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Military And Security Developments
Mar. 3.
Moldova: Parliament dissolution demand by pro-Russian opposition increases risk of anti-government unrest. On 2 March, the pro-Russian and Eurosceptic Communist and Socialist parties demanded the dissolution of the parliament and the resignation of President Maia Sandu. The calls come after the parliament approved a declaration made by the pro-EU ruling party condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – the first time the parliament has expressly condemned the invasion. The Communist and Socialist parties have issued a joint statement calling for fresh elections and encouraging anti-government protests. Anti-government protests backed by the pro-Russian Sor party have gained momentum in recent weeks, undermining the government’s stability amid a socio-economic crisis and ongoing Russian destabilisation efforts. While fresh elections remain unlikely given the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity’s majority in parliament, increased anti-government unrest is likely amid worsening polarisation and pro-Russian destabilisation efforts.
Russia-Ukraine: Bryansk incursion elevates risk of martial law expansion in Russian border regions. On 2 March, a Ukraine-based Russian group called the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) claimed it had crossed the international border into Bryansk oblast in Russia, claiming it wanted to ‘liberate’ fellow Russians from the tyranny of the Kremlin. The group claims to be a volunteer formation that is part of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, but Ukraine’s military denies ties to the group. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed the ‘saboteurs’ shot at civilians and children, but this cannot be verified. While the identity of the attackers remains unknown, it is more likely that this was a Kyiv-sanctioned raid. The Russian authorities remain on high alert, with Putin labelling it as a ‘terrorist attack’ and convening Russia’s Security Council. The RDK’s ties to suspected neo-Nazis will likely feed into Russian narratives around the need to ‘denazify’ Ukraine. This will likely prompt clampdowns in Russian society and elevate the risk of an expansion of martial law readiness conditions in the regions bordering Ukraine, or even a declaration of war.
• BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces are likely setting conditions for the withdrawal from Bakhmut as Wagner Group and regular Russian forces continue to make gains around the town. Ukrainian police officers have reported this morning (3 March) that overnight Russian forces blew up a key bridge linking Bakhmut to the village of Khromove, less than two miles (3km) west of Bakhmut railway station. The O0506 road that runs from Bakhmut through Khromove remains one of only two roads, together with the N-32 highway, that is not under direct Russian control. However, both roads are now under Russian fire control and Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed this morning that Bakhmut is now ‘practically surrounded’ given that only one road remains open – though he did not specify which. However, while the situation remains increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces, Russian forces will likely need to take both Khromove and Ivanivske (which sits on the N-32 highway) to completely cut off ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut.
• BAKHMUT: Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on 2 March that Ukrainian forces have the option of withdrawing from Bakhmut, but will only do so if ‘absolutely necessary’. However, there are already indications that Ukrainian forces are beginning to withdraw. The commander of the Madiar Birds drone reconnaissance unit confirmed on his social media on 3 March that he had been ordered to withdraw from Bakhmut immediately. If Russian forces make further progress in the coming days, further unit withdrawals are likely.
• DONETSK: Nothing significant to report.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: The Ukrainian Kharkiv regional military administration has ordered the mandatory evacuation of vulnerable residents from Kupiansk due to growing concerns of an eventual advance on the town by Russian forces. Kupiansk is an important railway junction and major supply hub, but Russian forces are still an estimated six miles (10km) north-east of the town. As such, it remains unclear whether the decision was triggered by any Russian advances in the area of Ukrainian intelligence. Elsewhere on the front, Russian correspondents on 2 March reported on attempts by a concentration of Russian forces to break through a densely defended Ukrainian position in the Kreminna area, though there is no indication of any success. The Ukraine General Staff reported that Ukraine forces repelled assaults eight miles (13km) south of Kreminna and 20 miles (32km) south of Kreminna.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• DIPLOMACY: The meeting of G20 foreign ministers ended on 2 March without a consensus on the conflict in Ukraine. Russia and China were the only two nations to reject a joint statement demanding Moscow’s ‘complete and unconditional withdrawal’ from Ukraine. Beijing did not provide a specific reason for rejecting the joint statement, but claimed that the G20 was an economic forum and not one for resolving security issues. Speaking to the German parliament on 2 March, Chancellor Olaf Scholz urged China not to provide Moscow with weapons to use in Ukraine and called on Beijing to encourage Russian troops to withdraw. Although China has denied intentions of providing lethal aid, Beijing’s failure to denounce the invasion is likely to further undermine relations with Western nations. Unnamed officials have claimed that Washington is attempting to garner support from its allies to impose sanctions on Beijing if it provides Moscow military aid. Further disagreements between nations on ending the Ukraine war are likely to endure, while China continues to strengthen its relations with Russia and potentially keep the option open to facilitate negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv at a later date.
• NEGOTIATIONS: German Chancellor Scholz confirmed on 2 March that Berlin was negotiating with allies on providing Kyiv security guarantees. While he did not specify their potential form, Scholz said they would only work if there is a Ukrainian victory. Scholz’s intervention comes after Berlin rejected earlier reports that it was working with British and French officials in compiling security guarantees for Ukraine to bring both sides to the negotiating table (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 27 February 2023).
• AID: Kyiv will receive jointly funded ammunition from the EU within weeks, according to the bloc’s officials. Reports on 2 March indicate that EUR 1 billion from the European Peace Facility will be used to buy shells for Ukraine after Brussels suggested reimbursing nations that provided ammunition for use on the battlefield. EU defence ministers are expected to refine the plan next week before a summit on 23-24 March. The US is also set to announce a new military aid package worth around USD 400 million for Kyiv on 3 March. The package is expected to include more Guided Multiple Launch Rockets for HIMARS launchers, ammunition and armoured vehicle-launched bridges. Kyiv has stated that increasing deliveries of artillery ammunition is vital given that the Russian military is estimated to fire four times as many shells as Ukraine per day. The ammunition from Washington and Brussels will likely mitigate the risk of major shortages in the short to medium term.
• NUCLEAR: On 3 March, the Russian nuclear energy agency Rosenergoatom alleged that Ukrainian forces fired upon employees at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) while they were meeting with inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Russian officials also claimed that the Russian side cleared seven trip mines along the mission’s route. These claims remain unconfirmed. On 2 March, a new team of IAEA monitors arrived at the power plant after a delay of almost a month. Moscow is highly likely to use these unconfirmed Rosenergoatom claims and others to continue threatening an escalation at the ZNPP, and by extension the threat of a nuclear incident. While the threat of false-flag radiological dirty bombs will remain the most credible threat if and when Ukrainian forces launch a counter-offensive south of Zaporizhzhia, a major meltdown at the plant remains highly unlikely even if fighting does escalate around the site. For further analysis of the risks of a nuclear incident in Ukraine, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 18 August 2022.
• MOLDOVA: On 2 March, the pro-Russian and Eurosceptic Communist and Socialist parties demanded the dissolution of the Parliament and the resignation of President Maia Sandu. The calls come after the Parliament approved a declaration made by the pro-EU ruling party condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – the first time the parliament has expressly condemned the invasion. The Communist and Socialist parties have issued a joint statement calling for fresh elections and encouraging anti-government protests. Anti-government protests backed by the pro-Russian Sor party have stepped up in recent weeks, undermining the government’s stability amid a socio-economic crisis and enduring Russian destabilisation efforts. While fresh elections remain unlikely given the ruling Party of Solidarity and Action’s majority, increased anti-government unrest is likely amid worsening polarisation and pro-Russian destabilisation efforts.
FORECAST
BORDERS: We still cannot confirm who precisely was behind the apparent incursion inside Russia’s Bryansk oblast on 2 March, but it now appears more likely that this was a Ukrainian-aligned operation than a Russian false-flag. Following the publication of yesterday’s report, the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) published a video claiming responsibility for the raid. They claimed that they crossed the international border in order to encourage Russians to fight and ‘liberate’ their countrymen and women from the tyranny of President Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin. Russian security services have claimed it has restored order and repelled the attack.
The RDK claims to be a Russian paramilitary unit operating under the Ukrainian military. Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) spokesperson Andriy Yusov claimed on 2 March that the unit is an ‘independent formation’ that has not been trained by, or has operated as part of, the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, it remains unclear to what extent they are truly affiliated with the Ukrainian Armed Forces as such a cross-border raid would likely require at least tacit sign-off from the GUR.
According to Bellingcat, the RDK is led by Denis Nikitin (real name Kapustin), a well-known neo-Nazi and prominent figure amongst the European transnational far right. While Russian-born, Nikitin has long maintained links with Ukraine’s far right and had reportedly once played a prominent role in the Azov Battalion’s international ‘outreach’ programmes. He is banned from the European Schengen zone.
If the RDK truly are behind the incursion, it is highly unlikely that this operation was a Russian false-flag operation as previously suggested. Last week, Ukrainian intelligence claimed that Russian forces were wearing Ukrainian-looking uniforms in the area in alleged preparations for a false-flag operation. Given the latest developments, it now remains much more likely that Ukrainian military intelligence signed off on the operation, and had set information conditions for such an operation in advance (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 24 February 2023). Ukrainian military intelligence hasn’t outrightly denied involvement, but has rather framed it as a ‘classic Russian provocation’. GUR spokesperson Yusov stated on 2 March that the incident was ‘part of transformative processes in Russia’ and that ethnic, religious and socio-economic tensions within Russian society led to the incident. Ultimately, if the Russian Volunteer Corps are responsible, the Kremlin is likely to exploit the reputation of its far-right leader Nikitin to reinforce its narrative that Ukrainian-backed neo-Nazis are a credible threat to Russia that justifies the ‘special military operation’. While unconfirmed, the aim of the operation appears to have been to encourage partisan activity inside Russia. However, this may prove counter-productive for Kyiv given that the optics of such an operation involving alleged neo-Nazis are much more likely to lend credence to the Kremlin’s ‘denazifying’ narrative and support Moscow’s domestic propaganda efforts. The most immediate implications of the incident will likely be felt inside Russia itself, where authorities are on high alert ahead of a Russian Security Council meeting which will be chaired by Putin today (3 March). This Security Council meeting will mark an important milestone in the Kremlin’s framing of the war, and increases the risk of an expansion of martial law readiness levels across Russia, particularly those areas under ‘medium’ readiness neighbouring Ukraine. Putin only this week called on the Federal Security Service (FSB) to step up counter-intelligence operations inside Russia to combat alleged Ukrainian and Western sabotage and espionage operations (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 1 March 2023). As such, it also increases the likelihood that Moscow will use this incident to change the status of the ‘special military operation’ by declaring either a state of emergency or a formal state of war – which hardliners have long demanded.
Mar. 2.
• BAKHMUT: Ukraine’s Eastern Operational Command stated on 1 March that despite the growing Russian encirclement of Bakhmut, no decision has been made to withdraw from the town. Russian forces, led by Wagner Group, continue to tighten the growing encirclement of the town. Unconfirmed but credible reports indicate that Russian forces have consolidated control over Yahidne, just over a mile (1.6km) north-west of Bakhmut, and are moving south-west towards Khromove and are now pushing south along the banks of the Bakhmutivka River towards central Bakhmut. While the situation for Ukrainian forces defending the town remains increasingly challenging, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin reported that Ukrainian forces are transferring large numbers of reserves to the area, which follows Eastern Operational Command’s order to reinforce the town earlier this week (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 1 March 2023).
• DONETSK: A New York Times investigation published on 1 March has indicated the scale of Russian losses during its failed offensive against Vuhledar, with claims that Ukrainian forces have destroyed over 130 tanks and armoured personnel carriers in just three weeks. Ukrainian officials have claimed that Russian forces made numerous tactical mistakes that allowed Ukrainian forces to lure tank columns into kill zones. Ukrainian forces then immobilised the Russian vehicles before funnelling them into mine-laden roads, whereafter they were destroyed by artillery fire. Ukrainian officials have described the battle for Vuhledar as the largest tank battle of the war. While the figures remain unconfirmed, ample other indications, including geolocated footage, support the assessment that poorly trained Russian mobilised forces have lost a very high number of tanks and armoured vehicles during the assault on Vuhledar. It also starkly reflects the inability of Russian forces to learn from earlier mistakes.
• DONETSK: The shift in Russian tactics away from the Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) concept towards much smaller infantry assault groups which focus on frontal assaults indicates the extent to which Russian manoeuvre capabilities have been degraded. The battle for Vuhledar also speaks to the inability of Russian forces to effectively utilise mechanised forces to generate breakthrough opportunities, given the increasing reliance upon frontal infantry assaults. As such, the extremely high losses sustained around Vuhledar mean Russian forces are unlikely to make any notable progress on this axis for the foreseeable future unless Russian forces commit sizeable reserves or possibly elite airborne (VDV) units to support poorly trained mobilised forces.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continued launching multiple ground attacks on the Oskil-Kreminna front, but only marginal advances remain unconfirmed around Kreminna. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups eight miles (14km) north of Svatove and that Russian forces are still conducting ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line and 12 miles (20km) northwest of Kreminna. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Russian forces, including airborne VDV elements, dislodged Ukrainian forces from fortified positions in the Kreminna sector. However, this remains unconfirmed as the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks north-west and south of Kreminna.
• SOUTHERN: Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated on 2 March that Ukraine will change its strategy to liberate occupied Crimea, but without specifying what this change in strategy will entail. Ukrainian officials and military officers have maintained that the ultimate aim of Ukrainian operations in 2023 is the liberation of all occupied territories, including Crimea. However, given the significant concentrations of Russian forces arrayed across the frontline, and the prospect of further rounds of mobilisation this year, this will remain an extremely difficult task and, as we have frequently assessed, would carry significant escalatory risks if successful. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humeniuk also reported on 1 March that Russian forces are forming new secondary defensive lines in Kherson oblast, in case Russian forces need to withdraw further from the Dnieper River – though this remains unlikely in the short term amid wider contingency planning for Ukrainian counter-offensive operations.
• STRIKES: Commander of Ukrainian Joint Forces Serhiy Naiev claimed on 1 March that the Ukrainian air defence interception rate against Russian missiles has reached 80%, as a result of the improvement of the training of air defence personnel. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has meanwhile underlined that the threat of Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure remains high, even as winter ends and the pressure on the Ukrainian energy grid reduces. While Russian forces have still not launched large-scale strikes against Ukraine following the invasion anniversary, strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kremenchuk and Zaporizhzhia on 1 March killed at least three people. Elsewhere, the Russian MoD reported on 1 March that its air defences had prevented an ‘attempted massive drone strike’ against occupied Crimea, and if accurate reflects the notable stepping up in drone activity on both sides over the last week.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• AID: Slovak defence minister Jaroslav Nad stated on 1 March that his government is considering transferring 10 of its 11 Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine, with a decision possibly within weeks. Slovakia currently has nine MiG-29AS and two MiG-29UBS aircraft. As we have previously assessed, the transfer of these Soviet-era fighters is much more likely in the short term given the stalling of negotiations around the transfer of modern Western jets last month. However, Slovakia had already pledged these aircraft as early as July of 2022, but no subsequent decision had been made to follow through with these transfers. As such, it remains unclear whether this transfer will go ahead as Nad previously stated that any transfers of Soviet-era aircraft would require the agreement of Slovakia’s NATO partners.
• CHINA: Unnamed US officials have claimed that Washington is seeking allies’ backing for coordinating sanctions against China if Beijing provides Russia with lethal aid. Reuters reported on 1 March that the consultations, which are still at an early stage, are intended to build support from G7 states in particular. However, it is not currently known what sanctions the US would impose. A report from Der Spiegel on 23 February cited unnamed sources who claimed that Russia and China are close to signing a deal with a private Chinese company on the supply of drones to Moscow (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 24 February 2023). While China has refuted these allegations, should China provide lethal aid to Russia, secondary sanctions are increasingly likely, though loopholes and proxy facilitation (such as via Belarus) could pose legal difficulties in proving Beijing’s involvement.
• MOLDOVA: Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humeniuk stated on 1 March that the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) in Transnistria is insufficient to open a new front in Ukraine, aligning with our assessment. In a separate statement, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated on 2 March that the likelihood of a Russian invasion of Moldova remains very low, assessing that Chișinău will be able to ‘cope’ with any escalation in Transnistria. We have frequently assessed that the OGRF, which numbers 1,500 at peak compliment but in reality is likely much smaller, together with the Transnistrian Armed Forces are unlikely to provide a credible force to seriously threaten Chișinău militarily. This is ultimately because Moscow will be largely unable to reinforce its forces in the region given Ukrainian air defences across the neighbouring Odesa oblast.
• MOLDOVA: Moscow would face major difficulties with consolidating any successful (or unsuccessful) Russian-triggered coup attempt or overt military intervention in Moldova. It therefore remains our assessment that Russia is more likely to utilise hybrid destabilisation capabilities to undermine the government ahead of the 2024 presidential election, rather than attempt an extremely risky military escalation. If this failed, it would threaten to seriously undermine Moscow’s long-term position and influence in the country. For further analysis on the threat of an escalation in Transnistria.
• GRAIN: Russia said on 1 March that it would only agree to extend the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) if its interests are considered. Moscow has repeatedly voiced grievances with the deal, mostly relating to sanctions on its payments, logistics and insurance industries, stating that they are a ‘barrier’ to its grain and fertiliser exports. Moscow has stated that the deal can only be extended if these are addressed – though it has threatened this before and approved the previous extension of the deal in any case. Yesterday (1 March), the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that ports in Ukraine’s Odesa oblast have been used to deliver radioactive material as recently as mid-February, which Moscow alleges are preparations for a false-flag radiological attack (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 1 March 2023). Russia is likely to leverage this narrative to stall or block the deal’s renewal, threatening to drive global food prices after 18 March if no agreement is reached, which would most acutely be felt in Africa and the Middle East.
• SABOTAGE: On 2 March, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that a Russian saboteur planning to target transport infrastructure was arrested in Rivne oblast, underlining the enduring threat of sabotage to western Ukraine. The individual in question reportedly entered Ukraine from the EU on 19 February under an EU passport and had been conducting reconnaissance of an unspecified ‘strategic transport artery’ (likely railways) in Rivne oblast. The aim of the individual had been to plant explosives to undermine shipments of Western arms supplies from Poland. While a single incident, the arrest highlights the enduring threat of sabotage operations in western Ukraine and the infiltration of Russian agents via the EU at the Polish border. Robust SBU counter-intelligence operations will mitigate this threat, but the steady stream of Western weapons will mean Russian intelligence will continue to focus on western Ukraine for the foreseeable future.
FORECAST
BORDERS: On 2 March, Russian sources reported a ‘shootout’ with Ukrainian sabotage groups in the Russian region of Bryansk, north of the Ukrainian border. According to unconfirmed reports, Ukrainian forces have penetrated the international border around the villages of Sushany and Lyubechane, around 57 miles (92km) south-east of Gomel in Belarus, with fighting resulting in civilian casualties, including a child. Initial reports indicate that an electrical substation and petrol station have been targeted and that hostages have allegedly been taken, but this remains unconfirmed. Ukrainian special forces have operated inside Russia and conducted raids against critical infrastructure across the border region, but the Ukrainian State Border Service has this morning denied any involvement. While unclear at time of writing, it remains likely that this is a Russian false-flag operation.
Last week we reported on indications that Russian forces had been deploying personnel dressed in Ukrainian-looking uniforms along the international border of Bryansk-Chernihiv oblasts, near the border with Belarus. Sushany would fit this location (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 24 February 2023). The Kremlin has long been trying to portray Ukrainian forces as a credible threat to Russian civilians in the border regions, and the details around civilian casualties and hostages (unlikely to be accurate if this was a genuine Ukrainian special forces raid) align with established Russian narratives.
President Vladimir Putin has already described the alleged incident as a ‘terrorist attack’, while Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that it is ‘difficult to say’ whether the status of the ‘special military operation’ will change due to the unfolding events in Bryansk oblast. There is a realistic possibility that this incident has been orchestrated in order to justify altering martial law readiness conditions inside Russia, though a declaration of war remains unlikely considering Putin reframed from doing so during his important 21 February speech.
As such, while we cannot yet confirm whether this is a genuine Ukrainian raid, it is more likely a Russian false-flag operation designed to generate anti-Ukrainian sentiment to distract from the continual failure of the Russian offensives to make any notable progress in the east.
Moldova-Romania: Pledge to deepen economic ties will strengthen Moldova’s resilience amid Russian destabilisation campaign. On 1 March, Moldova and Romania pledged to boost economic ties by deepening financial integration and making Bucharest’s capital markets accessible to Moldovan businesses. During his first foreign visit since assuming office, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean indicated that Moldova was considering curtailing its energy dependence on Russia by signing long-term contracts on gas and electricity supplies with Romania. Recean also confirmed that the likelihood of a Russian invasion of Moldova remains low, given its insufficient operational capacities in Transnistria – which aligns with Sibylline’s assessment. Nevertheless, Moldova’s pro-EU government remains vulnerable to Russia’s attempts to destabilise the country by leveraging Moldova’s economic instability and supporting pro-Russian parties. Increased co-operation with Romania will likely bolster Moldova’s medium-to-long-term economic resilience by further anchoring its economy to the EU’s economic space. However, Russian hybrid operations will continue to seek to undermine such economic integration efforts.
Russia-Ukraine: Moscow will likely stall renewal of grain scheme; further global food price hikes likely. On 2 March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused the West of ‘shamelessly burying’ the Black Sea Grain Initiative, underlining the threat of a Russian withdrawal from the deal. According to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Russia has yet to agree to renew the scheme, which is due to expire on 18 March. Lavrov’s latest comments increase the likelihood that the deal will not be renewed on time if Moscow does not secure concessions that benefit its own exports. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed on 1 March that ports in Ukraine’s Odesa oblast have been used to deliver radioactive material as recently as mid-February, which Moscow alleges are preparations for a false-flag radiological attack. Russia is likely to leverage this narrative to stall or block the deal’s renewal, threatening to push up global food prices after 18 March if no agreement is reached.
Mar. 1.
Cyber Update.
Latest Significant Updates
Pro-Russia cyber groups continue low-level DDoS targeting of Ukraine and countries that support Ukraine
• On 26 February, pro-Russia hacktivist groups National Hackers of Russia, Anonymous Sudan, and NoName057 targeted banks, public services, and government entities in Canada, Denmark, Spain, and Italy.
• On 25 February, the pro-Russia hacktivist group, Phoenix launched defacement and DDoS attacks against Pakistan’s tenant registration system.
• On 24 February, the pro-Russia hacktivist group, Noname05716 launched a DDoS attack against ZTR’s website, a Ukrainian manufacturer of magnetically controlled shunt reactors.
• On 23 February, the pro-Russia hacktivist group, the Cyber Army of Russia launched a DDoS attack against the Italian transport software company, DigiTaxi.
Pro-Kyiv hacking groups increased targeting of Russian communication organisations and Russian and Belarusian state websites following the one-year anniversary of the invasion
• On 26 February, the pro-Kyiv group, TeamOneFist, announced that the mission dubbed ‘Silence of the Steppe II’ is almost complete.
• Between 28 and 23 February, the pro-Kyiv Italian sect of Anonymous, AnonSecIta, targeted various companies belonging to Vladimir Potanin (a Russian oligarch) with DDoS attacks. The affected companies include:
o RB Leasing (provides financial and operative leasing services)
o Rosbank Depositary Custody Services (provides services for the transaction of bank securities)
o RB Specialized Depositary (provides services for the transaction of bank securities)
o Rosbank Dom (bank branch providing services for stipulate mortgages and mortgage loans)
o Murmansk Transport Branch (provides port services and cargo handling in Murmansk from Norilsk Nickel)
o Polar Transport Branch (provides port services and cargo handling in Dudunka from Norilsk Nickel)
o Norilsktransgazm (a company that transports and supplies gas to industrial districts of Norilsk Nickel)
• On 24 February, to mark the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the pro-Kyiv group, the Ukraine student cyber army and FRC24 launched a joint DDoS operation against 45 Russian and Belarusian networks. On the same day, Anonymous defaced at least 32 websites with images showing the Kremlin burning.
Forecast
Pro-Russia cyber attacks against Ukrainian and European targets were sustained during this monitoring period. Several pro-Russia hacktivist groups continued to focus their DDoS campaigns on European government organisations. Other pro-Russia hacktivists began targeting Pakistan after the country decided to provide ammo supplies to Ukraine, highlighting a shift in expanding targeting campaigns to countries outside of NATO and the EU. Canadian banks were also targeted. Pro-Russian hacktivist group, Phoenix, announced that they officially became a member of Killnet and are supporting their pro-Russia operations. This comes shortly after Anonymous Sudan announced that they officially joined Killnet the previous week. Killnet has started making their most active affiliates members of the overall organisation, rather than engaging as separate groups with the same motivations. This suggests that there is a realistic possibility that Killnet will become a more centralised group and will likely be able to conduct wider-reaching and more sophisticated campaigns in the medium term.
During the one-year anniversary of the Ukraine war and in the days following the anniversary, the National Hackers of Russia attempted to provide coordinates of potential strategic targets for missile strikes to the Russian military. However, there has been no confirmed action by the Russian military. Killnet was observed doing this earlier in the war, providing coordinates for targets, but such low-level intelligence is likely to already be in possession of the Russian military. Similarly, users on Twitter encouraged those in Ukraine to turn off geolocation tracking on their phones, cautioning that Russia was using it to track gatherings, potentially in order to target gatherings with missile strikes.
Following the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, new pro-Kyiv hacktivist CH01 defaced various Russian websites, showing a video of the Kremlin on fire, and expressed support in the fight against Russia’s invasion. The Ukraine Student Cyber Army and FRC24 also conducted a joint DDoS attack against 45 Russian and Belarusian networks on the day of the anniversary. Such attacks coincided with other disruptive and defacement campaigns by Anonymous directed at Russian communications, media, and other services. This highlights the ongoing and growing efforts of pro-Kyiv hacktivists targeting Russian and Belarusian websites to protest their continuous presence in Ukraine.
During this monitoring period, we observed a new cyber operation organised by pro-Ukraine threat group, TeamOneFist. The operation, dubbed ‘Op Silence of the Steppe II’, is aimed at Russian media organisations. The group claimed responsibility for the hack on Russian commercial radio stations where air raid sirens were played, with instructions for civilians to take shelter in air raid refuges to cause widespread panic. The new operation appears to be targeting media and radio in Russia. All of the affected radio stations in the most recent campaign are owned by Gazprom Media, which is partially owned by the Russian government and a subsidiary of Gazprom energy, which is a frequent target of pro-Kyiv hacktivist campaigns. This suggests that there is a realistic likelihood that companies owned by Gazprom or affiliated with it will continue to be targeted in low-level hacking campaigns, mainly DDoS and defacement.
DDoS attacks by pro-Kyiv Anonymous affiliate, AnonSecIta were sustained against businesses owned by Russian oligarch, Vladimir Potanin during this monitoring period, as they have the past month. The attacks focused on Potanin’s Russian businesses in the banking, transport and mining sectors that are alleged to contribute to the funding of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine. These operations are highly likely to continue against Russian entities as the Ukraine conflict continues.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing to tighten their growing encirclement around Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published over the last 24 hours supports earlier Russian claims that Wagner Group forces have taken the Stupky area in the northern suburbs of Bakhmut, indicating that Russian forces are now likely set to continue pushing southwards into central Bakhmut in the coming days. However, even as other reports and footage indicate that Russian forces are successfully interdicting key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) out of the city, Kyiv has indicated it is committing more forces to the town’s defence. Commander of Ukraine’s Land Force and Eastern Operational Command Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi ordered reinforcements to the town on 28 February. However, it remains a realistic possibility that such a publicly made order is part of an ongoing information operation designed to cover preparations for an eventual withdrawal from the town. In the meantime, however, Ukrainian forces are continuing to hold the town.
• DONETSK: Russian sources have claimed limited tactical breakthroughs west of Donetsk city around Marinka, but such advances remain unconfirmed and are likely very limited in nature. Aside from this unconfirmed advance, there are few notable developments to report given Russian ground assaults continue to make very little progress across the Donetsk city axis.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have continued to conduct limited ground attacks along the Oskil Kreminna front over the last 24 hours, but have achieved little progress. The Ukrainian General staff reported that Ukrainian forces successfully repelled Russian attacks at numerous points along the frontline, including west of Kreminna and Bilohorivka south of the Siverskyi Donets River. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces dislodged Ukrainian forces from unspecified positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line. Although Russian forces have been concentrating equipment and forces across the Luhansk oblast in recent weeks, the current inability of Russian operations to generate notable advances on the Oskil-Kreminna front suggests that Moscow lacks sufficient reserves to increase the intensity of the offensive and generate breakthroughs.
• SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 28 February that Russian forces are currently setting conditions for future offensive operations along the Zaporizhzhia axis. The General Staff have provided no further details, but, notably, on 28 February the Ukrainian adviser Petro Andryushchenko claimed that Russian forces have moved 20-25,000 personnel from Mariupol raion to unspecified sections of the frontline. However, Andryushchenko did not specify where on the frontline, and given the recent failures in Donetsk oblast, it remains likely that these forces have redeployed to support combat operations around Vuhledar and Donetsk city, rather than to the Zaporizhzhia front. Nevertheless, as we have previously assessed, if Russian forces do maintain reserves in the region, a supplementary offensive along the Zaporizhzhia front remains a realistic possibility.
• STRIKES: Over the last 24-48 hours, numerous drones have been operating across western Russia, causing airspace closures and some explosions. The most notable incidents took place in the southern Black Sea town of Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai, some 270 miles (430km) southeast of the frontline. At least one UAV hit a Rosneft oil depot, causing a significant fire. Another drone reportedly crashed near the village of Gubastovo in Moscow oblast, notably near a large Gazprom facility and was likely the intended target. While Russia has blamed Ukraine for the attacks, Kyiv has denied any involvement, though it remains likely that they were Ukrainian-aligned operations. In addition, Russian forces this morning (1 March) launched four Shahed drones at Poltava oblast in central Ukraine, but Ukrainian air defences successfully interdicted them all.
• DRONES: UK Defence Intelligence reported on 1 March that it is highly likely that Russian forces have begun launching Shahed-136 drones from Bryansk oblast, much closer to the Ukrainian border. Previously the only identifiable drone launch site since December 2022 had been from Krasnodar Krai, south-east of Ukraine, which had facilitated drone attacks against southern and central Ukraine. Activating a second launch site for drones in Bryansk will allow Russian drones to apply additional pressure on Kyiv and northern Ukraine while providing Ukrainian air defences less time to identify and interdict the drones. The overall number of drone attacks has reduced in recent weeks, which likely reflects diminishing stocks. However, Moscow is aiming to ramp up production and acquire large numbers of drones from third parties, including principally Iran but also potentially via Chinese companies as previously reported.
• STRIKES: Ukrainian intelligence has warned that Russian forces could be preparing for a series of mass long-range strikes in the coming 48-hour period given the uptick in Russian strategic air and naval activity. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on 28 February a marked step up in the number of Kalibr cruise missile carriers that have put to sea in the Black Sea, despite slightly stormy weather, which currently stands at five surface vessels and two submarines.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• ESPIONAGE: On 28 February, President Vladimir Putin ordered the Federal Security Service (FSB) to step up counter-intelligence operations inside Russia and the occupied territories to combat alleged Ukrainian and Western sabotage and espionage operations. Putin also acknowledged the FSB’s role in supporting the Russian Armed Forces and Rosgvardia in Ukraine, and continued to frame the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine in domestic security terms. Putin has frequently sought to do so to reinforce the narrative that Ukraine poses a domestic security threat to Russia and to justify a ramping up of repression under martial law conditions. This announcement is highly unlikely to indicate a recent shift in Moscow’s counter-espionage stance, but rather a public confirmation of the already heightened counter-espionage environment. Under martial law conditions, the risk of surveillance, censorship and arbitrary arrest remains high across the country, with recent drone attacks likely to help the Kremlin set conditions for further clampdowns in 2023 if Ukrainian and partisan activity continues to escalate.
• BELARUS: On 1 March, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka met with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Beijing, where he proposed deepening cooperation between Minsk and Beijing. Lukashenka also suggested the creation of joint ventures and the modernisation of Belarusian enterprises using Chinese technology, even though Minsk’s strategic industries remain under Western sanctions. Minsk is not directly involved in the war in Ukraine, and is unlikely to become a direct participant in the short term. However, amidst Western concerns that China could provide Russia lethal aid to use in Ukraine, growing ties between Belarus and China raises the realistic possibility that Minsk will facilitate sanctions evasion efforts between Russia and China. The high-profile state visit underlines the gap between Beijing and the West on relations with Belarus and Russia, with Beijing set to maintain cordial relations with all involved parties amid its potential role in facilitating negotiations to end the war in the future.
• MOLDOVA: The Transnistrian Ministry of Defence has announced that fresh military training exercises will begin on 1 March. On 28 February, the ministry stated that the region’s ‘peace-keeping contingent’ continues to accept applications for participation in the next three-month training camp. Russia has previously attempted to step up recruitment for Transnistrian militia forces, with advertising flyers appearing across the breakaway region last year. However, the timing of the Transnistrian MoD’s announcement is significant as Moscow recently claimed that Ukraine is preparing a false-flag attack in the breakaway region – which Moscow has now alleged could include a radiological incident (see FORECAST below).
• MOLDOVA: On 28 February, Ukraine’s State Security Service’s spokesman said that Defence Forces were fortifying the border with Transnistria. Moscow is likely to utilise Ukrainian border reinforcements to support its narrative that Kyiv is preparing a provocation or invasion of the breakaway region. Border provocations and false flag ‘terror attacks’ are increasingly likely in the short-term. Further domestic instability inside Moldova-proper is also highly likely, such as protests from pro-Russian parties which are likely to cause disruption in Chișinău and the capital’s surrounding highways.
• SANCTIONS: Western technology companies continued to export dual-use and specific military parts to Russia as late as November 2022, according to a report released by International Partnership for Human Rights and the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission. The 28 February report stated that components continued to be shipped to Russia, despite Western sanctions, through official distributors or third countries such as Hong Kong and Turkey. It also noted that the Russian Kalibr cruise missile, which has been frequently used during strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, allegedly uses parts produced by nine US companies, as well as by a Swiss enterprise and a Taiwanese company. Western parts were also reportedly found in Iskandr ballistic missiles, Kh-101 cruise missiles and Tornado multiple rocket systems. To mark the anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UK, US and EU announced new embargoes to target Moscow’s war machine. The report’s revelations are likely to only reinforce the West’s determination to close loopholes in existing sanctions regimes in 2023, increasing reputational and legal exposure for companies deemed to not be compliant across its entire supply and customer chains.
FORECAST
CBRN: The Russian Foreign Ministry on 1 March once again reiterated its unfounded accusations that Ukraine is preparing a radiological false-flag operation that it intends to blame on Russia. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova has now alleged that such a radiological incident could occur near Transnistria (for more analysis on escalation in Transnistria. However, Zakharova has also alleged that the ports of Ukraine’s Odesa oblast have been used to deliver radioactive substances as recently as 16 February.
Moscow now claims, again without evidence, that nuclear material arrived at the port of Chernomorsk, bypassing customs, to deliver Californium-252, a very strong neutron emitter that is extremely radioactive but which has civilian utility in monitoring the integrity of nuclear reactors. Ukraine’s nuclear energy agency Energoatom did confirm on 28 February that seven of its nuclear power units have now been fully converted to fuel supplied by US Westinghouse in a bid to gain independence from Russian-supplied nuclear fuel. As such, deliveries of nuclear material may have taken place under genuine nuclear contracts with US nuclear suppliers. However, Moscow is clearly trying to frame the transition to US-supplied nuclear fuel as indicative of preparations for a radiological false-flag operation. However, as previously assessed, Moscow has pushed the threat of false-flag operations at semi-regular intervals throughout this war without any major provocation triggering an escalation.
Nevertheless, the key implication is that Moscow is now linking allegations of a nuclear false-flag with Ukrainian ports utilised by the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which is due for renewal on 18 March. This will provide Moscow with another reason to delay or block the extension of the deal if it pushes the line that Ukraine is using the initiative to smuggle in nuclear material. We will continue to monitor given that this development risks disrupting the BSGI and resultant food security and prices around the world.
Belarus-China: Increased cooperation with China will continue despite Western sanctions pressure. On 1 March, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka proposed to deepen cooperation between Minsk and Beijing during a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. Lukashenka also suggested the creation of joint ventures and the modernisation of Belarusian enterprises using Chinese technology, despite the fact that Minsk’s strategic industries remain under Western sanctions. Beijing will reportedly supply two sets of screening equipment for Minsk’s airport, but the scale of further cooperation remains unclear. While Belarus is not directly involved in the war in Ukraine, Lukashenka’s visit to China signals stronger cooperation between Minsk and Beijing as the West remains concerned that China could provide Russia lethal aid to use in Ukraine. The high-profile state visit clearly underlines the division between Beijing and the West on relations with Belarus and Russia. China’s intention to maintain close ties with the two countries will increasingly undermine its claim of neutrality in the conflict and its role as a potential mediator in any future peace negotiations.
Russia: Ban on instant messaging services for select organisations increases risk of further censorship impacting foreign entities. On 1 March, the Russian media regulator Roskomnadzor prohibited certain organisations from using foreign instant messaging services to transfer payment documents and provide personal data of Russians or information on money transfers when providing public services. The banned messaging services include Discord, Microsoft Teams, Skype, Telegram and WhatsApp. While Roskomnadzor has not published its list of companies, entities with state involvement are the most vulnerable to this new rule change, with foreign companies less likely to be impacted in the short term – though it implies a potential direction for future media regulation. The amendment to media laws came as President Vladimir Putin called on the Federal Security Service (FSB) to step up counter-intelligence operations in Russia to mitigate the alleged activity of Western and Ukrainian espionage operatives. The new ban and the intensification of domestic surveillance underline the strengthening of Russia’s censorship and repressive apparatus, increasing surveillance, compliance and arbitrary law enforcement risks for foreign entities and staff.
Sanctions Update
Key Points
• Indicators point towards a protracted war of attrition in Ukraine in the coming year, with Western partners set to persist in efforts to close loopholes in the sanctions regime.
• The expansion and tightening of the sanctions regime will increase compliance, reputational and secondary sanction risks for firms with direct and indirect links to Russia.
• Russia’s consolidation of alternative trade partnerships with governments such as China, India and Iran is likely to undermine the effectiveness of enforcement measures and additional sanctions packages, exacerbated by disagreements between EU states over new sanctions measures.
• Efforts by European governments to reduce their reliance on supplies of Russian oil, gas and raw materials are likely to sustain energy insecurity, price volatility and supply chain risks in the near to medium term.
Context
Western governments and international allies have imposed a series of comprehensive financial sanctions, trade restrictions and export controls targeting Russia since its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Over 30 countries representing more than 50% of the world’s economy have placed sanctions on Moscow. The sanctions aim to weaken Russia’s ability to finance and sustain the war while increasing the costs to Russian President Vladimir Putin and his circle of elites. Despite sustained economic pressure, the Russo-Ukrainian war is showing few signs of ending (see Sibylline Special Report – Russia-Ukraine: A Year of War in Ukraine, Scenarios for the Year Ahead – 24 February 2023). Western allies will sustain efforts to close sanctions loopholes in the coming months, aiming to crack down on governments and companies which directly or indirectly facilitate Moscow’s sanctions evasion activities.
EU sanctions overview and recent actions.Since February 2022, EU member states have agreed on ten sanctions packages targeting Russia in response to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The packages have targeted critical sectors such as oil and gas, financial services, media and mining. The sanctions have included sector-specific trade restrictions, restrictions on the provision of business services to Russian companies as well as export restrictions on dual-use items and advanced technologies which support Russia’s ‘military and technological enhancement’. In recent months, the EU has expanded the sanctions regime to align further with G7 allies and curtail sanctions evasion efforts.
The tenth EU sanctions package, adopted on 25 February, will increase compliance and secondary sanctions risks for companies and third-country entities supplying dual-use equipment to Moscow. The EU has included third-country entities in the Russian dual-use sanctions regime for the first time, expanding sanctions to target seven Iranian entities. Aimed at undermining Russian critical sectors and military operations in Ukraine, the tenth package stipulates additional export bans and restrictions on dual-use and industrial goods such as cranes, engine components, electronics, machine parts and all remaining tech products with battlefield use.
UK sanctions overview and recent actions. As of 24 February, the UK government has implemented sanctions on more than 1,551 individuals and 181 entities, relating to Russia’s ongoing military activities in Ukraine. London has also sanctioned Russian assets worth more than GPB 18.3 bn. In coordination with Western partners, British sanction packages have targeted sectors identified as of strategic significance to the Russian economy, including the chemical, defence, energy, electronics and financial services sectors. UK sanctions include export and import bans on a range of products, materials and components, travel bans and sanctions on individuals linked to the Kremlin or the Russian defence sector.
On 24 February the UK government announced a new package of sanctions on Russia that include export bans on ‘every item Russia has [used] on the battlefield to date’. The list includes dual-use components such as aircraft parts, electronic components and radio equipment. The new sanctions also include import bans of iron and steel products processed in third countries, a loophole that was criticised previously by UK steelmakers (see Sibylline Monthly Sanctions Update – November 2022). The UK government also sanctioned individuals and entities, including Russia’s MTS Bank, which has branches in the UAE.
US sanctions overview and recent sanctions
US sanctions targeting Russia since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have broadly aligned with measures taken by Western partners, namely the EU and the UK. These include sanctions on Russian political and business elites, as well as sectors including aerospace, defence, electronics, financial services, and hydrocarbons. However, Washington’s relatively low reliance on Russian energy supplies compared to European governments has underpinned its unilateral ban on the import of Russian oil, liquefied natural gas and coal products since 8 March 2022.
The White House announced one of its most ‘significant sanctions actions’ on 24 February, the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This highlights efforts to increase economic pressure on Russia and crack down on the global network of individuals and companies supporting sanctions evasion. Washington listed nearly 90 Russian and third-country companies, including those based in Malta, Switzerland and the UAE, for engaging in sanctions evasion and activities in support of Russia’s defence sector. The listings aim to prohibit targeted companies from purchasing items such as semiconductors. Washington stated that it will also increase tariffs on Russian metals, minerals and chemical products worth approximately USD2.8m to Moscow.
Coordinated sanctions overview and recent actions
Coordinated sanctions announced by the EU, UK and US in recent months have aimed to tighten the sanctions regime. A key focus of such measures has therefore been to restrict Russian energy export revenues, bolstered by high global energy prices and trade with alternative partners such as China and India. The EU’s ban on Russian diesel fuel and other refined oil products came into force on 5 February and will be combined with an EU and G7 price cap of USD 100 per barrel of diesel and USD 45 per barrel on fuel oil and other low-end oil products. This will increase compliance requirements for shipping companies carrying Russian cargo. As agreed by EU and G7 governments in December, shipping companies must adhere to the cap in order to access insurance and finance from EU and G7 providers.
FORECAST
Expansion of sanctions regime amid protracted war in Ukraine will increase compliance, reputational and secondary sanction risks for third-party entities
All indicators point to the Kremlin persisting in a protracted war in Ukraine, with Putin under continuing pressure from hardliners to deliver on Moscow’s maximalist war goals (see Sibylline Special Report – Russia-Ukraine: A Year of War in Ukraine, Scenarios for the Year Ahead – 24 February 2023). This base case scenario would involve Western allies stepping up efforts to close sanctions loopholes.
The expansion and tightening of the sanctions regime will increase compliance, reputational and secondary sanction risks for businesses with direct links to Russia, as well as those with indirect links via third parties. If implemented, the proposal by over a dozen EU member states, led by the Netherlands, to establish a centralised EU sanctions watchdog will oblige companies to include end-clauses in contracts to ensure that they are not supplying their goods to Russia’s military (see Sibylline Daily Update – 22 February 2023). This would increase the need for firms to conduct enhanced supply chain due diligence. The proposed watchdog would also closely monitor trade flows and sectors in which the risk of sanctions circumvention is high.
Intra-EU disputes will undermine effectiveness of sanctions; additional sanctions will sustain energy insecurity, price volatility, supply chain risks in near to medium term
Disagreements between EU member states are likely to undermine the effectiveness of enforcement measures and new sanctions packages. With regards to the former, governments such as Cyprus and Hungary are likely to resist attempts to grant the proposed EU sanctions watchdog meaningful powers. Meanwhile, the latter is highlighted by the delay in the approval of the EU’s tenth sanctions package due to intra-bloc policy disagreements. Differing domestic economic, energy and political priorities are likely to continue to represent a source of tension between Western allies, and in particular, EU member countries.
Efforts by Western states to reduce their dependence on supplies of Russian oil, gas and raw materials such as iron and steel are likely to sustain energy insecurity, price spikes and supply chain risks in the near to medium term. This is highlighted by the EU’s ban on Russian diesel fuel and other refined oil products, combined with an EU and G7 price cap, which entered into force on 5 February. France, which has historically been reliant on Russian diesel, will face a significant challenge in replacing Russian supplies in the coming months. European governments will continue to seek alternative energy partners and are likely to consolidate economic, energy and trade ties with governments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
Crackdown on sanctions evasion will increase regional tensions, secondary sanction risks for governments in the MENA, Asia-Pacific regions. During 2023, the Kremlin will continue to evade sanctions via illicit smuggling activities and undermine their effectiveness by expanding energy, military and trade relations with alternative partners such as China, India and Iran. Nevertheless, sanctions on dual-use goods will increase supply chain risks for Russian industries and undermine state revenues in the coming months.
Governments in the MENA and Asia-Pacific regions, among others, will face increasing scrutiny by Western partners over their ties with Moscow, as Western allies are likely to further expand sanctions on third-party entities. Mounting pressure by Western governments in the coming weeks will increase the likelihood of Emirati authorities severing or downgrading banking ties with Russia’s UAE-licensed MTS Bank. This is underpinned by elevated secondary sanction risks, as London and Washington have placed sanctions on MTS Bank in the past week. In addition, the likelihood of Beijing supplying Moscow with weapons or equipment supporting its military capabilities will increase the risk of sanctions on Chinese companies. Such sanctions will be limited in scope, though will increase tensions between Beijing and Western governments.
Feb. 28.
• BAKHMUT: Reports over the last 24-48 hours that Ukrainian forces had launched a counter-attack north of Bakhmut designed to cut off advancing Wagner Group forces remain unconfirmed and are unlikely to be accurate. Beyond unconfirmed reports by pro-Ukrainian sources, there is little indication that Ukrainian forces have mounted such a counter-attack and Russian forces are likely continuing their steady advance into the northern suburbs of the town. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin this morning (28 February) claimed that Russian forces have now taken the Stupky area in the northern suburbs of Bakhmut, but this remains unconfirmed. The commander of Ukraine’s Ground Forces Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi described the situation around Bakhmut as ‘extremely tense’ on 28 February, and reported that Wagner forces are now committing its most trained assault units to the fight in a bid to break the back of the Ukrainian defence. President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 27 February that fighting in Bakhmut is ‘getting more and more challenging’, and with steady Russian advances to the north, it remains unclear when Ukrainian forces will decide to withdraw to prevent encirclement.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian spokesperson for the Tavriisk Direction Defence Forces, Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi has reported that the overall tempo of Russian operations around Vuhledar has decreased over the past four days due to poor weather. He also reported that Russian forces launched ‘only’ 17 ground assaults against the town on 27 February, a reduction compared to previous weeks.
• DONETSK: Former FSB and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officer Igor Strelkov (Girkin) claimed on 27 February that his sources near the front have also reported increased Ukrainian activity in the area of operations south-west of Donetsk near Vuhledar. Strelkov assessed that a build-up of Ukrainian forces would be logical given the extremely high casualties Russian forces have suffered in recent months during their failed assault on Vuhledar (including the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade). This would in turn provide an opportunity for Ukrainian forcesto exploit emerging vulnerabilities in the exhausted Russian line here. On 26 February, the GUR stated that a principal objective of the Ukrainian spring counter-offensive would be to drive a wedge between Crimea and Russia. A former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) militia spokesperson visited this section of the front earlier this week and underlined the importance of Russian efforts to hold the line here amid such Ukrainian plans. Ukrainian operations designed to capitalise on Russian failures in Vuhledar could therefore provide an opportunity to counter-attack in the coming weeks.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have continued to successfully repel Russian ground attacks along the Oskil-Kreminna front. On 27 February, Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bilohorivka, Kreminna, Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Svatove. Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast Serhiy Haidai reported on 27 February that Russian forces are currently concentrating equipment and forces across Luhansk oblast, with Russian forces reportedly deploying an additional 200 conscripts from Rostov Oblast to support operations in Luhansk. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger has claimed that Russia’s choice to conduct a gradual approach along the Oskil-Kreminna axis highlights the difficulties Russian forces are facing in achieving anything more than marginal and tactical advances on this front at present.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report.
• STRIKES: On 27 February, the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that it had hit numerous military targets during the UAV raids overnight on 26-27 February. According to Moscow, Russian forces struck a Ukrainian army electronic intelligence centre in Brovary, east of Kyiv, as well as the operational centre of Ukraine’s Special Operations West in Khmelnytskyi. While this remains unconfirmed, the fact that kamikaze Shahed-136 drones have ostensibly been used to target military, rather than energy, targets could indicate a slight change in targeting priority for the Russian military. As previously noted, Russian forces have yet to launch large-scale strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure following the anniversary. However, rising temperatures are likely to undermine the impact of strikes on energy infrastructure and as precision missile stocks deplete there is a realistic possibility that the Russian General Staff will prioritise military targets over energy infrastructure during future long-range strike campaigns. This particularly considering the fairly limited military impact of Russia’s energy infrastructure campaign to date.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• AIRSPACE: On 28 February, the airspace over St Petersburg’s Pulkovo airport was temporarily closed following reports that an unidentified object, possibly a drone, had been spotted. After the flights restarted, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) said it had been conducting drills, which had involved fighter jets over the country’s western airspace. Reports of an unknown object flying close to the northern Russian city are likely to cause further concern for Moscow about sabotage attacks as Belarusian partisans claimed to have destroyed a Russian plane at an airstrip near the capital of Minsk on 26 February.
• AIRSPACE: The closure of St Petersburg’s airspace comes after Hungarian budget airline Wizz Air announced on 27 February that it will suspend all flights to and from the Moldovan capital of Chișinău from 14 March, citing an ‘elevated’ risk to the country’s airspace. Moldova’s airspace was temporarily closed earlier this month following sightings of an unidentified balloon, reflecting the wider and growing threat of unidentified flying objects causing short-notice travel disruption. Should other companies stop routes to Moldova, as would be likely if a major escalation around Transnistria occurs in the coming weeks (see FORECAST below), this would severely impact travel options for organisations reliant on Moldova for its Ukraine operations.
• DOMESTIC: On 27 February, large numbers of teenagers identifying as members of the so-called ‘PMC Ryodan’ gathered in major cities across Ukraine with the intention of triggering mass brawls. Hundreds of teenagers, many of them minors, gathered in the city centres of Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv and Zhytomyr, but strong police presences prevented fighting and detained dozens of individuals across the country. While the group identifies as a PMC (private military company), they are not paramilitaries but rather a teenage sub-culture inspired by an anime series. The movement has its origins inside Russia. Russian security forces detained over 220 people on 24 February during a Ryodan flashmob brawl in the Aviapark shopping centre in Moscow, with further raids against the group across multiple other Russian cities since. There is no indication that Ukrainian members of the PMC Ryodan movement are operating under official Russian auspices, given that the Russian government is actively attempting to shut the movement down. Shopping centres will remain at increased risk of further ‘Ryodan’ flash mob brawls in the future, but such groups will pose a criminal security threat rather than a credible paramilitary threat in Ukraine.
• CBRN: On 28 February, the head of Russia’s Radiation, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops (RKhBZ), Igor Kirillov, accused the US of preparing a ‘provocation’ with chemical weapons in Ukraine. Kirillov claimed, without evidence, that US-supplied chemical substances have been delivered to the Kramatorsk Metallurgical Plant, specifically BZ (Substance 78), which is a military incapacitating agent which can cause psychosis and hallucinations. Kirillov claims that the provocation will be blamed on Russia, indicating the realistic possibility of a false-flag operation at some point in the future.
• CBRN: This is the latest Russian allegation in recent weeks that Ukraine and its Western partners are preparing for a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) escalation inside Ukraine. However, Moscow has frequently alleged such preparations over the last 12 months without anything happening (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 20 February 2023). We have previously assessed that the localised release of industrial hazards will remain a credible threat in the Donbas. Russian forces have previously targeted industrial centres indiscriminately with artillery. Increasing scrutiny will be placed on Kramatorsk in particular if and when Russian forces take Bakhmut.
FORECAST
MOLDOVA: On 27 February, Moldova’s intelligence agency said that two foreign nationals who posed as tourists have been removed from the country amid an ongoing Russian destabilisation campaign. The Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) claimed that the duo were trained in data and information gathering ‘for the implementation of a plan to destabilise’ Moldova’s internal security. The agency said that the pair surveyed ‘locations near government offices and critical infrastructure’. Moldovan President Maia Sandu warned earlier this month that Moscow was plotting to oust the country’s pro-EU government (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 13 February 2023).
On 28 February, the spokesman of Ukraine’s State Security Service said that Defence Forces were fortifying the border with the breakaway Moldovan region after Moscow claimed that Ukraine was planning to attack Transnistria. Such troop movements and fortifications will likely be utilised by Russia and pro-Russian information operatives to reinforce their narrative that Kyiv is preparing a provocation to lay conditions for the invasion of Transnistria. To justify its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow claimed it was to protect Russian-speaking minorities and further destabilisation attempts in Moldova are likely. Further polarisation in relation to whether Chișinău should align with the West and join the EU and NATO, or maintain traditional ties with Moscow, is likely. A recent poll found around 70% of respondents were against severing economic and diplomatic relations with Moscow.
Feb. 27.
• OFFENSIVES: Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym Skibitsky stated on 26 February that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a counter-offensive in the spring, with one of its goals to ‘drive a wedge […] between Crimea and the Russian mainland’. Skibitsky acknowledged that the specific timing of the counter-offensive will remain dependent upon a range of factors, and there remains scope for such statements to be part of information operations designed to distract from the principal effort. However, as we have frequently assessed, a Ukrainian counter-offensive designed to cut off the land bridge south of Zaporizhzhia remains a highly logical objective for Kyiv, given this is Russia’s weakest strategic point in Ukraine. Skibitsky also notably confirmed Kyiv’s intentions to strike arms depots and airfields inside Russia as part of its counter-offensive, including around the city of Belgorod.
• OFFENSIVES: So far, Russia’s winter offensive has achieved very few results. If Russian forces fail to achieve a breakthrough and steadily lose their offensive momentum in the process, this will provide Ukrainian forces opportunities to launch a counter-punch in the coming weeks and months to exploit emerging vulnerabilities in the Russian line. For scenarios around Russia and Ukraine’s offensives in Q1-Q2 2023, see our Anniversary Special Report – 24 February 2023. In the meantime, the Russian offensive continues to sustain heavy pressure on Ukrainian forces at three key points: Bakhmut, Oskil-Kreminna (the Lyman direction) and Vuhledar (south-west of Donetsk city). This morning (27 February), the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces had repelled 81 Russian ground assaults over the last 24 hours across eastern Ukraine.
• ANNIVERSARY: The Kremlin notably made no official comment to mark the first anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February. Despite the ramping up of rhetoric and threats last week (including around Moldova, Belarus and the threat of long-range strikes), Russian actions have so far remained restrained and limited, though these trigger points will remain credible threats moving forward.
• STRIKES: Despite predictions, Russian forces have so far refrained from launching long-range cruise missile strikes against Ukraine to mark the first anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but UAV attacks continue. Overnight on 26-27 February, Russian forces launched 14 Shahed kamikaze drones across Ukraine, 11 of which Ukrainian air defences intercepted – including nine over Kyiv. A number of UAVs succeeded in reaching Khmelnytskyi where several buildings have been damaged, resulting in casualties. As our recent strike pattern analysis showed, Sundays (i.e. 26 February) have recorded consistently high numbers of UAV drone strikes compared to other days of the week, which has frequently prefaced more significant cruise missile strikes on Monday morning. At time of writing Russian forces have not launched a wave of cruise missile strikes, though such attacks remain a realistic possibility in the coming hours and days. For our strike pattern analysis, see our Anniversary Special Report – 24 February 2023.
• BAKHMUT: Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on 24 and 25 February that his forces had successfully taken the villages of Yahidne and Berkhivka, just over a mile (1.6km) and two miles (4km) northwest of Bakhmut respectively. Geolocated footage seems to confirm the former, but the latter remains unconfirmed. Russian sources also claimed on 26 February that they captured Dubovo-Vasylivka, four miles (7km) northwest of Bakhmut, though this remains unconfirmed. Amid steady Russian advances to the north of Bakhmut, Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces destroyed a dam and flooded the Stupky area in the northern suburbs of Bakhmut (near Yahidne) where Wagner forces are currently advancing. This remains unconfirmed at this stage, but such an effort would likely aim to slow the Russian advances in this area.
• DONETSK: Russian offensive operations further south continue to focus on areas west of Donetsk city and around Vuhledar, but apart from marginal advances around Avdiivka, little progress has been made. Ukrainian spokesperson for the Tavriisk Direction Defence Forces, Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, reported that the Russian 155th and 40th Naval Infantry Brigades of the Pacific Fleet have been merged into a single brigade given their significant losses around Vuhledar and that Rosgvardia units have been deployed in the area as blocking units given reports that elements of the unit had refused orders to fight. This remains unconfirmed.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian advances made during the ongoing offensive in northern Luhansk oblast remain tactical and limited, with Ukrainian defences continuing to hold from Kupiansk to Kreminna. The Ukrainian General Staff and various other Ukrainian sources have over the last 48 hours reported that Ukrainian forces have repelled a large number of Russian ground assaults on this axis, including an attack around Novoselivske, eight miles (14km) north-west of Svatove. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on 24 February that Russian forces had taken an unspecified Ukrainian fortification near Bilhorivka, to the south of the Siverskyi Donets River, but this very much reflects that Russian forces are only achieving marginal and tactical advances on this front.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report.
• COMMAND: President Volodymyr Zelensky has fired the Ukrainian commander of Joint Forces Operations Major General Eduard Moskalov. The presidential decree, published on 26 February, did not provide a reason for Moskalov’s dismissal, but it comes amid a wider shake-up of the Ukrainian political and military leadership following a series of high-profile corruption scandals, including within the Ministry of Defence. It is unclear whether Moskalov’s dismissal is related to said scandals.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• PARTISAN: On 26 February, Belarus’ exiled opposition claimed that partisans had destroyed a Russian plane estimated to be worth EUR 330 m at an airstrip near the capital of Minsk. While the type of aircraft was not specified, reports suggest it might have been an A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) plane. Belarusian authorities did not comment on the incident, however, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka called for a meeting of security officials on 27 February. Although the reported attack on the plane cannot be verified, if confirmed it would be one of the highest-profile Belarusian partisan attacks against Russian military infrastructure in months. While such attacks could be utilised by Moscow and/or Minsk to justify greater Belarusian involvement in the war, it remains unlikely. See Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 24 February 2023 for more analysis on Belarus’ possible intervention in the war.
• DOMESTIC: On 24 February, small anti-war protests occurred across Russia to mark the first anniversary of the invasion, reflecting very limited anti-war sentiment in Russia. Over 50 anti-war protesters were arrested in major cities including Moscow and St Petersburg, and isolated protesters were detained in Kazan and Irkutsk. Any anti-war protests, however small, remain banned under current Russian legislation. The very low turnout at protests to mark the anniversary underlines the effectiveness of Russia’s repressive state apparatus in preventing mass demonstrations against the war. Amid widespread apathy, such repression will likely contain protest activity in Russia to very low levels for the foreseeable future.
• SANCTIONS: On 25 February, the EU approved fresh sanctions on Russia following reports of disagreements between member states. The new measures include export bans on dual-use and advanced technologies worth more than EUR 11 bn to deprive Moscow’s economy of critical technology and industrial goods. The embargoes also target 121 individuals and entities, including Iranian drone manufacturers. Three Russian banks were added to entities subject to asset freezes; import bans were placed on Russian bitumen, synthetic rubber and carbon blacks. The measures were delayed by the reported initial failure of EU member states to agree new restrictive measures against Moscow ahead of the anniversary, showing continuing policy disagreements within the bloc. Meanwhile, the UK and US announced new sanctions to hamper Russia’s war effort on 24 February.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Following the publication of China’s 12-point plan last week, French President Emmanuel Macron welcomed the role of Beijing in trying to facilitate talks to end the war. In contrast, however, US President Joe Biden rejected China’s 12-point plan on 25 February, stating that it is ‘not rational’ for China to negotiate a final peace settlement between Kyiv and Moscow. Ultimately, Beijing has not yet outlined any meaningful proposals for reaching a ceasefire or a final peace agreement (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 24 February 2023). The first anniversary of the invasion has reinvigorated efforts by the international community to explore options for a ceasefire, but almost all political and military indicators point to this being a longer-term prospect, with meaningful negotiations to end the war highly unlikely in the next six months. For further analysis of the trajectory of negotiations, see FORECAST below.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: On 24 February, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that officials from France, Germany and the UK are in the process of drawing up a NATO-Ukraine pact in a bid to bring both Kyiv and Moscow to the negotiating table. While unconfirmed, the WSJ cited unnamed officials from all three countries that the proposed pact would commit to supplying advanced NATO weaponry to Ukraine, but would not provide robust security guarantees akin to Article 5 in NATO – contrary to Kyiv’s NATO aspirations. Notably, however, the German government on 26 February denied these reports.
The pact would reportedly arm the Ukrainians to facilitate a major counter-offensive in 2023. This would form part of a wider effort to assist Kyiv in building a credible defence force to deter future Russian aggression. It is allegedly hoped that such a force would change the Kremlin’s military calculus and force them to the negotiating table amid Western concerns that the war in Ukraine could protract for years to come. However, there are widespread concerns in Kyiv and across central and eastern Europe that premature negotiations will only encourage further Russian aggression at a later date. Amid growing concerns that the war could protract for years to come, the officials reportedly expressed concerns about the West’s ability to continue supporting Ukraine indefinitely, high casualty rates being sustained by Ukrainian forces and Kyiv’s ability to recapture all occupied territory, including Crimea, in the short to medium term.
Ultimately, growing Western anxieties around fighting a protracted war are only likely to encourage the Kremlin to double down on its current strategy in Ukraine, which is highly likely designed to slowly grind the Ukrainians down and wait for Western support to Kyiv to steadily ebb away. An interview with CIA Director Bill Burns on 26 February supported this assessment when he claimed that following a meeting with his counterpart Sergei Naryshkin the Kremlin appeared ‘too confident’ in its belief that Moscow can ‘make time work’ for Russia. While it remains unclear whether Moscow will be able to sustain its war effort over the long term, particularly given credible reports that Putin is not receiving accurate reports on the state of the Russian Armed Forces, the Kremlin’s strategy is likely predicated upon an attritional conflict. As such, meaningful negotiations are highly unlikely in the next six months, short of a majorly successful Ukrainian counter-offensive this year.
Poland: Energy security will remain resilient despite Russian oil supply cut. On 25 February the CEO of Poland’s PKN Orlen refinery, Daniel Obajtek, announced that Russia had halted supplies of oil to Poland via the Druzhba pipeline. The supply cut was likely in retaliation to Warsaw delivering its first Leopard tanks to Ukraine a day earlier. According to Obajtek, the refinery will replace the Russian supplies – accounting for around 10% of the refinery’s supply – with seaborne supplies to an oil terminal in the northern city of Gdansk. The PKN Orlen refinery already sources oil from Mexico, the Middle East and West Africa. Disruption to deliveries of petrol or diesel is unlikely as a result of the supply cut. Poland’s efforts to source non-Russian energy supplies over the past decade mean that the country has a high level of energy security and resilience against potential supply disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Mar 23. Ukrainian pilot pair in Arizona to fly military simulators -US officials. Two Ukrainian pilots are in Arizona to fly flight simulators and be evaluated by the U.S. military, two U.S. officials said on Saturday, as Washington remains mute on whether it will send fighter jets or sophisticated remotely piloted drones to Kyiv.
The U.S. and allies have been flooding Ukraine with weapons from Javelin missiles to HIMARS rocket launchers, but sophisticated jets and the largest armed drones have not been pledged to Ukraine by Western allies.
The Arizona “familiarization event” is a first and will facilitate dialogue between Ukrainian and U.S. personnel and provide an opportunity to observe how the U.S. Air Force operates, a U.S. defense official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“This event allows us to better help Ukrainian pilots become more effective pilots and better advise them on how to develop their own capabilities,” the defense official said.
“The program involves watching how Ukrainian pilots conduct their mission planning and execution in flight simulators in order to determine how we can better advise the Ukrainian Air Force on how to use capabilities they have,” an administration official said on condition of anonymity.
Other allies have also conducted similar events in the past, the defense official said. The defense official did not say how long the Ukrainians had been in the Southwestern state.
The officials said there were no updates regarding F-16 fighter jet pledges to Ukraine.
“It’s about training them on their own planes,” the administration official said, “not about F-16s.”
The U.S. has not begun any F-16 training of Ukrainians, Colin Kahl, under secretary of defense for policy, told members of the House of Representatives on Tuesday.
Training on military equipment, both for its use and maintenance, has been a leading indicator of a potential transfer.
Kahl made the remarks during a hearing focused on oversight of the nearly $32 billion in military aid President Joe Biden’s administration has provided to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion a year ago, including drones, long-range artillery systems and air defense capabilities.
The Pentagon’s assessment for even the most expeditious delivery of F-16s and concurrent training is 18 months, “so you don’t actually save yourself time by starting the training early,” Kahl told the panel.
Complicating matters is that there is no clear fleet that Ukraine could get, according to Kahl. “They could end up getting British Tornados or (Swedish) Gripens or (French) Mirage aircraft, so you wouldn’t want to train them on F-16s,” he said. NBC News reported on the pilot’s presence in Arizona earlier Saturday. (Source: Reuters)
04 Mar 23. Rheinmetall in talks on building tank factory in Ukraine – report. German defence contractor Rheinmetall (RHMG.DE) is in negotiations about building a tank factory in Ukraine, the newspaper Rheinische Post reported on Saturday, citing an interview with CEO Armin Papperger.
Rheinmetall makes ammunition, other military equipment and also the Leopard tanks that Germany decided to send to Ukraine, which the company produces jointly with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann.
“A Rheinmetall plant can be set up in the Ukraine for around 200 million euros ($212.64 million), which can produce up to 400 Panthers a year,” Papperger was quoted as saying. Panthers are the company’s latest battle tanks models.
“Talks with the Ukrainian government are promising and I hope for a decision in the next two months,” he added.
While the Western Allies were sending enough arms for Ukraine to defend itself, the Ukrainians currently do not have enough equipment to fully retake their territory, Papperger said.
He said Ukraine needed 600 to 800 tanks and the construction of new tanks must start quickly to achieve that number, he said.
Rheinmetall will join Germany’s blue chip DAX (.GDAXI) index this month, Deutsche Boerse (DB1Gn.DE) said on Friday, citing increased defence spending due to the war in Ukraine.
Its shares hit a record high in January after Germany’s decision to send the heavy Leopard tanks to Ukraine. ($1 = 0.9406 euros)
(Source: Reuters)
06 Mar 23. Wagner chief says Russian position at Bakhmut at risk without promised ammunition.
Summary
• Wagner chief complains of ammunition shortages
• Russia says it hit Azov command centre
• Some Russian officers refuse ‘senseless’ orders – Ukraine
• Bakhmut defence is holding, says Ukrainian officer
The head of Russia’s Wagner mercenary force warned that Russia’s position around the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut was in peril unless his troops got ammunition, the latest sign of tension between the Kremlin and the private militia chief.
Ukrainian military officials and analysts also reported leaders of Russia’s 155th Brigade fighting near the town of Vuhledar, south of Bakhmut, were resisting orders to attack after sustaining severe losses in attempts to capture it.
For its part, the Russian Defence Ministry on Sunday said Russian forces had hit a command centre of the Ukrainian Azov Regiment in southeastern Zaporizhzhia region. The ministry did not elaborate on the attack.
Reuters could not independently verify the battlefield accounts.
Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin said Russia’s front lines near Bakhmut could collapse if his forces did not receive the ammunition promised by Moscow in February.
“For now, we are trying to figure out the reason: is it just ordinary bureaucracy or a betrayal,” Prigozhin, referring to the absence of ammunition, said in his press service Telegram channel on Sunday.
The mercenary chief regularly criticises Russia’s defence chiefs and top generals. Last month, he accused Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and others of “treason” for withholding supplies of munitions to his men.
In a nearly four-minute video published on the Wagner Orchestra Telegram channel on Saturday, Prigozhin said his troops were worried that the government wanted to set them up as possible scapegoats if Russia lost the war.
“If Wagner retreats from Bakhmut now, the whole front will collapse,” Prigozhin said. “The situation will not be sweet for all military formations protecting Russian interests.”
‘DEFENCE IS HOLDING’
A Russian victory in Bakhmut, with a pre-war population of about 70,000, would give it the first major prize in a costly winter offensive, after it called up hundreds of thousands of reservists last year. Russia says it would be a stepping stone to completing the capture of the Donbas industrial region, one of its most important objectives.
Volodymyr Nazarenko, a commander of Ukrainian troops in Bakhmut, said that there had been no order to retreat and “the defence is holding” in grim conditions.
“The situation in Bakhmut and around it is very much hell-like, as it is on the entire eastern front,” Nazarenko said in a video posted on Telegram.
Ukraine’s military said early on Monday its forces had repelled 95 Russian attacks in the Bakhmut area over the previous day.
“The situation in Bakhmut can be described as critical,” Ukrainian military analyst Oleh Zhdanov said in a video commentary.
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin ordered troops into Ukraine on a “special military operation” just over a year ago.
Since then, tens of thousands of people have been killed, millions have fled and cities have been reduced to rubble but Ukrainian forces, with the help of Western weapons, have limited Russian advances to the east and south.
To the north of Bakhmut, Russian troops advanced towards the town of Bilohorivka, just inside the Luhansk region, and shelled several settlements in the direction of Kupiansk and Lyman, the Ukrainian military said.
To the south, the Ukrainian military said Russian forces made preparations for an offensive in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, shelling dozens of towns and villages including the city of Kherson, causing civilian casualties.
A woman and two children were killed by Russian mortar bombs in a village in Kherson region, the head of Ukraine’s presidential office said.
Ukraine’s air force spokesperson, Yuriy Ihnat, said 13 kamikaze drones had been shot down on Sunday night.
The governor of Russia’s Belgorod region bordering Ukraine said one person was wounded by falling debris on Monday after Russian forces shot down three missiles near the town of Novy Oskol.
Belgorod borders Ukraine’s Kharkiv region and has repeatedly come under fire since the beginning of Russia’s invasion. Ukraine almost never publicly claims responsibility for attacks inside Russia.
‘REFUSING TO PROCEED’
Near Vuhledar, southwest of the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk, Ukraine said senior officers of Russia’s 155th Brigade, which Kyiv says suffered heavy recent losses, were refusing to obey orders to attack.
“The leaders of the brigade and senior officers are refusing to proceed with a new senseless attack as demanded by their unskilled commanders – to storm well-defended Ukrainian positions with little protection or preparation,” Ukraine’s military said in a statement.
Military analyst Zhdanov said two “Cossack” Russian units known as Steppe and Tiger had expressed frustration with their commanders and refused to take part in any new offensive on the hilltop town.
Reuters could not immediately verify the reports.
Russian Defence Minister Shoigu is on a rare visit to his forces in Ukraine, awarding medals and meeting commanders on the weekend. On Monday, he visited the eastern city of Mariupol, captured by Russian forces last year after a months-long siege.
(Source: Reuters)
06 Mar 23. Russia has hesitated to buy ballistic missiles from Iran out of concern that Ukraine’s allies would in response supply Kyiv with long-range rockets, according to assessments by western officials. Iran has sent hundreds of armed drones to Russia that have been used to attack Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Western capitals believe Tehran is open to further military co-operation with Moscow. But despite pressures on its own supplies, Russia has so far held back from purchases of Iran’s long-range ballistic missiles, which fly faster than the speed of sound and have larger explosive payloads. One significant factor, according to assessments in Nato countries, has been the threat of the US providing Kyiv with the long-sought “Atacms” missile system, whose 300km range could reach deep into Russian held territory. The US has recently stepped up warnings over deeper Russia-Iran military co-operation, while European diplomats have raised concerns with Tehran. Julianne Smith, US ambassador to Nato, said that western allies find the relationship “extremely worrying”. “This is a situation that obviously troubles all of us a great deal,” Smith said. “It is a topic of conversation inside the alliance. And we will continue to send signals to Iran about the dangers of supporting Russia with material support in its attacks and war inside Ukraine.” Such warnings fit a pattern since the invasion of Ukraine where Kyiv’s western allies have made public unprecedented amounts of classified intelligence in an attempt to undermine, pre-empt and deter Russia and its potential allies. But officials acknowledge that Moscow may change its stance on Iranian ballistic missiles as shortages of its own precision-guided munitions become more acute and domestic production falters. Washington has so far rebuffed Kyiv’s requests for Atacms, a tactical ballistic missile with a range of 300km © US Army/Pictorial Press/Alamy The Russian military was already concerned about its ability to sustain the war, one official added, with guided missile and artillery supplies running as low as half their levels late last year. “The Russians are in dire straits. They need missiles,” said one European official. Helped by Russian technology supplied in the 1990s, Iran has built the largest fleet of ballistic missiles in the Middle East under a programme that the US defence department described in 2019 as “increasingly accurate” and “sophisticated”. Iran has consistently denied that it has provided weapons to Russia since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last February. (Source: FT.com)
03 Mar 23. U.S. Sends Ukraine $400m in Military Equipment. The United States will transfer military equipment worth up to $400m to Ukraine to aid its defense against the Russian invasion, Defense Department officials said today.
This security assistance package features ammunition and support equipment to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, the United States has sent more than $30 billion worth of gear to Ukraine. This is the 33rd time the Biden administration has invoked the drawdown authority for Ukraine.
In this package, the United States will provide additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, additional 105 mm and 155 mm artillery rounds, and additional 25 mm ammunition.
The package also includes armored vehicle-launched bridges. These vehicles are designed to accompany armored columns and give them the ability to cross rivers, streams, ditches and trenches. The bridges are carried on the chassis of armored vehicles and launched at river or stream banks. Once the crossing is finished, the vehicle can pick up the bridge on the far bank and carry on.
The package will also include demolition munitions and equipment for obstacle clearing. To help the Ukrainians sustain their forces in combat, the package also includes testing and diagnostic equipment to support vehicle maintenance and repair, as well as spare parts and other field equipment.
Since the Russian invasion, the aid the United States has proffered has changed as the battle changed. In the beginning of the conflict, the Ukrainians needed anti-armor and air defense capabilities. The U.S. rushed Javelins anti-armor systems and Stinger air defense weapons to the country.
After Ukraine’s military turned back the Russian thrust on Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, artillery became more important, and the U.S. responded with howitzers and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition. Air defense remained a priority, and the U.S. sent National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems to the country and has pledged a Patriot air defense battery. The battle is changing again, and the United States will send 31 M1A2 main battle tanks to the country.
But the United States is just one nation supporting Ukraine’s right to sovereignty. According to DOD figures, more than 54 countries from around the world have pledged more than 1,000 tanks and other armored vehicles. They’ve delivered or pledged more than 800 artillery systems, and they’ve delivered more than 2 million rounds of artillery ammunition and more than 50 advanced Multiple Rocket Launch Systems. (Source: US DoD)
03 Mar 23. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announces the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This package features more ammunition and support equipment for Ukraine’s precision fires, artillery, and armored vehicle operations. This authorization is the Biden Administration’s thirty-third drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021 and is valued at up to $400m.
• Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• Additional 155mm artillery rounds;
• Additional 105mm artillery rounds;
• Additional 25mm ammunition;
• Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges;
• Demolition munitions and equipment for obstacle clearing;
• Testing and diagnostic equipment to support vehicle maintenance and repair;
• Spare parts and other field equipment.
To meet Ukraine’s evolving battlefield requirements, the United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with key capabilities. (Source: US DoD)
03 Mar 23. Russia close to encircling Ukraine’s Bakhmut after months of fighting.
Summary
• Russian mercenary chief says one route only out of Bakhmut
• Ukraine national guard says situation ‘critical’
• Biden and Germany’s Scholz meet to discuss support for Ukraine
Russian artillery pounded the last routes out of Bakhmut on Friday, aiming to complete the encirclement of the besieged Ukrainian city and bring Moscow closer to its first major victory in half a year after the bloodiest battle of the war.
The head of Russia’s Wagner private army said the city, which has been blasted to ruins in Russia’s more than seven month onslaught, was almost completely surrounded with only one road still open for Ukraine’s troops.
Reuters observed intense Russian shelling of routes leading west out of Bakhmut, an apparent attempt to block Ukrainian forces’ access in and out of the city. A bridge in the adjacent town of Khromove was damaged by Russian tank shelling.
Ukrainian soldiers were working to repair damaged roads and more troops were heading toward the frontline in a sign that Ukraine was not yet ready to give up the city. To the west, Ukrainians were digging new trenches for defensive positions.
Russia’s RIA state news agency released a video showing what it said were Wagner fighters walking by a damaged industrial facility. One fighter is heard saying Ukraine’s army is destroying infrastructure in settlements near Bakhmut to prevent the Russian encirclement.
The commander of Ukraine’s ground forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, visited Bakhmut on Friday for briefings with local commanders on how to boost the defence capacity of frontline forces.
Denys Yaroslavskyi, commander of a Ukrainian army unit at Bakhmut, told Espreso TV that parts of some units had been ordered to rotate to more secured positions, describing the situation since the morning as “a slaughterhouse on both sides.”
A Russian victory in Bakhmut, with a pre-war population of about 70,000, would give it the first major prize in a costly winter offensive, after it called up hundreds of thousands of reservists last year. Russia says it would be a stepping stone to completing the capture of the Donbas industrial region, one of Moscow’s most important objectives.
Before the war Bakhmut was known for salt and gypsum mines. Ukraine says the city has little strategic value and the huge casualties Russia has suffered trying to take Bakhmut could shape the course of the conflict.
‘PINCERS ARE CLOSING’
“Units of the private military company Wagner have practically surrounded Bakhmut,” Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin said in a video that Reuters determined was filmed on a rooftop in a village some 7 km (4 miles) north of the city centre.
“Only one route (out) is left,” he said. “The pincers are closing.”
He called on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to order a retreat from Bakhmut to save his soldiers’ lives. The camera panned to show three captured Ukrainians – a grey-bearded older man and two boys – asking to be allowed to go home.
Robert Brovdi, the commander of a Ukrainian drone unit active in Bakhmut who goes by the name “Madyar”, said in a video posted on social media that his unit had been ordered to withdraw immediately. He said he had been fighting there for 110 days.
Volodymyr Nazarenko, a deputy commander in the National Guard of Ukraine, told Ukrainian NV Radio the situation was “critical”, with fighting “round the clock”.
“They take no account of their losses in trying to take the city by assault. The task of our forces in Bakhmut is to inflict as many losses on the enemy as possible. Every metre of Ukrainian land costs hundreds of lives to the enemy,” he said.
“There are many more Russians here than we have ammunition to destroy them.”
MORE U.S. ARMS
The past few days have seen alarm in Russia at its own potential vulnerabilities after Moscow reported a number of drone attacks on targets deep within Russia, followed by what it said was an armed cross-border raid on Thursday.
President Vladimir Putin told his Security Council on Friday to step up “anti-terrorism measures”.
Meanwhile, Zelenskiy visited wounded soldiers at a military hospital in Lviv. One, shaking the president’s hand from bed, apologised that he could not stand up. “That’s OK,” Zelenskiy said. “The time will come and you will rise.”
Zelenskiy gave no details of the fighting in Bakhmut during an evening video address in which he thanked troops for “firmly and bravely” defending the city.
In Washington, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced another round of military aid for Ukraine, a package of ammunition and other support valued at $400m.
The United States has provided nearly $32bn in aid to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion on Feb. 24, 2022.
At the White House, U.S. President Joe Biden thanked visiting German Chancellor Olaf Scholz for “profound” support on Ukraine. Scholz said it was important to send the message that backing Ukraine will continue “as long as it takes and as long as is necessary.”
After their meeting, the White House said the pair reiterated their commitment to impose costs on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.
Germany makes Leopard tanks promised in January and expected to be the core of a new Ukrainian armoured force.
Scholz has been criticised by some Western allies for taking a cautious public stance toward arming Ukraine, although he has overseen a big shift in policy from a country that was Russia’s biggest energy customer before the war.
Kyiv’s ambassador in Berlin, Oleksii Makeiev, said Germany was now taking more of a leadership role in arming Ukraine.
Moscow, which says it has annexed nearly a fifth of Ukraine, accuses pro-Western Kyiv of posing a security threat. Ukraine and its allies say the invasion was an unprovoked war of conquest.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, pointing to U.S. military interventions around the globe, accused the United States of hypocrisy on Friday after Blinken said Moscow cannot be allowed to wage war in Ukraine with impunity. The two men met briefly on the sidelines of a G20 foreign ministers meeting in India. (Source: Reuters)
03 Mar 23. Germany has asked Switzerland to sell some of its decommissioned Leopard 2 tanks as it struggles to cobble together two battalions of the fighting vehicles to send to Ukraine. Berlin has requested that its neighbour sell some of its 96 mothballed Leopard 2 tanks to the German arms producer Rheinmetall. That could allow European countries to fill gaps in their own stocks after promising the modern fighting vehicles to Kyiv, or encourage nations that have been reluctant to spare tanks to increase their commitments. The request from German defence minister Boris Pistorius and economics minister Robert Habeck was sent to Swiss defence minister Viola Amherd last week, German and Swiss officials said. The request comes amid annoyance in Berlin that its western allies have pledged only disappointing numbers of tanks to Ukraine after spending months loudly urging Germany to do so. Pistorius expressed frustration at last month’s Munich Security Conference, saying: “Obviously there are some nations who just preferred to hide behind Germany. It’s easy to say we would if you let us, and when we let them, they didn’t.” Germany, which is the producer of the tanks that are used by armies across Europe, has been striving to secure enough commitments to fill two battalions of tanks — or 62 vehicles — to bolster the Ukrainian armed forces ahead of a possible spring offensive by Russian troops. Berlin has promised 18 of its Leopard 2s, while Poland has pledged 14. Sweden has said it will send up to 10. In their letter to Switzerland, the German ministers offered assurances that the tanks would not be sold on to Ukraine, acknowledging the possible concerns of a nation that has neutrality enshrined in its constitution. Amherd wrote back to Berlin on Wednesday indicating that a deal might be possible under the strict condition that the tanks or their parts were not to be sent onwards to Ukraine and would solely be used to plug European capability gaps. An official at the Swiss ministry of defence told the Financial Times that a “limited number” of the 96 battle tanks that were in storage could be sent back to Rheinmetall from Switzerland’s stocks, based on a preliminary assessment of materiel ordered by Amherd. Most would need to be retained as part of Swiss military contingency planning, the official said. Neither Switzerland’s constitutional neutrality nor its War Materials Act — which imposes strict conditions on weapons sales abroad — pose legal obstacles to the resale of Leopard 2s. But parliament’s approval is needed to formally release the stocks from military service. The country’s largest political bloc, the rightwing populist Swiss People’s party, is likely to oppose any measures that will further call Switzerland’s non-aligned status into question. The party has vociferously opposed the Swiss government’s decision to match EU economic sanctions against Russia. Other parties are more amenable to more military co-operation with European partners. A decision last year to refuse Germany permission to give Ukraine Swiss-made ammunition held in German stockpiles caused anger in Berlin but triggered a debate within Switzerland about the limits of the country’s neutral status. The Swiss government will make a recommendation to parliamentarians on the delivery of Leopard 2 tanks to Germany on Monday. (Source: FT.com)
03 Mar 23. Ukraine ‘repels 85 attacks in Bakhmut.’
Ukrainian forces repelled more than 85 attacks in the five principal sectors of the Bakhmut front line, the General Staff of the Ukraine Military said on Friday.
“Fighting is going on in Bakhmut round the clock…The situation is critical,” Volodymyr Nazarenko, a deputy commander in the National Guard of Ukraine, told Ukrainian NV Radio.
Moscow regards Bakhmut as key to gaining control of the Donbas industrial region, and the town has become one of the bloodiest battles of the war.
In a separate report on YouTube on Thursday night, Oleh Zhdanov, the Ukrainian military analyst, said that Ukrainian forces had repelled as many as 170 attacks in the past 24 hours on the five principal sectors of the front line.
Mr Zhdanov described Russians trying to encircle Bakhmut from the north, east and south and he said that on western approaches to the city “this is probably the only part of the Bakhmut sector where our forces, rather than the Russian occupiers, have the initiative.”
(Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)]
03 Mar 23. Under the radar, Germany trains Ukrainians on advanced air defence weapon.
Summary
• First reporters allowed to visit secret training site
• IRIS-T system “has hit 51 out of 51 targets” in Ukraine
• Tight security around weapon called a “game changer”
In a remote German wood away from prying eyes, around 40 Ukrainians are taking a crash course on one of the West’s most advanced air defence systems, already confident it will enable them to better ward off Russian strikes once they return home.
Boasting a range of some 40 kilometres (25 miles) and a 360 degree view, the IRIS-T SLM system is one of the most coveted of the weapons that Berlin has supplied to Kyiv.
“Our main task is to learn as quickly as possible so we can get back and continue to fight,” Myckhailo, a 45 year-old who has been a soldier for 27 years, told the first few reporters granted access to the training sessions on Wednesday.
So far, the single IRIS-T unit already deployed in Ukraine has been used to shoot down cruise missiles that Moscow has attacked power stations with, and aircraft including Iranian-made Shahed drones – with stunning success.
“A few days ago, our air force commander said IRIS-T has hit 51 out of 51 targets, that’s a 100% quota for Shahed drones and cruise missiles,” said 36 year-old Anatolii, adding Kyiv needed at least 12 of the systems.
Berlin has promised to send four in total, with the second due to arrive within weeks – two years before Germany’s own air force can expect its first.
The German military has organised big media events showcasing how Ukrainian troops are learning the ropes operating Leopard 2 tanks, but it has been wary of granting access to the training on the IRIS-T system built by German arms maker Diehl.
“The Russians see IRIS-T as a game changer. It is a modern system, whereas they have known the potential of the Leopard tanks for a while,” said a German air force officer by way of explanation.
TOUCH-SCREEN TECHNOLOGY
The first three reporters to visit the training site were asked not to disclose the location, and hand in cell phones and smart watches to prevent conversations from being tapped.
When they arrived, a truck-mounted radar was slowly turning on a small hill, while around a dozen Ukrainian soldiers were crowded into the IRIS-T command post, a sand-coloured container on another truck.
Using live radar pictures as well as a simulator, the Ukrainians learn how to pick their targets and shoot them down by pressing a silver “FIRE” button under a set of touch-screens.
Asked about the main differences to older Soviet-built air defences such as the S-300 or Buk, the Ukrainians cited greater effectiveness but also greater complexity.
A German trainer said IRIS-T, built by German arms maker Diehl, could not be operated by “turning a switch on and off. Here you have buttons with eight submenus on a touch-screen”.
It takes only a third of the time to set up its radar compared with the decades-old Patriot system – a critical factor, as any air defence system gives away its position once the radar is turned on.
Asked how being in a peaceful country felt after a year of war, Dmytro and Myckhailo described their situation as strange.
“It is unusual to see and hear aircraft in the sky. In Ukraine, the air space is closed – if anything flies there, it can be dangerous,” said Dmytro.
“Physically, it is very comfortable here. Mentally, we cannot enjoy the situation because our family and comrades are in Ukraine and some of them have died,” he added.
Myckhailo said his main concern was for the safety of his family at home.
“The nicest thing is being able to sleep for eight hours at a stretch,” he noted, while rejecting any notion he might enjoy any creature comforts such as a beer outside the compound.
“We are not here as tourists, this is a business trip. We will come back after the war to relax, when there is peace. But not now, we are soldiers.” (Source: Reuters)
03 Mar 23. Ukraine is set to receive vital artillery ammunition within weeks after Brussels proposed reimbursing countries that provided shells from their stockpiles, according to EU officials. All EU countries except Denmark have joined a project that paves the way for common procurement of replacement supplies, an official said. “I think this will go fast, very fast. And I think we’re talking about a matter of days, weeks, rather than a matter of months,” the person, speaking on condition of anonymity, said. Kyiv has made clear that its most pressing need as it seeks to hold off a renewed Russia offensive is for artillery ammunition — particularly 155mm howitzer rounds. The Russian military fires four times as many shells as Ukraine each day. A proposal by the EU diplomatic service, seen by the Financial Times, suggests providing €1bn from an existing fund used to reimburse capitals for arms purchases that go to Ukraine. The EU official said the bloc’s defence agency would then “conduct a fast-track procedure for direct negotiation with a number of key industrial providers in Europe”. There are 12 companies in the EU producing 155mm shells and Norway also makes them, they said. “It is positive that things are moving ahead. I am confident there will be results. But there are many issues to discuss,” said an EU diplomat. EU defence ministers will refine the plan next week before a summit of EU leaders on March 23-24. EU countries have struggled to provide enough to maintain Ukraine’s firing rate because their own stocks are running low and the defence industry lacks the capacity to replace it quickly. Some capitals also want money for their shells, the official said. Ambassadors on Thursday discussed the proposal to use the European Peace Facility, a fund set up of national contributions that has financed €3.6bn worth of weapons supplied to Ukraine since last February. In the short term, capitals would be reimbursed up to 90 per cent of the price of ammunition. The reimbursement rate would then steadily drop to about 40 per cent, the current average. In addition, a joint procurement task force would place orders for replacement ammunition. The 26 EU member states plus Norway have joined that nascent purchasing platform, which would pay for ammunition once at least three countries agree to use it. Recommended Martin Wolf The west must give Ukraine what it needs The bloc will also assist arms makers to increase production, possibly including investing in new factories. The European Commission last year drew up a plan to invest directly in arms factories, modelled on its vaccine policy during the coronavirus pandemic. While the EU budget cannot be used to buy weapons directly, it can be invested in industrial capacity. Brussels earmarked €500mn to help countries collaborate on arms purchases and increase “the competitiveness and efficiency” of the defence industry. A commission spokesman confirmed it was working on a plan for ammunition supply to Ukraine. “It is the EPF that needs to be used to buy military equipment,” the spokesman said. “We have also proposed [an act] about joint procurement and developing our industrial capacity.”
(Source: FT.com)
02 Mar 23. Ukraine plans spring counter-offensive to cut off Crimean peninsula from Russia. Ukraine’s impending counter-offensive plans to “drive a wedge” between Crimea and Russia. In an interview with a German paper, Ukraine’s deputy military intelligence chief, Vadym Skibitsky said his country is planning a spring offensive.
Mr Skibitsky says Ukraine will liberate all areas of the country including Crimea, taking it back to the 1991 borders, seeking to “drive a wedge” between Crimea and the Russian mainland.
Before the Russian invasion last year, there was only one way for Russian troops to enter Crimea and that was over a bridge across the Kerch Strait.
The invasion created a ‘land bridge’ to the peninsula by taking the coastline, which included cities such as Mariupol.
In October, part of the bridge was destroyed, with Russian President Vladimir Putin calling the attack on the Kerch Bridge “a terrorist act” carried out by Ukrainian special services.
Ed Arnold, a research fellow for European security at the military think tank RUSI, spoke to Forces News about how realistic is it for Ukraine to take it all back.
“Crimea is going to be a very difficult proposition for Ukrainian forces to assault and take back by force,” Mr Arnold said.
“The likelier option is that they will do effectively what they did with Kherson, they made the city untenable for Russian forces to hold,” he added.
“If they get to the Sea of Azov and are able to start to put in weapons systems on the coast that can control part of the Sea of Azov, with the trade line cut, it makes resupply of Crimea very difficult.
“Specifically if they can get Himars in range as well, of the Kerch bridge that effectively means that they control all movements in and out of Crimea.”
However, it should be questioned whether this latest information from Ukraine should be taken at face value.
Previously the Ukrainians have been relatively unwilling to reveal anything about their tactics. So it is somewhat questionable that now the deputy chief of military intelligence is effectively announcing their plans for a spring offensive. It remains to be seen if this is really what they are going to do or if this could be a red herring. (Source: forces.net)
02 Mar 23. US secretary of state Antony Blinken has met Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov for the first time since the Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year. Blinken and Lavrov spoke for about 10 minutes on the sidelines of a meeting of G20 foreign ministers in New Delhi on Thursday, according to a state department official. The official said Blinken told Lavrov that Washington would support Ukraine for as long as it took and that Russia should reverse its recent decision to suspend participation in New Start, the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the two powers. Blinken added that Moscow should release detained American citizen Paul Whelan, who has been imprisoned in Russia since 2018, according to the official. In comments quoted by Russia’s RIA Novosti state news agency, Maria Zakharova, the country’s foreign ministry spokesperson, said there were no official negotiations and that Blinken had requested the meeting. Thursday’s acrimonious gathering of foreign ministers ended without a joint communique. Instead, India, which holds this year’s G20 presidency, released a “chair’s summary and outcome document”. This referred to previous conclusions about the war but added that Russia and China did not agree to them. “There were differences on the Ukraine issue which we could not reconcile between various parties,” Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said after the meeting. “We found that positions were very far apart. We tried very hard, we were not the only country who tried . . . But we were not able to bridge the gap.” Russia said it and China had criticised attempts “to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries” through “blackmail and threats”. A senior EU official said the gulf between western nations and Russia and China had widened since global leaders met for a G20 summit in Bali last year, which Russian president Vladimir Putin did not attend. “The situation is a lot worse,” the official said. G20 finance ministers meeting in Bangalore last weekend also failed to sign off on a concluding statement. India has remained neutral over the war while calling for a peaceful resolution. Recommended The Big Read Arming Ukraine: how war forced the EU to rewrite defence policy It has also sought to use its G20 presidency to focus on issues it said were of greater concern to many developing nations, such as food and energy security, climate change and debt distress. “India’s G20 presidency is trying to provide a voice to the global south,” the country’s prime minister Narendra Modi said as he introduced the meeting. “We should not allow issues that we cannot resolve together to get in the way of those that we can.” India’s foreign minister also met China’s foreign minister Qin Gang on Thursday. The two countries have been locked in a multiyear border stand-off that has led to numerous clashes between troops, most recently in December. (Source: FT.com)
02 Mar 23. Situation ‘critical’: Ukraine clings to Bakhmut as Russians advance.
Summary
• “Wave upon wave” of Russian attacks on Bakhmut
• Ukraine says Russians can’t win Bakhmut in street battles
• War to dominate G20 foreign ministers’ meeting
• Zelenskiy says work under way to maintain energy system
March 2 (Reuters) – Ukrainian forces hung onto their positions in the ruined eastern city of Bakhmut early on Thursday under constant attack from Russian troops seeking to claim their first major victory for more than half a year.
Russia says seizing Bakhmut would open the way to fully controlling the rest of the strategic Donbas industrial region bordering Russia, one of the main objectives of its invasion a year ago on Feb. 24.
Delivering a regular morning roundup of the situation across the frontlines, the Ukraine military general staff said on Thursday that the enemy was continuing to advance toward Bakhmut and “is storming the city”.
It said Ukrainian forces were repelling attacks in Bakhmut and in other settlements in the Donetsk region that were coming under fire.
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Wednesday that his forces “are keeping each sector of the front under control”.
nevertheless put up fierce resistance. Not everyone in Ukraine is convinced that defending Bakhmut can go on indefinitely.
“I believe that sooner or later, we will probably have to leave Bakhmut. There is no sense in holding it at any cost,” Ukrainian member of parliament Serhiy Rakhmanin said on NV radio late on Wednesday.
“But for the moment, Bakhmut will be defended with several aims – firstly, to inflict as many Russian losses as possible and make Russia use its ammunition and resources,” Rakhmanin said, adding that no lines of defence should be allowed to collapse.
The battle for Bakhmut began about seven months ago, but in recent weeks Russian advances from three sides have left defenders with the only way out to the west.
Thousands of civilians remain in the ruined city, which had a pre-war population of about 70,000.
“There is a danger that our garrison in Bakhmut will be encircled,” military analyst Oleh Zhdanov said in a post on YouTube assessing the situation as “critical”.
“The enemy is attempting to sever the routes used to supply our forces in Bakhmut and halt all movement along them,” he said. “The Russian forces cannot win street battles in Bakhmut or take the city by attacking head-on. The only way they can take the city is to surround it.”
Zhdanov gave a graphic description of Russian efforts to force Ukrainian troops to abandon positions on the east bank of the Bakhmutka river.
“They are applying what can be described as colossal pressure, with wave upon wave of attacks. They bring in reinforcements in trucks and take away their wounded aboard the same trucks. This process is constant – like a conveyor belt – around the clock.”
‘WINTER IS OVER’
Russian forces were also making preparations for new attacks in the central Zaporizhzhia region and on the southern front in the Kherson region, the military said. More than 40 towns and villages were shelled, it said, including the regional centre of Kherson and other towns on the west bank of the Dnipro River, abandoned by Russia in November.
Reuters was unable to immediately verify the latest battlefield accounts.
The war looked set to dominate a G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi, just as a finance ministers meeting had days earlier. European and U.S. delegates reiterated that they hold Russia responsible for the conflict, with Germany saying it would use the meeting to counter Russian “propaganda”.
Russia said it would use the meeting to tell the world who, according to Moscow, was responsible for the crises the world finds itself in.
Ukrainians and Russians traditionally mark March 1 as the start of spring and frozen ground has melted at the front, ushering in the season of sucking black mud – “bezdorizhzhia” in Ukrainian, “rasputitsa” in Russian – that has been notorious in history for destroying attacking armies.
“Winter is over. It was a very difficult one and every Ukrainian, without exaggeration, felt the difficulties,” Zelenskiy said in a video message after a meeting devoted to energy issues.
“But we managed to provide Ukraine with energy and heat. The threat to the energy system remains. And work goes on to ensure the energy system keeps functioning,” Zelenskiy said.
Russia mounted regular waves of missile strikes on power stations in what Ukraine said was a calculated strategy to destroy civilian morale.
CENSORSHIP
Ukraine and its Western allies describe Russia’s war as unprovoked with the aim of crushing its European-leaning neighbour, which was part of the Soviet Union until its break-up in 1991.
Russia accuses the West of provoking what it calls its “special military operation” to eliminate security threats, and of prolonging the conflict by backing the Kyiv government with weapons.
Russia’s top lawmaker said he was introducing amendments to a wartime censorship law that would increase the penalty for discrediting the army from five to 15 years in jail and extend the law to cover the Wagner mercenary force. read more
Moscow introduced sweeping censorship laws shortly after ordering tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine a year ago.
A Russian defence ministry journal said Moscow was developing a new type of military strategy using nuclear weapons to protect against possible U.S. aggression, RIA news agency reported on Thursday.
The article is the latest in a series of combative remarks by Russian politicians and commentators following the invasion of Ukraine, that have suggested Russia would, if necessary, be prepared to deploy its nuclear arsenal. (Source: Reuters)
01 Mar 23. US seeks allies’ backing for possible China sanctions over Ukraine war. The United States is sounding out close allies about the possibility of imposing new sanctions on China if Beijing provides military support to Russia for its war in Ukraine, according to four U.S. officials and other sources. The consultations, which are still at a preliminary stage, are intended to drum up support from a range of countries, especially those in the wealthy Group of 7 (G7), to coordinate support for any possible restrictions.
It was not clear what specific sanctions Washington will propose. The conversations have not been previously disclosed.
The U.S. Treasury Department, a lead agency on the imposition of sanctions, declined to comment.
Washington and its allies have said in recent weeks that China was considering providing weapons to Russia, which Beijing denies. Aides to U.S. President Joe Biden have not publicly provided evidence.
They have also warned China directly against doing so, including in meetings between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping as well as during a Feb. 18 in-person meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi on the sidelines of a global security conference in Munich.
The Biden administration’s initial steps to counter Chinese support for Russia have included informal outreach at the staff and diplomatic levels, including the Treasury Department, sources familiar with the matter said.
They said officials were laying the groundwork for potential action against Beijing with the core group of countries that were most supportive of sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine a year ago.
Asked about the consultations, a White House National Security Council spokesperson said Russia’s war made it difficult for China with Europe and others.
“It’s a distraction for China and a potential blow to their international relationships they do not need nor should they want,” the spokesperson said.
INTELLIGENCE
One official from a country consulted by Washington said that they had only seen scant intelligence backing up the claims about China considering possible military assistance to Russia. A U.S. official, however, said they were providing detailed accounts of the intelligence to allies.
China’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war is expected to be among the topics when Biden meets with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the White House on Friday. Before that in New Delhi on Wednesday and Thursday, the war will be discussed by foreign ministers from dozens of countries, including Russia, China and the United States.
Last week China issued a 12-point paper calling for a comprehensive ceasefire that was met with scepticism in the West.
The initial outreach by Washington on sanctions has not yet led to broad agreement on any specific measures, the sources said.
One source said the administration wanted to first raise the idea of coordinated sanctions and “take pulses” in the event that any shipments are detected to Russia from China, which declared a “no limits” partnership shortly before the invasion on Feb. 24 last year.
“On the G7 front, I think there is real awareness,” a second source said, but added that detailed measures focused on China were not yet in place.
COULD CHINA TILT CONFLICT?
The Ukraine conflict has settled into grinding trench warfare. With Russia running low on munitions, Ukraine and its supporters fear that supplies from China could tilt the conflict to Russia’s advantage.
As part of a related diplomatic push, Washington won language in a Feb. 24 G7 statement to mark the war’s first anniversary that called on “third-countries” to “cease providing material support to Russia’s war, or face severe costs.”
Though the statement did not mention China by name, the U.S. imposed new penalties on people and companies accused of helping Russia evade sanctions. The measures included export curbs on companies in China and elsewhere that will block them from buying items, such as semiconductors.
“We’ve tried to signal very clearly, both in private in Munich, and then publicly, our concerns,” Daniel Kritenbrink, the top U.S. diplomat for East Asia, told Congress this week. “We’ve talked about the implications and the consequences if they were to do so. And we also know that many of our like-minded partners share those concerns.”
Among the challenges the United States faces in putting sanctions on China, the world’s second-biggest economy, is its thorough integration in the major economies of Europe and Asia, complicating the talks. U.S. allies from Germany to South Korea are reticent to alienate China.
Anthony Ruggiero, a sanctions expert under former President Donald Trump, said the Biden administration does have scope for economically restricting private actors within China and that doing so could deter the government and banks from providing further support.
“Then the administration can send messages to China in public and in private, with the latter being more explicit, that the U.S. will escalate the sanctions to include targeting Chinese banks with the full range of available options,” said Ruggiero, now with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies group.
Washington should make China choose between access to the U.S. financial system or aiding Russia’s war, Ruggiero said, citing the sanctions approach to Iran and North Korea. (Source: Reuters)
01 Mar 23. ‘Constant waves’ of Russian troops attacking Bakhmut. Russian forces are carrying out relentless attacks on the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut in their quest for a breakthrough in the year-long war.
“The enemy continues to advance in the direction of Bakhmut. He does not stop storming the city,” the Ukrainian military said on Wednesday morning.
Capturing the small mining city would open the way for Russia to seize the last remaining urban centres in the industrial Donetsk province.
In his video address late on Tuesday, President Volodymyr Zelensky said the battle for Bakhmut was “most difficult” but its defence was essential.
“Russia in general takes no account of people and sends them in constant waves against our positions, the intensity of the fighting is only increasing,” Mr Zelensky said. (Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)
28 Feb 23. NCOs Key to Ukrainian Military Successes Against Russia. Since 2014, the United States has sent Ukraine more than $32.4 bn in security assistance, and while the transfer of equipment is important in Ukraine’s defense, the training aspect of this aid may have longer term implications. These military capabilities — including Javelins, tanks, air defense systems and more — have been crucial, but Ukraine’s investment in developing a noncommissioned officer corps may be the key to victory against the Russian invader.
The Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman Ramón “CZ” Colón-López said that looking at a year of conflict in Ukraine since Russia invaded, he has been convinced of “the decisive advantage that the human brings” to combat.
The SEAC — who spent most of his career in special operations — noted that the No. 1 rule in his military community “is that humans are more important than hardware.”
Colón-López spoke before traveling to Europe to meet with his counterparts among the NATO frontline states. “That is true, not only for special operations, but for conventional forces, because you can have the best technology in the world, but if you don’t have the will and the pride to fight for your nation, you’re going to be on the losing end of the equation,” he said. “We have seen this play over and over again.”
One lesson of the conflict in Ukraine is that government and military leaders must prioritize the training, development and education of service members, he said. “At the end of the day, the rivets and steel is not as important as the flesh and bone if the flesh and bone is not willing to go all-in in the execution of the wartime mission,” he said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin expected an easy and quick war on Ukraine, U.S. officials have said. Ukraine and Russia had many of the same capabilities, including T-72 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, air defenses and more. Still, Russia — with more money — had the advantage there, as well.
“It’s like when you have two football teams. Everybody’s got the same equipment; they got the pads to helmets; they got a coach; they got the headsets and everything else,” Colón-López said. “But it all boils down to the execution and the strategy that actually decides who is the victor in that game. It’s no different in the military. And that is exactly what the Ukrainians have done.”
The U.S. military relationship with Ukraine began in 1993 soon after the Soviet Union broke apart and the nation declared its independence. Ukraine joined the State Partnership Program and partnered with the California National Guard — with whom they are still partnered.
Ukraine — and the rest of the nations that were in the Soviet orbit — used Soviet tactics and doctrine. When those nations participated in training sessions with U.S. and other NATO forces — most notably in an exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in 1995 — they invariably got waxed. Many of the nations aspired to join NATO, and they took to learning the NATO playbook.
“We decided to go ahead and start partnering with a lot of those regional partners to be able to help them break away from the Soviet model,” the SEAC said. “In the meantime, we had sporadic engagements.”
The Ukrainian military was still very “officer-centric” and not responsive or agile. If the officer went down, the unit had no idea what to do. “The NCOs … were not empowered, they were not entrusted, and they were not properly trained or educated to be autonomous on the battlefield,” he said.
All this changed after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, illegally annexed Crimea, and fomented uprisings in the eastern provinces of the nation. “The government of Ukraine decided to go all in on an NCO development model,” Colón-López said. “They wanted to westernize their approach. So, immediately, they enlisted the help of the United States and also of NATO to go ahead and shift their mechanism and their procedures.”
The idea was to empower junior leaders, to have them operate within the commanders’ intent, to display initiative, and to accomplish the missions. Colón-López said NATO’s Defense Education Enhancement Program was key to developing the capability.
Ukraine developed three service-specific NCO training centers. The military leaders introduced a new NCO education and training system. “Everything that they did in that curriculum and the syllabus was directly adapted from the NATO model to be able to go ahead and create interoperable NCOs — Ukrainian NCOs to be able to go ahead and partner and train with other NATO entities, even though they’re not part of NATO,” he said.
Like the United States and other NATO nations, NCOs were responsible for training new recruits and developing new small-unit tactics and being integral parts of the chain of command. “Right now, their basic training is about 2 1/2 to three months in duration, and it heavily focuses on the critical combat skills,” Colón-López said. “That was one of the key factors when they started taking in their recruits, that they immediately started implementing the ethos and the change in these young people’s minds to be able to go ahead and execute any type of wartime mission.
“That is the force that you see fighting today,” he continued.
Compare that to what the Russians are doing. The Russians still use conscription. They stint on training. The Russian military is still officer centric. They use tactics that haven’t changed since World War II.
“It is the human dynamic that is actually tipping the scales on victory versus failure out on that battlefield,” he said. “It is definitely a decisive advantage that the Ukrainians have that the Russians do not.”
The combat action in Ukraine has many military leaders looking. “Our partners are listening, and they’re wanting to learn, and a lot more officers are being open to the idea that … maybe we need to start educating more, so that they’re critical thinking thinkers on this hybrid battlefield,” the SEAC said. “That is going to be the way of the future.” (Source: US DoD)
28 Feb 23. Defense Officials: U.S. Ensures Accountability of Systems Supplied to Ukraine. The United States has provided $31.7bn in support since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine a year ago. Allies and partners have provided over $19bn during that timeframe.
“Even as we focus on getting Ukraine what it needs, we’ve always prioritized accountability, and Ukraine has, too. We have adapted our accountability practices for the combat environment to address the risk of illicit diversion, using mechanisms that go above and beyond our standard practices,” Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin H. Kahl today told the House Armed Services Committee.
Kahl said U.S. officials have had talks with their Ukrainian counterparts for years regarding the issue of corruption and the importance of accountability and transparency.
“I think there have been improvements over time, especially in the defense sector,” he said.
The U.S. has provided the Ukrainians with ways to track the military systems it provides, he said. Tracking includes scanners and software, as well as remote visits to sites when conditions permit.
“We don’t see any evidence of diversion in our reporting,” Kahl said. “We think the Ukrainians are using properly what they’ve been given,” he said.
Defense Department Inspector General Robert P. Storch testified that within the past year, the DOD Office of Inspector General completed five Ukraine-related oversight projects.
The OIG currently has some 20 ongoing and planned audits and evaluations that are focused on, among other things, ensuring that tax dollars are used properly, that there’s appropriate accountability for weapons and other material, and that U.S. stocks are appropriately replenished so they’re available should they be needed elsewhere, Storch said.
Additionally, the OIG’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service is actively engaged in conducting fraud prevention and investigative activities that play a critical role in ensuring the integrity of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, he said.
The OIG currently has more than 90 professionals engaged in oversight of security assistance to Ukraine. In 2022, the office issued two management advisories that identified several areas of concern that could directly impact DOD’s ability to transparently track and report the supplemental appropriations for Ukraine, he said.
The department has long been focused on end-use monitoring and enhanced end-use monitoring, which tracks how U.S. partners employ military assistance and sensitive equipment after those assets are transferred to them, he said.
Sensitive items transferred to Ukraine and subject to enhanced end-use monitoring have bar codes with unique identifying information, such as serial numbers, said a forward-deployed U.S. official familiar with the accountability process.
The Defense Department has provided the Ukrainian armed forces with a number of handheld scanners that capture the bar code information that can be transmitted later to DOD for accountability purposes, the official said.
Ukraine is using the NATO LOGFAS logistics planning system that allows their armed forces to track equipment across units and will expand further in the coming months, the official said.
LOGFAS, or Logistics Functional Area Services, is a suite of tools supporting NATO logistics processes.
Storch said that as early as 2020, OIG issued a report on how DOD was conducting enhanced end-use monitoring of military assistance to Ukraine.
“In October 2022, we published a classified report that identified challenges DOD personnel responsible for EUM and EEUM face when there are limited or no U.S. personnel present and the actions the DOD was taking to address those issues in Ukraine,” Storch said.
“As the situation on the ground has continued to evolve, we recently initiated our third evaluation on EEUM in Ukraine, and we will continue to focus on this important area,” he added.
DOD is also addressing critical issues — like the replenishment of U.S. stocks, intelligence sharing, security control for the transport of weapons and equipment, their maintenance and sustainment, awards of noncompetitive contracts and the training of Ukrainian armed forces, he said.
Storch noted that all of these oversight steps are done using a whole-of-government approach, partnering closely with a number of agencies including the State Department’s OIG and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s OIG.
Along with those oversight partners, the DOD OIG established and leads the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group, which brings together 20 oversight entities, he said.
“The DOD OIG, working hand in glove with our oversight partners, will continue to make independent oversight of assistance to Ukraine a matter of the highest priority. And we will continue to keep the Congress and the public informed about our work,” he said.
Army Lt. Gen. Douglas A. Sims II, the Joint Staff’s director for operations, thanked the committee and Congress for providing oversight and resources in support of Ukraine. (Source: US DoD)
28 Feb 23. U.S. Officials Urge China Not to Ship Arms to Russia. U.S. government officials are doing all they can to discourage China from supplying Russia with arms that could be used to subjugate Ukraine, Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said today.
President Joe Biden, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Secretary of State Antony Blinken have spoken in the past few days about discouraging China from supplying the Russian war machine. The latest administration official to speak on this subject was Colin H. Kahl, undersecretary of defense for policy, who testified before the House Armed Services Committee today.
The senior government leaders “have all talked to the potential ramifications of China providing lethal aid,” Ryder said during a Pentagon news conference. “We have not seen that they’ve done that at this point. But, again, it’s something that we’ll continue to closely monitor.”
For China to supply arms to Russia would be counter to China’s own expressed position on the conflict. “We believe that all countries deserve respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, that the purposes and principles of the U.N. charter should be observed, that the legitimate security concerns of any country should be taken seriously, and that support should be given to all efforts that are conducive to peacefully resolving the crisis,” said Mao Ning, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, on Oct. 10, 2022. “We hope all parties will properly address their differences through dialogue and consultation. China stands ready to continue to play a constructive part in de-escalation efforts.”
White House officials said there are “indications” that China is contemplating supplying Russia with weapons. There is no indication Chinese leaders have decided to arm Russia, but they haven’t taken it off the table, Ryder said. “And, so, we want to be crystal clear that that would be a poor decision, should they decide to do that.”
DOD is concentrating on supplying Ukraine with the equipment it needs to defend itself from the Russian invasion.
If China does decide to supply arms “it will extend this conflict needlessly,” Ryder said. “It will result in more innocent lives lost, as Russia continues to wage its campaign against Ukrainian citizens.
The press secretary also spoke of moves the United States is making to ensure the weapons are going where needed and not being diverted or sold. “We take accountability of U.S. assistance to Ukraine very seriously,” he said. “We have an active and proactive whole-of-government system … to prevent the illicit diversion of weapons in Eastern Europe. Secretary Austin and DOD leaders have repeatedly discussed the importance of protecting our contributions with our Ukrainian counterparts.”
DOD has a small team within the U.S. Embassy in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, that works closely with the Ukrainians to conduct end-use monitoring. “To this date, we have not seen any evidence of any type of widespread diversion of any of the assistance that we provided,” he said.
Any equipment is tracked as it goes into Ukraine. “Once it is in Ukraine, depending on the particular system and on the requirements of monitoring that system, personnel at the embassy again work closely with Ukrainians,” Ryder said.
The country is an active war zone, and U.S. personnel do not go into areas of active combat. Still, they’re able to conduct virtual inspections of the materiel. (Source: US DoD)
27 Feb 23. Putin’s £274m spy plane blown up by Belarusian partisans. Operation that involved drones dropping explosives hailed by opposition in country unhappy at its close collaboration with Russian president
A Russian spy plane worth £274m has been severely damaged by partisans in Belarus.
The A-50 aircraft, which is used to identify and track targets for military operations, was rendered non-operational after local resistance members used drones to drop explosives on it, according to reports.
The Belarusian regime has let its airfields and land be used by Moscow to stage attacks on Ukraine.
It comes as China hailed an “all-weather and comprehensive” strategic partnership with Belarus on Monday, the day before a state visit by President Alexander Lukashenko to Beijing.
The damaged A-50 had reportedly flown six missions into Ukraine on behalf of the Putin regime. Bypol, a group of Belarusian security officials who resigned in protest against the brutal crushing of anti-regime protests in 2020, claimed the attack. Aliaksandr Azarau, the group’s chief, said it had taken months to prepare and those responsible had already left the country. (Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)
28 Feb 23. ‘Extremely tense’ as Russians bid to encircle Ukraine’s Bakhmut – commander.
Summary
• Early spring thaw turns battlefields to mud
• Russian forces advance north and south of Bakhmut
• Yellen visits Kyiv, pledges aid
The situation in the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut was “extremely tense” on Tuesday, the commander of Ukrainian ground forces said, as Russian troops besieging it stepped up their assault in a bid to encircle it.
Russia is trying to cut the Ukrainian defenders’ supply lines to the city, the scene of some of the war’s toughest fighting, and force them to surrender or withdraw. That would give Russia its first major prize in more than half a year and open the way to the capture of the last remaining urban centres in the Donetsk region.
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“Despite significant losses, the enemy threw in the most prepared assault units of Wagner, who are trying to break through the defences of our troops and surround the city,” Ukraine’s Colonel general Oleksandr Syrskyi was quoted as saying on a military messaging platform.
Ukraine’s military said earlier Russia had strengthened its forces in the Bakhmut area and was shelling settlements around the city.
“Over the past day, our soldiers repelled more than 60 enemy attacks,” the military said early on Tuesday referring to Bakhmut and nearby eastern areas, adding that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on the villages of Yadhidne and Berkhivka, on the northern approaches to Bakhmut.
Ukrainian military analyst Oleh Zhdanov said Russian forces had driven a wedge between those villages as they tried to cut the road west to Chasiv Yar.
“The southern part of Bakhmut is the only area which can be described as under Ukrainian control. In all other districts, the situation is unpredictable,” he said in a video commentary, adding: “It is impossible to say where the front line lies.”
Ukrainian soldiers in Donetsk region hunkered in muddy trenches after warmer weather thawed out the frozen ground.
“Both sides stay in their positions, because as you see, spring means mud. Thus, it is impossible to move forward,” said Mykola, 59, commander of a Ukrainian frontline rocket launcher battery, watching a tablet screen for coordinates to fire.
The spring thaw, known as the rasputitsa, has a history of ruining plans by armies to attack across Ukraine and western Russia, turning roads into rivers and fields into quagmires.
Reuters saw several military vehicles stuck in mud. In a zigzag trench, Volodymyr, a 25-year-old platoon commander, said his men were prepared to operate in any weather.
“When we’re given a target that means we have to destroy it.”
Russia, its forces replenished with hundreds of thousands of conscripts, has intensified its attacks along the eastern front but its assaults have come at a high cost, Ukraine and its allies say.
“Vicious battles are going on there. The command is doing everything it can to stop the enemy from advancing through our territory,” Serhiy Cherevatyi, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s eastern military command, told Ukrainian television.
Russia said its forces had destroyed a Ukrainian ammunition depot near Bakhmut and shot down U.S.-made rockets and Ukrainian drones.
Reuters could not verify the battlefield reports.
The Russian defence ministry said the United States was planning a provocation in Ukraine using toxic chemicals. There was no immediate U.S. response.
YELLEN IN KYIV
U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen became the latest senior Western official to visit the Ukrainian capital, promising assistance and more measures to isolate Russia after meetings with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and other officials.
Her boss, President Joe Biden, went there a week ago to mark the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
“America will stand with Ukraine as long as it takes,” Yellen, flanked by sandbags at the Cabinet office, told Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal.
Yellen announced the transfer of the first $1.25bn from the latest, $9.9bn tranche of U.S. economic and budget assistance, and visited a school where teacher salaries are reimbursed with U.S. support.
She also backed completion of a fully financed programme for Ukraine with the International Monetary Fund by the end of March.
Ukraine’s forces have mostly focused on holding defensive positions in recent weeks but are expected to attempt a counter-offensive later in the year with new weapons from the West.
Zelenskiy pushed again for F-16 fighter jets that his Western allies have been reluctant to provide.
“We will be able to completely protect our skies when the aviation taboo is fully lifted in relations with our partners,” Zelenskiy said in his nightly radio address.
The Feb. 24 first anniversary of Russia’s invasion saw both sides trying to demonstrate resolve for a second year of war.
Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech in which he abandoned the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty with the United States but announced no major initiatives to change the war’s course.
He was upstaged by Biden, who journeyed to Kyiv and gave a landmark speech of his own in Warsaw.
Ukraine’s outnumbered troops repelled Russia’s attack aimed at taking the capital early in the war and later recaptured substantial territory. Russia still occupies nearly a fifth of Ukraine which it claims to have annexed. (Source: Reuters)
27 Feb 23. US approves more UAS, C-UAS, and EW detection systems for Ukraine. The UAS platforms included in this $2bn package are the Switchblade 600, Altius-600, Jump 20, and CyberLux K8 UAS. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has announced an additional $2bn military aid package for Ukraine, as part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).
The new tranche, announced on 24 February, also marks a year since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
It primarily includes additional Switchblade 600 uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), Altius-600 UAS, Jump 20 UAS, and CyberLux K8 UAS, as well as counter-UAS and electronic warfare (EW) detection equipment.
In addition, the US will deliver mine clearing equipment, secure communications support equipment, and more ammunition stocks for artillery and precision fire systems including High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, laser-guided rocket munitions, and 155mm artillery rounds.
This package also comprises additional funds for training, maintenance, and sustainment for the delivered systems.
Apart from the US, the Swedish and German governments have also revealed their joint support tranche for Ukraine, comprising crucial equipment such as IRIS-T anti-aircraft systems, and subsystems of the HAWK anti-aircraft system.
Under this 11th package from Sweden, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will also receive up to ten Leopard 2 main battle tanks (MBTs). Delivery of the tanks is now subject to final approval from the Swedish legislature Riksdag.
According to the Swedish government, the latest package is being provided in response to Ukraine’s requests for more defence systems and combat platforms.
On the same day, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau confirmed the delivery of four more Leopard 2 MBTs to strengthen the Ukrainian troops in defending their nation.
Furthermore, this package includes an additional armoured recovery vehicle and more than 5,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition.
Trudeau announced that previously approved four Leopard 2 tanks have already been delivered to Poland, where Ukrainian tank crews are currently being trained by the Canadian trainers on how to operate the MBTs. (Source: army-technology.com)
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