Ukraine Conflict Update

Ukraine Conflict Update – 04 May

Military and hard security developments

Multiple long-range Russian missile strikes targeted eight regions across Ukraine overnight, marking one of the largest long-distance offensives since the invasion on 24 February. The strikes notably targeted Ukraine’s railway infrastructure and damaged electricity substations in the western city of Lviv. Railway stations in central and western Ukraine have been targeted on several occasions in the last two months and underline the enduring risk of Russia targeting key infrastructure sites across the country. This threat will continue to remain very high as Moscow increases pressure on the Donbas and steps up efforts to disrupt the flow of military aid to Ukraine from the West. Moreover, as Russia’s forces struggle to gain traction in the east and south, last night’s strikes were also likely meant to send a message to Kyiv and the West that no part of Ukraine is safe.
Additionally, Germany is reportedly in the process of considering the possibility of shipping rapid-fire howitzers to Kyiv. Although Chancellor Scholz is still debating such measures, Berlin has notably increased its military support for Ukraine in recent weeks, including last week’s authorisation for the transfer of 50 Gepard anti-aircraft tanks. Moreover, Germany has also announced its willingness to support an EU-wide embargo on Russian oil imports. As such, should the rapid-fire artillery systems be approved for dispatchment to Ukraine, the development would mark an even greater shift in German policy and escalate tensions with Russia, potentially increasing the threat of Russian retaliation.
On 4 May, Belarus launched “surprise” military drills, with the Belarusian Ministry of Defence stating that the combat readiness exercise “will involve the movement of significant numbers of military vehicles, as the Belarusian military units test their capacity and readiness to “react rapidly to a possible crisis”. The drills will inevitably be closely monitored by Ukraine given the enduring threat of Minsk sending troops into Ukraine to support Russia’s invasion. Nevertheless, it is likely that the surprise exercises represent a show of force and intended to keep the pressure on Kyiv, rather than being an actual troop deployment masked as an exercise.

Diplomatic and strategic developments

During his visit to an arms manufacturing plant in Troy, Alabama on 3 May, US President Joe Biden praised the swiftness with which the US has provided military support to Ukraine since Russia invaded in February. Additionally, Biden also stated that “if you don’t stand up to dictators […] they keep coming”, a comment aimed at Russian President Vladimir Putin. Biden’s visit to the factory and his comments also came just before the aforementioned long-range strikes across Ukraine, likely in response to the ongoing US-led efforts to support Ukraine militarily. With the US and the West collectively largely backing Ukraine and pledging ever more aid, the threat of further long-range strikes against strategic infrastructure and routes transporting, or believed to be transporting, weapons shipments to Ukraine will remain high.
Russian media reported on 3 May that another attempt to destroy the radio and television centre in the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria has been prevented. The incident is in line with our previous assessment that additional instability and false flag operations in Transnistria are very likely to continue in the days and weeks ahead. The Ukrainian General Staff also reportedly stated that Russian officials are preparing the ground for evacuations of Russian military families from Transnistria, indicating that an escalation remains likely – though less probable in the immediate term. Nevertheless, in response to the heightened tensions in Transnistria, in a joint press conference with Moldovan President Maia Sandu, EU Council President Charles Michel said that the EU is considering further ways to support Moldova, such as building up Moldova’s forces. Michel did not comment on the specifics in order to “avoid any escalation” but did confirm that “some decisions” including enhanced support in the cyber defence and logistics fields have been taken. The developments will only reinforce tensions with Russia and sustain instability in Transnistria.
In a further sign of diplomatic tensions, on 4 May, Russia’s foreign ministry announced an indefinite entry ban on 63 Japanese individuals, accusing them of propagating “unacceptable rhetoric” against Moscow. The list includes Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi and Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi, along with lawmakers, academics, and journalists. The move is in retaliation to the Japanese government’s coordination with its Western partners in imposing the toughest sanctions on Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. Tokyo has applied sanctions on Russian banks, government officials and oligarchs, as well as revoking the most-favoured-nation trading status and taking action to reduce its energy reliance on Russia. Although Moscow’s latest move is largely a symbolic one, it is indicative of the deteriorating ties with Tokyo. In particular, rising diplomatic rhetoric will likely translate to heightened tensions over the Kuril Islands territorial dispute, with Tokyo formally declaring the four northern islands “illegally occupied” by Russia in its 2022 Diplomatic Bluebook for the first time since 2003. Having recently withdrawn from the peace talks on the issue, Moscow may ramp up military and commercial activities in and around the islands.
Televised comments on 2 May by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claiming that Hitler had Jewish origins and that “Jewish people say that the biggest antisemites are Jews themselves” have significantly heightened tensions with Israel. The statements have been strongly criticised by Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Naftali Bennet and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, with Lapid describing the comments as “unforgivable and outrageous”. These have been followed by statements on 4 May, by a spokesperson for Russia’s foreign ministry that Israeli mercenaries were fighting alongside the far-right Azov Regiment in Ukraine, further driving tensions. While Israel has maintained a mediating stance between Ukraine and Russia over the past months, such developments and a further deterioration of bilateral relations between Russia and Israel could prompt the latter to take a more decisive role. According to reporting by Israeli newspapers, officials are expected to support sending additional military aid to Ukraine. However, while this may take the shape of defensive weapons, provisions are likely to remain limited, in order to maintain a functional relationship with Russia. The latter continues to have significant influence regarding regional security dynamics across the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon and Syria, vis-à-vis Iranian influence. While Israel will likely face increased pressure domestically, it is unlikely to ship heavier military gear, with the current supplies stemming largely from NATO countries and, in particular, the US.

Economic/business environment developments

On 4 May, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a proposal to incorporate a phased ban on Russian oil imports into the European Union, speaking to members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Ambassadors from the EU27 will meet later today in Strasbourg to debate the proposal, which will require unanimous support from the heads of state of the European Union before being voted into effect. As part of a broader sixth sanctions package incorporating targeted sanctions against Russian finance and general industry, a phased-out ban on Russian oil marks a substantial development in European unity and will have a significant impact on the Russian economy. However, as several Brussels-based think-tanks have noted, firstly, whilst the ban would be phased in – expected to be fully in force by the end of 2022 – it will expose firms operating across the EU to greater risk of disruption, particularly those in Germany, Austria and Italy. Secondly, the move may elicit a more substantial response from the Kremlin, particularly in the form of a ban on general energy exports into the European Union. Such a tit-for-tat move would expose firms and national governments to further risk of energy instability and compound the current energy price crisis.
Additionally, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Liz Truss announced new sanctions against Russia, including a ban on all service exports, cutting Moscow off from UK management consultants, accountants and public relations firms. As such, Russian businesses will no longer be able to access the expertise of UK firms, upon which Russia is very reliant, amid ongoing moves to drive up the pressure on Russia’s economy. The sanctions furthermore include travel bans and asset freezes for individuals connected to Russian-state media, including employees of Channel One, a large state-owned media outlet. The latest UK sanctions follow yesterday’s pledge from UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson for an additional GBP 300 million military aid package to Ukraine. As such, the developments will only further aggravate relations with Russia and drive risk of Russian counter sanctions and retaliation against the UK.

Humanitarian/evacuation developments

As evinced by the missile strikes in Lviv on 3 May and the strikes on downtown Kyiv on 28 April, there remains a significant risk of targeted and indiscriminate air and missile strikes across central and western Ukraine. Despite their withdrawal from Kyiv oblast on 6 April, Russian forces retain the ability to strike across the entirety of Ukraine, and will likely continue to target major transport infrastructure (particularly railways and airfields) believed to be transit points for Western military aid. This will seriously impact efforts to move humanitarian aid into Ukraine, and particularly to move existing aid into eastern Ukraine, where food, water and power shortages continue to escalate in severity.
The H01/P01 and the E40 roads are the most viable routes for road access to and from Kyiv. The E40 and the E373 highways were declared ‘open’ for traffic by Ukrainian authorities and are now relatively safe, however, they remain heavily damaged and road-clearing processes continue which may cause delays. The threat of air attacks remains high and therefore, safety cannot be guaranteed on any westbound evacuation routes. The threat posed by mines and unexploded ordnance also remains high across Kyiv oblast. We note that this advisory is supported by a warning from the Kyiv Region Military Administration on 12 April stating that de-occupied towns and settlements adjacent to Kyiv should not be re-settled by civilian populations due to high quantities of mines and unexploded ordnance.
Due to air attacks on Kremenchuk and Uman on 25 April, the westbound E50 road to Oleksandriya and from there the H01 highway seems to be a relatively safer route from Dnipro to Kyiv. Between Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, there are two main road routes: the H08 and E105. Due to Russian military targeting civilian and military aviation infrastructure with missile strikes, we believe there is substantial risk associated with all road routes into Zaporizhzhia, as the H08 is close to Shyroke Airfield just north-west of Zaporizhzhia, and the E105 passes through Zaporizhzhia International Airport and then Vilniansk Airfield. As such, we assess that all approaches into Zaporizhzhia face elevated risk from air/missile strikes at present.

FORECAST

On 4 May, Russia’s defence ministry announced that it has disabled six railway stations across Ukraine used to supply Kyiv with western military aid. The statements followed numerous long-range strikes across Ukraine, including in the western and central parts of the country, with last night’s strikes also coinciding with President Biden’s visit to a Javelin factory, which has been one of the crucial elements of assistance provided to Ukraine. The developments are on trend with Russia’s threats to target strategic infrastructure and routes transporting, or believed to be transporting, weapons shipments to Ukraine. Moreover, indications that the EU will increase its support to Moldova, will only reaffirm the view in Russia of an increasing Western involvement close to Russia’s borders, and drive the risk of further Russian interdictions of weapons supplies in western Ukraine and false flag attacks in Transnistria in the weeks ahead.

Additionally, the Russian government has increasingly been shifting the narrative and encouraging the public to perceive the war in Ukraine as being against NATO. As such, it remains possible, that Putin could use 9 May to announce mobilisation and the expansion of the military campaign. Although unconfirmed, Ukraine’s intelligence noted this week that the Kremlin has in fact already initiated the preparation for potential mobilisation processes, with Russia seeking to legitimise its prolonged war in Ukraine. Notably, today the Kremlin denied reports that Putin will formally declare a war on Ukraine and that there are no plans to announce general mobilisation on 9 May, dismissing such media reports as “nonsense.” However, the denial was expected given that the Kremlin would not publicly admit to its plans. As such, an escalation of hostilities and even potentially a formal annexation of the occupied parts of the Donbas remain possible, as the pressure on the Kremlin to solidify its control over the captured territories grows amid the slow military progress and continuous supply of western military aid to Ukraine.

European Union: Sixth sanctions package elevates policy and operational risks for European businesses. On 4 May, the European Union will unveil its sixth proposed sanctions package which will reportedly aim to remove the Credit Bank of Moscow, the Russian Agricultural bank as well as Sberbank from the SWIFT international payment system. Furthermore, the new sanctions package will impose sanctions on Belarus’ main potash companies, the Belarusian oil refinery Naftan and on Russia’s oil industry, phasing out Russian oil imports from Europe by the end of 2022. Nevertheless, the sanctions package will likely include some exemptions or transitionary measures for EU countries heavily reliant on Russian oil to weather the sanction’s economic impact. As EU member states continue to look for alternative suppliers, it is likely that rising fuel prices will further exacerbate socio-economic health risks in the region in the short to near term, and elevate policy and operational risks for businesses.

Russian efforts to encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine continued, with the VDV, 1st Tank Army, 20th, 29th, 35th, and 36th Combined Arms Armies, as well as the 68th Army Corps operating towards Barvinkove from Izyum. Moreover, Russian forces sustained their fire along the Donetsk-Luhansk line, but no ground attacks were confirmed on 3 May. Meanwhile, several Russian units and forces from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic, were reportedly regrouping in order to advance towards Lyman and Slovyansk.
According to the UK Ministry of Defence, Russian forces deployed 22 battalion tactical groups in Izium to sustain their northward advance in the Donbas. The build-up also suggests possible Russian intentions to capture not just Izium, but also Kramatorsk and Severodonetsk, which would allow Russian forces to better control the north-eastern part of the Donbas region and to cut-off Ukrainian forces.
In Mariupol, Russian forces continued their air, ground, and artillery attacks against the Azovstal Steel Plant following preliminary evacuation of civilians. According to the mayor of Mariupol, on 3 May over 200 civilians and approximately 100,000 civilians remained in the Azovstal steel plant and Mariupol, respectively. Further efforts by Ukraine, the UN, and the Red Cross to evacuate more civilians to Zaporizhzia resumed on 4 May. Though Russian forces conducted ground offensives in Zaporizhia, these were limited, with no new territories reportedly seized. Moreover, Russian forces attacked Zaluznychne likely to secure the northbound T0401 highway.
On 3 May, unconfirmed videos on social media showed Ukrainian forces allegedly conducting an artillery attack against Russian supply convoy of approximately 30 vehicles in Vesele, Kharkiv region. Videos and imagery indicated that all vehicles had been destroyed. The attack would mark a major blow to Russian re-supply efforts, ultimately worsening their combat capabilities and likely lowering troop morale.
At around 2030 (local time) on 3 May Russian several strikes hit the western city of Lviv in multiple directions, damaging two power substations. As a result, six railway stations used to resupply Ukrainian forces with Western-supplied weapons were disabled, according to the Russian Ministry of Defence. The Ministry added that Russian forces had also struck 40 Ukrainian military targets, which included 3 ammunition and artillery depots.
Additionally, a Russian missile strike also hit Transcarpathia, a region close to the Slovakian and Hungarian border, marking the first attack in this in this region. Last night’s strikes across western Ukraine and close to the Slovakian and Polish borders were highly likely in response to the Slovakian and Polish Ministries of Defence agreement over the weekend for Polish F-16C/D aircraft to patrol Slovak airspace to allow the latter to transfer 12 Mig-29 fighter aircraft to Ukraine. Russia will continue to carry out such attacks in a bid to deter the transport of military equipment to Ukraine, and Moscow has previously threatened to target western arms deliveries and their routes. On 4 May, in fact, RIA news agency reported Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu as saying that Russian forces would consider NATO transport carrying weapons to Ukraine as legitimate targets.
Several other Ukrainian regions were also targeted in long-range strikes, including Vinnytsia, over which two missiles were reportedly shot down on 3 May. A cruise missile, reportedly heading towards Kyiv, was also allegedly shot down by Ukrainian air defences. Local authorities in the central Kirovohrad oblast also reported missile strikes. Last night’s strikes notably targeted railway infrastructure across Ukraine and underline the enduring risk of Russia targeting key infrastructure sites in western and central Ukraine. This threat will remain high as Moscow increases pressure on the Donbas and steps up efforts to undermine Ukraine’s ability to reinforce the region. According to Ukrainian media, Ukrainian troops repelled 12 Russian attacks in Donbas on 3 May alone, which allegedly resulted in the destruction of 6 main battle tanks (MBTs), 2 artillery systems, 3 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 15 armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), and 9 cars.
The Russian Ministry of Defence, in fact, released a video on 3 May showing Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles being fired from K-300P Bastion-P coastal defence systems against land targets, claiming they had destroyed a Ukrainian logistical centre. The use of such missiles, which are highly expensive, is understood to indicate that Russian forces may be running low on other types of precision guided munitions (PGMs).
A video released on Facebook on 3 May showed an alleged Ukrainian Bayraktar-2 drone strike against two Russian military positions on the currently Russian-occupied Snake Island.
Elsewhere, Russian media reported on 3 May that another attempt to destroy the radio and television centre in the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria has been prevented. The incident is in line with our previous assessment that additional instability and false flag operations in Transnistria are very likely to continue in the days and weeks ahead. The Ukrainian General Staff also reportedly stated that Russian officials are preparing the ground for evacuations of Russian military families from Transnistria, indicating a potential escalation. However, Russian combat power is still limited in the west, diminishing the risk of Russian forces in the region being deployed in Ukraine in the immediate term. As such, current instability in Transnistria is likely an attempt to keep up the pressure on the Ukrainian forces in the region and allows Russia to signal the enduring threat to Odesa, which will serve to help to force Kyiv to commit resources to the region, and subsequently stop them from deploying elsewhere.
In response to the instability in Transnistria, on 4 May, EU Council President Charles Michel stated that the EU was considering providing more military support, including military equipment and cyber defences, to Moldova in order to “cope with the consequences of the spill-over” in Ukraine. While additional military support will be welcomed by Moldova, such statements are likely to consequently increase the risk of further false flag attacks in Transnistria.
Lastly, on 4 May, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated that the armed forces of neighbouring Belarus had begun a sudden large-scale military drill, raising questions whether the exercise represents a show of force, or a troop deployment masked as an exercise. The Belarusian Ministry of Defence stated that the ‘combat readiness exercise’ “will involve the movement of significant numbers of military vehicles, which can slow down traffic on public roads”. Regardless, Ukrainian forces will likely monitor the border to gather intelligence about the scale and purpose of the drills. Additional NATO air reconnaissance patrols near Ukraine and Belarus are likely to be sustained to monitor Belarusian troops, likely relaying relevant intelligence to Ukraine.

Europe: Fresh EU Sanctions. Late on 3 May, European Union officials released a draft statement to EU member state representatives outlining the sixth round of sanctions on Russia in response to its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Whilst the package is widely expected to include punitive measures against Russian firms and government, a ban on Russian oil imports to the EU is also expected to form part of the sanctions package. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will confirm the substance and adoption of the package later today.

According to leaked assessments of the sixth sanctions package, the latest wave of sanctions will target Russian banks including Sberbank, removing the top Russian lender from the SWIFT international messaging system alongside other Russian banks as yet unaffected by the SWIFT ban.
The sanctions package will also enact an embargo on oil imports from Russia into the EU, in a phased reduction expected to take place over at least six months. While several EU member states remain reliant on Russian oil, President von der Leyen has stated that “additional measures” will be taken to shore up regional energy security and improve solidarity between member states to permit a more rapid divestment from Russian energy.
The move to divest from Russian oil may however provoke a more extreme response from the Kremlin, with several Brussels-based think tanks warning that a punitive halt on EU-bound gas and oil may be called for by Russian officials in retaliation to the latest sanctions package.

FORECAST

While the move to cut Russian oil imports to the EU will pose policy risk to firms operating across the bloc, most European states are already moving ahead rapidly with national initiatives to diversify and divest from Russian energy sources. Germany, which imported as much as 35 percent of its crude oil from Russia in 2021, has reduced its reliance by almost two-thirds to 12 percent as of May 2022. Furthermore, the phased nature of the oil embargo will give firms most likely to be affected time to adapt to the new sanctions regime. However, Western businesses operating in Russia are increasingly likely to be targeted punitively by Kremlin’s counter-sanctions. There is an elevated risk that Moscow’s retaliation to the latest sanctions package will include a suspension of gas and oil exports to those EU countries – notably Austria, Germany and Italy – most reliant on Russian energy.

US defence officials confirmed on 2 May that the Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov was in Ukraine over the weekend, though noted that the US had no indication of him being injured, following several media reports claiming this. The speculations arose after Ukrainian officials claimed that they had launched an attack on a Russian command post in Izyum, an important base for Russian military operations. However, Gerasimov had allegedly already left for Russia by the time of the attack. Gerasimov’s visit to the frontlines came amid an enduringly slow Russian military progress to take control of eastern Ukraine, with the Ukrainian artillery strike likely to temporarily disrupt the Russian forces’ efforts on the Izyum axis.
The Azovstal works in Mariupol continued to hold out over the weekend, though Russian forces have continued their bombardment of the plant on 2 and 3 May, disrupting the ongoing attempts to evacuate civilians that remain trapped in the underground bunkers. However, at least 100 people were reportedly evacuated over the weekend, marking rare progress after dozens of failed attempts. Ukrainian defenders, however, remain at the plant, but with ongoing shelling of the compound and the depleting food and water supplies, their ability to hold out for much longer remains uncertain.
Elsewhere, in the Russian-occupied Kherson oblast, media reported on 2 May that Russian forces were shelling the region with Grad rocket-propelled grenade launchers, resulting in several civilian injuries. Meanwhile, unverified claims by the Ukrainian forces allege they hit a Russian ammunition depot in Kherson oblast on 2 May. Additionally, unverified Ukrainian media reports also suggest that Russian attempts to stage a dubious independence referendum in Kherson are stalling given the reported lack of personnel needed to organise the vote. Nevertheless, given the strategic importance of Kherson, as well as Russia’s de facto control over the territory, a referendum in the coming days and weeks is likely, with the latest US intelligence predicting that Russia may be planning to declare a “people’s republic” in Kherson and annex Donetsk and Luhansk around mid-May. As such, the Russian forces are likely to increase their intimidation tactics against the local population in Kherson, which would be mobilised to vote when/if the event is organised.

Diplomatic and strategic developments

On 2 May, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukraine will not redraw its borders for the sake of peace, stating that Kyiv is instead ready to continue fighting to restore its territorial integrity. Additionally, Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov has furthermore stated yesterday that there can be no peace agreement with Russia, representing a strong statement by a top Ukrainian official and further underlining that Moscow’s proposed peace settlement is unacceptable to Kyiv.
Additionally, Zelensky stated yesterday that any discussions about the lifting of sanctions against Russia during the talks between the two sides is out of the question, following alleged remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in which he reportedly said that Moscow and Kyiv are discussing the lifting of sanctions on Russia. The developments underline the hardened Ukrainian position, since the discovery of war atrocities in Bucha, as well as growing reports on those committed in Mariupol. Moreover, Kyiv’s position also reflects last week’s developments in Washington, where US President Joe Biden asked Congress for a historic USD 33 billion package for military, economic and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, reflecting the doubling down of US military backing following the Ramstein summit in Germany.
In a further demonstration of growing support from Washington, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi made an unannounced visit to Kyiv over the weekend, one of the highest-ranking US officials to visits Ukraine since the invasion in February. During her meeting with Zelensky, Pelosi emphasised that Washington is committed to supporting Ukraine “until the fight is done.” Additionally, on 3 May, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson pledged an additional GBP 300 million military aid package to Ukraine. Both developments, will likely only further aggravate Moscow and reinforce the perception that the war in Ukraine is a proxy conflict with the collective West and NATO amid the continuation of western military aid.
Additionally, Israel summoned Russia’s ambassador following remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov that Adolf Hitler may have “had Jewish blood” – a comment made in relation to Moscow’s claims that it needs to “de-Nazify” Ukraine, despite President Zelensky himself being Jewish. Meanwhile, on 3 May, Moscow accused the Israeli government of supporting a “neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv.” The developments represent a notable diplomatic flareup with Israel, which has so far tried to mediate between the two sides.
On 2 May, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz disclosed that Ukraine’s refusal to welcome German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier last month, due to Kyiv’s reservations about his ties to Russia, now stands in the way of his visit to Ukraine. Chancellor Scholz expressed his disapproval of Kyiv’s decision not to welcome the German President and stated that it is not acceptable to treat a country that way considering the amount of military aid provided by Germany. In response, Ukraine’s envoy to Germany strongly criticised Chancellor Scholz’s statement, contributing to the diplomatic row between the two countries.
Lastly, Denmark became the first Western country to officially reopen its embassy in Kyiv on 2 May. The Danish Embassy is reopening after more than 20 embassies have already reopened in Lviv over the past weeks, including those of the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. On 1 May, South Korea has also reopened its embassy in Kyiv.

Economic/business environment developments

On 2 May, Warsaw once again urged the EU to impose sweeping sanctions on Russian oil and gas, and to resist Putin’s pressure to make payments for Russian gas in rubles. The EU held an emergency meeting in Brussels in response to Russia cutting gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria, underlining the threat of wider cuts if its demands are not met. The issue of whether to give in to Russian demands for ruble payments for gas continues to divide the EU, threating to widen the bloc’s attempt to present a united front against Russia. As such, following the emergency meeting, the EU said that it will issue more detailed guidance to companies in the coming days regarding the rules under the EU sanctions and Russia’s demands for payments in rubles. Nevertheless, numerous national governments, including Hungary’s, have indicated that they intend to accept the Kremlin’s demands, underling the current lack of a unified approach on the issue at the EU-level.
Germany reiterated on 2 May that it was willing to support an immediate or gradual EU ban on Russian oil, a development that further increases the chances of such action being approved in the days ahead. Should Germany – one of the more Russia-reliant EU nations – commit to an oil embargo, the impact on Russia’s energy sector will be substantial. However, Brussels-based think tanks have warned that the move may provoke Russian ministers to cut all gas exports to the EU, potentially compounding the current energy crisis affecting the EU and substantially elevating policy risk to firms across the bloc.
Meanwhile, likely in response to the anticipated sixth round of EU sanctions, on 3 May President Putin ordered retaliatory sanctions against the west over the “unfriendly actions of certain foreign states and international organisations.” The decree does not yet list the specific individuals or entities that will be impacted, but will reportedly ban the export of raw materials to those on the list, which the government has 10 days to compile. The new measures also forbid “to make transactions and (including conclude foreign trade contracts)” with the sanctioned individuals and entities.

Humanitarian/evacuation developments

Considering the withdrawal of Russian troops from around Kyiv, the security situation in and around the capital has moderately improved. However, missile strikes targeting downtown Kyiv on 28 April highlight the enduring risk of Russian air attacks across the country, including on the capital. The H01/P01 and the E40 roads are the most viable routes from Kyiv. The E40 and the E373 highways were declared ‘open’ for traffic by Ukrainian authorities and are now relatively safe, however, they remain heavily damaged and road-clearing processes continue which may cause delays. The threat of air attacks remains high and therefore, safety cannot be guaranteed on any westbound evacuation routes. The threat posed by mines and unexploded ordnance also remains high across Kyiv oblast. We note that this advisory is supported by a warning from the Kyiv Region Military Administration on 12 April stating that de-occupied towns and settlements adjacent to Kyiv should not be re-settled by civilian populations due to high quantities of mines and unexploded ordnance.
Due to air attacks on Kremenchuk and Uman on 25 April, the westbound E50 road to Oleksandriya and from there the H01 highway seems to be a relatively safer route from Dnipro to Kyiv. Between Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, there are two main road routes: the H08 and E105. Due to Russian military targeting civilian and military aviation infrastructure with missile strikes, we believe there is substantial risk associated with all road routes into Zaporizhzhia, as the H08 is close to Shyroke Airfield just north-west of Zaporizhzhia, and the E105 passes through Zaporizhzhia International Airport and then Vilniansk Airfield. As such, we assess that all approaches into Zaporizhzhia face elevated risk from air/missile strikes at present.

FORECAST

With Victory Day fast approaching, Russian territorial gains continue to remain slow in the Donbas. As such, the chances of a significant success by 9 May are currently very low, meaning that Putin could leverage the date to rally support domestically, and potentially escalate the “special military operation” to “war” status, which would allow increased mobilisation in an effort to capture eastern and southern Ukraine. This is one scenario that is currently anticipated by the latest US and Western intelligence, according to the latest reports. Such a development would also be reflective of the increased projection of the war in Ukraine to the domestic audience as a proxy conflict with NATO. To that end, the additional military aid pledged by the US and the UK may well be used to further reinforce this narrative and perception. Putin is still nevertheless likely to use the date to announce some sort of “victory”, with the anticipated referendum in Kherson, where the Russian forces have established de facto control and imposed the use of the Russian ruble, and “liberation” of Mariupol likely to be presented as notable strategic gains. Moreover, Western and Ukrainian intelligence have also reported that Russia will likely attempt to annex Luhansk and Donetsk territories in mid-May, an announcement that could also be made in the coming days.

Russian cyber activity has continued to remain moderately high during this latest monitoring period, in contrast to the trend observed during the early stages of the Ukraine conflict. These attacks have remained largely intelligence-gathering operations or DDoS attacks, with no overtly destructive attacks observed during this monitoring period. While Russia’s ongoing phishing campaigns against Western governments will likely persist for the foreseeable future, they will likely remain primarily targeted against government agencies and their private sector partners. However, entities indirectly supporting these entities could be impacted by “cyber spillover” activities.
Meanwhile, Pro-Ukraine hackers have continued to be highly active during this monitoring period, with groups linked to the hacktivist collective Anonymous remaining the most effective at targeting Russian state and private sector entities. Further low-level hacktivist attacks, such as DDoS or data leaks, are expected to emerge throughout the coming week against Russian government agencies and private sector organisations supporting its critical infrastructure in response to Moscow’s growing military operations.

Pro-Russian operations maintain pace; Western government and diplomatic entities to remain high profile targets

On 27 April, Microsoft claimed to have detected at least six separate Russian state-linked threat actors launching more than 237 cyber operations against Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in late February. These attacks have entailed a wide range of activities, including destructive attacks, such as data wipers, and “broad espionage and intelligence activities” against various targets, including NATO member states. Microsoft’s investigation revealed that 32 percent of the attacks recorded were targeted against Ukrainian government organisations and over 40 percent at Ukraine’s critical infrastructure operators. Microsoft’s findings further confirm the Security Service of Ukraine’s (SBU) 14 February disclosure that Ukraine is being targeted by an ongoing Moscow-directed “wave of hybrid warfare” (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 15 February 2022). Microsoft claimed that the timing of these cyber attacks closely matched Moscow’s conventional military activity in Ukraine.
On 28 April, Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) warned that pro-Ukraine sites and government web portals are being targeted by ongoing Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. While the responsible threat actor remains unknown, the targeting of Ukraine-linked sites likely indicates the involvement of a Russian state-linked campaign. Russian hackers have continuously compromised devices since before the start of the Ukraine conflict to build its botnet, with the Netherlands’ Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) disclosing on 3 March that Dutch routers were likely used in the February DDoS attacks that preluded Russia’s invasion. This continued probing has resulted in a notable uptick in DDoS activity in recent months, with cyber security firm Kaspersky claiming on 25 April that such attacks reached an all-time high in Q1-2022 (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 27 April 2022).
On 28 April, cyber security firm Mandiant disclosed that it has detected the Russian state-linked Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group 29 (also tracked as Nobelium) targeting European, American, and Asian diplomatic organisations with cyber espionage-related activity since early 2021. APT 29’s phishing emails reportedly originated from a legitimate diplomatic email address that was compromised in an early operation to improve the attack’s probability of being successful. These phishing emails use a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including HTML smuggling and DLL execution, to deliver the BEATDROP, and later C++ BEACON, loader to engage in activities such as keylogging, screenshots, and account credentials exfiltration.

Pro-Ukraine hackers continue data leak operations; Russia-linked state and private sectors entities remain vulnerable

On 27 April, a Twitter account purporting to represent the Anonymous hacktivist group claimed that the group hacked Russian electric firm Elektrocentromontazh and leaked 1.7 TB of sensitive information via whistle-blower site Distributed Denial of Secrets (DDoSecrets). While it is currently unclear what type of information was compromised in this data leak, Elektrocentromontazh is reported to have high profile domestic and international clients, such as the Moscow government’s Energy Department and SIEMENS. As such, the leaking of the Russian firm’s emails heightens the risk of its clients’ sensitive information also being compromised due to this incident.
On 28 April, the Anonymous affiliated group Network Battalion 65 (also known as NB65) claimed to have exfiltrated 542 GB of emails and files from the Russian Petersburg Social Commercial Bank (PSCB JSC Bank) and released it via DDoSecrets. This latest incident follows NB65’s previous allegation that they encrypted PSCB JSC Bank’s network with a variant of the recently disclosed CONTI ransomware and exfiltrated 1 TB of data, including financial statements. Meanwhile, a Twitter account allegedly linked to Anonymous claimed on 1 May that NB65 leaked 10.5 TB of sensitive data from Russian payment service provider Qiwi. While information related to this attack is limited at present, NB65 claimed to have stolen data, such as 12.5 million of Qiwi’s customers’ credit card numbers and 30 million payment records. If these incidents are officially confirmed, they would be indicative of the Anonymous collective’s 27 April claim that they have “hacked and released nearly 10 million Russian files and emails” since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
On 1 May, a separate Twitter account purporting to represent the Anonymous India faction claimed that the group hacked and published 2.48 MB of information from Russian Energo Trans Bank. It currently is unclear what type of data was allegedly contained in these data leaks, making it difficult to assess the level of disruption that could be caused by the attack.

FORECAST

In contrast to the early stages of the war, Russia’s cyber activity has continued to increase in recent weeks. These cyber campaigns appear to be a mixture of both intelligence-gathering operations DDoS attacks, with the APT 29 campaign constituting the most recent threat to Western organisations. The timing of this campaign and its initial phishing lures – related to Covid-19 updates – indicate that these attacks were not originally linked to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Nevertheless, the targeting of diplomatic entities heightens the risk that hackers could utilise any access gained through these campaigns to exfiltrate information of strategic interest to Russia, including Western states’ policies towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While these attacks will likely remain targeted against Western government agencies or organisations aiding the Ukrainian government, entities that are supporting these organisations’ operations, such as tech firms, will also be at a heightened risk of being indirectly impacted through either data leaks or “spillover” activity.

Meanwhile, pro-Ukraine hackers, such as the IT Army of Ukraine and Anonymous, have continued to launch cyber operations aimed at expressing their political grievances with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Anonymous and its affiliated groups have remained the most active groups in this conflict, with both Russian government and private sector targets being compromised during this last monitoring period. The alleged compromises of high profile firms, such as Elektrocentromontazh and PSCB JSC Bank, underscores the groups’ targeting of industries perceived to be contributing to Russia’s economy and associated ties with the government. With tensions related to the Ukraine conflict unlikely to abate, further such cyber campaigns are likely to be launched as a part of pro-Kyiv hackers’ efforts to oppose and disrupt Russia’s military operations in Ukraine. Such activity is expected to be predominately rudimentary, such as data leaks or DDoS, and have a minimal or temporary impact on their targets’ military or business operations

Over the past month, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has stalled. On 6 April, Moscow completed its withdrawal from around Kyiv and the northeast of the country and proclaimed the start of a “second phase” of the conflict focused on assuming full control of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the southeast. Western military and financial support for Ukraine accelerated over April, with over USD 29 billion in bilateral aid committed by the G7 and the EU. In addition, the West continues to maintain pressure on the Russian economy, with the sixth round of sanctions unveiled by the EU on 4 May pledging to cease oil imports from Russia by the end of 2022. The Kremlin has responded with counter-sanctions of its own and has shifted its domestic portrayal of the war in Ukraine to that of a proxy conflict between NATO and Russia, a development which increases the likelihood of national mobilisation. Despite military setbacks around Kyiv, Moscow is now fully committed to its operations in the southeast, with the formal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson regions now increasingly likely as the Kremlin seeks to secure strategic objectives such as limiting Ukraine’s access to the Black and Azov Seas and guaranteeing water security for the Crimean Peninsula. The conflict is unlikely to abate, with key battles around Izyum, Sloviansk and Barvinkove likely to shape the outcome of “phase two” in the southeast in the coming weeks. Russian forces will continue to strike key infrastructure in Ukraine. Kyiv’s ability to maintain fuel supplies will become a key factor in its ability to sustain its operational capability in the month ahead. Rising tensions along Ukraine’s border with the Russian-backed separatist republic of Transnistria offer another possible theatre of expansion for Russia, particularly if the Kremlin’s offensive in the Donbas proves successful. This would allow Moscow to transition its forces towards fully cutting off Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea and establishing a land bridge to Transnistria.

Eastern Europe: Russia-linked phishing against government and defence officials to continue in support of Moscow’s military offensives in Ukraine. On 3 May, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) disclosed that several Russian state-linked hacking groups are targeting Eastern European organisations with malicious cyber activity. For example, the Russian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group Turla is utilising phishing emails to compromise accounts linked to defence and cyber security organisations in the Baltics. Meanwhile, Google also observed the Belarusian state-linked group Ghostwriter, a key Russian ally, using phishing domains to exfiltrate credentials from a variety of “high-risk individuals in Ukraine”. While the end goal of these cyber operations is unclear, Moscow-linked cyber actors such as Turla or Coldriver are historically known to engage in intelligence gathering aimed at European states’ foreign and security policies. As such, these attacks are likely seeking to exfiltrate classified information about their targets’ security and foreign policy plans regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To this end, further phishing campaigns are highly likely to be launched in the coming weeks in support of Moscow’s military offensives in Eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian government agencies and international organisations supporting Kyiv’s operations, such as NATO, will remain the most at-risk for future Russian cyber attacks.

Ukrainian officials have voiced concerns over Russia’s growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) air zones in Donbas, further limiting Ukrainian air support capabilities to ground units as well as efforts to counter Russian aircraft. Ukrainian forces seek to draw Russian aircraft to lower altitudes and within range of their surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. Ukrainian air space remains highly contested with neither side gaining real air superiority.
In an effort to improve Ukraine’s air defences, the Slovakian and Polish Ministries of Defence agreed on 30 April for Polish F-16C/D aircraft to patrol Slovak airspace to allow the latter to transfer 12 Mig-29 fighter aircraft to Ukraine.
Russian naval artillery and air strikes targeted Mariupol on 1-2 May despite civilian evacuations from the Azovstal Steel Plant. On 3 May, mayor of Mariupol Vadym Boychenko reported that over 200 civilians remained with soldiers at the Plant, and that approximately 100,000 civilians were still present in the city. Moreover, despite continuous Russian assaults, the M14 highway in Azovstal appears to remain under Ukrainian control.
Troops from Ukraine’s 81st brigade withdrew from the eastern front, walking 12 km before retreating at Sviatoguirsk, suggesting that Russian offensive efforts may not be too severe. While their retreat may lead to larger Russian advances and a possible escalation from ‘special military operation’ to ‘war’, this is unlikely to occur by 9 May.
Russian forces continued their offensives along the Siverskyi Donets and Severodonetsk Salient, although Ukrainian forces have conducted successful counterattacks to the north and east of Kharkiv. These have gradually pushed Russian forces towards the Russian border and Siverskyi Donets, possibly allowing for a push toward Velvkyi Bulruk and Kupyansk. Russian offensive operations are expected to benefit from higher temperatures and clearer weather conditions until 10 May, allowing for better offroad movement and armoured support to infantry units. Russian air force operations, including sorties or reconnaissance by aircraft – manned and unmanned – are also expected to benefit from better weather conditions.
According to a post by Ukraine’s Chief of General Staff Valeriy Zaluzhniy on Telegram, Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 UAVs sank two Russian project 03160 Raptor class coastal patrol vessels near Zmiinyi (Snake) Island at dawn on 2 May. A video of the alleged operation was also shared online. The operation, if confirmed, likely marks the first time the Bayraktar TB2 was used to sink naval vessels during wartime. Independent geolocation checking indicated that at least one vessel was destroyed in the area.
According to a social media post by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, between 24 February and 3 May Russian forces lost 1,062 main battle tanks (MBTs), 2,567 armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), 1,843 vehicles and fuel tanks, 475 artillery systems, 162 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 84 missiles, 155 helicopters, 194 fixed-wing aircraft, 291 UAVs, 38 pieces of “special equipment”, and 10 vessels. Moreover, it also added that the “greatest losses” for Russia occurred towards Izyum.
According to the UK MoD, Russian forces have been “unable to translate numerical strength into decisive advantage” in Ukraine, ultimately leaving the Russian military “significantly weaker, both materially and conceptually” as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. This, coupled with the effects of Western sanctions, will hamper Russian military recovery efforts in the long-term, ultimately worsening its national security. A complete withdrawal, nonetheless, remains unlikely and more indiscriminate offensive operations, including the use of unguided munitions, are expected, ultimately raising the cost of war for both sides, including Ukrainian civilians.
Shelling along the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline continued over the weekend, though no progress in ground attacks on 2 May has reportedly been made. Attempts to complete the capture of Rubizhne have continued, underlining the enduring resistance of Ukrainian defences in the Severodonetsk salient. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russian forces have moved one battalion tactical group (BTG) to the Popasna area in order to improve their position in advancing toward Severodonetsk.
On 30 April, Ukrainian forces launched an attack against a Russian command post in Izyum, which will briefly moderately undermine the ability of the Russian forces’ efforts on the Izyum axis. Notably, following the attack, a US defence official stated that Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov was present at the headquarters in Izyum, but despite some media reports speculating that he was injured during the attack, Gerasimov had already allegedly left for Russia before the strike. Gerasimov’s arrival in Izyum was largely seen as a further indication of Moscow’s determination to achieve some progress in the Donbas ahead of 9 May Victory Day. Beyond these operational developments, Russian forces have not made any confirmed advances on 2 May in the Izyum area.
Elsewhere, over the weekend, several strikes on Odesa occurred, including on 1 May against an airbase. On 2 May, Ukrainian local authorities in the region reported that a Russian rocket strike hit a key bridge over the Dnister estuary. The strategic bridge represents the sole highway link, the P70, that runs inside Ukrainian territory connecting Odesa with the Romanian border. Its targeting was likely intended to undermine the potential transfer of weapons and other aid from Romania. Moreover, the threat of an amphibious assault on Odesa has decreased, especially following the sinking of Russian flagship Moskva, but Odesa is highly likely to remain a target, with the attack on the bridge likely also done to force Kyiv to commit resources to the area, and subsequently away from the east and the south, amid the overall slow Russian gains in the Donbas.
The targeting of the bridge also comes amid heightened tensions in the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria following a spate of likely Russian false flag attacks. These follow a senior Russian military official’s statement that Russia aims to control the entire southern Ukraine, which would allow it to establish a land bridge to Transnistria. The comments underline the potential for a “phase 3” operation in the coming months. However, as previously assessed, Russian combat power is currently limited in the west, meaning that the threat of Russian forces being deployed in Ukraine is relatively low, with Russia lacking the force concentration to launch a large-scale invasion of Moldova-proper in the short term. There have been no notable situational changes in Transnistria since last week, though further false flag operations remain very likely.
With Victory Day on 9 May, Russian gains continue to remain slow and steady in the Donbas, with Russian forces making few notable advances over the weekend. The chances of a significant success by 9 May are low, meaning that Putin could leverage the date to rally support domestically, and potentially escalate the “special military operation” to “war” status, which would allow increased mobilisation. (Source: Sibylline)

04 May 22. Belarus begins snap combat readiness drills. The armed forces of Belarus began sudden large-scale drills on Wednesday to test their combat readiness, the defence ministry of Ukraine’s neighbour said.

Belarus is a close ally of Russia, which invaded Ukraine in late February immediately after holding joint drills with Minsk which had allowed it to move more forces closer to the Ukrainian border. Russia calls its actions in Ukraine a “special military operation”.

“It is planned that the (combat readiness) test will involve the movement of significant numbers of military vehicles, which can slow down traffic on public roads,” the Belarusian ministry said in a statement.

The ministry said the exercise posed no threat to its neighbours or the European community in general.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spoke to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on Tuesday and the two discussed the Russian operation in Ukraine, among other issues, according to official statements.

Areas of Ukraine adjacent to Belarus, including its capital Kyiv, came under Russian assault in the initial stage of the invasion, but now Russia has focused its attacks on Ukraine’s eastern and southeastern regions. (Source: Reuters)

03 May 22. UK donates fleet of armoured vehicles to Ukraine to evacuate civilians from besieged areas.

The UK government is sending 13 protective armoured vehicles to Ukraine, to safely evacuate people from the shelled areas in east of the country.

UK to donate a fleet of 13 armoured vehicles to Ukraine to rescue civilians from besieged areas.
Vehicles will also transport key workers to rebuild vital infrastructure
Delivery of the highly specialised fleet is in direct response to a request from the Government of Ukraine

The UK is sending a fleet of 13 protective armoured vehicles to Ukraine, to safely evacuate people from the shelled areas in east of the country.

The steel-plated vehicles will be sent following a direct request from the Ukraine government for safe and resilient transport for civilians. They will also be used to transport officials from Ukrainian ministries to temporary command posts set up for government work and the rebuilding of key infrastructure, such as energy supplies, in besieged areas.

The Ukrainian police and the National Guard will also utilise the fleet to rebuild vital railway lines in the east of Ukraine.

The fleet is made up of highly specialised 4x4s that have been upgraded with armour to resist high velocity bullets, anti-personnel mines and improvised explosive devices – all tactics which have been used by Russian forces to slaughter civilians.

Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said: “The intentional targeting of innocent civilians is a war crime. This latest donation of armoured vehicles will help protect innocent Ukrainians attempting to flee Russian shelling and support Ukrainian officials carrying out vital work.

The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine continues to have a massive human cost, including the murdering of innocent civilians and mass displacement of families, as well as the destruction to vital infrastructure including schools and hospitals. It is estimated that more than 12 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance with the actual figure likely to be much higher.”

The vehicles, donated from the Foreign Commonwealth & Development Office’s fleet, will start to arrive in the east of Ukraine in the coming days with UK government logistics teams working with partners on the ground to dispatch them as quickly as possible.

That package includes £220 million to provide medical supplies and basic necessities on the ground, saving lives and protecting vulnerable people. This includes support through the UN, the Red Cross and NGOs, including the DEC and UK-Med.

The UK has also sent a rapid donation of food supplies following a request from the government, committed to donating up to 42 ambulances to help bring vital lifesaving care, and sent more than 5 million medical items to support lifesaving work in Ukraine.

Find out more about the UK government’s humanitarian response.

The UK has also been playing a lead role in supporting Ukraine militarily, committing to provide Stormer armoured vehicles, Air Defence Systems, 120 armoured vehicles, new anti-ship missiles, and over 5,000 anti-tank missiles, in addition to the Challenger 2 tanks provided to Poland to backfill those they are donating to Ukraine.

The UK Ambassador to Kyiv, Melinda Simmons, also returned to Kyiv on Friday.

Background

the fleet is worth £660,000 and the vehicles will be delivered in batches to meet the request from the Government of Ukraine
the vehicles are protected by steel plating, with reinforced glass, enhanced suspension and upgraded brakes, and include internal VHF 2-way radio for long range communication outdoors (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

02 May 22. Biden’s Javelin factory tour spotlights struggle to backfill Ukraine munitions. President Joe Biden is slated to visit Alabama on Tuesday to tour a Lockheed Martin facility tasked with manufacturing the Javelin anti-tank missiles that the U.S. has steadily provided to Ukraine with almost legendary success. While a presidential-level visit will draw the American public’s attention to the U.S. defense industry’s role in producing the weapons that have helped the Ukrainian military repel Russian advances, it will also highlight its struggles to replenish the stocks of munitions that the Biden administration has sent abroad. A bipartisan group of lawmakers have urged Biden to begin tackling the immensely complex task of keeping pace with current demand for increased munitions development while untangling a host of thorny supply chain issues that have impeded the U.S. ability to replenish weapons sent to Ukraine.

“They need to up our production capacity,” House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., told Defense News. “When it comes to munitions – missiles and drones – we need to figure out how to make more of them more quickly. And we’ve got to work with our industrial base both here in the U.S. and internationally to figure out how to do that.”

And Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., noted on the Senate floor last week the roughly 5,000 javelin missiles that the Biden administration has sent to Ukraine amount to one-third of the U.S. stockpiles. The U.S. has also sent more than 1,400 stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine, which represents a quarter of its stockpiles.

“This is a wake-up call, and not just about our ability to support the current fight,” said McConnell. “Ukraine’s expenditure rate of critical munitions should cause us to question whether our own wartime requirements for weapons systems and munitions are sufficient.”

“This would be less of a problem if we had a robust defense industrial base to quickly refill our armories,” he added. “But defense manufacturers have admitted that the production lines for some critical components have dried up and it could be years before they could replace weapons we’ve sent to Ukraine.”

Aside from highlighting the role that Javelin missiles have played in the Ukraine war, the White House has remained tight-lipped about the specifics of what Biden plans to address during his visit to Troy, Alabama.

Lockheed Martin’s facility there serves as a final assembly line for missiles, where approximately 600 employees produce systems such as Javelins, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile.

The weapons manufacturer began expanding its facility in Troy in 2019, but just as its competitor Raytheon will not be able to begin replenishing U.S. stockpiles of Stinger missiles until 2023, Lockheed Martin could face similar challenges as it seeks to backfill the Javelins transferred to Ukraine.

“We have the ability to meet current production demands and are investing to increase capacity and production to meet our customers’ future needs,” a Lockheed Martin spokesperson told Defense News.

With the Ukraine war threatening to drag on for months or years, an increased Javelin demand from other countries and the need for the U.S. and its allies alike to replenish stockpiles they’ve already sent to Ukraine, Lockheed Martin will indeed face a surge of future needs.

“It’s been a very effective system, and they’re asking for more, obviously,” Lockheed Martin CEO James Taiclet, told the Atlantic Council last week. “What our goal is going to be down in Troy, Alabama – and in our case when we make similar defensive products – is to expand the production capacity of those sites.”

He noted that for “something this urgent, we’re going to invest ahead of need.”

Taiclet has admitted that pandemic-related supply chain problems have also affected Lockheed Martin when it comes to producing major weapons systems such as the F-35 fighter jet, but he told investors on a quarterly earnings call last month that “we expect these timing impacts to be recovered over the course of 2022.”

Still, the U.S. government cannot even buy the additional Javelins it needs from Lockheed Martin to backfill U.S. stocks and continue supplying security partners until Congress acts on the massive $33bn Ukraine aid supplemental that Biden requested last week.

The president’s request includes more than $20bn in additional Ukrainian security assistance, a thus far unprecedented amount that is expected to include funding to backfill U.S. munition stockpiles.

Lawmakers have received the Ukraine supplemental request with broad bipartisan support, but Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, suggested in a statement last week that the $33 billion price tag may be too low and vowed to pay special attention to the portion of the request for backfilling U.S. munitions.

“I will also be looking closely at the backfill portion of the supplemental request, where we are still moving much too slowly,” said Inhofe. “I am glad that the Department of Defense is taking real steps to address the shortfalls in our stocks of various critical munitions and those of our allies and partners. With the flexible munitions funds, Department of Defense leadership is thinking creatively, and we will work to ensure that creativity is met in kind.”

Pentagon leaders, after delivering more than 5,000 Javelins to Ukraine from the military’s own stocks, are publicly expressing confidence in the military’s readiness and that it has other anti-armor capabilities. Still, they share concerns with the defense industry about supply chain challenges surrounding the Javelin, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Switchblade drones.

All three, which were sent from U.S. stockpiles to Ukraine, were topics of a meeting last month between Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks and executives from eight major defense firms to discuss industry proposals to accelerate production of existing systems. Those conversations come amid fears the war, which is intensifying in eastern Ukraine, will grind on.

“The secretary wants to keep that dialogue going with the defense industry as well, on those and maybe even other systems,” Pentagon Spokesman John Kirby told reporters last week. “Because we certainly think that now that the focus is on the Donbas, this could become a more prolonged conflict. And we want to make sure that our own defense industrial base can continue to support our needs, as well as … support Ukraine’s needs.”

Biden has also come under pressure from lawmakers, including McConnell and Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., to ameliorate supply chain issues by invoking the Defense Production Act.

His supplemental request also included funding to help utilize that Korean War-era law, which allows the federal government to direct private companies to prioritize supplying customers critical to U.S. national security – such as the defense industrial base.

(Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)

02 May 22. Ukraine says its drones hit Russian fast boats at sea. In what appears to be their latest exploit, Ukraine’s armed drones destroyed two Russian patrol boats in the Black Sea just off Snake Island Monday morning, according to the country’s defense ministry and videos of the strikes.

Multiple videos of the attacks have been circulating on social media, including a version posted to the Ukraine Defense Ministry’s verified accounts that includes timestamps and geographic coordinates on the drone’s operating display.

The island, where Ukrainian border guards were attacked by deck guns on Russian vessels at the war’s onset, has been a symbol of Kyiv’s resistance and willingness to fight since audio emerged of the island’s garrison responding to a surrender demand by telling the Russian cruiser Moskva to “go f—” itself.

Ukrainian government sources initially stated that all 13 guards on the island were killed, but backtracked days later after Russia said they had been taken prisoner.

All 13 Ukrainian guards were eventually released in a prisoner exchange. In April, the cruiser Moskva was also badly damaged by a Ukrainian anti-ship missile attack and later sank.

In an English-language tweet, Ukrainian Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyy confirmed that a Bayraktar TB2 drone “sent two russian patrol boats to f..k themselves at dawn today.”

A longer version of the footage depicts portions of what appears to be the island’s coastline.

Military analyst Rob Lee described the strike’s targets as Russian Raptor-class fast attack boats.

According to an Army Training and Doctrine Command site, the Raptor-class has been around since 2015 and has a crew of two and a transport capacity of 19 troops to complement its armament of machine guns and automatic grenade launchers. The boats are intended for operations in and around coastlines, with a range of 400 nautical miles.

The attack also represents a reappearance of Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2 armed drones, which have played a major role in recent conflicts in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria.

Ukrainian military officials indicated before the war that they had approximately 20 of the small Turkish-made drones, though they say they’ve received more since the war’s outset.

While the weapons have reportedly played a role in some of the war’s high profile events, a large part of their benefit comes from what drone expert Samuel Bendett described to Military Times as the “mythology of the Bayraktar” in a March phone interview.

According to open source analysts Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, newer Bayraktar models have appeared on the battlefield as well.

Since the war began, Mitzer has counted at least 62 Russian assets destroyed by the drones, including logistics trains carrying fuel and the two patrol boats destroyed Monday.

(Source: Defense News Early Bird/Military Times)

02 May 22. Russians Make Minimal Progress in the Donbas, DOD Official Says. Russian forces in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine — where the bulk of the fighting is taking place — are suffering from poor command and control, low morale, and less than ideal logistics, a senior Defense Department official, said today.

“We continue to see minimal, at best, progress by the Russians in the Donbas,” the official said. “They are not making the progress that they had scheduled to make and that progress is uneven and incremental.”

The Russians have had some minor gains east of the Ukrainian cities of Izyum and Popasna, the official said, adding that that progress has been anemic.

“What we saw there in Popasna is not unlike what we’ve seen in other hamlets in the Donbas. will move in and then declare victory and then withdraw their troops only to let the Ukrainians take it back. So, there was a lot of back and forth over the last couple of days,” the official said.

Also, the Pentagon has observed that Russian forces seem to have a risk and casualty aversion in both the air war and the ground war, the official said.

Ukrainian forces continue to hold Kharkiv against nearby Russian forces. The city continues to endure Russian air strikes, the official said.

“But the Ukrainians have been doing an able job over the last 24 to 48 hours of pushing the Russians further away. And they have managed to push the Russians out about 40 kilometers to the east of Kharkiv,” the official said.

That’s a good example of the stiff and formidable resistance Ukrainian forces are displaying, the official said.

Mariupol continues to get hit with standoff Russian air attacks. “We continue to see them using dumb bombs in Mariupol,” the official said, referring to ordnance that’s not precision-guided.

Regarding security assistance to Ukraine, more than 70 of 90 M-777 howitzers the U.S. planned to send are now in Ukrainian hands, along with over 140,000 155 mm rounds that these cannons use, which is about half of the projectiles planned for delivery, the official said.

Training on those weapons continues outside of Ukraine, the official added. From the start of the invasion 68 days ago, the Russians have launched 2,125 missiles into Ukraine, the official mentioned. (Source: US DoD)

02 May 22. UK promises further $375m in military aid for Ukraine. Britain said on Monday it would provide 300m pounds ($375m) more in military aid to Ukraine, including electronic warfare equipment and a counter-battery radar system, on top of around 200m pounds of assistance so far.

Britain has sent Ukraine more than 5,000 anti-tank missiles and five air defence systems as well as other munitions and explosives since Russia’s invasion on Feb. 24, which has destroyed cities and left thousands of people dead or injured.

The United States has provided $3bn of military aid to Ukraine so far, and last week President Joe Biden asked the U.S. Congress to approve more than $20 billion in military support. read more

Russia last week said NATO countries were in effect engaging in a proxy war by providing arms to Ukraine, where it says it is conducting a “special operation” to disarm the country and rid it of anti-Russian nationalism fomented by the West.

Ukraine and the West say Russia launched an unprovoked war of aggression to seize territory, which threatens to spiral into a much wider conflict.

Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s office said that as well as the other equipment, Britain would offer night vision devices, tools to jam satellite navigation, heavy-lift drones to resupply Ukrainian troops and armoured cars for civilian officials.

Johnson intends to address Ukraine’s parliament on Tuesday morning via videolink.

“Your children and grandchildren will say that Ukrainians taught the world that the brute force of an aggressor counts for nothing against the moral force of a people determined to be free,” Johnson plans to say, according a speech extract provided by his office.

While Britain has provided significant military aid, it has so far accepted relatively few of the more than 5 million Ukrainians who have fled their country. As of last week, Britain’s government said it had issued 86,100 visas to Ukrainians, of whom 27,100 had reached Britain. ($1 = 0.7987 pounds) (Source: Reuters)

29 Apr 22. How military technology reaches Russia in breach of U.S. export controls. By his own account, Ilias Sabirov, a Moscow businessman, had supplied Russia’s military with high-performance computer chips made in the United States for years.

Then, in 2014, Russia seized the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, and the U.S. government began imposing a series of new sanctions and export controls on Russia, including severely restricting sales of such chips.

But that didn’t stop Sabirov from obtaining more, according to U.S. authorities and a Reuters review of Russian customs records.

In the spring of 2015, a parcel containing more than 100 memory chips specially hardened to resist radiation and extreme temperatures – critical components in missiles and military satellites – arrived at Sabirov’s business address in Moscow, according to the Russian customs records and a U.S. federal indictment. American prosecutors allege that the “rad-hard”chips were sourced from a company in Austin, Texas, called Silicon Space Technology Corp, or SST, but shipped to Russia via a firm in Bulgaria to evade U.S. export law.

After Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, the United States and more than 30 other nations responded with an unprecedented barrage of additional sanctions and export restrictions. But the story of how the American chips made it from Texas to Moscow back in 2015 shows how sensitive Western technology can still end up in Russia despite strict U.S. export controls.

This account of the criminal case against Sabirov and two Bulgarian businessmen, which remains open, contains new details from interviews with U.S. officials and several of the main actors, including two fugitives. And it points to the challenges of imposing a rigorous export-control regime, especially on so-called dual-use components that can serve both civilian and military purposes.

The Texas scheme and other U.S. criminal cases involving sensitive technology that ended up in Russia, reviewed by Reuters, reveal a chain of willing suppliers, front and shell companies and false claims on export forms that specialized Western components were intended for civilian rather than military use. Sought-after parts have included microelectronics and precision tooling for the Russian military.

During war, said U.S. Department of Defense spokeswoman Sue Gough, rad-hard chips play an essential role for communications, intelligence and surveillance.

“Acquisition of radiation-hardening technology by nuclear-capable aggressive states, like Russia, could embolden them, increasing international security destabilization,” Gough said. “Therefore, protection of these chips is extremely important to U.S. national security.”

Today, Russia’s efforts to circumvent U.S. restrictions on military and other sensitive technology are on the rise, according to U.S. Homeland Security Investigations officials. A specialized unit of 25 U.S. counter-proliferation analysts, whose objective is to spot suspicious shipments, shifted their sole focus from China to Russia in late February, the HSI officials said.

“China doesn’t dominate our attention like they used to, and it’s Russia where we’ve seen the biggest increase lately,” said Greg Slavens, who recently retired after 30 years as a HSI counter-proliferation supervisor. “The Russians have steadily increased their attempts to get chips for missile and space technology.”

The Kremlin did not respond to questions about U.S. accusations that it uses deceptive schemes to bypass Western sanctions and trade restrictions. Russia has previously cast Western sanctions as a hostile act.

U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, who met with Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in Washington on April 21, said in a statement the same day that her department is “laser focused on depriving Russia the items and technologies it needs to sustain its war machine.”

Complicating matters for U.S. law enforcement: Since 2018, Russia no longer authorizes U.S. export-control officers to conduct on-the-ground checks to ensure that sensitive goods are used for their officially declared purposes, according to people familiar with the matter.

investigate and adjudicate while accused Russian nationals remain beyond the arm of U.S. law. In the Texas matter, it took about five years for U.S. authorities to bring criminal charges and impose a penalty.

Sabirov, as well as the two Bulgarian businessmen, Dimitar and Milan Dimitrov, were indicted in 2020 on charges of illegally exporting rad-hard chips to Russia and money laundering. And SST, which changed its name to Vorago Technologies in 2015, was fined $497,000 last year by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security in a separate enforcement action. The bureau oversees export licenses for goods that can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

The Texas company, which had been repeatedly warned by its own lawyers that it couldn’t ship rad-hard chips to Russia without a license, admitted that from 2014 to 2019, it had conspired with the three men to do just that. Reuters couldn’t determine whether the chips ultimately were used for a military purpose. The U.S. attorney’s office in the western district of Texas declined to comment.

In a statement, Vorago said it “is, and always has been, committed to zero tolerance compliance with all U.S. laws, including export controls.” It said it “has been fully cooperative” in the U.S. investigations and “has implemented strengthened compliance procedures and training to prevent a recurrence.”

The company also said it was “deliberately misled into believing that shipments were going to Bulgaria for use in Europe – a legal export. These customers provided a seemingly valid end-user certificate to Vorago certifying that the end user of Vorago’s products was not in Russia.”

Sabirov denied any wrongdoing in an interview with Reuters and said the rad-hard chips never went from Bulgaria to Moscow, contradicting evidence gathered by U.S. prosecutors and customs records reviewed by Reuters. He said he always complied with U.S. export rules and never laundered money. “The sanctions they applied on myself, on my companies and on my friends are absolutely unfair, absolutely fake and absolutely wrong,” he said.

Milan Dimitrov also denied any wrongdoing. The accusations of export violations are “nonsensical,” he told Reuters. “The whole thing is a misunderstanding. “His father, Dimitar Dimitrov, couldn’t be reached for comment.

Sabirov, who is in Russia, and the two Bulgarians remain fugitives in the criminal case.

A review by Reuters of U.S. court and other federal records shows that the Texas case isn’t unique.

Between 2008 and 2014, a father-and-son team smuggled more than $65 million worth of sensitive microchips from New Jersey to Moscow-area companies directly associated with Russian military, intelligence and nuclear-warhead design programs, according to U.S. authorities.

Alexander Brazhnikov Jr. of New Jersey, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Russia, pleaded guilty in federal court in 2015 to purchasing microelectronics inside the United States, repackaging and relabeling them, and then shipping the goods to Moscow apartments and vacant storefronts linked to his father, a Russian national. There were 1,923 shipments in all, and the son admitted that the money to pay for it was laundered from Russia through 50 foreign shell companies, registered in countries stretching from the Marshall Islands in the Pacific to Panama and Belize in Central America, court records show.

“We believe that the microchips were all going to the military-industrial complex because Russia doesn’t produce anything else that would have required that level of chips,” said Peter Gaeta, one of the prosecutors on the case, which remains open.

The son, whose field of study was listed as “nuclear physics” in court records, was sentenced to 70 months in prison and was released in December 2018. His father, Alexander Brazhnikov Sr., owner of a Moscow-based microelectronics import-export firm, was charged with conspiracy and remains a fugitive. The company allegedly distributed the components acquired in the United States to Russian defense contractors licensed to procure parts for the Russian military and security service, and Russian companies involved in the design of nuclear weapons.

“The scale of this case is just daunting,” Gaeta told Reuters. “But this was not a lone wolf operation. This is happening across the board with Russia.”

Alexander Brazhnikov Jr. declined to comment on the case. His father couldn’t be reached.

In another case, Alexander Fishenko, a dual citizen of the United States and Russia, ran a years-long scheme to procure and ship sensitive microelectronics from U.S.-based companies to Russian government customers, including its military and intelligence services.

Fishenko owned a Houston, Texas-based export company and also was an executive in a Moscow-based procurement company, according to federal prosecutors. Between 2002 and 2012, his export company shipped goods through New York to contacts in countries including Finland, Canada and Germany who would send them onto Russia. Among the items were electronics with applications in radar and surveillance systems, weapons guidance systems and detonation triggers.

Fishenko and 10 other people were indicted in 2012 for participating in a conspiracy to sell controlled technology to Russia without required licenses. He later pleaded guilty to, among other charges, acting as an agent of the Russian government. Seven others were convicted either through pleas or at trial. Fishenko spent more than seven years behind bars.

New York lawyer Richard Levitt, who represented Fishenko in the case, declined to comment, and Fishenko himself couldn’t be reached.

“It is common for illegal exports of controlled technology to go through middlemen overseas to hide the true destination of the goods,” said Daniel Silver, a former federal prosecutor in Brooklyn who handled the Fishenko case. “These global networks can shield U.S. exporters by making it harder for law enforcement agents to connect the dots.”

In recent years, Russia has tried to blunt Western export restrictions by making more parts at home or shifting to suppliers located in allied countries, such as China. Still, Russian companies remain heavily reliant on the West for high-precision machinery and some high-performance semiconductors like the radiation-hardened chips Sabirov imported.

“If a Russian satellite orbits around the Earth without a glitch, you can definitely assume that it contains Western electronics,” an executive with a U.S. semiconductor maker said, asking not to be named. Russia doesn’t make such chips and China, despite heavy investment, has yet to bridge the gap with rivals, the person said.

To supply its military, Russia has found high-tech suppliers in the U.S. and other Western countries. Between 2015 and 2018, Almaz-Antey, a state-owned manufacturer of Russia’s sophisticated air-defense missile systems, managed to bypass German export restrictions and procure nearly $10 million worth of high-precision metalworking machines, according to a person familiar with the matter and an official case summary filed with a Hamburg court. Export-license papers claimed the machinery was destined to various Russian producers of civilian goods in the city of Yekaterinburg when, in fact, they were delivered to a nearby Almaz-Antey facility, according to the person familiar with the matter and the case summary. Almaz-Antey didn’t respond to a message seeking comment.

Suzette Grillot, a professor of international studies at the University of Oklahoma, said Western trade restrictions on Russia worked during the Cold War because the West then dominated world trade. “When you went from the U.S. to Russia in the early 1990s, it was a different world technologically speaking, the place was definitely behind the times in communications and other technologies,” she said.

But replicating Cold War sanctions to squeeze the Russian economy and military industry today seems like an elusive goal, Grillot said, because Russia has had almost unlimited access to Western technology for the past 30 years and can now also rely on alternative suppliers such as China and India. “You can’t unring a bell,” she said.

Trained as a physicist and chemist, Wesley Morris had developed solutions to harden semiconductors against heat and radiation. In 2004, he founded SST (now called Vorago Technologies) in a bid to monetize his patented inventions. Morris told Reuters that his techniques caught the attention of the U.S. military, and SST received millions of dollars in research grants from the U.S. Department of Defense, including from top-secret missile programs, to hone its technology.

But 10 years later, in the spring of 2014, SST was still chasing its first significant commercial order. That’s when Morris, the company’s chief executive, said he learned from a newly recruited salesman that a Russian businessman, Sabirov, was interested in buying rad-hard chips from SST. Sabirov, the salesman said, wanted to purchase them for Russia’s space agency, making him an attractive customer prospect because Russia relies almost entirely on imports for its rad-hard requirements.

The Russian space agency, Roscosmos, said it had no information about Sabirov’s involvement in procuring electronic components for Russia.

Sabirov arrived at a meeting at SST’s office in Austin in May 2014, accompanied by a Bulgarian associate, Dimitar Dimitrov. The two men formed an odd pair, Morris and several other people who dealt with them said. The Russian spoke English fluently and projected the confidence of a man with solid connections in his country’s state bureaucracy. The Bulgarian appeared to be a brilliant scientist whose scuffed shoes suggested that he didn’t worry too much about his attire. Both men seemed to have solid technical backgrounds.

According to Morris, Sabirov told him that one of his Russian companies, Kosmos Komplekt, had been buying rad-hard chips from SST’s bigger U.S. rival, Aeroflex, since 2011, and was interested in transitioning to SST’s products.

“I wanted to get the business,” Morris recalled thinking at the time.

A spokesman for Cobham Group, which acquired Aeroflex in September 2014, said Aeroflex had stopped shipping rad-hard chips to Sabirov in Russia prior to the acquisition.

A week after the May 2014 meeting in Austin with Sabirov, SST’s outside lawyer dampened Morris’s expectations of quickly clinching a lucrative contract. “Anything that requires a license to Russia is currently subject to a presumption of denial,” the lawyer told Morris and other executives, according to Commerce Department documents.

Morris told Reuters he wasn’t ready to abandon what could be the transformational contract SST had longed for. From his conversation with Sabirov, Morris said he had grown hopeful the Russian would order $10 million worth of goods. He said he believed that the chips would be used in satellites, not in missiles.

Morris said that in July 2014, he and Sabirov discussed their options upon meeting on the sidelines of a nuclear-technology conference in Paris. Morris said his ideas hinged on obtaining one of the few export licenses U.S. authorities were still granting as part of Washington’s cooperation with Russia on joint space programs.

Days after the Paris meeting, however, Morris lost hope. Geopolitical tension with Moscow had escalated after a Malaysian airliner flying through Ukrainian airspace was downed by a Russian-made missile, killing 298 people. Even though Moscow denied involvement in the tragedy, obtaining an export license to Russia was now virtually impossible, Morris concluded after conferring with SST’s lawyer.

“We can’t send you anything,” the American CEO said he told Sabirov.

But Morris said Sabirov proposed to him an alternative solution: how about using Bulgaria, a country for which an export license wasn’t necessary, as a transit point? To avoid the need for a U.S. license, chips could be mounted on electronic boards in Sofia, effectively changing the product’s designation in export documents before they were shipped to Moscow.

In early August 2014, Morris again conferred with SST’s lawyer, who said the plan wouldn’t fly. Unless Sabirov could prove he was “adding substantial value in Bulgaria,” a license for export to Russia likely would be required, the lawyer advised in an email, according to Commerce Department documents. The documents don’t name the lawyer.

That same month, Sabirov told SST that since sanctions had disrupted his business of procuring parts for Russia, he had set up a Bulgarian company that would target civilian markets in Europe, according to former SST employees and the Commerce Department documents. The plan was to assemble modules with chips and sell them to car makers for use in engines and exhaust systems. Rad-hard chips aren’t commonly used in automobiles because of their cost.

Sabirov’s Bulgarian business – Multi Technology Integration Group EOOD, or MTIG – was set up by a relative of a business partner in Sofia. The next month, September 2014, MTIG ordered a silicon wafer of rad-hard memory chips from SST for $125,000, according to interviews and federal court documents. Sabirov told SST that MTIG would test the chips and that more orders would follow, according to interviews and Commerce Department documents.

The wafer, which had been produced using SST’s hardening process at a Texas Instruments Inc foundry, was shipped to MTIG at the end of January 2015, according to former SST employees. Four months later, after the eight-inch wafer had been cut into 115 memory chips, the semiconductors were shipped to one of Sabirov’s companies in Moscow, Sovtest Comp, where a 4.6-pound parcel arrived on May 25, according to Russian customs records, interviews and Commerce Department documents.

Texas Instruments said it “complies with applicable laws and regulations in the countries where we operate. At this time, we are not selling into Russia or Belarus.”

By the time SST shipped the wafer to MTIG, the U.S. company had undergone a change in management. In early January 2015, Morris had been stripped of his CEO title after losing a battle for control with the firm’s main investor, New Scientific Ventures. NSV declined to comment. The new CEO, Bernd Lienhard, learned of the shipment to Bulgaria in March 2015, according to the Commerce Department documents. Vorago declined to comment about Lienhard being informed about the deal.

The company rebranded itself as Vorago Technologies that August, but its fortunes continued to rely on Sabirov. In the fall of 2015, Lienhard learned that the Russian was planning to order five more wafers. Lienhard sent Sabirov an email saying it was “the most important biz opportunity for us this year and we are very committed to do whatever necessary to help you,” according to the Commerce Department documents.

In November 2015, the two men exchanged more emails. Lienhard offered a steep discount if Sabirov ordered more wafers before year end.

“How would you feel about the following scenario? Could you buy only 3 wafers this quarter and we would reduce the price per wafer from currently $125,000 to $100,000?” Lienhard emailed Sabirov. “You would help us a lot.”

Five days later, Sabirov asked if there were “any obstacles for direct shipment to Moscow?” Lienhard responded that the wafers would have to be sent to Bulgaria to comply with export regulations, according to the Commerce Department documents, which contained excerpts from the communications.

In December 2015, a new Vorago sales executive, Anne Joubert, met with Sabirov and Dimitar Dimitrov in Munich to discuss additional wafer purchases, according to interviews and Commerce Department documents. Days later, MTIG sent Vorago a purchasing order for five more wafers. Federal documents show that Vorago shipped two of them to MTIG in December 2015.

In July 2016, Joubert flew to Bulgaria where she met with Sabirov and the two Dimitrovs. During the meeting, Joubert asked if MTIG was shipping Vorago’s rad-hard chips to Russia, according to interviews and federal court records. “Maybe,” Sabirov replied. When Joubert said this would violate U.S. export regulations, Dimitar Dimitrov assured her that all of the chips the Texas company previously had shipped to MTIG had remained in Bulgaria

According to the federal indictment, this claim was false because some chips had been sent to Russia. The indictment says that the “Ship to” address on an MTIG invoice was Sabirov’s company, Sovtest, in Moscow. Joubert declined to comment.

Sabirov continued discussing ordering more wafers, including during a meeting with Lienhard in Sofia in August 2018, according to the Commerce Department documents.

That December, an export control officer from the Commerce Department went to Sofia to verify that Vorago chips had been used by MTIG in Bulgaria. The officer met with the younger Dimitrov, Milan, who denied the semiconductors had been sent to Russia and said they were still in Bulgaria, according to the federal indictment.

By then, Vorago, Sabirov and the Dimitrovs were under investigation by both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Commerce Department for alleged export violations, according to interviews.

In early 2016, the company’s founder, Morris, informed the FBI about what he viewed as alleged irregularities at the firm, including the sales involving Sabirov, according to people familiar with the matter.

Weeks after the tip-off, in April 2016, FBI agents raided Vorago’s head office in Austin, searching the premises while staffers were told to remain in one room, according to the people familiar with the matter. “It was a very disruptive day,” one former employee recalled.

According to people familiar with the matter, the federal investigations made slow progress. In July 2019, the FBI raided the third floor of an office building, also in Austin, where Vorago had relocated. That same month, arrest warrants were issued for Sabirov and the Dimitrovs.

Seventeen months later, in December 2020, the U.S. Justice Department announced the indictment of the three men on charges of illegally procuring rad-hard chips and money laundering.

Then, last September – six years after the Texas company first began shipping the specialized chips to Bulgaria – the Commerce Department announced a settlement in which Vorago agreed to pay a penalty: $497,000, the proceeds of its sales. Neither Vorago nor its executives were charged in the criminal case. (Source: glstrade.com/Reuters)

29 Apr 22. US Army Futures Command learning from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. U.S. Army officials say it’s too early to take definitive lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, though they are learning from the conflict.

“We’re 61 days into a major ground combat operation in Europe. It gives us a really unique opportunity to see how ground combat could be fought in the future based on what we’re seeing today,” said Director of Intelligence and Security at Army Futures Command Ed Mornston at the GEOINT Symposium in Denver on April 25. “But it’s really early – in my mind – to say that we have learned anything that we are going to 100% export into future concepts or change the trajectory of our technology investments.”

“We’re learning a lot,” he said, “but I don’t think we’ve slapped the table on anything and say this is what we have ultimately learned.”

AFC, a public-private initiative that runs modernization projects for the Army, is taking notes on what it needs, what it’s doing right and how the service has to move forward to fight on the future battlefield.

The conflict in Ukraine is a showcase for what commercial satellite imagery and sensing can bring to the table. Commercial providers supply satellite imagery to the military and the public, documenting the invasion in real time. That’s as companies including Hawkeye 360 detected GPS interference in the region leading up to the conflict.

For Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology Willie Nelson, there’s still a ways to go to turn those commercial systems into an effective military capability for the U.S.

The Army needs more persistence from commercial providers, allowing them to revisit a specified area rapidly to take images of an evolving situation, he said, adding that those sensors also need to be better integrated with Army systems, to the point that satellite data can be downlinked directly to the battlefield.

“I’m your biggest fan, we need everything we can get,” Nelson said to commercial providers at the event. “But if you can’t get that down to a tactical user in the field in a format that they can rapidly use, then you’ve got a lot of persistence but no real warfighting capability.”

The Army is making progress toward that end through agreements with the National Reconnaissance Office and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to foster rapid prototyping, as well as a memorandum of understanding with the Space Force, he said.

Need for speed

The conflict has also shown the need for faster development of software and technologies, as well as flexible systems that can adapt and continue working in an adversarial environment.

“The situation is extremely dynamic. The intelligence demands are changing and evolving as we watch this conflict,” said Mark Kitz, chief engineer within the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors. “We have got to build our systems that can adapt in a dynamic way as the threat elapse[s], as our data demands adapt, as different sensors enter and exit the environment.”

The Army needs an infrastructure that can do those things in an open and adaptable way, so that troops on the ground aren’t waiting three months to a year for new software or a new antenna built for that environment, he said.

Russia’s shortcomings

There are also lessons to be learned from the ways Russia’s efforts have fallen short of the expectations of its government and of outside observers.

“You can really see where they are. Are they really ten feet tall? Sometimes we tend to paint our adversaries as 10 feet tall when maybe they aren’t,” said Major General John Rafferty, director of AFC’s Long-Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team.

For AFC officials, Russia’s failure to deliver in the conflict validates the U.S. Army’s entire approach to modernization and training, from doctrine to facilities to combined arms training to leader development.

“It’s a complete validation – at least, in my opinion – of the Army Futures Command and largely the Army’s approach to this, Rafferty said. “The second thing for me it validates is our approach to training and combined arms training. It’s hard. It’s expensive. But you can see what the shortcom[ings] are if you don’t invest in that.”

And for Brigadier General Stephanie Ahern, director of concepts at AFC, the conflict is also a validation that the Army needs to continue developing its multi-domain operations doctrine.

“It also reminds us that countries have very unique ways of approaching warfare, and that our future warfare must remain American to its core,” she said. “But those who we are fighting against probably won’t pursue the same approach and so the ability to have information that we can share very quickly across communities, across countries, across allies is absolutely essential.” (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

28 Apr 22. France steps up support for Ukraine with 155mm artillery. A dozen Caesar 155mm artillery systems will be delivered to Ukraine after France reverses a previous focus on providing defensive weapons.

Following a period of relatively muted materiel support for Ukraine since the Russian invasion began on 24 February, the French government on 22 April finally decided to raise the tempo by announcing it would deliver heavy weaponry to Kyiv.

In particular, a dozen Caesar 155mm self-propelled artillery systems on a 6×6 chassis will be transferred from French Army stocks, leaving 64 units in place.

France recently decided to order 32 new-generation Caesar 6×6 Mark II systems using a new chassis.

In terms of providing heavy weapons to Ukraine, there was speculation that artillery destined for Morocco could be diverted, but nothing seems to have come from this.

However, the commitment — confirmed by French President Emmanuel Macron — to send Caesar may displease the army, as senior officers have often complained they have insufficient artillery.

The 155mm guns, which will be delivered to Ukraine in a few weeks, will be accompanied by about 10,000 rounds of unspecified ammunition and training for Ukrainian artillery personnel (which began in late April).

This type of training (with live firing) is normally carried out at the army base in Canjuers near Marseilles, where demonstration firings are regularly carried out for export customers.

The pending Caesar deliveries follow more modest support for Ukraine from France, mainly in the form of MILAN antitank weapons. French officials only admitted these shipments under pressure from the media and other governments, especially the authorities in Kyiv who were critical of Macron for not doing enough.

As a NATO member, France has mobilised various capabilities to support the alliance’s response to Russian aggression. The French Air and Space Force deployed fighters deployed in Estonia within the Baltic Air Policing mission, while daily fighter patrols have been flown eastwards and E-3F AWACS aircraft have been active.

France has also deployed 550 soldiers in Romania and 250 more in Estonia as NATO enhances its forward posture in Eastern Europe. It is also allocated significant intelligence resources to monitor the Black Sea region, such as one of the two Transall C-160G Gabriel SIGINT aircraft.

A Beechcraft King Air 350 VADER was also flown operationally for the first time by the French Air and Space Force.

On the other hand, until recently France had emphasised that military equipment it was transporting to Ukraine was mainly defensive, such as body armour, helmets and logistical systems. With the imminent arrival of Caesar, it is clear that Paris has changed its posture.

However, open-source imagery of Russian MBTs destroyed or captured in Ukraine revealed one embarrassing fact. Some of these tanks were equipped with thermal-imaging fire control systems from Thales, supplied legally after 2014 through a loophole in EU sanctions imposed after the original Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Source: Shephard)

24 Apr 22. Satcube Provides Mission-Critical Satellite Comms For Humanitarian Organizations In Ukraine. Satcube is now launching a new online rental service used by ITV Daytime, 7 News Australia, ICRC (International Red Cross) and other organizations on the ground in Ukraine. The Satcube Instant web platform is an online rental service that supplies the Satcube Ku terminal and high speed data packages that empower organizations to access seamless, satellite broadband to communicate and deliver critical services at any time in the most remote locations around the globe. The online data service is built on Intelsat’s FlexMove network.

Filling a connectivity gap for niche verticals with vital connectivity needs, Satcube identified a gap in the market for verticals, such as broadcasters and humanitarian aid organizations where future deployments and needs arise with extremely short notice. The Satcube Instant online service provides users with an easy to transport, pre-configured Satcube Ku terminal that is ready to use upon arrival.

Satcube Ku lightweight satellite terminal and Intelsat FlexMove Satcube Ku is a compact, lightweight terminal with a feature-rich GUI enabling users to create an easy-to-use Wi-Fi hotspot in just a minute to execute critical on-the-spot work assignments. The sophisticated intelligence of FlexMove will automatically identify which satellite is best suited at that place and time even in the most remote and hostile locations. FlexMove’s unique high-throughput global network and Satcube’s easy-to-use interface provides users with portable, seamless high-speed connectivity.

Versatile teams on the move can hit the ground running, allowing focus on essential missions and transfer of information. The versatile web platform enables users to monitor and control their data consumption with the option to add more data on the go if needed. The Satcube Instant benchmark service provides its global users with:

Easy management of user terminals via secure website
Pre-configured Satcube Ku and data service enables users to create a Wi-Fi hotspot within minutes
Satcube manages all freight of the Satcube Ku’s 1–6-month rental periods
Intelsat FlexMove data packages available from 3 GB – 240 GB
Robust broadband connectivity in 190 countries 24/7 support

A senior Satcube representative will be available on-site at NAB Show, Las Vegas, to discuss and demonstrate the service.

”At Satcube, we aspire to make our solutions available online to a growing number of segments and users with critical connectivity needs,” said the company. “We have developed a flexible online rental service that harnesses the agility of the Satcube Ku portable, lightweight satellite terminal, high-speed data packages from global satellite broadband solution Intelsat FlexMove and the ability to 24 Apr 22. Satcube Provides Mission-Critical Satellite Comms For Humanitarian Organizations In Ukraine. Satcube is now launching a new online rental service used by ITV Daytime, 7 News Australia, ICRC (International Red Cross) and other organizations on the ground in Ukraine. The Satcube Instant web platform is an online rental service that supplies the Satcube Ku terminal and high speed data packages that empower organizations to access seamless, satellite broadband to communicate and deliver critical services at any time in the most remote locations around the globe. The online data service is built on Intelsat’s FlexMove network.

Easy management of user terminals via secure website
Pre-configured Satcube Ku and data service enables users to create a Wi-Fi hotspot within minutes
Satcube manages all freight of the Satcube Ku’s 1–6-month rental periods
Intelsat FlexMove data packages available from 3 GB – 240 GB
Robust broadband connectivity in 190 countries 24/7 support

A senior Satcube representative will be available on-site at NAB Show, Las Vegas, to discuss and demonstrate the service.

Ukraine Conflict Update – 04 May

EXHIBITIONS AND CONFERENCES

VETERANS UPDATE

MANAGEMENT ON THE MOVE