Major Sanders has produced a systems and technology-focused view of the challenges that the professionalisation of Defence logisticians must address.  His essay concentrates on the professionalising of Defence logisticians rather than all of the constituents of the Whole Force, but acknowledges the bridges, interaction with, and lessons that can be learned from industry and other allies. Major Sanders’ paper was second runner up in the 8th Fujitsu Future of Logistics Challenge annual Essay Competition in 2016.

Introduction

In 1959, Admiral H Eccles USN described military logistics as “a bridge from the national economy to the operation of combat forces”[i].  This concept endures, but Defence logistics is now an immensely complex system of systems connecting a globalised economy to UK and allied forces on a range of contingent operations.  As the UK prepares to deploy joint forces, act as NATO framework nation and share platforms and support systems with allies, complexity and challenge grow.    A secure and responsive Defence Support Network (DSN)[1] must integrate multiple support chains[ii] and solutions, regulating materiel and information flows to assure cheaper, faster and better operational support.  UK Defence logisticians and their partners in industry and NATO must share and exploit trusted information readable by people and (increasingly) machines, whilst transforming their enterprise in contact with current and potential enemies.  This complex and adaptive DSN will be peopled by ‘a diverse, healthy and versatile force of professional logisticians [and support engineers] from within an effective and efficient “Whole Force”’[iii].  How then should we professionalise these logisticians to face future challenges?

This essay will answer this question in five parts.  First it will explore what is meant by the term ‘logistics professional’, and secondly the cognitive space in which Defence logistic professionals solve problems.   The third part will discuss how logistics management[2] will be shaped by emerging enterprise and information architectures.  The fourth section will explore how new technology might enhance training, career development and professional associations in adopting licensing, and strengthening ethical standards.  The fifth part will draw conclusions and suggest directions of travel in professionalising Whole Force logisticians.

 The Logistics Problem Space

What do we mean by ‘professional logistician’?

One definition of a professional is ‘a member of a well-defined group who solves real-world problems with the help of skills, creativity and scientific design knowledge’ [iv].   Professional work involves planning an action in advance of or during the action (what Schön[v] calls ‘reflection-in-action’).  Van Aken posits that each time a professional sets out to solve a unique and specific problem for, or with a client, he or she does so by using the problem solving cycle:

• defining the problem out of its ‘messy’ context (‘naming and framing’),
• planning the intervention (diagnosis, design of alternative solutions, selection),
• applying the intervention
• evaluating outcomes and lessons learned.

The military estimate process[3] is but one example of this cycle.  Professionalism requires deeper understanding than craft, involving designing methods for solving different classes of problems, rather than successive examples of one type of problem.

Larsen (1979 p.208)[vi] argues that, to be termed ‘professional’, any discipline must possess the following characteristics:

• a cognitive base of distinctive theory;
• professional association;
• institutionalized training;
• licensing;
• work autonomy;
• colleague control;
• a code of ethics.

This essay will take the premise that the Whole Force logistics professional’s business is:

Applying logistics expertise to balance ends, ways and means in assuring flow of physical and informational assets^[4] to support military activity.

A professional Defence logistician is, therefore, any Whole Force member of the Defence logistic enterprise embodying professional characteristics in their conduct of Defence logistics business.

1.     Cognitive base, information network and problem space

The Defence logistic enterprise exists to enable political/military ends, its ways and means of delivery are generated by the national economy and authorised by Parliament, to which the MoD is accountable.  In a space framed by these competing interests, Whole Force logisticians exercise professional skills, exchanging information with Industrial, customer and policy-focused partners to resolve complex problems of demand fulfilment.

 

1.1 –  A logistics information network – concept

Kress (2016) argues that logistics managers require information on three types of logistic parameters: potential resources; actual resources; and demand (Kress (2016).  By Resources Kress (2016 p.7) means consumables (materiel/inventory) and services (i.e. procurement, storage and transportation).  Managers also require information on operational parameters of logistics organisations (military or contracted) staffed by Operators who provide information on actual resource supply, and on operational parameters regarding in-transit resources.  The information flowing into operators is potential resource from managers, and demand from customers.  Operators also need information on the materiel distribution lay-down (at home in the UK, or deployed in an operational area) as well as locations and operating states of customers. The customers are the logisticians or end users at the lower level of demand/fulfilment planning, e.g. operational logisticians upstream in the support chain have forward, tactical logisticians as their downstream customers, and tactical logisticians sustain then the warfighter.

In business and in Defence logistics, ends, ways and means are balanced at strategic, tactical and operational[6]  levels, with powers appropriately delegated to manage risk.  The risk picture at each level is shaped by the information exchanges within the planning timeframe – from epochs at the strategic level to days at the tactical.  The instruments of risk management include financial resource control totals, commissioning/contracting delegations, and in the mission space, mission command[7].

The Means – Cost of Ownership, Balance of Investment and Capability

At the strategic level, staffs make structural and capability decisions for the joint domain and to inform this they must understand the balance of capabilities required to achieve policy.  Logisticians at this level represent support costs of ownership in the overall balance of investment decision.  At lower levels, logisticians must make trade-offs across support channels according to commanders’ priorities and delegated resources; ways may include contracted support.  The evidence supporting these decisions must follow a ‘golden thread’ of logic through layers of supporting premises formed by workflows within the DSN’s enterprise architecture.

The Ends – Understanding the Demand Signal

The logistics professional must understand his customers’ intent, the ensuing load on the joint force ‘system of systems’, and the resultant demand signal.  In relating to the customer (who may be the warfighter, platform support engineer or another DSN logistician) a logistician must be master of his space, and fulfil his customer’s need for evidence-based capability outcomes.  What happens inside the logistician’s ‘black box’, and can its output evidence be trusted?

The business of logistics – ways and means

Throughout the DSN, a professional logistician’s judgement must be supported by qualitative and quantitative evidence, appropriately aggregated and filtered, derived from DSN process workflows and performance metrics.

The DSN support chains are complex arrangements, including availability based solutions for land platforms, warships and aircraft, such as the F35 Joint Strike Fighter’s Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS).  In the Air environment, demand and fulfilment are tightly scheduled systems driven by potential and actual behaviour of the given platform under load, and how much availability can be financed.   In the Land domain, simpler, more numerous and dispersed platforms with variable user care, and largely unscheduled repair, generate a very different demand signal.  Maritime platforms and logistics present challenges all their own that are not addressed here.  However, support solutions across all three environments are driven by the same principles namely stock and flow dynamics, with demand being dependent/push-based or independent (i.e. stochastic) pull-based.  In the former, mass, volume and lead times are manageable by averages-based yardsticks.  In the latter, random failures within the platform breakdown structure require calculation of NSN[8] cost/criticality segmentation and safety stock holdings against variable lead time.  Current planning relies on static modelling in the base to simulate projected platform performance and materiel flows[9].  The logistician needs to understand the uses and limitations of this approach in informing logistics planning, and may rely on experts with deep supply chain management or transportation management skills to do so.  These sophisticated forecasts deliver meaningful performance metrics of expected outcomes in terms of risk to availability/capability in strategic time horizons.   On contingent, short-notice or unexpected operations, the adaptive environment generates activity that dynamically alters the inventory picture, requiring more agile anticipation and fulfilment of local demand in the operational and tactical time/space.

The ways of managing this risk between DSN partners varies from formal contracting for availability, through partnering arrangements, to military command and staffing processes disposing inventory that has been paid for by the end user[10].   In the Air domain, contractor support risk is tightly managed from factory to flight-line.  In the Land domain, the operational environment forward introduces more informational risks for industry, especially in gaining a ‘true’ demand picture.  New, more robust information architectures and data capture may mitigate this risk.  To properly manage flows of materiel and money across the DSN, processes and information exchanges generating flow and output metrics must be consistently defined and codified within a coherent enterprise and information architecture.    The lack of such coherence has been repeatedly cited as a key factor in the poor performance of the legacy joint supply chain[viii].

The Legacy Support Chain – why transformation is needed.

The enterprise is fragmented with local optimisation at the expense of the whole, and inadequate support chain management information[x].   The support chain performs badly compared with industry standard metrics, (see Table 1)[xi] delivers poor value for money, and lacks agility and responsiveness to the likely demand range[xii].

Comparing MoD performance to industry benchmarks
	Industry Benchmark	MoD
Demand forecast accuracy	97.8%	47%
Raw Materials and Consumables inventory cover	15 days	10.3 years
Average lead time from dispatch from industry to available for issue	3 days	23 days
Deliveries on time	98%	70%
% of inventory sent for disposal	0.3%	8%

Table 1 – MoD Supply Chain benchmarked performance (from EY Support Chain Improvement High Level Business Case dated 3 Jul 15)

But before stock flow processes can be optimised, or subjected to automation or autonomy, they must first be understood, codified and integrated in relation to other tangential processes and workflows.  For this, coherent cross-Defence Authority business strategy and operations, policy alignment and governance are imperative.  How can these be achieved in such a complex undertaking as Defence logistics?

Transformation of the Defence Logistics Enterprise

The Defence Authority (DA) for Logistics[11] has a vision of a DSN optimally using resource across the Whole Force, depending on Industry and a multi-national ‘Collective Responsibility’ approach, maximising information and technology to assure logistic support to operational commanders.  The DSN concept emphasises a mindset of collaborative working and improved information exploitation (IX) which will begin with the rapid adoption of mature technology that is, as Barrons says in his paper,  is ‘proven elsewhere, but will evolve rapidly, probably endlessly, and at pace’^[xiii] .   People, information and partnerships are three of the 6 key enablers to this programme as shown at Figure 5.

Figure 5 – DSN(T) themes (ACDS (Log Ops)

The DA’s five Objectives are[xiv]:

1. Develop the Defence Support Chain to support the delivery of a Defence Support Network.
2. Continue to develop an agile partnership with Industry in order to optimise management of End-to-End (E2E) risk and Through Life Support.
3. Embrace Collective Responsibility for operational logistic support with Allies and Coalition Partners.
4. Exploit Logistic Information Systems’ network capability to support all operations, ensure compliance and deliver effective E2E management of the Defence Inventory.
5. Drive logistics coherence across Defence.

We shall address these objectives as they relate to professionalising Defence logistic people and skills in reverse order.

The DSN architecture- driving coherence

A business architecture is a blueprint of the enterprise, providing a common understanding of the organization and is used to align strategic objectives and tactical demands[xv].   The enterprise methodology for DSN(T) is DefSCOR, a UK Defence-focused adaptation of the industry standard Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) Model.   Its three primary uses are as:

• a diagnostic tool as a basis for measuring DSN performance;
• a platform to drive transformational business change across the DSN;
• definition of the high-level information user need for DSN Information Services as they build the logistics information network.

 

 

Building the Logistics Information Network – Defence Support Network (Transformation)

The logistics information network depicted conceptually at Figure 2 is currently composed of legacy Information systems which will ‘waste out’ from 2021[14] .  It will eventually be renewed through the agile, spiral development-based Log Information Services (DSN IS) programme, which will enable information flow between DLF and DefSCOR processes as the DSN information architecture.  The DSN IS change programme will leverage Defence as a Platform (Future) (DaaP(F)) architecture in sourcing hardware and end-user services.  The DaaP initiative moves from traditional information systems acquisition and life cycle to an evolutionary information services concept.  Vertically integrated system stove-pipes with their ‘own’ data (and sometimes networks), give way to an open, flexible, environment where storage, networking, and information-processing are all provided by services.  These services are ‘composed’ into ‘applications’ using appropriate open-source tools by developers (including some working for Front Line Commands[15]).  Applications executing DefSCOR/DLF work-flows can be made available as services for other users, and be used as building blocks for other complex workflows.  One such use might be to produce network models and recognised logistics pictures for use on operations and in training.  The ISS[16] ‘system-house’ will develop, with logisticians’ advice, catalogues of logistics applications that emulate, then integrate and replace legacy information systems. The idea of DaaP is one of seamlessly adapting information services to meet DSN Key User Requirements (KUR)[17] and give E2E DSN Logistic situational awareness and access to defined metrics.  Thus the information infrastructure becomes a “platform” assuring the Operational Commander delivery of ‘Right Items, Right Condition, Right Place at Right Time’.

The axiom that logistics professionals must understand the centrality of business and information architectures in shaping their current and future operating space has never been truer.  What cannot be understood, cannot be managed.

Contracting for change

Technological advances are shifting both ends of Eccles’s bridge.  Logisticians must balance operational/technical risk against commercial and financial risk, with the advice of MoD finance and commercial professionals.  Traditional acquisition arrangements struggle to keep pace, but especially so in the field of information services, as already described.  Opportunity may lie in giving logisticians delegated license to commission incremental change in renovated contracts under spiral development.  This would require negotiation with (some might suggest direction to) the D Commercial and other stakeholders.

Developing agile partnerships with allies and industry

Embracing Collective Responsibility

Future operations will be joint and multinational, and UK policy places NATO at the heart of Defence[xvi].  Logisticians must understand the organisational and informational aspects of multinational logistics to act as lead and/or role specialist nation on behalf of the joint and combined force[xvii].   To lead effectively in planning and coordinating logistics, UK logisticians must build mutual trust and confidence with NATO partners in realistic and demanding logistics training[18].   Rather than being UK-centric, such training should be based on in NATO logistics doctrine, ways of working and information systems such as LOGFAS[19].

Recognising and understanding technological opportunity

Most successful technologies come from the commercial market.  Understanding if and how they may transfer to DSN requires informed engagement with industry.  Such transfer is easier in the strategic base, but future robust architectures may enable full logistics information exploitation in the deployed space.  Much supply chain risk comes from humans’ inability to cope with masses of data; trusted machine logic filters and aggregate data into logistics pictures and ‘what-ifs’ to accelerate and optimise human decision making.    Autonomous systems and platforms could optimise and cue tactical resupply, informed and updated by the common operational picture.  Data analytics processing demand captured from on-platform sensors could produce platform availability ‘risk pictures’ that inform local inventory modelling.  Materiel flow optimised by transportation routing and scheduling, additive manufacturing, connected components via the Internet of Things, fuel/water scavenging and reusable packaging – all potentially smooth and reduce overall demand.  The logistician’s challenge is in balancing the realistic evidence of benefits against technology readiness and costs of capability integration and support.  Engagement in horizon scanning[20] helps understand which technological readiness level might be achievable in the conceptual, future and funded force development time horizons. The challenge is having the capability and capacity to do so.

Building Recognisable Logistics Pictures

 

Logisticians need to imagine the system models that usefully represent their problem space.   The equipment range manager’s view of cross capability spend; the transportation manager’s view of physical flows and lead times; the inventory manager’s view of stock as a partial projection  of system availability;  the availability manager’s view of SUSTAT[22] mandated platform readiness – all feed into the commander’s view of actual and potential combat power.  Logisticians must engage with information services developers to deliver applications that impart such understanding.

Training and developing the Defence Logistician

For logistician trainers, the task is to develop situational understanding and decision making skills through realistically simulated individual and collective training.  Such training might take form of serious wargames in virtual[23] environments[xx] and must be sufficiently realistic to avoid teaching false lessons.  The benefits are threefold:

• enhanced speed and quality of planning outputs to sustain future warfare;
• time compressed actions enabling double-loop learning as logistics and mission systems interact adaptively;
• expert deliberate and dynamic planning and decision skills developed across the mission and logistics domains, using simulated integrated C4IS[24].

As for any capability, development of logistics information services and of simulated Training and Education (T&E) must both be agile and coherent[25][xxi].  As for logistics C4IS, logisticians must engage with learning technologies experts and developers in agile acquisition of services, rather than (legacy) obsolete systems[xxii].

Whence the deep skills?

Technical leadership can be aided by logistics deep specialists in a Whole Force staffed under the New Employment Model[26], whereby commercial and defence logistics skills can exist within the same individual.   Logisticians must be technically confident in dealing with other interested professions; such confidence is strengthened by engaged membership of professional bodies, such as CILT^[27] and study groups and conferences under NATO auspices.   Here logistics professionals across sectors share experience and insight in similar classes of problems, and technical standards are converged under industry associations such as the SC21[28] initiative.  These institutional exchanges make the UK/NATO and private/public boundaries more permeable, and provide more fertile ground for cross-pollinated ideas, relationships and trust.

Conclusion: so – how to professionalise?

The logistics professional’s cognitive base is as a planner and solver of materiel flow problems bounded by ends, ways and means, structured by technical architectures, made situationally aware through information workflows.  The quantitative aspect lies in understanding the evidence produced by dynamics to support decisions that sustain warfighters.  The qualitative aspect  lies in understanding human aims, operational context and assumptions, and using appropriate methods and tools to turn complexity and apparent chaos into tractable and solvable problems.    Such understanding demands well-designed, operational level coalition training that accommodates NATO as well as UK logistics doctrine.  Education such as the Defence Logistics Staff Course and other higher programmes accredited to professional bodies should be the default; academic study plus reflection with peers equals understanding.  New technologies will not make supply chain dynamics disappear.  They will turn them from screenshots of abstruse historical data, to near real-time views of the DSN’s probable response to commanders’ intent.

Imagination can envision, but only action delivers.  In order to compete successfully for funds and successfully lead beneficial programmes, Whole Force logisticians must understand finance, P3M[29], and how to present evidence that makes hard choices defensible.   Amateur soldiers talk tactics, professionals talk logistics[30], but Eccles reminds us that professional logisticians must also talk commerce.

Truly professional logisticians need imagination to see opportunity in constant change, intellectual capacity to manage complexity, and confidence in partnership to deliver optimal outcomes.  Whatever the technological ways and means, Defence logistics exists to enable political and military ends.   A strong cognitive base and healthy professional ethos will join Whole Force logisticians in shared higher purpose, help them work in partnership to deliver better-faster-cheaper logistics,  and inspire them never to give up in the face of difficulties.

[1] The Defence Support Network is defined as: a flexible set of supply chains connecting points of production and use, ensuring the most appropriate and efficient use of resources across the Whole Force, maximising information and technology to assure logistic support to operational commanders.(JDP 4-00 4^th Edn 4 p9 referencing  Joint Capability Concept paper, Support Network, 3 March 2010)

[2] Command and leadership skills are assumed to be peculiar to a logistician’s organisation and are not addressed in this essay

[3] The Estimate is a 7-stage decision making tool designed to deliver a course of action from a body of information.

[4] The MoD Information Strategy 2011 begins by classing Defence information as a strategic asset.

[5] Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations) – ACDS (Log Ops), who provides strategic logistics advice to the MOD Head Office and, as the Logistics Process Architect, and is charged with designing and implementing a Logistics Process that best enables military tasking and delivers through-life effectiveness and efficiency. He supports the MOD strategic staffs through the provision of logistics advice to military strategic planning and strategic command of operations (including the strategic logistics direction to current operations).

[6] Business speaks of strategic-tactical-operational and Defence transposes tactical and operational.

[7] Mission Command is a philosophy of command, with centralised intent and decentralised execution, that is particularly suitable for complex, dynamic and adversarial situations. Mission Command focuses on outcomes, as it stresses the importance of understanding what effect is to be achieved, rather than specifying the ways by which it should be achieved

[8] NATO stock number (NSN) is a 13 digit code corresponding to an inventory item – its commercial equivalent is the stock keeping unit (SKU).

[9] For static inventory modelling in the strategic base, the outputs are optimised inventory for given fleet availability against cost (using the OPUS 10 stochastic modelling tool), and optimised stock distribution across representative echelons (SIMLOX).

[10] The Sale of Inventory Purchased (SOIP) represents a crossover from business financial accounting to military materiel accounting.

[11] The DA for logistics is the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations) – ACDS (Log Ops).

[12] DefSCOR is owned by Defence Support Chain Transformation (DSCT) is a DE&S-Support Enablers Operations Centre (SEOC) programme within the wider DSN (Transformation) Programme owned by  ACDS (Log Ops).

[13] The DLF is a digital codification of the Support Chain processes formerly covered by JSP 886 (The Defence Support Chain Manual).

[14] Under the Future Logistics Information Systems (FLIS) programme managed by Lockheed-Martin.

[15] The operational capability providers of the RN, Army and RAF, who will be monitored and regulated by the Defence Authority for Logistics, ACDS (Log Ops).

[16] Information Systems and Services (ISS) is part of Joint Force Command and is the MoD lead on technical  implementation of  the MoD Information Strategy.

[17] DSN(IS) Spiral has defined 10 KURs: 1.Support Business Processes (DLF / DefSCOR); 2. Logistic Decision Support – (Management Information); 3. Materiel Management; 4. Inventory Management;  5. Asset Management;  6. Asset Tracking;  7. Movement and Transportation (M&T) Services;  8. Training;  9. User Accessibility;  10. Availability.

[18] The only UK joint and combined logistics training is the biannual Joint Logistics Operations Course (JLOC) run by the Defence College of Logistics, Personnel Administration and Guarding.   It is based at Defence Logistics School, Deepcut and at the National University of Public Service Budapest.

[19] The NATO Logistic Functional Area Services suite (LOGFAS) and it’s yet to be funded successor Logistics Functional Services  (LOGFS)  are used to support operational level decisions and present a recognised theatre logistics picture.

[20] Such as the AUS/CAN/UK/US/NZ  Technical Cooperation Program (TCCP) and their NATO equivalents.

[21] Recognised theatre logistic picture (RTLP): ‘The aggregation of logistic data on quantities, location, condition and transit status to provide a near real time disposition of logistic resources, which can be compared with rates of demand and replenishment to inform logistic planning. (JDP 0-01.1)’

[22] The Sustainability Statement (see JDP 4-00 Joint Logistics) sets the logistics parameters of commanders requirements, in output terms (e.g. stock and platform availability levels) and in process (supply chain transit times).

[23] Virtual simulation: real people in a simulated environment, using simulated equipment. (Defence Policy For Simulation (CDP/4/3DCDS (MilCap)/15/Apr/34) April 2015).

[24] Command, Control, Communications, Computer & Information Systems.

[25] ‘Simulation capability must be acquired in compliance with the Training, Education & simulation Technical Authority Rule Set’  (Defence Policy For Simulation (CDP/4/3DCDS (MilCap)/15/Apr/34) April 2015).

[26] The 2010 Strategic Defence Review recommended that a comprehensive analysis of military Terms and Conditions of Service occurred; this review became the New Employment Model Programme (NEM).

[27] CILT – the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport.

[28] SC21 is a change programme designed by |ADS|, the defence industry trade body, to accelerate the competitiveness of the aerospace & defence industry by raising the performance of its supply chains. International competition, together with the challenges posed by the defence industrial strategy, necessitates rapid improvement in the effectiveness of our supply chains. At the same time, industry must ensure that it delivers competitive solutions for customers whilst maintaining profitable business growth.

[29] P3M: Portfolio, Programme and Project Management.

[30] A well known aphorism in logistics circles: ‘Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics’.

References and Bibliography

[i] Eccles, H. E. 1959. Logistics in the National Defense, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, The Stackpole Company.

[ii] The DSN is defined as “A flexible set of supply chains connecting points of production and use” – Support Network, ACDS (Log Ops) dated 3 Mar 2010.  Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33690/JCCSUPPORTNETWORK.pdf.

[iii] ACDS (Log Ops) Logistics Proposition presentation of 27 Jan 2016:  Defence Support Network (Transformation) Information Services  (DSN(T) IS).

[iv] Van Aken, J. E. 2004. Management research based on the paradigm of the design sciences: the quest for field‐tested and grounded technological rules.   Journal of management studies, 41, 219-246.

[v] Schön, D. A. 1983. The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action, Basic books.

[vi] Larson, M. S. 1979. The rise of professionalism: A sociological analysis, Univ of California Press.

[vii] Kress, M. 2016. Operational logistics: The art and science of sustaining military operations (Second Edition), Springer.

[viii] DE&S IMOC Supply Chain Diagnostic Jun 14 – Defence Support Costs Model.

[ix]   Source: SEOC Strategy Supply Chain Diagnostic, June 2014

[x] SEOC Strategy Supply Chain Diagnostic, June 2014 referenced by Defence Support Network (Transformation) Information Services  (DSN(T) IS) presentation dated 27 Jan 16.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] ACDS Log Ops Presentation:  Support Chain Transformation 16 Jan 2016.

[xiii] MoD Paper: Barrons R (2014) ‘Warfare in the Information Age’ paper.  Comd JSC

[xiv] Defence Logistics Strategy Sep 14 p.3

[xv] Wikipedia entry:  ‘Business Architectures’ accessed 12 May 16 at

[xvi] D/CDS/3/1/5, Putting NATO at the Heart of UK Defence, 13 July 2012.

[xvii] JDP 4-00 (Fourth Edition) Logistics for Joint Operations DCDC 2016 p.22

[xviii] JDP 0-01.1, UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database.

[xix] Rouse, W.B., & Morris, N.M. (1986). On looking into the black box: Prospects and limits in the search for mental models. Psychological Bulletin, 100, 349-363. Cited in: Brown, A., Karthaus, C., Rehak, L. A. & Adams, B. (2009). The role of mental models in dynamic decision-making. DTIC Document On Behalf of Department of National Defence, Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto.

[xx] Defence Policy For Simulation (CDP/4/3DCDS (MilCap)/15/Apr/34) April 2015)

[xxi] ‘Simulation capability must be acquired in compliance with the Training, Education & simulation Technical Authority Rule Set’  (Defence Policy For Simulation (CDP/4/3DCDS (MilCap)/15/Apr/34) April 2015)

[xxii] Ibid.