Francis Tusa is a respected and well informed defence journalist, so his recent posting on City Forum’s Defence Eye news letter was particularly dispiriting. He reported that the business case for the British Army’s Mobile Fires Platform (MFP) had failed its Initial Gate review and would be further delayed. He also reported that the business case consisted of a proposal to buy more Archer Systems to supplement the token force that has been acquired on an urgent Government to Government basis from Sweden, and to procure the as yet to be fielded Remote Controlled Howitzer (RCH) on the Boxer platform.
We must assume that the business case¹ included a section on the ammunition for the two proposed systems. However given the configuration of the ordnance for each system two slightly different ammunition systems would be required. Although assuming that the RCH is based on the 52 calibre ordnance from the Panzer Howitzer 2000 there would be some commonality with another European system.
Given the age, availability and firing range of the AS90 and the small number of Archer it is reasonable to assume that the British Army does not have an tube artillery capability . MFP is unlikely to enter service before the end of the decade, despite Ministers assuring the public that the procurement would be accelerated.
Furthermore there is a reasonable chance that the British Army does not have a meaningful Main Battle Tank (MBT) capability. The number of Challenger 2 tanks available is uncertain and Challenger 2 has a unique ammunition system that may be have obsoescence challenges. Challenger 3 will come into service at the end of the decade and then with only 148 systems.
The British Army also lacks an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). The cancellation of the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP) in the 2021 Defence Command Paper obviously questions how the in service Warrior IFV capability will be sustained and the lack of a stabilised weapon raises survivability questions and therefore whether the systems can be deployed.
The British Army’s project to replace the BOWMAN C4I² system with a modern open system is in tatters, with the fielding of a capable system in the next three to five years improbable.
These observations on materiel only compound the risks that arise from the dwindling numbers of soldiers and the challenges of recruitment and retention. A recent media storm around the introduction of conscription to bring the Army increase the Army to 500,000 ignored the apparently obvious point that if the current force of 70,000 is not properly equipped how would a force around seven times the size engage with an adversary such as Russia?
One of the UK’s commitments to NATO is to provide an armoured division to the alliance. That commitment has not be fulfilled for the last decade and on the current trajectory it will not be met until the turn of next decade at the earliest. In the event that Russian aggression continues for the next five years drawing NATO forces into conflict, what contribution will the British Army make? If it cannot fulfil that commitment what is the purpose of the Army?
The presentation to the public is that the UK is a mainstay of NATO. It is reasonable to assume that there is an expectation from the taxpayer³, fuelled by the defence establishment via a willing media, that UK forces will play a substantial role in any NATO response to Russian aggression. Given that there is an imminent election in the UK, now would be a good time to explain to the electorate how that expectation would be met, particularly by the Army.
I accept that this post is based on information that is in the public domain and I may be missing a grand strategy. However I suggest that if there is a plan it is time to place it in the public domain not only to deter the enemy, but also to inform the taxpayer.