NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 05.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS:

• DONETSK: Russian forces are intensifying ground attacks near Avdiivka; advances remain extremely slow and highly costly
• STRIKES: Ukrainian strikes against Russian-occupied Crimea and border regions underline the increased capability (and likelihood) of Ukrainian retaliatory strikes
• AID: The US State Department announced that aid to Ukraine will continue for ‘as long as it takes’, while acknowledging that 2022-23 levels are not guaranteed
• FORECAST: Russia’s alleged procurement of North Korean missiles will likely prompt sanctions; it also underscores growing defence co-operation between Moscow and Pyongyang
• BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
• DONETSK: On 4 January, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, reported that Russian forces had nearly doubled the number of their attacks near Avdiivka. Vitaliy Barabash, the head of the Ukrainian Avdiivka military administration, also reported that Russian forces had intensified their attacks across the front, with a particular focus on disrupting Ukrainian logistics at Stepove (which remains in Ukrainian control). Geolocated footage published on 4 January indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced near the waste heap north-west of Avdiivka. Positional fighting is ongoing across multiple points of the frontline.
• KHERSON: Earlier on 5 January, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing to expand the bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson oblast. However, while positional fighting is ongoing, there has been no visual confirmation of Ukrainian gains over the past 24 hours. One Russian milblogger claimed on 4 January that Ukrainian forces were hampering Russian efforts to repel Ukrainian troops through the effective use of electronic warfare (EW) and first-person view (FPV) drones.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 4 January indicates that Russian forces made limited advances east of Terny, located around nine miles (15km) north-west of Kreminna. Separately, Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Volodymyr Fityo reported on 4 January that the tempo of Russian attacks in the direction of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) had decreased, possibly due to poor weather conditions. However, he also noted that Russian forces were attacking at Synkivka, located around five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk, as part of an effort to advance towards the latter.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its air defences intercepted 37 drones and ten missiles launched by Ukraine late on 4 January. The drones were reportedly destroyed over Russian-annexed Crimea and Krasnodar Krai (Russia), while the missiles were intercepted over Russia’s Belgorod oblast. The governor of Belgorod, Vyacheslav Gladkov, reported that the missiles damaged a residential building in Belgorod city. The Crimean branch of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported explosions in the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk (Krasnodar Krai). The media also reported explosions across Crimea, including in Sevastopol and in the Kerch Strait area. A pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel reported explosions in Saky (western Crimea), where an important military airbase is located.
• STRIKES: Russia’s MoD also reported that its air defences intercepted ten Ukrainian missiles over Crimea earlier on 4 January. Mikhail Razvozhayev, the Russian governor of annexed Crimea, reported that nearly 100 people were evacuated from a village near Sevastopol. The Strategic Communications Department of the Armed Forces of Ukraine claimed that the attack hit a command post near Sevastopol. The latest Ukrainian attacks illustrate Kyiv’s efforts to degrade Russian military capabilities across Crimea and to target critical infrastructure, such as Russian Black Sea ports. They also indicate that Ukrainian retaliatory strikes are increasingly likely in the coming months.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller stated on 4 January that the US is committed to supporting Ukraine for ‘as long as it takes’. However, he also acknowledged that this does not mean that Washington DC will provide the same level of military funding as in 2022 and 2023. Miller stated that the ultimate goal is to enable Ukraine to become more militarily self-sufficient. However, Kyiv will highly likely remain reliant on military aid from Western allies in the long term. On 27 December 2023, the US announced the final package of weapons and military assistance for Ukraine for 2023. It included air defence munitions and additional ammunition for high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), among other elements.
• MOBILISATION: On 4 January, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that it unveiled a draft-evasion network assisting draftable Ukrainians to escape to the Russian-backed breakaway region of Transnistria in Moldova. In the past year, reports have unveiled several draft-dodging schemes operating within the Ukrainian military which enable draftable Ukrainians to leave Ukrainian territory. In November 2023, a BBC investigation indicated that around 20,000 Ukrainian men illegally left the country to avoid military service and that border guards arrested around 21,000 individuals attempting to cross the border. The SBU’s announcement reflects Kyiv’s efforts to close draft-evading loopholes that compound Ukraine’s persistent military recruitment challenges.
• For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2023, please see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly: Scenarios and Forecasts – 22 December 2023.

FORECAST

NORTH KOREA: On 4 January, White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated that North Korea has recently provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and missiles. Kirby also stated that the US assesses that Russia will use additional North Korean missiles to target Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Further sanctions against entities assisting in the provision of such weapons are likely in the coming weeks and months. Although Kirby did not specify the type of missiles North Korea had transferred to Russia, they reportedly have a range of around 550 miles (900km). The White House released a graphic which appeared to show KN-23 and KN-25 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The specifications of the KN-23 are somewhat comparable to Russian Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Kirby stated that Russian forces launched at least one of these projectiles against Ukraine on 30 December 2023; it reportedly landed in an open field in an unspecified location in Zaporizhzhia oblast. The spokesperson also noted that Russia launched several North Korean-supplied ballistic missiles at Ukraine on 2 January as part of an overnight aerial attack (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 2 January 2024). However, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s air force, Yuriy Ihnat, stated earlier on 5 January that it cannot yet be confirmed if Russia used North Korean missiles to target Ukraine.

Russia’s alleged procurement and utilisation of North Korean ballistic missiles ultimately underscores the growing defence partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang. Meanwhile, Kirby stated that Russia is seeking to obtain close-range ballistic missiles from Iran. However, he also revealed that the US does not believe that Iran has delivered such technology to Russia. He claimed that Washington DC is concerned that negotiations to acquire the missiles are ‘actively advancing’. Moscow will likely continue to co-operate with other states in the so-called ‘axis of the excluded’ in the coming months to bolster its supplies of ballistic missiles and to sustain its strike campaign against Ukraine.

Jan 04.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS :

• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are steadily advancing to the north-west of Bakhmut and modestly shortening the frontline as they increase the pressure on Ukrainian forces in the area
• RECRUITMENT: Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree granting Russian citizenship to foreign nationals who sign contracts to serve in the armed forces
• BORDERS: Polish farmers resumed the blockade of the Shehyni-Medyka crossing at the Polish-Ukrainian border, sustaining supply chain disruption
• FORECAST: Russia and Ukraine announced their first official exchange of prisoners of war (POWs) since August 2023
• BAKHMUT: It is likely that Russian forces are steadily advancing to the north-west of Bakhmut and modestly shortening the frontline as they increase the pressure on Ukrainian forces in the area. Geolocated footage published in recent days confirms that Russian forces are advancing along the O0506 highway that runs between Bakhmut and Bohadanivka (via Khromove). They are likely aiming to push west towards Chasiv Yar, located around four miles (6.5km) west of Khromove. Russian airborne (VDV) forces appear to be leading the advances in this direction. While the full extent of their recent gains remains unconfirmed, evidence suggests that they are modestly building momentum in this area. Russian sources claimed on 3 January that their forces are also advancing to the north-east of Bakhmut, and that they are making unconfirmed progress to the east of Vesele, located around 11 miles (18km) north-east of Bakhmut.
• DONETSK: Earlier on 4 January, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, stated that the rate of Russian attacks doubled along the Donetsk frontline over the past 24 hours. Russian forces reportedly conducted 47 ground attacks, 25 airstrikes and around 875 artillery attacks in the Donetsk sector. Geolocated footage posted on 3 January indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced on the outskirts of Pervomaiske, located to the south-west of Avdiivka.
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 3 January indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances on the south-eastern outskirts of Pobieda, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Donetsk city. Russian milbloggers also reported earlier on 4 January that Russian forces are focusing on Novomykhailivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Donetsk City.
• KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Earlier on 4 January, several Russian milbloggers reported that fighting is ongoing in the Serebrianske forest area, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Kreminna. Nevertheless, the milbloggers acknowledged that the frontline remains stable.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Overnight on 3-4 January, Ukraine claimed that its air defences intercepted two Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia. The projectiles were destroyed over Khmelnytskyi oblast. However, a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that a drone struck the Starokostiantyniv airfield (Khmelnytskyi). The airbase houses Su-24 bomber aircraft. These are highly likely the primary launch platforms for Storm Shadow missiles. As such, the airbase will remain a principal target for Russian long-range strikes for the foreseeable future, particularly when F-16 jets begin operating from the facility.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• CHINA: On 2 January, international media reported that Chinese deliveries of advanced machine tools to Russia have increased tenfold since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to Russian customs data, Chinese manufacturers shipped around USD 68 million worth of computer numerical control (CNC) devices in July 2023, up from around USD 6.5 million in February 2022. Notably, Chinese-origin CNC tools made up around 57% of Russian imports by value in July 2023. Before the war, such tools accounted for around 12% of Russian imports by value.
• CHINA: While it is unclear how Russia utilises these devices, the significant increase in CNC imports is almost certainly assisting Moscow in ramping up its military-industrial production. There is no evidence on social media or in any films taken inside Russia’s military factories of these devices being used. However, we continue to assess that they are being employed in the military supply chain. Furthermore, the significant increase in CNC imports reflects growing co-operation between Russia and China; it also underscores Russia’s reliance on obtaining vital technology from alternative partners following the imposition of Western sanctions. Further punitive Western measures aimed at targeting such technology imports are likely in the coming months.
• RECRUITMENT: Earlier on 4 January, Russian state media reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree granting Russian citizenship to foreign nationals who sign contracts to serve in the armed forces during the war in Ukraine. The legislation also concerns foreign nationals who sign up for service in other ‘military formations’, likely referring to paramilitary units and private military companies (PMCs). Prospective applicants must sign a contract to serve for at least a year to receive citizenship. Immediate family members, such as spouses and children, are also eligible for Russian citizenship; this is likely an attempt by the Russian state to provide greater incentive for foreign citizens to sign military contracts.
• RECRUITMENT: Similar efforts, such as the introduction of legislation that simplifies the process of obtaining Russian citizenship, will likely bolster Russian manpower levels for the duration of the war; this will in turn reduce the need for nationwide mobilisation. Another round of formal mobilisation would likely precipitate domestic unrest and government stability risks; the Kremlin almost certainly wants to avoid such instability ahead of the March presidential election. As such, foreign citizens and criminals will likely continue to form a major recruiting source for the Russian war effort. For further analysis, please see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 16 November 2023.
• BORDERS: Earlier on 4 January, Polish farmers resumed their blockade of the Shehyni-Medyka crossing at the Polish-Ukrainian border. Roman Kondrów, a protest leader, stated that the participating farmers would end their blockade as and when the government formally agrees to subsidise corn and maintain the agricultural tax at its current rate. On 18 December 2023, Polish farmers reportedly joined the border crossing blockade initiated by Polish truckers in November 2023; they subsequently suspended the protests on 24 December 2023.
• BORDERS: The latest farmers’ blockade is reportedly stricter; it only allows military and humanitarian aid to transit, as well as perishable goods. Kondrów stated that while the agriculture minister agreed to the demands in December 2023, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk did not sign an official declaration. On 3 January, Tusk called on farmers and truckers to end the border blockade due to the resultant strains on trade ties with Ukraine. However, truckers and farmers will likely continue blocking border crossings in the coming weeks, sustaining operational and supply chain disruption risks.

FORECAST

PRISONERS: On 3 January, Russia and Ukraine announced their first official exchange of prisoners of war (POWs) since August 2023 following mediation efforts by the UAE. Ukraine stated that it was the largest exchange of POWs since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, noting that 230 Ukrainian men and women were released. It is understood that many of the Ukrainian prisoners involved in the swap were captured on Snake Island and in Mariupol, meaning they were likely imprisoned for almost two years. Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that 248 of its own military personnel were returned to Russia.

While the POW exchange is notable and underscores that both sides are willing to engage in low-level negotiations, we do not assess that it is an indicator that peace talks are likely in the coming months. On 28 December 2023, Russian state-media reported that Russia deployed a battalion comprising Ukrainian POWs to the frontline. As such, Russia likely agreed to the exchange to undermine reports in recent months of Ukrainian POWs experiencing abuse, as well as other potential violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs.

*Heightened long-term espionage risks to military entities will likely endure amid Ukraine war. On 3 January, the security company Uptycs reported that the threat actor ‘UAC-0050’ is conducting a new phishing campaign to distribute the remote access trojan (RAT) ‘Remcos RAT’ using new techniques to evade security detections. The campaign is suspected of targeting Ukrainian military personnel advertising consultancy roles with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The newest iteration of the RAT leverages pipes in the Windows operating system to create a communication channel for UAC-0050 to covertly transfer stolen data, circumventing Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) and antivirus security detections. Such methods highlight the group’s sophistication and ability to remain undetected in a system, prolonging security risks to military entities. The Remcos RAT is typically used for surveillance and remote control of a network; it is highly likely being used for long-term espionage against Ukrainian military targets. Targeting by UAC-0050 will likely persist as the Ukraine war remains ongoing.

Jan 03.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS:

• BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to make confirmed advances north-west of Bakhmut, albeit at a slow and attritional rate; nevertheless, pressure is continuing to mount on the defending Ukrainians
• MARITIME: The Turkish government confirmed that it will continue to block the passage of two British-supplied Sandown-class minehunter vessels to Ukraine through the Turkish Straits
• MOBILISATION: Ukrainian lawmakers confirm that the Rada will not consider the government-proposed draft law on mobilisation in its original form – indicating that amendments will be made to ease proposed restriction of rights of draft dodgers
• FORECAST: Kyiv confirms that Russia launched at least 500 missiles and drones in the past five days, but given mixed interception rates of ballistic missiles, Ukraine remains overwhelmingly reliant upon Western aid to maintain air defences
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 1 and 2 January confirms that Russian forces have indeed made further advances to the north-west of Bakhmut in recent days. Russian forces are now confirmed to have entered the north-eastern outskirts of the village of Bohdanikva, located around four miles (6km) west of Bakhmut. They are also likely making slow but steady gains at other sectors of the frontline, including near Kurdyumivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut.
• DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
• KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 2 January indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Karmazynivka, located around seven miles (11km) south-west of Svatove and Ploshchanka, nine miles(15km) north-west of Kreminna. However, the overall tempo of operations of the north-eastern frontline has remained broadly on trend over recent weeks.
• SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian General Staff reported earlier on 3 January that their forces have successfully forced Russian forces to retreat from certain positions on the southern Zaporizhzhia frontline. Kyiv claims that Russian forces have retreated from positions near Verbove, a key settlement located six miles (10km) east of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast) that both sides have been fighting over for the full duration of Ukraine’s 2023 counter-offensive. We cannot confirm if and how far Russian forces have retreated, but any movement will likely be limited given Russian forces are now moving to the offensive on this sector of the frontline, with Russian sources also claiming on 2-3 January that they are advancing in the same area.
• STRIKES: See FORECAST below.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• MARITIME: On 2 January, the Turkish government confirmed that it will continue to block the passage of two British-supplied Sandown-class minehunter vessels to Ukraine through the Turkish Straits. Ankara invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention, which prohibits the passage of vessels belonging to ‘belligerent states’ through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. The convention has prevented Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet since the beginning of the war with commissioned warships. The UK government confirmed on 11 December 2023 that the two Sandown-class vessels, now known as the Ukrainian naval vessels Chernihiv and Cherkasy, have been transferred to the Ukrainian Navy and are currently operated by Ukrainian personnel in British waters. Turkey has reiterated that it will not permit their passage into the Black Sea for ‘as long as the war continues’, meaning they are highly unlikely to operate in the region for the foreseeable future.
• MOBILISATION: On 2 January, a senior Ukrainian lawmaker Yevheniia Kravchuk confirmed that the Ukrainian Parliament (the Rada) will not consider the government-proposed draft law on mobilisation in its original form – indicating that amendments will be made. The original proposal put forward on 25 December included wide-ranging provisions to sanction and limit the rights of individuals who evade military conscription and registration. These included bans on travelling abroad, limited rights to drive a vehicle and acquire a driving license, refusals of credit or loan agreements, limits on liquidating funds and other valuables as well as limits on transactions with ‘movable and immovable property’. However, Ukraine’s human rights ombudsman, Dmytro Lubinets, stated that such restrictions would contradict the Ukrainian Constitution. As such, a compromise deal with the Ministry of Defence is understood to have been reached, which will likely form the basis of the future revised mobilisation law.
• MOBILISATION: It remains unclear when the revised mobilisation law will be presented to parliament, but it is clear that the Ukrainian government is prioritising closing conscription loopholes in its bid to increase military recruitment. The rights of draft dodgers is nevertheless highly likely to be curtailed in 2024, with ever-greater efforts to deter evaders both in Ukraine and abroad. On 2 January, for example, local military administrators in the capital Kyiv confirmed that commandant’s offices and the police have been tasked with ‘searching for persons who violate the legislation on mobilisation’ at key checkpoints across the city.
• MOBILISATION: Meanwhile, new conscription laws entered into force in Russia on 1 January, raising the upper limit of conscription age from 27 to 30. However, the new law will only apply to affect the upcoming spring 2024 conscription cycle, which is set to run between 1 April-15 July 2024. This means that Russian men aged between 18-30 are now eligible for conscription – though it remains Russian policy that conscripts continue not to be deployed to frontline operations in Ukraine.

FORECAST

STRIKES: On 2 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak that Russia launched at least 500 missiles and drones in the past five days. On 29 December, the UK announced it would supply Ukraine with hundreds of UK-made air defence missiles. The provision of Western-made air defence systems and missiles will remain crucial for maintaining Ukraine’s air defence capabilities in 2024.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, said that US-made Patriot air defence systems allowed Ukraine’s Air Force to intercept all ten Kinzhal ‘hypersonic’ ballistic missiles launched on 2 January. The interception of these projectiles illustrates the effectiveness of the Patriot system in countering Russian ballistic missiles, including the Kinzhal system which had been partly designed to circumvent such Western air defences. Ukraine’s Air Force nevertheless failed to intercept any Kinzhal missiles launched on 29 December, which indicates some improvement of Ukrainian air defence operations since that attack.

Russia’s use of experimental tactics in recent months and a mix of strike assets are clearly aimed at overwhelming Ukrainian air defences. However, it remains unlikely that similar strike packages will achieve the same results as on 29 December, as long as Ukrainian air defence systems and ammunition remain stable. However, if Russian forces maintain a semi-regular tempo of intensive strikes in the coming weeks, this will severely strain Ukrainian air defences, requiring additional transfers of Western assistance to maintain its current rate of air space coverage.

On 2 January, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) announced it dismantled webcams hacked by Russian special services to identify critical infrastructure locations in Kyiv for its 2 January strike. The SBU explained that both devices were located in residential buildings and were used to monitor the surrounding areas. The case illustrates civilian surveillance devices will remain vulnerable to Russian cyber-espionage operations, allowing Russian security services to map critical infrastructure and military targets across Ukraine for its striking campaign.

* Russia: Ongoing military recruitment of convicts will drive. long-term crime risks. On 2 January, the Russian independent online investigation outlet Mediazona reported that almost half the presidential decrees signed in 2023 were confidential. If confirmed, this would mark a record high. A similar rise occurred in 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These rises are likely due to war-related decisions, including classified military spending projects. Mediazona also noted that secret presidential decrees are typically issued to pardon convicts who have fought in Ukraine for six months. On 13 June 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that he will continue to pardon convicts who have fought in Ukraine (while also acknowledging that some of these individuals are likely to reoffend). Despite the risk of an increase in repeat offences, Russia is highly unlikely to halt the recruitment of convicts, especially in light of its growing need for personnel to fight in its attritional war in Ukraine. As such, the pardoning of dangerous convicts who have served in the military will drive long-term crime risks and repeat offence rates.

*Kazakhstan: Increased security measures will mitigate risk of unrest related to 2022 anniversary. On 3 January, President Kassim-Jomart Tokayev claimed that there was no more political persecution and censorship in Kazakhstan. This claim likely forms part of a bid to mitigate the risk of unrest during the anniversary of the January 2022 protests. Tokayev further stated that he has no intention of changing the constitution to run for a second presidential term in 2026. Tokayev’s remarks are highly likely aimed at portraying himself as a reformer. However, despite the implementation of some modest reforms since 2022, state repression remains extensive. On 25 December 2023, the police arrested activists taking part in an unauthorised rally commemorating the death of protesting oil workers in 2011. Similar rallies occurred in Kazakhstan’s restive Mangystau region on 17 December 2023. While activists are likely to stage protests in the coming days to commemorate the anniversary of the 2022 unrest (2-11 January), increased state security measures will mitigate the risk of protests escalating into large-scale demonstrations. However, in the event of escalatory clashes in Mangystau, the risk of nationwide unrest will increase.

Jan 02.

• DONETSK: A Ukrainian commander described December 2023 as the ‘most difficult’ month for Ukrainian forces defending Avdiivka, with confirmation from Kyiv that their forces withdrew from nearby Marinka
• STRIKES: On 29 December and 1-2 January, Russia launched its largest strike package since the beginning of the war; this succeeded in penetrating air defences at multiple points, and focused on military-industrial sites
• SPILLOVER: A suspected Russian missile violated Polish airspace on 29 December; while this is highly unlikely to represent a major escalation, further violations will increase the risk of collateral damage and unwanted escalation
• FORECAST: The New York Times claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is allegedly expressing interest in a ceasefire in Ukraine through backchannels, though this does not change our assessment that a genuine ceasefire is unlikely in the short term
• BAKHMUT: Over the last two weeks, Russian forces have continued their offensive around Bakhmut. They are continuing to achieve slow, incremental advances to the north-west of the city. Geolocated footage from 30 December 2023 indicates they advanced in Khromove, located on the western outskirts of Bakhmut. Additionally, more Russian sources are claiming (without verification) that their forces are advancing to the north-west, and that they have entered the north-eastern outskirts of the village of Bohdanikva, located around four miles (6km) west of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage from 30 December 2023 also confirms that Russian forces have advanced to the north of Klishchiivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut. However, their progress on this axis remains slow.
• DONETSK: On 28 December, Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun stated that December 2023 was the most difficult month for Ukrainian forces defending Avdiivka and Marinka. Shtupun explained that despite heavy losses, Russian forces continued to make advances in both sectors. On 25 December, Moscow claimed to have taken Marinka in its entirety; this is likely to be accurate. Geolocated footage posted over the past week shows that Russian forces also continued to make incremental gains around Avdiivka, though at a high cost. An OSINT account reported that from 10 October to 29 December, Russia lost at least 411 tanks, fighting vehicles and artillery pieces in the area. By contrast, Ukraine reportedly lost 30 pieces of heavy equipment, though this cannot be confirmed. Estimated losses and casualty rates nevertheless illustrate the high cost of Russian ‘meat grinding’ operations in the sector. However, they continue to make progress despite these losses.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhnyi acknowledged on 26 December that Ukrainian forces partly withdrew from Marinka; this underscores the mounting pressure facing Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine. He stated that while holding territory is important, Kyiv is prioritising the preservation of its troops. Zaluzhnyi also stated that he believed Russian forces can repeat ‘what happened in Bakhmut’ in Avdiivka over the next two to three months; this likely refers to Wagner Group-led attritional frontal assaults that steadily force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the city. Zaluzhnyi’s comments likely reflect an attempt to limit expectations of Ukrainian counter-offensives in Q1 and to prepare the information space for possible losses during Russia’s ongoing offensive.
• DONETSK: On 27 December, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, stated that the Avdiivka sector is the focus of Russia’s main offensive effort, and that this is where Russia is actively transferring troops. Operations near Novomykhailivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Donetsk City, are part of a diversionary effort. Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are not seeking to enter Avdiivka, as any attempt to break through the city’s highly fortified defences would force Russia to commit significant numbers of additional troops. However, Russia’s slow grinding offensive operations have achieved advances in the past.
• KHERSON: In recent weeks, there has been very little change to the frontline along the Dnieper River in Kherson oblast. Ukrainian forces are maintaining a number of positions on the left (east) bank of the river, but have not been able to expand these beachheads for several months. Russian forces are continuing their efforts to repel Ukrainian troops, but have so far been unable to dislodge them from their side of the river. The destruction of three Russian Su-34 aircraft over southern Ukraine between 21 and 22 December has also seemingly coerced Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) to reduce the tempo of their operations in the area, including glide bomb attacks (which have remained the principal airstrike type along the frontline in recent months).
• KHERSON: Ukrainian Southern Operational Command spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk reported on 26 December that Russian forces have deployed high-calibre artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to the left bank of the Dnieper River in a bid to offset the lack of air support. However, there has also been an overall reduction in the tempo of land operations over the past week; this likely reflects Russian ground forces’ reliance on glide bomb air support.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past week, there has been limited change along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline. Russian forces made limited confirmed gains in the Kreminna and Kupiansk sectors.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have continued to counter-attack along the southern frontline in Zaporizhzhia oblast; they have seemingly retaken numerous positions Ukraine seized during its 2023 counter-offensive. Geolocated footage from 27 December onwards confirms that Russian forces have advanced west of Verbove, located six miles (10km) east of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia).
• SOUTHERN: Further east along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border, Russian forces are also counter-attacking, though with comparatively less success. However, among the most significant developments along this section of the frontline in recent weeks were Russian state media reports from 27 December which confirmed that a battalion formed of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) has been deployed to the frontline. The Bogdan Khmelnitsky battalion reportedly includes 70 Ukrainian POWs and is currently fighting Ukrainian forces near Urozhaine, located around six miles (10km) south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). If true, this would represent a direct contradiction of the Geneva Conventions regarding POWs. There is mounting evidence of much broader violations of the conventions by the Russian military, including footage of executions of Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne on 27 December.
• STRIKES: On 29 December, Russia launched its largest strike package since the beginning of the war. The attacks included 156 projectiles: 36 Shahed-136/131 drones and an unprecedented 120 missiles of various types and sizes. Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted 115 projectiles, including 27 drones and 88 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles. However, the Ukrainian authorities reported that the strikes killed 39 people and injured 159 others. They targeted military and industrial facilities and critical infrastructure in the cities of Dnipro, the capital Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia, as well as sites in Cherkasy, Mykolaiv and Sumy oblasts. The authorities reported that the largest civilian casualties were recorded in Kyiv, where 16 people were killed.
• STRIKES: The 29 December strikes focused primarily on hitting military-industrial targets; this highly likely reflects Russia’s efforts to undermine Ukraine’s domestic military-industrial complex and therefore its military self-sufficiency. As the attritional war continues, Russia is highly likely to target military-industrial sites to ensure Kyiv remains overwhelmingly reliant on Western military aid, which it hopes (and likely predicts) will steadily erode in the coming years. However, if this targeting pattern is sustained in 2024, it will elevate the risks facing Western investment in strategic sectors; it is also likely aimed at deterring further Western military-industrial investment inside Ukraine.
• STRIKES: Following the strikes, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi explained that Russia first launched 36 drones from different directions early on 29 December. Later, Russian strategic aircraft and bombers launched around 90 Kh-101, Kh-555 and Kh-55 cruise missiles as well as eight Kh-22 and Kh-32 missiles. Concurrently, Russian forces launched a total of 14 S-300, S-400 and Iskandr-M ballistic missiles from Crimea and mainland Russia. Russian forces also reportedly launched five Kinzhal ‘hypersonic’ air-launched ballistic missiles, four Kh-31P anti-radar missiles and one Kh-59 cruise missile.
• STRIKES: Ukraine air defences failed to intercept any ballistic missiles, Kinzhal ‘hypersonic’ ballistic missiles, Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, Kh-22/32 or Kh-59 cruise missiles, indicating that Russia’s experimentation in recent months has increased the lethality of its swarming attacks. We previously assessed that Russia’s use of innovative tactics and mix of strike assets during attacks was aimed at identifying weaknesses in Ukraine’s air defence network. The initial launch of drones during the 29 December strikes was likely intended to probe Ukrainian air defences and establish striking routes to avoid air defence clusters. This approach was seemingly successful.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 29-31 December, Russia reported that Ukraine launched two missiles and several rockets against Belgorod (Russia). We previously assessed that mass attacks would trigger a Ukrainian response, with other drone attacks seemingly targeting military-industrial targets near Belgorod, Bryansk, the capital Moscow, Tula and Tver (all Russia). The Belgorod attack reportedly killed 22 people and wounded 111 others. If confirmed, this would represent the deadliest single attack against a Russian urban centre since the beginning of the war.
• STRIKES: In retaliation for the Belgorod attack, Russian forces launched a missile and drone strike against Kharkiv overnight on 30-31 December. The Ukrainian authorities reported that the attack included at least six S-300 missiles and 49 Shahed-131/136 drones. They were launched at Kharkiv and Kyiv, as well as Kherson, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted only 21 drones, marking one of the lowest interception rates against Russian drones in recent months. This likely reflects the relative success of Russia’s swarming tactics to overwhelm and undermine Ukrainian air defences over a series of days. However, these interception rates have increased during subsequent attacks.
• STRIKES: Early on 1 January, Russia carried out a further massive drone attack which included around 90 Shahed-136/131 drones. The drones were launched in four waves from the Black Sea and Crimea. They targeted port infrastructure in Odesa oblast. Ukraine’s air force reported that it intercepted 87 drones (a much higher and on-trend rate than that on 30-31 December). Later on 1 January, Russian forces launched a further ten Shahed drones and one Kh-59 missile; Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted nine drones and the missile.
• STRIKES: Earlier on 2 January, Russia launched a further massive missile attack similar to the strikes launched on 29 December. The attack included 35 drones launched in the first wave and 99 missiles launched in two subsequent waves. Russian strategic bombers launched at least 70 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 air-launched cruise missiles. In the second wave, Russia launched ten Kinzhal ballistic missiles, three Kalibr cruise missiles, 12 S-300, S-400 and Iskander-M ballistic missiles, as well as four anti-radar Kh-31P missiles. Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted all the Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 59 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles, three Kalibr missiles and all the drones. The missiles targeted military facilities and critical infrastructure in Kyiv, as well as in Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Vinnytsia oblasts. The striking pattern and projectile mix in the latest attack strongly resembles the attack on 29 December. However, it was seemingly less successful due to the higher interception rates.
• STRIKES: On 29 December, Ukrainian Defence Minster Rustem Umerov said that Russia has been accumulating missiles for several months, and that this will allow Russian forces to carry out further strikes in the coming months. However, the unprecedented scale of the 29 December and 2 January attacks means that Russia is unlikely to be able to sustain such attacks on a regular basis due to the current estimates regarding missile production in Russia. Nevertheless, stockpiling over the autumn and winter in 2023 has likely provided Russia with significant projectile numbers; further high-intensity attacks are therefore likely in the coming months.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• SPILLOVER: On 29 December, a stray missile seemingly crossed the Ukrainian border into Polish airspace during the largest missile strike against Ukraine of the war to date. Warsaw reported that the missile flew roughly 25 miles (40km) inside Polish airspace for about three minutes before re-entering Ukrainian airspace. While the missile was being actively tracked by Polish and NATO radar systems, no decision to intercept the missile was taken – though Warsaw reiterated after the event that its armed forces are stand ready to shoot down missiles which fly further into Polish airspace. Poland subsequently confirmed that the missile was Russian and summoned the Russian charge d’affaires for an explanation. The incident is highly unlikely to trigger a major escalation between Russia and NATO, though it underscores the credible threat posed by conflict spillover to regions neighbouring Ukraine – particularly during high-intensity missile strikes.
• MARITIME: On 26 December, Ukrainian forces successfully hit the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF)’s Novocherkassk (a Ropucha-class landing ship) in Feodosia (occupied-Crimea). According to Russian sources, a single Storm Shadow cruise missile (either British- or French-supplied) hit the bow of the ship; this later ignited ammunition, which effectively destroyed and largely sank the ship. A second Storm Shadow cruise missile reportedly landed in the water; it seemingly damaged a pier and a nearby mechanical plant, as well as BSF administrative buildings.
• MARITIME: The Novocherkassk is the third Ropucha-class vessel to be hit by Ukrainian forces. It is clear that Ukraine’s Black Sea counter-offensive continues to achieve significant results by forcing BSF surface assets to relocate ever further eastwards. In this regard, it is likely that Russia has started to build a new naval base in Ochamchira in occupied Abkhazia (Georgia). While the size of the base and the time needed to construct the appropriate naval infrastructure will severely limit its utility for large vessels, the construction clearly reflects Russia’s increasingly defensive posture in the Black Sea. Ukrainian forces will continue to try to hit Russian surface vessels and the land-based infrastructure needed to support BSF operations. Ukraine’s offensive missile and maritime drone capabilities will highly likely grow even further in 2024.
• MARITIME: On 28 December, the Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian naval mine hit and damaged a civilian vessel sailing under a Panama flag. The vessel was reportedly travelling to a Ukrainian Danube River port to transport grain through the Black Sea. While the command assessed that poor weather in the Black Sea will increase the risk of vessels hitting naval mines, the so-called grain corridor is likely to remain operational, despite the apparent risks. Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are set to reach a new deal on demining the region later in January, which, if implemented successfully, would moderately mitigate the threat of mines to vessels in the medium-to-long term.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: On 23 December 2023, the New York Times published an article citing two former Russian officials close to the Kremlin, as well as US and international officials. It reported that President Vladimir Putin is allegedly expressing interest in a ceasefire in Ukraine through backchannels. This directly contradicts Putin’s public statements and those of his officials, which over the last month have reiterated that Russia’s objectives in Ukraine are unchanged. Western officials cited by the New York Times nevertheless warned that such overtures could be ‘Kremlin misdirection’. On 1 January, Putin stated that Russia wants to end the war against Ukraine ‘as soon as possible’, but only on ‘our terms’.

It remains highly likely that backchannel negotiations have been taking place on-and-off throughout the war, including between Russian, Ukrainian and Western officials. However, the fact that backchannel negotiations are likely occurring does not necessarily reflect a genuine or sincere desire for a negotiated settlement or even a temporary ceasefire. It remains our assessment that the Kremlin highly likely considers it to be in Russia’s interests to continue fighting the war ahead of the US presidential election in November, given that its attritional strategy is more likely to bear fruit the longer Western support for Ukraine is tested.

In the unlikely scenario that the Kremlin does agree to some form of ceasefire in the next six months, it remains our assessment that such an agreement will only serve to allow Russia to reconstitute its military to prepare for further offensives. Almost all indicators we are monitoring point to the Kremlin maintaining its maximalist strategic objectives in Ukraine – namely the demilitarisation and ‘de-nazification’ of Ukraine and further territorial conquests. Public rhetoric has also indicated clearly that Moscow has no interest in negotiations at present. The recent hardening of Russia’s rhetoric, on which we have previously reported, is possibly aimed at strengthening Moscow’s backchannel negotiating position (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 21 December 2023). However, it remains unlikely that this is a genuine attempt to reach a stable ceasefire or peace settlement. The possibility of negotiations could form part of Russian information and psychological operations designed to further undermine Western support for Ukraine by extending war fatigue and fomenting Western impatience over the war.

*Poland-Ukraine: Ongoing Russian malware development points to persistent risks facing firms. On 28 December 2023, Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) reported on a phishing campaign conducted by the Russian threat group ‘APT28’. The group is allegedly using new malware to target users in Poland and Ukraine. The phishing activity was observed by CERT-UA between 15 and 25 December 2023. Previously undocumented custom malware employed in this campaign include ‘OCEANMAP’, ‘MASEPIE’ and ‘STEELHOOK’. These new strains of malware highlight the Russian group’s developing sophistication and ability to sustain information theft operations against strategic targets for espionage purposes. Reconnaissance and lateral movement activities were observed within an hour of the initial compromise, underscoring the speed with which APT28 can spread within an infected network and obtain sensitive information. These developments underscore the security risks facing Polish and Ukrainian government entities and organisations in the medium-to-long term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

06 Jan 24.  Russia to produce over 32,000 drones each year by 2030 -TASS. Russia plans to produce more than 32,000 drones each year by 2030 and for domestic producers to account for 70% of the market, the TASS news agency cited First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov as saying on Saturday.

Drones have been widely used by Moscow and Kyiv since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and both sides are sharply increasing military production as the war drags on.

“The annual production volume of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – excluding educational UAVs – is planned at 32,500 units,” Belousov told TASS. “This is almost three times higher than current production volumes.

“At the same time, it is planned that the share of Russian UAVs will make up 70% of the market in this type of UAV.”

Moscow has been using the cheaply-produced, Iranian-made Shahed drones, known in Ukraine for their noisy petrol engines, more and more frequently in aerial assaults on Ukrainian infrastructure far behind the war’s front lines in the east and south of the country.

Russia will finance the national project on UAVs with 696 bn roubles ($7.66 bn) by 2030, Belousov said, and will publish more details this month.

Last year President Vladimir Putin said that UAVs could be used across virtually all industries, not just the military.

Russian drones initially confused Ukrainian air defences as they were harder to detect than missiles, while shooting down cheaply-made drones with expensive air defence missiles was not the most cost-effective strategy.

Ukraine, meanwhile, has intensively used FPV drones – small drones originally meant for personal civilian use but modified for the battlefield – as a cheap but effective option for reconnaissance and attacks, a tactic Russia has copied.

Ukraine said in December it planned to produce more than 11,000 medium- and long-range attack drones in 2024, as well as one m FPV (first-person-view) drones, widely in demand on the front line.($1 = 90.9205 roubles) (Source: Reuters)

 

05 Jan 24.  Germany Details Latest Weapons Shipment to Ukraine.

List of Military Support Services for Ukraine (latest shipments only). Germany supports Ukraine with supplies of equipment and weapons – from Bundeswehr stocks and through industrial supplies, which are financed from the Federal Government’s training aid funds. An overview. (Only changes compared to the previous week — Ed.)

This list provides an overview of military support provided by the Federal Republic of Germany to Ukraine. It includes levies from Bundeswehr stocks, those from industry and deliveries together with partners, which are financed, among other things, from funds from the Federal Government’s training initiative.

The funds for the upgrade title amount to a total of around 5.4bn euros for 2023 (after 2 bn euros in 2022), plus commitment authorizations for the following years amounting to around 10.5bn euros.

These funds should primarily be used for military support for Ukraine. At the same time, they are used to finance the replacement of military material transferred to Ukraine from Bundeswehr stocks for the Bundeswehr as well as German contributions to the European Peace Facility (EPF), which in turn can be used to reimburse EU member states’ costs for support services to Ukraine.

Armored combat vehicles

— Ammunition for LEOPARD 2 A6 (from Bundeswehr and industrial stocks*)

— 90 MARDER armored personnel carriers with ammunition and spare parts (from Bundeswehr and industrial stocks*) (previously: 80)

Air defense

— Missile IRIS-T SLM*

— 1 SKYNEX air defense system with ammunition*

— 8 TRML-4D* airspace surveillance radars (previously: 6)

Artillery

— 44,970 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition (previously: 35,890) (from Bundeswehr and industrial stocks*)

Combat engineering

— 16 WISENT 1* mine clearing tanks (previously: 14)

— 14 BIBER bridge-laying tanks with spare parts* (previously: 13)

Protective and special equipment

— 31,350 combat helmets (previously: 28,000)

— 212 drone sensors* (previously: 182)

— 56 GO12* ground surveillance radars (previously: 46)

Logistics

— 250 Zetros trucks* (previously: 240)

— 90 heavy-duty semi-trailers 8×8 HX81 and 90 semi-trailers* (previously: 87/89)

— 358 motor vehicles (trucks, minibuses, off-road vehicles) (from Bundeswehr and industrial stocks*) (previously: 324)

Perseverance

— 305 assault rifles MK 556*

— 47.85 m rounds of small arms ammunition (previously: 47.1 m) (from Bundeswehr and industrial stocks*)

— 1,162 winter camouflage nets (previously: 10) (from Bundeswehr and industrial stocks*)

— 2,000 Winterntarnponchos *

Air defense

— 9 air defense systems IRIS-T SLM* (previously: 5) *

— 1 SKYNEX air defense system with ammunition*

Protective and special equipment

— 50 drone sensors* (previously: 30)

— 26,850 combat helmets

Logistics

— 41 Mercedes trucks*

Perseverance

— 4,695 MK 556 assault rifles *

— 8.75 m rounds of handgun ammunition * (previously: 8.3 m)

— 8,000 anti-tank mines *

* This is an industrial supply financed from funds from the training initiative. Some of the deliveries are associated with repair work or production is still ongoing; In addition, some training services are also provided.

The full list is posted here, on the German MoD website: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/schwerpunkte/krieg-in-der-ukraine/lieferungen-ukraine-2054514 (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ German Ministry of Defense; issued Jan. 04, 2024)

 

04 Jan 24. ‘We’re out of money’: US exhausts security funds for Ukraine. The U.S. had no funds left to replace weapons sent to Ukraine, Pentagon press secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said during a Thursday press briefing.

“We’re out of money,” he told reporters.

There exists $4.2bn left in authority to send such aid, Ryder explained, but the lack of replenishment funds will likely lead to a pause in support, as the Pentagon doesn’t want to risk the readiness of U.S. forces.

Administration officials had issued warnings about this outcome for months, amid Congress’ debate over how to fund the federal government and the White House’s requests for further Ukraine funding.

A group of senators is negotiating a border security deal seen as the key to unlocking a $100 bn spending bill, of which more than half would go to Ukraine-related support.

The Pentagon announced its final Ukraine aid package for now in late December — worth $250m and mainly comprised of artillery and other munitions.

“Right now, I’m not anticipating any new PDI announcements in terms of new capabilities,” said Ryder, referring to the remaining authority to send aid. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

 

05 Jan 24.  Where did Russia get its North Korean missiles? Russia has launched multiple North Korea-made ballistic missiles at Ukraine recently, the White House said on Thursday, the first time the North’s latest weapons have been used in battle.

Here is what we know about the missiles, and where they came from.

WHAT MISSILES DID RUSSIA USE?

While the White House would not say specifically what type of missiles Pyongyang had sent to Russia, Kirby said they had a range of about 900 km (550 miles) and released a graphic that appeared to show KN-23 and KN-25 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).

Joost Oliemans, a Dutch researcher and expert on North Korea’s military, said images from Ukrainian social media accounts clearly show fragments of the ring housing the control vanes that are characteristic to North Korea’s Hwasong-11 family of missiles, which includes the KN-23 and KN-24.

The solid-fuel KN-23 was first tested in May 2019, and is designed to evade missile defences by flying on a lower, “depressed” trajectory, experts said.

North Korea has test-fired it from wheeled launch vehicles, train cars, a buried silo, and a submerged submarine.

“Despite external characteristics and what some may state on the matter, this missile family does not appear to be substantially related to the Russian 9K720 Iskander, and is instead an indigenous North Korean development,” Oliemans said.

The KN-24, also powered by solid fuel, was first tested in 2019 and appears to have entered mass production and deployment with military units.

The KN-24 resembles the U.S. MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and, like the KN-23, is designed to evade missile defences by flying on a flatter trajectory than traditional ballistic missiles.

Because the North Koreans may have configured their launchers based on their extensive experience with legacy Soviet equipment, the learning curve for Russian crews to operate the imported systems may not be particularly great, said Ankit Panda, of the U.S.-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“North Korean technical advisers may be present in Russia to advise on the use of these systems,” he said.

WHERE DID RUSSIA GET THE MISSILES?

North Korea has been under a United Nations arms embargo since it first tested a nuclear bomb in 2006. U.N. Security Council resolutions – approved with Russian support – ban countries from trading weapons or other military equipment with North Koread.

In November, South Korean authorities said North Korea may have supplied SRBMs to Russia as part of a larger arms deal that also included anti-tank and anti-air missiles, artillery and mortar shells, and rifles.

Both Moscow and Pyongyang have previously denied conducting any arms deals, but vowed last year to deepen military relations.

Since August, Rason port on North Korea’s northeast coast has seen visits from Russian ships linked to that country’s military logistics system, according to U.S. and South Korean officials and reports by Western researchers citing satellite imagery.

As of November, North Korea had sent an estimated 2,000 shipping containers from Rason suspected of carrying those weapons, including possibly the SRBMs, South Korea has said.

The KN-24 appears to be assembled at an armaments factory in Sinhung, which was visited by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in August, Oliemans said.

“The examples photographed back then might well have been shipped to Russia just months later,” he said.

Kim has called for the defence industry to increase its output to respond to U.S. threats, but has not mentioned providing weapons to Russia.

“War preparations provides a nationalistic cover to reinvigorate the military industry to both replenish what is presumably depleted stocks and potentially continue to provide Russia with additional stocks going forward,” said Jenny Town, director of the Stimson Center’s 38 North Program, which studies North Korea.

WHAT DOES NORTH KOREA GET FROM THE DEAL?

Kirby said U.S. intelligence suggests that in exchange for the missiles and other armaments, North Korea is seeking military assistance from Russia including fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armoured vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment or materials, and other advanced technologies.

Some experts have questioned whether Moscow would be willing to give Pyongyang sensitive military technology, but note there are a wide range of areas for the two politically and economically isolated neighbours to cooperate on.

“There are any number of things that Russia and North Korea have discussed as part of their deepening relations, from increasing trade, to setting up joint agricultural zones, to updating North Korea’s antiquated air force, to cooperation on satellites,” Town said.

North Korea would benefit from any data on the battlefield performance of its missiles, but it is unclear if Russia will share that, Panda said.

“The most valuable data would concern the performance of these missiles against Ukrainian air defence systems, including those supplied by NATO,” he said. (Source: Reuters)

 

05 Jan 24. Russia will not stop in Ukraine, warns Latvian foreign minister. Latvia’s foreign minister said the west needed a long-term strategy to contain Russia as Moscow would seek new targets irrespective of the outcome of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Krišjānis Kariņš, a former Latvian prime minister and self-declared candidate to head Nato, told the Financial Times that Russia had an “imperialistic-fuelled ideology” which meant that the threat from Moscow would persist even under a new president or if Ukraine regained all its territory. “Russia will not stop, Russia can only be stopped. Stopping Russia in Ukraine does not mean that it is over. It simply means we will have to continue. That is what is important for Nato: that we will have to work on a long-term strategy of Russia containment,” Kariņš said. The Baltic states and Finland are on the frontline between Nato and the EU on one side and Russia on the other, and have been stepping up their warnings that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to limit himself solely to Ukraine. Russian diplomats have also hit out regularly at the Baltics and Finland. Latvia, together with Estonia and Lithuania, has increased its military spending dramatically in the years since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. It is aiming to spend 3 per cent of GDP on its military by 2027, surpassing Nato’s target of 2 per cent. Kariņš said Nato needed to boost the capacity and “interoperability” of its defence industry to ensure different weapon systems were standardised and allow greater sharing of ammunition and artillery between allies. “Once the war ends, the war machine will start to rebuild itself. It will be looking to provoke, to make difficulties on its border. We know this. We have to make sure on the Nato side that the likelihood of any incidents is simply ruled out, by our resolve, by our investments in defence,” he added. The Baltic Sea — to which Russia also has access — will become a “Nato lake” according to Kariņš, following the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance. Finland joined last April, becoming Nato’s 31st member, but Sweden’s accession has been delayed by Turkey and Hungary. Nordic diplomats have privately suggested that both Finland and Sweden could send troops to Latvia as part of Nato’s advanced battle groups for frontline states. Kariņš said Latvia would welcome such a deployment to join the multinational troops from 10 countries in his country led by Canada. “It is a microcosm for how Nato can work together for collective defence,” the foreign minister added. Kariņš conceded it was a difficult time in the war in Ukraine. But he added that he was optimistic that both Europe and the US would continue to support Kyiv militarily and financially, arguing that Russia was trying to “psych out” the west by saying it is divided. “Russia is trying to instil a doubt among us . . . But Putin has managed to reinvigorate Nato. We have managed to converge on all issues to date regarding Ukraine,” he said, despite Hungary having blocked long-term EU funding for Kyiv. He added that western unity and Nato membership for Ukraine after the war were needed. “Russia is not only a problem in Ukraine for Ukraine, it poses a danger for all of Europe, even after the Ukrainian war,” he said. “If Ukraine regains its territory, Russia will still be a threat. That means we need to adjust our thinking to the long term.” (Source: FT.com)

 

04 Jan 24. Denmark to begin training F-16 pilots for Ukraine. Denmark will train F-16 pilots for Ukraine as part of a coalition of countries enhancing Ukraine’s air force. Denmark is beginning to train Ukrainian pilots in F-16 fighter Jets donated by Norway, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence announced 3 January 2024, as allied nations work to provide Ukraine with a modern air force in the defence against the ongoing Russian invasion. Ukrainian technicians for the F-16 jets are also training in Denmark, as well as the USA and Belgium. The Ukrainian pilots are seasoned cohort experienced in flying fighter jets of a less advanced design. The trainees have recently completed a training programme with the RAF in the UK, that began in August as part of the Air Force Capability Coalition. The UK will contribute by providing training through the Royal Air Force. Ukraine is set to receive F-16 aircraft from NATO allies as early as Spring 2024, according to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III. Prior to the transfer of the F-16s, Ukraine must fulfill specific requirements, such as obtaining the necessary licenses and ensuring infrastructure preparedness. The planes will be subject to thorough inspections and modifications to ensure they are not used for unintended purposes.  Norwegian defence minister Bjørn Arild Gram visited the airfield at Bodø, Norwy where the 2 F-16’s are being prepared for donation, accompanied by 10 Norwegian instructors, all set to begin instruction in Skydstrup, Denmark.  The decision by Norway, Denmark, Belgium and The Netherlands to support Ukraine’s Air Force comes through a range frames of international support, including the donation of F-16 fighter jets for the air force.  (Source: airforce-technology.com)

 

04 Jan 24.  Russia and Ukraine exchange record number of war prisoners. The prisoner exchange was the first since August 2023, and involved more than 200 soldiers from each side. Russia and Ukraine have released more than 200 prisoners of war in the largest mutual hostage exchange since Russi invaded its neighbour nearly two years ago. The Russian Defence Ministry said 248 of its soldiers had returned safely from Ukraine, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said 224 Ukrainian soldiers and six civilians had been freed from Russian captivity.

“We remember each and every one of our people,” Zelensky said in a post on X (formerly Twitter). “And we must return all of them.”

Kyiv’s human rights ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets said the deal was the 49th prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine, in which 2,828 Ukrainians have been freed. Prior to yesterday (3 January), the most recent exchange was in August. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

04 Jan 24.  Russians advance near Avdiivka. Russia has made a confirmed advance near the heavily-attacked eastern Ukrainian city of Avdiivka. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) think tank said it had geolocated footage showing Moscow’s forces push back the Ukrainian army. Avdiivka is a partially encircled industrial city where Russia has focussed attacks in recent months in a bid to take a major settlement for the first time since Bakhmut in May. The ISW said Russian soldiers also advanced to the south-west of Donetsk city. Russian bloggers have also claimed to have advanced near Bakhmut in recent days but their reports have not been confirmed. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

03 Jan 24.  Norway sends 2 fighter jets to Denmark for Ukraine training mission. Norway will send two F-16 fighter jets to Denmark to contribute to the training of Ukrainian pilots on the use of the U.S.-made airplane, the Norwegian defence minister said on Wednesday. F-16s have been on Ukraine’s wish list as the country seeks to boost its air force in the war with Russia, and Norway last year said it would join Denmark, the Netherlands and others in donating aircraft. Norway has already sent 10 instructors to Denmark to aid the education of Ukrainian pilots, Defence Minister Bjoern Arild Gram said in a statement. The Norwegian air force has replaced its own F-16s with the successor model F-35. (Source: Reuters)

 

03 Jan 24.  Ukrainian pilots complete UK F-16 training – Netherlands commits aircraft. The collaborative effort strengthens Ukraine’s air defence against Russian aggression. In a strategic move to fortify Ukraine’s air capabilities, the United Kingdom has successfully concluded basic training for Ukrainian combat air pilots, enabling them to embark on F-16 fighter jet proficiency in Denmark.

Simultaneously, the Netherlands has pledged 18 F-16 fighter aircraft, solidifying international support against Russian aggression.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) initiated the training programme in August, encompassing flying and English language training for six seasoned Ukrainian pilots. This initiative is part of the international Air Force Capability Coalition, where allies collaborate to enhance Ukraine’s air defences.  As the first cohort advances to F-16 training in Denmark, ten Ukrainian trainee pilots remain in the UK for further practical flight training, including aviation medicine and centrifuge training.  The defence secretary highlighted the UK’s commitment to ensuring Ukraine possesses a modern air force. “Together, we’re now going further by ensuring Ukraine has a modern air force in the future, formed around the highly capable fourth-generation F-16 fighter jet. Combined with training from the world-leading RAF, this is a significant step forward from Ukraine’s current Soviet-era capabilities.” The UK has been providing military aid to Ukraine, from deliveries of M270 MLRS and Nlaw anti-tank weapons to training Ukrainian troops in the UK, according to GlobalData’s intelligence on “The UK Defence Market 2023-2028” report.

The defence minister of Ukraine, Rustem Umerov, commended the rapid and effective program, emphasizing its significance in preparing Ukrainian pilots for F-16 operations, “Ukraine highly values the pilot training that the UK and other partners are providing, to help us prepare for operating F-16s in Ukraine.”

Once the RAF training concludes, the pilots will undergo advanced flying training overseen by Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence recently announced the commitment of 18 F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine, marking a step in strengthening Ukraine’s defence against Russian attacks. In November last year, The Netherlands strategically deployed five F-16 fighter jets to the European F-16 Training Centre (EFTC) in Romania, signalling a collaborative effort to reinforce Ukraine’s air defence capabilities. Under Dutch ownership, these training aircraft facilitated a refresher course for instructors and prepared Ukrainian and Romanian pilots for missions.  Ukraine is set to receive F-16 aircraft from NATO allies as early as Spring 2024, according to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III. Before the F-16s are transferred, stringent criteria must be met, including licensing and infrastructure readiness in Ukraine. The aircraft will undergo inspections and modifications, focusing on preventing undesirable end-use. The commitment underscores the collective effort to equip Ukraine with defence capabilities amid ongoing geopolitical challenges. The UK’s dedication to training Ukrainian recruits extends beyond air forces, with plans to train an additional 10,000 in the first half of 2024 as part of Operation Interflex. The collaborative support aims to empower Ukraine to resist Russian forces, further manifested in the £4.6bn ($5.8bn) worth of military aid, including long-range missiles, main battle tanks, and logistical support. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

 

02 Jan 24. Turkey blocks Ukraine’s UK-donated minehunters from entering Black Sea. Turkey’s implementation of the Montreux Convention gives it the ability to prevent combatant warships entering the Black Sea. Turkey has blocked the transit of Ukraine’s newly-commissioned mine countermeasure vessels (MCMV), which had been donated to Kyiv by the UK in a bid to bolster the Ukrainian Navy’s ability to monitor and protect its shoreline.  In mid-December the UK further announced the provision of two Royal Navy Sandown-class MCMVs to Ukraine, a move that had been long discussed and part of London’s ongoing support of Kyiv as the latter battles Russia followed Moscow’s large-scale invasion of its neighbour in February 2022. In a statement, Turkey’s Directorate of Communications revealed that “the claim in some media outlets” that MCMVs donated to Ukraine by the United Kingdom were allowed to pass through “the Turkish Straits” and into the Black Sea “were not true”. Further, Turkey’s Directorate of Communications said that Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine – a term propagated by Moscow – had been classified by Turkey “as a war”. As a result of this, Turkey, in accordance with Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, “closed the [Bosphorus] Straits to warships of the belligerent parties (Russia and Ukraine)” in order to prevent “the escalation of tension” in the Black Sea.

“Our pertinent allies have been duly apprised that the mine-hunting ships donated to Ukraine by the United Kingdom will not be allowed to pass through the Turkish Straits to the Black Sea as long as the war continues,” Turkey’s statement concluded.

What is the Montreux Convention?

At the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February this year, Turkey enacted the 1936 Montreux Convention that allows it to limit naval transits of the Dardenelles and Bosphorous straits, effectively introducing a Black Sea maritime arms trade embargo on the two countries and their backers. However, in 2022 it appeared that a Russian commercial vessel purportedly carrying equipment related to the S-300 air defence system from the Russian military port of Tartus in Syria was permitted to transit through the straits into the Black Sea, inbound to the port of Novorossiysk. Taking exception to the exception Turkey could have made to the Montreux Convention, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the unusual step on 29 August 2022 of calling the Turkish ambassador to the country, Yagmur Ahmet Guldere, to the ministry for a public dressing-down. Russia has maintained a blockade at sea on Ukraine since its withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal in July last year. One of the key threats to shipping in the Black Sea is from floating sea mines, primarily laid by Russia, which has sought to maintain a stranglehold of Ukraine’s maritime exports. Speaking in December 2023 on a joint UK-Norway-Ukraine deal on the formation of a new Maritime Capability Coalition to support Ukraine in the Black Sea, UK Secretary of State for Defence Grant Shapps said that the donated MCMVs would “deliver vital capability to Ukraine which will help save lives at sea and open up vital export routes, which have been severely limited since Putin launched his illegal full-scale invasion”. In November 2023 during a visit to Ukraine, the UK Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron welcomed efforts to support this goal by UK company Marsh McLennan, which aims to provide affordable shipping insurance for grain and food supplies exported from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports though a new ‘Unity Facility’ it has launched with the Ukrainian Government. In September 2023, it was announced that Romania would acquire two Sandown-class MCMVs from the Royal Navy, HMS Blyth and HMS Pembroke, for increased security in the Black Sea. Turkey and the UK are both Nato members, although the foreign policy goals of Ankara are frequently at odds with European and US allies. Ankara maintains close ties to Russia, and was previously expelled from the US-led F-35 fighter programme after Turkey moved to acquire Russian air defence systems. (Source: naval-technology.com)

 

03 Jan 24. Dogs use Kromek Detectors to find radiation on Ukraine’s battlefields. Dogs carrying radiation detectors the size of a mobile phone have been dispatched to Ukraine to provide troops with early warning of a nuclear disaster. Real-time data on radiation levels collected by eight dogs will be sent to soldiers on the ground, who will be able to decide whether to move forward into battle. The radar technology, made in Sedgefield, Co Durham, is so sensitive that it will pick up even the lowest levels of radiation. It can also identify the exact nature of the radioactive source material, such as plutonium or uranium.

Arnab Basu, chief executive of the manufacturer Kromek, said: “The canines are going to add an enormous new capability to the Ukrainian forces to deal with difficult situations. We are able to provide the highest quality information to people who are responsible for protecting or monitoring the field. “If you have the right information you can act in the right way and that saves lives. There is no one silver bullet but the more capability that can be provided the better.”

The team of detector dogs is made up of Belgian malinois, German shepherds and one Dutch shepherd. They are called Zyga, Ines, Dimico, Bella, Zorr, Rapina, Tomy and Lilly. Although dogs sent to Ukraine previously have been used to find landmines, the latest batch will carry radiation detectors because of the risk of a radiation incident caused by indiscriminate shelling by Russian forces and fighting near some of Ukraine’s nuclear power stations. The detectors are attached to a harness on the dogs, which also wear equipment to protect their eyes and paws. The handler carries a phone with an app which tells them if there is any radiation found. If the dog gets too close to the radiation the handler, who will be about 30m away, gets an alarm within a second. The detectors are so sensitive that they go off at the lowest levels of radiation to get the dogs out of danger and protect them. Ukraine has 15 operational nuclear reactors that generate approximately 54 per cent of the country’s electricity needs.

“They are not areas where you want to have active fighting,” Basu said. “The threat of nuclear incidents increases if you use nuclear power plants as a battlefield. It is an accident waiting to happen.”

In 1986 the worst nuclear accident in history occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, 67 miles north of Kyiv. One of its four reactors exploded, spewing clouds of radiation across Europe. Since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2021, Russia has targeted Ukraine’s energy sector, increasing the risk of a nuclear disaster. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southeastern Ukraine, the biggest in Europe and home to six reactors, was captured by Russia in March 2022. It has been on the frontline of the war ever since, raising fears of a radiological disaster. Although the plant is no longer generating power it needs electricity to cool one of its four reactors which is in a state of “hot conservation”, meaning it has not fully been shut down. Kromek has sent other dogs to Ukraine to help search for mines and explosives as soldiers struggle to retake territory occupied by Russia because the land is littered with landmines. The dogs have been trained as part of a European Commission programme in co-operation with the Belgian army. A total of 50 dogs will be transferred to Ukrainian forces. A report by the Henry Jackson Society, a foreign policy think tank, said that Ukraine’s nuclear facilities have been left hugely exposed and are being compromised by Russia. The report entitled Ukraine’s nuclear shadow: National security implications for Nato and the UK, by Bahram Ghiassee, a nuclear analyst, said there was an “alarming prospect” of non-state actors, including proxy groups acting for hostile states, terrorists and criminal gangs, acquiring small quantities of radioactive substances.

“Such materials could be the subject of illicit transnational trafficking, and be used to construct radiological dirty bombs, thus presenting a significant risk to major cities across Europe, the UK, and the Middle East and North Africa region”, it said.

 

01 Jan 24. Iran’s Shahed-238 presents stiffer challenges for counter-UAS in Ukraine. The emergence of Iran’s jet-powered Shahed-238 UCAV, revealed by the Ashura University of Aerospace Sciences and Technologies last November, has led to considerable speculation on social media as to the effect the weapon in Russian hands might have on the conflict in Ukraine. An upgraded variant of the Shahed-136 which, license-manufactured by Russia, is known as the Geran-2, the Shahed-238 is turbojet-powered. This will give the UCAV a higher top speed – so-called ‘dash’ speed having become a tactical priority as operational concepts have evolved – but with a likely trade-off against endurance and range. At least three variants are thought to exist: a baseline model with an autonomous INS/GPS guidance system; a model designed for operations in a thermal imaging environment, carrying EO/IR sensors; and a radar-guided model. With details sketchy to say the least, much of the assessment of capability must remain speculative. For example, the matt black coating seen on the demonstration models is thought by some to indicate a radar-absorbing or other low-observable capability. It is clear, however, that launch from a mobile platform has been added to the weapon’s flexibility. The most significant advantages in the context of the Ukraine conflict are likely to be the autonomous guidance system, which will allow for better target selection and discrimination, and the redesigned engine cover which, combined with the new engine, will add to the aircraft’s manoeuvrability and agility. As will the doubling of the number of actuators, from four to eight. Taken together, this could mean it will be easier for Russia to mount effective attacks on critical targets such as fast-moving armour, agile air defence assets or command/communications nodes. For outside observers, this means Russia may develop a significant short-term advantage by using the Shahed-238, although no confirmation has yet been evident as to numbers shipped from Tehran or, indeed, whether Russia may be manufacturing it under licence. However, despite the advantages in speed, manoeuvrability and agility, all may not be rosy in Moscow’s garden. If the last 22+ months of conflict have taught us anything about the Russian armed forces, it is that they have very poor middle management. Russian officers – especially from the O5/O6 level and up – are well educated, competent and often innovative: laudable initiatives such as switching from ponderous fixed-site air defence to more agile solutions and the innovations surrounding fitting field-expedient C-UAS jammers to armoured vehicles prove that. But at the level of the NCO and platoon leader – the level at which the tactical battle is won or lost – Russian capabilities are poor to say the least. An attempt was made a decade ago to fix this capability gap by engaging Rheinmetall to mastermind a combat training centre (the first of four) at Molino in the Nizhny Novgorod oblast. After the 2014 invasion of Crimea, however, Rheinmetall cancelled the contract. On the other hand, Ukrainian NCOs have benefited significantly from training provided by the US, UK and Canada, among others. The bottom line, at least for now, is that, despite the potential advantages offered by the new UCAV, it is extremely unlikely that Russia will gain a strategic advantage from their use, due primarily to a systemic inability to be sufficiently tactically flexible.  Meanwhile, Ukraine will have to develop and field in greater numbers a series of C-UAS solutions that will cope with the increased approach speed and more advanced target discrimination of the Shahed-238. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

02 Jan 24. Norway authorises direct arms sales to Ukraine. Norway will permit direct arms sales to Ukraine, allowing for manufacturers to apply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a significant policy shift announced on 1 January 2024, Norway’s government has authorised the direct sale of weapons and defence-related products from Norwegian manufacturers to Ukraine’s defence authorities. Effective of the date of the announcement, Norway – already part of the F-16 Coalition pushing for transference of the advanced fighter air platforms – will deepen the nation’s involvement in the defence of Ukraine against the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022.

“We must plan for the possibility that the illegal war of aggression may be prolonged,” said Foreign Minister Espen Eide. Norway’s commitment to military support for Ukraine, totalling approximately Nkr11bn ($1.21bn) in 2023, will continue under this program.

Initially responding with donations of weapons and defence-related products, Norway’s government is now expanding its support through direct sales. Eide emphasised the importance of supporting Ukraine in the current security situation, which is closely tied to Norwegian and European security. This step, according to Eide, is a response to the potential prolongation of the conflict. Defense Minister Bjørn Gram highlighted that this policy change aligns with Norway’s fundamental defence and security policy interests and the role of the defence industry in the current security policy context. “This change means that we are safeguarding fundamental defence and security policy interests for Norway together with our allies,” said Gram.  The process for direct sales involves Norwegian companies applying to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an export license.  Criteria for assessment include sales exclusively to Ukrainian authorities, documentation regarding end-use and end-user, secure transportation routes, and compliance with Norwegian export control regulations and international law, including the UN Arms Trade Treaty. The current decision to permit direct sales to Ukraine is specific to the unique security situation and does not indicate a broader shift in Norway’s stance on arms sales to countries in conflict, and as such, Norway’s arms export policy remains largely unchanged. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

02 Jan 24. Russia has fired a second massive barrage of the new year on Ukraine’s capital and the country’s second-largest city, with the Ukrainian president calling on allies to accelerate financial and military aid to refill depleting air defences. Volodymyr Zelenskyy said four people were killed and more than 90 injured in Kyiv and Kharkiv after 100 missiles and drones hit the two cities. Rescue workers had rushed to locations affected to put out fires and sift through rubble for survivors, he added. Without directly mentioning delays in US and EU financial and military assistance for 2024, Zelensnkyy nudged them to act, especially by providing more critical air defence systems. “Our air defence warriors have been doing an incredible job for the past three days. Since December 31, Russian monsters have already fired 170 [Iranian] Shahed drones and dozens of missiles of various types. The absolute majority of them targeted civilian infrastructure,” Zelenskyy said. “I am grateful to all of our partners who are helping us,” he said, calling upon “everyone around the world who values life to bolster our air shield and hold Russia accountable for everything it has done”. UN officials estimate that dozens of Ukrainians have been killed and scores more injured in recent days, as Russia has intensified its air campaign nearly two years into its full-scale invasion. “The enemy repeated a mass strike with various types of air attack, as it happened a few days ago,” said Valery Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, referring to a record nationwide air assault on December 29. Describing Kyiv as Tuesday’s “main direction of the attack”, Zaluzhny said air defences intercepted 72 of some 99 drones and missiles fired by Russia. In addition to casualties and damage to buildings, authorities reported disruptions in utilities and telecommunications in the Ukrainian capital. Rubble and a damaged car at the site where a residential building was heavily damaged during a Russian missile attack on central Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Tuesday © Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy/Reuters Air strikes were also reported in the north-eastern city of Kharkiv, which was heavily battered by air strikes on Saturday night. Posting photos on social media of bombed-out residential buildings, the region’s governor Oleg Synegubov said a 91-year-old woman was killed and 44 people injured, including five children, by what he described as a “massive missile attack” that caused fires and damage to infrastructure. Ukrainian officials said strikes also hit Ukraine’s southern port city of Mykolayiv and Kropyvnytsky, a central provincial capital. On the Russian side, one person was killed and five injured in a missile attack on the Russian city of Belgorod on Tuesday. “A man was driving a car next to which a shell exploded. He died on the spot,” the governor of the Belgorod region, Vyacheslav Gladkov, wrote on his Telegram channel. President Vladimir Putin on Monday vowed retaliation for Ukraine’s weekend attack on Belgorod, in which 24 civilians were killed, saying that the strike “will not go unpunished”. Ukraine has blamed Saturday’s Belgorod explosions on the “unprofessional” actions of Russian air defence forces. The Russian defence ministry said that one of the Russian missiles fired at Ukraine on Monday fell in its own border region of Voronezh and severely damaged several homes. After early failed attempts to capture Kyiv and Kharkiv, Russia continues to occupy south-eastern regions amounting to 18 per cent of Ukrainian territory. In a post on social media platform X citing “loud explosions in Kyiv”, US ambassador to Ukraine Bridget A. Brink said “Putin is ringing in 2024 by launching missiles . . . as millions of Ukrainians again take shelter in freezing temperatures”. “It’s urgent and critical that we support Ukraine now — to stop Putin here,” she added. (Source: FT.com)

 

02 Jan 24. Russia hammers Ukrainian cities with hypersonic missiles after Putin vows revenge – latest updates. Dozens of civilians have been injured amid waves of Russian missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities overnight. One person was killed in Kharkiv, in the north-east, and at least 41 others were wounded after the attacks by strategic bombers and 35 Iranian-made Shahed drones. In Kyiv, more than 20 people were injured and power has been cut off in parts of the capital.  Ukraine’s air force said it shot down all the drones but missile attacks including hypersonic Kinzhal rockets were continuing. Poland has scrambled four F-16 fighter jets to defend its airspace. Vladimir Putin vowed on Monday to intensify air strikes after 25 civilians were killed in a Ukrainian attack on Belgorod on Saturday, warning the incident would “not go unpunished”. The assault on Tuesday came after Russia launched its largest aerial assault on Ukraine since the outset of the war on Friday, killing at least 39 people. Following that attack, Moscow’s forces on Monday launched a “record” high 90 drones on targets across the country. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

29 Dec 23. The UK bolsters Ukraine’s air defence after Putin’s latest air strikes. Defence Secretary announces that hundreds of British-made air defence missiles are being shipped to Ukraine to protect civilians and infrastructure from drones and bombing. Delivery of a new package of sophisticated air defence missiles for Ukraine has commenced, rounding off a landmark year for the UK’s support for Ukraine – having been the first country to provide modern Western tanks, as well as long-range precision strike capability. The delivery comes as Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, with hundreds of drones and missiles believed to have been launched overnight on cities including Kyiv, Lviv and Odesa. The package of around 200 air defence missiles will re-supply UK-developed air defence systems provided to Ukraine in late 2022, topping up Ukraine’s crucial air defence capability to protect their citizens, front line, and critical national infrastructure from Russian bombing and one-way attack drones.

The new package of support comes amid the most significant year for the UK’s military aid to Ukraine so far. Following announcements by the Prime Minister at the start of the year, the UK has now supplied a squadron of battle-ready Challenger 2 tanks, three batteries of self-propelled AS90 guns, hundreds of armoured and protected vehicles, as well as long-range precision strike capability in the form of Storm Shadow cruise missiles and long-range attack drones.

Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps said: “Putin’s latest wave of murderous airstrikes are a desperate and futile attempt to regain momentum after the catastrophic loss of hundreds of thousands of conscripts and ahead of the humiliation of his three-day war entering a third calendar year. We continue to stand by Ukraine’s defence, which is why today we are sending hundreds of air defence missiles to restock British gifted air defence systems capable of striking down Russian drones and missiles with incredible accuracy. Putin is testing Ukraine’s defences and the West’s resolve, hoping that he can clutch victory from the jaws of defeat. But he is wrong. Ukraine’s degradation of the Russian Black Sea fleet has proven it is still in this fight to win. And today’s air defence package sends an undeniable message, in the face of Russian barbarity that the UK remains absolutely committed to supporting Ukraine. Now is the time for the free world to come together and redouble our efforts to get Ukraine what they need to win.”

These air defence missiles (Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles – ASRAAM) are manufactured in the UK by defence contractor MBDA and are designed to be launched from aircraft including the UK’s Typhoon and F-35 fighter jets. In summer 2022, a joint MoD-MBDA team developed air defence systems to fire ASRAAM from the ground for the first time. Within four months of initiating the surface launched ASRAAM project, these air defence systems were developed, manufactured, trialled and Ukrainian crews trained on their usage, on UK soil, before being transferred into Ukrainian hands.

The surface launched ASRAAM project has demonstrated the best of British engineering ingenuity and the agility of MOD and British industry to rapidly deliver very effective yet low-cost solutions to the frontline to meet urgent requirements. The systems have proven highly effective – with a successful hit rate reported as high as 90% against some Russian air targets. Ukrainian operators have become adapt at their usage and have asked for more missiles to protect their country.

Further to the thousands of rounds of ammunition and anti-tank missiles provided to Ukraine by the UK, November marked 30,000 recruits having passed through Operation Interflex – the programme of training delivered to Ukrainian recruits on UK soil.

Including specialised training delivered by the UK to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, such as training of Ukrainian marines, explosive ordnance disposal experts, and combat air pilots, the UK has now trained more than 53,000 Ukrainians since Putin first ordered the invasion of Crimea in 2014. The Defence Secretary previously announced an ambition to train an additional 10,000 recruits in the first half of 2024.

UK military support to Ukraine has seen a total commitment of £4.6bn, with the £2.3bn set aside for FY23/24 covering up until the end of the financial year. The Prime Minister has expressed his intent to continue support for Ukraine in 2024. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

29 Dec 23. Russia has launched its biggest missile and drone attack on multiple Ukrainian cities since the start of its full-scale invasion, killing at least 12 people and injuring 76. In a massive raid on Friday morning against the capital Kyiv, as well as cities in the east, south and west, Russian forces fired 158 missiles and drones, officials said, including Kinzhal (Dagger) ballistic missiles, which are hard to intercept. Worst hit appeared to be Dnipro, in the east of the country, where five people were killed and a shopping centre was set on fire, according to Serhii Lysak, head of the regional administration. A maternity hospital was also damaged. General Valeriy Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, said that of the 158 missiles and drones launched by Russia, 87 cruise missiles and 27 attack drones were shot down by air defence forces. Military facilities were also targeted. Lieutenant-General Mykola Oleschuk, head of Ukraine’s air force, said Friday’s strikes amounted to the biggest aerial attack of the war so far. Smoke rises over Kyiv after the Russian missile and drone strike © Gleb Garanich/Reuters President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram: “Today, Russia struck with almost everything it has in its arsenal: Daggers, S-300, cruise missiles, UAVs. Strategic bombers launched Kh-101/Kh-505. About 110 missiles were fired, most of them were shot down. Unfortunately, as a result of the shelling, there are dead and wounded.” In Kyiv, which is well defended by multiple air defence systems, two people were killed and 17 injured. Four people were rescued from the rubble of a warehouse. Recommended War in Ukraine EU readies €20bn plan B to fund Ukraine In the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, which has been spared from much of Russia’s bombardment, one person was killed, an apartment block was hit and three schools were damaged. “We are doing everything to strengthen our air shield,” Andriy Yermak, head of the presidential administration, wrote on Telegram. “But the world needs to see that we need more support and strength to stop this terror.” Western officials warned recently that Russia had probably been hoarding missiles and drones for a winter campaign of strikes. Attacking with a large number of varied missiles has more chance of overwhelming Ukraine’s western-supplied air defence systems. Last winter, Russian forces carried out a sustained missile and strike campaign against Ukrainian power and heating plans and grid infrastructure in a bid to disrupt the economy and break Ukrainian morale. (Source: FT.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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