NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Aug 18.

BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on 18 August that Russian forces expanded their zone of control south-west of Vilshana, located around nine miles (15km) north-east of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). The source claimed that Ukrainian units are still holding the south-western outskirts of Synkivka, a village located five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk, allegedly at the expense of significant losses. According to the milblogger, Russian forces have occupied two strongholds south-west of Vilshana and improved their tactical positions near Synkivka, surrounding the village in a semi-circle, though this cannot be confirmed. The source stated neither side has ‘confident control’ over their positions in Synkivka. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s General Staff reported on 18 August that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations around Synkivka. Fighting in this sector is likely to remain highly dynamic in the coming days and weeks. As such, conflicting reports will pose challenges in determining the extent of claimed Russian advances in this section of the Oskil-Kreminna axis.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Elsewhere along this section of the frontline, another Russian milblogger reported on 18 August that Russian forces engaged Ukrainian infantry fighting without the cover of armoured vehicles west of Kreminna (Luhansk oblast) at the Torske ledge. The milblogger claimed this could indicate Ukrainian units lack armoured combat vehicles in this direction. However, the source reported that Ukrainian forces did use armoured vehicles in four attacks south of Kreminna in the Serebrianske forest area, but claimed these were destroyed. While such reports cannot be confirmed, this could indicate that Ukrainian forces are prioritising certain equipment for specific sectors, namely in the south, rather than a general lack of armoured vehicles.
SOUTHERN: The overall tempo and shape of Ukrainian counter-offensive and Russian defensive operations remained broadly on trend along the southern axis over the last 24 hours. Ukrainian forces are continuing to focus their efforts at two points: south of Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia oblast, and along the Vremevsky salient, south of Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk oblast. However, there have been no confirmed advances over the last 24 hours. Both Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed on 17 August that Russian forces launched a counter-attack towards the recently liberated village of Urozhaine, 11 miles (18km) south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast), but Kyiv has claimed it repulsed this attack. Meanwhile, further west, Ukrainian forces continue attempts to break through Russian defences around the key town of Robotyne, eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast), but have not made any confirmed progress into the centre of the settlement.
STRIKES: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed on 18 August that, at around 0400hrs local time, Ukraine launched another attack using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to target Moscow and Moscow oblast. According to the MoD, air defences intercepted the drone, which then hit a non-residential building in the Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment area of the capital. The drone debris fell on the Moscow Expocentre, according to Russian state media, which is situated around three miles (5km) from the Kremlin. Flights to and from four Moscow airports, Domodedovo (DME), Sheremetyevo (SVO), Vnukovo (VKO) and Zhukovsky (ZIA), were temporarily restricted, causing seven flights to divert to alternate airports in Nizhny Novgorod and St Petersburg. Kyiv continues to show its increasing willingness and capability to strike deep within Russian territory – including the Russian capital – with further attacks likely in the coming weeks.
STRIKES: Separately, the Russian MoD reported on 17 August that Ukraine’s armed forces attempted to target Black Sea Fleet ships overseeing navigation in the south-western section of the Black Sea. The ministry claimed the attempted attack by a Ukrainian sea drone occurred at around 2300 hrs local time about 149 miles (240km) south-west of Sevastopol, but that it was repelled. For further analysis, see the BLACK SEA section below.
Russian APTs sustain elevated cyber espionage activities against NATO-aligned diplomats. On 17 August, several media sites reported an ongoing campaign by the Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) group ‘APT29’ targeting ministries of foreign affairs in NATO-aligned countries. The campaign uses phishing emails impersonating the German Embassy and containing PDF lures about a farewell party for the departure of the German Ambassador. One of the documents installs malware (‘Duke’), while the second one notifies the actors if a victim opened the message, likely for either reconnaissance or to test new malicious features. APT29 used open-source chat application ‘Zulip’ for their command-and-control (C2) to evade detection and mask their malicious traffic behind a legitimate application. It is common for threat actors to abuse open-source applications, such as DropBox, for their C2 servers as it is more difficult to detect malicious behaviour and track the traffic. Russian threat actors have maintained elevated levels of activity against NATO-aligned countries for the last several months, targeting both private organisations and government entities via malicious Microsoft Teams phishing attacks. As the war in Ukraine persists, Russian APTs will sustain increased cyber espionage activity against Western and allied diplomatic and government entities.
US: Approval of F-16 transfers to Ukraine will likely trigger retaliatory measures from Moscow. On 17 August, the Biden administration confirmed it has issued approval for Denmark and the Netherlands to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. According to a senior official, the jets will be sent once pilot training has been completed. Officials from both Denmark and the Netherlands, who have been leading the push to train Ukrainian pilots and maintenance staff, have signaled that they confer with European allies and imminently reach final decisions for the transfer. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force said on 16 August that it is unlikely to receive the F-16s until Q1-Q2 2024, so they will not support the ongoing counter-offensive. Both Denmark and the Netherlands are partners in the global F-35 Joint Program, however, production delays have pushed the rollout of the upgraded aircraft from April 2023 to April 2024. Biden’s approval of F-16 transfers is likely to provoke a Russian response, raising the risk of retaliatory measures (including cyber) against government and private institutions in the near term.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

BLACK SEA: On 18 August, the first vessel to use Ukraine’s ‘humanitarian corridor’ in the Black Sea crossed Turkey’s Bosphorus Strait. The Hong Kong-flagged Joseph Schulte container ship left Odesa earlier this week after having been trapped in the Ukrainian port since 23 February 2022 – the day before the full-scale invasion. Given that the corridor remains close to Bulgarian, Romanian and Ukrainian waters close to the shore, it remains largely out of the reach of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. However, the shots fired at the Turkish-owned cargo on 13 August underscore the persistent security threats for civilian vessels. Subsequently, on 17 August, Turkey warned Moscow to avoid further escalation after the incident. Such security threats are also related to the increasing militarisation of the Black Sea. Notably, reports on 17 August indicate that a Ukrainian sea drone unsuccessfully targeted a Russian navy vessel. The attack will likely raise the risks of Russian retaliatory actions, increasing the spillover security risks for civilian ships.
NUCLEAR: On 17 August, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka claimed that Belarus would use Russian nuclear weapons stored on Belarusian territory in the case of foreign aggression. However, such threats are purely rhetorical given Minsk does not have control over Russian nuclear weapons stationed in the country, which remain under the command and control of Moscow. Instead, Lukashenka’s bellicose rhetoric is likely part of Minsk’s information operations aimed at exacerbating rising tensions with neighbouring NATO countries and deterring perceived threats. Notably, the nuclear claims were issued after the Lithuanian government announced on 16 August that it would temporarily close two of its six checkpoints on the border with Belarus, with Latvia and Poland reportedly considering a complete closure of their borders with Belarus. Such nuclear threats, from both Minsk and Moscow, have been and will continue to be issued at regular intervals during periods of heightened tensions.
REFORMS: On 17 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky approved a law reforming the election of Ukraine’s constitutional judges. Zelensky claimed that the reform ensures that the selection procedure is more transparent and as such will bolster the country’s EU application. The first version of the law failed to align with the EU’s Venice Commission recommendations as it limited international experts’ oversight of the candidate selection process. While the EU criticised the first version of the bill, Ukrainian anti-corruption activists claimed that the bill would allow Zelensky to handpick loyalists. Following the backlash, Ukraine’s Parliament amended the text of the law, strengthening the role of international experts in the selection of judges. Although the Venice Commission praised the improvement on 10 June, it pointed out that the reform still does not fully meet its recommendations, namely expanding the six-strong Constitution Court to seven. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the EU will assess that the reform is insufficient, moderately impacting Ukraine’s integration prospects, which remain long-term in any case.
MOBILISATION: On 17 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree sacking all the enlistment office heads in the country in a bid to crackdown on draft dodging. The decision comes after Zelensky decided on 11 August to dismiss all the heads of Ukraine’s regional army recruitment centres after an investigation revealed that recruitment officials were illegally enriching themselves by helping draft-eligible men leave Ukrainian territory. The fired officials will be replaced by officers with battlefield experience and who have passed an inspection by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU). The measure underscores Kyiv’s increasing efforts to curtail draft dodging. However, while the initial goal is to ensure a functional military recruitment system, the appointment of battle-experienced officers to such administrative tasks will place additional pressure and potentially exacerbate shortages of experienced military cadres on the frontline. Nevertheless, ensuring a steady flow of troops remains a key priority for Kyiv as the war protracts into an attritional struggle.
AID: On 17 August, the Biden administration confirmed it has issued approval for Denmark and the Netherlands to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. According to a senior official, the jets will be sent once pilot training has been completed. Officials from both Denmark and the Netherlands, who have been leading the push to train Ukrainian pilots and maintenance staff, have signalled that they confer with European allies and imminently reach final decisions for the transfer. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force said on 16 August that it is unlikely to receive the F-16s until Q1-Q2 2024, so they will not support the ongoing counter-offensive. Biden’s approval of F-16 transfers is likely to provoke a limited Russian response, raising the risk of retaliatory measures (including cyber) against US government and private institutions in the near term, but a military escalation remains highly unlikely.

FORECAST

OFFENSIVES: On 17 August, the Washington Post cited an undisclosed US intelligence assessment that the US intelligence community does not believe the Ukrainian counter-offensive will succeed in achieving its principal object of severing Russia’s land bridge to Crimea. Citing unnamed US intelligence officials, the reported assessment states that Ukrainian forces are unlikely to be able to push towards the key southern city of Melitopol – the key node in Russia’s southern axis and a stronghold which controls the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Crimea. The US assessment anticipates that even if Ukrainian forces succeed in breaking through Russia’s defensive lines in the south, they will remain several miles outside the city. The more limited objective of taking the fortified town of Tokmak, still 14 miles (22km) south of the Ukrainian frontline, remains an equally formidable obstacle. This would require Ukrainian forces to penetrate several layers of Russian defences and retain suitably large forces after gruelling attritional fighting to push towards the town. The unconfirmed US intelligence assessment ultimately aligns with our own most-likely scenario over the next three months, which anticipates that the Ukrainian counter-offensive is unlikely to achieve major strategic objectives this summer which could set conditions for an end to the war. Nevertheless, despite the US assessment, there still remains an opportunity for Ukrainian forces to achieve a strategic breakthrough in the south, as their gruelling counter-offensive steadily attrits and hollows out Russian defences. Prominent Russian volunteer ‘Vostok’ battalion commander, Alexander Khodakovsky, who is defending the Vremevsky salient, has in recent days published increasing pessimistic appraisals of Russia’s military position, even calling for a freezing of the conflict on 17 August given the extent to which Russia’s military capabilities have been hollowed out. It remains unclear if Ukrainian forces are near to achieving a breakthrough given Russian weaknesses and lack of operational reserves. However, while less likely, if Russian forces are near breaking point, Ukraine’s attritional strategy focused on reducing their own casualties while inflicting maximum casualties on Russia could yet bear fruit, allowing them to break through towards key objectives in the south in the coming months.

Aug. 17

BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: A prominent Russian milblogger claimed earlier on 17 August that Ukrainian units have left the village of Synkivka (Kharkiv oblast), situated around five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk. While this cannot be verified, there is a realistic possibility that the source is inflating the success of Russian forces’ operations in this area. The milblogger stated that battles have taken place on the outskirts of the village in recent days. Another Russian source reported on 17 August that Russian forces are building the initiative along the Kupiansk sector of the frontline.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: The commander of Ukraine’s land forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, acknowledged on 16 August that there are ‘complications’ around the north-eastern city of Kupiansk. He said that Russian forces are trying to break through Ukrainian defences in different directions in an attempt to block and then capture the city. According to Syrskyi, these Russian assault detachments are mainly comprised of prisoners; this supports our wider assessment that many Russian units are of a poor standard along this axis. Syrskyi nevertheless stated that Russian forces are regrouping and replacing units with degraded combat capabilities stemming from losses suffered in the Lyman direction (Donetsk oblast). However, he revealed that Russian forces are not abandoning plans for new offensive operations, noting that the task of the Ukrainian forces is to take advantage of this situation to improve their positions.
SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian General Staff claimed on 17 August that its forces have made further advances along the Vremevsky salient, south of the key village of Urozhaine (Donetsk oblast) which was liberated earlier this week. While it did not specify the extent of the advances, it remains highly likely that Ukrainian forces are pushing south of the village and are preparing operations to take Zavitne Bazhannia, the next village along the Mokri Yaly River valley, located just under two miles (3km) south of Urozhaine. Ukrainian forces on this axis are likely prioritising the capture of Staromlynivka, the largest town along the river valley, located some ten miles (16km) south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk).
SOUTHERN: However, the current Ukrainian position in this sector is around seven miles (11km) north of the first line of Russian fixed defences. The slow progress up until now reflects the density of minefields and fierce Russian defences. It is notable that a senior Ukrainian official reported on 17 August that Russian forces are currently building additional defensive lines in the Nikolsky direction, directly south of the current axis of the Ukrainian advance along the Vremevsky salient. While we cannot confirm this claim, any such construction efforts would likely point to Russian contingency planning for a Ukrainian breakthrough in this eastern sector of the southern front.
SOUTHERN: Further west, heavy fighting continues around the key town of Robotyne, located around eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Russian sources also acknowledged earlier on 17 August that fighting is currently taking place in the centre of the settlement, confirming Ukrainian control over the town’s northern sectors. Russian tactical aviation operations are also continuing in the sector. Ukrainian sources claim their forces hit two Russian Ka-52 helicopters earlier on 17 August. Russian sources confirmed (also on 17 August) that Soviet-era Buk air defence systems shot down at least one Ka-52, indicating that Ukrainian forces are bringing forward additional air defence assets in a bid to consolidate their control over recently taken territory.
STRIKES: The Ukrainian authorities reported on 17 August that Kh-22 cruise missiles targeted the village of Rohan (Kharkiv oblast), citing preliminary information. Elsewhere, the authorities reported that Russian forces attacked Novomoskovsk region (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) with missiles, but did not specify the type. Around 10,000 residents were temporarily left without electricity. Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its forces downed a Ukrainian strike drone over Belgorod oblast (Russia).
STRIKES: The Financial Times reported on 17 August that Ukraine is relocating crucial weaponry and skilled personnel to avoid them being targeted in Russian strikes. According to insiders familiar with the matter, the targeting of air bases, air strips and a pilot training facility far removed from the frontline forms part of Moscow’s plan to destroy Ukraine’s runways and platforms from which British Storm Shadow and French SCALP cruise missiles can be launched. The outlet claimed that Ukrainian pilots are constantly moving to and from dozens of domestic air bases and commercial airports in order to minimise the risk of being targeted. Russian forces launched a massive missile strike early on 15 August, hitting several regions in western Ukraine; they reportedly struck Starokostiantyniv Airbase (Khmelnytskyi oblast), a major hub for Storm Shadow missiles (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 15 August 2023). Further Russian attacks targeting Ukraine’s aviation and long-range strike capabilities are highly likely in the coming weeks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

NEGOTIATIONS: On 16 August, Stian Jenssen, the director of the private office of the NATO Secretary General, nuanced his statement that Ukraine would need to give up territory to Russia in exchange for NATO membership and to end the war. The original statement was made on 15 August during a discussion on Ukraine’s postwar status; it triggered serious rebukes from Ukrainian officials. Jenssen explained that his comments formed part of a discussion on the different possible options in the event of negotiations involving both parties. Furthermore, Jenssen stressed that NATO’s immediate priority is to support Ukraine’s efforts to resist Russia’s invasion. US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby further stated that there are no conditions in place whereby NATO membership will only be granted to Ukraine if it gives up part of its territory. As such, Jenssen’s initial remarks do not indicate that NATO’s support for Ukraine has changed. Further such discussions around how the war will end are likely in the coming months. For further analysis, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 16 August 2023.
AID: On 15 August, a US Republican Party-affiliated group, Republicans for Ukraine, announced that it launched a USD2m communication campaign to garner support for Ukraine in the Republican camp. The group opposes calls made by some prominent Republican politicians, such as the former president Donald Trump, to end or severely reduce US military and financial support to Ukraine. A CNN poll published on 4 August found that 71% of Republicans believe that the US Congress should not authorise new funding for Ukraine; this stands in stark contrast to 61% of Democrats who believe that more should be done to support Ukraine. As such, the group’s new campaign illustrates growing bipartisan differences on the issue of Ukraine; these will play a key role in determining the extent of longer-term US support for Ukraine within the Republican Party ahead of the Republican primaries planned for 15 August 2024.
ENERGY: On 17 August, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that Ukraine is equipped with enough energy reserves to last the coming winter. According to the statement, Ukraine has replenished its fuel reserves and has been able to mobilise its mining sector to ensure a steady supply of coal for thermal power and to heat plants this winter, while substantial gas reserves will provide additional reserves. Last winter, Ukraine demonstrated that its energy workforce could operate energy infrastructure despite being consistently targeted by Russian strikes. As such, Russian strikes are unlikely to degrade Ukraine’s energy output significantly in the coming cold season, though it remains likely that Russian forces will start to target energy systems in the run-up to winter.
CENSORSHIP: On 16 August, several senior Russian senators proposed amendments to media laws which would prohibit the distribution of photos or videos relating to various aspects of the Russian military and the war in Ukraine. The proposals are highly likely to be approved in the coming weeks amid the Kremlin’s efforts to expand its control over the information space as the war protracts. The proposals would prohibit the dissemination of images relating to Russian deployments, unit composition, military equipment, critical infrastructure, defeated or destroyed Russian units and/or equipment and locations confirming where Ukrainian strikes have taken place. If the amendments are approved and rigorously enforced, they would significantly reduce Russian open-source intelligence (OSINT) resources, as well as our ability to track Russian military developments and operations.
How will a possible stalemate on the Battlefield pan out? Is there a will in the West, particularly with the UK elections looming, with the possibility of a return of Donald Trump, and if there a Korean style 5th parallel deal results, which would allow Russia to rearm and attack Ukraine and Europe at the end of the decade.

FORECAST

MOBILISATION: Independent Russian news outlets reported on 16 August that Russian military enlistment offices recently sent summons to residents in Chelyabinsk, Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk, Perm and Ulyanovsk regions. While the summons are allegedly largely aimed at verifying recipients’ personal details, officers in Ulyanovsk have reportedly offered recipients the chance to sign engagement contracts with the MoD. These reports have elevated fears of preparations for a new wave of mobilisation. Russian officials have repeatedly stated that there are no plans for such a wave; a fresh official round of mobilisation is unlikely in the short term, especially given that Russia’s digital summons system will not be fully operational until the autumn. However, Moscow is highly likely to continue crypto mobilisation, through which individuals are called up on a case-by-case basis; this aims to limit public backlash ahead of key local elections in September. Nevertheless, even in the absence of an official mobilisation decree, the digital summons system and a recent presidential decree banning draftees from leaving Russian territory will likely complicate exit strategies for men attempting to avoid military service. On 17 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky formally approved the extension of martial law and mobilisation until 15 November. The extension comes amid increasing efforts to crack down on draft-dodging networks. On 11 August, Zelensky sacked all the heads of Ukraine’s regional army recruitment centres after an investigation revealed that recruitment officials were illegally enriching themselves by helping draft-eligible men leave Ukrainian territory. While the case illustrates Kyiv’s increasing efforts to tackle widespread corruption, it also reflects Ukraine’s recruitment challenges amid a highly attritional war that is driving demand for military personnel (a resource area in which Russia has a distinct advantage).

Russia-Ukraine: Re-Militarisation of Black Sea Will Increase Threats to Commercial Shkipping

Key points

There is a realistic possibility Russian inspections and warnings to cargo ships will increase in the coming weeks as Moscow attempts to deter shipping and indirectly enforce a de facto blockade.
The re-militarisation of the Black Sea will increase the risk of miscalculation, though a direct NATO-Russia military escalation in the region remains unlikely.
Possible expansions of over-land ‘solidarity lanes’ will somewhat ease global concerns over food prices, but significant cuts to Ukrainian grain exports will continue to undermine global food security.

Context

Russia announced on 17 July that it halted its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which facilitated the export of grains and other agricultural products from Ukrainian ports. While Russia’s withdrawal has triggered renewed pressure on international food prices, the Kremlin justified its withdrawal by claiming that parts of the original agreement that precipitated the BSGI had not been implemented. These included facilitating the access of Russian agricultural products to global markets and the resumption of its ammonia exports. While Western nations did not impose sanctions against Russian food and fertiliser exports, punitive measures were implemented on several Russian banks, companies and individuals. According to Moscow, these impeded shipments of Russian grain, insurance and arranging payments. Moscow has claimed that as soon as these conditions are met, Russia will rejoin the BSGI, but this remains unlikely in the short term.

The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced on 19 July that all ships travelling to Ukrainian Black Sea ports will be recognised as potential carriers of military cargo and therefore potential military targets. Ukraine’s MoD also released a similar statement regarding vessels heading to Russian or Russian-controlled Black Sea ports. Such mirrored declarations underscore the growing re-militarisation of large parts of the north-west Black Sea, thus increasing the risk of civilian ships being targeted and posing difficulties for insurance.

Forecast

The re-militarisation of the Black Sea will pose risks for civilian vessels, complicate insurance.

Despite the de-facto blockade of Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea, OSINT reports indicate that several ships have defied the Russian MoD’s threats to treat civilian ships as potential carriers of military cargo. This suggests that Russia is either unwilling or unable to enforce a genuine blockade of Ukrainian ports. Russia’s MoD claimed on 13 August that a Black Sea Fleet patrol vessel had fired warning shots at a Turkish-owned cargo ship sailing under the flag of Palau bound for the Ukrainian riverine port of Izmail. The incident reportedly forced the vessel to stop and was subsequently boarded and inspected, in the first example of a civilian vessel being so inspected by Russian constabulary and naval forces since the collapse of the BSGI.

It is likely that the operation was designed to deter civilian shipping to Ukraine and to demonstrate that its threats against civilian vessels remain credible, given its reticence to deploy surface vessels to enforce the blockade for fear of Ukrainian missiles and maritime drones. Given that the Black Sea region has become an increasingly contested zone, Russian inspections and warnings will likely ramp up in the coming weeks if civilian vessels continue the run the de facto Russian blockade. The threat posed by sea mines also continues to increase, with an explosion at the Romanian resort of Costinesti (Romania) on 14 August underscoring the growing risk to civilian shipping, as well as offshore, port and coastal infrastructure.

Amid these threats, NATO states, including Turkey, have indicated their unwillingness to commit naval assets to escort civilian vessels through Ukrainian waters. While reducing the threat of escalation, this will also place the risks of Russian coercive action solely at the door of commercial shipping companies. This will highly likely make insurance brokers less willing, or able, to provide cover for vessels travelling to Ukrainian ports.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s vow to ‘mirror’ any Russian attack in the Black Sea has significantly increased the drone and strike threat to Russian port infrastructure since the collapse of the BSGI and has increased the costs of freight for Russia. Further Ukrainian attacks against Russia’s Black Sea ports, such as Novorossisyk, in the coming weeks will also likely reinforce reluctance to facilitate Russian maritime exports in the region, including not only agricultural but also key oil exports – a major source of revenue for Moscow.

Strikes against Ukraine’s port infrastructure will severely undermine agricultural export capacity

Russia has launched a high-intensity missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian grain and port infrastructure since withdrawing from the BSGI, in a clear attempt to degrade Ukraine’s ability to export through the Black Sea over the medium term. Kyiv confirmed on 31 July that Russian attacks had destroyed 180,000 tonnes of Ukrainian grain in the first nine days after Moscow left the agreement, adding that 26 port infrastructure facilities and five civilian vessels had been damaged. Such strikes have notably increased security threats to vessels transiting through this section of the Danube. Strikes are also likely to cause supply chain disruption, with ships having to anchor along this route during and after attacks.

Collapse of BSGI will drive EU tensions, but solidarity lanes will moderately alleviate food insecurity

The collapse of the BSGI has increased the importance of alternative over-land export routes for Ukrainian grain to reach the international market. The EU’s agriculture commissioner, Janusz Wojciechowski, has stated that Brussels could offer alternative routes for most of Ukraine’s grain by expanding ‘solidarity lanes’, which currently handle 65% of exports. The traders’ union Ukrainian Grain Association (UZA) has requested the expansion of the solidarity lanes to grow by 1-1.5 million tons a month. Possible expansions of ‘solidarity lanes’ will partially mitigate global concerns over agricultural prices and products, which have been instrumental in lowering food prices since March 2022. However, the economic feasibility and logistics of expanding transportation infrastructure will likely hinder implementation, and they are unlikely to match the overall volumes exported via Black Sea ports.

Nevertheless, there is also widespread resistance to facilitating influxes of cheap Ukrainian grain across the EU. On 19 July, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia requested the EU extend trade restrictions on Ukrainian grain imports beyond the initial 15 September deadline. Previously, the EU allowed the five states to ban domestic sales of Ukrainian grain while still permitting transit for exports in order to protect their domestic agrifood markets. Should the EU decide not to extend the ban, the five aforementioned states will likely impose unilateral measures from 15 September to mitigate farmers’ backlash and avoid a grain surplus. With Polish elections on 15 October, and the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party considering farmers as an important constituency, Warsaw in particular is highly likely to follow through with pledges to close the border in this scenario. In turn, this will likely drive tensions between EU member states, including France and Germany, who oppose such protectionist measures. There remains a moderate risk that the EU will impose fines on governments if such restrictions violate the bloc’s trade policy.

Re-militarisation of the Black Sea will increase the risk of miscalculation, though open NATO-Russia escalation remains highly unlikely. During recent Russian attacks against Izmail and Reni, key riverine ports on Ukraine’s south-western border with Romania and Moldova, Russian drone attacks have struck targets as close as 0.123 miles (200m) from the Romanian (and therefore NATO) border. This indicates that Russia’s willingness to conduct strikes near NATO territory has increased, increasing the risk of miscalculation or debris crossing international borders.

NATO announced on 26 July that it would enhance its surveillance and reconnaissance in the Black Sea region, including with maritime patrol aircraft and drones. The military bloc’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, said Russia’s actions pose substantial risks to the stability of the region, emphasising that it is an area of strategic importance for NATO.

The Black Sea has always remained a key arena for Russia-NATO confrontation, with various incidents over the last two years. Given growing risks of miscalculation and unwanted escalation, there is a realistic possibility increased NATO surveillance and Russian military activity will lead to accidental confrontation between the alliance’s drones and Russian aircraft in the coming months. Such encounters will likely involve Russian jets scrambling to prevent UAVs or Western aircraft from what Russia deems to be actions that encroach upon its borders. Similarly, Russian attempts to enforce its de facto blockade will increase NATO freedom of navigation operations, involving naval vessels, drones and aircraft. However, such incidents are highly unlikely to trigger a direct NATO-Russia military escalation, though the risk would be higher if Russian forces were to fire or carry out unsafe manoeuvres (either intentionally or unintentionally) on manned aircraft.

Aug. 16

BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: A Russian milblogger stated on 16 August that Russian troops continue to develop their offensive operations along the north-eastern front after clearing forest belts near Vilshana, located about nine miles (15km) north-east of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). The source also relayed reports that unspecified reconnaissance groups have engaged Ukrainian forces on the outskirts of Petropavlivka, located around four miles (7km) east of Kupiansk. Another Russian milblogger claimed on 16 August that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian defensive lines near Petropavlivka, reporting that Russian units attempted to advance near the village of Synkivka, located just under five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: A prominent Russian milblogger published details on 15 August which suggest that Ukrainian forces have advanced south of Dibrova, located around four miles (7km) south-west of Kreminna (Luhansk oblast). According to the source, small contingents of a Ukrainian unit attempted without success to storm Russian strongholds along the Karmazynivka ledge. The milblogger also claimed a similar operation was carried out near Torske (Donetsk oblast), adding that the attack was synchronised with Ukrainian sorties in the Serbrianske forest area. Ultimately, Russian forces are likely to continue attacking along the Oskil-Kreminna axis in the coming weeks, presenting Moscow with the clearest opportunity to distract Ukrainian forces and disrupt their counter-offensive plans further south.
SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, Hanna Maliar, officially confirmed that Urozhaine has been liberated by Ukrainian forces. Urozhaine is a key village along the Vremevsky salient, located around 11 miles (18km) south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). It has been the centre of fierce fighting in recent weeks. However, Russian sources continue to issue contradictory reports, describing the settlement as a contested ‘grey zone’, while others have confirmed that the Russians have now completely withdrawn. Maliar also confirmed that counter-offensive operations continue in this direction as Ukrainian forces consolidate control over recently recaptured territory.
SOUTHERN: Further west in Zaporizhzhia oblast, Russian sources reported on 16 August that Ukrainian forces are actively advancing along the Orikhiv sector. Ukrainian forces are reportedly successfully entrenching themselves in the north-eastern outskirts of Robotyne, located around eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia). According to Russian sources, Ukrainian forces also penetrated the settlement during subsequent assaults. Geolocated footage published on 14 August also showed Ukrainian forces occupying a building in the centre of the town, though Russian sources have claimed the footage is from a failed Ukrainian advance two weeks ago. Nevertheless, the fact that Ukrainian forces have been confirmed as present in the centre of the town at least indicates the settlement is heavily contested. While Ukraine continues to ramp up pressure south of Orikhiv, the first confirmed sighting of a British Challenger 2 tank operating near the frontlines on 15 August underscores that preparations are likely in place to commit additional Western-equipped brigades to the offensive in the south. Notably, the tank was sighted with a protective frame above its turret, a measure that is highly likely intended to protect the asset and its crew from kamikaze drones.
KHERSON: Russian sources claimed earlier on 16 August that their forces have successfully eliminated the Ukrainian bridgehead along the east (left) bank of the Dnieper River, west of Kozachi Laheri. While this cannot be confirmed, Russian sources have acknowledged that Ukraine retains a separate bridgehead south of the Antonivsky Bridge, and that further cross-river raids are likely in the coming weeks.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force reported earlier on 16 August that its air defences shot down 13 Shahed-136/131 attack drones. The Ukrainian authorities stated 11 drones were shot down over Odesa oblast while two were downed over Mykolaiv oblast. Separately, Ukraine’s Eastern Air Command also reported that it shot down three Shahed-136 drones over Kharkiv oblast. The governor of Odesa, Oleh Kiper, said that Russian forces launched two waves of drones against the region, noting that the main targets included port and grain infrastructure. Kiper stated that warehouses and granaries were damaged in strikes against one of Ukraine’s Danube River ports. Although Kiper did not specify which port, he advised residents in Izmail district to take shelter in the early hours of 16 August. Air defence systems were heard firing in the area near two Danube ports – Izmail and Reni.
STRIKES: A major Swedish bearings manufacturer stated on 15 August that its factory in Lutsk (Volyn oblast) in north-western Ukraine was hit by a missile in an overnight attack. The company’s spokesperson confirmed that three employees were killed, underscoring the risks facing foreign-owned industrial enterprises, especially as Moscow is stepping up its efforts to target defence-industrial sites. A prominent Russian milblogger also reported on 16 August that the new terminal at Lviv Danylo Halytskyi International Airport (LWO) was struck the day before. The head of Lviv’s state administration announced in June that the airport will possibly resume its operations as part of a humanitarian corridor. While the strike cannot be confirmed, such reports will possibly impede plans to reopen Lviv for air travel. Overall, renewed focus on sites across western Ukraine will severely undermine the viability of reopening even limited air transit connections to Lviv.
STRIKES: Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that air defences intercepted a drone over occupied Crimea and three others over Kaluga oblast (Russia) earlier on 16 August. These strikes underscore Kyiv’s increasing willingness to carry out attacks deep into Russia and Russian-annexed territories. According to the spokesman for Ukraine’s naval forces, Dmytro Pletenchuk, Russia has strengthened security near the Kerch Strait Bridge, which has been targeted several times in recent weeks. Pletenchuk reported that the number of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) ships operating in the area has also increased.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

BLACK SEA: On 16 August, Ukrainian Minister of Infrastructure Oleksandr Kubrakov announced that a freight civilian vessel departed from the port of Odesa. The ship, the Joseph Schulte, is a Hong Kong-based vessel carrying around 30,000 metric tonnes of cargo, including food. It had been blocked in Odesa’s port since the beginning of the war and is the first vessel to use the alternative Black Sea corridor declared by Ukraine on 10 August for ships stuck in Ukrainian ports. Ukraine’s navy stated that Russian mines will continue to threaten these shipping lanes, and that the general re-militarisation of the Black Sea will exacerbate the security threats facing this and other civilian vessels attempting to run the de facto Russian blockade. Notably, following an incident on 13 August in which a Russian patrol ship fired warning shots at a cargo vessel (which was then boarded and searched), Russian forces will possibly seek to intercept the vessel far from Ukrainian waters in a bid to deter further use of Ukraine’s new ‘humanitarian corridors’ and enforce its blockade. Open Russian attacks on the vessel remain highly unlikely, though mines will pose ongoing passive threats. Coercive interceptions and boarding missions are likely. The passage of the Joseph Schulte will be a key trigger point in the coming days; it will be a critical indicator of Russia’s ability and willingness to enforce its blockade.
WAGNER GROUP: Wagner-affiliated Russian and Belarusian Telegram channels recently claimed that rumours surrounding the incorporation of Wagner group commanders into the Redut private military company (PMC) are fake. Rumours that the Russian MoD wishes to transfer Wagner commanders to the Redut PMC (which remains under its control) are currently circulating on social media channels. During the Battle for Bakhmut in April, the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, strongly criticised the Redut PMC amid tensions with the MoD. As such, the recent claims likely underscore the persistent efforts of Wagner-affiliated channels to discredit the Russian MoD’s efforts to take control of various PMCs and to integrate Wagner fighters into units under the MoD’s direct control. On 14 August, a Russian independent news outlet reported that the Convoy PMC, financed by Russian businessmen close to the Kremlin, continues to operate independently. The report likely indicates that the Russian MoD is unable to take full control over various PMCs and that there remains scope for semi-independent armed units to operate under the patronage of various high-profile Kremlin allies.
NUCLEAR: On 15 August, Ukraine’s National Resistance Centre (NRC) allegedly obtained leaked documents proving that Russian forces are planning a provocation at the Kursk Nuclear Power plant (KNPP). According to the NRC, Russia will attribute the attack to Ukrainian forces to divert attention from its actions at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power plant (ZNPP). Russia is reportedly planning to evacuate people residing near the KNPP. In November 2022, Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) reported that Russian forces were storing missiles near the KNPP. Kyiv has at semi-regular intervals accused Russia of preparing an imminent provocation or false-flag operation (these have not yet materialised). While the authenticity of the documents provided by the NRC remains unverified, false-flag operations constitute a credible threat. However, we assess that there is little for Russia to gain by staging an attack at the KNPP at this current time. If and when Ukrainian forces achieve a major breakthrough in the south, the risk of false-flag operations, including at the ZNPP (and to a lesser extent the KNPP) will increase.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: On 15 August, Stian Jenssen, the chief of staff of the NATO Secretary General, speculated that Ukraine will possibly have to cede territory to Russia formally in order to gain NATO membership. He emphasised that ceding territory is possibly necessary to reach a peace that will prevent Russia from initiating another invasion. The connection to Ukraine’s NATO application is notable. While Jenssen reiterated NATO’s position (that it must be up to Ukraine to decide when and on what terms it wants to negotiate the war’s end), his comments represent a significant intervention and have triggered widespread backlash in Kyiv. Numerous high-profile Ukrainian officials have described the proposals as ‘absolutely unacceptable’. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, Iryna Vereshchuk, stated on 15 August that the road to victory for Ukraine will be ‘long and difficult’, and that Ukraine must ‘get ready for a long fight’. This assessment broadly aligns with our own, namely that Ukraine is unlikely to achieve a major strategic breakthrough this summer, especially one which brings about a rapid end to the war. Both sides are preparing to fight a protracted and attritional conflict, as underlined by the fact that neither side can effectively gain the upper hand on the battlefield. Nevertheless, discussions surrounding how to end the war will only increase if the war protracts into 2024; while Ukraine’s NATO membership remains a very remote prospect at present, Kyiv will strongly reject pressure to entertain claims that territorial concessions are a necessary condition that Ukraine needs to satisfy before it can enter the alliance.

Aug. 15

BAKHMUT: Some Russian sources claimed on 14 August that their forces had fully regained all positions in Klishchiivka, following earlier Ukrainian advances into the south-west of the settlement. However, there is currently no evidence to support this. More broadly, the pattern of activity has remained on trend over the last 24 hours, with little other indication of notable advances.
DONETSK: A Russian milblogger stated on 14 August that there is a ‘certain stalemate’ in the Donetsk direction at present. The source described it as very difficult for both sides and claimed there are no tactical advances. According to the milblogger, Russian forces nevertheless continue to receive orders to advance and constantly press Ukrainian defences, but noted there is insufficient manpower to achieve any success. The source said Ukrainian forces have slightly fewer manpower challenges, but given they are on the defensive the situation is fundamentally different. On 13 August, another Russian milblogger stated that fighting in the directions of Avdiivka and Marinka is mostly positional because both Russian and Ukrainian forces are concentrating their efforts on other areas of the front. The Donetsk frontline has remained one of the most static throughout the war.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Ukraine’s deputy defence minister Hanna Maliar stated on 15 August that Russian shelling and attacks in the east have decreased over the past week. Maliar claimed Ukrainian forces inflicted significant casualties on Russian troops when they became more active in the directions of Kupiansk and Lyman. However, according to Maliar, Russian forces are currently regrouping, rather than abandoning their plans to advance in these sectors. On 14 August, Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson, Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, stated Russian forces are concentrating their efforts in the Lyman-Kupiansk direction by pulling up reserves and maximising the use of its aerial and artillery strike capabilities.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: A Russian milbogger reported on 14 August that Russian forces continued to press north-east of Kupiansk around Synkivka (Kharkiv oblast). The source also stated that Russian troops continue to push towards Oskil in the Svatove direction. According to the milblogger, Ukrainian forces have intensified counter-attacks to restrain Russian offensive operations. Geolocated imagery posted on 13 August indicates that Russian forces have advanced near Orlianka and Mykolaivka, situated around 14 miles (22km) and 15 miles (24km) east of Kupiansk, respectively. There is a realistic possibility that Russia will make small advances along this axis in the coming weeks as Ukrainian forces focus their counter-offensive efforts on other sectors of the frontline.
SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 15 August that their forces had made further gains around the village of Urozhaine, 11 miles (18km) south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Unconfirmed reports also indicate that Ukrainian forces have moved further south and that Russian forces may have withdrawn from the southern section of the settlement, but this has not been confirmed.
SOUTHERN: What is notable about the battle for Urozhaine is the fact that prominent Russian volunteer ‘Vostok’ battalion commander, Alexander Khodakovsky, who is fighting on this front, has candidly reported on the high losses and lack of support his forces are experiencing. On 14 August, Khodakovsky reported that his forces had not been provided the reinforcements they had been promised during the battle and that forces on this section of the frontline are fighting with only the resources currently available to them. This indicates once again that Russia lacks reserves to be able to rotate currently exhausted units, which according to Khodakovsky are now operating ‘at the limit of what is possible’. If this exhaustion and lack of support is reflected at other points of the line, which is likely, this will present a key opportunity for Ukraine to breakthrough, given the lack of Russian reserves to be able to effectively man second- and third-layer defences. Nevertheless, Khodakovsky described Urozhaine as a ‘meat grinder’, and it remains unclear how many casualties Ukrainian forces have also taken in recent days.
SOUTHERN: Further west, Ukrainian forces continue counter-offensive operations south of Orikhiv, but there is little evidence that they have made any more confirmed gains around the town of Robotyne, eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Russian sources reported on 15 August that Ukrainian attempts to enter the town have increased, and Ukrainian forces are using forested areas nearby as cover during these assaults. Some Russian sources indicated on 15 August that Ukrainian forces are attempting to by-pass Robotyne, by focusing on attacks to the east. Russian sources also continue to make claims about numerous Ukrainian vehicle losses in this sector, claiming that Ukrainian mechanised attacks are night are performing poorly. A video published on 15 August shows a Russian Lancet drone striking what is likely a US-supplied Stryker armoured personnel carrier, which Russian sources have claimed is the first confirmed destruction of that vehicle type in Ukraine. However, it remains unclear how damaged the vehicle is.
STRIKES: Russia launched a massive missile strike against Ukraine early on 15 August with air and sea-based missiles. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that at least 28 cruise missiles of various types were fired, including four Kh-22 cruise missiles, 20 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and four Kalibr cruise missiles. Air defences downed 16 Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles. The attack damaged civilian facilities in eight Ukrainian oblasts. Two cruise missiles hit an industrial facility in the western Ukrainian city of Lutsk (Volyn oblast). Ukrainian authorities also reported that more than 100 apartments were damaged in Lviv. Meanwhile, seven Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles were shot down over Dnipropetrovsk oblast, although an industrial facility was hit in the city of Dnipro. Russian missiles also hit a commercial and a medical facility in Smila, Cherkasy oblast. Kyiv oblast was also targeted, but there were no reported hits on critical and residential infrastructure, likely underscoring the effectiveness and density of Ukrainian air defences around the capital. Air defences also reportedly activated in Khmelnytskyi and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts.
STRIKES: A Russian milblogger claimed that facilities of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex were hit in the attacks, including an airfield in Starokostiantyniv (Khmelnytskyi oblast), which is the main base for Storm Shadow missiles. While this cannot be confirmed, it will likely remain a target for Russian forces for the foreseeable future.
BORDERS: On 15 August, the commander of Ukrainian Joint Forces Serhiy Naiev reported that Ukrainian forces have repelled two Russian ‘sabotage groups’ which attempted to cross the international border into Chernihiv oblast. The sabotage groups reportedly consisted of five to seven soldiers each, and as such the attempted raids were very small-scale. However, we have previously assessed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are likely to increase pressure at other quiet points of the border in an attempt to draw off reserves from the key focus of fighting in the south. Such Russian operations are highly unlikely to present a serious military threat to Ukrainian border regions, and Ukrainian forces are highly likely able to contain limited raids. Similarly, the Russians are also continuing to strengthen their border regions. On 14 August, Maliar reported that Russian forces are increasing the density of mines along the Belgorod border. Such measures are being taken to mitigate the risk of Ukrainian raids into Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CHINA: On 14 August, Chinese Minister of Defence Li Shangfu started his official trip to Russia and Belarus, which will end on 19 August. Li is currently attending the Moscow Conference on International Security in Russia and met with the Russian top defence leadership. On 15 August, Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu praised Russo-Chinese military and defence co-operation, while Li stated that China intends to reinforce security co-operation with the member-states of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). In April, Li’s first official visit to Russia as the newly appointed Chinese defence minister likely did not result in increased support for Russia’s war effort. We continue to assess that Li’s recent visit to Russia will not result in China providing lethal aid to Moscow. Instead, it reflects Beijing’s persistent goal to secure advantageous defence co-operation with Russia by continuing to leverage the unequal nature of the Sino-Russian partnership.
AID: On 14 August, the US Department of Defence (DOD) announced an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth USD200m. The package includes ammunition for Patriot air defence systems, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), artillery rounds, tank and anti-tank munitions and 12m rounds of small arms ammunition. The US DOD will also supply Ukraine with 37 logistics vehicles and mine-clearing equipment – which are key to facilitating progress through dense minefields currently slowing the counter-offensive in the south. With the previous US aid package worth USD400m provided in July, the latest package underscores Washington’s commitment to bolster Ukraine’s offensive and defensive capabilities. In particular, the additional Patriot ammunition will allow Ukraine to continue to counter Russia’s ballistic missile strikes. However, due to the limited number of Patriot systems, Ukraine’s interception rate of ballistic missiles will remain limited if Russia can sustain its current rate of attacks. The provision of artillery rounds and various munitions will allow Ukraine to replenish stocks that are most likely stretched by the ongoing counter-offensive efforts.
AID: On 14 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine is focusing on expanding the production of drones as a key capability during the counter-offensive. He also called on Western allies to continue to supply Ukraine with such military equipment. Notably, German defence manufacturer Rheinmetall confirmed on 14 August that it will deliver the new Luna reconnaissance drone over the course of 2023. According to Rheinmetall, the provision of Luna drones is part of Germany’s aid package to Ukraine and emphasises the increasing emphasis being placed on drones by Ukraine’s Western partners. Notably, German Finance Minister Christian Lindner stated on 14 August that Berlin plans to provide EUR 5bn worth of annual military aid until 2027. While the proposal still needs to be approved by Germany’s Parliament, Lindner’s announcements reflect Berlin’s commitment to support Ukraine’s defence capabilities over the medium term, German contributions to which have increased significantly over the last six months.

FORECAST

GRAIN: On 11 August, Romanian Transport and Infrastructure Minister Sorin Grindeanu pledged that Romania would increase the transit capacity of Ukrainian grain from 2 million to 4 million metric tons per month. The announcement comes after Grindeanu met with EU, Moldovan, Ukrainian and US officials in Galati (Romania) to discuss Ukrainian grain exports after Russia withdrew from the grain deal. Grindeanu stated that Bucharest would hire additional personnel to facilitate the movement of ships in the Sulina Canal in the Danube River and will complete the plans to improve Romanian Danube ports’ infrastructure with EU-allocated funds. As such, Bucharest’s plans to expand the transit capacity of its Danuban ports will likely be achieved in the coming months. In the meantime, he said that the ports of Galati and Brăila will be used to ship Ukrainian grain exports to global markets. However, these operational Romanian ports are unlikely to process enough Ukrainian grain exports to compensate for the loss of Black Sea transit routes.

Black Sea shipping remains under increasing pressure amid the remilitarisation of the area, and floating sea mines will remain a key threat to civilian shipping, as well as offshore, port and coastal infrastructure. Following the explosion of a sea mine in Costinesti (Romania) on 14 August, both the Romanian and Bulgarian navies have stepped up patrols in their waters in order to identify mines and defuse them with diving teams before they reach key infrastructure or the coastline. Bucharest has confirmed that sightings of a second mine off the coast following the initial explosion in Costinesti were ‘unfounded.’

Aug. 14

BAKHMUT: Russian forces have continued to launch intense counter-attack operations around Bakhmut, and are more likely to have made limited advances over the weekend of 12-13 August than Ukrainian forces. While unconfirmed, Russian sources indicate that their forces have retaken limited positions on the outskirts of Klishchiivka, four miles (6km) south-west of Bakhmut, but Ukrainian forces are still likely in position of the south-western outskirts of the settlement. Further north, Russian forces have also likely made limited advances towards the Berkhivka Reservoir, three miles (5km) north-west of Bakhmut. The rate of the Ukrainian advance on the Bakhmut axis has slowed significantly over the last two weeks, with Ukrainian deputy defence minister Hanna Maliar reporting on 14 August that only 0.2 square miles (0.75 square km) have been liberated south of Bakhmut over the last week. While Ukrainian military officials are claiming that their forces still retain the initiative, it is clear that sustained Russian counter-attacks are limiting the scope for advances here.
DONETSK: A Russian source reported on 13 August that Russian forces conduct daily assault operations in Marinka and are attempting to advance towards Avdiivka. A Russian milblogger reported on 12 August that Ukrainian forces control 30% of Marinka and that elements of Chechen Akhmat special forces have reinforced Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces operating in the area, indicating possible personnel shortages along this axis. The source also stated that storming Avdiivka ‘head-on’ is pointless given that Ukraine is repelling attempts to advance through the suburbs and trying to counter-attack. Ukraine’s General Staff reported on 14 August that defence forces continue to hold back the advance of Russian troops around Marinka and Avdiivka.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: A Russian source claimed on 13 August that Russian forces have a ‘serious initiative’ along the Oskil-Kreminna axis and said Russian troops are trying to break through to Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). The milblogger described it as a key logistics point of Ukraine’s armed forces. The former interior minister of Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Vitaly Kiselyov claimed on 13 August that Russian troops are advancing in unspecified areas on the left (east) bank of the Oskil River and are no more than three miles (5km) from the outskirts of Kupiansk in some areas, though this cannot be confirmed. A Russian source claimed on 11 August that Russian forces had seized more than 30 Ukrainian strongholds on a broad front from Kupiansk to Kyslivka (Kharkiv oblast). Fighting along this sector is likely to remain intense in the coming weeks as Russian forces attempt to push Ukraine to draw its forces from other axes to relieve pressure on Russian forces elsewhere. However, Russian sources will also likely inflate unverified claims of advances to serve their information operations.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: A prominent Russian milblogger reported on 14 August that Russian troops tried to advance near Myasozharivka, west of Svatove. The source stated the goal of Russian forces is to push Ukrainian troops across the Zherebets River and that this is the new direction of attack. The source also claimed on 12 August that Russian troops have seized the initiative near Karmazynivka and again conducted offensive operations near Nadiya, situated eight miles (13km) south-west and nine miles (15km) west of Svatove respectively.
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces highly likely advanced into the village of Urozhaine on 12 August, but despite initial reports of a Russian withdrawal, heavy fighting appears to be ongoing in the southern sections of the settlement. The village is situated 11 miles (18km) south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast) and has been the primary objective of Ukrainian forces operating in the Vremevsky salient for a number of weeks. Russian sources have notably responded to the advances by highlighting failures in Russia’s command and control as well as poor morale within units defending the area. Certain sources have alleged that the 37th Separate Guards Motorised Rifle Brigade failed to commit armoured support to defend the village, leading to a premature withdrawal, though other sources have refuted this. The milblogger response to the loss of Urozhaine indicates that there is significant tension between various Russian units defending the area, and recriminations are being directed in multiple directions amid wider concerns that the Russian defence in this sector has severe limitations.
SOUTHERN: Russian sources, as well as UK Defence Intelligence, reported over the weekend of 11-13 August that Russian forces have likely deployed elements of the 7th Guards VDV (Airborne) Division to critical sections of the southern front. The deployments near the key town of Robotyne, eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast), which have also reportedly included the Chechehn Vostolk Akhmat Battalion, likely indicate the extent to which Ukrainian forces have degraded Russian defences there. Ukrainian forces highly likely made advances to the north and north-east of the settlement in recent days. Amid these limited but tactically significant advances, there is little evidence at present to indicate that the 42nd Motorised Rifle Division, which has been defending this section of the frontline, has been rotated out as the VDV and Akhmat forces have moved in. This likely reflects the lack of Russian reserves and, therefore, the realistic possibility that the second and third layers of Russian defences south of Orikhiv are only lightly manned. If Ukrainian forces are able to maintain the current pressure, the deployment of VDV and Akhmat forces could provide Kyiv with an opportunity to break through as Russian defences are steadily degraded and their defence-in-depth is steadily hollowed out.
KHERSON: Russian sources have meanwhile continued to report that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnieper River, including to the west of Kozachi Laheri and to the south of the Antonivsky Bridge. Russian Spetsnaz units are reportedly involved in heavy fighting near Antonivsky amid ongoing Russian efforts to clear Ukrainian bridgeheads in the area. Notably, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister Hanna Maliar stated on 12 August sought to downplay expectations around Ukrainian operations on the left bank, stating that certain ‘tasks’ had been completed, but refusing to say whether Ukrainian forces have gained a foothold. Nevertheless, wider Ukrainian presences along the left bank are more likely aimed at spoiling Russian defences rather than prefigure major offensive operations.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s Air Force reported on 14 August that all eight Kalibr cruise missiles and 15 Shahed-136/131 attack drones launched in an overnight attack targeting the centre of Odesa were shot down. However, fragments of the missiles and drones fell in Odesa, causing fires in several locations of the city. A supermarket, an educational institute’s dormitory and a residential building were reportedly damaged by the debris. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Air Force stated on 12 August that three out of five Shahed-136/131 UAVs were destroyed over Zaporizhzhia oblast. The governor of Dnipropetrovsk oblast reported on 12 August that Russia also launched a missile strike against Kryvyi Rih, stating that, according to preliminary information, it was a ballistic missile. A spokesperson of Ukraine’s Air Force reported that, on 11 August, Russian troops launched four Kinzhal missiles towards the Kolomyia airfield in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, allegedly targeting Ukrainian pilots who are due to learn how to fly F-16 fighter jets.
STRIKES: Russia has reportedly started to manufacture its own version of Iranian attack drones and has used them during recent aerial assaults against Ukraine. According to a UK-based research group, Conflict Armament Research, the Geran-2 drones are similar to Iranian Shahed-136 drones but made with different materials and appear to have been adapted to better suit Russia’s strike operations. As such, it shows Russia’s efforts to domestically produce equipment in significant quantities for use against Ukraine in the long term. While Ukrainian authorities continue to report successes in downing Iranian Shahed-136/131 drones, manufacturers of the Geran-2 drones will likely seek to continue bolstering their efficiencies in an attempt to lower their rate of interception.
STRIKES: Russian authorities reported on 12 August that Ukrainian forces launched two missile strikes targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge, which connects occupied Crimea to Russia. Russian officials reported that air defences downed up to three Ukrainian missiles launched from S-200 systems. A Ukrainian media outlet, citing its sources in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), also reported that dozens of Russian soldiers were killed or injured in a Ukrainian drone attack on Russian-annexed Crimea overnight on 12 August. The outlet’s sources reported that the SBU was behind the attack, in which 17 drones were used to target a Russian logistics base near Yevpatoria. Russia’s MoD reported on the morning of 12 August that it had repelled an attack involving 20 drones against the peninsula. Meanwhile, on 13 August, Russia’s MoD reported that three Ukrainian attempts to hit targets in Russia with drones were also repelled. Two drones were shot down over Belgorod oblast and one over Kursk oblast. Images circulated on Russian Telegram channels on 13 August which purport to show damage to an apartment building in Belgorod city. Further Ukrainian attacks against Russian logistics in Crimea are highly likely in the coming weeks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

INFIGHTING: On 12 August, Ukrainian authorities of occupied Mariupol reported that a shootout took place on 11 August between Chechen and Russian conventional units. The shootout reportedly took place in the village of Urzuf in the Mariupol district and resulted in several dead among Russian soldiers and the civilian population. According to Russian independent outlet Meduza, the Russian-appointed mayor of Ursuf confirmed that the shootout involved elements of the Russian military. Chechnya’s Minister for National Policy, Akhmed Dudayev, denied the claims made by Ukrainian authorities. On 12 June, in a bid to reign in private military companies and paramilitary formations, the Russian Ministry of Defence reportedly signed a contract with Chechen Akhmat units. As such, although the shootout has yet to be confirmed, it illustrates the challenges the Russian MoD faces in enforcing discipline among freshly incorporated paramilitary formations and enduring tensions between such units.
ESPIONAGE: On 14 August, Polish Interior Minister Mariusz Kamiński reported that Poland’s domestic intelligence service and police arrested two Russian individuals allegedly distributing propaganda material related to Wagner Group. The suspects reportedly operated in the capital Warsaw and in Kraków, where recruitment posters for the Wagner Group reportedly appeared in the streets. The case highlights the increasing risk of cross-border subversive activity carried out by Wagner after it redeployed to bordering Belarus. It also underscores the persistent threat of Russian espionage across Europe, though such operations are less likely to pose a serious security risk to non-state and non-defence sector institutions. Notably, German news outlet Deutsche Welle reported on 11 August that a man was arrested last week on suspicions of spying for Russia. The suspect worked for Germany’s Bundeswehr’s procurement agency and had access to sensitive information on Germany’s military electronic capabilities. As such, NATO-member European countries will remain vulnerable to Russian spying activity, though European counter-intelligence services have likely stepped up the monitoring of Russian spy networks since the beginning of the war in Ukraine.

FORECAST

BLACK SEA: On 13 August, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that a Russian patrol ship fired warning shots and subsequently searched a cargo vessel bound for Ukraine’s Danube River port in Izmail. According to the MoD, the Palau-flagged cargo ship had not responded to a request to halt for an inspection, whereafter the Vasily Bykov used small arms fire as a warning and forcibly stopped the vessel. A Ka-29 helicopter then reportedly deployed a small team of Russian forces aboard to search the vessel. However, a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group claimed Russian authorities gave a false account of the incident, alleging the Russian side only transmitted threats over the radio. The development marks the most significant escalation and targeting of civilian vessels since Moscow announced on 19 July that it would consider civilian vessels bound for Ukraine’s Black Sea ports as potential carriers of military cargo and, therefore, potential military targets. The alleged warning shots came after Ukraine announced the opening of new routes through the Black Sea for ships that have been stuck in Ukrainian ports since the beginning of the war. On 12 August, Ukraine’s Navy spokesman, Dmytro Pletenchuk, announced that Ukraine has started registering commercial ships that will travel via these temporary routes. This latest escalation is highly likely in response to Ukraine’s new routes, and is designed to undermine confidence in Ukraine’s new ‘humanitarian corridors’, deter travel to and from Ukrainian ports as well as undermine freedom of navigation. Such warnings also likely serve the purpose of deterring vessels without having to deploy significant numbers of Black Sea Fleet surface vessels to enforce the blockade writ large – which would remain highly vulnerable to Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USV) maritime drones. If such warnings do not result in a reduction in the number of vessels travelling to Ukrainian ports, Russian inspections, warnings and boardings of civilian vessels will likely ramp up in the coming weeks. In a separate development, unconfirmed reports emerged on 14 August that a sea mine exploded on a beach near the Romanian Black Sea resort of Costinesti. We have previously assessed that the risk of sea mines (as well as light-weight PMF-1 mines that had been washed into the sea following the destruction of the Kakhovka Reservoir) washing up on the shores of non-combatant Black Sea littoral states remains high. Civilian beaches as well as industrial ports and offshore infrastructure will remain vulnerable to stray mines, particularly as both Russian and Ukrainian forces step up efforts to attack vessels in the region.

Russia-Ukraine: Warning shots at cargo vessel aimed at deterring freedom of navigation in Black Sea. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 13 August that a Russian patrol ship had fired warning shots at a cargo vessel bound for Ukraine’s Danube River port in Izmail. According to the MoD, the Palau-flagged cargo ship had not responded to a request to halt for an inspection. However, a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group claimed Russian authorities gave a false account of the incident, alleging the Russian side only transmitted threats over the radio. The MoD announced on 19 July that it will consider civilian vessels bound for Ukraine’s Black Sea ports as potential carriers of military cargo and therefore potential military targets. There is a realistic possibility that Russian forces fired at the ship to deter other ships after reports that civilian vessels had defied Russia’s de facto blockade. Nevertheless, the MoD’s statement is likely aimed at deterring travel to and from Ukrainian ports as well as undermining freedom of navigation. Russian inspections and warnings will possibly ramp up in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

21 Aug 23. Ukrainian attacks on Russian rear worsen their morale at front. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has said Ukrainian strikes on the Russian rear areas worsen the Russian troops morale, creating a probable threat to the stability of the Russian occupiers’ defence in many critical areas of the combat zone.

Quote: “Russian frontline units, particularly in southern Ukraine, have frequently struggled with degraded morale following Ukrainian strikes on rear areas. Morale issues can quickly intensify and spread among Russian frontline units if one unit under pressure breaks, which could spread panic and significantly reduce the combat effectiveness of other Russian forces.”

Details: The ISW reported that the Russian milbloggers criticised the Russian Defence Ministry (Russian MoD) for not taking actions to prevent a drone attack on the Soltsy airfield in Novgorod Oblast conducted on 19 August and downplaying the severity of damage to the aircraft that were deployed there.

“The Russian MoD claimed on 19 August that Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian drone using small arms and that a fire damaged one aircraft but that firefighters promptly put out the fire. Images published on 20 August reportedly show a Tu-22M3 (NATO reporting name Backfire-C) long-range supersonic bomber on fire at the Soltsy airbase. A Russian insider source claimed that witnesses said that fire damaged or completely destroyed two aircraft. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used a small and relatively inexpensive quadcopter drone to conduct the attack and criticised the Russian MoD for not storing the aircraft in hangars, noting that even elementary protective structures and nets are reliable against quadcopters.”

The ISW believes that the damage or even the destruction of two Tu-22M3 aircraft in itself will not lead to significant military aftermath, but the reaction of Russian milbloggers to the attack demonstrates how such strikes in the rear areas have positive effect for Ukraine’s larger efforts to lower the morale of the Russian military. (Source: News Now/https://ukragroconsult.com/)

21 Aug 23. Ukrainian naval forces open corridor for ships in the Black Sea. Temporary humanitarian corridors for ships in the Black Sea have been opened up by Ukrainian naval forces, according to an official statement by the country’s military forces, reported by AgriCensus.

Although the corridor had been declared open for ships to enter and leave Ukrainian Black Sea ports, the 10 August statement warned of continuing risks of military threat and danger of naval mines from Russian naval activity.

Vessels would only be allowed to use the corridors if their owners or captains officially confirmed their willingness to ship in the current conditions, or were prepared to accept the risk, the note added.

Ukraine had offered such routes for shipments out of the Black Sea to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and the organisation had recognised Ukraine’s right to continue free commercial navigation, as guaranteed by international maritime law, according to the statement.

Previously only used for ships carrying agricultural products, the Black Sea corridor would now be mainly used for vessels that had been stuck in Ukrainian ports following Russia’s invasion and subsequent conflict last February, the note said.

Despite the move, trade sources said the primary concern about who would provide insurance for such shipments remained, AgriCensus wrote.

“It’s a good step but if it doesn’t eliminate the risk, people will probably approach on a ‘wait and see’ basis. That is, they will wait for somebody else to go first,” a freight analyst was quoted as saying.

In July, Ukrainian officials said that they had made an insurance fund of UAH20bn (around US$544M) available to cover any potential damage for such shipments, the report said.

However, when the fund was announced, it was also said that the decision on whether or not to cover any damage would be analysed and taken by the Ukrainian government and, as such, it was not fully clear how it would work, AgriCensus wrote.

“Until Russia agrees to some kind of deal, the owners will not be sure of their safety,” a freight broker was quoted as saying.

Since Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) on 17 July, ship owners were no longer prepared to risk entering the region without Russian guarantees, particularly since Russia had attacked ports in the region, the report said.

By directly targeting and damaging Ukraine grain assets at Black Sea ports and on the Danube River since withdrawing from the BSGI, Russia had weaponised food, Stephen Nicholson, global sector strategist, Grains & Oilseeds, at Rabobank, was quoted as saying in a World Grain report on 4 August.

“Russia has made a clear decision that it is going to use food as a weapon,” Nicholson told World Grain.

In a letter seen by Reuters, the European Union (EU) had warned developing countries and G20 members – comprising the world’s largest economies – that Russia was offering cheap grain “to create new dependencies.”

“As the world deals with disrupted supplies and higher prices, Russia is now approaching vulnerable countries with bilateral offers of grain shipments at discounted prices, pretending to solve the problem it created itself,” the letter said. “This is a cynical policy of deliberately using food as a weapon to create new dependencies by exacerbating economic vulnerabilities and global food insecurity.”

According to a report by The Guardian on 27 July, Russian president Vladimir Putin had promised free grain supplies to six African countries following the collapse of the BSGI. (Source: News Now/https://ukragroconsult.com/)

21 Aug 23. Russian morale ‘degraded’ by Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian strikes on the southern front are “demonstrably degrading” the morale of Russian forces, a think tank has claimed.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said this could lead to a “break” in the front line, but added it was unclear “if, when, or where” this could happen.

It comes amid criticisms of Moscow’s campaign after Ukraine regained the village of Urozhaine in the Zaporizhzhia region, in its bid to sever the Crimean land bridge – a vital Russian supply line.

The commander of a Chechen battalion fighting in the area complained that Russia had not rotated in reserves or provided sufficient artillery. A Russian blogger claimed one brigade was undisciplined and drunk.

Earlier today, Kyiv said troops were advancing on the eastern city of Bakhmut and had retaken three square kilometres (1.2 square miles) in the last week.

The ISW said: “Strikes on Russian rear areas are demonstrably degrading the morale of Russian forces in Ukraine, which could threaten the stability of Russian defences on multiple critical areas.

“Morale issues can quickly intensify and spread among Russian frontline units if one unit under pressure breaks, which could spread panic and significantly reduce the combat effectiveness of other Russian forces.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)

17 Aug 23. Has Russia destroyed Ukraine’s naval drone capability?

This week Russia claims to have destroyed the Ukrainian Navy’s production and storage facilities for naval drones, using multiple seaborne long-range precision weapons against the sites. Ukraine’s navy drone inventory first drew global attention when the navy used seven USVs (or unmanned surface vessels) packed with explosives to attack Russia’s Sevastopol Black Sea Fleet headquarters in October 2022.

In the past few weeks, Ukraine has reported a number of successful sea drone attacks, prompting global media to attribute it with a tactical advantage, altering the “balance of power in the Black Sea” (Wall Street Journal, August 11th). In the early hours of Monday July 17th morning, two Ukrainian USVs hit the concrete piers of the 12 kilometre Kerch Bridge, which links Crimea to Russia. One of the bridge’s sections was destroyed, bringing traffic to a halt, with several civilian casualties.

On August 1st, Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced that it had thwarted several attacks by Ukrainian sea drones on both Russian Navy and commercial ships in the Black Sea. The defence ministry reported that a total of three USVs had made attempts to attack the Sergei Kotov and Vasiliy Bykov patrol ships during the night of July 31st / August 1st, southwest of Sevastopol. It said that all three drones were destroyed,

Two days later, a USV carrying 450 kilograms of TNT hit the Russian Navy landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak, which had around 100 Russian servicemen on board, disabling the vessel. One day after that, the Ukrainian Navy used a USV to attack and disable the Russian merchant tanker (MT) Sig near the Kerch Strait off Crimea, which is contracted by the Russian military to ship fuel.

We now know, via a report by CNN, that the drones used in the bridge attack were developed over the past 18 months by the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU). Named the ‘Sea Baby’, the new USV was developed by the SSU inside Ukraine without the involvement of commercial technology vendors. Piloted remotely, the Sea Baby can reportedly carry a payload of up to 850 kilograms, although the full specifications have not been disclosed.

More is known about the Security Service’s Magura V5, a smaller, sleeker 5.5 metre-long USV. The sea drone has an operational range of 800 kilometres (500 miles), a burst speed of 42 kmph and is able to carry a payload of up to 300 kg (700lb). Reports of the Magura V5’s specifications vary. It has also been reported by CNN that the Security Service has developed a faster drone with a maximum speed of 80 kph (50 mph).

So, it comes as no surprise that Russian has sought to score a quick victory over Ukraine’s sea drones, as a message that any tactical advantage earned over its military can be easily neutralised. We will only know for sure if this is the case, if Ukraine’s sea drone attacks on Russian maritime targets come to a complete halt.

(Source: Armada)

20 Aug 23. Netherlands, Denmark commit to delivering F-16s to Ukraine. The Netherlands and Denmark will supply F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine with first deliveries due around New Year, the prime ministers of the two NATO countries announced on Sunday during visits by Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy.

The pledge is the first real promise of F-16’s for Ukraine’s armed forces and comes a few days after the United States approved the possible delivery of the fighter jets by the two countries.

Zelenskiy called the decision a “breakthrough agreement” and said the planes would help strengthen Ukraine’s air defences and help its counter-offensive against Russia’s 2022 invasion.

Denmark will deliver 19 jets in total, with the first six due to be shipped to Ukraine around New Year, followed by eight in 2024 and five the following year, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said.

“We know that your freedom is our freedom. We also know that you need more” weapons, Frederiksen said during a joint press conference with Zelenskiy in the Skrydstrup airbase in Denmark.

“This is why we are announcing that we are donating 19 F-16 fighter jets,” she said.

The Netherlands has 42 F-16s available in all but has yet to decide whether all of them will be donated, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said earlier on Sunday, when Zelenskiy visited the country.

The Netherlands and Denmark have led a months-long push to train Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16’s and to ultimately deliver the jets to help counter the air superiority of Russia, whose forces invaded Ukraine in February 2022. (Source: Reuters)

17 Aug 23. BAE says $5.5bn Ball Corp deal will help it meet Ukraine-led defence demand.

Britain’s BAE Systems (BAES.L) said its $5.5bn purchase of Ball Corp’s (BALL.N) aerospace business would help it meet the soaring demand for munitions seen since the invasion of Ukraine, underscoring the impact the war has had on the sector.

Russia’s invasion of its neighbour has led to a surge in demand for weapons, with European governments ordering less-sophisticated items such as shoulder-fired missiles, artillery, and drones that have proven critical in the conflict.

BAE, which produces everything from infantry fighting vehicles to missiles and launchers, said earlier this month that global uncertainty had driven its military equipment orders to a record level.

Colorado-based Ball Corp’s aerospace assets provide aerospace and national defence hardware such as sensors and antennas, and also supply electronics that are used to make munitions, BAE U.S. CEO Tom Arseneault said.

Elaborating on the rationale for the deal, seen by analysts as expensive, BAE CEO Charles Woodburn told reporters that the ongoing conflict in Europe had highlighted the significance of space assets for situational awareness and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

“The reappraisement of the threat environment, not just in the European theatre but also in Asia Pacific, is certainly causing our (government) customers to put defence … further up their priority sets,” he said.

“We see space as becoming an increasingly important domain of future warfare. This acquisition really accelerates our position into one of the fastest growing areas of defence spending,” he added.

Shares in BAE have surged 60% in value since Russia sent troops into Ukraine on Feb. 24 last year.

The deal announced on Thursday, is the company’s largest to date and could mark the beginning of a consolidation in the defence sector as companies seek out strategic fits to meet changing requirements due to the war, with demand for cheaper items such as drones on the rise.

Both Ukraine and Russia have attacked each other using drones in the conflict, with the U.S.-based Atlantic Council think tank describing the aerial strikes as “the world’s first drone war.”

The focus on high-volume, less costly weapons underscores how the war in Ukraine has reshaped strategic thinking in European capitals about how future conflicts could be fought. ($1 = 0.7824 pounds) (Source: Reuters)

17 Aug 23. Challenger 2 tanks have been seen for the first time on the Ukraine battlefield along with Leopard 2s and Bradleys. Forces.com said that, more than a dozen Challenger 2 tanks, which the UK donated to Kyiv, are waiting to play their part. Instructors from the Royal Tank Regiment oversaw the training of Ukrainian tank crews – teaching the soldiers who would soon be fighting for real on the frontline. Senior gunnery instructor Staff Sergeant Richard Johnson said: “The reality of the situation in Ukraine really struck a chord with all the instructors because we knew they were going back to fight that war.”

17 Aug 23. Offensive tactics and leadership rise to top of Kyiv’s training wish list. Minutes after tank muzzles flashed and the crack of guns rang out across muddy grounds, the head of the EU’s Special Training Command explained how Ukraine is seeking more training on offensive tactics and the education of military leaders.

Eighteen months after Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Kyiv’s requests have changed from an initial need for training on defensive tactics and how to fight in urban areas, Lieutenant General Andreas Marlow told reporters on a visit to a training ground in Germany on Thursday.

“The training of sergeants and officers is what moves the Ukrainians most because the professional soldiers have been fighting this war for one and a half years now, and many have died or been wounded – so they need a fresh supply of military leaders,” he said.

Marlow was speaking at the Klietz training ground, situated about 100 km (62 miles) west of Berlin, minutes after Ukrainian troops had fired 105mm rounds with the Leopard 1 tanks they had been trained to operate over the past five weeks.

Muzzle flashes could be seen even before the cracks of the shots were heard, and dust clouds rose where the shells hit their wooden targets on a shooting range marked by the tracks of the tanks that rumbled back and forth through the mud.

As part of the EU military mission EUMAM, Western troops have trained some 6,200 Ukrainians in Germany this year, in a wide range of skills stretching from operating advanced air-defence systems such as IRIS-T to driving and firing modern tanks such as the Leopard 2, produced by German arms maker KMW.

In January, Western nations pledged to send to Ukraine several dozen modern Leopard 2 tanks, a scarce asset in most armies today.

Scrambling to find more heavy armour for Kyiv, they later also turned to the industry’s mothballed Leopard 1 tanks.

The Leopard 1 has been around since the 1960s, but the embattled nation will receive a more advanced version that was standard at the end of the 1980s.

It still makes sense to deliver the tank to Kyiv despite its age, said Marlow who trained on the Leopard 1 himself in 1982, when he joined Germany’s Bundeswehr.

“You know that the Russians cannot use their latest models any longer, either, as they have higher losses than the Ukrainians,” he said, adding the Leopard 1 had an edge over Russian tanks, such as the T-72, the T-64 and the T-55 due to its night vision, the way its main gun was stabilised and its mobility.

The Ukrainian troops training in Klietz are already the fifth rotation since Germany and Denmark announced they would pay the industry to refurbish at least 100 Leopard 1 tanks, some of which had been mothballed for 20 years, to send them to Kyiv.

Citing reasons of operational security, Marlow declined to give a number for the Ukrainian tank crews trained and tanks delivered so far.

However, he said that the training of the next Ukrainian Leopard 1 crews would start as soon as the current round of training wraps up next week.

Ukrainian troops arrived in Germany with very different levels of experience, he said, ranging from absolute beginners to skilled tank crews, who with their Soviet-era T-80 and T-64 models, had already been deployed to the frontline, including the Bakhmut area.

One Ukrainian soldier who was set to be sent to the frontline on his return to his war-torn home country said he would have preferred the modern Leopard 2 but did not really mind.

Wearing dark ballistic glasses and a scarf pulled up over his face to hide his identity as he spoke to the media, he played down questions as to whether he was scared.

“We are strongly motivated to defend our fatherland, and this is the best remedy for fear,” he said. (Source: Reuters)

17 Aug 23. US approves sending F-16s to Ukraine from Denmark and Netherlands. The United States has approved sending F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine from Denmark and the Netherlands to defend against Russian invaders as soon as pilot training is completed, a U.S. official said on Thursday.

Ukraine has actively sought the U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets to help it counter Russian air superiority.

Washington gave Denmark and the Netherlands official assurances that the United States will expedite approval of transfer requests for F-16s to go to Ukraine when the pilots are trained, the official said.

“We welcome Washington’s decision to pave the way for sending F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine,” Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra said on messaging platform X, formerly known as Twitter.

“Now, we will further discuss the subject with our European partners.”

Denmark also said providing Ukraine with the jets would now be discussed.

“The government has said several times that a donation is a natural next step after training. We are discussing it with close allies, and I expect we will soon be able to be more concrete about that,” Danish defence minister Jakob Ellemann-Jensen told news agency Ritzau on Friday.

A coalition of 11 countries was due to start training Ukrainian pilots to fly the F-16 fighter jets this month in Denmark. Denmark’s acting Defense Minister Troels Poulsen said in July that the country hoped to see “results” from the training in early 2024.

NATO members Denmark and the Netherlands have been leading international efforts to train pilots as well as support staff, maintain aircraft and ultimately enable Ukraine to obtain F-16s for use in its war with Russia.

Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte in May said the Netherlands was seriously considering providing Ukraine with F-16’s, as it is currently phasing out the fighter jets from its own armed forces.

According to figures from the Dutch defence ministry the Netherlands currently has 24 operational F-16’s which will be phased out by mid-2024. Another 18 of the jets are currently available for sale, of which 12 have been provisionally sold.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken sent letters to his Danish and Dutch counterparts assuring them that the requests would be approved, the U.S. official said.

“I am writing to express the United States’ full support for both the transfer of F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine and for the training of Ukrainian pilots by qualified F-16 instructors,” Blinken said in a letter to the two officials, a copy of which was seen by Reuters.

Blinken said, “It remains critical that Ukraine is able to defend itself against ongoing Russian aggression and violation of its sovereignty.”

He said the approval of the requests would allow Ukraine to take “full advantage of its new capabilities as soon as the first set of pilots complete their training.”

U.S. President Joe Biden endorsed training programs for Ukrainian pilots on F-16s in May. In addition to training in Denmark, a training center was to be set up in Romania.

Kyiv will not be able to operate U.S.-built F-16 fighter jets this coming autumn and winter, Ukraine air force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat told Ukrainian television late on Wednesday.

U.S. officials have privately said that F-16 jets would have been of little help to Ukraine in its current counteroffensive and will not be a game changer when they eventually arrive given Russian air defense systems and contested skies over Ukraine. The F-16 is made by Lockheed Martin (LMT.N). (Source: Reuters)

17 Aug 23. President Putin has shown he is not serious about any peace in Ukraine that respects international law: UK statement at the Security Council. Statement by Deputy Political Coordinator Tom Phipps at the UN Security Council meeting on Ukraine.

Let me begin by thanking High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing today.

President, last week, Russian missiles targeted hotels in Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhia. As people nearby rushed to rescue the wounded from the rubble, further missiles hit both locations – a ‘double tap’ strike timed deliberately to kill first responders.

On Sunday, a baby just 22 days old, her 12-year-old brother and their parents were among seven people killed by Russian shells in Kherson.

On Tuesday, a Russian missile ripped through a playground in Lviv.

This is how Russia’s leaders conduct their war of choice. And it is why we are proud to support Ukraine as it defends itself in line with international law and the UN charter.

Colleagues, the UK wants peace. Ukraine wants peace, indeed the whole world wants peace.

But President Putin has shown he is not serious about any peace that respects international law.

While Ukraine and international partners from all over the globe discussed last week the importance of a just and sustainable peace, underpinned by the UN charter, Russia continued to drop bombs on Ukrainian ports and grain silos, targeting the world’s food supply.

Russia now claims it is under assault from the West, but it was President Putin who chose to invade Ukraine last February, despite calls from within this Council to withdraw Russian troops from Ukraine’s borders.

It was Putin who ordered hundreds of thousands of Russian troops to their deaths on the soil of another country, to which they should never have been sent. It is his choices which have diminished Russia’s standing in the world and destroyed the trust of Russia’s neighbours. It is President Putin who is hurting Russia.

President, Russian authorities estimate up to a million people left the country in 2022. Many have spoken of their concerns about the war and its impact, others have fled to avoid being conscripted to fight.

Those who have stayed face dire consequences for speaking out.

And it is telling that our Russian colleagues can only rely on fringe journalists to defend the war in this Chamber.

Let me be clear. An unstable Russia is in none of our interests and we have the highest respect for the Russian people.

President Putin can end the suffering of the Ukrainian people, and of Russia’s own soldiers, tomorrow by withdrawing all Russian forces from within Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory.

But, until then, we will continue to help Ukraine defend itself. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

17 Aug 23. £90m boost to Ukraine’s air defence capability as new contracts signed. It comes as delivery begins of a new package of drones to Ukraine, funded by the UK-administered International Fund for Ukraine.

Three contracts to deliver air defence equipment to Ukraine worth more than £90m have been signed by the Ministry of Defence on behalf of the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU).

These include a £56 million counter-uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) contract with Norwegian defence company Kongsberg and two further contracts to provide further air defence capabilities.

The contract with Kongsberg will purchase vehicle-mounted counter-drone systems to detect, track, destroy or disrupt UAS.

The CORTEX Typhon system is designed to be operated by as few as two users, and can be rapidly deployed and repositioned to maximise its operational effectiveness.

The system can operate individually, or as part of an integrated network, and will use a complex suite of sensors, cameras, radars, and electronic surveillance equipment to allow it to physically destroy or disrupt drones.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said: “These air defence systems have the capability and flexibility to be rapidly deployed to either protect Ukraine’s civilian population and infrastructure, or be put to use on the frontline.

The International Fund for Ukraine highlights the unity and resolve of our Allies to work together to provide Ukraine with cutting-edge equipment to meet its capability requirements.”

Awarded by the MOD’s procurement arm, Defence Equipment & Support, these contracts are part of procurement packages announced by IFU defence ministers earlier this year to supply air defence capabilities, drones, radars, and electronic warfare systems to Ukraine.

The contracts come as a new delivery of aerial reconnaissance drones arrives in Ukraine, designed to carry out both land and sea-based reconnaissance missions.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine have already begun training on the systems, which will form a package of more than 100 drones.

The uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) delivery comprises multiple types of drone for different roles – including target acquisition, electronic warfare, guiding artillery, and night operations.

The IFU uses financial contributions from international partners to procure priority military assistance for Ukraine. This will ensure the continued supply of military support – lethal and non-lethal – to Ukraine through 2023 and beyond.

More than £770m has been raised through the IFU following contributions from the UK, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland and Lithuania.

The UK remains fully committed to supporting Ukraine, with £2.3bn already earmarked for further military support through 2023, with additional munitions and equipment to be delivered in the coming months. Further UK government assistance continues in the form of humanitarian support and economic aid. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

18 Aug 23. Ukrainian drone attack strikes central Moscow. A Ukrainian drone has smashed into a building in central Moscow after air defences shot it down, disrupting air traffic at all civilian airports in the capital, Russian officials said.

The drone reportedly fell on a non-residential building in Moscow’s Expo Center complex in the early hours of Friday morning. The site consists of exhibition pavilions and multi-purpose halls, around three miles from the Kremlin.

“At about 4 am Moscow time, the Kyiv regime launched another terrorist attack using an unmanned aerial vehicle on objects located in Moscow and the Moscow region,” the Russian defence ministry said.

There were no casualties in the incident, according to the defence ministry and Sergei Sobyanin, Moscow’s mayor.

Drone strikes deep inside Russia have increased in recent months, since a drone was destroyed over the Kremlin in early May.

Civilian areas of the capital were also hit later in May and a Moscow business district was targeted twice in three days earlier this month.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

17 Aug 23. Ukraine tells military-age citizens to ‘overcome their fear’ in recruitment campaign. Ukraine’s defence ministry urged military-age citizens to update their data at army enlistment offices and “overcome their fear” in a campaign launched on Thursday as a summer counter-offensive grinds through its third month.

The campaign, which draws on slickly-produced videos and photo testimonials of prominent soldiers describing their fears, aims to break down a major obstacle in army recruitment, Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Maliar said.

“We’re all living people and we all overcome this fear in order to win,” she said, noting that military-age citizens are duty-bound to keep their personal data at draft offices up-to-date.

The campaign comes with Ukraine likely facing tougher challenges in recruiting as the war with Russia, now in an brutally attritional phase, nears the 18-month mark.

As she outlined the campaign, Maliar was careful to say that not all those who updated their personal data would automatically be mobilised into the army and that not all those who are mobilised would end up in a combat zone.

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy announced a general mobilization after Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion and military reservists between the ages of 18 and 60 are eligible for conscription.

“Bravery conquers fear,” ran one of the campaign’s slogans. “Everyone has fears in a war. I do too,” a Ukrainian soldier who fought in Bakhmut was quoted as saying.

Maliar also pledged to stamp out corruption from the recruiting process.

“Trust between citizens and (recruiting centres) is important,” Maliar added in comments carried by an official military platform. “Right now we’re taking a step toward establishing this trust.”

The military has been hit by scandals involving graft or heavy-handed recruitment tactics.

Zelenskiy signed a decree on Thursday, formalising a decision taken last week to fire all the heads of regional recruitment offices after a nationwide investigation turned up scores of cases involving corruption and abuse.

“This system should be run by people who know exactly what war is and why cynicism and bribery during war is treason,” he said.

The moves come as Ukraine is trying to make headway in a counteroffensive to retake occupied territory that has been hampered by minefields and Russian defences in the southeast

(Source: Reuters)

17 Aug 23. Training for the Mission: Ukrainians Learn to Operate the Leopard 1 A5. Every tank is different: if you can drive a T-72 or another Soviet-designed main battle tank, you can’t operate a Leopard 1 by a long shot. Ukrainian soldiers are therefore being trained on the Leopard 1 as part of the EU training mission EUMAM UAEuropean Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine. A challenge for the professionals of the armed forces base.

“The Leopard 1 A5 is much more manoeuvrable than our T-72,” notes the Ukrainian military driver. In addition, it is easier to handle because of its controls, and also faster, although the two main battle tanks date from the same era. The soldier brings a lot of experience from his association and is battle-hardened. This is one of the reasons why his superiors sent him to Germany for training.

He is currently learning to drive the Leopard 1 A5 along with almost a dozen other comrades. In February, the federal government approved the export of 178 main battle tanks of this type. They should train Ukraine to lead its offensive successfully. The men take part in a two-week course at a training facility in the armed forces base.

Much experience

“It’s not about acquiring a service driver’s license in the sense the Bundeswehr defines it,” explains Sergeant Frank M., one of the trainers. “The Ukrainian comrades will be able to safely move and handle the ‘Leo’ in the field. Basic driver training, so to speak.” The participants later learn tactical use and interaction with other weapon systems in conjunction with the other crew members at a military training area in eastern Germany.

The experienced Bundeswehr trainers also teach the Ukrainians many tricks and tips for handling battle tanks. After all, the Leopard 1 main battle tank was used by the army’s armored forces for around 40 years, most recently in the 1A5 version. To this day, this type of vehicle is used for training, since equipment such as the Panzer 2 “Standard” recovery vehicle, and the Dachs armored engineer vehicle, are based on the chassis of the Leopard 1.

Master challenges

A stroke of luck for Ukraine, which will receive more Leopards, including those from other countries. Not much had to be prepared for the “courses” themselves. A greater challenge was the replacement of dummy pipes, “because we no longer had to train MKF military drivers for battle tanks,” explains the deputy department head, Captain Daniel F. So, these were already decommissioned together with the vehicle type. But even this hurdle was taken with a lot of commitment and some improvisation.

Cooperation with the six translators runs just as smoothly. These are not trained forces, but volunteers from associations of the armed forces base with Russian or Ukrainian roots. First Petty Officer Alexander C., a soldier in the logistics squad, compares the differences between the two languages with those between German and Dutch. “The technical and specialist terms were much more difficult,” he says. In the meantime, trainers, course participants and interpreters have become a well-rehearsed team that also works through the weekends and public holidays.

The trainers use a model to explain how to use the controls. They were appropriately labeled for the Ukrainian soldiers in both German and Ukrainian.

The Ukrainian soldiers thank their trainers with great interest and are eager to learn. They recognize the value of the measures for themselves, their association, for the mission and ultimately for their country. The stream of Ukrainian course participants is far from over. Ukrainians are regularly sent to the training center, where they are also trained to drive the Panzerhaubitze 2000 and the MARS medium artillery rocket launcher with the most modern teaching tools. Simulators are available at the site for the vehicle types, which help streamline training time and content.

“Some soldiers from Ukraine have no driving experience, let alone a licence,” states one of the trainers. The Ukrainian Armed Forces require their tank drivers to have a “tractor license”. The more experienced soldiers help their comrades. They all cram the training material after work.

The essentials

Soon the Ukrainians will have to use their newly acquired skills in combat. An oppressive idea for everyone on site, but also a great motivation. However, it was recently possible, for example, to enable family reunification for a course participant.

His wife and children had found refuge in Germany and learned that the father of the family was in Germany for training. After many months, they were able to see each other again for a few hours. “Now I know exactly why I have to learn and fight here: My children should grow up in freedom!” says the father. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Bundeswehr)

17 Aug 23. The recent Jeddah conference on Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace plan was an attempt to build international support for a negotiated end to the devastating Ukraine conflict. The proposal stipulates the complete withdrawal of Russian forces and the restoration of Kyiv’s control over its sovereign territory. The next big step would be a summit of world leaders to endorse Kyiv’s resolution formula and increase pressure on Moscow to end the war. This new approach by Ukraine and its western allies could suffer the same doomed fate as the other peace proposals by Brazil, China and South Africa. However, the presence of delegations from China — Russia’s largest strategic partner and one of its key export markets — as well as India, a major importer of Russian crude oil, seemed to indicate that a global consensus was finally emerging around the principles necessary for a resolution in the conflict. China’s presence in particular was arguably a sign that Vladimir Putin’s most important ally wanted him to start making the necessary concessions to end the war. It is more likely, though, that Beijing is shoring up its own role in any future negotiation. Pressurising Russia to change its course on the war is a dangerous game: if Putin has to compromise and his grip on power weakens, China could lose a strategic partner. Furthermore, any settlement over Ukraine risks loosening Moscow’s economic and diplomatic reliance on Beijing. Betting on a Chinese change of heart seems unwise.

The bigger question is whether Russia, which did not participate in the Jeddah talks, will make concessions. Despite official silence from the Kremlin, the US appears to be in informal discussions with Moscow. While it is possible that the Russian president may contemplate compromises, his plans to double defence expenditures in 2023 and to increase the maximum conscription age suggest otherwise. The key challenge lies in differing notions of what “meaningful concessions” might look like. For the Kremlin, accepting Zelenskyy’s peace plan would be seen as an unconditional surrender — even though Russia has not been occupied by foreign troops, nor is it being asked to demilitarise and surrender any of its original territory. The restoration of Ukraine’s full territorial integrity and the protection of its people are rightly seen by Kyiv as vital for both moral and pragmatic reasons. Yet for Russia, the total or partial loss of the currently occupied territories — and especially of Crimea — is considered intolerable. This is because what began as a war of choice, under the pretext that Ukraine belonged to the “Russian world”, has now become an existential fight not only for Putin but also for Russia itself. The Kremlin used Nato’s enlargement eastward to justify its invasion, even though there were no concrete plans to grant Ukraine Nato membership; this has backfired. For Russia, Ukraine’s western-armed military forces now represent a real threat. Ukrainian forces have shown their effectiveness on the battlefield, despite the difficulties, and Moscow is clearly concerned that they may advance deeper into Russian occupied territory, and potentially dislodge its forces from Crimea. Furthermore, Nato is planning to have 300,000 troops at high readiness to deploy to its eastern flank if necessary. As a result, Moscow no longer describes Ukrainian territories controlled since 2022 as belonging to the “Russian world” (after all, Russia has bombed the area); they are seen as buffers against Ukraine and Nato. The Kremlin is increasingly coming to terms with the fact that Ukraine will neither be “de-Nazified” (there will be no pro-Russian “puppet” government in Kyiv) nor “demilitarised”, nor will it remain neutral. It is now clear to Moscow that Ukraine will probably become part of the EU and anchored to Euro-Atlantic security structures. For Russia, accepting these new realities is a significant concession. Moscow’s priorities appear to be safeguarding itself against Ukrainian and Nato forces, retaining some of the land it currently occupies in Ukraine (especially Crimea and possibly in the Donbas) and ensuring Putin saves face after a compromise is found. Yet, accepting Russia’s conditions — that it keeps part, if not all, of the seized territories, in exchange for an end to the war and its tacit acceptance of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic alignment — is highly risky. Not only would this undermine Kyiv, it would justify Russia’s aggression and might even encourage new assaults, for instance by China in the Indo-Pacific. There is no guarantee that Russia will not regroup its forces after a ceasefire agreement is reached, putting Ukraine under renewed threat. A negotiated outcome, therefore, remains elusive. As the belligerents test their strength on the battlefield, their positions remain far apart. This could change, however, if neither side gains the military advantage and a cold winter stalemate sets in. (Source: FT.com)

17 Aug 23. Ukraine says it has no hope of using F-16 fighter jets this year. Ukraine will not be able to operate U.S.-built F-16 fighter jets this coming autumn and winter, air force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat told Ukrainian television late on Wednesday.

“It’s already obvious we won’t be able to defend Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets during this autumn and winter,” Ihnat told a joint telethon broadcast by Ukrainian channels.

Ukraine has repeatedly called its Western allies to supply the country with F-16s, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said would be a signal that Russia’s invasion would end in defeat.

U.S. President Joe Biden endorsed training programmes for Ukrainian pilots on F-16s in May but no timing for the supply of war planes has been given so far.

“We had big hopes for this plane, that it will become part of air defence, able to protect us from Russia’s missiles and drones terrorism,” Ihnat said.

The West says it wants to help Ukraine defeat Russia but has repeatedly insisted it does not want to trigger a direct confrontation between the U.S.-backed NATO military alliance and Moscow. (Source: Reuters)

17 Aug 23. Russia hunts Ukraine’s western missile stocks British Storm Shadows and French Scalps have helped Kyiv in its counteroffensive, but more are needed Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, writes ‘Glory to Ukraine’ on a Scalp cruise missile provided by France that is mounted on a Ukrainian bomber © Zelenskyy/Telegram Military briefing: Russia hunts Ukraine’s western missile stocks on twitter (opens in a new window) Military briefing: Russia hunts Ukraine’s western missile stocks on facebook (opens in a new window) Military briefing: Russia hunts Ukraine’s western missile stocks on linkedin (opens in a new window) Share Save current progress 34% Roman Olearchyk in Kyiv 3 HOURS AGO 34 Print this page Stay across the latest Ukraine coverage.Join the FT’s Telegram channel Russia’s increased attacks on targets deep within Ukraine appear to have one goal above all: destroying Kyiv’s ability to launch the long-range missiles it is receiving from western allies. Moscow launched dozens of missiles this week far into western Ukraine, targeting air bases, air strips and a pilot training facility that are up to 1,000km from the front line.

Ukrainian officials said 28 cruise missiles were fired on Tuesday alone, 16 of which were intercepted. The strikes are seen by Kyiv and its allies as part of a weeks-long effort to shatter Ukraine’s runways and the fleet of bombers used to fire British Storm Shadow and French Scalp missiles, according to people familiar with the matter. To avoid being hit, Ukraine is now racing to move around crucial weaponry and its skilled personnel, officials said. Ukrainian pilots are constantly shuttling around dozens of domestic air bases and commercial airports. “It’s no surprise that they are trying to destroy our aviation and pilots,” said Colonel Yuriy Ignat, spokesperson for Ukraine’s air force. “Our pilots are bothering them . . . [and] causing a lot of trouble.” The long reach of these western missiles has played a significant role in helping Ukraine make some modest advances against Russian positions. Ukraine on Wednesday said its forces had liberated the village of Urozhayne in southern Donetsk region. “The French Scalps and British Storm Shadows provided to us have actually played a decisive role,” said Valeriy Kondratiuk, former head of Ukraine’s military and foreign intelligence agencies. Russia had no other way to stop those strikes than “to hit the airfields where the planes from which these missiles are launched are located”. The UK was the first to supply its Storm Shadow missiles, followed by France’s Scalps — and officials say both are making a difference in combat. The US and Germany remain more wary of sending long-range missiles to Ukraine, fearing the missiles risk escalating the conflict, particularly as they can be used to strike targets within Russia. Ukraine says its pilots only fire western missiles within its borders to strike Russian arsenals, command posts and logistics points in occupied territories, including bridges. In the first months of the war, Ukraine had to rely on a swiftly depleting Soviet arsenal of surface-to-air missiles, including S300s and Buks, which prevented Russia from establishing air superiority. This has forced the Russian military to fire its missiles from Russia and the Crimean peninsula. (Source: FT.com)

16 Aug 23. Ukraine modifies British Challenger 2 tanks to protect them from Russian drones. British Challenger 2 tanks have been modified by Ukrainian forces with cages welded on top to fend off drone strikes.

Images of the tanks, which have been circulated in Ukraine, show them inscribed with new tactical markings, which suggests that they are prepared to join a new counter-offensive thrust.

The new mesh screens are likely to defend against drones deployed by Russia to drop munitions from above, as well as some small “kamikaze” drones.

It is thought that the tanks, 14 of which were given to Ukraine by the UK earlier this year, were deployed in the area around Robotyne, in the Zaporizhzhia region, to be operated by the 82nd Air Assault Brigade, Ukraine’s new elite airborne force.

It is the first time the 82nd brigade has entered the battlefield, suggesting new Western-armed and trained troops are forming a new push on what has become a relatively static frontline.

Russian sources linked to the military said the images of the tanks showed that they were being deployed to break the stalemate on the southern front. The Telegram channel Rybar, well-connected with the Russian military, said: “The published picture… indirectly confirms that the Ukrainian command is preparing to use earlier reserve formations for a strike in the Orikhiv direction.” Another pro-Russian blogger suggested that Ukraine’s counter-offensive could lose momentum without reserves of other brigades. Ukraine’s counter-offensive started in June but has slowed, facing stiff resistance from well-embedded Russian defences. The Challenger 2 tanks, the first Western tanks to be pledged to Ukraine, are designed to withstand direct hits from Russian T-72 tanks, have a firing range of 3km and can reach speeds of 59km per hour. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

16 Aug 23. Slovakia’s First Two Out of 16 Zuzana 2 SPHs – Jointly Funded by Denmark, Norway and Germany – Have Now Been Handed Over to Ukraine. Today at the Zuzana 2 Handover Ceremony in Dubnica nad Váhom, the first two out of 16 Zuzana 2 self-propelled howitzers (SPHs), manufactured by state-owned joint stock company KONŠTRUKTA – Defence, have been handed over to Ukraine under a contract worth approximately €92m. All of the 16 Zuzana 2 SPHs – jointly funded by the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany – are expected to have been delivered to Ukraine by the end of 2024.

In attendance at the handover ceremony, alongside Prime Minister Ľudovít Ódor, were Defence Minister Martin Sklenár, the ambassadors of Denmark, Norway, Germany and Ukraine, State Secretary of the Slovak Ministry of Defence Marian Majer, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs Peter Mišík, and representatives of the subcontractors.

At a press conference after the handover ceremony, Defence Minister Martin Sklenár said: “This project is a joint effort of four countries that have joined forces and resources to help Ukraine defend itself against Russiaʼs senseless aggression. This is a clear demonstration of our will and commitment to support Ukraine as long as it takes. In addition to the priority goal of helping our neighbour under attack from the aggressor, the order for 16 howitzers, worth some €92m, represents a significant financial stimulus for the Slovak defence industry and is good news for the SVK employment and economy. I want to say a huge thank you to everyone who has contributed to the success of this initiative. I believe our cooperation is a good example, which Ukraine, Slovakia and our allies can build on into the future.”

Prime Minister Ľudovít Ódor said: “Today is the result of great international cooperation which proves that in Slovakia we can make modern and reliable equipment that meets the strictest international standards. This is also evidenced by cooperation between KONŠTRUKTA – Defence and Ukrainian company KZVV, which should result in a prototype of a new howitzer. While the Slovak side will bring its know-how to this project, the Ukrainian side will provide its extensive production capacity.”

As Director General of DMD Group Štefan Škultéty explained, KONŠTRUKTA – Defence is reflecting on the lessons that can be learned from the use of the Zuzana 2 SPHs on the battlefield in Ukraine. These have already been factored in to the production of the 16 howitzers on order from the company. “They primarily concern greater fire accuracy, enhanced crew protection, and upgraded howitzer fire control software,” Director General of KONŠTRUKTA – Defence Alexander Gurský added.

Separately, Ukraine signed a commercial sale contract with Slovakia in June 2022 for a battery of eight Zuzana 2s, all of which have been delivered. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Slovak Republic Ministry of Defence)

16 Aug 23. Technologies are playing a prominent role on Ukraine’s battlefields as the country continues to defend its homeland — and European destiny — against Russia’s war of aggression. Civilian and military technologies are being tested and used in new ways. Drones inform troops about the frontier, AI labels targets, and facial recognition systems identify fallen Russian soldiers. Some corporate leaders can hardly hide their excitement about the war as an opportunity. In the months leading up to the invasion, analysts imagined the first full blown cyber war, given Russia’s record of wreaking havoc against Ukraine with NotPetya in 2017. That ransomware, launched by Russia, targeted government departments, media organisations and power companies, causing global damage of over $10bn. The worst fears of such a cyber war have certainly not materialised. Ukraine has proven resilient, and the role of technology is not what was anticipated. Today, we see technologies integrated with battlefield methods. This is a hybrid conflict, in which the lines between civilian and military uses of technologies are blurred. Drones are used in massive numbers for reconnaissance flights as well as to deliver explosives. Their use is so substantial that Ukraine reportedly loses around 10,000 of them a month. Among some business leaders there is a perverse sense of enthusiasm for testing out new products. Alex Karp claims his company, Palantir, is making a decisive difference in favour of Ukraine, for example through their AI that supports identifying targets. Since shaking hands with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in June 2022, the company has opened an office in Kyiv. Karp has said: “the power of advanced algorithmic warfare systems is now so great that it equates to having tactical nuclear weapons against an adversary with only conventional ones.” (So far the fear of conventional nuclear weapons is still having a more tangible effect.) Former Google chief Eric Schmidt took a trip to Ukraine, where he met staff in President Zelenskyy’s office and the country’s defence minister.

He scoped out future investment opportunities and is now supporting a local start-up incubator for military technologies. Schmidt spoke of the first “networked war” and praised Elon Musk for providing satellite internet connections through his company Starlink to the Kyiv government. US military leaders are less enthusiastic about the developing dependence on commercial tech firms. They worry about Elon Musk’s dominance in satellite internet constellations. Musk denied a request by the Ukrainian military to turn on Starlink near Crimea, for example, and promoted a so-called “peace plan” that might as well have been written by Russian president Vladimir Putin himself. Still, Ukraine’s digital minister Mykhailo Fedorov emphasised: “Starlink is indeed the blood of our entire communication infrastructure now.” The controversial AI company Clearview is facing fines for violating privacy rules in Europe, but proved keen to offer its technologies to hundreds of Ukrainian officials. They use it, for example, to identify Russian soldiers who have been killed, or those still alive and committing war crimes or looting. The free use of its systems in Ukraine is aimed, no doubt, not only at supporting Ukraine but also at polishing Clearview’s embattled reputation. William LaPlante, US under-secretary of defence for acquisition and sustainment, poured some cold water on all this, tempering the hype from tech CEOs talking up the role their products might play in deciding the outcome of the war. He warned that fighting is not done by Silicon Valley “even though they’re gonna to try to take credit for it.” Still, Ukrainian officials hope that the influx of the west’s technology companies will have a lasting positive impact on the country. Nursing the objective that one day they might develop a Silicon Valley of their own, the government is banking on being hub for all kinds of innovative technologies that can be developed from the military technologies they need to defend the country now. Fedorov has compared what could be achieved in Ukraine to the “Israeli model” of high-tech business growth. He has presided over the digitisation of government services ranging from permit applications to citizen services and IDs. But for a start-up nation to flourish, the country first needs to successfully stave off Russian invaders so that its people can focus on starting companies instead of fighting in the trenches to defend their country against artillery and bombs. (Source: FT.com)

15 Aug 23. Thirteenth Swedish Aid Package to Ukraine Focusing on Ammunition and Spare Parts. The government has decided on a new support package for Ukraine. The support includes ammunition and spare parts for several of the materiel systems that Sweden donated to Ukraine, including Combat Vehicle 90 and Combat Vehicle 122. With the support, Sweden also donates transport vehicles, emergency supplies and mine clearance equipment. At the same time, the government receives an authorization to decide on the sale of Rb 99 missiles (AMRAAM) to the USA, which will then be donated to Ukraine. The total value of this thirteenth support package amounts to approximately SEK 3.4bn.

Spare parts and emergency supplies

Among other things, Ukraine has requested spare parts for the Combat Vehicles 90 and Combat Vehicles 122 that Sweden donated to the country. The government is now responding to that need and is donating spare parts and emergency supplies that can be spared for a limited time to a value of no more than SEK 1.1bn.

Ammunition, mine clearance equipment and transport vehicles

In the thirteenth support package, Sweden also donates ammunition with ammunition components, transport vehicles and demining equipment that can be spared for a limited time to a value of SEK 2.15bn.

Sale of Rb 99

The Riksdag also authorizes the government to sell missiles of the type Rb 99 (AMRAAM) to the USA in 2023. The US will in turn donate these missiles to Ukraine and offer Sweden to buy a more modern version of AMRAAM.

The total value of this thirteenth support package amounts to approximately SEK 3.4bn ($314m–Ed.).

The support package also includes compensation to the Swedish Armed Forces for, for example, transport and security protection costs. Sweden comes after this support package has been decided to have contributed roughly SEK 20bn in military support to Ukraine, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Swedish Ministry of Defense;)

15 Aug 23. Fundraiser Launched in Ukraine for 10,000 Kamikaze Drones. The Come Back Alive Competent Army Assistance Fund, the UNITED24 fundraising platform and monobank co-launched the Operation Unity fundraising project to purchase 10,000 kamikaze drones for Ukraine’s Defense Forces.

“This war is a technology fight. Starlinks, naval drones, situational awareness systems, unmanned aerial vehicles — all this has an impact on the battlefield. The importance of user-friendly and inexpensive kamikaze drones cannot be overstated. So we’re excited to announce a fundraiser that underpins the importance of coming together for a cause. Operation Unity is a good example of a joint initiative of major fundraising actors for a common goal. We are sure that dozens of Ukrainian companies and hundreds of thousands of donors from all over the world will join us,”

said Mykhailo Fedorov, Deputy Prime Minister for Innovation, Development of Education, Science, and Technology of Ukraine, Minister for Digital Transformation of Ukraine.

As noted, FPV drones worth UAH 178m (USD 4.7m) will be purchased abroad before being additionally equipped in Ukraine with combat parts worth a total of UAH 57m (USD 1.5m).

The Come Back Alive platform will deal with the purchase of kamikaze drones, as well as their transfer to the military units.

“Operation Unity is our response to one of the most frequent requests that we see from our military today – attack drones. Together with the UNITED24 fundraising platform and monobank, not only will we purchase 10,000 FPV drones – all of them will have a warhead – thermobaric and cumulative fragmentation munitions. Such kamikaze drones proved effective on the battlefield, destroying dozens of enemy armored vehicles and burning out hundreds of invaders from their fortifications,” said Taras Chmut, CEO Come Back Alive.

In addition, the organizers of the project will draw special prizes among those who will contribute to the purchase. Among prizes will be a battle flag raised in the recently liberated village of Pyatykhatky, Zaporizhzhya region, a meeting with UNITED24 ambassadors, and 100 platinum monobank cards, five of which have UAH 100,000 (USD 2,700) in the account.

As reported, the UNITED24 project was founded on the initiative of President Volodymyr Zelensky in May 2022. Today, UNITED24 is the main platform for donations to support the country at war. The funds are deposited into the accounts of the National Bank of Ukraine and directed by relevant ministries to cover the nation’s key needs. (Source: UAS VISION/Ukrinform)

14 Aug 23. Pentagon Announces $200m in Security Assistance for Ukraine.

The Defense Department announced an additional security assistance package valued at up to $200m to help Ukraine counter Russia’s ongoing war of aggression. The package includes critical munitions for U.S.-provided Patriot air defense systems and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, among other items.

The items are being provisioned as part of the $6.2bn in presidential drawdown authority restored in June following a reevaluation of the total value of items already committed to Ukraine.

The latest round of assistance marks the 44th drawdown of equipment from DOD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.

The package underscores the United States’ continued commitment to providing Ukraine with the capabilities it needs to defend its territory.

“Russia started this war and could end it at any time by withdrawing its forces from Ukraine and stopping its brutal attacks,” Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said today in a statement. “Until it does, the United States and our allies and partners will stand united with Ukraine for as long as it takes.”

The Biden administration has committed more than $43bn in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s invasion in February 2022.

That assistance has included more than 2,000 Stinger anti-aircraft systems, more than 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems, and more than 2 million 155mm artillery rounds, among other items.

The assistance has been provisioned through drawdowns of existing U.S. stocks and through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, the authority under which the U.S. procures capabilities from industry and partners.

In response to the effort to assist Ukraine, the U.S. has ramped up production of key artillery rounds used most by Ukraine in support of its counteroffensive operations and in defending its territory against the invading Russian forces.

Douglas R. Bush, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology, said last week that the U.S. is currently producing new artillery rounds at a rate of 24,000 per month and is on track to produce in excess of 80,000 rounds per month over the following year.

He said the DOD remains committed to arming Ukraine as the country defends itself against Russia’s unprovoked invasion while at the same time maintaining U.S. military readiness.

“The U.S. Army is committed to and will succeed at maintaining our stocks sufficient for training and readiness of the U.S. Army, while also supporting our ally, Ukraine, with what they need, working as part of an international team to make sure that happens,” Bush said.

He added that, throughout the war, U.S. equipment has remained highly effective in combat.

“That’s the result of decades of work by thousands of people to make sure our equipment is tested well and also that our industry partners produce it, critically, at a high level of quality,” Bush said. “Lots of countries can produce. The United States produces the best in terms of quality. I think we are seeing that, and I think that speaks well of our industry partners.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

14 Aug 23. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s forty-fourth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. It includes additional air defense munitions, artillery and tank ammunition, anti-armor weapons, and other equipment to help Ukraine counter Russia’s ongoing war of aggression.

The capabilities in this package, valued at up to $200m, include:

Additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems;
Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
Mine clearing equipment and systems;
155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
120mm tank ammunition;
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
Javelin and other anti-armor systems and rockets;
37 tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment;
58 water trailers;
Over 12 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades;
Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing; and
Spare parts, maintenance, and other field equipment.

This security assistance package will utilize assistance previously authorized under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) for Ukraine that remained after the PDA revaluation process concluded in June.

The United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with capabilities to meet its immediate battlefield needs and longer-term security assistance requirements. (Source: U.S. DoD)

14 Aug 23. Rheinmetall to deliver Luna drone system to Ukraine by year end. Germany’s Rheinmetall (RHMG.DE) will deliver a Luna New Generation drone system to Ukraine by the year end, Bild am Sonntag reported on Sunday, citing company sources.

Ukraine is desperate to boost its weapons arsenal, from drones and munitions to tanks, as it battles to repel Russia’s invasion.

The “Drones Package” consists of a ground control station with several drones, a launch catapult and military trucks, Bild said, adding the drone system could be used as a reconnaissance system, provide an LTE network and intercept or jam communications.

The company was not immediately available for comment. (Source: Reuters)

12 Aug 23. Ukraine military reports progress in south. Ukrainian military officials said on Saturday that Kyiv’s forces had made progress in the south, capturing unspecified territories and claiming partial success near the key village of Robotyne.

“Tavria direction,” General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, commander of Ukrainian forces in the south, wrote on Telegram, referring to the southern front. “There are liberated territories. The defence forces are working.”

He did not specify where or when the advances were made. Separately, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said they had “partial success in the Robotyne area of the Zaporizhzhia region.” Reuters could not immediately verify the battlefield report.

The general staff said children were among dead or wounded civilians following a day in which Russians launched six rockets and 36 air strikes and fired 32 rocket salvo fire systems at populated areas and Ukrainian troop positions. It said 33 combat clashes had taken place and noted that Ukraine’s defence forces continued an offensive operation in Melitopol and Berdyansk directions. (Source: Reuters)

11 Aug 23. Estonia donates handguns in recent Baltic support for Ukraine.

The Estonian handgun package is the latest in a series of additional military aid to Ukraine from the Baltic region.

a proposal by its Minister of Defence Hanno Pevkur to send handguns and ammunition to Ukraine.

Estonia’s pledge is the latest in a series supplied by Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – as the Ukrainian Armed Forces pursue their counter-offensive against invading Russian forces dug-in across the south and east of Ukraine.

“We must support Ukraine in their fight against the continuing Russian aggression. Once again, we have found an opportunity where Estonia can lend a helping hand,” said Pevkur. “The Russian Federation cannot gain anything from this aggression. Therefore, all who support Ukraine must both speed up the provision of military aid as well as increase the capacity of their defence industry.”

Estonia’s previous military aid has included Javelin anti-tank systems, howitzers, artillery ammunition, anti-tank mines, anti-tank grenade launchers, mortars, vehicles, communications equipment, military field hospitals, medical supplies, personal protective equipment, and food packages.

Similarly, Lithuania and Latvia supplied missile launch systems this week and in May respectively.

Limited military capability of the Baltic states

The Baltic states are limited in their contributions to the Nato military alliance; their relatively small economies do not have the capacity to meet the new demands of defence alone.

As it stands, Estonia has provided Ukraine with military aid in the value of over €400m ($438.1m), which amounts to more than 1% of the gross domestic product.

Only recently has Lithuania expressed intent to acquire main battle tanks for the first time; the Leopard 2 was chosen largely because of its interoperability with its western European neighbours that operate the Leopard.

Likewise, despite GlobalData forecasting the Latvian government’s defence budget to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 2.4% over the next decade, these figures will grow from $900m to just shy of $1bn between 2022-2027.

Balancing capability with innovation

The limited capability of the Baltic states in no way negates what these states have to offer. In fact, these states have provided more than just tanks and ammunition.

Discussing the rise of small business startups in the wider tech industry, Laurynas Mačiulis, the CEO for an optical space-to-ground communications company based in Lithuania called Astrolight, told Army Technology that “with more and more commercial infrastructure and technology that is being used for war… It’s important to have support from venture capital [and] from business angels to support these initiatives.”

A lot of these technologies are Baltic-conceived ideas that have proven critical to Ukraine’s war effort.

“I don’t think it’s necessarily our disadvantage that the defence industry is less mature [in the Baltic]. It might even be an advantage because we see that military warfare technology is really changing with what we witnessed in the war in Ukraine, with drones, with more and more commercial infrastructure and technology that is being used for war,” Mačiulis stated. (Source: army-technology.com)

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