On 2nd May 2024 the Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, or maybe the imminent Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey tabled the following question in the House of Commons:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when the Boxer RCH 155 Self Propelled Howitzer will enter service with the Army?
Given the U.K.’s track record in defence procurement and specifically that of the British Army, this is more than a fair question. Over the last twenty years equipment procurement for the British Army has been a catalogue of failures; from the decisions on the ill fated 155mm Extended Range Ordnance / Modular Charge System (ERO / MCS) programme at the turn of the century, through the grandiose fantasy of the Futures Rapid Effects System (FRES) with the Powerpoint inspired System of System Integrator (SOSI), onto the decision to mandate the 40mm Cased Telescope Weapon System (CTWS) before it reached maturity, which has been a key factor in the delay to the FRES Specialist Vehicle (SV) / Scout / AJAX entering service and the cancellation of the Warrior Capability and Sustainment Programme (WCSP); and onto the LE TaCIS / Morpheus C4I debacle.
In this context and given that the Remote Controlled Howitzer (RCH) 155 is a project that has been designated sole source, it is reasonable that Mr Healey, Parliament and the taxpayer should expect a better answer than the following from the Minister of Defence Procurement James Cartlidge:
RCH155 will be developed through a jointly led collaborative procurement between the UK and Germany. Working collaboratively on a joint assessment and qualification plan will exploit the combined capabilities of each nation’s test and trials centres enabling faster delivery at less cost. The certainty of platform choice also enables us to advance early acquisition of ammunition and other critical enablers in the assessment phase. Concurrently, we will continue to explore opportunities to accelerate delivery of RCH155 to the Army, where possible and in line with the new Integrated Procurement Model. The assessment phase of the programme will determine the most appropriate manufacturing approach and confirm the number of platforms required by the British Army. The Army aims to achieve a Mobile Fires Platform Minimum Deployable Capability within this decade. The joint programme is potentially worth upwards of £3 billion and marks a step change towards a deeper industrial and wider defence relationship between the UK and Germany.
So the short answer is he does not know. Remember that this is a programme that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) said would be accelerated as confirmed by the answer. Although the reason for the acceleration was not disclosed it may be because the British Army does not have a 155mm Tube Artillery Capability beyond the limited number of Archer systems that have been acquired as an ‘interim’ capability, the utility of which is questionable. Surely we are owed a better answer to the simple question posed. It would be helpful in beginning to restore confidence in the British Army and its procurement projects if the MoD and Ministers were to provide greater transparency as to why RCH 155 has been selected and of the project itself. It is unlikely that the security risks of such an approach would outweigh the benefits in public confidence. Given the non answer given by Mr Cartlidge perhaps he, or his successor, would provide more information. The following questions are by no means comprehensive, however they provide a starting point for greater clarity that would build confidence that the RCH 155 project will avoid the pitfalls of other programmes.
- Why was RCH 155 selected? Whilst it is a combination of relatively mature subsystems, it is an immature system itself compared to other available self propelled howitzers.
- What are the key risks in the programme? What reassurance can the Minister provide that the Mobile Fires Platform Minimum Deployable Capability within this decade – will be achieved? What is meant by Minimum Deployable Capability?
- What is the nature of the collaboration with Germany? International programmes have a poor record.
- What are the contract arrangements for the programme? Given that the Intellectual Property for RCH 155 resides largely in two German companies, will the contracts be placed by BAAINBw in Germany or Defence Equipment and Support in the UK? Will the programme be subject to the Single Source Pricing Regulations?
- Is ‘the combined capabilities of each nation’s test and trials centres’ the only feature of the collaboration that deliver cost and programme benefits? If so why and what is the risk that these benefits will not be delivered?
- What impact if any will the different positions of Germany and U.K. with regard to 155mm Tube Artillery have on the project? Germany has the PzH2000 and associated ammunition suite in service.
- What does – advance early acquisition of ammunition and other critical enablers in the assessment phase – mean? Will the UK and Germany be pursuing common ammunition natures for RCH 155? Will new ammunition types be qualified in the ordnance or will it be the German suite of DM121 etc.? How does the recent U.K. purchase of Modular Charges from Hanwha fit with the RCH 155 programme? What was covered by the MoD investment in BAES facilities to in expand 155mm production?
- How has the value – potentially worth upwards of £3 billion – been calculated?
- What is meant by – a step change towards a deeper industrial and wider defence relationship between the UK and Germany?
- What risk does the C4I fit represent to the project?
- Given the demand placed on a industrial capabilities such as the common ordnance manufacturing facility for the RCH 155, Challenger 3, and other contracts, what steps are the European NATO nations taking to build resilience throughout the supply chain?
These questions may be taken as negative comments on the decision to select the Mobile Fire Platform project to RCH 155. That is not the intention. RCH 155 may be an excellent choice. The project may be low risk and likely to be delivered swiftly and on time. However given the performance over the last twenty five years it is reasonable to hold the British Army to a higher standard of transparency. This would also benefit the project as given the paucity of information that has been provided there is a perception that there has been no real change in approach. It is well known what doing the same thing and expecting different outcome defines