Ukraine Conflict Update – March 30

Ukraine Conflict Update – March 30

Military and hard security developments

• UK defence intelligence stated on 30 March that Russian units that have suffered heavy losses around Kyiv have been forced to return to Belarus and Russia to reorganise and resupply, but will likely compensate for reduced manoeuvre capability by employing mass artillery and missile strikes. While the Pentagon has furthermore confirmed that “small numbers” of Russian forces have begun moving away from Kyiv over the last 24-48 hours, they cautioned that they believe that it is “a repositioning, not a real withdrawal”, and that “we should not be deceived” by Russian claims of a de-escalation in the region. The threat to Kyiv remains acute given the vast majority of Russian forces arrayed around the capital remain in place. Indeed, artillery bombardments also continued overnight in Chernihiv, leading the governor of Chernihiv oblast to state this morning that he sees no signs of a drawing down of Russian operations despite their pledge to do so yesterday.
• Russian Refit and Reequipping. Russia forces in Ukraine have very old equipment which needs replacing. The reported 10 year Reequipment Programme of the Russian forces was only partially successful which has caused problems on the battlefield and l0gistic problems. In addition Sanctions have caused component supply problems at  a number of factories including the key tank plant.
• Russian withdrawal from Kyiv and Cherniev following yesterday’s announcement is reported as marginal with sources suggesting that this is more of  a realignment than a tactical withdrawal. Cherniev is being fortified and attacks have restarted against Lviv. Mariupol centre is under Russian control with the town being seen as a key asset to the area given the huge steel works.
• China’s stance on Ukraine has not changed with observers seeing that its stance as a Cold War problem generated by the West remain; they require a peaceful solution.
• 25% of the Ukrainian population have now been displaced with 4 million refugees and 6 million displaced internally.
• Reports of Ukraine firing into Russian territory destroying a Russian ammunition plant appear overdone with suggestions being that tis was caused by an internal Russian accident.
• Odesa is deemed as being safe for now  given that the beach is now mined and the approach to the beaches by an amphibious force would be hampered by limited landing sites.
• OSINT from pro-Ukrainian telegram channels showed Russian boats operating near the Antonov Bridge on 29 March in the occupied town of Kherson, potentially indicating engineers are prepping the bridge with explosives. Ukrainian counterattacks and Russia’s stalling advance has meant Russian forces have fallen back from Mykoliav towards Kherson in recent weeks. Given that Russian operations are now officially refocusing on the Donbas, this could indicate Russian forces are moving to the defensive in key areas, including in the south-western direction, and preparing to hold the ground already captured, including protecting the principal crossing across the Dnieper in Kherson.
• Nevertheless, fighting remains heavy in the Donbas, where Russian forces are expected to receive reinforcements in the coming days and weeks from other axes of attack, including Eastern Military District units that had been deployed around Kyiv. Nevertheless, artillery bombardments and long-range missile strikes will remain likely across the full length of the country, as a strike on a fuel depot Khmelnitsky overnight illustrated.

Diplomatic and strategic developments

• On 29 March, the US State Department issued a warning that Moscow “may single out and detain US citizens in Russia”, reiterating its previous advice against travelling to Russia and to leave the country “immediately.” The announcement follows Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s confirmation yesterday that Russia was preparing measures to restrict entry into the country for nationals of “unfriendly” states, including the UK, EU member states and the US. The development also furthermore underlines the higher-than-usual risk of arbitrary detentions and targeting of western personnel.
• Numerous European Union member states have today, 30 March, expelled Russian diplomats suspected of being intelligence agents. Belgium is expelling 21 Russian diplomats from their embassy in Brussels, the Netherlands 17, four from Ireland and one from the Czech Republic. The moves are just the latest in a series of diplomatic expulsions involving Russian embassies in recent months, and it remains highly likely that reciprocal expulsions will take place in Moscow.
• Much uncertainty remains around the incident, but Moscow could look to blame Ukraine for the suspected poisonings given previous rhetoric and accusations that Ukraine has developed chemical and biological weapons. Russian security forces nevertheless have a clear track record in utilising chemical agents in assassination attempts, most notably the Novichok poisonings in Salisbury in 2018, and more recently the poisoning of Alexei Navalny in 2020. As such, it remains much more likely that Russian operatives were responsible – if indeed the symptoms were caused by a deliberate chemical weapon, rather than environmental issues as has also been posited. Nevertheless, the fact that Russian envoy Abramovich, engaging in negotiations as a direct conduit to President Putin, also experienced symptoms could provide Moscow with plausible deniability and blame Ukrainian radicals for the poisoning. This could potentially be exploited by Moscow and play into efforts to “justify” chemical weapons use in Ukraine, which remains a key escalation trigger following US President Joe Biden’s pledge that NATO would “respond” to such weapons use. Ultimately, however, the cause of the symptoms remains unclear and unconfirmed, but this will threaten to undermine perceptions that the peace negotiations are being conducted in good faith nevertheless.
• Amid the unfolding war in Ukraine, tensions in the Southern Caucasus have risen significantly in recent days. On 27 March Russia accused Azerbaijani forces of violating the ceasefire which ended the 2020 Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russia retains a peacekeeping force. While Russia maintains that it has redeployed peacekeepers in the area and that Azerbaijani troops subsequently left the village of Farrukh/Parukh, both Baku and Yerevan reject this amid numerous conflicting accounts coming from Baku, Moscow and Yerevan. Armenia has in fact called on Russia to remove Azerbaijani troops from the area. While the situation on the ground currently remains unclear, the current spike in tensions reflects worsening relations between Azerbaijan and Russia, with the former taking a relatively pro-Ukrainian line since the invasion.

Economic/business environment developments

• On 30 March the German government activated the first phase of an emergency energy plan amid growing concerns that Russia could cut off supplies of natural gas. The first of three phases will involve intense monitoring of gas consumption and reserves, while the final third phase would see the government take over management of available energy stocks. The move is precautionary at this stage, however, the Kremlin’s demand that energy payments be made in rubles – which Germany and the wider G7 have rejected – threatens to result in disruptions to energy flows after the 31 March deadline for the switch to ruble payments. The German Economy Minister Robert Habeck has stated that German energy supplies are currently secure, with the country’s gas storage facilities 25% full. However, if Moscow reduces or terminates gas exports, energy prices will increase once again across Europe and drive shortages which could impact industrial and commercial operations in the short term.
• At a UN Security Council session on 29 March dedicated to the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, Russia was accused of causing a global food crisis that has increased the risk of famine around the world. The director of the World Food Program (WFP) stated that Ukraine and Russia together represent 30% of the world’s wheat exports, 20% of corn and 75% of sunflower oil, while the US Deputy Secretary of State stated that the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine is preventing around 94 ships with food aboard from reaching the Mediterranean. As sowing season approaches in Ukraine, the war will have a profound impact on worsening food insecurity across the planet.
• However, senior Russian lawmaker Vyacheslav Volodin stated on 30 March that ruble payments should be extended to grain, fertiliser, timber, oil and metals exports to the EU, underlining the risk of the ruble payment dispute also spilling over to food and agricultural exports, which would further exacerbate the issue. If the Kremlin moves forward with such proposals, this will raise the possibility of wider disruptions to extractive sector exports to countries that refuse to pay in rubles, which would threaten already pressured supply chains reliant upon various commodities, including palladium, nickel and oil.

Humanitarian/evacuation developments

• The safest route for departure from Kyiv as of 30 March remains the H01/P01. For routes to western Ukraine, we recommend following the H01/P01 southbound until connecting with the westbound P32. On 28 March, RU forces have begun a series of attacks along the north-western and eastern perimeter of Kyiv, and thus we reiterate past advisories that the westbound E373 and E40. While Russian ground troops have been pushed back, the south-west E95 and the P04 remain unsafe as well considering that they are within range Russian artillery.
• SOCMINT indicates ad-hoc checkpoints and stop-and-search checks by Ukrainian rear echelon units continue to take place on the P02, P69, M07 circular and H01/P01 in Kyiv. These are likely conducted in order to identify potential Russian fifth columnists/saboteurs, and Ukrainian units conducting these checks are believed to be operating on capture/kill orders. As such, those seeking to leave/enter Kyiv should treat such checks with due caution. Finally, Russian forces will likely continue their indiscriminate attacks on private vehicles on westbound routes into Kyiv, highlighting the severe risk to life posed by travelling on westbound routes to and from Kyiv at present.
• For routes toward western Ukraine, the P32 westbound from Bila Tserkva currently remains the safest major westbound road out of Kyiv. However, shelling in Vinnytsia, Vasylkiv and Fastiv remains an ongoing threat, and air raid warnings across the length of the P32 – notably in Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv – highlights the increasing spread of the conflict into western Ukraine, particularly following the strike against a fuel depot in Lviv on 27 March. Therefore, safety cannot be guaranteed on any westbound evacuation routes at present.
• The advance around Kyiv remains largely stalled at the time of writing, with Russian land forces regrouping east of Kyiv. We assess that the southwest of the city remains highly unsafe, and that the areas of Fastiv, Obukhiv and Byshev Airport on the westbound P04 represent viable targets for Russian forces.

FORECAST

Following the Kremlin’s announcement that Russian military operations will draw down around Kyiv and Chernihiv, President Volodymyr Zelensky joined Western leaders in expressing his scepticism on pledges to de-escalate to facilitate talks. The fact that bombardments unsurprisingly continued overnight in northwest Kyiv and Chernihiv underline our assessment that such an overture was most likely designed to justify military redeployments rather than facilitate meaningful trust building as was claimed.

Indeed, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov today, 30 March, downplayed the recent peace talks, stating that the negotiations offered no breakthroughs and denying anything “very promising” had been proposed by the Ukrainians. In particular, Peskov placed emphasis on the issue of Crimea, referring to Kyiv’s proposed 15-year consultation period on the region’s status, maintaining that it is a part of Russia and constitutionally is not up for discussion. As such, both sides clearly remain far apart on numerous issues, with the notable absence of any mention of the Donbas in the Ukrainian proposals and Zelensky’s stance that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is not up for debate indicating that a peace agreement is still a remote prospect at present.

However, the fact that the first written proposals were issued does indicate procedural progress if nothing concrete, and further meetings in Turkey or elsewhere in the coming weeks will likely see new proposals put forward that will aim to move closer to a compromise. Nevertheless, it remains our assessment that both sides believe they have advantages to gain on the battlefield, and as such the situation on the ground will determine the pace of negotiations to a large extent, particularly as Russian forces have yet to secure any significant political objectives in Ukraine.

• Heavy artillery use occurred northwest of Kyiv overnight, with both sides exchanging fire principally in the vicinity of Gostomel airport. Shelling also continued on Chernihiv and the adjacent encircled city of Nizhyn.
• The shelling occurred despite Russia’s pledge at the peace negotiations in Turkey to reduce military operations in these areas as an act of “goodwill”. The continuation of fighting is not surprising; the Russian pledge is a reflection of existing military realities and the need now to focus effort on the Donbas, rather than any worthier cause. Moreover, Ukrainian forces are particularly likely to continue the counter-attacks of recent days in order to try to take advantage of Russian weakness as troops rotate out for replacement. This will continue to lead to heavy fighting, particularly west of Kyiv.
• Of note, Russian UAV operations continue over Kyiv, with artillery and air defence remaining priority targets. This pattern will not likely change, and both Kyiv and Chernihiv/Nizhyn will remain under artillery fire. The situation in the latter cities is significantly worsening due to lack of food, water, and power, coupled with tighter Russian encirclement.
• Troops are nonetheless most certainly being rotated out of these areas, with VDV (airborne) forces pictured entraining in Gomel, Belarus. These are most likely part of the group that had already been withdrawn into reserve in the 35th Combined Arms Army salient north-west of Kyiv a week or so ago. As some of the Kremlin’s best assault troops, and still very capable despite heavy losses around Gostomel, it is likely that they are being replaced by “line” infantry in increasingly fortified positions to hold the area near the capital; this will allow security for further artillery strikes, maintaining pressure on Kyiv.
• The VDV will almost certainly be redeployed to Donbas, and are likely to form part of any infantry assault on Severodonetsk and the various Ukrainian-held cities in the northern part of Donetsk oblast, centred on Kramatorsk. This continues to be the area where Russia is making the most progress, albeit this remains slow, hard fighting in congested terrain, with progress measured in at most a kilometre or so a day on each axis.
• In Donbas, the towns of Avdiivka and Maryinka, north and west of Donetsk respectively, continued to see heavy bombardment. A Russian/Donetsk separatist 1st Army Corps assault continues to develop towards Toretsk, with several more villages reportedly being taken north of Donetsk from the direction of Horlivka. Further development of this axis will require clearance of several urban areas, and so will be a slow operation if that route is chosen towards the regional hub of Kramatorsk. The more likely intention is to cut off Ukrainian defenders north of Donetsk, prompting a wider withdrawal and allowing a wider advance by Russian forces from the city.
• Russia meanwhile continues slowly to gain ground south of Izyum, where there are several crossings over the Donets river, and further forces are likely to be committed in this area this week. Several units are currently assessed to be in the process of moving to Izyum from the failed 1st Guards Tank Army offensive near Sumy, and these may be joined by more forces from around Kyiv in due course.
• Operations have continued around Mariupol, with the centre now largely captured, and attention now focusing on the Azovstal plant on the eastern side of the river mouth. Pockets of resistance also remain north and south of the city centre, and heavy fighting will continue at least through this week, with resistance of some form being likely to be maintained for an extended period.
• Despite expectations of a Ukrainian assault, fighting between Mykolaiv and Kherson remains stalled. Russian engineers have been pictured examining the main bridge over the Dnieper in Kherson, which has raised concerns that it is being scheduled for demolition. Although possible in due course, it is more likely that this was a preliminary reconnaissance or potentially a counter-espionage check.
• Strategic strikes have continued, with the airfield at Starostyantyniv being struck with Kalibr cruise missiles overnight, while an oil depot was struck in Khmelnitsky. Two missiles were also launched towards Lviv but were reportedly destroyed by Ukrainian integrated air defences in the western region.
• Finally, a major fire and explosion at an arms depot near Belgorod overnight has been variously attributed to a Ukrainian strike, and “human error”. The latter would also underscore the ammunition handling failure that possibly led to the loss of the Alligator-class landing vessel in Berdyansk last week. Such incidents are not uncommon in Russia, but this is nonetheless an embarrassing setback that will further hinder the already failing operations north of Kharkiv. While artillery attacks there will continue, this may help to lower the tempo, as will the withdrawal of forces between the city and Sumy in order to prioritise on Donbas.
• We expect the next 24 hours to follow the pattern established in the last week, although fighting will gradually escalate in Donbas – especially from early April, as further Russian forces are committed to the region. The (final) fall of Mariupol will allow additional Russian forces to be freed up, but on its own will not suffice to enable a decisive breakthrough. We are therefore particularly watching for signs of where forces rotating from Kyiv are being fed into the conflict in Donbas, as this will likely signify the main Russian effort. Meanwhile, pressure will be maintained on Kyiv and Chernihiv, despite pledges, with the latter being a major focus of starvation efforts.
• Heavy artillery use occurred northwest of Kyiv overnight, with both sides exchanging fire principally in the vicinity of Gostomel airport. Shelling also continued on Chernihiv and the adjacent encircled city of Nizhyn.
• The shelling occurred despite Russia’s pledge at the peace negotiations in Turkey to reduce military operations in these areas as an act of “goodwill”. The continuation of fighting is not surprising; the Russian pledge is a reflection of existing military realities and the need now to focus effort on the Donbas, rather than any worthier cause. Moreover, Ukrainian forces are particularly likely to continue the counter-attacks of recent days in order to try to take advantage of Russian weakness as troops rotate out for replacement. This will continue to lead to heavy fighting, particularly west of Kyiv.
• Of note, Russian UAV operations continue over Kyiv, with artillery and air defence remaining priority targets. This pattern will not likely change, and both Kyiv and Chernihiv/Nizhyn will remain under artillery fire. The situation in the latter cities is significantly worsening due to lack of food, water, and power, coupled with tighter Russian encirclement.
• Troops are nonetheless most certainly being rotated out of these areas, with VDV (airborne) forces pictured entraining in Gomel, Belarus. These are most likely part of the group that had already been withdrawn into reserve in the 35th Combined Arms Army salient north-west of Kyiv a week or so ago. As some of the Kremlin’s best assault troops, and still very capable despite heavy losses around Gostomel, it is likely that they are being replaced by “line” infantry in increasingly fortified positions to hold the area near the capital; this will allow security for further artillery strikes, maintaining pressure on Kyiv.
• The VDV will almost certainly be redeployed to Donbas, and are likely to form part of any infantry assault on Severodonetsk and the various Ukrainian-held cities in the northern part of Donetsk oblast, centred on Kramatorsk. This continues to be the area where Russia is making the most progress, albeit this remains slow, hard fighting in congested terrain, with progress measured in at most a kilometre or so a day on each axis.
• In Donbas, the towns of Avdiivka and Maryinka, north and west of Donetsk respectively, continued to see heavy bombardment. A Russian/Donetsk separatist 1st Army Corps assault continues to develop towards Toretsk, with several more villages reportedly being taken north of Donetsk from the direction of Horlivka. Further development of this axis will require clearance of several urban areas, and so will be a slow operation if that route is chosen towards the regional hub of Kramatorsk. The more likely intention is to cut off Ukrainian defenders north of Donetsk, prompting a wider withdrawal and allowing a wider advance by Russian forces from the city.
• Russia meanwhile continues slowly to gain ground south of Izyum, where there are several crossings over the Donets river, and further forces are likely to be committed in this area this week. Several units are currently assessed to be in the process of moving to Izyum from the failed 1st Guards Tank Army offensive near Sumy, and these may be joined by more forces from around Kyiv in due course.
• Operations have continued around Mariupol, with the centre now largely captured, and attention now focusing on the Azovstal plant on the eastern side of the river mouth. Pockets of resistance also remain north and south of the city centre, and heavy fighting will continue at least through this week, with resistance of some form being likely to be maintained for an extended period.
• Despite expectations of a Ukrainian assault, fighting between Mykolaiv and Kherson remains stalled. Russian engineers have been pictured examining the main bridge over the Dnieper in Kherson, which has raised concerns that it is being scheduled for demolition. Although possible in due course, it is more likely that this was a preliminary reconnaissance or potentially a counter-espionage check.
• Strategic strikes have continued, with the airfield at Starostyantyniv being struck with Kalibr cruise missiles overnight, while an oil depot was struck in Khmelnitsky. Two missiles were also launched towards Lviv but were reportedly destroyed by Ukrainian integrated air defences in the western region.
• Finally, a major fire and explosion at an arms depot near Belgorod overnight has been variously attributed to a Ukrainian strike, and “human error”. The latter would also underscore the ammunition handling failure that possibly led to the loss of the Alligator-class landing vessel in Berdyansk last week. Such incidents are not uncommon in Russia, but this is nonetheless an embarrassing setback that will further hinder the already failing operations north of Kharkiv. While artillery attacks there will continue, this may help to lower the tempo, as will the withdrawal of forces between the city and Sumy in order to prioritise on Donbas.
• We expect the next 24 hours to follow the pattern established in the last week, although fighting will gradually escalate in Donbas – especially from early April, as further Russian forces are committed to the region. The (final) fall of Mariupol will allow additional Russian forces to be freed up, but on its own will not suffice to enable a decisive breakthrough. We are therefore particularly watching for signs of where forces rotating from Kyiv are being fed into the conflict in Donbas, as this will likely signify the main Russian effort. Meanwhile, pressure will be maintained on Kyiv and Chernihiv, despite pledges, with the latter being a major focus of starvation efforts.
• Russia: US State Department travel advisory underscores heightened arbitrary arrest threat to US citizens. On 29 March, the US State Department issued a travel advisory warning that Moscow “may single out and detain US individuals” in the country. Meanwhile, sanctions on Moscow and countersanctions have restricted the ability of US credit and bank cardholders to make financial transactions, in addition to severely limiting inbound and outbound commercial flights. As such, the advisory repeated calls for Americans to avoid travel to the country, while urging citizens remaining in Russia to leave “immediately”. The advisory comes days after a US diplomat visited basketball athlete Brittney Griner, detained in Russia on 17 February on charges of carrying cannabis vape oil cartridges in her luggage. The arrest took place amid a severe deterioration in bilateral relations ahead of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, which began one week later. Consequently, the State Department advisory underscores the elevated threat of arbitrary arrest and detention to US citizens and travellers in Russia.

US: Russian retaliatory cyber attacks against US critical infrastructure to pose long-term threat as tensions over the Ukraine conflict remain high 

On 29 March, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned that US organisations’ uninterruptible power supply (UPS) devices are being targeted in an ongoing cyber campaign. UPS are internet-connected devices used by mission-critical organisations – such as server rooms or hospitals – as emergency backup power generators. While the aim of this campaign is unclear, the 2015 Russian cyber attack against Ukraine’s electrical grid underscores the severe impact UPS-related attacks can have. Russian hackers launched multiple attacks against the UPS systems supporting Ukraine’s power grid – such as control rooms – and communication lines to prevent system operators from coordinating a robust response to their main attack, which resulted in power outages of 1-6 hours across Ukraine. There is currently no indication that such an attack is being planned. Nevertheless, US federal agencies have warned in recent weeks that Russian hackers are continuously scanning US organisations’ networks for vulnerabilities, indicating a potential plot to launch retaliatory cyber attacks against the US over Ukraine. With tensions related to the Ukraine conflict unlikely to abate, there will remain an elevated risk of UPS devices being used in multi-step cyber attacks to disrupt US critical infrastructure operators, such as those in energy-related sectors.

UK: Growing concerns over retaliatory Russian cyber attacks will further heighten the challenging operating environment in the West for firms with alleged links to Moscow

On 29 March, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) warned that there is a risk of Russian firms being pressured by the Russian government to help them launch cyber attacks against the West through their commercial products and services. While the NCSC said that there is no evidence to indicate such attacks are imminent, they also claimed “it would be prudent to plan for the possibility” due to these firms’ legal obligation to assist the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). This alert is indicative of the German Federal Office for Information Security’s (BSI) early March warning that Russian cyber security firm Kaspersky’s antivirus products could be used by Russian hackers to engage in malicious cyber activity against EU or NATO-based countries. With Western governments’ concerns over retaliatory Russian cyber attacks related to the Ukraine conflict likely to continue to intensify, further regulatory scrutiny of Russian firms is expected. Related actions taken against these organisations – such as Washington’s 25 March blacklisting of Kaspersky – will further heighten the challenging operating environment firms with perceived links to Moscow will face in the West in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

 

 

 

30 Mar 22. Truckmaker MAN furloughs 11,000 staff as Ukrainian supplies run dry. German group points to “massive” shortage of wiring harnesses manufactured in war-hit country. While some vehicles can be built without certain chips, it is usually impossible to begin constructing a car or truck without wiring harnesses. MAN, the German truckmaker, has been forced to furlough about 11,000 employees after the war in Ukraine led to a “massive” shortage of wiring harnesses supplied by factories in the country. The group, which is owned by Volkswagen, disclosed that plants in Munich and Krakow had been shut since March 14, and production had been cut back at three other sites, including its engine factory in Nuremberg. “Suppliers of truck wiring harnesses are unable to produce at their Ukrainian sites, or only to a very limited extent,” MAN said on Wednesday. “This will result in the threat of a truck production outage lasting several weeks and a significant reduction in production in the second quarter.” Workers will be put on so-called short-time work schemes, which will see them compensated for 80 per cent of the lost income caused by cancelled shifts through a mix of support from the government and MAN itself. Shutdowns from Ukraine’s harness factories have already forced both Volkswagen and BMW to cancel shifts or close plants for brief periods. Despite shutting down after the initial invasion, most of Ukraine’s harness plants, which are located in the west of the country, have reopened, with staff keen to return to work, according to managers at several companies with facilities in the country. Leoni, which owns two sites on the west of Ukraine, said last week that both its factories were running again. (Source: FT.com)

 

30 Mar 22. Sanctions against Russia will affect arms sales to Africa: the risks and opportunities. Following its invasion of Ukraine, countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) imposed comprehensive sanctions on Russia in a bid to cripple its ability to participate meaningfully in the global economy. These included exclusion from the Bank for International Settlements, including SWIFT which facilitates cross-border money transfers messaging.

The wide-ranging sanctions could have serious implications for Africa. Importantly, they could affect the continent’s ability to procure and maintain military hardware from Russia.

Almost half of Africa’s imports of military equipment (49%) come from Russia. These include major arms (battle tanks, warships, fighter aircraft and combat helicopters) and small arms (pistols and assault rifles such as the new Kalashnikov AK-200 series rifle).

By comparison, China accounts for 13% of the continent’s arms imports.

The biggest buyers of armaments from Russia – and most long-standing importers – are Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco and Uganda.

Egypt and Algeria are in the top ten list of major importers in the world. Egypt accounts for 5.8% of arms imports globally, and Algeria for 4.3%. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute yearbook 2021, the global arms trade in 2019 alone was estimated at US$118 billion.

Russia, along with the four largest exporters of major arms to the continent – the US France, Germany, and China – accounted for 76% of major arms exports between 2016-20.

Russia commanded 20% of the market share in Africa, second only to the US (37%). France accounted for 8.2%, Germany 5.5% and China 5.2%.

At 7.3% Africa is not a significant importer of major arms compared to Asia and Oceania (42%), Middle East (33%) and Europe (12%).

Russia has capitalised its close ties with many African countries based on its historical links with the continent since the days of the Soviet Union. This has enabled it to negotiate arms deals with relative ease. In addition, its pricing structure and lack of political conditionalities, such as human rights sensitivities, make its arms sales attractive and affordable.

Russia’s suspension from global financial systems will disrupt these sales. This presents both risks and opportunities for the continent. The risks include insecurity of supply of essential spares, disruption of the operational and training plans for the defence forces that are using Russian equipment, and high cost of sustaining equipment already deployed in operations.

But the prevailing situation also presents an opportunity for African countries to turn to their own defence industry capabilities to fill the gap.

Implications for the defence industry

The sanctions have a few practical defence industry implications for African countries.

The first is that current orders of military hardware from Russia can no longer be fulfilled.

The second is that repairing, maintaining or overhauling existing Russian-made hardware will be hard, if not impossible. This is because essential spares, tools and certification cannot be provided.

Linked to this is the fact that specialists from the Original Equipment Manufacturers, which are the original designers, developers and manufacturers of the military equipment concerned, will not be able to fly from Russia to support the equipment.

Third, contractual obligations, including financial and performance obligations, won’t be able to be fulfilled. This implies that neither Russia nor African countries could be held liable for breaching contracts, as it is impossible to perform, even if they wanted to.

Fourth, the void created by Russia’s suspension from global trade will have to be filled by alternative suppliers.

African countries will have to search for capable defence industry players that can conduct maintenance, repair and overhaul operations on their existing hardware.

And there will also be arms suppliers making themselves available to African countries to help with new and existing hardware.

In the past Russia has been astute in filling the void left by western countries. It did this in 2013 when the US cut off military aid and arms to Egypt after the military staged a coup. Suppliers such as Russia and France were happy to fill the gap.

Similarly, in 2014 when the US cancelled a contract for fighter helicopters with Nigeria over human rights violations Russia stepped in to supply the country with Mi-35M attack helicopters.

Lastly, the disruption in the supply value chain due to the sanctions could facilitate and promote a huge black market in arms transfers. This may be difficult to reverse even after the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

As African countries cease to transact openly with Russia on defence hardware and services, the black market is likely to flourish. This would reverse the gains made by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs’ Programme of Action and the African Union’s strategy on illicit arms transfers.

Many small and light weapons, such as the NATO-standard M16 and M4 assault rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, and pistols, flooded the black market after the withdrawal of the US from Iraq and Afghanistan.

There’s a real danger of black market arms transactions, involving both state and non-state actors, becoming entrenched on the continent.

What can be done?

The demand for military hardware and services will continue despite the exit or suspension of Russia’s participation. This presents an ideal opportunity for African countries to consolidate and align their defence industry capabilities for sustainability. Through collaboration, defence industry companies in Africa will be able to retain skilled workforces (engineers and technicians), invest in research and development and remain competitive in the global marketplace.

Russian-made equipment can still be maintained and supported by indigenous African defence industry experts. Countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria and Algeria have credible local defence industries that, collectively, could manage to fill the void left by Russia.

It may also be advisable to engage Russia, through diplomatic channels, for the transfer of maintenance contracts to African defence industry companies. For instance, there are at least 80 Russian-made MiG-29 fighter jets in Algeria, Chad, Eritrea and Sudan, while Egypt has at least 46 of the upgraded variants of the same aircraft. These aircraft and other military hardware for the land and sea capabilities require reliable maintenance service providers, preferably located in Africa.

Being members of the African Union, it will be much easier to address contractual challenges from within the continental body than when confronted by restrictions that may be imposed from outside the continent.

The comprehensive sanctions imposed on Russia are likely to last beyond the current conflict. This implies that what may be regarded as ‘interim measures’ to fill a temporary void may end up being a long-lasting solution to Africa’s desire to produce its own military hardware for its own use, and also to reduce reliance on external suppliers.

African countries should therefore make a concerted effort to look towards defence companies on the continent for support. The African Union and South Africa, in particular, given its BRICS link, should play a central role in driving such a campaign.

Written by Moses B Khanyile, Director: Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University.

Republished with permission from The Conversation. The original article can be found here: https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038 (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

16 Mar 22. Ukraine conflict: Procurement of Russian aircraft at risk in South and Southeast Asia. South Asian and Southeast Asian countries are regarded by Moscow as key defence markets for its military aircraft, with Russian Mil military helicopters and Sukhoi fighter aircraft in use in the region, building upon some major defence co-operation agreements consolidated in the past decade. However, the conflict in Ukraine is likely to adversely affect Russia’s position as military aircraft supplier particularly in South Asia and Southeast Asia, where it is also a key economic partner for the supply of oil, gas, and raw materials. As sanctions are imposed on Moscow by the US and its NATO partners and allied countries, Russia’s ability to meet existing commitments and future regional defence requirements will likely be hampered. This includes demand for maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) services, and spare parts to support existing fleets of Russian aircraft and helicopters in the region. Janes Markets Forecast data shows that the military aircraft market in South and Southeast Asia in 2022–31 will reach USD136.7bin, with uncontracted opportunities for new aircraft and upgrades of existing fleets forecast at about USD64.5bn. (Source: Janes)

 

30 Mar 22. Ukraine troops upbeat on repelling Russia’s assault. Commander says confidence growing as outer circle of Kyiv’s defences is widened. Artillery fire boomed a short distance away as Colonel-General Oleksander Syrsky took time to award medals to a dozen or so Ukrainian soldiers to reward them for their role in defending Kyiv. Tuesday’s ceremony took place more than 10km outside the capital in trenches freshly dug by Ukrainian troops as they resist Russian forces. Conducted while journalists toured the positions, it underlined Ukraine’s growing confidence in being able not just to resist Moscow’s stalled invasion but to move Vladimir Putin’s troops farther away from the capital. “This is the general trend and our strategy, to maximally increase the outer circle of defences around Kyiv,” Syrsky, the commander of Kyiv’s defences, told the Financial Times in an interview. Ukrainian troops guarding the new frontline position, near a pine forest, said they were wearing sneakers so that their army-issued boots did not make their feet too warm on an early spring day. “We have dug into our new positions . . . we will only advance,” said one of the soldiers, who gave his name as Serhiy. The position, which protected access towards a key road into Kyiv, could not be revealed for security reasons. But it was close enough to Irpin and Bucha — two bombed-out suburbs north-west of Kyiv, which Russian and Ukrainian forces have battled over for weeks — to feel the ground trembling. Syrsky confirmed reports that Irpin, the suburb on Kyiv’s north-west outskirts — which Russian troops had pinpointed as a gateway into the city from the north — “is 95 per cent under our control”. “This was achieved in the last several days. There were fierce battles,” he said with a cool stare. (Source: FT.com)

 

28 Mar 22. Why did Nato enlarge? ‘Nato’ was a little-talked-about acronym in 2021. In fact, for decades it has hardly been the go-to topic of dinner table conversation. This year, however, the noun seems to be on everyone’s lips, thanks to one Vladimir Putin.

“You promised us in the 1990s that [Nato] would not move an inch to the East. You cheated us shamelessly,” he said at a news conference in December. Since then, Putin has tirelessly invoked ‘Nato aggression’ as one of the reasons – if not the main reason – for his ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

So, what is Nato and why has it expanded so much over the past 30 years?

Is Nato more than just an anti-Soviet pact?

Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) is an intergovernmental military alliance among the US, Canada and 28 European countries – but it was not always this large.

In fact, when Nato was first conceived in 1949 there were just 12 members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US.

Born in the aftermath of the Second World War and the early stages of the Cold War, Nato had three clear and interrelated aims: “To keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” as Stanley Ismay, Nato’s first secretary-general, famously put it.

Keeping the ‘Russian out’ referred to the US’s pillar of Cold War foreign policy: containment. First laid out in 1947, it stated that communism needed to be contained and isolated, or else it would spread to neighbouring countries. Strong military alliances such as Nato were essential to this since an attack against one of its members is considered as an attack against all – the principle of collective defence.

Keeping the ‘Americans in’ related to post-war fears that the US would pull out of western Europe, so to speak, rather than providing the fragile region with the military assurances it so needed – much as it also relied on US money for its economic recovery (through the 1948 Marshall Plan).

Without US military support, it was feared that war-ravaged western Europe could not present the necessary force to deter potential Soviet aggression, or for that matter, keep ‘the Germans down’ too. Although the Nazis had been defeated, fears of revanchism were very real since, just a decade earlier, a Germany defeated in the First World War had rapidly revived its military might. Through Nato, West Germany’s rearmament could be managed by, and bound into, the West (which is why the country joined the pact in 1955).

In short, Nato’s original raison d’être must be understood in the context of both the Cold War and the Second World War, the Soviet Union and Germany. It is not all about Russia.

How did Nato outlast the Cold War?

It is important to remember that the Soviet Union had its own version of Nato, known as the Warsaw Pact, which was founded in 1955. However, when the Cold War came to an end in 1991, the bloc was dissolved. So why wasn’t Nato also disbanded? The answer is a simple one: Germany.

Following the fall of the Berlin War in 1989, the almighty and contentious question of German reunification arose. With the shadow of the Second World War still looming large, many on both sides of the Iron Curtain were deeply worried by the thought of an empowered Germany. One of the staunchest opponents was then UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who in 1990 famously described the idea of unification as “historical nonsense”.

However, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s final leader, was more afraid of a neutral Germany, belonging nowhere, than a unified German state that could be anchored in the EU and Nato, explains Professor Kristina Spohr, deputy head of the international history department at the London School of Economics.

“So, as the Soviet Union began dissolving, even Russia wanted Nato to stay intact so it could manage Germany and prevent it from being a loose agent in Europe,” she says. “At that time, many politicians still really feared the rise of a Fourth Reich.”

As a result, the 2+4 treaty was signed in 1990, paving the way for a unified Germany that would be integrated into Nato.

Although the document made no mention of future Nato enlargement east of Germany, the Russian narrative in subsequent years and decades would claim that Gorbachev accepted the treaty with the tacit promise that there would be no Nato enlargement – this was the “spirit of the treaty” as Boris Yeltsin, post-Soviet Russia’s first president, would describe it in 1993. Here lies the genesis of Putin’s “you cheated us shamelessly” allegation.

“But no binding promises were made about non-enlargement,” says Spohr. “What is in the treaty is in the treaty. You cannot start talking about a ‘spirit’. That’s not practical. Nevertheless, this moment began the seed of betrayal in Russia’s narrative, something that just got bigger and bigger over the decades.”

During the preliminary talks for the 2+4 treaty, the US secretary of state at the time, James Baker, did indeed tell the Russians that Nato would not expand “one inch eastward”. However, these now much-quoted words have, in subsequent years, been intentionally taken out of context or just plain misunderstood, as argued by Spohr in a detailed piece about the incident. In short, the treaty’s negotiations were never about Nato expansion into eastern Europe, but rather specific issues around how Nato would subsume East Germany (such as restrictions on the deployment of Nato troops to the former East German territory, as later agreed in the treaty).

Optimism and insecurity in the 1990s

The formal and final dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought with it a tidal wave of optimism about the inexorable global march of liberal democracy. This was the ‘End of History’ era in which the West had won the ideological argument, so it believed.

“At that time we were dealing with a new Russia under Yeltsin, one that publicly wanted to have alliances with Nato and America, to democratise and open its economy to the global market – and everybody was sort of taken in by these heady hopes,” says Spohr.

Historic steps were indeed taken, such as Russia joining the World Trade Organisation and the G7. Meanwhile, Nato’s open-door policy was of course extended to the Kremlin, albeit not via any formal invitation since Nato can only expand if a country invites itself. Russia, however, never applied (and hasn’t to this day) but maintained a positive relationship with the bloc until the early 2000s.

Nonetheless, cracks in the relationship began to show as early as 1993, when Russia entered a period of political and economic chaos that would haunt it for most of the decade.

“In 1993, we saw hardliners and ultranationalists come out of the woodwork, challenging Yeltsin’s rapprochement and making noises about Russia’s entitlement to the ‘near abroad’ [the former Soviet republics],” explains Spohr. “It was at this point that much of eastern Europe, especially the Baltic states, began getting very worried again. After all, these small countries were invaded and occupied for most of the 20th century, first by the Nazis and then the Soviets.”

Such fears were exacerbated by numerous conflicts across the 1990s. Eastern Europe watched in trepidation the instability spreading across Russia’s southern rim: the Chechen War, the dissolution of Yugoslavia (including genocide in Bosnia) and ethnic strife in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Tensions in Russia’s western-most European enclave, Kaliningrad, were another source of concern, sandwiched awkwardly as it is today between Poland and Lithuania.

It is in this context that countries across central and eastern Europe began clamouring to join Nato in the mid-1990s onwards. “Many of them also realised that it would be years until they became EU members, since only the most developed economies such as Austria were able to join quickly,” says Spohr. “As a result, they put more and more pressure on the US and western Europe to let them into Nato.”

As a result, Nato made its first post-war enlargement, bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the fold in 1999. It was also believed that Europe would be more secure if an increasingly sovereign Germany was surrounded by Nato countries.

The poisoning of relations between Nato and Russia

Nato’s expansion in 1999 elicited little to no negative reaction from the Kremlin, busy as it was in the chaos of its internal affairs.

It was in this climate, albeit one year later, that Vladimir Putin took control of Russia’s highest office, quickly moving to stabilise the Russian economy for the next decade – a feat for which he is praised to this day.

In fact, so busy was Putin in consolidating Russia’s internal affairs (and his power), that he did not say much on the second round of Nato enlargement in 2004, which saw Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania join, as well as Russia’s neighbours, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. For these nations, the chaos and insecurity of the 20th century was still very much front of mind.

“You have to put yourself into the shoes of these small countries, sandwiched between Germany and the Soviet Union,” says Spohr. “They were hungry for security guarantees. Back in 1995, the Estonian president expressed fears held widely within the region that, if Russia did not democratise, it would try to take back territory.”

Although Putin remained relatively silent on the 2004 enlargement, many experts cite that year as a turning point in relations between Russia and the defence pact. Trust was further deteriorated in 2004 during the anti-Kremlin Orange Revolution in Ukraine, flames that were fanned by US and EU funding and support, according to Putin.

Things managed to get even worse a few years later after Georgia and Ukraine knocked on Nato’s door, developments that contributed very significantly to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. Although Ukraine scrapped its Nato bid in 2010, opting for non-alignment under its new pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, the decision was reversed in 2014 following the anti-Russian Maidan Revolution (the uprising that ultimately led to Putin’s annexation of Crimea).

Despite Ukraine’s efforts to join Nato since 2008, and the pact’s vague promise that the nation would one day join the club, several Nato members (namely France and Germany) for years staunchly opposed the expansion due to Putin’s long-held demand that Ukraine remain neutral. Fear of provocation is why Finland and Sweden have never sought to join Nato.

Whether Nato went too far in its post-Cold War enlargement, playing with Russian fears and/or egos, is a subject for a different article. What is clear from this account, however, is that Nato’s expansion over the past seven decades was driven by a combination of fright and hope.

Far more than just an insurance policy against Russia, Nato’s growth was driven by Germany too. These fears outlived the fall of the Soviet Union, leading to Nato’s rapid growth in eastern Europe amid a frenzy of post-war chaos (and optimism).

Nato really believed that the new Russia would not mind its growth – maybe even joining the party itself. Unfortunately, Putin very much did mind, an affront that undergirds, but by no means justifies, the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.  (Source: airforce-technology.com)

 

30 Mar 22. China reverses roles in arms trade with Russia. Beijing becomes partner and potential supplier to former source of military equipment. Russia has been enabling China’s rise as a military power. Russian weapons producers have supplied the People’s Liberation Army with missiles, helicopters and advanced fighter jets to the tune of an average of $1.5bn a year. Now, the tide is turning. As reported by the Financial Times this month, Russia has requested military assistance from China to maintain its invasion of Ukraine. According to intelligence the US shared with allies, Russia requested supplies including surface-to-air missiles, drones, intelligence-related equipment and armoured and logistics vehicles. Arms trade experts said that if these requests were made after the start of the war, the shopping list pointed to a military in dire need of basic support. “Trucks are something that Russia produces a lot of. If they have to ask for that, that would tell you what bad condition their armed forces are in,” said Siemon Wezeman, an arms trade specialist at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Both governments have denied that Moscow made a request for Chinese assistance with military equipment for its Ukraine war. Such support would mark a role reversal in China’s long-running defence trade relationship with Russia, and one that analysts said would highlight a broader change already under way in the bilateral power dynamics. Sipri’s arms transfers database, which tracks deals from 1950 to 2021, records scores of Russian weapons exports to China, with none going the other way. But China is clearly outgrowing its traditional reliance on Russian for supplies of advanced arms. China over the past two decades has increasingly manufactured under licence defence products it historically bought from Russia. Such licensing deals helped China develop the ability to build its own frigates, aircraft carriers and advanced fighters — and even their hugely complex engines — instead of relying on Russia suppliers. More recently, China has shipped some arms components to Russia. (Source: FT.com)

 

29 Mar 22. USMC Deploys to Eastern Europe for the First Time in Response to Ukraine. Marines will now be among the thousands of U.S. troops who have been deployed to Europe and the eastern edge of the NATO alliance in response to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. About 200 Marines from a command-and-control unit for Marine Air Control Group 28 based at Cherry Point, North Carolina, were sent to Lithuania, following a cold weather exercise in Norway, the Pentagon said Tuesday. A couple of Marine Corps C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and 10 Marine F-18 Hornet fighter jets from Beaufort, South Carolina will be repositioned to Eastern Europe. The latest deployment comes as Russia appeared to be pulling back and repositioning its invasion forces following weeks of stiff resistance by Ukraine, and the Pentagon claimed Russian President Vladimir Putin had “failed” in his effort to seize the capital Kyiv. The Pentagon has 14,000 troops already deployed to Europe, positioned with allies such as Poland, Germany and the Baltic states, or on high-alert for possible deployment. On Monday, it announced that six Navy EA-18G Growler aircraft based at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island in Washington state were sent to Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany.

“It’s not about a number goal, it’s really about capabilities and it’s based on constant conversations with our NATO allies on the eastern flank,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said during a briefing on Tuesday.

The Marine and Navy deployments were done unilaterally by the U.S. and were not part of the NATO Response Force, which is an elite multinational force of 40,000 troops that includes the U.S. and was recently activated by the alliance.

Marines are arriving to bolster the NATO alliance, and like all the U.S. troops now in the region will not fight the Russians in Ukraine. President Joe Biden has made clear that the U.S. will not get involved militarily unless a member of NATO is attacked, but his administration has sent over $1 billion in weapons and military support to Ukrainian forces amid the Russian onslaught and imposed heavy sanctions.

The Russians said on Tuesday they were withdrawing troops from around Kyiv amid peace talks with Ukraine aimed at ending the unprovoked invasion that began on Feb. 24. But the Pentagon was skeptical of the claim.

“We believe that this is a repositioning, not a real withdrawal, and that we all should be prepared to watch for a major offensive against other areas of Ukraine. It does not mean that the threat to Kyiv is over,” Kirby said. “Russia has failed in its objective of capturing Kyiv, it has failed in its objective of subjugating Ukraine, but they can still inflict massive brutality on the country, including on Kyiv.” (Source: Military.com)

 

29 Mar 22. Russia, first in the headlines, is Pentagon’s No. 2 challenge. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is dominating the news, but the Biden administration’s new defense strategy makes clear China is still the Pentagon’s top focus.

A classified version of the updated National Defense Strategy is being briefed to lawmakers to justify the Pentagon’s new $773bn budget request for 2023, and the undersecretary of defense for policy, Colin Kahl, said in a tweet Monday night the unclassified version “will be out in the coming months.” But a public summary calls China “our most consequential strategic competitor,” while saying Russia poses “acute threats.”

Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks and other defense officials echoed that distinction in remarks Monday, saying “the people of Ukraine are foremost in our minds” while emphasizing the People’s Republic of China’s “military, economic and technological potential to challenge the international system and our interests.”

“Russia poses an acute threat to the world order, as illustrated by its unprovoked invasion and vicious tactics,” Hicks told reporters at the defense budget rollout Monday. “Even as we confront Russia’s malign activities, the defense strategy describes how the department will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence with the PRC as our most consequential strategic competitor and pacing challenge.”

To be clear, as defense officials briefed reporters Monday on the budget, they often mentioned Russia and China together. They cautioned that both continue to develop advanced capabilities, like hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite weapons, and that the Pentagon must be ready to deter them both with its own developing weaponry.

Replacing the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy, the new document prioritizes homeland defense with China in mind; deterring strategic attacks against the U.S. and allies, and deterring aggression while prepared to prevail in a conflict when necessary while “prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe,” according to the summary.

North Korea, Iran and violent extremist organizations are described as “persistent threats.”

The Trump administration’s strategy, spearheaded by then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, marked a shift from principally fighting terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State toward strategic competition with authoritarian powers Russia and China. That focus has since driven defense budgets ever higher, even amid the shrinking U.S. troop presence in the Mideast and Afghanistan.

The new strategy comes as Russia shocked the globe by invading Ukraine, sparking Europe’s biggest land war since 1945. That’s galvanized western powers behind military aid for Kyiv, crippling sanctions for Moscow and lifting allied defense spending, all while the invasion has exposed deep flaws in Russia’s military.

National security officials have warned China is also engaged in its largest-ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal diversification effort in its history, that it wants to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space and that it presents a huge cyber espionage threat to the U.S.

Todd Harrison, director of defense budget analysis and of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the strategy’s “carefully chosen words reflect a consciousness about the time-phasing of threats and challenges.”

“China is the major challenge, and it’s a long-term, growing challenge. Russia is an immediate challenge, but quite frankly, it’s a declining power, and over time, they will become less of a threat because of economics, demographics, and they appear to overextend themselves now,” Harrison said.

“This conflict has revealed that the Russian military is not 10 feet tall,” he added. “They’ve got serious weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and coming out of this conflict they’ve got significant attrition of their capital assets and major weapon systems that they will not be able to replace anytime soon. So Russia could emerge from this conflict substantially weaker and a much smaller threat to European security than it was prior to this conflict.”

Eric Sayers, a former adviser to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and now senior vice president at Beacon Global Strategies, said the Biden strategy makes an important shift. “Trump NDS was China and Russia. This is China then Russia,” he said in a note to Defense News.

A vocal advocate for making China the Pentagon’s enduring priority, Sayers said Tuesday the administration’s request was “maturing in the right direction,” but said sea and airpower investments, amid budget proposals to scuttle ships and aircraft, are “still not growing at a level commensurate with the challenge.”

“The Pentagon seems intent on making planning for the PRC the enduring priority ahead of all other challenges, including Russia,” Sayers said. “That’s a win for those who believe the competition with the PRC is paramount both today and into the decades ahead. How this translates to resources is now the open question.”

Some defense officials justified their budgets this week in terms of the National Defense Strategy. Navy’s deputy assistant secretary for budget, Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, pointed to Russia’s recent nuclear posturing and the new U.S. strategy’s emphasis on deterring strategic attacks to highlight several of the Navy’s proposed investments: the Columbia-class submarine; its nuclear command-and-control systems, and its sub-launched ballistic missile, the Trident D5.

“When we look at the Navy-specific budget, that’s over [$8.5] billion dollars just out of the Navy side of the DoD budget request, all in that one mission set. So a very significant investment for a very real requirement,” Gumbleton said.

Asked if the budget reflected any last-minute changes based on Russia invading Ukraine, Gumbleton noted Russia is no longer considered a “near-peer” of the U.S.

“For your Navy-Marine Corps team, I would suggest that it’s agnostic. This budget gets after a near-peer competitor, of which Russia is not,” he said. “Now, they have nuclear weapons, that’s concerning. But they’re not a near-peer competitor. Your Navy-Marine Corps team, though, will be outfitted to go anywhere in the world, whether that’s near there or the South China Sea.”

Describing the new National Defense Strategy at a briefing for reporters Monday, Pentagon Comptroller Mike McCord called Russia “an acute threat,” while calling China “our pacing challenge” and “our No. 1 challenge.”

Asked whether Russia is still considered a near-peer adversary, McCord demurred, noting the budget and strategy were set ahead of Russia’s invasion on Feb. 24. But he said Russia’s nuclear arsenal means it must be taken seriously.

“We did not feel that what’s happening today altered the picture that China is the No. 1 issue to keep our eye on,” McCord said. “Obviously you can draw your own conclusions about Russia’s performance on the battlefield, but all these [budget and strategy] documents were pretty much finalized some time ago. So this is not attempting to be a commentary on what’s happening last week or the week before.” (Source: Defense News)

 

29 Mar 22. Defense Official Says Real Withdrawal Is Complete Withdrawal From Ukraine.  The Russians have said they are withdrawing forces from around Ukraine’s capital city of Kyiv, and so far, reports show that some — but not many — Russian forces have indeed moved away from the area. But where those troops are going and why is likely less about signaling a willingness to end a bloody and illegal war, and more about repositioning of forces elsewhere to focus on alternative and potentially more successful military objectives.

“Has there been some movement by some Russian units away from Kyiv in the last day or so? Yeah. We think so. Small numbers,” said Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby during a briefing today. “But we believe that this is a repositioning, not a real withdrawal, and that we all should be prepared to watch for a major offensive against other areas of Ukraine.”

A real commitment, a believable one, Kirby said, would involve a complete withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukraine.

“They have an opportunity here, an opportunity that they have missed, many, many times over the last month to end this war and to do it responsibly and to negotiate in good faith,” Kirby said. “We hope that they’ll do that. But the war could end today if Mr. Putin did the right thing and actually did withdraw all his forces from Ukraine and respect Ukrainian sovereignty.”

From the onset, Kirby said, the Russians have attempted to mislead the world and its own people about its intentions for Ukraine.

“We’ve seen that Russia has attempted now for going on a month to sell this war of theirs to its domestic audience as a ‘liberation of the Donbas,'” Kirby said. “However, the intensified rhetoric over the last year and in the lead-up to Russia’s invasion, demonstrated that the Kremlin’s real intent was to overthrow the democratically elected government and to occupy or annex large portions of Ukraine.”

Kirby outlined a three-pronged approach for how the Defense Department has assessed Russia might have planned to achieve that objective.

In the north and northeast, he said, the Russians focused efforts on the cities of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv.

“That whole northern grouping was really designed against the capital city — the effort to cut off Kyiv,” he said.

Down in the southern part of Ukraine, coming out of Crimea, he said the Russians split forces northeast against Mariupol and then northwest to Kherson, where they also made an attempt to take Mykolayiv — something they’ve been unable to do.

In the east, in the Donbas, he said, there has already been conflict there for eight years now, and the Russians have put more resources there to further their objectives.

All of those efforts, Kirby said, were believed to be part of a Russian effort to subjugate Ukraine. But so far, the effort has not been successful.

“Now we think that they’re going to prioritize the east,” he said. “They have been stalled in the north, and the progress in the early days they had made in the south — they had made progress — now that stalled out.”

Despite Russian promises to move out of Kyiv, Kirby said, the city can’t be considered safe. It’s still at risk from continued Russian aggression.

“Russia has failed in its objective of capturing Kyiv,” he said. “It’s failed in its objective of subjugating Ukraine. But they can still inflict massive brutality on the country, including on Kyiv. We see that even today in continued airstrikes against the capital city.”

Kirby said it’s unclear now what actions Russia will take next in Ukraine, or what their ultimate goals there have metastasized into. Briefings from the Russian Ministry of Defense, he said, have been misleading and amount to efforts to recast recent missteps as intermediary steps to its ultimate goals.

“It’s too early to judge what additional actions the Kremlin may take,” Kirby said. “No amount of spin can mask what the world has witnessed over the past month — and that’s the courage and the military prowess of Ukraine’s armed forces and its people, which are proving to be more than what Russia bargained for in its unprovoked and unjustified invasion.”

Underlying that military prowess, Kirby said, has been years of military training for the Ukrainians by U.S., allied and partner nations, as well as the continued material support being provided — support he said will continue.

“The United States, together with our allies and partners … are going to continue to provide that support going forward to meet their security needs as they bravely stand up to this Russian aggression,” he said.  (Source: US DoD)

 

30 Mar 22. Violent contagion – How the Russian invasion of Ukraine could spark fresh hostilities in the Middle East. Analysts have raised concerns over fresh hostilities in the Middle East following Russia’s bungled invasion of Ukraine, prompted by a breakdown in Russia’s willingness to co-operate with the West over a range of issues including counter-terrorism and the Iran nuclear deal.

Analysts have pointed to Russia’s bungled invasion of Ukraine as a catalyst for renewed hostilities in the Middle East, evaluating a range of potential scenarios that are likely to precipitate further decline in regional co-operation.

At the core of the analyses are scenarios in which either: a weaker Russia vacates its allies in the region, a belligerent Russia refuses to work with the West in addressing counter-terrorism and negotiating the Iran deal, or even fresh Saudi-Iranian hostilities as Russia turns inwards and the US turns toward the Asia-Pacific region.

These concerns were examined by senior research associate with the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Hanna Notte, outlining that a weaker – yet more antagonistic Russia – coupled with a disengaged US would threaten relative stability in the Middle East.

“In Syria, Russia and the West have in recent years competed for influence, deconflicted to avoid clashes, while cooperating selectively on counter-terrorism, humanitarian issues, and a political process under UN auspices,” Notte explains.

“On Iran, they have managed to insulate co-operation on the nuclear dossier even amid growing tensions surrounding Ukraine, yet failed to join forces in tackling a broader regional arms-control agenda.”

However, Notte explains that a weaker and more cynical Russia may seek retribution by suspending their previous cooperation with the US against ISIS in the Levant, and seek to minimise their role in restraining explicit Iranian intentions under the Iran nuclear deal.

On the other side of the coin, the analyst suggests that the invasion of Ukraine may leave European negotiators with little appetite to find mutually agreeable outcomes seeking to restrain Russia’s regional ally.

While not necessarily a pre-condition to war, Notte explains that these events could threaten a reduction in cooperation between states in the region and prompt new conflict.

These scenarios could prove problematic for the West since Russia has grown their presence in the region while the United States has strategically re-postured to the Asia-Pacific. In fact, Notte explains that Russia even deployed critical military infrastructure to Syria less than a fortnight before the invasion of Ukraine.

“Russian exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean last summer, which involved Tu-22M3 bombers and MiG-31K interceptors with Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, served as a reminder that Russia can quickly position serious naval and aerial assets to Syria. Ten days prior to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia redeployed the same systems to the area,” Notte continued.

Despite this, a continued Russian military presence in the region is far from guaranteed as Russia regathers its forces and tries to minimise the deployment of costly expeditionary forces.

While some may suggest that the absence of Russian and US geopolitical interests in the region could result in an era of improved co-operation, there appears to be little appetite among regional actors to come to the negotiating table in the absence of global superpowers.

“Developments since the Ukraine invasion — be it the recent Iranian strikes on Israeli targets in Erbil, the suspension of Iranian-Saudi talks, or Friday’s Houthi attack on an oil depot in the Saudi city of Jeddah — raise doubts over the robustness of that realization, however,” Notte argues.

Nevertheless, the United States’ traditional allies in the region simply are not happy with growing US disengagement and ongoing negotiations with Iran.

A weak Russia and a disengaged US, will the US’ Gulf allies cosy up to China?

In fact, so much so has US disengagement concerned the West’s allies in the region that leading media personalities have attacked the US for abandoning their allies.

Former editor of Al Arabiya English, Saudi Arabian Mohammed Alyahya, penned an opinion piece in the Jerusalem Post over the last week likening the United States’ nuclear talks with Iran as a “divorce” with not only Saudi Arabia but stirring division with regional allies like Israel.

“Most importantly, to its authors, the deal takes the United States out of the business of containing Iran, which in response has further ramped up its attacks on regional peace and stability,” Alyahya wrote.

In fact, the former editor even ended his opinion piece with an olive branch to Beijing:

“What is not yet clear is whether the Chinese can be helpful in deterring Iran, or whether they share the American belief in ‘balance’. But Xi Jinping will visit Riyadh in May. It is a certainty that Saudi leaders will ask him if Iran’s rocketing of the oil facilities of the world’s most reliable oil producer is in the interest of China and, if not, can Beijing make it stop?”

While some may look to China for future support, it is not clear whether Russia’s allies in the region will remain steadfast following the invasion of Ukraine – many of whom rely on Russian military technology.

Russian technology, not what it’s cracked up to be

In late February, Professor Spence Meredith in the Modern War Institute explained that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would bring poor Russian military technology to global attention – and undermine the competitive control the Kremlin exercises over allied rogue nations through military arms sales.

“Specifically, highlighting operational ineptitude and technical malfunctions in Ukraine can impact global arms sales and the Russian brand in the competitive market for private military companies (PMCs). Both costs would heighten intra-elite rivalries in Moscow as losses mount elsewhere,” Professor Meredith said.

“When those failures leave dead Russians in their wake, oft-repeated lies about training deaths in Ukraine, Syria, and the Central African Republic cannot easily convince the growing list of grieving Russian mothers.”

Professor Meredith’s projection has proven correct.

In early March, online sleuths took to social media to argue that a combination of poor vehicle maintenance and badly made Chinese tyres had stalled Russia’s advance to Kyiv, forcing military vehicles off of muddy fields and onto roads. This had the result of Russian-tank-induced traffic jams on major Ukrainian highways.

Last week, Major General (Ret’d) Mick Ryan questioned Russia’s lack of innovative solutions on the battlefield – whether cyber operations or machine-human teaming. These missing solutions have led to Ukrainian information dominance and an inability for Russia to dominate the air.

Twitter has also been aflame with stories of corner cutting, including use of civilian equipment throughout the invasion.

This then raises questions about the ongoing loyalty of those countries that rely on Russian military technology for their warfighting capabilities.

Looking to stalled Russian advances in Ukraine, and the apparent technological corner cutting, many militaries would begin questioning the efficacy of their Russian imports: not least India and Turkey with deep ties to the West, but also Syria and Iran. Could the US lean into this to cleave them from their reliance on Russian technology?

State of play

The Middle East is in a state of flux. There appears to be growing discontent among some of the United States’ allies in the region about the country’s growing bipartisanship. Meanwhile, there is little guarantee that a weaker and poorer Russia can continue to support Iran and Syria. The future is indeed unclear.  (Source: Defence Connect)

 

30 Mar 22. Russia pledges withdrawal in two key areas but Ukraine remains sceptical. There are signs of optimism, tangible progress, from the latest round of Russian-Ukraine peace talks. Russia’s announced it will “drastically reduce combat operations” in two key areas – around the capital, Kyiv, and the northern city of Chernihiv, where troops have faced setbacks. The move to withdraw is aimed “to boost mutual trust”, according to Russia, which has previously revealed it is focusing on Ukraine’s eastern regions. But this scaling back of operations has been met with scepticism. “We can say that the signals… are positive, but those signals do not drown out the explosions or Russian shells,” says Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky. The Ukrainian military says it’s “probably a rotation of individual units”. Outside of Ukraine, the US and the UK are also apprehensive. President Joe Biden says he wants to see what happens on the ground and Prime Minister Boris Johnson will be looking at Russia’s actions not its words.

As this pledge was made, the search for survivors continues after a Russian rocket tore a hole through a nine-storey government building in the southern city of Mykolaiv. Twelve people were killed and more than 20 others injured, according to Ukrainian officials. Further questions have been raised over Russia’s claims it doesn’t target civilians, the buildings in which they live and work, or the people themselves. However, Ukraine and the US say Russian troops are repositioning. This comes amid what Russia’s chief negotiator, Vladimir Medinsky, describes as “meaningful” negotiations in Turkey. Russia says it aspires to reach a ceasefire and Ukraine’s proposals on neutrality – to no longer join Nato, which Russia opposed – will be put to President Vladimir Putin. (Source: BBC)

 

30 Mar 22. Ukraine isn’t naive, Zelenskiy says after Russian pledge to scale down attack on Kyiv.

• Summary
• U.S. says on lookout for major offensive elsewhere
• Moscow’s pledge comes at peace talks with Ukraine
• Kyiv proposes neutral status with guarantees
• Biden to hold talks with UK, European leaders

Ukraine reacted with skepticism to Russia’s promise in negotiations to scale down military operations around Kyiv and another city as some Western countries expected Moscow to intensify its offensive in other parts of the country.

Talks took place in an Istanbul palace more than a month into the largest attack on a European nation since World War Two that has killed or injured thousands, forced nearly 4 million to flee abroad and pummelled Russia’s economy with sanctions.

The invasion has been halted on most fronts by stiff resistance from Ukrainian forces who have recaptured territory even as civilians are trapped in besieged cities.

“In order to increase mutual trust and create the necessary conditions for further negotiations and achieving the ultimate goal of agreeing and signing (an) agreement, a decision was made to radically, by a large margin, reduce military activity in the Kyiv and Chernihiv directions,” Russian Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Fomin told reporters.

He made no mention of other areas that have seen heavy fighting, including around Mariupol in the southeast, Sumy and Kharkiv in the east and Kherson and Mykolaiv in the south.

“Ukrainians are not naive people,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said late on Tuesday.

“Ukrainians have already learned during these 34 days of invasion, and over the past eight years of the war in Donbass, that the only thing they can trust is a concrete result.”

MAJOR OFFENSIVE POSSIBLE

Russia has started moving very small numbers of troops away from positions around Kyiv in a move that is more of a repositioning than a retreat or a withdrawal from the war, the Pentagon said on Tuesday.

“We all should be prepared to watch for a major offensive against other areas of Ukraine,” spokesman John Kirby told a news briefing. “It does not mean that the threat to Kyiv is over.”

Britain’s Ministry of Defence in an intelligence update said: “It is highly likely that Russia will seek to divert combat power from the north to their offensive in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east.”

Reuters could not immediately verify the claims made by either side.

The Moscow-backed self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine may consider joining Russia once it controls all of Ukraine’s Donetsk region, its leader was quoted as saying. Kyiv has said any such move would have no legal basis.

Russia calls its assault a “special operation” to disarm and “denazify” Ukraine. The West says it launched an unprovoked invasion.

In Ukraine’s besieged seaport Mariupol, thousands of civilians may have died, the head of the United Nations human rights mission in the country told Reuters on Tuesday.

Those who remain are suffering.

“We are eight people. We have two buckets of potatoes, one bucket of onions,” said Irina, an engineer, in her apartment where windows had been blasted out.

Elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have made advances, recapturing territory from Russian troops on the outskirts of Kyiv, in the northeast and in the south.

In the southern city of Mykolaiv, a missile blasted a hole through the main administrative building. Authorities said at least 12 people were killed and 33 injured.

Some analysts noted that Russia’s promise to reduce fighting mostly covered areas where it has been losing ground.

The general staff of the Ukrainian armed forces said Russia’s promise to curtail military operations in some areas was “probably a rotation of individual units and aims to mislead.”

The Russian military accused Ukrainian forces in cities under attack of using ceasefires to restore their combat readiness and set up firing points in hospitals and schools, Interfax news agency said.

DIPOLOMATIC PRESSURE

U.S. President Joe Biden will talk to the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Britain on Tuesday to discuss the latest developments in Ukraine, the White House said.

French President Emmanuel Macron is scheduled to talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. deputy national security adviser for economics, Daleep Singh, will both visit India, which has called for a ceasefire but has refused to explicitly condemn Moscow. read more

The U.N. food chief warned on Tuesday that the war was threatening to devastate the World Food Programme’s efforts to feed some 125 million people globally because Ukraine had gone “from the breadbasket of the world to breadlines.” read more

PROPOSALS

Ukrainian negotiators said that under their proposals, Kyiv would agree not to join alliances or host bases of foreign troops, but would have security guaranteed in terms similar to “Article 5”, the collective defence clause of the transatlantic NATO military alliance.

They named Israel and NATO members Canada, Poland and Turkey as countries that may give such guarantees. Russia, the United States, Britain, Germany and Italy could also be involved.

The proposals, which would require a referendum in Ukraine, mentioned a 15-year consultation period on the status of Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014.

The fate of the southeastern Donbass region, which Russia demands Ukraine cede to separatists, would be discussed by the Ukrainian and Russian leaders.

Kyiv’s proposals also included one that Moscow would not oppose Ukraine joining the European Union, Russia’s lead negotiator Vladimir Medinsky said. Russia has previously opposed Ukrainian membership of the EU and especially of NATO.

Medinsky said Russia’s delegation would study and present the proposals to president Putin.

To prepare a peace agreement, Medinsky later told the TASS news agency, “We still have a long way to go”.

(Source: Reuters)

 

29 Mar 22. General Says NATO Is Stepping Up Defense Investments. Russia’s premeditated and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has galvanized NATO and global partners, Air Force Gen. Tod D. Wolters told the Senate Armed Services Committee today.

“We are witnessing a generational moment, a historic demonstration of unity in will and an unprecedented effort by allies to strengthen defense while simultaneously helping those in need,” said Wolters, commander of U.S. European Command and NATO supreme commander in Europe.

For instance, NATO ally Germany has committed to meeting the alliance’s 2% benchmark for military spending, he said. “We expect other allies will follow and redouble efforts to adequately invest in defense to generate peace — from Turkey in the southeast, to Norway, Sweden and Finland.”

Wolters said U.S. investments in military-to-military relationships, training, and readiness help to build unity, resolve and combat-credible deterrence.

Years of focused investment through the European Reassurance Initiative and European Deterrence Initiative include facilities, prepositioned equipment, rotational deployments, and all-domain exercises to improve speed and agility, Wolters said.

Thanks to these initiatives, the Army was able to deploy an entire armored brigade combat team from the U.S. to Germany in just one week amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he said. “That level of speed and agility is unmatched.”

Air Force Gen. Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, commander of U.S. Transportation Command, testified that Transcom, in concert with Eucom, is providing critical aid to Ukraine and assuring NATO allies through troop deployments and exercises.

Transcom operates an agile and resilient logistics enterprise comprised of military components, commercial partners and industry teammates, delivering materiel and manpower to allies and partners around the world, she said.

“We project and sustain the world’s most capable military force. The speed and reliability at which we execute these missions, demonstrates our nation’s resolve and serves as a deterrent to our adversaries,” Van Ovost said.

Transcom’s top readiness concern remains sealift and air refueling assets, as these platforms are approaching the end of their service life, she said. (Source: US DoD)

 

29 Mar 22. Ukraine shows the need to change US export rules on unmanned systems.

“How does it make sense that American troops would die on the behalf of NATO nations, but Washington doesn’t trust the countries with unmanned systems?,” asks Heather Penney of the Mitchell Institute.

Despite reform efforts by the Trump administration and a major push from industry, American unmanned aerial vehicle exports remain limited to a handful of countries. With the conflict in Ukraine proving the benefit of such systems, a new reform push is needed to be able to supply allies in Europe and elsewhere with the best American equipment, argues Heather Penney of the Mitchell Institute in this new op-ed.

Ukrainian airpower operations against invading Russian forces have clearly reinforced the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The ability to combine onboard sensors to understand the battlespace with kinetic firepower is powerful. Against an overwhelming conventional force, UAVs have helped even the odds for Ukraine’s defenders.

It’s notable, however, that the UAVs Ukraine is relying on do not come stamped “Made in America.” Instead, Ukraine is largely relying on — and making famous — the Turkish-built TB2 Bayraktar UAVs. Kyiv is not alone in this regard: many US partners and allies are forced by US regulations to buy UAVs from other countries, including Israel, Turkey and, most concerningly, China.

Major adversaries like China and Russia, middle tier actors like Iran, and non-state actors like al Qaeda and ISIS pose significant threats to US interests around the world. It is unrealistic to think American forces can deal with these aggressors alone. Instead, the United States must ensure that its allies and partners are best equipped to check these dangers themselves. That requires arming them with the right tools, with UAVs on the top of that list. Ukraine’s defense will only increase the desire for armed UAVs around the globe, and the US government must use this moment to change UAV export rules that ultimately harm US security interests.

While it is heartening to see videos of TB2s blowing up Russian trucks, tanks, and even surface-to-air missile sites, it is frustrating to know that the Ukrainians could be even more effective if they were employing American UAVs. The Bayraktar TB2 is a remotely piloted aircraft that has a nominal range of 150 km and payload of 150 kg. With only four hardpoints, the Bayraktar is limited in what kind of weapons it can carry and how many. This, in turn, limits its utility in a country as vast as Ukraine against the large numbers of Russian forces engaged.

While the Biden administration recently announced its intention to transfer 100 “Switchblade” UAVs, the United States has better UAVs that it could send to Ukraine. The Switchblade is really a loitering munition, more like a steerable cruise missile or guided rocket than a remotely piloted aircraft like the TB2. That means that the Switchblade is a one-time use weapon.

By contrast, remotely piloted aircraft are just that — aircraft — than can be conduct multiple sorties. Some US UAVs have longer ranges and greater payloads than the TB2, which would significantly bolster the effectiveness of Ukrainian defenses. It doesn’t take a math major to realize that longer ranges and more weapons could inflict far more damage-per-sortie than the TB2. Ukraine needs all the support the United States can provide; sending larger UAVs would seem like an obvious move, especially as Russia seems to have accepted Turkey sending more TB2s but has signaled sending manned fixed-wing aircraft would cross a red line for Moscow.

Information superiority and speed to mission are the hallmark of multi-cloud environments, along with automation, cybersecurity, and governance.

However, that is currently impossible given that the United States severely restricts its own UAV exports. As a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) — a wholly voluntary agreement to limit the export of technology related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — the US State Department treats UAVs as if they were akin to nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles or cruise missiles when considering requests by allies and partners.

This is ludicrous given the massive differences between the systems, but the US State Department largely denies ally and partner requests for UAVs on this basis. At the same time, we will gladly sell far more lethal manned combat aircraft to these same nations. The incongruity behind these policies is extremely counterproductive given allied requirements. Do we really think a jet fighter like an F-15 or F-16 is less capable than a propeller-driven UAV?

Every country in the world is studying the lessons of the Ukraine war, and a glaringly obvious one is that UAVs are effective against an overwhelmingly larger land force. It seems inevitable nations will want to stock up on UAVs, but right now the US can’t sell its best equipment to most of the world — including, crazily enough, our NATO allies on whose behalf we would send forces to fight.

How does it make sense that American troops would die on the behalf of these nations, but Washington doesn’t trust the countries with unmanned systems? Given the security climate, it is time to reset these rules so that US UAV export policy guidance is more pragmatic and less dogmatic.

Current US policy calls for assessing five primary principles when considering the export of military UAVs: 1) how the transfer can bolster partner security, 2) whether the sale will strengthen bilateral relationships, 3) whether the export will preserve US military advantage, 4) whether the acquisition will grow trade opportunities for US companies, and 5) preventing the proliferation of WMD delivery systems. Of these objectives, the Department of State is predominantly fixated on non-proliferation. This arcane interpretation is undermining US and allied interests.

UAVs are not nuclear-tipped ICBMs, cruise missiles, or even a loitering munition like a Switchblade. UAVs are aircraft whose sensors give human operators superior decision-making situational awareness and the ability to employ precise kinetic firepower when conditions warrant. Results in Ukraine speak to this, with armed UAVs allowing human operators to find specific targets and precisely hit them for maximum effect and minimum collateral damage.

The Trump administration modified US UAV policy, allowing UAVs that fly up to 800 kph to no longer be subject to the MTCR’s “strong presumption of denial.” Yet this change did not materially affect Department of State export decisions. Because range and payload (300 km and 500 kg, respectively) can also drive a strong presumption of denial, these attributes often are the deciding factors. More capable UAVs can fly farther and longer and carry more payloads. As a consequence, the answer to these export requests is most often, “No.”

The Turkish TB2 has been a critical capability enabling Ukrainian resistance. Just imagine how much more effective the Ukrainians could be if they had more capable UAVs.

The Department of State must change its attitudes towards exporting UAVs to partners and allies if we want to build their ability to deter and, if needed, blunt regional aggression. Conditions will only grow more complex and dangerous if we do not deal with brush fires before they become forest fires—Ukraine is proving this every single day. As Russia reinforces their invasion with additional troops and equipment, supporting the Ukrainian defense with additional US UAVs may become even more critical to their survival and to preventing the spread of Russian aggression across the European continent.

It may not be too late to equip Ukraine with superior UAVs, and it most certainly is not too late to support our other partners and allies by updating our export policies. We need to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. It is time for Department of State to move out of the way of inhibiting US and allied security interests. (Source: glstrade.com/Breaking Defense.com)

 

29 Mar 22. Does the UK need to change its defence strategy after the Ukraine war? With the number of soldiers at the lowest level since the 18th century, questions are being asked about the weakness of the army The British army is down to 72,500 regular soldiers and is facing cuts to tank numbers. When Ben Wallace claimed that Britain was taking a leading role in aiding Ukraine’s war effort, it was not just post-Brexit boosterism the UK defence secretary was voicing. Volodymyr Zelensky has singled out the UK as one of the western allies doing most to help his country fight Russia — be that the thousands of anti-tank missiles London sent to Ukraine, or the training provided to the country’s armed forces by the British military since 2015. “Britain is definitely on our side,” the Ukrainian president said in a recent interview. “Britain wants Ukraine to win and Russia to lose.” Less clear cut, though, is what Russia’s invasion of Ukraine means for British security policy, as laid out in last year’s integrated review. This major strategy document sought to shape post-Brexit defence policy by tilting the UK away from Europe and towards Asia to counter China’s growing military assertiveness. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has posed an early test of the review and led some government and military officials to re-examine assumptions held when it was published last March. “The world, especially Europe looks very different now,” said Tobias Ellwood, chair of the House of Commons’ defence select committee. “The type, scale and enduring characteristics of the threat requires a review of our entire defence posture — especially if we have any intentions to play a leading role in shaping Europe’s collective security strategy.”  In some ways, the review called it right, analysts and defence officials said, even if parts may require reinterpretation. The head of Britain’s armed forces, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, and the government’s main civilian adviser on defence, David Williams, will discuss UK defence priorities at a seminar on Thursday. The review correctly identified Russia as Europe’s most acute security threat, even if as part of the Indo-Pacific tilt London’s participation in the Aukus nuclear submarine pact with Australia alienated France, traditionally a close defence partner. “The world has completely changed,” said Lord Peter Ricketts, the UK’s former national security adviser. “The focus of the review was on new relationships, new networks and new horizons, not European security and for that reason it does need to be reviewed.” The document’s emphasis on Washington as “an indispensable” ally and the Five Eyes intelligence sharing network, which includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand, was also vindicated by British and US intelligence gathering that predicted Russian president Vladimir Putin’s subsequent actions. Also prescient was the review’s focus on the “high north”, covering the Arctic and Scandinavia, a key area of Russian operations. More open to question is the review’s emphasis on the navy, including the almost £8bn spent on two new aircraft carriers — plus the F-35 stealth aircraft that operate off their decks, costing £90mn each — at the expense of capabilities needed to fight the kind of land-based conventional warfare launched by Moscow. The army is set to lose its entire fleet of more than 700 Warrior infantry fighting vehicles earlier than planned and a third of its Challenger II main battle tanks. Operationally, British land forces are now their smallest since the 18th century, with just 72,500 regular soldiers. Challenger 2 Main Battle tanks © Cpl Julian Packer/MoD/Crown Copyright “We can achieve mass, but it will always be alongside other forces and we may have to look at that,” a senior defence official conceded. What does need to change is the review’s “frankly insulting indifference to European partners and . . . the necessity, and opportunity, of playing a much better game on European security,” said Professor Michael Clarke, former director of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think-tank. The invasion of Ukraine means European security has “crossed a perceptual threshold” that transcends any issues brought up by Brexit, Clarke added. That is especially so given Germany’s planned increase in defence spending to 2 per cent of gross domestic product. That means Berlin’s defence budget will soon reach £62bn a year compared with Britain’s £45bn, which would knock the UK out of second place as Nato’s highest military spender after the US. (Source: FT.com)