NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jul 21.

BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces are continuing to launch counter-offensive operations along Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks, making limited but steady advances over the last 24-48 hours. Russian sources acknowledged today (21 July) that Ukrainian forces have advanced near the village of Yahidne, a mile (1.6km) north-west of Bakhmut. Together with Klishchiivka, seven miles (11km) to the south, Yahidne is where Ukrainian forces have been pressing hardest in recent weeks, likely as part of an effort to ‘semi-encircle’ Russian forces that have dug in within Bakhmut town. Heavy fighting is set to continue as Ukrainian forces make slow progress, with the battle for Klishchiivka likely to be a key engagement in the coming days and weeks.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 21 July, a Russian miblogger claimed that Russian forces continued to make advances along the Kupiansk-Lyman line. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have dislodged Ukrainians near a village close to the Molchanovo railway station, situated 13 miles (21 km) northwest of Kupiansk, along the Kupiansk-Lyman axis. While this remains unconfirmed, Ukrainian officials continue to report that their forces are successfully repelling Russian attacks on this front. Geolocated footage from 20 July nevertheless indicates that Russian forces advanced along the N26 highway, connecting Kupiansk to Svatove, just south of Novoselivske, which is situated 11 miles (18km) northwest of Svatove.
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces are likely continuing to make limited gains along the southern axis, but Russian counter-attacks and fixed defences continue to slow the rate of advance. Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces have made marginal advances north-east of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast), eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv. Further east, along the Vremevsky salient (Donetsk oblast), heavy fighting continues, but despite limited Ukrainian advances, Russian forces likely retain control over Staromaiorske, six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka.
STRIKES: On 21 July, Russia launched a fourth consecutive night of strikes against Odesa since its withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). Two Kalibr cruise missiles reportedly struck warehouses at an agricultural company. According to the head of the Odesa Regional Military Administration, Oleh Kiper, the missiles destroyed 100 tons of peas and 20 tons of barley, adding to the 60 thousand tons of grain claimed destroyed on 19 July. Russian strikes will continue targeting grain and port infrastructure in Odesa to undermine Ukraine’s ability to export grain through the Black Sea (see FORECAST below for further analysis). Overnight from 20 to 21 July, Russian strikes targeted ten oblasts, including Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Sumy oblasts.
STRIKES: On 20 July, Odesa regional Governor Oleh Kiper reported that Russia’s 20 July strikes damaged a building belonging to the Chinese consulate in Odesa. While the strike underscores the increasing risk of collateral damage, it is unlikely to alter the relations between Beijing and Moscow, especially given that the damage was minor.
STRIKES: The secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, Oleksiy Danilov, stated on 21 July that Ukraine’s defence industries are speeding up the production of air defence systems to protect port infrastructure. Danilov’s comments come after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pledged on 19 July to reinforce the protection of port infrastructure against Russian strikes. In the meantime, Ukrainian authorities will likely have to divert air defence capabilities from elsewhere, given that Russian forces are clearly prioritising attacks against Odesa.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

SANCTIONS: On 20 July, the UK announced sanctions on 13 individuals and companies associated with the operations of the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and Sudan. The announcement follows Yevgeny Prigozhin’s confirmation that Wagner personnel would withdraw from operations in Ukraine and deploy to Africa. Further sanctions will almost certainly be applied over the coming months as Wagner pivots back to operations in Africa. These sanctions will likely elevate compliance challenges for businesses operating in Mali, CAR and Sudan, particularly in extractive industries. This threat will likely spread to new jurisdictions over the coming months as Wagner ramps up its efforts to expand to new markets in Africa. Separately, the US announced a range of sanctions designed to further undermine Russia’s war effort. Notably, a number of Kyrgyz-based entities were sanctioned for exporting electronics and other technology (including the supply of sensitive dual-use goods) to Russia since February 2022. The sanctions are a further sign of Bishkek’s growing exposure to US secondary sanctions (see Sibylline Special Report – 6 July 2023).
SANCTIONS: On 20 July, the UK announced that it was removing sanctions against Russian-born businessman Oleg Tinkov. It represents the first significant de-listing of a sanctioned individual since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Tinkov has been notably critical of the war in Ukraine and renounced his Russian citizenship in protest in 2022. Whereas other businessmen have drawn on technicalities in their efforts to have sanctions removed, Tinkov based his case on his opposition to Moscow’s war effort, and received the support of the most prominent exiled Russian businessman, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, to repeal the sanctions. There is a realistic possibility that Tinkov’s case will set a precedent, whereby the appeals of sanctioned individuals that forcefully criticise the invasion of Ukraine will be given greater consideration by Western governments.
WAGNER GROUP: UK Defence Intelligence reported on 21 July that the last remaining contracts of convict-recruits that fought for Wagner Group are due to expire in the coming days. While many convicts will leave after receiving their promised pardons, many are expected to sign new contracts with Wagner, and possibly move to Belarus where Wagner are regrouping ahead of future deployments to Africa. The ‘Project K’ prison recruitment programme provided Wagner with at least 40,000 conscripts during the battle for Bakhmut, but resulted in extremely high casualties. Russian sources citing a senior Wagner commander on 19 July reported that of the 78,000 Wagner personnel fighting in Ukraine, 49,000 were convicts.
WAGNER GROUP: According to the commander, Wagner had suffered some 20,000 killed in action and 40,000 wounded in action by the time Bakhmut had fallen on 20 May. If accurate, this would put the Wagner casualty rate at 79.5%, and a 28.2% death rate – an extremely high and unsustainable figure. The commander also stated that of the 25,000 Wagner fighters still alive, 10,000 are now in Belarus and 15,000 are ‘resting’, likely in Russia. Those remaining 15,000 are likely either to be integrated into the Russian armed forces or redeploy to Belarus. The Polish Ministry of Defence confirmed on 21 July that it had ordered the redeployment of troops to the eastern Belarusian border in response to ongoing Wagner exercises in western Belarus. However, as previously assessed, it remains highly unlikely that Wagner’s deployment will pose a direct security threat to NATO member states, though border ‘provocations’ remain a realistic possibility.
AID: On 21 July, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby stated that Ukraine would receive F-16 fighter jets before the end of 2023, but notably added that Washington DC does not believe these deliveries will alter the situation on the battlefield. Kirby’s comments refer to the European coalition that plans to supply Ukraine with the US-made jets; they do not refer to possible US deliveries. Washington DC continues to withhold the supply of its own F-16s. Kirby stressed that the US continues to regard ammunition, air defence, armour (tanks) and most importantly, artillery, as the critical supplies that Ukraine needs in order to make gains in its counter-offensive.
AID: the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell presented a proposal to EU foreign ministers on 20 July to earmark EUR 20 billion in military aid for Ukraine over the next four years. The plan would involve a EUR 5 billion tranche per year linked to the newly created programme under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which was created in 2021. The aid would be part of ongoing Western efforts since the NATO summit in Vilnius to provide longer-term security assurances to Ukraine. Detailed talks on the aid are set to take place in August where EU governments will also discuss a separate EU Commission proposal to provide EUR 50 billion over the same four-year period. It is possible the talks will protract, with Hungary, in particular, likely to stifle progress on military aid to Ukraine.
CONSCRIPTION: On 21 July, Russian lawmakers confirmed that a planned increase in the conscription age will not take place, likely reflecting enduring need for manpower in the absence of further rounds of mobilisation. Moscow had planned to increase the minimum conscription age from the current 18-27 to 21-30, but this has now been scrapped. The Russian government is highly likely to continue crypto-mobilisation efforts in a bid to generate personnel for the war effort, while avoiding a politically dangerous second round of mobilisation.
INFIGHTING: On 21 July it emerged that former Federal Security Service (FSB) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officer, Igor Strelkov (Girkin), has been detained by Russian authorities. Strelkov is a prominent ultranationalist, pro-war commentator and convicted war criminal who has remained highly critical of the way the war has been prosecuted. He has previously published criticisms of not only the Ministry of Defence (MoD), but crucially President Vladimir Putin. He has also remained a staunch opponent of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. Strelkov’s wife alleges that he was arrested under Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (extremism). While we cannot confirm this, reports indicate that a member of Wagner Group allegedly requested Strelkov’s arrest. Given Strelkov is one of the highest profile critics of the MoD, with over 875,000 followers on Telegram, it remains highly likely that Strelkov’s arrest forms part of a wider ongoing purge of dissenters across Russia following the Wagner mutiny. His arrest will highly likely encourage further self-censorship amid the ongoing purge, with critical pro-war voices being silenced.

FORECAST

BLACK SEA: On 20 July, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence announced that as of 0000hrs 21 July Kyiv will consider all vessels heading to Russia or Russian-controlled Black Sea ports as potential military transport vessels. The Ukrainian announcement mirrors that made by the Russian MoD and confirms the remilitarisation of large sections of the Black Sea, increasing the risk of civilian vessels being caught up in above or below surface fighting, or deliberately targeted. The director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reiterated concerns on 20 July that Russia is considering false-flag operations that blame attacks on commercial shipping on Ukraine or mines.

Russia’s MoD confirmed on 21 July that the Black Sea Fleet has undertaken a live fire exercise in the north-west Black Sea, which is highly likely aimed at demonstrating Russian capability and will to enforce its threats. Both sides are highly likely to attempt to unilaterally close large stretches of the Black Sea to navigation during exercises, or under the guise of ‘protecting’ civilian operations. The Kremlin has already designated unspecified areas of the north-western and south-eastern parts of international wars ‘temporarily dangerous for passage’.

While tensions continue to rise, and both sides seek to illustrate capability and will to enforce threats, Russia’s upcoming Navy Day celebrations on 30 July are highly likely to be a key trigger for further escalations in the Black Sea. Ukrainian forces are likely to attempt to target the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol with drones, with high-profile attacks against the Kerch Strait Bridge or other key assets also a realistic possibility. If Ukraine conducts a highly successful attack, Russian forces will be increasingly likely to retaliate asymmetrically, with not only long-range cruise missile and drone attacks, but also possibly attacks against civilian vessels it deems ‘military transports’.

The timing of Russia’s moves are clearly intended to maximise their impact on global food security, given the peak Ukrainian harvest season runs between July and August. Numerous countries around the world will begin stockpiling grain for the winter in the coming months, and prolonged disruption to agricultural exports is likely to have a profound impact on numerous food insecure jurisdictions – particularly in the Middle East. The continual Russian attacks on Ukrainian grain and port infrastructure will inevitably cause significant delays and limit export capacity even if the deal is restored in the coming weeks, indicating a determination on the part of Russia to ramp up pressure on the West to extract concessions.

*Europe: Russian espionage operations continue to pose elevated security risk to European defence sector. On 18 July, the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) and Microsoft attributed a campaign targeting the defence sector in Eastern Europe and Ukraine to the Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) group, ‘Turla’. The campaign is distributed via phishing emails containing a malicious document and uses a novel backdoor (‘DeliveryCheck’) that can install secondary malware in multi-stage attacks. Additional malware (‘Kazuar’) is also installed during the infection process that steals application configuration files, event logs and web browser data. According to CERT-UA, the goal of the attacks was to exfiltrate messages from the messaging application Signal to access sensitive conversations, documents and images, likely to aid Russian military efforts in Ukraine. The discovery of this campaign follows Ukrainian Cyber Police dismantling a bot farm run by over 100 people, which was allegedly used to spread Russian propaganda that justified the invasion, leak Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Ukrainian citizens and run fraud schemes. The developments underscore the ongoing efforts by Ukrainian entities to combat Russian cyber activity, and Russian cyber threat actors to engage in disruptive and espionage operations to aid the Kremlin as the war continues.

Jul 20.

BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces continue to make slow but steady progress around Bakhmut’s flanks, though Russian counter-attacks and superiority in artillery and air assets continue to slow the rate of advance. Russian sources acknowledged on 20 July that over the last 24 hours Ukrainian forces have taken further elevated positions to the immediate west of Klishchiivka, four miles (6km) south-west of Bakhmut. If accurate, which remains likely, Ukrainian forces will likely move forward into the western outskirts of the settlement in the coming days, though Russian forces continue to deploy additional reserves, including VDV airborne units, to the defence of the front.
BAKHMUT: On 20 July, commander of Ukrainian ground forces Oleksandr Syrsky claimed that Ukrainian forces have ‘semi-encircled’ Russian forces in Bakhmut – though this is slightly premature given the frontline has straightened out in recent weeks. He also claimed that Ukraine will be able to re-take Bakhmut with ten times as fewer losses as those incurred by the Russians when they seized the town in May. Nevertheless, Syrsky also acknowledged that Russian forces still retain an advantage in artillery, air assets and other equipment, which are slowing the rate of Ukraine’s advances. In a separate update, a representative of the Ukrainian National Guard stated that Russia’s ‘scorched earth’ policy, which resulted in the almost total destruction of buildings and fortified positions in the town, is now to the detriment of the defending Russians. This will provide increased opportunities for Ukrainian artillery, which now enjoy fire control over large portions of the town, to degrade Russian fixed defensive positions.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 19 July, former Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast Serhiy Haidai claimed that Russian offensives in the direction of Bilohorivka, situated seven miles (12km) west of Kreminna, are likely part of a broader effort to establish a defensive line around Lysychansk. While Haidai nevertheless reported that the frontline along the Svatove-Kreminna sector has stabilised, fighting continues at various points of the line. Russian sources claimed Russian forces made advances near Karmazynivka, seven miles (12 km) south-west of Svatove, though this remains unconfirmed.
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian counter-offensive operations continued on trend over the past 48 hours, with limited advances made around the administrative line between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. On 19 July, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces gained control of unspecified areas near Velyka Novosilka-Staromaiorske. This was supported by a statement made by the Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valeriy Shershen that Ukrainian forces conducted significant assaults in the vicinity and that Russian forces were losing control around Staromaiorske. In western Zaporizhzhia oblast, Shershen claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced 0.6 miles (1km) in an unspecified location in the direction of Melitopol, underlining the continued slow progress that the Ukrainian counter-offensive is achieving on the southern front.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s Air Force reported that on the night of 19-20 July, Russian forces launched a large-scale strike campaign, focusing on port and grain infrastructure in Odesa oblast. The attack included 19 missiles – including seven Onyx, four Kh-22 and three Kalibr cruise missiles, as well as five Iskander-K ballistic missiles – and 19 Iranian-made Shahed 136/131 drones. Ukrainian defences reportedly intercepted two Kalibr, three Iskander-K missiles, and 13 drones, representing a lower rate of interception than attacks against Kyiv, for example. Odesa and Mykolaiv were the main targets of the strikes.
STRIKES: Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), Odesa has been targeted for the third consecutive day in what is highly likely an attempt to undermine Ukraine’s ability to export grain through the Black Sea. Following the strike on 19 July, Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that the strikes hit grain and oil terminals as well as tanks and loading equipment in the port of Chornomorsk, situated twenty miles (32km) southeast of Odesa. Russian officials also claimed that Russian forces struck the Kanatovo military air base situated in Kirovohrad oblast. On 19 July, Ukrainian Minster of Agriculture Mykola Solskyi claimed that 60 thousand tons of grain were destroyed as a result of the strikes. Ukraine’s port infrastructure, particularly grain and oil terminals, and military facilities will remain a priority target for Moscow’s strikes.
STRIKES: On 19 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pledged to reinforce port air defences. However, this would mean that Ukrainian forces would have to divert air defence systems from elsewhere, which in turn would stretch out Ukraine’s limited air defence capabilities. Russia’s attacks are highly likely aimed at overwhelming Ukrainian defences in the south, and the lower interception rate reflects the success of this strategy. However, it remains unclear how long Russian forces can maintain the current tempo of cruise missile strikes given the likely ever-dwindling stockpiles of missiles.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

WAGNER GROUP: On 19 July, footage emerged of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin addressing Wagner forces in Belarus in effectively his first public appearance since the mutiny. The ceremony clearly indicates that Prigozhin is still in control of the private military company (PMC), though the founder of Wagner Group, Dmitry Utkin, was also seemingly in attendance – an extremely rare public appearance. Prigozhin described events in Ukraine as ‘a shame’, in which Wagner does not take part. However, he did state that Wagner may return to Ukraine when he has assurances that Wagner forces will not have to ‘shame’ themselves; most likely meaning if Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and/or Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov are no longer in charge of the war effort. However, this remains unlikely in the short to medium term.
WAGNER GROUP: Prigozhin stated that Wagner forces will remain in Belarus ‘for some time’, likely undertaking training of the Belarusian army and security forces. Following the Wagner meeting, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced on 20 July that its forces will conduct joint training with Wagner along the Polish border, though no further details have been provided. While Wagner’s deployments will likely raise tensions with Poland and Lithuania along the border, it remains highly unlikely that a major escalation will occur as a result of Wagner’s presence.
WAGNER GROUP: After regrouping in Belarus, Prigozhin stated that Wagner forces will then go to Africa – seemingly confirming our initial assessment that the bulk of Wagner forces would go to Belarus before returning to their principal area of operations and commercial interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, Prigozhin’s status and role in Africa remain unclear, and it is uncertain whether Prigozhin will relocate to the region after a period of exile in Belarus. These latest developments strongly indicate that the Kremlin wishes to retain Wagner Group as a coherent PMC that will continue operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, but likely with a much more open affiliation and co-ordination with the Russian government than before the mutiny.
NUCLEAR: On 19 July, Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) once again accused Russia of preparing a false-flag incident at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The GUR claim to have received reports that Russian forces are planning to stage a false-flag ‘assault’ against the ZNPP in late July, which will be blamed on ‘volunteer armed units of Ukraine’. False-flag operations at the ZNPP remain a realistic possibility under certain conditions, with the principal triggers being: a Ukrainian breakthrough along the southern sector; a genuine Ukrainian attempt to seize the plant; or major ill-discipline, desertions or a wider Russian military collapse. While it should be noted that the GUR have accused Russia of preparing imminent false-flag operations many times, most of which never materialise, the above triggers remain credible scenarios for a limited escalation at the plant during the ongoing counter-offensive. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a genuine nuclear disaster at the plant remains very low. For in-depth analysis and scenarios for a nuclear incident at the ZNPP, including the health implications and comparisons to the Chernobyl and Fukushima incidents, please see the Sibylline Special Report – Ukraine – 19 July 2023.
GRAIN: On 19 July, five EU member states called on Brussels to extend restrictions on Ukrainian grain imports beyond mid-September due to concerns that Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) will renew pressure on their domestic agricultural sectors. The request was made by Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, all of which imposed restrictions on the import of Ukrainian foodstuffs in April as an influx of Ukrainian grain imports led to downward pressure on prices and complaints from domestic farmers. In May, the unilateral bans were dropped following a deal with Brussels that Ukrainian grain could only enter the countries if transiting to other countries. The Polish government, which faces a general election in November and counts farmers as among its supporters, has been particularly insistent that Brussels agrees to extend the restrictions, stating that Warsaw will impose unilateral measures if the EU does not. This is likely to limit Ukraine’s options to increase grain shipments via existing overland routes, which is in turn likely increase pressure on global food prices.
GRAIN: Ukraine’s Ambassador to Turkey Vasyl Bodnar stated earlier on 19 July that Kyiv is considering an alternative grain corridor that traverses the waters of NATO member states Bulgaria and Romania. While few details were given, this almost certainly refers to the two countries’ territorial coastal waters, rather than Ukrainian or international waters. Bodnar noted that the main challenge to this alternative route was Russia’s warning (see FORECAST) that all vessels destined for Ukrainian ports would be considered as potential military targets. However, Russia’s threat almost certainly extends only to Ukrainian and international waters. Russia is highly unlikely to attack vessels within Bulgarian or Romanian (NATO) waters, given that would be a serious step towards Article 5. The potential extension of restrictions on Ukrainian grain imports via EU overland routes will possibly add pressure on Bulgaria and Romania to agree to this option, though this will ultimately depend on the assurances they are offered by fellow NATO members.

FORECAST

BLACK SEA: On 19 July, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed that all ships travelling to Ukrainian Black Sea ports will be recognised as ‘potential carriers of military cargo’. The statement, confirmed by the Kremlin, represents the most serious escalation in the Black Sea following Moscow’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) on 17 July. On 20 July, Moscow also confirmed that Russian personnel have left the Joint Co-ordinating Centre in Istanbul, which had overseen the implementation of the BSGI.

These developments, together with the intensification of strikes against Ukrainian port infrastructure, seemingly confirm that Moscow has no intention of re-entering the deal in the short term. Russian President Vladimir Putin nevertheless stated on 19 July that Russia would return to the grain deal only when its conditions had been met – namely reconnecting agricultural export banks to SWIFT. However, if the West agrees to this concession, it will effectively vindicate Russia’s threats to gain key concessions. Even if an agreement is reached to restart the deal, which is currently unlikely, it remains highly likely that Russia seeks to prolong uncertainty in order to strengthen its hand and destabilise global food markets, which could delay any deal being signed. There is also a realistic possibility that Moscow will announce plans to distribute large quantities of grain to developing countries via alternative routes for free, in a bid to further undermine the BSGI and Ukraine’s exports.

On 19 July, US National Security Council spokesperson Adam Hodge cited declassified intelligence that Russia is considering attacking civilian vessels in the Black Sea and blaming Ukraine. Russian forces have highly likely laid additional sea mines in waters approaching Ukrainian ports, increasing passive security threats for civilian vessels operating in the region. However, the risk of false-flag or even open attacks against civilian vessels has increased notably following the MoD’s statement, with unmanned drones also providing Russian forces plausibly deniable options which Moscow could blame on Ukraine.

Ultimately, the combination of the threats to target civilian vessels and strikes against Odesa oblast is highly likely intended to illustrate that the deal requires Russian support to continue, and to deter the UN and Turkey from attempting to proceed without Moscow’s involvement. As previously assessed, when Russia previously backed out of the deal in October 2022, Turkey and the UN effectively called Russia’s bluff, which forced an embarrassing Russian U-turn in November. Moscow is clearly adamant not to allow this to happen again and had likely taken the decision to fully withdraw from the deal weeks ago. In any case, Russia may not need to follow through with its threats to target civilian vessels heading to Ukrainian ports. The threats in and of themselves are highly likely to seriously compromise any ability to insure vessels in the Black Sea, which could effectively nullify the possibility of Ukrainian grain exports in the short to medium term.

Europe: Protectionist measures risk by EU states will increase after Russia’s withdrawal from BSGI. On 19 July, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia requested the EU to extend trade restrictions on Ukrainian grain imports to alleviate concerns over a possible influx following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). Poland urged the EU to extend the ban beyond the initial 15 September deadline to the end of 2023. The requests follow complaints from concerned European farmers that an influx of Ukrainian grain imports caused a downward pressure on prices, which disrupted their local markets (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 18 April 2023). Should the EU decide not to extend the ban, the five aforementioned member states will likely impose unilateral measures from 15 September to mitigate farmers’ backlash and avoid a grain surplus. The five countries also pledged to aid Ukraine with the transit of grain shipments through their countries to other destinations, therefore reducing supply chain and price volatility risks. However, there remains a moderate risk that the EU will impose fines on governments if such restrictions violate the bloc’s trade policy.

Russia-Ukraine: Designation of civilian vessels as military targets will increase threat of attacks. On 19 July, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that, following Russia’s withdrawal from the BSGI, it will consider any civilian vessels travelling to Ukrainian Black Sea ports as potential military cargo carriers, and therefore military targets. The MoD added that the flag countries of such vessels will be considered co-belligerents with Ukraine, underlining the increasing threat of a re-militarisation of the grain corridor. Moscow’s warnings underline the heightened risk of false-flag operations or open attacks against civilian vessels along the grain corridor. In addition to posing security and operational risks for maritime cargo carriers, the withdrawal of Moscow’s security guarantees will increase insurance premiums and deter maritime insurers from providing cover for merchant vessels in the Black Sea. Despite ongoing negotiations, the MoD’s statement indicates that Russia is unlikely return to the BSGI deal in the short term, driving global food security risks.

Azerbaijan: Crackdown on opposition parties reflects worsening democratic standards. On 19 July, the Ministry of Justice rejected half of the list of members of the opposition Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (APFP). The APFP will have 30 days to propose a new list; failure to do so will likely block its registration as a political party. On 17 July, the Republican Alternative party was denied registration for the same reason, underscoring the government’s efforts to crack down on opposition parties amid elevated repressive measures. In January, President Ilham Aliyev and the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) passed legislation raising requirements on political party registration, such as having a minimum of 5,000 registered members. Fifteen parties consequently dissolved. Such obstacles reflect the country’s worsening democratic standards under Aliyev’s rule, aimed at further reducing political pluralism.

Jul 19.

BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces have continued to make marginal advances along Bakhmut’s flanks over the past 24 hours. Earlier this week, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, Hanna Maliar, claimed that Ukrainian forces now control almost all the elevated heights around the town. This is providing Ukraine with fire control over key areas across the sector. Nevertheless, Russian forces continue to launch counter-attacks and to commit additional reserves to the axis, while their offensive operations to the north aim to alleviate pressure on units defending Bakhmut. Earlier on 19 July, the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that its forces successfully pushed Russian forces from positions to the north-east of the village of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, located around seven miles (12km) north-west of Bakhmut. While this remains unconfirmed, Ukrainian forces continue to increase pressure on Russian positions along the M-03 (E-40) highway that runs north-west of Bakhmut.
DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 18 July indicates that Russian forces have made limited progress west of Marinka (Donetsk oblast). Additional footage indicates that Russian forces have made advances around the Trudovska mine east of Marinka and south of the village of Krasnohorivka, located around 11 miles (18km) south-west of Donetsk International Airport (DOK). Given the intensity of Russian operations in this sector, the capture of Marinka clearly remains a priority for Moscow, though limited resources will render this unlikely in the short term.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 18 July, Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Maliar claimed that Russia’s offensive in the Kupiansk direction remains unsuccessful, even though Russian forces are making slow advances. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 18 July that Russian forces advanced up to 1.2 miles (2km) along the front and 0.9 miles (1.5km) in depth in an unspecified area of the Kupiansk sector. Russian milbloggers reported that ‘Storm-Z’ units took control of Novoselivske, located around 11 miles (18km) north-west of Svatove, though this remains unconfirmed. Despite the reported growing concentration of Russian forces along this front, the tactical gains made in the sector have not yet translated into major operational breakthroughs, and are currently unlikely to do so.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 18 July indicates that Russian forces have made limited advances north-west of Dibrova, located around six miles (9km) south-west of Kreminna. The UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported on 18 July that Russian forces are trying to advance through forests west of Kreminna.
SOUTHERN: Much of the southern axis remains highly contested as Ukrainian forces continue to launch small-scale infantry-dominated assaults, with Russian forces broadly succeeding in repelling or delaying these attempted advances. The Ukrainian General Staff nevertheless reported on 18 July that its forces are making progress south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk). However, Russian sources maintained earlier on 19 July that their forces retain control of the village of Staromaiorske, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka, but that Ukrainian assaults are continuing.
KHERSON: Along the south-western Kherson frontline, fighting continues along the Dnieper River. DI reported earlier on 19 July that fighting has highly likely increased along the lower reaches of the river since the start of July, which is likely presenting Russian forces with a dilemma i.e. whether or not to respond to this growing vulnerability on its western flank by redeploying forces from the Zaporizhzhia front. However, given the clear evidence that has emerged in recent weeks that Russian forces are in significant need of rotation along the Zaporizhzhia front, any redeployments to Kherson would likely weaken Russian defences around one of the focal points of the Ukrainian counter-offensive.
SOUTHERN: Russian state media reported earlier on 19 July that T-14 Armata main battle tanks, Russia’s most advanced tank, are being used by the southern grouping of forces along the frontline. There is currently no independent verification of this reported development. However, until now, the Armata has not been deployed in frontline operations. This suggests that Russia’s industry is possibly incapable of producing the newest generation of tank en mass, or that there are possibly serious problems with the prototypes that are preventing its deployment. • STRIKES: Earlier on 19 July, the head of the Russian occupation authority in Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, reported that a fire broke out at a military facility in the Kirovske district in Crimea, with Telegram sources reporting massive explosions. Following the incident, reports indicated that Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) chief, Kyrylo Budanov, claimed responsibility for the explosion at the military facility, though Kyiv has subsequently denied this. Ukraine generally does not claim responsibility for strikes against Crimea and Russian territory. While such actions reflect Kyiv’s growing ability to carry out operations deep into Russian territory and on the Crimean peninsula, they also raise the risk of Russian retaliatory strikes – as occurred following the Kerch Strait Bridge attack.
STRIKES: Earlier on 19 July, Ukraine’s air force reported that its air defences intercepted 13 Kalibr missiles, one guided Kh-59 cruise missile and 23 Iranian-made Shahed-136/131 drones. Russian forces targeted Odesa oblast with the Iranian-made drones and missiles. This follows an attack involving 20 drones against the region on 18 July, which Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov openly stated was in retaliation for the attack against the Kerch Strait Bridge on 17 July; the timing of the collapse of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) is also highly likely to be a factor in Moscow’s intensification of strikes against Odesa’s port infrastructure. Over the past 24 hours, Russian strikes targeted 14 oblasts, including Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: On 18 July, Ukraine’s need for more ammunition and the training of Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets dominated discussions between Kyiv’s Western allies during the latest Ramstein summit. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin confirmed that individual countries and the EU plan to increase their ammunition production. For example, the EU is likely to approve the so-called Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) imminently; this earmarks EUR 500m (USD 560m) to support EU-based arms manufacturers to increase production. Austin also noted that Denmark and the Netherlands continue to progress with plans to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets. Ensuring that Ukrainian forces have adequate ammunition supplies remains a key challenge for Kyiv’s Western allies, and one which will require long-term planning.
AID: Unnamed US officials also told Reuters on 18 July that Washington DC is likely to announce a new EUR 1.4bn (USD 1.57bn) military aid package for Kyiv in the coming days. According to the sources, the package will include air defences, including Vehicle-Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment (VAMPIRE) ammunition and counter-drone systems, as well as drones like the Phoenix Ghost and Switchblade loitering munitions variants. However, the precise details of the package, which would be the eighth of its kind in the 2023 fiscal year, will possibly be subject to change until an official announcement is made.
GRAIN: On 18 July, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed that the EU will continue to facilitate the access of Ukrainian agricultural products to global markets. In May 2022, the EU established overland shipment ‘solidarity lane’ routes across Europe to support Ukraine’s agricultural exports and to increase global food security. However, exporting via these routes will raise transport costs; this will impact food prices and increase pressure on the EU’s internal market. Notably, five Central and Eastern European countries have banned food imports from Ukraine to protect their agro-industries. However, wider negotiations are taking place following the collapse of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). On 18 July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan discussed alternative routes for grain supplies for African countries. However, alternative routes are unlikely to compensate for the volumes normally exported through the Black Sea under the BSGI. Ultimately, these measures will only moderately mitigate global food security risks if the BSGI does not restart.
DIPLOMACY: Earlier on 19 July, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s office announced that ‘by mutual agreement’ Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the BRICS summit hosted by South Africa in August. The statement follows weeks of speculation as to whether Putin would attend the summit given the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against him. While Moscow is yet to confirm Ramaphosa’s announcement, it appears that the Russian president will be represented by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The statement also comes just a day after publicly released court papers showed that Moscow had warned the South African government that enforcing the ICC arrest warrant against Putin would amount to a ‘declaration of war’. The court papers were revealed as part of a case brought by South Africa’s opposition Democratic Alliance, which sought to force the government to enforce the ICC arrest warrant in the event that Putin attended the summit in person. Nevertheless, diplomatic ties between Moscow and Pretoria are unlikely to be notably affected by Putin’s non-attendance, with President Ramaphosa set to attend a Russia-Africa summit in Russia later in July.

FORECAST

OFFENSIVES: During the latest Ukraine Defence Contact Group ‘Ramstein’ summit on 17 July, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley confirmed that Western partners helped equip 17 combat brigades for Ukraine’s counter-offensive. Milley confirmed that the brigades comprise around 63,000 personnel, of whom the US has trained around 15,000; an unspecified number have reportedly not yet been committed to the counter-offensive. We assess that Kyiv is possibly holding back up to ten brigades in reserve as Ukrainian forces proceed with their current attritional strategy, which is focused on targeting Russian artillery ahead of a concerted push (as and when Russian defences have been sufficiently degraded). Milley reiterated that the counter-offensive ‘will be slow, difficult and […] come at a high price’, with Russian minefields remaining a key obstacle.

However, other indicators point to Ukraine’s inability to conduct complex combined arms and manoeuvre operations at scale, with most Ukrainian attacks seemingly limited to artillery-supported infantry assaults. As yet, there is little evidence of significant Ukrainian mechanised formations being deployed, with attacks showing little co-ordination at higher levels. These are likely needed to generate opportunities for rapid and significant breakthroughs, though the current pattern of slow but steady advances will possibly still provide opportunities for progress. Nevertheless, we maintain that the Ukrainian military does not need to fight to NATO standards; it only needs to be better than Russia’s forces.

However, the overall pattern of Ukrainian counter-offensive operations since June means it remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces will be able to utilise their Western-equipped brigades to their greatest potential, given the extremely complicated command and control (C2), logistics and co-ordination required to conduct combined arms manoeuvre operations. Much will depend on whether the brigades which have not yet been committed are retained as a coherent fighting force for a future push, or whether they will be drip-fed into the lines to maintain the current rate of slow, incremental advances, particularly on the southern axis.

*Nuclear Incident Scenarios at Zaporizhzhia plant.

Key points

Upticks in fighting and rhetoric surrounding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) have increased concerns over the likelihood of a nuclear incident; Russia and Ukraine continue to accuse one another of preparing ‘provocations’ that risk endangering nuclear safety.
However, a major nuclear disaster at the ZNPP remains highly unlikely, even in the event of an accidental or deliberate strike against the reactor. Containment measures and back-up cooling systems will likely mitigate the release of radiation during a meltdown; the design of the plant offers a more robust ‘defence in depth’ system than that of Chernobyl or Fukushima.
As such, the worst-case scenario at the ZNPP would be more akin to the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident (Japan) as opposed to the 1986 Chernobyl disaster (Ukraine). However, the back-up safety features and systems (which operate independently of one another) at the ZNPP make this scenario highly unlikely. Radiation released during a meltdown would most likely impact the surrounding area, rather than spreading hundreds of kilometres across Europe.

Context

Over the last year, Moscow and Kyiv have accused one another of preparing so-called ‘provocations’ at the ZNPP. Ukraine recently accused Russia of mining the plant, including its cooling pond, and setting devices resembling ‘explosives’ on the various roofs of a reactor building. Moscow alleges that Ukrainian forces stationed in Nikopol (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) intend to shell the plant, after which Kyiv will, according to the Kremlin, blame Moscow for creating a ‘man-made disaster’ at the site. Both sides have also accused one another of preparing a radiological ‘dirty bomb’ attack at the plant and elsewhere along the frontline. While we cannot confirm the validity of these claims, Russian false-flag operations are a signature of this war. False-flag threats will remain heightened at the ZNPP going forward, particularly if Ukraine’s counter-offensive builds momentum along the southern frontline in the coming weeks. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed that it has drawn up plans to evacuate the area in the event of an incident, while Ukraine’s interior ministry reported on 29 June that the authorities in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts have launched a large-scale exercise in preparation for a nuclear incident at the ZNPP. These are the latest indications that the situation at the plant continues to deteriorate, with both sides increasing their preparedness to act in the event of an incident.

Russia-Ukraine: Alternative routes are unlikely to compensate for lost export volumes following end of grain deal. On 18 July, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed that the EU will continue to facilitate the access of Ukrainian agricultural products to global markets. In May 2022, the EU established overland shipment ‘solidarity lane’ routes across Europe, to support Ukraine’s agricultural exports and to increase global food security. However, exporting through these routes will raise the cost of transportation, which will impact food prices, and increase pressure on the EU’s internal market. Notably, five Central and Eastern European countries have banned food imports from Ukraine to protect their agroindustry. On 18 July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan discussed alternative routes for grain supply for African countries. However, alternative routes are unlikely to compensate for the volumes exported through the Black Sea under the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). Ultimately, these measures will only moderately mitigate global food security risks if the BSGI does not restart.
Kyrgyzstan-Russia: Growing trade ties with Russia is increasing risk of secondary sanctions. On 18 July, Kyrgyzstan ratified an agreement establishing the Eurasian Reinsurance Company (ERC). The ERC was created by Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states in October 2022 and aims to enhance economic and trade ties within the EAEU as well as with third countries by insuring exports from business and political risks. Ratified by Russia in May, the ERC is likely part of Russia’s efforts to create sanctions evasion opportunities through further economic integration with its economic partners. As a key element in Moscow’s parallel import strategy, Bishkek has seen a sharp increase in exports of dual-use items to Russia. In May, Kazakh customs seized a Kyrgyz shipment of Chinese drones destined for Russia. Subsequently, US officials indicated that economic measures will be taken to deter Bishkek from facilitating Russia’s sanctions evasion. With the ERC acting as an incentive for deepening trade turnover with Russia, Bishkek’s exposure to US secondary sanctions is increasing (see Sibylline Special Report – Global – 6 July 2023).

Jul 18.

Uzbekistan: Crime risks will increase amid socio-economic health issues. On 17 July, Uzbek Supreme Court statistics highlighted the evolution of crime rates between 2019 and the first quarter of 2023. The statistics indicate an overall increase in crime rates in Uzbekistan, with the number of court hearings doubling between 2021 and 2022. Violent crime is also up, with homicides increasing from 376 in 2019 to 422 in 2022. This suggests a reversal in the previous trend, as crime rates steadily declined between 2015 and 2020 (though underreporting was possibly a factor during this period). The increase since 2021 coincides with the country’s economic difficulties following the Covid-19 pandemic, with disruption to labour migration curtailing remittances, a key source of income for Uzbeks. As a result, unemployment remains high, and around five million Uzbeks now live below the poverty line. Despite government efforts to tackle unemployment by attracting foreign investment, reliance on remittances and ongoing corruption will undermine efforts to alleviate poverty in the short term, sustaining growing crime risks.
Russia: Draft law punishing ‘extremist’ propaganda reflects increasing restrictions, repression. Earlier on 18 July, State Duma deputies drafted a law punishing the justification of ‘extremism’ with severe sentences of up to five years in prison. The proposed law is allegedly aimed at protecting children and young people from the influence of extremist ideology. However, it likely forms part of the government’s wider effort to crack down on press freedom and expression. On 17 July, the UN issued a statement expressing concerns over the growing number of arrests for treason and espionage in Russia since its invasion of Ukraine. The official definition of ‘extremism’ is becoming gradually catch-all; the authorities are likely to use increasingly draconian anti-extremism measures to reinforce repressive powers of arbitrary detention as part of their crackdown on anti-war sentiment.
BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces continue to make limited gains around Bakhmut’s flanks, with Russian sources acknowledging that the situation on the southern flank remains particularly difficult. Russian forces have nevertheless launched some limited counter-attacks over the last 24 hours, but they are unlikely to have made any significant ground. Ukraine Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty claimed on 17 July that Russian losses in the Bakhmut area are currently approaching those experienced by Wagner Group at the height of the battle for Bakhmut earlier this year. Cherevaty claims that, as an example, 81 Russians were killed over the previous 24 hours in the area, with a further 156 wounded. We cannot confirm these casualty figures. Nevertheless, Cherevaty placed emphasis on Ukraine’s efforts to conserve manpower in this section of the frontline, reflecting the wider counter-offensive strategy amid Ukraine’s decreasing reserve of available manpower.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 17 July, Ukraine Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty claimed Russia is concentrating forces along the Oskil-Kreminna line. According to Cherevaty, the Russian command has concentrated more than 100,000 personnel, 900 tanks, 555 artillery systems and 370 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). This sector clearly remains a priority for Russian forces as they attempt to alleviate pressure on other sectors further south, in particular Bakhmut.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: The commander of Ukraine’s Land Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, claimed that Russian forces are stepping up offensive operations in the Kupiansk sector. A Russian milblogger claimed on 17 July that Russian forces have advanced up to 1.2 miles (2 km) in the Kupiansk sector, though the Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian offensive in the past 24 hours remained unsuccessful in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed on 17 July that units of the 21st Motorised Rifle Brigade and ‘Storm-Z’ units launched offensives near Karmazunivka and took control of Ukrainian positions northwest of Novovodyane, eight miles (13 km) southeast and nine miles (15 km) southwest of Svatove, respectively. However, this information has yet to be confirmed. On 18 July, another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to push Ukrainian forces back along the Oskil-Kreminna line. Ultimately, Russian forces are likely making tactical gains on this axis, but the overall quality of much of these forces (including convict-heavy Storm-Z units) is unlikely to translate these tactical advances into major operational breakthroughs in the short term.
SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian General Staff claimed on 18 July that over the last 24 hours, their forces have advanced in two key sectors of the southern axis, near Mala Tokmachka (Zaporizhzhia oblast) and Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Ukrainian forces are continuing to increase pressure along the Vremevsky salient (Donetsk oblast). Russian sources reported on 18 July that Ukrainian forces have made limited advances north of Staromaiorske, six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka, with naval marine units taking up positions in houses at the northern edge of the settlement.
STRIKES: On 18 July, Russia launched 36 Iranian-made Shahed-136/131 drones and six Kalibr cruise missiles in retaliation for the Ukrainian drone attack against the Kerch Bridge in Crimea. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that air defence shot down 31 Iranian-made drones, all six Kalibr cruise missiles and one reconnaissance drone. The Kalibr cruise missiles were reportedly destroyed over Odesa Oblast, also targeted by 21 drones. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that the strikes hit fuel storage facilities in Mykolaiv and Odesa. The targeting of Odesa clearly illustrates that Russia is stepping up the intensity of strikes against grain infrastructure to illustrate their withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). See FORECAST below for further analysis.
STRIKES: On 18 July, the head of the Russian occupation authority in Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, claimed that Russian air defences intercepted 28 drones out of the 30 drones launched against the Crimean Peninsula. Ukraine rarely claims responsibility for strikes against Crimea and Russian territory. However, in addition to the strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge, the latest drone strikes reflect Kyiv’s increasing willingness to carry out drone strikes against Crimea.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

STRIKES: Following the 17 July attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin reported that two-way traffic would resume for one lane by 15 September, with two-way traffic in both lanes expected to resume on 1 November. Knusnullin also reported that there was ‘insignificant’ damage to one line on the rail bridge, but that train operations were unaffected. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin condemned the incident as a ‘terrorist attack’ and stated on 17 July that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was preparing proposals for a Russian response to the attack, with an intensive strike campaign remaining likely in the coming days.
STRIKES: The second attack to strike the bridge since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine comes just weeks after the Wagner mutiny exposed deep failings within Russia’s security services. Infighting within the security services over who bears ultimate responsibility for the latest attack is now likely to ensue. While the FSB’s T (counter-terrorism) Directorate has seemingly taken the leading role in protecting the bridge, a wider layered defence involving air, land and sea assets also clearly failed to prevent the attack. Russian Telegram channels indicate that the T Directorate is likely attempting to shift blame for the incident onto the MoD and National Guard (Rosgvardia). President Putin has appeared reluctant to penalise the FSB for its recent security failings, including its apparent failure to foresee and prevent the Wagner mutiny and now the attack on Kerch Strait Bridge. Although the outcome of the latest infighting remains unclear as of writing, it will ultimately continue to undermine Russia’s overall war effort and exposes enduring domestic security capability gaps which Ukraine will continue exploiting.
BELARUS: Satellite imagery and social media footage analysed by CNN and the New York Times appears to confirm that a large convoy of vehicles carrying Wagner Group PMC forces arrived at a military field camp in Belarus on 17 July. Although Wagner forces have been slowly moving to Belarus in recent days, both outlets claim that the convoy is the largest observed movement of Wagner personnel to Belarus since the mutiny in June. The field camp, which is a former military base, is located in the village of Tsel near Asipovichy in Mogilev oblast, approximately 55 miles (90km) southwest of the capital, Minsk. It is possible that Wagner forces will now redeploy to Belarus in greater numbers, though this remains unclear. We continue to assess that Wagner forces stationed in the country are unlikely to launch a ground invasion on Ukraine’s northeastern flank, or seriously destabilise the Polish and Lithuanian border in the short term (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 17 July 2023).
Ukraine Army armoured vehicle losses are estimated at 8x Leopard 2, inclsuing 4x mine clearers, no M1A! Abrams, no Challenger 2, 4x AMX 10 and 35 Bradley APCs.

FORECAST

GRAIN: On 17 July, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky proposed that Ukraine, Turkey and the UN will continue facilitating grain exports through the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) corridor without Russia’s involvement. The proposal comes after Moscow confirmed it will cease participation in the deal, raising concerns around not only the continuation of grain exports and global food prices, but the basic security of civilian vessels in the western Black Sea. It currently remains unclear whether Ankara and the UN will proceed with an attempt to continue grain exports, as they effectively did in November 2022 by calling Russia’s bluff. However, Russian rhetoric, the timing following the Kerch Strait Bridge attack and Turkey’s agreement to allow Sweden to join NATO mean the risk of a genuine escalation is higher than previously.

Following its decision to withdraw from the deal, the Kremlin stated that Russia has withdrawn shipping ‘safety guarantees’ as set out under the BSGI, which effectively threatens to re-militarise the grain corridor. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is highly unlikely to re-impose a blockade of Ukraine’s ports, particularly given Ukraine’s growing A2/AD and long-range missile capabilities, as well as the likely international condemnation this would draw. However, the withdrawal of safety guarantees does increase the risk of false flag attacks along parts of the grains corridor. As a result, even if Ankara and the UN commit to escorting vessels, insuring vessels that intend to use the route is likely to be a key challenge.

While Ukraine will continue to export via overland routes, including corridors via Moldova, Poland and Danube river ports, it will be difficult to replace volumes lost as a result of the BGSI breakdown. Expanding exports via these routes will also increase the cost of transportation, contributing further to the rise in global food prices, and have knock-on impacts on the EU’s internal market. A significant influx of cheap Ukrainian grain has already driven tensions across the bloc in 2023, with several Central and Eastern European and Southeast European countries imposing temporary restrictions on Ukrainian grain imports in April, even while the BSGI was working. In the absence of sea-borne grain exports, there is likely to be significant internal EU resistance to expanded overland grain export routes, particularly ahead of the Polish general election later this year and given the protectionist measures governments have previously taken to protect their domestic agri-food sectors.

Russia has insisted that it would immediately return to the BSGI initiative once restrictions on the export of its own fertiliser and agricultural products to global markets are lifted, though demands are ambiguous, possibly by design. It remains unclear whether recent proposals outlined by the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres would be sufficient to ensure Russia’s return to the deal, or whether Moscow is seeking wider concessions. However, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Moscow would only consider renewing the agreement once ‘concrete results’ had been achieved and not on the back of promises or assurances. While it is possible that an international backlash against Moscow will pressure it to re-enter the deal, the Kremlin has previously committed to send free shipments of grain to African countries in need, which will limit the risk of a diplomatic fallout with key partners in the Middle East and Africa regions.

Jul 17.

OFFENSIVES: The New York Times reported on 15 July that the Ukrainian military has adjusted its strategy in order to minimise losses. Unnamed US and European officials assess that Ukraine lost as much as 20% of its Western-supplied weapons and armour during the first two weeks of the counter-offensive, a loss rate that has necessitated a shift in strategy. These loss rates reportedly improved in the subsequent weeks to around 10% (a more sustainable rate) amid Kyiv’s focus on wearing down Russian forces with artillery and long-range missile interdiction campaigns. This has led to a notable uptick in Russian artillery losses. The dismissal of the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) last week further illustrates Russia’s diminishing counter-battery capabilities amid the increased losses inflicted on its forces due to the current Ukrainian strategy. It is likely that several Western-equipped brigades have not yet been committed to the fighting. It is also possible that this attritional phase of the counter-offensive is likely aimed at laying the conditions for future breakthroughs. However, Russia’s extensive minefields will continue to pose the most formidable obstacle to Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, Hanna Maliar, reported earlier on 17 July that Ukrainian forces have liberated 2.7 square miles (7 sq km) around Bakhmut and 4.2 square miles (10.9 sq km) along the southern front over the last week.
BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces continued to make slow but steady advances around the flanks of Bakhmut over the weekend of 15-16 July. Russian sources reported on 16 July that Ukrainian forces have retaken the village of Zaliznyanske, located seven miles (11km) north-west of Bakhmut, though this has not been confirmed amid other reports of marginal Ukrainian advances elsewhere. Other Russian sources also reported on 15 July that Ukrainian forces had crossed the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal south of Bakhmut and had advanced near Andriivka, located six miles (10km) south of Bakhmut. Following these unconfirmed advances, several Russian sources reported on 17 July that Ukrainian forces are currently taking a tactical pause in order to conduct troop rotations ahead of further attacks.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 16 July, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, Hanna Maliar, stated that Russian forces have been advancing toward Kupiansk over the past 48 hours and that the situation on the eastern front has deteriorated. On 17 July, Maliar explained that Russian forces are launching assaults around both Masyutivka, located around eight miles (13km) north-east of Kupiansk, and Novoselivske, located around 11 miles (18km) north-west of Svatove. The Russian command’s goal, according to Maliar, is to regain lost positions in the sector and to stretch Ukrainian forces across the frontline by forcing the Ukrainian command to draw additional forces to this sector from other parts of the front. On 13 July, Ukrainian military sources reported that the Russian command is concentrating its best units along the Oskil-Kreminna line, which likely supports Maliar’s assertion that Russian forces are trying to undermine Ukraine’s primary counter-offensive efforts in the south.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage indicates that, as of 16 July, Russian forces have made limited progress west of Berestove, located 18 miles (30km) south of Kreminna. Russian milbloggers claimed on 15 July that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kreminna sector around Torske and in a forest west of Kreminna. They also reported that Russian attacks took place near Bilohorivka and Spirne, situated seven miles (12km) and 16 miles (25km) south of Kreminna, respectively.
SOUTHERN: On 16 July, spokesperson for the Tavriisk Group of Forces, Valeriy Shershen, reported that Ukrainian forces had advanced over a kilometre into Russian defensive positions in the Berdiansk direction, likely referring to areas south of Velyka Novosilka. Ukrainian counter-offensive operations have continued to make slow progress in both western Donetsk oblast and across Zaporizhzhia oblast in recent days. Russian and Ukrainian sources indicated an uptick in fighting around Staromaiorske, located six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka along the Vremevsky salient. Some sources claim that Ukrainian forces have liberated the village, though this remains unclear amid other reports that Russian forces successfully counter-attacked.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force reported that air defences intercepted four Iranian-made Shahed-136/131 drones on the night of 15 July. On 16 July, Ukrainian air defences shot down one drone over Sumy oblast. Over the past 24 hours, Russia launched various strikes against Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
COMMAND: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) is possibly escalating a purge of insubordinate officers across the Russian military in the aftermath of the Wagner Group mutiny, underscoring extensive command and control and infighting issues. Following the dismissal of Ivan Popov last week (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 12 July 2023), reports emerged on 15 July that the Russian high command dismissed the commander of the 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, Major General Vladimir Seliverstov, allegedly for raising issues on behalf of his troops. Unconfirmed audio footage from personnel of the 7th VDV Guards Mountain Division has also indicated that their commander, Major General Alexander Kornev, was dismissed earlier this month, and that the commander of the 90th Tank Division, Major General Ramil Ibatullin, had been arrested. There are also rumours that the Kremlin is preparing to dismiss Mikhail Teplinsky, the head of the VDV and the (suspected) deputy theatre commander in Ukraine. Teplinsky was previously linked to the Wagner Group and is the most senior officer to be considered a prominent critic of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.
COMMAND: Audio recordings indicate that 7th VDV personnel have threatened to withdraw from their positions in Kherson oblast if the Kremlin moves to dismiss Teplinsky. If genuine, this illustrates that further military purges of highly popular officers will possibly trigger profound discipline and morale issues, as well as mass desertions at the front. Infighting will therefore continue to hinder the Russian war machine and further undermine operational cohesion at a time when the VDV is playing an increasingly pivotal role in propping up Russian forces across the frontline.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

GRAIN: On 17 July, the Kremlin press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, announced that Russia will halt its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which expires on the same day. Peskov stated that the conditions imposed by Moscow to extend the deal have not been fulfilled, adding that Russia would nevertheless agree to renew the deal if its demands are met. Such conditions include facilitating the access of Russian agricultural products to global markets and the resumption of its ammonia exports. On 11 July, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres proposed to connect a subsidiary of Russia’s agricultural bank to the SWIFT international payment system. However, Russia has reportedly constructed a fertiliser terminal in Krasnodar Krai, reducing its dependence on supply routes transiting Ukraine.
GRAIN: Moscow’s withdrawal from the BSGI will increase the risk of spikes in food prices and drive global food insecurity, though the UN and Turkey are likely to attempt to continue facilitating grain exports without Russia. The UN and Turkey effectively called Moscow’s bluff in November 2022 when Russia previously announced its withdrawal from the deal, precipitating an embarrassing U-turn. This effectively laid bare Russia’s inability to prevent the continuation of grain exports and its unwillingness to follow through with implied threats to undermine the deal (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 3 November 2022). It remains unclear if Russia will seek to escalate in order to illustrate the need for its involvement in the deal as and when the UN and Turkey attempt to continue facilitating grain exports. Russia’s withdrawal from the deal has therefore increased the risk of false-flag attacks against or near civilian vessels (e.g. attacks framed as sea mine incidents). Nevertheless, there will also be increased diplomatic pressure on the EU and/or the UN to facilitate the reconnection of Russia’s fertiliser export bank to SWIFT in order to restart the deal and prevent any major and prolonged fluctuations in global food prices.
GRAIN: While the Kremlin has emphasised that there is no link between the decision to withdraw from the deal and this morning’s attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge, the timing is highly notable. It remains unclear if Kyiv deliberately sought to provoke Russia just hours before the expiration of the grain deal; some Ukrainian officials have claimed that the attack was a false-flag provocation by Russia, though this remains unlikely. For analysis on the Kerch bridge attack, see the FORECAST below.
WAGNER GROUP: On 16 July, Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service spokesman Andriy Demchenko stated that the presence of Wagner forces in Belarus does not pose a significant threat to Ukraine. However, Demchenko stated that Ukrainian border forces will keep monitoring the movement of Wagner forces, as they will possibly look to conduct destabilisation actions along the Ukrainian-Belarussian border. Likewise, the spokesperson of the State Border Guard Service of Lithuania stated that Lithuania is monitoring the movement of Wagner mercenaries in Belarus, though there is no indication that they currently pose a security threat to Lithuania. On 17 July, activists from the Belarusian Hajun Project reported that a third column of Wagner forces comprising 20 vehicles arrived in Belarus; they are likely headed to the village of Tsel in central Belarus, with further Wagner Group deployments likely in the coming weeks.
For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2023, please see Sibylline Special Report: A Year of War in Ukraine, Scenarios for the Year Ahead – 24 February 2023.

FORECAST

STRIKES: At around 0200hrs (local time), the Russian-controlled Kerch Strait Bridge (which connects mainland Russia with occupied Crimea) was attacked. The incident caused significant damage to one span of the road bridge. It is the second attack to strike the key bridge since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. An explosives-laden lorry destroyed a large section of the bridge on 8 October 2022 (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 10 October 2022).

Ukrainian sources reported that the latest attack was a special operation conducted by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Ukrainian Navy. It reportedly involved maritime unmanned surface vessel (USV) drones. While the SBU has not officially claimed responsibility for the attack (nor is it likely to), the strike was highly likely a Ukrainian operation; the SBU stated that details regarding the attack ‘will be announced after the victory’, which points to official Ukrainian involvement.

Additional unconfirmed reports suggest that there was no anti-aircraft fire during the attacks; this suggests that the bridge was likely attacked by USVs, as opposed to aerial drones or Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Footage of the bridge also shows no damage to the road surface, which again suggests it was likely attacked from beneath, rather than via a road-borne explosion (like that which occurred in October 2022).

Following last year’s attack on the bridge, Russia deployed significant capabilities to the area to defend the crucial crossing point. However, while numerous Russian naval vessels with air defence capabilities are currently defending the strait, the threat posed by Ukrainian maritime drones to the Russian fleet is likely to be growing. This is an area on which the Ukrainians have focused significantly in order to be able to employ a range of airborne, surface and submersible drones to attack Russian naval assets and critical infrastructure. Earlier reports emerged of severe cracks appearing in several spans of the road bridge; they reportedly reduced the amount of civilian traffic allowed to cross the bridge. It is therefore possible that a Ukrainian operation aimed at exploiting this vulnerability.

Even though the bridge was repaired following last year’s attack, Russian forces have almost certainly been struggling to facilitate crossings in recent months due to severe bottlenecks and delays for both overland cargo and tourist traffic. Earlier in July, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet began using Ropucha-class amphibious landing ships to transport civilian traffic across the strait. This is a clear example of how Ukrainian attacks against critical infrastructure can impact Russian military logistics for months following a strike. The latest attack will only reinforce these logistical problems for Russia, forcing critical military resources to be diverted to support civilian transport and logistics at a crucial point in Ukraine’s counter-offensive.

Russia-Ukraine: Withdrawal from Black Sea Grain Initiative will increase global food security risks. On 17 July, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov announced that Russia will halt its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which expires today. Peskov stated that the conditions imposed by Moscow have not been fulfilled, adding that Russia would agree to renew the deal if its demands are met. Such conditions include facilitating the access of Russian agricultural products to global markets and the resumption of its ammonia exports. On 11 July, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres proposed to connect a subsidiary of Russia’s agricultural bank to the SWIFT international payment system to facilitate the payment of Russian products. However, Russia has reportedly constructed a fertiliser terminal in Krasnodar Krai, reducing its dependence on supply routes transiting through Ukraine. Ultimately, Moscow’s withdrawal from the deal will increase the risk of spikes in food prices and therefore raises the risk of global food insecurity.
Ukraine: Gamaredon’s data exfiltration will sustain elevated security risks to Ukrainian entities. On 13 July, Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) issued a warning about Russian state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) group ‘Gamaredon’, noting its ability to steal data from victims’ networks in under an hour following their initial compromise, highlighting the speed of their operations. The group often uses spear-phishing emails and messages via mobile phones apps Telegram, WhatsApp or Signal as initial attack vectors, as well as exploits previously compromised accounts for access. According to CERT-UA, once a target opens an infected document, it takes between 30-50 minutes to steal and exfiltrate data, highlighting the need for the rapid deployment of mitigations to contain and prevent Gamaredon’s infections. Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Gamaredon has primarily targeted Ukrainian security services, military and government organisations, likely to aid the Kremlin’s intelligence-gathering for its military operations. The speed of the group’s operations, compounded with the development of new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), increases the likelihood of infection and subsequent data loss for Ukrainian entities, sustaining elevated security risks as the war persists. (Source: Sibylline)

21 Jul 23. L3Harris VAMPIRETM systems bound for Ukraine to be equipped with EOS Gimbal technology. EOS Defense Systems USA, Inc, the U.S defence subsidiary of Electro Optic Systems (EOS) has been selected to provide the EOS AS-65 gimbal, developed for the R150 remote weapon system (RWS), as the positioning component for the L3Harris Vehicle Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment – or VAMPIRETM. The VAMPIRETM system is a vehicle-agnostic, rapid weapon deployment solution that gives ground forces the ability to quickly and accurately engage targets. L3Harris received a contract from the U.S Department of Defense to deliver 14 of their VAMPIRETM multi-purpose weapons systems to strengthen Ukrainian security defence efforts and allow Ukraine ground forces to target and shoot down enemy drones and defend against adversary ground threats.

By selecting the EOS AS-65, L3Harris is choosing the lightest weight and most precise gimbal in the industry enabling unmatched accuracy and stabilisation. The AS-65 is the smallest gimbal within the EOS weapon system family and is capable of precisely aiming and firing rockets, missiles, and other payloads, supporting ground-to-ground, and ground-to-air delivery with high speed and precision strike capability.

For the VAMPIRETM system, the EOS AS-65 is coupled with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) in a 4-pack launcher configuration providing long-range accuracy to destroy up to Group 3 UAS threats at a wide variety of speeds, ranges and altitudes. The 70 mm diameter laser guided rocket is effective at tracking and killing targets using advanced seeker optics and four guidance wings that are deployed after firing.

EOS will perform integration and support operations for the VAMPIRETM system from its U.S facility in Huntsville, Alabama. EOS is proud to be supporting L3Harris in the endeavour.

The EOS AS-65 gimbal joins more than 40 EOS R400 remote weapon systems, fitted to Bushmaster armoured vehicles delivered to Ukraine, as part of the Australian Government’s ongoing commitment to the defence of Ukraine.

In June Canberra-based EOS officially opened a new production line for the R150 RWS in response to growing international demand for lightweight systems that can be fitted to a wide range of protected and utility vehicles.

EOS has experienced an increase in global sales this year. In April, they announced two conditional contracts with Ukraine, totalling up to US$121 million (A$181 million), to provide up to 150 RWS units and related components. In June, they secured another EUR32 million (A$51 million) contract to supply RWS units, including spares, training, and related services, to a Western European government. EOS will leverage its extensive support network and supply chain to fulfil the contracts.

21 Jul 23. Royal Navy train Ukrainian counterparts in Scotland. Ukrainian troops are learning how to disarm and diffuse Russian bombs, booby traps and mines from their towns, fields, rivers and lakes.

Royal Navy divers, bomb disposal and mine warfare experts are training their Ukrainian counterparts on finding and safely neutralising mines and other explosive devices blighting their land, ensuring that once the war is over, Ukrainian people and the commercial shipping industry can live and operate without fear or risk from explosives.

Specialist personnel from the Royal Navy’s Diving and Threat Exploitation Group (DTXG) – experts in dealing with explosive threats on land through extensive experience in Afghanistan, and at sea with the UK’s respected mine warfare forces – used the remote waters of Loch Ewe in north-west Scotland to pass on their knowledge and expertise to Ukrainian Navy divers, Ukrainian explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators and personnel who work with uncrewed underwater vehicles.

Building on training the Royal Navy has provided over the past 12 months to Ukrainian personnel, this is just one element of the United Kingdom’s widespread commitment to training and supporting Ukraine in opposing Russia’s illegal invasion.

Sailors from Delta Diving Unit 1 and DTXG’s Operational Support Squadron delivered the training alongside NATO allies, including the United States, France, Belgium and Georgia, building on the existing knowledge and skills of the Ukrainian Expeditionary Mine Countermeasures team and helping them prepare for future operations.

Training progressed from clearing deep water shipping lanes to rendering shallow water and beaches safe for amphibious raids. It also covered clearing ports, jetties and any other infrastructure from potential threats.

Lieutenant Ali Aindow, Officer in Charge of Delta Diving Unit 1, said: “It’s been great to be working with our close allies and partners again.

“We have been able to reinforce relationships and cohere into a single multi-national force able to find and destroy underwater or maritime threats for the Task Group Commander.”

She added: “The Ukrainian Navy divers have been great, it’s been a brilliant opportunity to share experience and learn techniques from each other. The Ukrainians are really focused and their enthusiasm for the training has been amazing.”

Teams trained with crewless underwater vehicles – submarine robots packed with cutting-edge technology such as sensors which generate images of objects so operators can identify the threat.

Once a threat was identified, the divers moved in to neutralise the device and make the area safe. The training dealt with all types of exercise targets – free-floating buoyant mines, ground mines and improvised explosive devices in, on and around the water.

‘’This training has delivered real value,” said Lieutenant Commander David Starkey, Commanding Officer of DTXG Delta and Echo Squadrons.

“The operational capability of all the nations has improved and this continued effort, working together again has led to a really integrated team developing to counter explosive threats in the maritime environment.

“The relationships between the units and personnel continues to grow, bound by a common purpose and shared values. It demonstrates how we are stronger as a coherent team and how together we can defeat aggression to our nations’ sovereignty.’’

Lieutenant Frank Macleod, part of the Royal Navy training team, added: “‘The Ukrainians have been fantastic, motivated and very professional sailors.

“We have learnt together over the last few weeks and delivered a very credible search capability.” (Source: Royal Navy)

21 Jul 23. Cluster bombs ‘having an impact’ on Russian defences, US says.

US-supplied cluster munitions are “having an impact” on Russian defences as Ukraine seeks momentum in its grinding counteroffensive, Washington has said.

“They are using them appropriately,” said White House national security spokesperson John Kirby.

“They’re using them effectively and they are actually having an impact on Russia’s defensive formations and Russia’s defensive manoeuvring,” he added, noting Ukrainian forces had started using the weapons “in the last week or so”.

The US’ decision to supply Ukraine with the munitions was highly controversial given that more than 100 countries, including the UK, are signatories to a treaty that bans their use and production.

The indiscriminate weapons have a long history of maiming and killing civilians. Ukraine has promised to only use them in appropriate areas to dislodge enemy forces and not in populated areas.

Since last month, Ukrainian forces have been on the march in the east and the south, recapturing small amounts of territory in their first big counteroffensive since last year. But the going has been slow, and they are yet to take on Russia’s main defensive lines. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

21 Jul 23. Wagner chief Prigozhin should expect payback from Putin, says CIA head. CIA chief William Burns has suggested that Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin should not fire his food taster, suggesting that Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely take further revenge against him following his failed mutiny.

Putin is likely trying to buy time as he works out how to deal with the mercenary head, according to the CIA director who was talking at the Aspen Security Forum.

“What we are seeing is a very complicated dance. Putin is someone who generally thinks that revenge is a dish best served cold. In my experience, Putin is the ultimate apostle of payback so I would be surprised if Prigozhin escapes further retribution.”

“If I were Prigozhin, I wouldn’t fire my food taster,” he added.

Mr Burns said that Putin will likely want to hold onto Wagner but get rid of Prigozhin. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

19 Jul 23. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package to support Ukraine’s battlefield needs and underscore unwavering U.S. support for Ukraine. This package, which includes critical air defense capabilities and munitions, will be provided as part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).

This USAI package highlights the continued U.S. commitment to meeting Ukraine’s pressing requirements by committing critical near-term capabilities while also building the enduring capacity of Ukraine’s Armed Forces to defend its territory and deter Russian aggression over the mid and long term.

Unlike Presidential Drawdown authority, which DoD has continued to utilize to deliver equipment to Ukraine from DoD stocks at a historic pace, USAI is an authority under which the United States procures capabilities from industry or partners to then send to Ukraine. This announcement represents the beginning of a contracting process to provide additional priority capabilities to Ukraine.

The capabilities in this announcement, which totals $1.3bn, include:

Four National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions;
152mm artillery rounds;
Mine clearing equipment;
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
Phoenix Ghost and Switchblade Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS);
Precision aerial munitions;
Counter-UAS and electronic warfare detection equipment;
150 fuel trucks;
115 tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment;
50 tactical vehicles to recover equipment;
Port and harbor security equipment;
Tactical secure communications systems;
Support for training, maintenance, and sustainment activities.

The United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with capabilities to meet its immediate battlefield needs and longer-term security assistance requirements. (Source: U.S. DoD)

19 Jul 23. Lithuania Assembles Demining Coalition in Assistance to Ukraine. Lithuania is assembling a coalition for demining Ukraine and invites countries to contribute demining personnel training or equipment need to that end for the Ukrainian military. Minister of National Defence Arvydas Anušauskas announced the plan on June 18 at the distance meeting of the Ramstein-format Ukraine Defense Contact Group.

“We are rallying a coalition for demining efforts with an aim to consolidate and coordinate the ongoing as well as planned assistance to Ukraine in this area. The coalition is being assembled according to the ‘train and equip’ principle used in the training assistance for the Ukrainians carried out Lithuania with Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and soon – Denmark. We invite other countries to join us with their instructors and equipment,” said Minister.

A.Anušauskas underscored at the meeting that there was a need for a more rapid and extensive Western assistance to Ukraine’s counteroffensive so that Ukraine’s victory would cut the war was short sooner. Ministers of Defence introduced their respective packages of assistance to Ukraine. LIThuania’s contribution in July is worth of EUR 24m.

The Defence Materiel Agency under the MOD signed a contract on NASAMS launchers with Norway’s Kongsberg on June 27. The assistance will be delivered to Ukraine this fall. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Lithuania Ministry of Defence)

19 Jul 23. Benelux Donates Refurbished Armored Infantry Vehicles to Ukraine. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg will donate M113 armored infantry vehicles to Ukraine in the short term. These are refurbished vehicles that are purchased from industry. The ministers of defense of the three countries reported this today in a joint statement.

The M113 is a vehicle used by many international partners. It is mainly used to move infantrymen from one point to another on the battle scene. They are better protected by the strong armor of the M113.

The M113s will be equipped with a remote-controlled weapon system. It is also possible to mount machine guns on the vehicles. Ukraine will also receive the necessary spare parts. The intention is that the entire package will be handed over sometime in the coming months.

“With this donation we show that we continue to support Ukraine against Russian aggression,” said ministers Ludivine Dedonder (Belgium), Kajsa Ollongren (Netherlands) and François Bausch (Luxembourg) in the statement. “By joining forces, we are responding to the request of the Ukrainian armed forces to continue deploying armored vehicles.”(Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Dutch Ministry of Defence;)

18 Jul 23. Ukraine Defense Contact Group Members Remain Unified in Support to Kyiv. There is no lessening of the solidarity of members of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said at the conclusion of the 14th meeting of the group, today.

Austin and Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke to the press about the virtual meeting of 50 nations committed to supporting Ukraine as the country seeks to drive Russian forces from its soil.

The group meeting comes after the successful NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, Austin said, where the allies discussed their determination to support Ukraine in its counteroffensive.

“Today, we recommitted to supporting Ukraine during this crucial counteroffensive and for the long haul,” Austin said. “This is no time to slow down. The United States and our allies and partners have moved mountains to provide Ukraine with critical air defense systems, munitions and more. Coming out of today’s meeting, I’m grateful to all of our allies and partners for their commitment and their clarity.”

The secretary said contact group members have dug deep in their military stocks to provide Ukraine critical military equipment and ammunition. These capabilities support “Ukraine’s sovereign right to live free today and for the future,” he said.

The contact group members discussed plans to ramp up production at both national levels and at the multinational level through the European Union’s important initiative to produce more ammunition, Austin said. The group also heard from representatives from Denmark and the Netherlands who lead the effort to train and supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter capability.

These moves and commitments underscore just how badly Russian President Vladimir Putin miscalculated when he invaded Ukraine last year. Austin said three of his blunders are especially clear today. “First, Putin thought that he could take Kyiv in days and force a new government of Russian puppets on the Ukrainian people,” he said. “But Ukraine chose to fight back. Ukrainian armed forces have defended their country with courage and skill.”

Second, Putin bet that the world would just live with his cruel assault on Ukraine. “But Russia’s aggression and atrocities have shocked the world including even Moscow’s long-term partners,” Austin said. “Putin’s final miscalculation he thought that Ukraine’s friends would waver or flee. Instead, nations of goodwill from around the world have stood up for Ukraine’s sovereign right to defend itself. And by joining together, we have achieved something extraordinary. And today this contact group stands as united and firm as ever.”

Milley discussed Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Many critics are concerned that Ukraine’s military operations are not successful enough and worry that a stalemate might be developing. “We are reminded that real war is not war on paper: Real war is unpredictable,” the general said. “It’s filled with fear, fog and friction. Real war is brutal.”

Combat causes enormous costs in terms of those killed or wounded, he said. Ukraine has had millions of its citizens driven from their homes, and “yet despite the enormous costs, Ukrainians are advancing steadily and deliberately, braving brutal and bloody battles to reclaim their homeland,” Milley said.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive will be slow, the chairman said. Ukrainian service members are fighting their way through dense Russian minefields and obstacles.

Meanwhile, there are robust Ukrainian reserve forces waiting to be committed at the optimal time in a place of Ukraine’s choosing, the general said. “The Ukraine contact group’s assistance goes beyond mere words or symbolic gestures,” Milley said. “We are committed to helping them where it matters most.”

The group has trained 17 brigade combat teams, 63,000 Ukrainian troops and training continues. The training includes “individual non-commissioned officers and officers and staff training along with artillery, air defense, artillery, engineers, logistics, medical and of course putting it all together in combined arms maneuver at night,” Milley said. “This training has developed tangible skills that have helped create capable Ukrainian leaders and units that are having a measurable impact on the battlefield today.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

19 Jul 23. The UK will support Ukraine until it wins a just peace that respects. Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the UN General Assembly meeting on Ukraine.

Thank you, Madam President. When we gathered for this debate on 24 February 2022, we stood on the edge of war, urging Russia to choose the path of peace as thousands of Russian troops amassed at Ukraine’s border.

Within 24 hours, Russian tanks were rolling into Ukraine, marking the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion – an egregious violation of the UN Charter by a permanent member of the Security Council.

In September, Russia again blatantly violated international law, conducting sham elections in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

This Assembly categorically rejected Russia’s attempts to illegally annex yet more Ukrainian territory. Russia did not change course.

Russia is not seeking to “liberate” Ukrainian civilians. Russia, named by the Secretary-General as a state committing grave violations against children, is seeking to seize and consolidate control through violence and repression.

Russia is, according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, torturing civilian detainees and committing summary executions.

Russia is trying to erase Ukrainian culture and identity.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began not on 24 February 2022, but eight years earlier when Russia illegally annexed Crimea.

Civilians in Crimea, particularly Crimean Tatars, have faced oppression since 2014.

Their situation has only deteriorated since Russia’s full-scale invasion, with an increase in violence, house searches, arbitrary arrests, and conscription into the Russian armed forces.

The downing of flight MH17 with a Russian anti-aircraft weapon nine years ago was a shocking violation of the international norms which keep our societies and our countries safe.

It serves as another stark reminder of the human cost of Russia’s actions in Ukraine over many years. We remember the 298 victims.

Madam President, as the Secretary-General said last year, we must not accept Russia’s illegal control of this territory.

The UK will continue to support Ukraine to defend itself, until it wins a just and sustainable peace, in line with the UN Charter, that respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Thank you. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

19 Jul 23. EU and Latin America fail to agree stance on Ukraine war. Europe and Latin America failed to agree on even an expression of “concern” over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but leaders of the two regions maintained that their first summit in eight years had pushed forward relations. Wording on Ukraine had already been significantly watered down over the course of the two-day meeting, including by removing any reference to Russia, to the frustration of European leaders who have sought to win over the “global south” to Ukraine’s cause. But Nicaragua, whose president Daniel Ortega is an ally of Vladimir Putin, was the sole holdout on a text approved by 59 other nations that expressed “deep concern on the ongoing war against Ukraine”. That prevented a unanimous statement on the issue. After the summit, Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, said: “It’s also essential to note that our friends in Latin America and the Caribbean support us . . . the war is a problem for Europe and the world.” European leaders stressed they had achieved broad agreement for the expression of “concern” about the war, including from other Russian allies such as Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia. The countries in attendance, minus Nicaragua, issued a joint declaration. “What’s important to me is that all the EU members are aligned on that and all the Celac [Community of Latin American and Caribbean States] members are aligned except Nicaragua,” said Emmanuel Macron, the French president. “The meeting was very important and very ambitious,” said Alberto Fernández, president of Argentina. “Never before have we been able to reach so many points of agreement as we have achieved now.” Macron also praised the role of Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in supporting efforts to find common language. “[Lula] doesn’t go as far as some allies of Nato but he is perfectly lucid on the nature of this war and its consequences, including on food,” said Macron, referring to Russia’s decision to back out of a deal to export Ukrainian grain across the Black Sea. While talks on the joint statement were held up by Nicaragua, there was progress in side-meetings at the two-day summit. Both Lula and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said they hoped to reach agreement on the long-delayed EU-Mercosur deal by the end of the year. Lula, Macron, Fernández and Gustavo Petro, the president of Colombia, brokered the first meeting between the government of Venezuela and its opposition since talks broke down between the parties in Mexico in November 2022. Countries also reached accord on the post-Cotonou agreement, a political and trade agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, which had been blocked by Poland. Establishing more regular contact with Latin American leaders had also been a goal of the summit. The leaders agreed to meet in Colombia in 2025. (Source: FT.com)

19 Jul 23. Thousands evacuated over mysterious fire at Crimea military base. Thousands of civilians are being evacuated in Russian-occupied Crimea after a fire broke out at a military training ground.

The incident, which occurred in the Kirovsky district, comes just days after an explosion of the Kerch bridge which links the peninsula to mainland Russia, which the Kremlin blamed on a strike from Kyiv.

There were not any casualties and the causes of the fire’s outbreak are being investigated by authorities, Sergei Aksyonov, Crimea’s head of government, said.

He continued: “The temporary evacuation of residents of four localities adjacent to the military field in the Kirovsky region is planned. That’s more than 2,000 people.”

Sections of the Tavrida highway, which connects Sevastopol to the Crimean port of Kerch, have been closed. Vehicles are being redirected through regional roads. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

19 Jul 23. Russia brainwashing Ukrainian children to ‘use as weapons.’

Officials warn that Russia is brainwashing abducted children to turn them against Ukraine, writes Nataliya Vasilyeva and Inna Varenytsia.

It comes as a Telegraph investigation reveals a system of re-education to “Russify” children illegally taken from Ukraine.

Children schooled in occupied parts of eastern Ukraine and Crimea have been taught to blame “Nazis and Nato” for the war that has killed family and friends.

Pupils are forced to learn the Russian national anthem, study textbooks littered with historical inaccuracies and, in some cases, write thank-you letters to Russian soldiers responsible for atrocities in their regions.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

19 Jul 23. MI6 chief to say Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains doomed.

Sir Richard Moore’s speech at the British Embassy in Prague will be only the second he has given in public. The chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) will on Wednesday say Russia is failing in its military aims in Ukraine as he gives a rare speech in Prague.

Sir Richard Moore is set to make the comments at the British Embassy in the Czech capital, emphasising the UK’s “close relationship” with the former Eastern Bloc country and the symbolism of the country’s resistance to Soviet imperialism in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

It comes as Ukraine warned that Russia is amassing a force of 100,000 soldiers to attack the northern section of its frontline to divert forces away from its counter-offensive.

Sir Richard, 60, who was appointed SIS chief in 2020, will use the speech – only the second he has ever given in public – to insist that Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine remains doomed and offer an explanation as to “why Russia is continuing to fail to achieve its military objectives”.

He will also condemn Iran and other nations for their support of Russia during the war and which he will say will only serve to fuel further conflict in Ukraine.

In a further swipe at the Kremlin, Sir Richard is also expected to highlight growing concerns over the “wave of Russian imperialism” spreading in Africa, where the Wagner group of mercenary soldiers had been waging secret wars. Its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin attempted what appeared to be a failed coup against Putin before calling off a march on Moscow.

The central theme of the speech, according to the intelligence service, will be the continuing need for the “human factor” in the role played by SIS, the foreign branch of Britain’s intelligence services.

Sir Richard will argue that intelligence agents can target “secrets” that artificial intelligence (AI) will never spot.

He is set to deny suggestions that AI will “put intelligence services like mine out of business”, providing much-needed succour to Hollywood that the highly lucrative James Bond franchise will not be killed off by robots.

Using a fishing analogy, Sir Richard will say that while AI can “trawl the ocean of open source” material, it is his human field agents who can “obtain secrets beyond the nets”. Agents can be deployed to influence governments or even terrorist groups. They are not, he will say, “just passive collectors of information”.

Sir Richard will say: “AI is going to make information infinitely more accessible and some have asked whether it will put intelligence services like mine out of business.

“In fact, the opposite is likely to be true. As AI trawls the ocean of open source, there will be even greater value in landing, with a well-cast fly, the secrets that lie beyond the reach of its nets.

“The unique characteristics of human agents in the right places will become still more significant. They are never just passive collectors of information: our agents can be tasked and directed; they can identify new questions we didn’t know to ask; and sometimes they can influence decisions inside a government or terrorist group.

“Human intelligence in the age of artificial intelligence will increasingly be defined as those things that machines cannot do, albeit we should expect the frontier of machine capability to advance with startling speed.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)

14 Jul 23. Ukraine’s new Sandown-class minehunters conclude MCM training with ‘Sea Breeze.’

The Ukrainian Navy has completed its first multinational exercise series, ‘Sea Breeze 2023′, operating the service’s two newly acquired ex-Royal Navy (RN) Sandown-class minehunters, Chernihiv (ex-HMS Grimsby) and Cherkasy (ex-HMS Shoreham).

In a Twitter announcement on 12 July the UK RN said the exercise marked the end of this phase of training for the Ukraine’s new minehunting ships, which were transferred from the UK in late 2022.

Cherkasy and Chernihiv participated with assets from 15 countries and NATO Maritime Command in the 22nd iteration of the Black Sea-focused Exercise ‘Sea Breeze’, which this year took place in the Firth of Clyde, near Glasgow and Loch Ewe, Scotland, from 26 June to 7 July. While the exercise was in progress, on 2 July the Ukrainian Navy also held an official flag-raising ceremony in Glasgow and commissioned the two ships into service. (Source: Janes)

18 Jul 23. Ukrainian military using UK C-UAV system. The Ukrainian military appears to be fielding a UK-developed counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (C-UAV) system.

Imagery posted on Twitter on 12 July closely resembles components of the Anti-UAV Defence System (AUDS) produced by UK companies Chess Dynamics, Blighter Surveillance Systems, and Enterprise Control Systems (ECS).

AUDS is designed to detect, track, classify, and disrupt small UAVs, and is equipped with Blighter Surveillance Systems A400 series air security radar, Chess Dynamics’ Hawkeye Deployable System (DS) and electro-optical (EO) video tracker for tracking and classifying targets, and ECS’s smart radio frequency (RF) inhibitor.

The A400 system is an electronic scanning micro-Doppler radar operating in the Ku-band and has a maximum detection range of 8 km, while the RF inhibitor can interfere with UAV command channels covering the GNSS 433 MHz, 815 MHz, and 2.4 GHz frequency ranges.

The integrated solution is available in three configurations – a portable platform for rooftop installation; a deployable option for forward-operating bases; and a fixed system for critical infrastructure. It is not clear which configuration the Ukrainian military is using.

(Source: Janes)

17 Jul 23. State Partnership Program Turns 30: A Crucial Arrow in Ukraine’s Quiver. When Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, some of the first phone calls from the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, were to Sacramento, California.

For almost 30 years, since the founding of the Department of Defense National Guard State Partnership Program, California National Guardsmen and their Ukrainian counterparts have held exchanges, trained together and built troop-to-troop friendships.

Now, Ukraine was under attack, a victim of a brutal, unprovoked invasion, and much of the world thought it would be conquered quickly.

“California Guardsmen told me, ‘Not so fast. We’ve trained with them and learned from them, shoulder-to-shoulder. They’re good,'” recalled Army Gen. Daniel Hokanson, the 29th chief of the National Guard Bureau. “Because the Ukrainians felt comfortable with those [relationships] they had developed for almost 30 years at that point, those were their friends, and they were the people they reached out to immediately.”

Urgent text messages from a Ukrainian soldier experiencing a weapons malfunction were exchanged with a Washington National Guardsman back in the U.S. who he had trained with — an expert on the antitank missile system in question — and were later followed by a video of a destroyed Russian tank.

“In this war, it doesn’t matter which kind of technique or technology we use; people are still critical — crucial,” said Chief Master Sgt. Oleksandr Kosynskyi, senior enlisted leader of the Ukrainian armed forces. “Modern warfare needs responsible, competent and motivated NCOs [noncommissioned officers]. We have a huge history of cooperation with the California National Guard, which has given us good help.”

Army Maj. Gen. Matthew Beevers, California’s adjutant general, said that cooperation continues today. “We’re maintaining a relatively persistent dialogue with our Ukrainian counterparts throughout the entire invasion,” Beevers said. “So, even though we are unable to execute SPP engagements in Ukraine during the conflict, we have been able to maintain those relationships.”

“We can help Ukrainians translate, if you will, the great work that they’re doing on behalf of, not just Ukraine, but NATO and the entire free world.”

The 1993 California-Ukraine pairing in the SPP had also been a textbook example of one of the messages Guard leaders repeat to partner nations: When you partner with a state, you partner with the entire National Guard.

On Feb. 20, 2014, Russia began annexing the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. Shortly afterward, Air Force Gen. Phil Breedlove, who was dual-hatted as both commander of U.S. European Command and NATO’s supreme allied commander Europe, invited the National Guard Bureau’s then-Chief Army Gen. Frank Grass, who’s since retired, to his official residence in Mons, Belgium.

“With a resurgent Russia, we talked about the value of the State Partnership Program in all these countries,” Grass recalls. “He gave me his guidance to share with the adjutants general about what was needed from a Eucom and NATO perspective.”

Grass shared Breedlove’s guidance: Accelerate exercises. If you need resources, team up. Link up with the partner defense chiefs. If they ask for something, work it through Eucom, but know you probably already have my approval, if it makes sense.

“He just couldn’t say enough good things about the relationships the adjutants general had with the chiefs of defense in all those countries,” Grass said, “especially the former Warsaw Pact nations, those now-independent countries, and how they had built through the SPP, working with Eucom and the State Department, creating incredible capacity from virtually nothing.”

In Ukraine’s case, the California Guard was the key to Guard nation. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea later resulted in years of intensified training that National Guard leaders said can be directly tied to Ukraine’s ability to resist the recent invasion, 18 months on.

By 2015, Guardsmen and women were almost continuously training with Ukrainian counterparts, rotating through the newly established Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center in western Ukraine.

The mission of JMTG-U is to train, equip, develop and assist the Ukrainian armed forces with doctrine refinement, and 7th Army Training Command oversees the mission.

When the California Guard wasn’t there, units from other states were. Indeed, Florida Guardsmen would be among the last U.S. troops to leave the country in the days leading up to Russia’s 2022 invasion. The Florida Guard’s 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team was repositioned to Grafenwoehr, Germany, where the JMTG-U mission quickly resumed and continues to this day.

Two months ago, California Guardsmen reunited with some of their Ukrainian counterparts in Poland. “They came to us and said, ‘We have this initiative to make behavioral health a priority in our forces, we just don’t know how to do it’,” said Army Lt. Col. Dustin Harris, chief of behavioral health at the California National Guard.

The California Guard had a rich variety of resources to draw on and share, including the U.S. Army’s Master Resilience Training program, which enhances soldier leadership and effectiveness and teaches resilience skills.

And, typical of SPP engagements, the California Guardsmen took what they had learned back home. “One of the most important things to remember is the Ukrainian troops don’t get to go home,” Harris said. “They’re fighting on their own territory. That was such a big takeaway and so eye-opening.”

A Ukrainian showed Harris a smartphone image of his home. “I’m like, ‘Oh! That’s a beautiful home,’ right?” Harris recalls. “Then he swipes to the next photo, and he’s like, ‘[It was blown up].’ They’re in constant war. What they’re going through in their forces, they’re going to deal with this for decades. Our intent is making sure that they have what they need — the framework — to help their troops, [and] to help their entire nation.”

Army Maj. Daniel Burns, a California Guard behavioral health officer, feels a strong bond with the Ukrainians he worked with in Poland, and he will be continuing to train with them in more exchanges scheduled for the coming months.

“They know what they’re fighting for: They’re fighting for freedom,” Burns said. “It is just very similar to our core value of fighting for freedom. This is just kind of an ethos alliance between the two cultures — and it makes it very, very pure and a very rewarding exchange.”

Hokanson visited the 53rd IBCT last June and the New York Guard’s 27th IBCT, the next unit in the JMTG-U rotation, in March. There, he met with the guardsmen and active-component Army troops responsible to refit and train Ukrainians headed back to the front lines of Ukraine’s fight for democracy, sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russian aggression.

“The whole world is watching the work you’re doing,” Hokanson told 27th IBCT soldiers, “and it’s making a huge difference.”

Retired Air Force Gen. Joseph Lengyel, Grass’ successor as the 28th chief of the National Guard Bureau, also observed the training in Yavoriv firsthand during a 2018 visit.

“You could see the value in the professional development of the soldiers of the Ukrainian military,” Lengyel said.

Army Command Sgt. Maj. Christopher Kepner served with Lengyel as the fifth senior enlisted advisor to the chief of the National Guard Bureau.

“He used to tell me that the most important people in the Army are the sergeants who lead the soldiers and trust them and ensure they’re properly trained,” Lengyel said. “I’m a big believer in that. And I suspect that’s had a huge impact on the success of Ukraine’s military in this conflict with Russia — Ukraine being force developed under the model of our military, where people are motivated, disciplined and trained, equipped and ready and can do amazing things against a bigger adversary.”

SEA Tony Whitehead, the 6th senior enlisted advisor to the chief of the NGB, said the SPP has had a significant impact on Ukraine’s military capabilities.

“During the Russian attack on Ukraine, the importance of fostering and maintaining connections was evident,” Whitehead said. “We have set a precedent and laid a foundation that can inspire other nations to educate and empower their enlisted corps. The transformation of Ukraine’s military into a formidable force is a testament to the effectiveness of our longstanding relationships and training partnerships.”

It all comes down to the SPP’s secret sauce: individual relationships built and nurtured over years.

“What friendships do, what relationships do is they allow countries to be open and honest and transparent with each other,” Lengyel said. “They can share their weaknesses and ask for help. Because they’re friends, they will share things they might not otherwise want to expose. [The result] is they fix their problems and their weaknesses, and they become a much more capable force. And I’m quite sure that’s what happened in Ukraine.”

That type of transformation happens at the small-unit level, where dialogue between individual soldiers makes both partners better.

“We build high-performing teams,” Lengyel said. “Those teams aggregate to make a fighting force. The building blocks are at the individual soldier and airman level.”

The Russian model concentrates power and decision-making authority with general officers. The U.S. model delegates to the noncommissioned officer level, empowering NCOs to take initiative in the absence of orders.

“Back when the former Soviet Union would look at us and wonder what our strength was, it was the value of the enlisted soldiers and airmen, who are so outstanding,” said retired Air Force Gen. Craig McKinley, 26th chief of the National Guard Bureau. “We decentralize control so that these young men and women can make decisions on the battlefield or in the air.”

For a generation, Ukraine had absorbed that model from guardsmen from their California SPP partner, and from other states that partnership gave them access to.

“Many countries have not adopted that,” Grass said. “If you study those that haven’t, you begin to see the true value of the NCO corps — and it’s coming out loud and clear in Ukraine.”

(Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ US Department of Defense)

18 Jul 23. Ukraine innovates on cyber defence Military tie-up with western technology helps harden response. Collaborative effort: Ukraine’s cyber defence is using an array of services from private western business. In an unassuming office building in a quiet suburb of Kyiv, young Ukrainians in military uniform employ a shockingly effective shield against Russian cyber attacks: a combination of training, vigilance and the chutzpah of a digital Sparta to thwart a powerful enemy. In one room sits an Israeli replica of the industrial system behind Ukraine’s hydroelectricity grid, which they use to identify, and then fix, any hacking vulnerabilities. In another, a mass of screens use US software to track Russian cyber attacks in real time. But there is also a break room, where couches and beanbags mimic a tech start-up’s culture of work and play — in the hope that the unit avoids burnout under the relentless 24/7 cyber attacks. But as Ukrainian networks, from telecoms to critical infrastructure like the power grid, continue to withstand the most sophisticated cyber attacks ever seen, a false notion has taken hold: that the Russian cyber offence is as under-resourced as its army, bogged down in inch-by-inch trench warfare with its weaker, poorer neighbour. In fact, Ukraine’s cyber defence offers an innovative template for other countries’ security efforts against a dangerous enemy. Constant vigilance has been paired with unprecedented partnerships with US and European private sector groups — from Microsoft and Cisco’s Talos to smaller firms like Dragos — which take on contracts to protect Ukraine in order to gain a close-up view of Russian cyber tradecraft. Amazon Web Services has sent in suitcase-sized back-up drives. Cloudfare has provided its protective service, Project Galileo. Google Project Shield has helped fend off cyber intrusions. “Moscow [has found] itself up against not just Ukraine but a global network of public and private cyber security professionals — limiting the extent to which it [can] exploit cyber space,” says US think-tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which has studied dozens of Russian attacks and the Ukrainian response to them.

These companies have become de facto military contractors. And the successful, layered and collaborative defence has yielded a model that Ukraine’s allies, wary of Chinese assaults, have now fully embraced. “This is a new scale of collaboration — not a procurement of vendors that help government; instead, this time, it is a voluntary involvement with geopolitical flavour,” says Yuval Wollman, a former director-general of the Israeli intelligence ministry and now president of US-based security firm CyberProof. “They are taking a political stand, to some extent, with the company’s leadership making a strategic decision in a certain geopolitical context.” That geopolitical context now has a sprawling canvas, says Robert M Lee, a US military and National Security Agency veteran who co-founded Dragos, a cyber security company that provides defences for industrial systems, including power grids. “We have seen the Russians pick out key targets and get access across critical sectors in Europe and the United States,” he says. “[The Europeans] are keenly aware of the position they are in, by supplying natural gas, and they are keenly aware of the threats that they are facing from Russian actors.” These skirmishes, which do not rise to a level categorised as acts of war, are increasingly common in the European energy sector, he adds, as Russia counters sanctions on its energy exports and the still unexplained destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines. Experiences in Ukraine show that successful defence is possible. In 2015, a Russian cyber attack knocked out parts of the country’s energy grid. Last year, a similar assault on a power generator was foiled. Microsoft technicians in the US noticed a single computer behaving oddly in an undisclosed location in Ukraine and alerted engineers in the Kyiv suburb. The potency of Russian cyber aggression is still being parsed, but lessons have emerged. During full-scale hostilities, for instance, cyber attacks are of limited value; blowing up a power plant with a missile is cheaper and more likely to succeed than a months-long subterfuge involving malware and hacking. Recommended Special ReportNavigating Cyber Risk What Ukraine’s cyber defence tactics can teach other nations Instead, cyber is particularly useful for more traditional espionage and for disinformation and causing panic. One Russian assault in the early days of the war simply sent citizens a faked text message from a bank saying their money was safe, prompting a bank run. Russia has since pivoted to so-called wiper attacks, where phishing links download a malware that simply deletes all the data from a targeted network. Most of the disclosed attacks have tended to be on private businesses, underlining the fact that industries are as much a target in the cyber war as governments. But, while they might have expected — reasonably — that governments would come to their defence, now they must erect perimeters against hostile state actors. CSIS researchers — noting that business tends to respond to incentives more than generalised concerns — say it is up to governments to lead the private sector into substantive investments in cyber security. “The more incentives the US government can offer for public-private sector collaboration, the more likely cyber defence will hold against future attacks,” the CSIS researchers conclude. (Source: FT.com)

18 Jul 23. Cooperation with Ukraine in the Field of Defense Industry Supported by Two Other Memoranda. Last week, the third meeting of the Czech-Ukraine intergovernmental commission in the field of defense industry took place in Prague. The Czech side was represented by the senior director of the industrial cooperation section Radka Konderlová, the Ukrainian deputy minister of defense of Ukraine and the NAD Volodymyr Havrylov.

The meeting was also attended by authorized representatives of both parties: Sergei Bojev, Deputy Minister of Strategic Industry of Ukraine, and Aleš Vytečka, Director of the Intergovernmental Agency for Defense Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense. The Ukrainian delegation was also accompanied by experts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and representatives of Ukrainian state enterprises that are part of the Ukraine Defense Industry holding (formerly known as UkrOboronProm).

Both sides agreed to deepen mutual cooperation on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Strategic Industry of Ukraine on cooperation in the field of the arms industry, signed on July 7, 2023 in Prague.

At the beginning of the meeting, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine expressed sincere gratitude for the general support of the government of the Czech Republic in protecting Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity and all Ukrainian citizens against Russian aggression. The Czech side has confirmed its firm support and will continue to do so.

The Czech side proposed further cooperation in six areas:

— supplies of Czech defense industry products for the needs of the armed forces of Ukraine,

— support of the government of the Czech Republic in the supply of weapons and military equipment from third countries,

— cooperation in the field of repair and maintenance of heavy weapons and military equipment (battle tanks, armored vehicles, howitzers, rocket launchers) and repair and modernization of aircraft platforms,

— cooperation within the Czech-Ukrainian defense cluster and its working groups as a basic platform for the implementation of projects,

training of repair and maintenance personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,

— demining of Ukrainian territory.

During the commission meeting, memorandums of cooperation were also signed between Ukraine Defense Industry and the Czech companies Česká zbrojovka Uherský Brod and Sellier & Bellot. The memoranda are the result of long-term discussions between the companies, and this contractual basis allows the cooperation to formally begin.

The two sides also agreed to bring together the innovation sectors of the defense industries of both countries in order to find areas of possible cooperation in the development and research of new technologies, especially EDTs.

During the visit, the Ukrainian delegation also met with the national security advisor of the Czech Republic, senior representatives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and visited 12 companies of the Czech defense industry, focusing on the areas of heavy technology, ammunition and aviation. The aim of these visits was to present the possibilities of the Czech defense industry for the armed forces of Ukraine and, in some cases, also to discuss current cooperation projects. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Czech Republic Ministry of Defence)

18 Jul 23. RoK’s Stance Against Lethal Arms Aid to Ukraine Remains Unchanged: Defense Ministry. South Korea’s policy stance against the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine remains unchanged, the defense ministry said Monday, after President Yoon Suk Yeol made a surprise visit to the war-torn nation in a show of solidarity over the weekend.

During his talks with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv on Saturday, Yoon agreed to provide Ukraine with a package of security, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance under the name “Ukraine Peace and Solidarity Initiative.”

“There is no change in the government’s position that South Korea does not provide lethal weapons,” Jeon Ha-kyu, the ministry’s spokesperson, told a regular press briefing.

Following the summit between Yoon and Zelenskyy, Principal Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo said South Korea will supply Ukraine with more mine detectors and demining equipment as part of its assistance package.

Seoul recently sent portable mine detectors and protective suits in its latest batch of military supplies to support Ukraine

Last year, it sent three batches of nonlethal military assistance to Ukraine, including first-aid kits, medicine, gas masks, tents, bulletproof vests and food for field troops.

(Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Yonhap News Agency)

18 Jul 23. Secret talks to return Ukrainian children taken by Russia Saudi Arabia and Turkey are brokering a deal to repatriate thousands of children displaced by Vladimir Putin’s invasion. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are seeking to broker a deal to repatriate Ukrainian children taken to Russia and held in children’s homes or adopted by Russian families, according to four people familiar with the talks. Officials in Kyiv and Moscow are compiling lists of the thousands of children moved to Russia since President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, as part of the mediation process, which has not been previously reported. The highly sensitive talks, which have been ongoing for several months, indicate third parties are still looking for ways to agree compromises between Ukraine and Russia in the hope they can evolve into channels for potential peace talks aimed at ending the war. Former Chelsea football club owner Roman Abramovich, who has previously mediated with Ukraine with Putin’s blessing in peace negotiations, prisoner exchanges and a grain deal, is also involved in the discussions, according to two people familiar with the matter. The need for mediators highlights the complexity of repatriating the relocated Ukrainian children, an issue that led the International Criminal Court to charge Putin with war crimes in March, along with his children’s rights commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova. The issue is so contentious that Ukrainian and Russian officials have refused to speak to each other directly, unlike for some past prisoner swaps or ceasefire negotiations.

“There is no [direct] communication with the Russian side,” said Daria Herasymchuk, children’s rights commissioner in president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office. “Moreover, we are convinced that there can be no talks in this direction, because it is not a question of exchange of prisoners of war, these are civilians, these are children.” Saudi Arabia raised displaced children at a meeting of officials from selected G20 members in Copenhagen in June as part of broader discussions about the need for third parties to talk to both Ukraine and Russia, according to a diplomat briefed on the talks. The western countries gave Riyadh their blessing to continue mediating on the children and other issues including the grain deal, fears over contamination at a Russian-held nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine, and potential nuclear escalation, the diplomat said. Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has sought to carve out a role as a peacemaker by brokering the failed talks on an end to the war last year, as well as the grain deal and several prisoner exchanges. government, and Abramovich did not respond to requests for comment. The Saudi government did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Ukraine alleges Russia arranged the abductions of as many as 20,000 children with the explicit intent of erasing their Ukrainian identity. Yale’s Humanitarian Lab says at least 6,000 Ukrainian children have been moved to Russia, while Russia’s official figures count fewer still. Neither side has kept centralised records of how many Ukrainian children have been relocated to Russia, while the differing circumstances in which they were taken make drawing up a full tally or working out where to send them difficult, the people said. “There’s one situation when mom and dad are on Ukrainian territory. There’s another where there’s no mom and dad but there’s an aunt in Voronezh [southern Russia],” a person briefed on the talks said. “The goal is to count all the children to understand how many there are and then find the best solution for each child.” Russia has used children in Russian-speaking areas of eastern Ukraine as propaganda tools to justify its invasion. Some children brought to Russia have been enrolled in “patriotic” classes where they sing the Russian national anthem, are taught the Ukrainian nation never existed, and are told Moscow is fighting a war against “Nazism”. Ukraine claims Russia is trying to eradicate the children’s Ukrainian identity, which Kyiv says is a form of genocide. “We are well aware that their actions are not chaotic, but they had a well-planned genocide policy towards us,” Herasymchuk said. “They are kidnapping children to replenish their dying nation.” Another factor complicating the talks is the different ways the children arrived in Russia.

18 Jul 23. Ben Wallace: We will pay for tanks but not more troops. Britain must pay for tanks, not more troops, the Defence Secretary has said ahead of a major announcement on the military’s plans in response to the invasion of Ukraine.

Ben Wallace said reversing cuts to the size of the Army would have meant sending troops into battle equipped with “pitchforks” instead of high-tech weapons because of the constraints of the defence budget.

He made the comments ahead of the publication of the Defence Command Paper on Tuesday, which has been updated from its original publication in 2021 in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The paper outlines how the military will modernise and adapt to the “changing global picture” as well as prioritise investment in science and technology.

Mr Wallace previously announced that the number of fully trained soldiers would fall to 73,000 by 2025 – its smallest size ever, down from 82,000.

He said: “I’m not prepared to cut the Armed Forces by about £5bn to put on a postcard ‘I’m going to go back to 82,000’. You’ve got to equip those soldiers with married accommodation, barracks, night sights, helmets, guns, whatever equipment you’re going to give them.

“If it’s going to be a battle group, are you going to buy 300 armoured vehicles or am I just going to give them a pitchfork? I mean, that’s the choice.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)

18 Jul 23. Ukraine ‘sends 28 drones to Crimea after hitting Kerch bridge.’ Ukraine has launched dozens of drones over Crimea just hours after striking a bridge that connects to mainland Russia, Moscow says.

Russia’s defence ministry said it had downed 28 drones over the region, claiming they did not cause any casualties or damage.

Air raid alerts have blared across Ukraine’s south and east as Russia launched overnight air attacks using drones and possibly ballistic missiles, according to the Ukrainian air force.

A “serious” fire broke out at a facility in the port of Mykolaiv, the city’s mayor said. Alerts were finally called off around 4.30 am local time.

It comes after Russian President Vladimir Putin promised “reprisals” for a “terrorist attack” on the Kerch bridge in Crimea.

Moscow said it was hit in the early hours of yesterday by a maritime drone strike launched by Ukraine, although Kyiv has not claimed credit for the damage. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

18 Jul 23. Russia launches drones, missiles on Ukraine’s south and east – Ukraine’s Air Force. Russia launched overnight air attacks on Ukraine’s south and east using drones and possibly ballistic missiles, Ukraine’s Air Force and officials said early on Tuesday. A fire broke out at one of the “facilities” in the port of Mykolaiv late on Monday, the city mayor said. The port city provides Ukraine with access to the Black Sea.

“It’s quite serious,” Mayor Oleksandr Senkevich said on the Telegram messaging app of the fire, adding that more detail will come in the morning.

The southern port of Odesa and the Mykolaiv, Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions were under threat of Russian drone attacks, the Air Force said on the Telegram messaging app.

It added that Russia may be using ballistic weaponry to attack the regions of Poltava, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Kirovohrad.

Reuters could not independently verify the reports.

Air raid alerts blared in many Ukrainian regions for hours, before being called off at around 04:30 a.m. local time (0130 GMT).

Oleh Kiper, the head of the Odesa region’s military administration, said air defence systems there were engaged in repelling several waves of Russian drone attacks.

Serhiy Bratchuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Odesa military administration, said on the Telegram messaging app that details of the attack will come later in the morning.

“Thank you all for your endurance,” he said.

There was no immediate comment from Russia on the attack.

Early on Monday, a blast knocked out the Crimean Bridge linking Russia to the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow annexed from Ukraine in 2014, in what Moscow called a strike by Ukrainian sea drones and vowed retaliation. (Source: Reuters)

17 Jul 23. Suspected Russian Intelligence Operative Extradited from Estonia to Face Charges Related to Providing American-Made Electronics and Ammunition to Russian Military. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has announced that Vadim Konoshchenok, 48, of Tallinn, Estonia, with alleged ties to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has been charged with conspiracy and other charges related to a global procurement and money laundering network on behalf of the Russian government. Konoshchenok was arrested in Estonia on a provisional arrest warrant issued from the Eastern District of New York and extradited from Estonia to the United States on July 13. According to the indictment and court filings, Konoshchenok and his co-defendants were affiliated with Serniya Engineering and Sertal LLC (the Serniya Network), Moscow-based companies that operate under the direction of Russian intelligence services to procure advanced electronics and sophisticated testing equipment for Russia’s military-industrial complex and research and development sector, some of which can be used in the development of nuclear and hypersonic weapons, quantum computing and other military applications. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce (DOC) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) levied sanctions against Serniya, Sertal, and several individuals and companies engaged in the scheme, calling them “instrumental to the Russian Federation’s war machine.” As alleged in the indictment, the Serniya Network was licensed to conduct highly sensitive and classified procurement activities by Russia’s FSB, Russia’s principal security agency and the main successor agency to the Soviet Union’s KGB. According to court documents, in electronic communications, Konoshchenok explicitly identified himself as an FSB “Colonel” and enclosed a photograph of himself wearing his FSB uniform. Additionally, a review of electronic communications equipment recovered from Konoshchenok revealed saved contacts beginning with the prefix “FSB” and email addresses from “FSB[.]ru” domains. One of Konoshchenok’s calendar entries referenced an “FSB order.” As described in the indictment, Estonia was a popular transshipment point, where Konoshchenok would smuggle U.S.-origin items across the border into Russia. On Oct. 27, 2022, Konoshchenok was detained by Estonian authorities while attempting to cross into Russia from Estonia with approximately 35 different types of semiconductors and electronic components, including several U.S.-origin and export-controlled items. Konoshchenok has also been repeatedly stopped by Estonian border officials attempting to smuggle hundreds of thousands of American-made and export-controlled rounds into Russia, including 6.5 mm, 7 mm, .338, and .308 magnum rounds, which are commonly used by snipers, as well as military-grade .223 rounds. Konoshchenok used an Estonian front company called Stonebridge Resources and communicated frequently with other co-conspirators about sourcing, transporting, and paying for controlled items. In electronic communications, Konoshchenok is clear that his fee is “10%” because he “can’t do less. Sanctions . . . Sanction item for 10%.” To date, over half a ton of military-grade ammunition linked to Konoshchenok has been recovered or interdicted before being smuggled into Russia. DOJ’s Task Force KleptoCapture, an interagency law enforcement task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping sanctions, export restrictions, and economic countermeasures that the United States has imposed, along with its allies and partners, in response to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, coordinated this case. (Source: glstrade.com)

13 Jul 23. “Japan to supply Ukraine with counter-UAS system.” JIJI press reports Japan will provide counter-UAS detection equipment as part of its aid to Ukraine, said Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, at the NATO summit in Vilnius.

“In March, Kishida visited Ukraine and told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Japan would provide USD 30m in nonlethal defence equipment assistance through a NATO trust fund. This framework will be used to provide a drone detection system.“

For more information: https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2023071200961/japan-to-provide-ukraine-with-drone-detection-system.html (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

17 Jul 23. Russia has formally withdrawn from a UN-brokered deal to export Ukrainian grain across the Black Sea, potentially imperilling tens of millions of tonnes of food exports from the war-torn country. Dmitry Peskov, president Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, told reporters on Monday that the agreement had “essentially stopped” and Russia would no longer co-operate with the deal. Russia has complained since the UN and Turkey initially brokered the deal a year ago that western sanctions were holding up a parallel agreement to allow payments, insurance, and shipping for Moscow’s own agricultural exports. Peskov said Russia would resume its participation in the deal “as soon as the relevant agreements are fulfilled”. Moscow informed other stakeholders on Monday morning that it would withdraw from the deal, a western diplomat told the FT. The initiative has allowed some 32.9mn metric tonnes of food to be exported by sea from Ukraine since August, more than half to developing countries, according to the co-ordination committee set up to monitor its implementation. (Source: FT.com)

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