26 Jan 23. International procurement, and uncertainty of long-term pipeline, risks prosperity of Scottish military shipbuilding sector. The future prosperity of Scottish military shipbuilding is at risk through the lack of a clear drumbeat of orders exacerbated by opening procurement up for international competition, the Scottish Affairs Committee warns today as it publishes its report, Defence in Scotland: Military shipbuilding. Scottish military shipbuilding is a major success story, with the expertise and skills present at Scottish shipyards helping to secure contracts to build Type 26 anti-submarine warfare frigates and Type 31 frigates. However, the Committee is concerned that there is no longer a clear commitment to warships being designed and built in the UK, following recent indications the Ministry of Defence will allow ‘offshoring’ of military shipbuilding. While there has been positive policy moves in recent years, such as the National Shipbuilding Strategy offering a long-term look for Scottish shipbuilders, and the establishment of a National Shipbuilding Office in Edinburgh, more recent developments present uncertainty for the sector. The Defence and Security Industrial Strategy and National Shipbuilding Strategy Refresh appear to represent a marked shift from Royal Navy warships being designed and built in the UK, leaving the door open to international competition.
A consistent theme heard by the Committee was that to continue to thrive, the sector must have a regular drumbeat of orders. This could be at risk if cancellations and offshoring of production lead to ‘gaps’ in the workstream for naval shipyards This would have negative social and economic impacts for areas reliant on the shipbuilding sector and its supply chains.
The procurement of Fleet Solid Support ships was opened to international bidders, with the successful team being a consortium of companies including Spanish state-owned Navantia. It is expected that the successful consortium, Team Resolute, would offer fewer jobs in the UK, and less investment in infrastructure, apprenticeships and training at Scottish yards than if Team UK, comprising BAE Systems and Babcock, had been successful.
Opening up procurement to international competition is against the backdrop of uncertainty over the domestic pipeline of procurement extending to the 2030s and 2040s, such as the basis on which the Type 45 destroyers will be replaced. The UK Government must therefore offer greater clarity about the work expected in the coming decades to allow Scottish shipbuilders to strategically invest. It is not just the large shipyards that are affected by uncertainty in the pipeline. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) offer a crucial role in many supply chains for the sector. The Committee has previously reported to the UK Government that MOD spend for Scottish SMEs is well below the national average, and again calls on ministers to update the Committee on what proportion of its spend is with Scottish SMEs and to level the playing field with defence SMEs throughout the UK.
A central tenet of the success of Scottish military shipbuilding is the knowledge and expertise. Warships are built to withstand combat and incorporate a number of specialised systems to support military operations, and much of the UK’s knowledge in these areas is based in Scotland. However, a more holistic view is needed to address any future skills gaps. The creation of the UK Shipbuilding Skills Taskforce is a welcome development, but given Scotland’s importance to UK shipbuilding and the devolved nature of skills policy in Scotland, the Taskforce must look at how it can encourage cooperation between the UK and Scottish Governments.
Scottish Affairs Committee Chair, Pete Wishart MP, said: “Military shipbuilding is a major Scottish success story. From Rosyth to Glasgow, we have military shipbuilding hubs that boost local economies and invest in skills and training. The recent announcement that Type 26 frigates will be built by BAE Systems in Glasgow is a major vote of confidence in the Scottish shipbuilding sector.
However, UK Government policy on military shipbuilding ebbs and flows. On the one hand, ministers are championing the skill and expertise the military shipbuilding sector thrives on in Scotland. But on the other, its policies have opened up the ‘offshoring’ of warship production to other countries. The Government cannot have this both ways: a thriving shipbuilding sector is dependent on the drumbeat of orders. We have the skills and expertise here, in Scotland, to support our future military shipbuilding needs so it is unclear what benefit is to be had by opening up procurement to international competition.
“We hope the UK Government carefully considers our findings and recommendations, and in turn offer some certainty to the military shipbuilding sector in Scotland that its prominence in designing and building warships is here to stay.”
26 Jan 23. Defence Sub-Committee launches inquiry into MOD equipment procurement process.
Today the Defence Sub-Committee launches an inquiry into Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S).
DE&S is an arm’s length body of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), which manages a range of defence equipment and service purchases for the UK’s armed forces. This inquiry will examine the strengths and weaknesses of DE&S, as well as its effectiveness and efficiency. It will also ask what can be learned from the UK’s history of defence procurement and our current international comparators.
The deadline for written evidence is Friday 31 March 2023.
Chair of the Sub-Committee on Defence Equipment and Support, Mark Francois MP, said:
“From ships and armoured vehicles, to aircraft and weaponry, DE&S holds responsibility for major defence procurement programmes. This is a role fundamental to our defensive posture and capabilities.
“The Defence Committee has repeatedly questioned the Ministry of Defence’s woeful track record when it comes to procurement and the department’s equipment and services programme was labelled ‘broken’ by the Public Accounts Committee.
“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should serve a warning to the UK. With war raging in Europe, our Armed Forces are potentially left vulnerable without the right equipment.
“This inquiry will place DE&S under the microscope, examining the agency’s strengths and weaknesses. It will ask how effective our current approach to procurement is and whether we have the necessary skills and incentives. We’ll also look to lessons from the past and overseas to establish what more we can do to improve the DE&S’ performance.”
The Committee welcomes written evidence on one or more of the following points:
- What are the strengths and failings of DE&S’ current approach to defence procurement? Does it deliver value for money to the taxpayer?
- How effective and efficient is DE&S? What can be done to improve DE&S’ overall performance?
- What has been the impact of DE&S on the effectiveness of defence operations?
- What lessons can be learned from the UK’s recent history of defence procurement?
- What can the UK learn about defence procurement from international comparators? Which countries have a particularly strong model and track record and what can the UK learn from them?
- Does DE&S have the right set of skills and incentives to succeed in its tasks?
The Sub-Committee welcomes written submissions from all interested parties. However, the Sub-Committee would be particularly grateful to receive submissions from those with direct experience of working with DE&S itself, whether within MOD and the Armed Forces or the defence supply chain. The Committee normally publishes written evidence that meets parliamentary rules. Please state in your submission if you wish for the Committee to keep it confidential or to anonymise it before publication.
Form of written evidence:
Submissions should be no longer than 3,000 words. The main body of any submission should use numbered paragraphs. Each submission should contain:
- a short summary, perhaps in bullet point form;
- a brief introduction about the person or organisation submitting evidence, for example explaining their area of expertise or experience;
- any factual information from which the Committee might be able to draw conclusions, or which could be put to other witnesses;
- any recommendations for action by the Government or others which the submitter would like the Committee to consider for inclusion in its report to the House.
Submissions should be in malleable format such as MS Word (not PDFs) with no use of colour or logos.
Guidance on submitting written evidence and data protection information is available here: Guidance on submitting written evidence.
Deadline for submissions
The Committee is asking for initial written evidence to be submitted through the Committee’s web portal by 31 March 2023.
House of Commons and House of Lords Hansard Written Answers
Challenger Tanks
Question for Ministry of Defence
Mr Kevan Jones
Labour
North Durham
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the cost to the public purse is to sustain a Challenger 2 squadron, based on 14 platforms, for (a) seven days, (b) 28 days, (c) 90 days and (d) six months.
Answer
Alex Chalk
Conservative
Cheltenham
Commons
Answered on 26 January 2023
The Department carefully considers the cost of using, deploying and sustaining platforms, including those granted to Ukraine. The costs associated with the specific metrics requested by the right hon. Member would however be subject to many variables and include commercially sensitive information. I am therefore unable to provide an assured figure.
Challenger Tanks
Question for Ministry of Defence
Mr Kevan Jones
Labour
North Durham
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what are the forecasted Whole Life Costs, including the Total Departmental Expenditure, Capital Departmental Expenditure and Resource Departmental Expenditure, for the Challenger 3 upgrade programme.
Answer
Alex Chalk
Conservative
Cheltenham
Commons
Answered on 26 January 2023
We do not routinely release forecast figures regarding the resource and capital expenditure of our major projects. Portfolio data is published annually in support of the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) Annual Report which includes a budget baseline and the latest HM Treasury approved estimates in respect of whole life costs.
The current report is available here:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/infrastructure-and-projects-authority-annual-report-2022
National Security: Cybersecurity
Question for Ministry of Defence
John Healey
Labour
Wentworth and Dearne
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 19 January 2023 to Question 122045 on National Security: Cybersecurity, how much of the whole life cost of the Joint Crypt Key Programme will be funded by (a) his Department and (b) the National Cyber Security Centre.
Answer
Alex Chalk
Conservative
Cheltenham
Commons
Answered on 26 January 2023
As a Ministry of Defence-sponsored programme, the Joint Crypt Key Programme is almost entirely funded by the Ministry of Defence. Less than one per cent of programme whole-life costs are drawn from other Departments.
National Security: Cybersecurity
Question for Ministry of Defence
John Healey
Labour
Wentworth and Dearne
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 19 January 2023 to Question 120871 on National Security: Cybersecurity, whether the six Programme Directors since 2016 left their positions voluntarily.
Answer
Alex Chalk
Conservative
Cheltenham
Commons
Answered on 26 January 2023
All Ministry of Defence Programme Directors left the position voluntarily.
Topaz Marine: Contracts
Question for Ministry of Defence
Ian Mearns
Labour
Gateshead
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, on what date his Department opened formal negotiations with Topaz Marine over the purchase of MV Topaz Tangaroa; and if he will list the other vessels considered for carrying out the subsea security function.
Answer
Alex Chalk
Conservative
Cheltenham
Commons
Answered on 26 January 2023
Extensive market engagement and analysis was conducted to determine the suitability of available vessels to meet the requirements of the Ministry of Defence. It was concluded that the MV Topaz Tangaroa was the only ship capable of fully meeting those requirements. Following this determination, an invitation to negotiate was issued to the owner of the MV Topaz Tangaroa on 5 August 2022. I am unable to provide details of the other vessels considered as to do so could be prejudicial to the commercial interests of third parties.
Fleet Solid Support Ships: Contracts
Question for Ministry of Defence
John Healey
Labour
Wentworth and Dearne
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Written Statement entitled Shipbuilding Update, published on 18 January 2023, HCWS502, what estimate he has made of the proportion of the build work that will take place in Cadiz.
Answer
Alex Chalk
Conservative
Cheltenham
Commons Answered on 25 January 2023
The three Fleet Solid Support ships will be assembled from 21 blocks. Fourteen of the blocks, comprising the mid and forward sections of all three ships, will be built by Harland & Wolff in the UK. Seven aft blocks of the Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ships will be built by Navantia in Cadiz. Following arrival of the aft blocks from Spain, the final outfitting, integration of blocks and modules and fitting of sensitive systems, as well as all testing and commissioning will take place in the UK. The involvement of a world-class shipbuilder allows for technology and skills transfer into the UK, and UK capability and employment to sustainably step up to deliver the contract.
Fleet Solid Support Ships: Contracts
Question for Ministry of Defence
John Healey
Labour
Wentworth and Dearne
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Written Statement entitled Shipbuilding Update, published on 18 January 2023, HCWS502, whether he has placed any contractual guarantees on the proportion of the work that will be undertaken in the UK.
Answer
Alex Chalk
Conservative
Cheltenham
Commons
Answered on 25 January 2023
As the prime contractor for the Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ship contract, Navantia UK will be held to account to deliver all its contractual obligations.
Army: Deployment
Question for Ministry of Defence
Mr Kevan Jones
Labour
North Durham
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what constitutes the lead deployable armoured infantry Brigade Combat Team by (a) unit, (b) manpower and (c) platform.
Answer
James Heappey
Conservative
Wells
Commons
Answered on 24 January 2023
The lead Armoured Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is a scalable force trained for warfighting up to joint medium operations.
As the lead Armoured Brigade Combat Team, 12th Armoured Brigade Combat Team has a current, Regular strength of 4,473. It is equipped with Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Challenger 2 as well as Bulldog, AS90, Titan and Trojan.
As of January 2023, 12th Armoured Brigade Combat Team is structured as follows:
12th Armoured Brigade Combat Team
Headquarters 12th Armoured Brigade Combat Team
The King’s Royal Hussars
The Royal Tank Regiment
The Royal Wessex Yeomanry (Reserve)
1st Battalion, The Royal Welsh
3rd Battalion, The Royal Welsh (Reserve)
1st Battalion, The Mercian Regiment
4th Battalion, The Mercian Regiment (Reserve)
3rd Battalion, The Rifles
4th Regiment, The Royal Logistics Corps
4 Battalion, The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
4 Armoured Medical Regiment, Royal Army Medical Corps
Where required, other units are drawn from across the Field Army. The BCT
will be structured with a Brigade Headquarters, one Armoured Regiment, two Armoured Infantry Battalions, one Armoured Cavalry Regiment and other supporting units.
Armoured Fighting Vehicles
Question for Ministry of Defence
Mr Kevan Jones
Labour
North Durham
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the cost to the public purse is of an AS-90, based on the platform travelling 30 miles per day and firing 90 rounds per day.
Answer
Alex Chalk
Conservative
Cheltenham
Commons
Answered on 26 January 2023
The Department carefully considers the cost of using, deploying and sustaining platforms, including those granted to Ukraine. The costs associated with the specific metrics requested by the right hon. Member would however be subject to many variables and include commercially sensitive information. I am therefore unable to provide an assured figure.