Ukraine Conflict Update – March 28

Ukraine Conflict Update – March 28

Military and hard security developments

• Fighting continues to rage around Kyiv, with Russian forces in the north-west of the city appearing to have held their ground over the weekend along their new defensive lines. However, the Ukrainian General Staff stated this morning, 28 March, that Russian forces are attempting to break through defences from the northwest and east, capturing roads and key settlements. Heavy bombardment has furthermore been reported in the north-east of the city this morning and it is likely that pressure on the city will remain high as Russian forces currently reconstitute numerous battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in Belarus, which will likely be recommitted around the capital. Power lines near Kyiv were furthermore damaged during shelling this morning, resulting in a partial temporary blackout of parts of western Kyiv. The curfew in the city has furthermore been relaxed slightly by two hours, which will now apply from 2100-0600 (local time).
• 5 Weeks to go until May Day Victory Parade. Sources suggest that with only 50% of objectives captured by Russia forces that a May Day Victory Parade to celebrate the war being won is unlikely. However to demonstrate that Russia is still a force to be reckoned with, the Kremlin will scrape together  a show of strength using T-14 Armata tanks, SU-57 aircraft and a variety of tactical nuclear weapons and new ‘wonder weapons.’  Given that 85-90% of Russian combat troops are in Ukraine, manpower will be in short supply for the Parade, so expect limited showing of massed troops. The Russian 116th Brigade is in reserve in Moscow as a Counter-Coup Brigade and Russia has deployed 35000 to the Japanese border at Sakhalin. A more likely target for ending the war is now June at the earliest given that Ukraine appears to be short of fuel, vehicle and missiles; Russia now has command of the air.
• Despite the fighting around Kyiv, Russian forces remain focused on the Donbas following the Russian Ministry of Defence’s announcement on Friday 25 March. Russian forces continue to make steady progress, particularly south and west of the Donets River at Izyum, while fierce Ukrainian resistance north and west of Donetsk city continues to stall advances in that direction. The Russians have furthermore gained ground in Mariupol as local authorities confirm that some 160,000 civilians remain trapped in the besieged city.
• On 27 March Ukrainian Minster of Energy Lana Zerkal confirmed that the US, Germany and Poland will begin sending diesel fuel to Ukraine amid reports of increasing shortages. The announcement comes after numerous Russian long-range strikes in recent days that have targeted fuel depots, including against Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Dupno, Kharkiv, Zhitomyr, Kramatorsk and Kyiv. The number of strikes and the subsequent announcement indicate that Ukrainian forces are experiencing mounting fuel shortages, with Russian forces highly likely to continue targeting such depots across the country in a bid to degrade Ukrainian defensive capabilities. However, it is also notable that diesel and wider fuel shortages will also hamper agricultural production, further exacerbating pressures on this year’s harvest which will have knock-on impacts on food prices across the Middle East and parts of Africa that remain reliant upon Ukrainian grain.

Diplomatic and strategic developments

• The Ukrainian and Russian delegations will reportedly resume in-person peace talks either today or tomorrow, 29 March, in Turkey. Previous discussions have notably failed to end the fighting or make meaningful progress towards a settlement, as Zelensky remains adamant that Kyiv will not surrender to Russia. However, following Moscow’s announcement that Russian forces will instead refocus on the Donbas region, the likelihood of the talks being more productive has only modestly increased, as we are still far from a peace treaty. Additionally, ahead of the talks, Zelensky also said that Kyiv is ready to declare neutrality, abandon its ambitions to join NATO, as well as pledge not to develop nuclear weapons. In exchange, Zelensky asked for Russia to withdraw its troops and provide security guarantees. Any potential deal would, however, be put up for a public referendum, which is likely to complicate matters and take months to carry out.
• Following Biden’s unprecedented comment that Putin “cannot remain in power”, numerous Western allies have sought to distance themselves from the remark. Most notably, French President Emmanuel Macron commented on 27 March that “we shouldn’t escalate, with words or actions” in response to Biden’s statement. Macron has kept lines of communication with Moscow open since the invasion began last month, and he has clearly sought to distance himself from Biden’s remarks in a bit to keep the dialogue with President Putin open. Ultimately, despite the White House walking back the comments, it will likely reinforce paranoia inside the Kremlin that the West is seeking to orchestrate a regime change in Russia, which in turn could undermine the upcoming talks in Turkey.

Economic/business environment developments

• According to the Swiss newspaper NZZ am Sonntag, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) seized millions of dollars worth of Audemars Piguet luxury watches in Moscow, in apparent retaliation for Switzerland’s ban on luxury goods exports to Russia. The FSB cited customs offences as the official reason for the seizure. It is notable that the EU has also banned exports of luxury goods to Russia, but no such seizures of assets have yet been reported against EU firms, though this remains an increasing risk. Switzerland’s decision to sanction Russia over the invasion marked an historic divergence from its traditional neutral foreign policy. As such and given that it is not a member of the EU or NATO, Swiss firms are likely perceived by Russian security services as a less provocative target than EU companies for retaliation. With many governments, including those of Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, reticent to impose energy sanctions on Russia, Moscow may wish to avoid   targeting EU firms with asset seizures as such a move could yet influence their respective governments to support more extensive sanctions packages. Nevertheless, the threat of asset seizures and de facto nationalisations of European and wider international firms will remain high as the impact of sanctions begins to bite.
• The Dutch brewer Heineken announced that the company will terminate its operations in Russia, a decision that is likely to cost the company EUR 400 million. The Danish brewer Carlsberg followed suit on 28 March, pledging to pull out entirely from Russia, where it has 8,400 employees. Although Heineken’s exposure to Russia is relatively small, with the Russian business representing only about 2% of the global sales, the announcement will only put more pressure on the company’s competitors and other corporates to follow suit, as was the apparent case with Carlsberg. At the same time, the decision to pull out of the Russian market will also expose the company and those that protest the war in Ukraine to asset seizures as the Russian government has stepped up its retaliation against companies and governments that it deems “unfriendly” or hostile.
• Following Putin’s announcement last week that payments for Russian gas from the “unfriendly” countries are to be made in rubles, the Russian president has instructed the government to prepare a report with the relevant measures by 31 March. The move, which is designed to strengthen the Russian currency, is however in violation of contract, with the G7 today unanimously rejecting the demands. As such, the likely refusal to pay in rubles will drive the likelihood of Russia suspending supplies, which will not only lead to a sharp increase in prices, but also potential interruptions to industrial production. Whilst the EU is developing plans to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, the planned measures will not mitigate the heightened short-term risk of shortages and price spikes should European countries refuse to agree to Putin’s new terms.
• A new Russian social network, Rossgram, will reportedly be launched today, 28 March. The rapid launch of a new social network follows the blocking of Instagram this month. The development is on trend with the ongoing governmental campaign to establish total control over the information landscape and control the narrative about the war in Ukraine. This was further underlined by the Russian media regulator, Roskomnadzor’s, warning over the weekend for media outlets not to broadcast Zelensky’s interview, threatening platforms with prosecution.
• The Yale School of Management under Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld on 28 March updated a list of Western companies that are still operating inside Russia. 43 companies have been listed as “defying demands for exit or reduction of activities”, while a further 56 have been listed as “holding off new investments/developments”. Sonnenfeld has stated that the aim of the list is to “shame” the named businesses into changing their course and withdraw from Russia by listing their names for investors and consumers to see around the world. Such consumer activism reflects mounting pressure on Western firms to self sanction and sever commercial ties with Russia, despite the fact that formal government sanctions often do not require such a step. The Ukrainian government continues to promote the idea of an international boycott of companies still doing business in Russia, though Kyiv has not published its own definitive list – though various firms have been singled out for censure in official government statements. The Yale campaign has already garnered attention in prominent international news outlets, and will thus reinforce the risk of online or physical activism directed at European and North American companies that refuse to leave Russia.

Humanitarian/evacuation developments

• According to Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk, no humanitarian corridors will open today, 28 March, due to Ukrainian intelligence reports that indicate Russian forces are planning to stage provocations along the routes of the corridors. It remains unclear at this stage when the humanitarian corridors will reopen, but the reports underline the enduring threat of civilian convoys being targeted and cut off during evacuations of key cities, particularly in the east.
• SOCMINT indicates ad-hoc checkpoints and stop-and-search checks by Ukrainian rear echelon units continue to take place on the P02, P69, M07 circular and H01/P01 in Kyiv. These are likely conducted in order to identify potential Russian fifth columnists/saboteurs, and Ukrainian units conducting these checks are believed to be operating on capture/kill orders. As such, those seeking to leave/enter Kyiv should treat such checks with due caution. Finally, there are increasing (unverified) accounts shared on social media of Russian forces firing indiscriminately on private vehicles on westbound routes into Kyiv, highlighting increased desperation on the part of Russian units in the area, but equally highlighting the severe risk to life posed by travelling on westbound routes to and from Kyiv at present.
• For routes toward western Ukraine, the P32 westbound from Bila Tserkva currently remains the safest major westbound road out of Kyiv. However, shelling in Vinnytsia, Vasylkiv and Fastiv remains an ongoing threat, and air raid warnings across the length of the P32 – notably in Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv – highlights the increasing spread of the conflict into western Ukraine, particularly following the strike against a fuel depot in Lviv on 27 March. Therefore, safety cannot be guaranteed on any westbound evacuation routes at present.
• Russian armour and infantry units continue to be dispersed north and south of the E373 and the E40, and as such these routes remain unsafe. The advance around Kyiv remains largely stalled at the time of writing, with Russian land forces regrouping east of Kyiv. We assess that the southwest of the city remains highly unsafe, and that the areas of Fastiv, Obukhiv and Byshev Airport on the westbound P04 represent viable targets for Russian forces in the event that a serious push to encircle Kyiv begins again.

FORECAST

The Kremlin confirmed today that peace talks between the Ukrainian and Russian delegations would likely take place in Turkey tomorrow, 29 March. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered to host the talks during a call with President Vladimir Putin, and while Erdogan hopes the talks will facilitate a ceasefire, this remains unlikely. Both sides remain far apart in terms of what they are willing or unwilling to concede respectively, with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s negotiating position hardening in recent weeks. Ukraine’s position at present includes demands that Russian forces vacate the country and respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, while Zelensky has pledged to put any major peace agreement to a referendum before its implementation – all of which Moscow will clearly reject as non-starters at this stage, particularly as Russian forces recalibrate themselves and prepare for the second phase of the war focused on the Donbas.

Prospects of a face-to-face meeting between Zelensky and Putin furthermore remain low at present, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stating today, 28 March, that such a meeting would prove “counterproductive” and that more progress was needed before any such meeting. In addition, the termination of humanitarian corridors today by the Ukrainians further underlines the challenges of both sides making progress on even tactical humanitarian issues.

• The weekend was dominated by the Russian announcement on Friday afternoon that it had completed Phase 1 of its operation, now accepting that it could not achieve total domination of Ukraine and therefore would focus on the South and Donbas. This was an admission of strategic reality rather than any reflection of a genuine plan. However, it offers a reasonable chance of Russia achieving a degree of mission success that will suffice for Putin.
• The expectation is that this will shape military actions in the coming weeks, with more reserves being fed into the south. Russia has announced the arrival of ten more battalion tactical groups (BTGs) to be committed to this arena. However, the weekend saw no particular shift from recent patterns.
• The most notable incident has been a wave of strikes on strategic targets, mostly fuel depots, in Lviv, Lutsk, Rivne, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dupno, Zhitomyr, and Kramatorsk. Ukraine is suffering significant diesel shortages already, as emphasised in a speech by the Interior Minister, which also highlighted the issue of food supplies being systematically targeted by Russian forces. TV broadcast facilities, military barracks, logistic centres, infrastructure, and aviation facilities in the western and central cities less affected by the war will continue to be targets for precision guided munitions. These attacks are successfully and persistently penetrating Ukrainian air defences.
• The US, Germany, and Poland have offered to supply diesel fuel to Ukraine, further underscoring its importance, as fuel shortages are impacting agriculture as well as military operations, leading to spiralling food prices in areas such as the Middle East. Such shipments will be priority Russian targets, along with any munitions supplies.
• Following the NATO meeting, there is no sign of the more advanced offensive weapon systems requested by Ukraine being supplied. The majority of defensive aid pledged ahead of the conference has reportedly yet to arrive in country, although we believe that enough will be arriving to maintain the current limited pattern of Ukrainian tactical counter-attacks.
• Although Russia has lost ground to small unit infiltration, the units north-west of Kyiv appear to have held firm in their new lines, and intense bombardment is being reported north-east of the city today as well. Russian BTGs are being reconstituted in Belarus following earlier losses, particularly in the VDV (airborne forces), and will likely soon be recommitted around the capital. As expected, Russia has tightened the siege of Chernihiv, shrugging off Ukrainian attacks to fully isolate the city for the first time. It has received waves of bombardment and significant forces have been prepared for an assault, likely to take a similar pattern to Mariupol.
• Ukrainian advances between Sumy and Kharkiv may help to relieve pressure on both cities, and the replacement of the commander of 1st Guards Tank Army outside of Kharkiv shows the Kremlin has judged the conduct of this part of the operation to be particularly poor. However, reserves are being fed into the fight here, including some naval infantry battalions. Kharkiv and Sumy will both continue to face prolonged bombardment, with the latter judged one of the cities most likely to see toxic industrial hazards released on the battlefield.
• In Donbas, which is now officially rather than de facto the Russian main effort, efforts have continued to take ground south and west of the Donets River at Izyum. Pontoon bridges west of the city have seemingly allowed a limited Russian advance by the 144th Motor Rifle Division, although this continues to be held up by Ukrainian resistance. Reinforcements are visible here in the form of naval Infantry. Severodonetsk in the north of Luhansk oblast is the main focus of conflict, with Russian forces of the 3rd Motor Rifle Division attempting to besiege several Ukrainian brigades in the city. An offensive by the Luhansk People’s Militia through Popasnaya will likely continue in an effort to cut off this salient, but will face stiff opposition.
• Further south, offensives continue north and west of Donetsk city. These are encountering little success due to strong resistance in the defensive positions established since 2015, which have multiple layers, and confer strong advantages to the defender. Although Russia would like a breakthrough here to link up with the forces trying to work their way south from Izyum, thereby cutting off a large part of the pre-war Ukrainian military, this is unlikely to materialise in the short term.
• Russia has been making better progress with five BTGs advancing on a wide front north of Mariupol, but these now appear to be held and are facing limited counterattacks east of Huliapilskyi. West of the Dnieper, Ukrainian forces have recaptured areas south of Kryvyi Rih, where around five BTGs are concentrated.
• Ukraine’s hopes currently rely on Kherson, which is facing nightly bombardment. However, the city continues to be well defended with numerous units being brought in to maintain order. There is no sign yet of imminent collapse, despite US statements that the city is no longer under Russian control. This may be due to confusion between the city and the wider Kherson oblast in reporting. Regardless, this remains a focus for Ukraine, not only to stop any further offensive west of the river, but also to hold off any move on Odesa.
• Russian forces in Transnistria continue to be on alert and could be committed in the Ukrainian rear should any offensive on Kherson gain pace. Similarly, an amphibious element continues to sit south of Odesa, although we calculate that most naval infantry from this force have now been committed to the fight elsewhere. Odesa will therefore mainly face bombardment as a distraction tactic to keep Ukrainian forces focused there.
• Overall, Russia has successfully committed reserves to the south including troops from South Ossetia, whose movement we reported last week, now in action north of Mariupol. With the additional commitment of the Naval Infantry and reconstitution of units in Belarus, Moscow appears to be making good its losses, albeit at a lower quality level than at the start of the campaign.
• Future operations by Russian forces are likely to be better planned, with more focused objectives and better support. This will include fighting truly at Brigade/Regimental or even Divisional level, rather than at the BTG level (or even lower) seen so far, which has minimised the impact of offensives. This will require an improvement in battlefield communications, however, which continues to be a major problem for Russia.
• Meanwhile, a move to the defence in many areas has included the laying of rapid minefields and other obstacles that will prevent further significant loss of ground. Supply lines will nonetheless remain vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction, and this will be a continued weak point for Russian forces.
• Russia is gradually increasing aerial dominance, but this will be contested especially in the west due to the number of Ukrainian SAM systems still in operation, meaning that many operations will take place in low light conditions. Helicopters will continue to be the tool of choice in Donbas.
• On 25 March, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) added Russian cyber security firm Kaspersky to the US’ Covered List and banned US firms from buying parts and components without government approval. FCC Commissioner Brandon Carr claimed that the blacklisting will help protect US networks from “Russian state-backed entities seeking to engage in espionage and otherwise harm America’s interests”. This decision follows the German Federal Office for Information Security’s (BSI) early March warning that Kaspersky’s antivirus products could allow Russian hackers to launch cyber attacks or engage in cyber espionage against EU or NATO-based countries. While there is no evidence of such supply chain attacks taking place as of yet, Kaspersky’s blacklisting is one of Washington’s latest efforts to strengthen its cyber security robustness in light of the growing cyber threats linked to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. With these concerns unlikely to abate, there is a high likelihood of additional such Covered List designations and/or cyber security bills being announced. Such actions will further heighten the challenging operating environment that firms with perceived links to Moscow will face in the US in the coming months.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

28 Mar 22. Over 450 Companies Have Withdrawn from Russia — But Some Remain. Since the invasion of Ukraine began, over 450 companies have announced their withdrawal from Russia—but some companies have continued to operate in Russia undeterred.

Originally conceptualized as a simple “withdraw” vs. “remain” list, our new list of companies now consists of five categories:

1) WITHDRAWAL – Clean Break: companies completely halting Russian engagements/exiting Russia;

2) SUSPENSION – Keeping Options Open for Return: companies temporarily curtailing operations while keeping return options open;

3) SCALING BACK – Reducing Activities: companies scaling back some business operations while continuing others;

4) BUYING TIME – Holding Off New Investments/Developments: companies postponing future planned investment/development/marketing while continuing substantive business;

5) DIGGING IN – Defying Demands for Exit: companies defying demands for exit/reduction of activities

The list can be downloaded from the Yale website as an excel spreadsheet,  (make sure to “download” the file from Box as an excel document rather than “previewing” for best file quality)

The list is updated continuously by Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his team of experts, research fellows, and students at the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute to reflect new announcements from companies in as close to real time as possible.

Our list has already garnered extensive coverage for its role in helping catalyze the mass corporate exodus from Russia.

When this list was first published the week of February 28, only several dozen companies had announced their departure.

Hundreds of companies have withdrawn in the days since, and we are humbled that our list helped galvanize millions around the world to raise awareness and take action.

Although we are pleased that our list has been widely circulated across company boardrooms, government officials, and media outlets as the most authoritative and comprehensive record of this powerful, historic movement, we are most inspired by the thousands of messages we have received from readers across the globe, especially those from Ukraine, and we continue to welcome your tips, insights, and feedback at . (Source:  Sibylline/Yale)

 

25 Mar 22. Ukraine conflict: NATO leaders approve four new battlegroups in Eastern Europe. NATO leaders meeting during an extraordinary summit in Brussels on 24 March 2022 approved the establishment of four new multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe. France will lead a battlegroup in Romania; the Czech Republic, one in Slovakia; and Bulgaria and Hungary have offered battlegroups on their own territory. The Slovak parliament has approved the deployment of up to 2,100 soldiers on its territory. The Czech-led battlegroup will have troops from Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United States. The Chamber of Deputies of the Czech parliament on 24 March approved the deployment of up to 650 members of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) to Slovakia until 30 June 2023. The Czech contingent will consist of at least 400, including combat and logistics support units, and military police. The ACR will initially deploy soldiers from the 43rd Airborne Regiment and 73rd Tank Battalion, plus electronic warfare specialists and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). (Source: Janes)

 

28 Mar 22. Even Putin’s Praetorian Guard is turning against him. You’d think a ruthless autocrat who believes he faces a West that wants to unseat him using people power would make damn sure to keep his Praetorian Guard on side. You’d think. After all, it has long been one of the Kremlin’s tenets that the West is committed to first isolating and then reshaping Russia using a ‘colour revolution’ or ‘Trojan Horse’ strategy. The idea is that popular revolutions and street protests are mobilised and weaponised by the dark arts of western ‘political technologists’, with military force deployed only as a last resort. Rising against post-Soviet authoritarians? The protests against rigged elections in Russia and Putin’s return to the presidency from 2011 to 13? The Syrian Civil War? The Ukrainian ‘EuroMaidan’ revolution of 2014? The mass demonstrations against Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko last year? None of these, of course, could be natural, organic responses to corrupt and unresponsive regimes. Instead, they were made in Langley, CIA operations in every case (although the Kremlin would generously single out MI6 for a supporting role). In that context, no wonder Putin has been preparing for a fight against ‘fifth columnists’ for years. One of the main expressions of this was the creation of the Rosgvardiya, or National Guard, in 2016. What this meant was that some 180,000 security personnel (and as many private security guards) were transferred from an Interior Ministry that was beginning to show some discomfort at being expected to be the Kremlin’s stormtroopers into a new force under General Viktor Zolotov, a man who could be counted on to show none. (Source: Spectator)

 

28 Mar 22. Estonian president: Nato must bolster its eastern flank before it’s too late. A permanent allied presence will make clear to Putin that we are poised for a forceful military response. Seventy three years ago, more than 22,000 people were forcibly taken from my country to Siberia. Half of them were women. A third were children. The youngest of those deported was just three days old. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 left the Baltic states stranded on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Today, we watch as Russia attempts to reestablish this divide. Ukrainian families caught up in the middle of the war are transported to a country that is not their own. A six-year-old boy with shrapnel in his skull describes, without tears, how his mother had burnt to death in their car after it was hit by a Russian shell. This scene took place just a 90-minute flight from Tallinn, Berlin or Bucharest. This is happening in Europe, and Ukraine needs our help. In a way, Vladimir Putin has already lost his war, as indicated by the vote at the UN General Assembly, where Russia was supported by just four countries with 141 others demanding an end to hostilities. Even during the cold war, the Soviet Union was never this isolated. However, a cold war-era economy is exactly where Russia is heading as a result of the far-reaching economic and political sanctions imposed by democratic countries. Our military assistance and weapons are bolstering Ukrainians as they defend their country, its sovereignty and their freedom. But they need more. (Source: FT.com)

 

28 Mar 22. Armenia – Azerbaijan: Ceasefire violation accusation highlights concerns over Nagorno-Karabakh escalation. On 26 March, Russia’s Defence Ministry accused Azerbaijan of breaking a ceasefire agreement after its armed forces entered a Russian peacekeeping zone in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Moscow claimed that these actions represented a violation of the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement that ended the six-week war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020. In an expression of “severe concern” over mounting regional tensions, Moscow reportedly also called on Baku to withdraw troops from the region. This marks the first time that Russia has accused a party of violating the ceasefire agreement, notable given that Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) alliance and has supported Russia in Ukraine in the past month. The incident and condemnation underscore enduring volatility in the disputed region, which will remain a flashpoint for localised attacks and the consequent further deterioration in bilateral relations in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

28 Mar 22. Six JEF nations conduct FONOP patrols in Baltic Sea region. The JEF partners resupplied military vehicles and equipment to the UK-led Nato Battlegroup in Estonia. The UK Royal Navy along with its Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) partners have conducted freedom of navigation (FONOP) patrols in the Baltic Sea region. Ships, aircraft and personnel from the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania took part in the mission. The UK Royal Navy’s HMS Northumberland and HMS Richmond joined Danish frigate HDMS Niels Juel and vessels of the other remaining countries to conduct maritime patrols. The assets also participated in a series of joint exercises to showcase and strengthen their interoperability capabilities. The UK Royal Air Force’s new Poseidon P8A and submarine hunter aircraft rehearsed with the ships to spot enemy vessels. In addition, Swedish Gripen fighter jets and Danish F-16s practised different air defence tactics with the ships.

UK Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) commander major general Jim Morris said: “Activities such as these in the Baltic Sea are routine business for us and our JEF partners, in one of our principal areas of geographical interest. Given the current level of aggression being displayed by Russia, there has never been a more important time to ensure that freedom of navigation is maintained in the Baltic Sea.”

Furthermore, the JEF naval vessels and aircraft delivered vital supplies to the UK-led Nato Battlegroup in Estonia. The deployment aims to enhance security and stability in the Baltic Sea region, amid the Ukraine crisis. According to the UK Government, the number of troops deployed to Estonia and Poland have also been doubled, to strengthen Nato deployment in the eastern defences amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Royal Danish Navy chief rear admiral Torben Mikkelson said: “The current situation calls for increased focus on the security of the Baltic Sea and stability of our region. The Danish Navy will, with our partners in the JEF alliance, do our utmost to contribute to that.”

Launched in 2015, the JEF coalition is made up of ten nations and focuses on enhancing security in the Baltic Sea region, the High North and the North Atlantic. (Source: naval-technology.com)

 

25 Mar 22. Stinger and Javelin production can be boosted, says Army acquisitions chief.  The production of critical Stinger and Javelin missile systems can be boosted, said the U.S. Army’s acquisitions and logistics head, allowing the United States to refill its arsenals after sending thousands of the systems to Eastern Europe in support of Ukraine.

“I think, really, those are two opportunities for the Army to rapidly move ahead, the way Congress wants us to replenish those stocks,” Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Doug Bush said during a March 25 Defense News event. “I think we can do it.”

Speeding or increasing production of the anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, though, involves heaps of considerations: long-lead procurement, ancillary equipment, field needs and supply chain concerns. Those “exact issues,” Bush said, are being looked at “right now.”

“Congress provided a large amount of money in the omnibus to help us replenish our stocks, which we greatly appreciate,” he said. “And we are very close to being ready to inform Congress of our first moves in that direction.”

Passed by Congress earlier this month, the $1.5trn fiscal year 2022 government funding package included $728bn for national security.

The legislation also sets aside $13.6bn in aid to Ukraine, $3bn of which is dedicated to supplying new weapons — such as Javelins — to the besieged government.

Russia’s massing of troops on the Ukrainian border, its invasion in late February and the ongoing war there have put Stingers and Javelins in the spotlight. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly sought the arms, which they say will give their country an upper hand on the battlefield.

“We need as much Stingers and anti-tank equipment as possible to protect our peaceful cities,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said in a video shared to Youtube Feb. 24. “In order to provide for reliable procurement of equipment, you may deliver it to Poland. From there, we will transport them across the land and quickly saturate our defense.”

The U.S. has sent Ukraine an array of weapons and other military equipment in recent weeks. An $800 million security package announced March 16 included 800 Stinger and 2,000 Javelin systems. The White House at the time said the gear would help the Ukrainian military “defend their country against Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion.”

Previous commitments included more than 600 Stingers and roughly 2,600 Javelins.

The Russia-Ukraine war has publicly proven the value of logistics, Bush told Defense News.

“The Army, of course, one thing we bring to the fight for the joint forces is logistics capability at massive scale,” the acquisitions chief said. “If you can look at anything, you could point at that and say that this is a reminder of just how important that is. We kind of take it for granted, because the Army is so good at it. But it doesn’t just happen.” (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)

 

25 Mar 22. Budget hikes test shared European Union spending goals. The billions of euros in additional defense spending promised by European governments after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have made the German phrase “Zeitenwende,” referencing a turning point for a more muscular military posture, look like an understatement. Germany announced it will spend an extra 100 billion euros on armaments over five to 10 years, while even the Italian parliament — traditionally dubious about defense — backed a vote to push Italian spending to 2% of GDP, making clear just how fast things are moving. The talk of extra cash has come with bold statements about shared new programs and industry cooperation — a logical corollary of the newfound military vigor on the continent. But experts are cautious, warning the exact opposite may happen as nations worry about protecting their own, strategic defense industries in a time of war and focus the funds on domestic programs, draining resources from European initiatives and delaying, rather than accelerating, a coherent European defense capability. The drive to quickly plug capability holes also could skew the trans-Atlantic defense market in favor of readily-available U.S. weapons, undermining the objective of nurturing a European industrial ecosystem capable of underwriting the bloc’s political ambitions.

More cash may mean less, not more, Europe — or as one analyst put it: “European defense might be about to die of indigestion.”

The dynamic is not lost on key decision makers in Brussels, where EU military acquisition chiefs took stock of the way ahead at the European Defense Agency headquarters earlier this month.

Jiří Šedivý, the agency’s chief executive, finds himself beating the drum of spending coordination ever louder. “Quick decisions should not mean hasty and thoughtless decisions,” he said. “On the contrary: We need to spend more wisely.

At the same time, Šedivý acknowledged there is a place for fast fixes, as Europeans come to terms with a Russian regime bent on restoring a Soviet-style zone of influence in the continent’s east. “Let’s be realistic,” he told Defense News. “At this specific moment a lot will have to be bought off-the-shelf, including from the United States.”

While there should be a preference for European-made equipment, ideally developed through multinational cooperation, Šedivý argued acquisitions from outside the bloc should at least be “done together, in coordination.”

In short, European states must take a deep breath before going on spending sprees, said Ester Sabatino, a research analyst with International Institute for Strategic Studies’ office in Berlin. “They need to sit down and have a discussion about balancing local industry and quick purchases against the EU becoming a global defense player and halting centrifugal forces pulling member states apart,” she said.

Fresh guidance

Europe’s leaders have continued to push cooperation this month, and some analysts believe the bloc by now has instituted sufficient guardrails prizing coordinated spending.

For example, EU leaders meeting in Versailles on March 11 called for more “collaborative investments in joint projects and joint procurement of defense capabilities.

Next came the EU’s new Strategic Compass document, approved this week, calling for a new 5,000-strong rapid reaction force but also “further incentives for member states to engage in collaborative capability development.”

The document talks of “overcoming fragmentation” and “economies of scale” and lists systems that would benefit from teamwork, including tanks, “Soldier Systems,” patrol vessels, “Anti Access Area Denial capacities,” anti-drone technology, space defense and “Enhanced Military Mobility.”

But Italian analyst Michele Nones warned that in a time of war, governments are more likely to buy new kit fast, and spend it on their home industries — tendencies that would not favor multi-national programs.

“The risk of uncoordinated spending is rising,” said Nones, vice president at Italian think tank IAI.

“Why not create a joint European procurement fund built on the fresh funds being provided now?” he asked. “Why should that be a taboo? After all, no one thought there would be a land war in Europe — there are no more taboos.”

A rash of quick purchases of current products from domestic industries would slow down future moves towards commonality, Nones added. “There are joint EU research and development programs, but when they come to fruition, who will buy those products if they have stocked up in the meantime?” he said.

Member states have several programs underway, like the Eurodrone or a new main battle tank, that will take years to come to fruition, but for which weapons exist on the global market that could reasonably fit urgent needs today.

Additionally, companies will feel less of a need to look for cross-border mergers and joint ventures if their home governments are keeping the orders coming, argued Nones. And with fewer mergers, governments will be less inclined to consider multi-national orders.

“Mergers occur in times of crisis, not when budgets are expanding,” he said.

In France, strong support for the country’s national defense and technological base is expected to continue, with Paris likely to use a portion of new spending to build partnerships with non-traditional partners and tech start-ups, according to analyst Simona Soare, also of the IISS think tank’s Berlin office.

But while national military priorities will remain a priority, French President Emanuel Macron has used France’s six-month tenure as president of the European Union Council to push for a more unified defense strategy and spending across the alliance, she noted. To that end, the European Defense Agency picked up a key tasking at the EU’s Versailles confab earlier this month: an analysis of defense investment gaps and additional initiatives “necessary to strengthen the European defense industrial and technological base,” according to the summit’s final declaration. The study is due in mid-May. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)

 

28 Mar 22. Why hasn’t Russia used its ‘full scope’ of electronic warfare?

“The Ukrainians still have good command and control over their forces in the field in ways that the Russians actually don’t have,” Pentagon press secretary John Kirby told reporters last week.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is now a month old, and Ukraine’s stiff resistance has exposed wide issues with Russia’s perceived military dominance. While Russia’s military challenges are pervasive, one surprising situation sticks out to puzzled experts: the apparent lack of widespread use of advanced electronic warfare capabilities.

At the beginning of March, a senior defense official said that the Russian military had yet to use its “full scope” of EW, but stated that “we do have indications that in some places they have used EW to their advantage, particularly in jamming, at a local level.” Weeks later, the Pentagon still assesses that Ukrainian forces retain command and control of their military.

“The Ukrainians still have good command and control over their forces in the field in ways that the Russians actually don’t have,” Pentagon press secretary John Kirby told reporters on March 22.

That is not what many experts expected to happen, given Russia’s well-documented buildup of advanced electronic warfare platforms and its proven use in the 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

“I would have, prior to the invasion, assessed that Ukrainian logistics and command and control would be hampered, that UAVs would be targeted, quite extensively, and that they would struggle to coordinate a response against the Russian forces,” said Sam Cranny-Evans, a C4ISR research analyst at the London-based think tank Royal United Services Institute.

One of the reasons the Russians haven’t been able to use the full range of EW capabilities is because the Ukrainians are fighting an “irregular” war than what Russia’s EW systems are designed to challenge, said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. They’re dispersed, operating in much smaller units and using a combination of Western-supplied radios that the Russians aren’t necessarily able to detect easily.

He added that emissions from Ukrainian forces using their cell phones are also being caught up in other civilian emissions, making it harder for Russian forces to find Ukrainians in the forest of electromagnetic spectrum emissions.

Laurie Buckhout, a retired Army colonel who specializes in EW, told Breaking Defense that the non-contiguous battlefield could be impacting Russian decision-making on its electronic warfare capabilities. For example, in 2014 the battlefield had an obvious forward line of troops that allowed for the Russian military to jam without impacting their own communications. That’s made more difficult without a distinct forward edge and Russian forces trying to surround multiple cities.

“When you’re [the Russia military] trying to get into Kyiv and you’re trying to surround the city and there’s people all around you …you need to be a little more careful and more surgical,” Buckhout said. “So you’re not going to see some of the broadband, high range stuff that you saw the first time into Ukraine … because you’ve got now your own troops in that area.”

Russian military advances in Ukraine have largely stalled amid fierce Ukrainian resistance and significant logistical issues, including lack of fuel or getting stuck in the mud. For example, Buckhout said that Russia’s airborne EW system, like a helicopter with an EW payload, is only valuable if there is a capable ground attack.

“If you wanted to blind and deafen your enemy when you were about to go after him with heavy armor, you would have a helicopter up then,” Buckhout said. “But if your armor’s bogged down in mud or soldiers are surrendering or giving up their vehicles because they’re out of fuel, you’re not going to put your helicopters up to support that, because there’s not going to be a heavy armor attack. Why put your asset up there for it to be taken down if there’s not an operation worthy of it happening on the ground?”

What’s Being Missed?

Another question is how observers know that the Russian forces aren’t using electronic warfare — particularly given that it’s an invisible capability. Cranny-Evans explained that just because it’s not being observed, in part because “good EW” is very targeted, doesn’t mean it isn’t happening.

“You try and find a specific radio and you jam that specific radio, or you jam a number of radios in an area. You don’t take down everything because you need it as well,” Cranny-Evans said. “So I’m very reticent to say that we haven’t seen it because it’s not observed. And B, the Ukrainians will be the last to admit that they’re having problems communicating.”

According to a 2017 report from the International Centre for Defence and Security, Russia’s EW portfolio is geared toward challenging NATO communications, radars, unmanned aerial vehicles and other sensors. For Sergey Sukhankin, a senior fellow at Jamestown Foundation, Russia’s lack of extensive use of its EW capabilities is showcased by Ukraine’s success using Bayraktars and other types of killer drones.

Ukrainian drones have “managed to derail at least part of the supplies of fuel and other important commodities, and basically, Russia was unwilling or unable … to deal [with] it,” Sukhankin said.

However, experts said Russia will likely increase its use of electronic warfare as the war progresses. Clark said the Russia military is “adapting and learning” to new radios used by Ukrainian forces and how they can be jammed.

“So I think what we’re going to see in the EW world is just a steady increase in the use of EW by Russian forces, because at this point, the EW capabilities that they have… been using in the past are mostly designed around ground force operations,” Clark said. “I think you’ll see more and more of that, especially the use of UAVs because I think early on they were reticent to use a lot of their UAV-based EW systems because the Ukrainians had a bunch of these air defense systems [and] stinger missiles.” (Source: Breaking Defense.com)