relationship in achieving its aims[25].

Boeing has nominated a number of sub-contractors to assist with its delivery of FLIS. They bring their own skill-sets and expertise to the delivery of the contract but also introduce further distance between Defence and Boeing as the supplier of the product as the outsourcing of the contract is devolved. In this case, the MOD must remain fully engaged in the partnership with Boeing; poor communication is one of the main reasons that partnerships have failed[26].  Effective interaction will allow continued understanding and awareness of progress of the contract and the benefits being realised. Boeing must also welcome this approach as part of an effective and open partnering relationship and MOD must ensure that it holds its partner to account, whilst concurrently acting as a responsible and intelligent customer.

Of particular note, the FLIS project is not intended to replace all 160+ MOD Logistics Information Systems with a single IS solution.  This is perhaps a sensible course of action; government has a chequered track record of delivering large IT programmes with many proving far too complex to work effectively or overrunning on cost or time[27].  Even DHL, an industry leading courier has fallen foul of this, being forced to abandon an IT project worth hundreds of millions of Euros after the system proved unworkable[28].  At this stage, consolidation is therefore the optimum course of action but must be accompanied by improved interoperability between the systems, thus generating an end-to-end view of the supply chain.  The ultimate end state, whether through FLIS or a follow-on project, must remain a single IT system, linked into engineering and operations and providing full visibility to the supplier and customer of materiel within the system.  A materiel-in-transit tracking solution is essential as part of this.

But introducing new IS – ALIS

Concurrently, as work is conducted to consolidate IS, Defence must be alive to consequences of acquiring new IT systems.  The MOD is in the process of acquiring F-35 Lightning II jet aircraft which will operate from both land and sea, embarked in QUEEN ELIZABETH class aircraft carriers.  The F35 has been developed with Automatic Logistics Information System (ALIS) which

“integrates a broad range of capabilities including operations, maintenance, prognostics, supply chain, customer support services, training and technical data.  A single, secure information environment provides users with up-to-date information on any of these areas using web-enabled applications on a distributed network”[29].

Such a system is the pinnacle of Logistics IS, linked to the maintenance system, utilising operational information and combining all of this data to prompt the pull for resupply and support maintainers in conducting predictive and restorative maintenance.  While the system is well conceived and will provide strong support to F35, Defence must consider how it sits alongside other Log IS systems and how it will interact with them.  It is unclear whether ALIS will support tacking of materiel in transit and this should form part of an overall Logistics IS solution.  One element that ALIS has got right however is end-to-end connectivity reaching right back to the supplier of the equipment.  A sophisticated IS which does not communicate with the manufacturer is of limited use as the final step in the demand process would require human intervention, thus slowing and complicating the process.

Maritime Connectivity

Another important consideration is the bandwidth requirement for ALIS.  A permanent, wired connection at an Air Station will present no issues but at sea this is not the case, as MJDI has demonstrated.  Satellite connection speeds are slower, less reliable, do not provide total coverage and come at significant cost[30].  Data on the bandwidth requirements of ALIS is not readily available and costs of satellite broadband are commercially sensitive so a detailed assessment cannot be made, but it is a fundamental consideration for all Logistics IS in the maritime environment.  Nevertheless, this should remain a consideration and not be the limiting factor.  The massive amounts of data that a more consolidated and effective Logistics IS could provide from transactions occurring throughout the supply chain, whether at sea or ashore, and through whichever system is in use, must be harnessed.

Big Data

In 2012, a National Audit Office report criticised the MOD on the subject of stock holdings.  The NAO judged the department to be holding stock in excess of the requirement.  This placed a two-fold cost on the MOD, for firstly acquiring the stock and then for storing it.  Furthermore, the NAO concluded that the recording of inventory on IT systems was inconsistent[31].  The report highlighted that the defence inventory consisted of over 900,00 line items ranging from clothing to missiles and spares for everything from jet aircraft to nuclear submarines.  While the NAO’s conclusion that Defence was managing its inventory poorly was valid, it did not explain the complexity of the problem.  One criticism was that some stock had been untouched for a number of years.  What was not articulated was that the some of the identified slow moving spares would only require replacing over a longer period and delays to the introduction of equipment had not been taken into account when assessing stock movement.

Given the technology available today, the solution lies in more and better data, and most importantly, the efficient exploitation of that data for enhanced insights and decision making[32] [33].  From the simplest levels of understanding rates of consumption and thus push and pull required from the supply chain, when linked with operations and engineering data, the system can provide a detailed level of information[34] [35].  One example would be the programming of predicative maintenance instead of preventative maintenance depending on hours of operation and equipment loading[36].  Patterns and correlations that were once hidden would be discovered, allowing action to be taken to mitigate them.  Additionally, as Defence equipment becomes increasingly advanced and expensive, therefore limiting numbers purchased, better understanding of the maintenance requirement and load this will place on the supply chain is essential to ensure platforms can be maintained thus ensuring their availability for tasking[37].  A case in point is the ASTUTE class submarine; with only 7 platforms to be procured, it is vital that consumption of spare parts and consumables is understood based on empirical data and not simply manufacturers recommendations.

Other advances

 DHL, another major global courier in the same market as UPS, is employing novel technological solutions in its warehousing and distribution operations.  These include the introduction of augmented reality glasses to its warehouse teams which provide the user with a digital ‘heads-up display’ of picking and packing information to improve productive and reduce errors when filling orders[38].  While perhaps less able to be applied across defence, this relatively simple solution could pay dividends in the management of inventory for defence.

Additive manufacturing, more commonly known as 3D-printing, is an exciting possibility for the supply chain[39].  It has already been demonstrated to work at sea[40].  Deploying with the raw materials and a printer programmed with every conceivable spare part would dramatically reduce the inventory required to be carried, the pressure on the supply chain and would mean repairs could be made or new spares fitted within minutes instead of days, particularly for a ship deployed at sea.  The ability to 3D-print some objects such as complex electronics remains embryonic but the technology is continuing to evolve at a rapid rate and it could revolutionise the supply chain.

 Remembering People

In all of this, one element that must not be overlooked by the DSN is the workforce and their engagement and acceptance of the needs for change and the ultimate goal.  The problems that necessitated DSN are not purely borne of bad IS and over-purchasing.  The human factors of bad behaviour or low performance (although neither of which are malicious) are just as much to blame[41].  Poor behaviours were highlighted by the National Audit Office[42] as being part of the problem.  Therefore, as DSN and novel technologies and ways of working are introduced, the organisation, and by extension its people, must be kept informed and engaged, to feel like part of the solution towards a better Defence Supply Chain[43].  Avoiding change fatigue is equally crucial.  Fundamental requirements of a successful change programme are therefore the need for it to be clearly articulated to the workforce, it to be well managed and to be led by a dedicated team[44]. 2006).

Summary – Challenges and opportunities

 The challenge facing the Defence Support Network is an immense one.  It must first consolidate and rationalise what IS it already has into a more coherent and functional, connected network.  The long term solution should be that this is a single, all-encompassing system, linked end-to-end and globally accessible by those at home and deployed.  This may be some years away however and will doubtless be highly costly.  In the interim, close working with Boeing is essential to deliver the benefits of FLIS in a timely manner.  In its delivery, the unique circumstances in the maritime domain must be taken into consideration.

As the benefits of FLIS begin to be realised, attention should be paid to mining the data within the IS.  This will allow better understanding of the rates of usage of materiel and when combined with operational and engineering information, will allow platforms to be operated and maintained more effectively thus improving their availability.

There are a number of other exciting developments which Defence could exploit to better enable it’s support chain.  Chief amongst these is 3D printing which could fundamentally alter the role of the supply chain in supporting Defence over the next decade and therefore must be considered.  If the DSN has come about as a result of Defence not keeping up with the advances in technology and software over the last decade, then Defence must remain adaptive and forward looking, ready to embrace the future.  The alternative is that when the FLIS project completes in 2021, Defence finds itself years behind technological advances once again.

Finally, and crucially, the people delivering DSN must be engaged, encouraged and supported throughout.  Ultimately, they will be key to its success.

References

 

Beaudan, E. (2006) Making change last: How to get beyond change fatigue. Ivey Business Journal, 70(3) 1-7.

Beaumont, P. (2012) The Defence Enterprise is More Than Just a Supermarket Chain.  RUSI Defence Systems, Spring 2012 25-32.

Boeing UK (2016) Boeing Information Services [online] Boeing UK. Available from http://www.boeing.co.uk/products-services/boeing-defence-uk/programmes/boeing-information-services.page.

Bongsug, C., Olson, D. and Sheu, C. (2014) The impact of supply chain analytics on operational performance: a resource-based view.  International Journal of Production Research, 52(16) 4695-4710.

Brauner, P., Runge, S., Groten, M., Schuh, G. and Ziefle, M. (2013). Human Factors in Supply Chain Management.  In: Sakae Yamamoto (eds.) Human Interface and the Management of Information. Las Vegas, Nevada, 23-26 July 2013.  Berlin: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 423-432.

Chen, D. Q., Preston, D. S. and Swink, N. (2015) How the Use of Big Data Analytics Affects Value Creation in Supply Chain Management. Journal of Management Information Systems, 32(4) 4-39.

Clemente, D. and Evans, R. (2014) Wartime Logistics in Afghanistan and Beyond. Chatham House.

Davis-Sramek, B., R. Germain, and K. Iyer. 2010. Supply Chain Technology: The Role of Environment in Predicting Performance. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38 42-55.

Defence Contracts Online (2015) About DE&S. [online] Glasgow: BIP solutions. Available from http://www.contracts.mod.uk/about-the-mod/about-des/.

Defence Equipment and Support (2008) Business Strategy 2008-12. BTH01463. Bristol: DE&S Graphics and Photography.

Defence Equipment and Support (2015) Corporate Plan 2015 – 2018. ABW-14-318. Bristol: DE&S Corporate Communications.

Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2007) Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations (3rd edition). JDP 4-00.  Swindon: Ministry of Defence.

Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2015) Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations (4th edition). JDP 4-00.  Swindon: Ministry of Defence.

DHL (2014) Augmented Reality in Logistics. Troisdorf: DHL Customer Solutions and Innovation. Available from http://www.dhl.com/content/dam/downloads/g0/about_us/logistics_insights/csi_augmented_reality_report_290414.pdf.

Financial Times (2016) Equities.  Available from www.markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Tearsheets/Financials?s=UPS:NYQ.

Humbert, X. P., and Passarelli, C. P. M. (1997) Outsourcing: avoiding the hazards and pitfalls.  NAPM International Conference, 4-7 May 1997.

Iijima, T. (2015) Key Points of Failure for IT Project Business Cases.  Journal Of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 26(4) 57-63.

Janssen, A. and Hagan, J. (2014) Moving Maintenance from Preventative to Predictive with SAP HANA, SAPInsider, Jan, Feb, Mar 2014.

Lockheed Martin (2016) Autonomic Logistics Information System. Available from http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/products/ALIS.html.

Lummus, R. K. and Vokurka, R. J. (1999) Defining supply chain management: a historical perspective and practical guidelines. Industrial Management and Data Systems, 99(1) 11-17.

Lysons, K. and Farrington, R. (2010) Purchasing and Supply Chain Management. 4th edition.  Harlow: Pearson.

Marketline (2016) Company Profile – United Parcel Service, Inc. Ref: 233ADDC2-32B5-4702-AD8D-5ECA699536AA.  Available from www.marketline.com.

Marle, G. (2015) We are not to blame for DHLs €345m NFE new technology debacle says SAP. [online] theloadstar.co.uk Available from: http://theloadstar.co.uk/we-are-not-to-blame-for-for-dhls-e345m-nfe-new-technology-debacle-says-sap.

Ministry of Defence (2014) Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045. 5th edition. London: Ministry of Defence.

 

National Audit Office (2012) Managing the Defence Inventory. 2488461. London: HMSO.

Project Management Institute (2013) A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge. 5th edition.  Pennsylvania: Project Management Institute, Inc.

Public Accounts Committee (2009) Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence: The use of information to manage the defence logistics supply chain.  Available from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1202/1202we02.htm.

Public Accounts Committee (2011) The use of information to manage the defence logistics supply chain. HC1202. London: HMSO.

Sanders, N. R. (2016) How to Use Big Data to Drive Your Supply Chain. California Management Review, 58(3) 26-48.

Southampton University (2015) Southampton engineers test fly printed aircraft off Royal Navy ship [online] Southampton: Southampton University. Available from http://www.southampton.ac.uk/news/2015/07/uav-royal-navy-test-flight.page.

Sumic, D., Perakovic, D., and Jurcevic, M. (2014) Optimizing Data Traffic Route for Maritime Vessels Communication.  Proccedia Engineering. 100(2015) 1286-1293.

UPS (2016) UPS Factsheet.  Available from https://pressroom.ups.com/pressroom/ContentDetailsViewer.page?ConceptType=FactSheets&id=1426321563187-193.

Watt, T. (2011) Fixing Logistics. Defence Management Journal. Available from: http://www.paconsulting.com/introducing-pas-media-site/highlighting-pas-expertise-in-the-media/opinion-pieces-by-pas-experts/defence-management-journal-fixing-logistics-november-2011/

[1] Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2015) Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations (4th edition). JDP 4-00.  Swindon: Ministry of Defence.

[2] The Defence Support Network is an evolution of the UK MOD’s  Joint Supply Chain and recognises the increasing complexity of logistics, information, and enabling activities for defence on operations, and preparing force elements for operations. It includes Regular and Reserve Forces, other government departments, allies and industrial partners.

[3] Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2007) Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations (3rd edition). JDP 4-00.  Swindon: Ministry of Defence. Lexicon 13.

[4] Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2015) Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations (4th edition). JDP 4-00.  Swindon: Ministry of Defence, Chapter 9.

[5] ibid, Chapter 9.

[6] Lysons, K. and Farrington, R. (2010) Purchasing and Supply Chain Management. 4th edition.  Harlow: Pearson. 2012, 140, 324.

[7] Defence Contracts Online (2015) About DE&S. [online] Glasgow: BIP solutions. Available from http://www.contracts.mod.uk/about-the-mod/about-des/.

[8] Defence Equipment and Support (2008) Business Strategy 2008-12. BTH01463. Bristol: DE&S Graphics and Photography.

[9] Defence Equipment and Support (2015) Corporate Plan 2015 – 2018. ABW-14-318. Bristol: DE&S Corporate Communications.

[10]The phases of an Integrated Logistics System process, applicable throughout the whole life of an equipment project: Concept, Analysis, Design, Manufacture, In-Service, Disposal.

[11] Public Accounts Committee (2011) The use of information to manage the defence logistics supply chain. HC1202. London: HMSO.

[12] Lummus, R. K. and Vokurka, R. J. (1999) Defining supply chain management: a historical perspective and practical guidelines. Industrial Management and Data Systems, 99(1) 11-17.

[13] Lysons, K. and Farrington, R. (2010) Purchasing and Supply Chain Management. 4th edition.  Harlow: Pearson. 347-348.

[14] Davis-Sramek, B., R. Germain, and K. Iyer. 2010. Supply Chain Technology: The Role of Environment in Predicting Performance. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38 42-55.

[15] Bongsug, C., Olson, D. and Sheu, C. (2014) The impact of supply chain analytics on operational performance: a resource-based view.  International Journal of Production Research, 52(16) 4695-4710.

[16] Marketline (2016) Company Profile – United Parcel Service, Inc. Ref: 233ADDC2-32B5-4702-AD8D-5ECA699536AA.  Available from www.marketline.com.

[17] ibid.

[18] Financial Times (2016) Equities.  Available from www.markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Tearsheets/Financials?s=UPS:NYQ.

[19] Beaumont, P. (2012) The Defence Enterprise is More Than Just a Supermarket Chain.  RUSI Defence Systems, Spring 2012 25-32.

[20] Defence Equipment and Support (2015) Corporate Plan 2015 – 2018. ABW-14-318. Bristol: DE&S Corporate Communications.

[21] MJDI is the UK military logistics system for demanding, receiving, supplying and maintaining details of materiel ranging from boots to ammunition and medical stores. It is replacing the three Services current divergent logistics systems by a single IS capability that significantly improves Supply Chain Management, visibility and accounting for materiel utilising common operating procedures. Based on an extant RAF system, MJDI was planned to address the core issues of visibility, excessive stockholding and cost of storage providing a streamlined cost-effective process.

[22] Public Accounts Committee (2009) Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence: The use of information to manage the defence logistics supply chain.  Available from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1202/1202we02.htm.

[23] Project Management Institute (2013) A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge. 5th edition.  Pennsylvania: Project Management Institute, Inc.

[24] Boeing UK (2016) Boeing Information Services [online] Boeing UK. Available from http://www.boeing.co.uk/products-services/boeing-defence-uk/programmes/boeing-information-services.page.

[25] Humbert, X. P., and Passarelli, C. P. M. (1997) Outsourcing: avoiding the hazards and pitfalls.  NAPM International Conference, 4-7 May 1997.

[26] Lysons, K. and Farrington, R. (2010) Purchasing and Supply Chain Management. 4th edition.  Harlow: Pearson. 402-403.

[27] Iijima, T. (2015) Key Points of Failure for IT Project Business Cases.  Journal Of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 26(4) 57-63.

[28] Marle, G. (2015) We are not to blame for DHLs €345m NFE new technology debacle says SAP. [online] theloadstar.co.uk Available from: http://theloadstar.co.uk/we-are-not-to-blame-for-for-dhls-e345m-nfe-new-technology-debacle-says-sap.

[29] Lockheed Martin (2016) Autonomic Logistics Information System. Available from http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/products/ALIS.html.

[30] Sumic, D., Perakovic, D., and Jurcevic, M. (2014) Optimizing Data Traffic Route for Maritime Vessels Communication.  Proccedia Engineering. 100(2015) 1286-1293.

[31] National Audit Office (2012) Managing the Defence Inventory. 2488461. London: HMSO.

[32] Ministry of Defence (2014) Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045. 5th edition. London: Ministry of Defence., 59

[33] Clemente, D. and Evans, R. (2014) Wartime Logistics in Afghanistan and Beyond. Chatham House.

[34] Chen, D. Q., Preston, D. S. and Swink, N. (2015) How the Use of Big Data Analytics Affects Value Creation in Supply Chain Management. Journal of Management Information Systems, 32(4) 4-39.

[35] Sanders, N. R. (2016) How to Use Big Data to Drive Your Supply Chain. California Management Review, 58(3) 26-48.

[36] Janssen, A. and Hagan, J. (2014) Moving Maintenance from Preventative to Predictive with SAP HANA, SAPInsider, Jan, Feb, Mar 2014.

[37] Ministry of Defence (2014) Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045. 5th edition. London: Ministry of Defence. 94.

[38] DHL (2014) Augmented Reality in Logistics. Troisdorf: DHL Customer Solutions and Innovation. Available from http://www.dhl.com/content/dam/downloads/g0/about_us/logistics_insights/csi_augmented_reality_report_290414.pdf.

[39] Ministry of Defence (2014) Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045. 5th edition. London: Ministry of Defence, 68.

[40] Southampton University (2015) Southampton engineers test fly printed aircraft off Royal Navy ship [online] Southampton: Southampton University. Available from http://www.southampton.ac.uk/news/2015/07/uav-royal-navy-test-flight.page.

[41] Brauner, P., Runge, S., Groten, M., Schuh, G. and Ziefle, M. (2013). Human Factors in Supply Chain Management.  In: Sakae Yamamoto (eds.) Human Interface and the Management of Information. Las Vegas, Nevada, 23-26 July 2013.  Berlin: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 423.

[42] National Audit Office (2012) Managing the Defence Inventory. 2488461. London: HMSO.

[43] Watt, T. (2011) Fixing Logistics. Defence Management Journal. Available from: http://www.paconsulting.com/introducing-pas-media-site/highlighting-pas-expertise-in-the-media/opinion-pieces-by-pas-experts/defence-management-journal-fixing-logistics-november-2011/.  

[44] Beaudan, E. (2006) Making change last: How to get beyond change fatigue. Ivey Business Journal, 70(3) 1-7.

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