NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Dec. 22

The most intense fighting over the last 24-48 hours continues to be concentrated along the Bakhmut line, where Russian forces continue to struggle to make notable progress. While Russian sources have reported on Wagner Group assaults to the south-west of Bakhmut, numerous Ukrainian sources have claimed in recent days that their forces are successfully repelling all Russian attacks against the town. In particular, Ukrainian advantages in reconnaissance drones are reportedly allowing Ukrainian forces to effectively identify and neutralise small Russian attacks attempting to penetrate the city’s defences.
Further south along the Donetsk city line, Russian offensives are similarly making little progress. Russian sources have nevertheless claimed that fighting remains ongoing in Marinka, 13 miles (21km) south-west of Donetsk city, where Russian forces are allegedly now in control of 80% of the settlement. While there are few further developments to report on, the former CEO of the Russian space corporation Roscosmos Dmitry Rogozin and former Prime Minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Vitaly Khotsenko were wounded on 21 December in occupied Donetsk city. Both men have been hospitalised but are understood to be recovering. While details remain limited, Russian sources have suggested that the attack had been planned, which if true would once again illustrate poor operational security on the part of DNR officials and the ability of Ukrainian forces to exploit such lapses to conduct targeted strikes close to the frontline.
Along the Oskil-Kreminna line, there are few developments to report on over the last 24-48 hours. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have continued launching small-scale attacks and counter-attacks near Svatove and Kreminna, but there has been little confirmation of any movement of the frontline.
On the southern Kherson front, Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on 21 December that their forces had successfully repulsed a Russian attempt to take control over various islands in the Dnieper delta. Details remain limited and it is unclear when precisely this attack took place, but Ukrainian officials have stated that Russian forces may attempt to establish control of the islands in the future. Aside from this, reports from the southern front indicate Russian forces are moving across southern Kherson oblast to support the construction of second and third lines of defence, with no indication that Russian forces are withdrawing from their current defensive lines closer to the Dnieper and Zaporizhzhia frontlines.
The Ukrainian General Staff claimed this morning, 22 December, that Russia has now lost some 100,000 personnel, 3,000 tanks and around 6,000 other armoured vehicles in ten months of war. As we have previously assessed, reliable casualty figures on both sides are very difficult to confirm. Mediazone, in collaboration with BBC News Russian service, has tracked Russian combat deaths using publicly verifiable data, including social media posts by relatives and official reports in local media. As of 16 December, the number of confirmed deaths stands at 10,229, but the real number is likely to be much higher.
On 21 December, President Vladimir Putin attended a public meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), where he and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu outlined numerous goals and reforms of the Russian military. Chief among them is a planned expansion of the Russian Armed Forces, which aims to increase its strength from 1 to 1.5 million service personnel, including 695,000 contract service personnel (notably higher than the 380,000 figure previously given in 2021). Ultimately, Shoigu justified the reorganisation of the military in part by stating that NATO’s expansion to Russia’s borders, namely the expected accession of Finland and Sweden, requires an ‘appropriate’ response. As set out by Shoigu, the planned Russian military reforms will include:

o The gradual raising of the age of conscription from 18 to 21 years as well as raising the upper age limit from 27 to 30 years;

o Reestablishment of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts;

o The decision to effectively reverse many of the Serdyukov 2008 reforms of the army, by expanding numerous independent brigades into full divisions;

o The establishment of numerous new ‘groupings’ of troops, including: an army corps in Karelia (in north-western Russia specifically designed to counter Finland’s accession to NATO); ten new divisions – including five artillery, two air assault and three motorised rifle divisions, two of the latter will be deployed in occupied Zaporizhzhia and Kherson; expand seven existing brigades to divisions, as well as expand five additional existing naval infantry brigades into divisions; establishment of three additional divisions for the Aerospace Forces, including one fighter and eight bomber regiments, as well as six army aviation brigades.

Shoigu provided no time scale for the implementation of the planned reforms. Given that Russia is currently in recession, mobilisation has been beset by challenges and previous pre-war attempts at much less ambitious reforms took extended periods of time, it remains unlikely that Moscow will be able to complete said reforms in a timely fashion. Putin and Shoigu both acknowledged challenges and shortfalls with this year’s partial mobilisation and pledged to learn lessons of the ‘special military operation’, particularly as they related to communications, command and control and counter-batter capabilities. However, it remains to be seen whether any meaningful reforms will be implemented to mitigate institutional shortcomings as well as major bureaucratic, logistical and command and control issues that have undermined operations and force generation to date. Shoigu nevertheless stated that the number of contracted service personnel will reach 521,000 by the end of next year. The reform plans clearly illustrate that the Kremlin is making a long-term military commitment to increase its overall strength which will likely see state funding allocated in ever-increasing quantities to the defence budget. In this respect, President Putin stated during the meeting that there are no financial limitations for the Armed Forces and that everything they request must and will be provided. Crucially, the military expansion plans have also increased the likelihood of future waves of mobilisation given the need to man these new divisions.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Aside from the military reform proposals (see above), yesterday’s MoD board meeting provided numerous insights into the Kremlin’s intentions in Ukraine. The meeting ultimately supports our assessment that the Kremlin is doubling down on a protracted, and increasingly attritional, war in Ukraine and is prepared to make investments (likely at the expense of Russian living standards and other services) to support a longer-term commitment.
Statements made by both Putin and Shoigu illustrated that the Kremlin’s maximalist goals remain in place, namely the ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘denazification’ of Ukraine, and Putin reiterated his rejection of Ukrainian sovereignty. While this may ultimately be a negotiating tactic aimed at extracting larger concessions from Kyiv during future negotiations, it remains highly likely that the Kremlin remains committed to the belief that it can achieve further battlefield advantage in the meantime. Putin and Shoigu maintained that Moscow remains open to constructive negotiations, but framed it in such a way that the West must pressure Kyiv to enter into such negotiations. For further analysis on the prospect of peace and negotiations following President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the US, see the Forecast below.
President Putin placed emphasis on Russia’s nuclear combat readiness and strategic deterrence capabilities. Amid commitments to continue developing and modernising Russia’s nuclear triad, Putin stated that Avangard nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are in service, with new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles to enter active service ‘in the near future’. These statements reflect no change in Russian nuclear policy or capability, and our assessment of the nuclear threat environment has not altered following the MoD meeting.
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Rossi is due to visit Moscow today, 22 December, to discuss the possibility of establishing a safety zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). As previously assessed, such a zone remains unlikely in the short term, and it is notable that various Russian sources over the last 24-48 hours have stepped up accusations that Ukrainian forces have been attacking Enerhodar, the location of the ZNPP. Further accusations of Ukrainian attacks threatening to trigger a nuclear incident are likely in the coming weeks, but our assessment of the overall threat of a nuclear escalation, whether a false-flag or accidental, has not changed.
French President Emmanuel Macron this morning, 22 December, gave an interview wherein he stated that he considers it unlikely that Ukraine will ever join NATO. While he acknowledged that to end the war Ukraine will require security guarantees, Macron stated that Russia will also need such guarantees, and Ukraine’s accession to NATO would be viewed by the Kremlin as essentially unacceptable.

FORECAST

On 21 December, President Volodymyr Zelensky visited his counterpart Joe Biden in Washington DC in the former’s first foreign visit since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the visit, Zelensky addressed a joint session of the US Congress, where he stated that US military support was not charity but rather an investment in global security. He also directly appealed to prominent Republican lawmakers ahead of the Republicans taking control of the House of Representatives in January, after which congressional scrutiny over US military support for Ukraine is set to increase. Despite at least two Republican lawmakers reiterating that they would still not support more aid, Zelensky’s visit underscored Washington’s strong commitment to Ukraine, with Biden confirming a new USD 2 billion package and pledging a further USD 45 billion in the future. During the one-on-one meeting between the presidents, Biden reportedly wanted to hear Zelensky’s perspective on the strategic direction of the war, given Zelensky’s playing down reports that his government was prepared to enter into negotiations any time soon. Various sections of the Biden administration favour one of three current options proposed to end the war: a Russian withdrawal from all occupied territories in Ukraine; a withdrawal of Russian forces from the Donbas, but not Crimea; and a withdrawal of Russian troops to the pre-24 February line of contact. Zelensky has repeatedly rejected the latter two scenarios and remains committed to liberating all occupied territory, including Crimea. For analysis of Zelensky’s proposed ten-point peace plan, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 15 November. During Zelensky’s visit, the Biden administration reiterated its position that it is not Washington’s place to dictate how and when diplomatic negotiations should begin. Rather, they state that it is Washington’s role to support Ukraine in establishing the strongest possible negotiating position from the battlefield. It remains our assessment that despite growing appetite in the West for negotiations, neither Moscow nor Kyiv are prepared to seriously enter negotiations in the short to medium term. Yesterday’s Russian MoD board meeting in particular has underscored Russia’s disinterest in genuine peace negotiations at this stage, despite playing lip service to the prospect.

Dec. 21

Heavy fighting and positional battles have continued along the Bakhmut line over the last 24 hours, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting that their forces successfully repelled numerous Russian attacks. The Institute for the Study of War on 20 December notably estimated that Russian forces have gained a total of 74 sq miles (192 sq km) in the Bakhmut area between 1 October and 20 December. This reflects the extremely slow progress Russian forces have made along the Russian High Command’s primary military objective in Ukraine at present.
Russian sources have reported unconfirmed breakthroughs northeast of Bakhmut, particularly around Bakhmutske, 6 miles (10km) northeast of Bakhmut. However, geolocated footage emerging on 20 December indicates that Ukrainian forces have retaken ground to the south of Bakhmut around the heavily contested town of Opytne, 2 miles (4km) south of Bakhmut. Further south along the Donetsk city line, Russian sources have made further unconfirmed claims of marginal gains around the town of Marinka, located 13 miles (21km) south-west of Donetsk city, though beyond this there are few developments to report on that front.
There are few notable developments to report along the Oskil-Kreminna line over the last 24 hours, with sources on both sides continuing to report on seemingly unsuccessful attacks and counterattacks on both sides. Notably, however, former DNR commander and FSB officer Igor Strelkov (Girkin), who claims to have served on the Oskil-Kreminna front earlier this year, reported this morning that Ukraine is building a ‘strong grouping’ in the vicinity of Kharkiv, either for defence or offence. While this remains unconfirmed, strengthening the defences around Kharkiv could reflect Ukrainian preparations to defend against a potential Russian offensive early next year. There is a realistic possibility that northern Kharkiv oblast remains a target for Russian forces. However, the build-up of forces near Kharkiv could also indicate preparations for renewed counter-offensive operations towards Svatove and Kreminna, aimed at retaking northern Luhansk oblast over the winter.
There have similarly been few developments along the southern Kherson frontline, though Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on 20 December that Russian forces are increasing troop numbers in the direction of the Kinburn Spit. There have been few reports or indications to update on the current Ukrainian operation on the Kinburn Spit in recent weeks, with most reporting suggesting fighting remains limited to artillery and counter-battery fire at present.
Later today, 21 December, President Vladimir Putin is expected to hold an expanded meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defence which will summarise the activities of the ‘special military operation’ in 2022 and set its goals for 2023. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu will deliver the keynote speech, while 15,000 Russian military officials will take part via videoconference alongside Putin and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Shoigu will likely present Russia’s special military operation as a success to date, glossing over the numerous setbacks in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts after 300 days of war. However, any announcements regarding the goals for the next phase of the ‘special military operation’ will be particularly significant and could provide insight into the Kremlin’s plans. However, these goals will likely be highly optimistic, and the probable use of the public address as part of wider information operations means maskirovka (military deception) should be recognised as playing a potentially large role in this highly choreographed meeting.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Today, 21 December, President Volodymyr Zelensky is travelling to Washington DC to meet with US President Joe Biden, Zelensky’s first foreign trip since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February and just 24 hours after he visits the frontline at Bakhmut. The visit comes shortly after the US Congress on 20 December announced a new USD 45 bn package in emergency assistance to Ukraine, which would be the largest aid package to date and goes beyond Biden’s initial request for USD 37 bn – emphasising the strong bipartisan support for military aid for Ukraine following the Midterms.
According to unnamed US officials, Biden is also expected to announce a new USD 2bn package of military aid to Ukraine during the meeting, which will likely include Patriot air defence systems – though only one such system is expected to be initially transferred. Kyiv has long lobbied for Patriot systems, and their transfer will notably increase Ukraine’s ability to interdict cruise and ballistic missiles, depending on the number of systems provided. Moscow has reiterated that such systems would remain legitimate targets if transferred to Kyiv. While their provision represents the latest example of the ‘slippery slope’ of ever more advanced Western military aid to Ukraine, given Patriots are defensive in nature, Moscow is unlikely to treat this as a red line that risks major escalation. Nevertheless, in the short term, there is a realistic possibility that Russian forces will launch renewed long-range strikes against critical infrastructure and/or government institutions while Zelensky is in the US, given the symbolic value of the visit.
Around 20 unidentified individuals were filmed throwing sledgehammers at the Finnish Embassy in Moscow on 20 December, in the latest indication of growing far-right violence targeting Western institutions inside Russia. Sledgehammers have become the symbol of the private military company (PMC) Wagner Group. While it remains unconfirmed whether the group was involved, Telegram channels associated with Wagner initially promoted the videos, reinforcing the likelihood that they were.
Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is increasingly positioning itself as an ultra-nationalist and patriotic military organisation that is actively defending Russian interests. The state-aligned RT network ran a segment earlier this week promoting the group in a likely bid to legalise the institution. It bears reminding that PMCs are technically banned in Russia, and Prigozhin has made efforts in recent months to establish Wagner as a legitimate military force rivalling the Ministry of Defence. As Wagner Group’s influence continues to grow, the organisation’s brutal tactics and reputation are likely to increase the risk of further attacks and violence targeting Western-linked institutions across the country. Putin’s recent directive for the security services to step up efforts to hunt down ‘traitors, spies and saboteurs’ could further encourage such violence, with not only embassies but also potentially cultural and NGO institutions at increased risk.
On 20 December, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a bill regulating the selection of Constitutional Court judges, which according to anti-corruption activists will allow the President’s Office to handpick loyalists. Reform of the constitutional court is one of the recommendations outlined by the European Commission as a condition for joining the European Union (EU). Under the new law, there will be three representatives of the Ukrainian government and three foreign experts in a panel to approve or reject candidates for Constitutional Court jobs. However, the EU’s Venice Commission has criticised this as providing more power to the Ukrainian government in choosing judges, which threatens to undermine supervision quality and would provide Kyiv with de facto control over the Court. Given the lack of oversight given to international organisations to assess candidates, the new bill risks hindering Ukraine’s negotiations to join the European Union, though it is unlikely to seriously impact Western military and financial aid flows in the short term.

FORECAST

We continue to carefully monitor developments inside Belarus that could indicate a shift in the military balance along the southern Ukrainian border, and alter the subsequent threat of a renewed invasion towards Kyiv in 2023. Yesterday the independent Belarusian Gayun monitoring project reported that Russia transferred a number of mechanised forces on 20 December closer to the southern border with Ukraine, including over 30 T-80 tanks and 20 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. In addition, reports emerging this morning, 21 December, indicate that Belarusian authorities have temporarily restricted entry and movement to three districts of the Gomel region near the border with Ukraine (Loevsky, Braginsky and Khoiniky). This could potentially form part of efforts to obfuscate a military build-up or play into wider deception efforts to raise fears of military preparations. It should be noted that following his visit to Minsk, Putin confirmed on 20 December that Russian forces are currently conducting military drills in Belarus. As such, this most recent redeployment could form part of such exercises, and in any case, remains a relatively small force. Military exercises of course could be used as a thinly disguised cover for the formation of a larger strike group. However, as previously reported, we would have to see much larger quantities of mechanised forces moved towards the border over the coming weeks before Russia likely amasses a force of sufficient size to seriously threaten a renewed ground invasion. In its latest military brief this morning, 21 December, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that their intelligence continues to detect ‘no signs of the formation of enemy offensive groups’ along the Belarusian border. Despite this, however, on 20 December, the commander of the Ukrainian Joint Forces, Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev, stated that Russian forces inside Belarus now have military capability which is ‘currently sufficient’ to conduct unspecified ‘tactical actions’ against Ukraine. While Nayev did not provide any further clarification, his report marked a departure from previous Ukrainian reports that have not identified any particular tactical capability along the border. In any case, the emphasis on ‘tactical’ capability likely reflects the fairly limited capability along the border at present and could reference Russian capability to conduct small-scale raids or reconnaissance operations rather than operationally significant manoeuvres. For Russia to launch a concerted ground offensive towards Kyiv or western Ukraine, a much more significant build-up would have to take place. It is important to recognise, however, that the quantity of open-source intelligence available to monitor military build-ups is significantly less than earlier in the conflict – in part due to increased operational security and GPS jamming on both sides. Nevertheless, the redeployment of tens of thousands of personnel and attendant mechanised forces is very hard to hide, particularly during the winter when satellite imagery can penetrate wooded areas. We will continue to monitor for any further Russian deployments to Belarus, but at present, our overall assessment remains unchanged – that under current conditions Russia is unlikely to launch a renewed invasion towards Kyiv in the short to medium term.

US-Ukraine: Zelensky’s visit to Washington DC reaffirms US support for Ukraine. Ukrainian President Zelensky is expected to arrive in Washington DC on 21 December. According to US officials, Zelensky will deliver a prime-time address to a joint session of Congress and meet with President Biden. This will be Zelensky’s first foreign visit since the start of the conflict in February 2022. The US is currently in the process of greenlighting nearly USD 50 bn in aid to Ukraine, in order to sustain the country’s military efforts through 2023. Separate officials suggested that Biden is not expected to push for a diplomatic resolution and will reiterate the US’s support for further Ukrainian offensives. It is a possibility that Russian forces will stage retaliatory attacks on energy infrastructure or high-profile sites in Ukraine during the visit.

Europe: Russian pipeline explosion briefly elevates gas prices, but energy security risks remain unchanged. On 20 December, an explosion at a natural gas pipeline delivering gas to Europe via Ukraine was reported in the Chuvashia region of Russia. Three workers died in the incident that took place during scheduled maintenance. Following the incident, Gazprom published a statement saying that gas deliveries to Europe will continue without disruption via an alternative route, which suggests that the explosion was likely the result of negligence during maintenance processes. While natural gas futures prices on the Dutch TTF increased by 6.6% in response to the news, they have now returned to pre-explosion levels. As such, the incident is unlikely to have a notable impact on European energy security and gas prices.

Russia: Growing brain drain and labour shortage amid mobilisation will decrease labour flexibility for tech sector. On 21 December, Minister of Digital Development, Maskut Shadyev, reported that since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, 100,000 IT specialists have left Russia. The majority of those who left arrived in Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia, though 80% of those who have left continue to work for Russian companies remotely. The minister recommended imposing restrictions on remote work to mitigate the potential of Russians working for foreign companies, though it remains unclear what these restrictions could entail. The reports come shortly after the governor of Russia’s Central Bank, warned of labour shortages due to the recent mobilisation of 300,000 reservists. Growing labour shortages and brain drain will increase the risk of a policy shift to combat the remote working of Russian citizens, decreasing labour flexibility that would likely impact the IT and tech sectors most acutely – particularly in the event of further rounds of mobilisation in 2023.

Ukraine: New law regulating selection of Constitutional Court judges raises concerns regarding supervision quality and EU accession prospects. On 20 December, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a bill regulating the selection of Constitutional Court judges, which according to anti-corruption activists will allow the President’s Office to handpick loyalists. Reform of the Constitutional Court is one of the recommendations outlined by the European Commission as a condition for joining the European Union (EU). Under the new law, there will be three representatives of the Ukrainian government and three foreign experts in a panel to approve or reject candidates for Constitutional Court jobs, though the EU’s Venice Commission has criticised this as providing more power to the Ukrainian government in choosing judges, which threatens to undermine supervision quality and impartiality. Given the lack of oversight afforded to international organisations to assess candidates, the new bill risks hindering Ukraine’s negotiations to join the EU, though it is unlikely to seriously impact Western military and financial aid flows in the short term.

Cyber Update

KEY EVENTS

During this monitoring period, there was a moderate increase in pro-Russian cyber campaigns against Ukrainian and Western targets compared with previous weeks. Most notably, Russian-affiliated hacking group Killnet claimed to have conducted cyber attacks targeting several US government websites and systems, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Meanwhile, several incidents suggest that cyber attacks by Russian and pro-Russian cyber threat groups are becoming increasingly sophisticated and diversifying from the reliance on distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. This is highlighted by several phishing and malware attacks targeting Ukrainian government systems, including via the distribution of false Windows 10 Operating System installers which dropped malware aimed at stealing information from government systems.
In the past week, pro-Ukraine hacktivist volunteer groups and hacktivist collectives, notably the Italian branch of the Anonymous collective, have allegedly intensified their cyber attacks on private entities linked to the Russian government and prominent oligarchs. This remains broadly consistent with trends observed in recent months. In the coming weeks, pro-Kyiv cyber threat actors will continue to use web defacement campaigns and DDoS attacks in ongoing efforts to undermine Russia’s influence and military operations in Ukraine.

LATEST SIGNIFICANT UPDATES

Killnet intensifies cyber attacks on Western government and state-linked systems; increase in suspected pro-Russian malware attacks on Ukrainian targets

On 18 December, the pro-Russian cyber threat actor Killnet claimed to have hacked the Advanced Technologies Group (ATG), a software provider to the US Department of Corrections. The group reported that it had accessed data regarding prisoners, employees, telephone conversations and prison monitoring and tracking systems. The group later posted alleged access credentials to US government websites, potentially trying to crowdsource their attack. However, the validity of these claims has not been independently verified.
On 18 December, the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) reported and warned of a pro-Russian email phishing attack designed to infect targets with information-stealing malware. The campaigns mainly targeted users of the DELTA situational awareness system, which is an intelligence and management system created by Ukraine to track the movement of Russian forces. While CERT-UA was not able to directly attribute the operation to a known cyber threat actor, the operation and its targets indicate the likely involvement of a pro-Russian actor.
On 15 December, a cybersecurity subsidiary of Google, Mandiant, reported that they had identified a cyber operation using trojanised Windows 10 Operating System installers to target Ukraine government organisations with malware that conducts reconnaissance and data theft. Mandiant has reported that it does not have the information required to attribute the threat activity, labelled as UNC4166, to a state sponsor or previously identified group. However, the targeted Ukrainian entities overlap with organisations previously targeted by Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).
On 15 December, the pro-Russian hacking group NoName05716 launched a DDoS attack on nine e-learning systems and websites of the Italian Ministry of Defence. The attack comes days after the Italian Senate approved the extension of weapon supplies to Ukraine until the end of 2023.
On 15 December, the pro-Russian group cyber threat actor Killnet claimed that they had launched cyber attacks targeting the FBI, the domestic intelligence and security service of the US. Screenshots shared by the group on Telegram contain purported evidence of the attack, with Killnet claiming to have accessed the passwords, Google and Apple accounts and medical profiles of more than 10,000 FBI employees. The FBI has neither confirmed nor denied the claims.
The Italian branch of Anonymous intensifies its cyber campaign targeting Russian-owned or affiliated private sector entities

On 17 December, a Twitter account claiming to represent the Italian branch of the decentralised Anonymous hacktivist collective reported cyber attacks on Russia’s largest food retailer, XR5 Retail Group. The group posted alleged evidence of the attacks bringing XR5’s webpage offline. However, website operators appear to have restored access to the website as of 19 December.
Over 14-16 December, the Italian branch of the Anonymous group, conducted a number of cyber attacks, disrupting access to the websites of global telecommunication services company VEON and associated brands such as telecommunications operator Beeline and investment company LetterOne. Access to all affected sites has now been restored. VEON is linked to Russian-Israeli billionaire and oligarch Mikhail Fridman, sanctioned by the EU and the UK. Though Fridman resigned as a director of the VEON Board in the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he retains influence in VEON via his 37.86% stake in VEON’s main shareholder company, LetterOne. In a post announcing the cyber attack on LetterOne, Anonymous Italia highlighted Mikhail Fridman’s influence in the company as the co-founder.
On 15 December, the IT Army of Ukraine, a volunteer pro-Kyiv hacking group with alleged ties to the Ukrainian government, reported cyber attacks on the Russian freelance content exchange and copywriter platform, Advego. The group posted evidence of Advego reporting that a widespread DDoS attack had targeted its servers on 14 December, causing disruptions to the platform and company operations.

FORECAST

During this monitoring period, there was a moderate increase in pro-Russia cyber attacks on Ukrainian and Western targets. Patterns of pro-Russian cyber activity have remained in line with the assessment of a sustained cyber threat towards Ukrainian and Western governments and state-linked entities, particularly in the defence, security and energy sectors. In line with previously observed trends, pro-Russia cyber attacks remain highly likely to take place in response to Western governments and entities making public announcements in support of Ukraine. This is highlighted by the cyber attacks by NoName057 on Italian military e-learning platforms after Rome approved the extension of weapons supplies to Ukraine. Meanwhile, the alleged intensification of cyber attacks by pro-Russian cyber threat actor Killnet on the US government and affiliated entities comes amid confirmation by the US Cyber Command that it had increased offensive operations against foreign adversaries before the 8 November midterm elections (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 20 December 2022). This suggests that there is an increased risk that state and non-state adversaries will retaliate against US government infrastructure in the coming weeks and months. Several incidents suggest that cyber attacks by Russian and pro-Russian cyber threat groups are becoming increasingly sophisticated and diversifying from the reliance on DDoS attacks. This is highlighted by the Windows 10 Operating System installer malware attacks on Ukrainian government organisations. If attributed to Russian or pro-Russian cyber threat actors, the malware would indicate the launch of more sophisticated pro-Russian cyber threat campaigns, as designing malware typically requires significant expertise and resources most commonly available to governments. In addition, such cyber threats typically lie dormant for several weeks or months. As such, there is a realistic possibility that cybersecurity and technology companies will identify further similar suspected Russian or pro-Russian malware threats on Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian targets in the coming months. During the monitoring period, we also observed an intensification in the pro-Kyiv cyber campaign led by the Italian branch of the decentralised Anonymous collective. Anonymous Italia’s targeting of Russian-linked companies in sectors including retail, financial services and telecommunications aligns with the targeting history of the Anonymous group more broadly and also that of other pro-Kyiv cyber threat actors. The incidents are likely to have involved relatively low-level DDoS attacks temporarily overwhelming targeted servers. Anonymous Italia is highly likely to claim further attacks on Russian-owned or affiliated private-sector targets in the coming days. Meanwhile, the IT Army of Ukraine’s cyber attacks on the Russian freelance content exchange and copywriter platform, Advego, remain consistent with the group’s targeting patterns. This is highlighted by cyber attacks targeting the Russian freelance platform FL during the previous monitoring period Pro-Kyiv cyber threat actors will continue to target private sector companies perceived to be contributing to Russia’s propaganda or war efforts in the coming weeks.

Russia: State-linked hackers will sustain elevated risk of espionage against European, NATO-linked public and private entities. Cyber security firm Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 published a report on 20 December, disclosing that the Federal Security Service (FSB)-linked advanced persistent threat group ‘Trident Ursa’ (aka Gamaredon, Primitive Bear, Shuckworm) attempted to compromise a petroleum firm belonging to an unidentified NATO country on 30 August 2022. The hack was conducted for espionage purposes but failed. It indicates that Trident Ursa and other Russian cyber actors are increasingly targeting entities, both public and private, in countries beyond Ukraine, especially against its NATO and European allies. Russian cybercriminals will continue to pose a threat to the European and US energy sector through ransomware attacks. Other Russian threat actors, such as Calisto, which is known to have targeted NATO entities and Ukraine defence contractors, will also continue to pose espionage and data theft risks to European and NATO countries, including against technology and logistics firms.

Dec. 20

20 December marks the 300th day of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The latest estimates indicate that Ukrainian forces have now liberated some 28,668 sq miles (74,250 sq km) of territory since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion in February.
President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the frontline town of Bakhmut earlier on 20 December. He described the area as the ‘hottest point on the entire frontline’. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces are currently repelling between five and seven Russian reconnaissance groups near Bakhmut every day, and that Russian forces continue to make very few gains. Ukrainian forces have also continued to repel Russian attacks further to the south-west of Donetsk city over the last 24-48 hours. Despite earlier Russian claims of a breakthrough around Marinka, located 13 miles (21km) south-west of Donetsk city, it remains to be seen if Russian forces have been able to push further west amid the general stalemate along this section of the front.
Along the Oskil-Kreminna line, the situation has not significantly changed in the last 24-48 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on numerous Russian assaults north-west of Svatove and Kreminna, though it is unlikely that these attacks have significantly altered the frontline. The Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast, Serhiy Haidai, reiterated earlier on 20 December that progress remains slow for Ukrainian forces advancing towards Kreminna. He stated that the few remaining kilometres in the approach to Kreminna have been heavily mined, and that this is impeding Ukrainian progress.
Along the southern fronts, there have been few notable military developments to report over the last 24 hours. Military operations have been largely limited to exchanges of artillery fire and the interdiction of ground lines of communication (GLOC) on both sides of the Dnieper river.
On 19 December, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valeriy Zaluzhny called on Zelensky to toughen the legal liability for military desertion and insubordination at the front. Zaluzhny argued that the current legislation, which only allows for fines and/or probationary sentences, has resulted in instances of desertion at the front. He reported that these cases have led to an ‘increase in the loss of personnel, territories and civilians’, as well as costly efforts to retake abandoned positions. Zaluzhny’s public appeal is an important reminder that the Ukrainian Armed Forces also face morale and discipline issues. These are, in some instances, undermining Ukraine’s combat effectiveness along the front. While this is happening in a far less widespread manner than within Russia’s military, desertion rates are likely to increase on both sides as the weather deteriorates.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Minsk (Belarus) on 19 December and his summit with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the two leaders reiterated their countries’ growing military integration. However, they made no significant announcement regarding political integration. Lukashenka confirmed that Russia will deliver S-400 air defence and Iskander ballistic missile systems to Belarus, while Putin stated he is considering training Belarusian air force crews to use ‘munitions with special warheads’ given the ‘escalating’ situation on the border. While this is likely an allusion to previous plans to update Belarus’ Su-25 jets to enable them to carry air-launched nuclear missiles, it remains to be seen whether this will actually take place Notably, Putin also stated after the meeting that ‘Russia is not interested in absorbing anyone’. This is possibly an indication that no progress has been made towards the long-touted political integration of the two countries under the ‘Union State’.

Serhiy Kovalenko, the CEO of Yasno, Ukraine’s largest energy company, stated on 19 December that only 20% of Kyiv’s population currently has access to electricity following the latest Russian cruise missile and drone attacks last week. Kovalenko reported that power outages lasting ten hours are now the new reality in Kyiv, and that he cannot predict when scheduled power outages will return. While power has reportedly been restored to critical infrastructure, including hospitals and public transport systems, enduring energy deficits will continue to sustain acute shortages for non-critical and private sector operations for the foreseeable future.
To mark Security Agency Worker’s Day in Russia, Putin addressed members of the Russian security services on 20 December, acknowledging for the first time that the situation in the newly annexed regions of Ukraine is ‘extremely complicated’. He nevertheless ordered the country’s domestic intelligence agencies to ramp up efforts not only to prevent threats from abroad but also to hunt down ‘traitors, spies and saboteurs’. Putin ordered the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Guard Service to step up surveillance efforts. The FSB and National Anti-Terrorism Committee will take joint ‘special control’ over strategic facilities. This is most likely in response to Ukraine’s growing ability to strike energy infrastructure in recent weeks. While it remains to be seen how enthusiastically this order will be carried out given existing martial law powers, it underlines Russia’s growing insularity and repression. In particular, following the expansion of the Foreign Agent laws earlier this month, Western-linked NGOs will face greater harassment risks, while the ever-increasing scrutiny of border points will likely raise the already high risk of arbitrary detainment for individuals perceived to oppose the Kremlin.

FORECAST

Alexandru Musteață, the head of Moldova’s Information and Security Service (SIS), warned on 19 December that there is a ‘very high’ risk of a new Russian offensive into western Ukraine and towards Moldova in early 2023. Musteață stated that while Moldova’s intelligence agencies are considering various scenarios, it is not a case of ‘if’ Russia undertakes any such advance, but rather ‘when’. He argued that an offensive could come at any point between January and April 2023. Moldova’s latest intelligence forecast follows the Ukrainian General Staff’s assessment that Russia will push towards Kyiv from Belarus next year. While we maintain that the Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist objectives in Ukraine in the longer term, including the establishment of a land bridge to Transnistria (Moldova), we assess that a renewed advance towards Moldova and Transnistria remains unlikely in the short to medium term for several reasons. Ultimately, Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson city in November is the clearest indicator that seizing further territory in south-western Ukraine (including Mykolaiv and Odesa) is currently not a short-term priority for Russian forces. It would be beyond almost all military and strategic logic for Russia to withdraw its forces across the Dnieper river before then recommitting these forces to a highly costly campaign just months later. There is a realistic possibility that any such campaign would end in failure and divert resources away from Russia’s key schwerpunkt in the Donbas. As we previously assessed, Russia currently retains limited military capabilities with which to seriously threaten south-western Ukraine (and by extension Moldova) with ground assaults. Russia’s military contingent stationed in Transnistria stands at an estimated two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), which together roughly comprise 1,500 personnel. Transnistria’s armed forces currently field around eight BTGs. In addition, the 200,000 Russian reserves who are likely to be mobilised early next year are much more likely to be deployed along existing or developing fronts in eastern Ukraine. Aside from the practical military issues and Russia’s clear prioritisation of eastern Ukraine, there are numerous other reasons why an attack against Moldova is unlikely in the short to medium term. Russia still retains various political, hybrid and non-military levers in Moldova; this ultimately means that a military offensive is less of a priority (and less of a necessity) for Moscow to shore up its long-term influence over the country. Moldova is far from a lost cause for Moscow, unlike Ukraine. Pro-Russia actors inside Moldova remain highly influential. They do not need a Russian military intervention to threaten the stability of the pro-EU government under Maia Sandu this winter. Moldova: Russian invasion of Moldova in early 2023 remains unlikely, despite Moldovan reports. On 19 December, the head of Moldova’s Information and Security Service (SIS), Alexandru Musteață, warned of the possibility of a Russian invasion of Moldova in early 2023, though the SIS later clarified that such an invasion depends on the course of hostilities in Ukraine. While we anticipate Russia is planning fresh offensives in early 2023, the likelihood of such forces targeting Moldova remains low. The Russian withdrawal from Kherson in November is the clearest indicator that seizing territory in southwestern Ukraine, aimed at establishing a land bridge with Transnistria, is currently not a priority for Russian forces. Opening up new fronts in Ukraine is much more likely than renewed attempts to reach Odesa and Transnistria. Moreover, Russia still retains various political and non-military levers in Moldova that it can leverage to shore up its influence without resorting to military intervention. As such, we assess that a Russian invasion of Moldova remains unlikely in early 2023.

Dec. 19

Military And Security Developments

Over the weekend of 17-18 December, Russian and Ukrainian military operations remained broadly on trend with patterns Sibylline has been monitoring in recent weeks. Along the Bakhmut line, Russian forces have continued offensive operations, where they have likely continued to make marginal gains. On 17 December, Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin claimed that DNR and Wagner Group forces were closing the pincers around Ukrainian positions in Bakhmut. However, many Russian milbloggers denied that DNR forces are currently active around Bakhmut, reiterating previous claims made by Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin that Wagner forces alone are making progress along the Bakhmut line. These claims further illustrate the endemic factionalism within and between Russian forces in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, geolocated footage emerging in recent days suggests Russian forces have indeed made incremental progress to the northeast of Bakhmut around Soledar, with the Russian Ministry of Defence claiming they have taken Yakovlivka, 10 miles (16km) northeast of Bakhmut. However, despite some incremental progress, Russian sources also claimed on 18 December that Ukrainian forces had successfully dislodged Russian forces from unnamed positions around Bakhmut which they had reportedly held ‘all autumn’. While it remains unclear where this has occurred, other Russian sources have reported in recent days on Ukrainian counter-attacks south of Bakhmut, particularly around Opytne, 2 miles (4km) south of Bakhmut. While such reports indicate that the area remains highly contested and that progress for Russian forces remains very slow, footage of alleged Ukrainian trenches in the city centre of Bakhmut began circulating amongst Russian sources this weekend. This is a likely indication of Ukrainian preparations for urban fighting and the possibility that the Ukrainian General Staff intends to fight for the city rather than withdraw if Russian forces break through.
Further south along the Donetsk city line, fighting remains intense but there have been few notable developments in recent days. Pushilin reported this morning, 19 December, that offensive operations are progressing ‘slower than we would like’, citing poor weather and the large number of Ukrainian reserves being brought forward along this axis as reasons for the lack of progress. He also stated that taking Marinka, 13 miles (21km) southwest of Donetsk city, remains a key priority for Russian forces, with unconfirmed reports emerging over the last 48 hours that intense fighting remains ongoing in the town centre.
Further north along the Oskil-Kreminna front, there have been few significant developments over the last 48-72 hours, with Ukrainian forces continuing to launch limited counter-offensive operations, but most fighting remaining positional in nature. Nevertheless, Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast Serhiy Haidai claimed on 17 December that Ukrainian forces are steadily advancing near Svatove, which he stated is one of the most active sections of the front at present. Russian sources have also reported various Ukrainian attacks northwest of Kreminna over the weekend. However, it remains unclear whether Ukraine has made any ground amid continual spoiling attacks by Russian forces, which have up until now seemingly succeeded in slowing down or preventing a sustained Ukrainian counter-offensive towards Kreminna and the R-66 highway.
On 17 December, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that unspecified Russian forces have withdrawn from Nova Kakhovka in Kherson oblast to Nyzhni Sirohozy, 48 miles (78km) to the east. Nova Kakhovka is a strategic town guarding the southern (left) bank of the Dnieper River and the hydroelectric plant and dam that connects the city to Ukrainian-held positions in northern Kherson oblast. The General Staff have reported that Russian forces have been spreading reports that Nova Kakhovka will be abandoned by Russian forces by the end of the year. Such withdrawals remain unconfirmed, and Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command is currently verifying these reports given the possibility that Russian forces are attempting to lure Ukrainian forces into a trap, whereby they would be effectively cut off from the western (right) bank of the Dnieper River.
Elsewhere along the southern front, the Ukrainian General Staff reported this morning, 19 December, that Russian forces are massing additional troops near Melitopol, 95 miles (153km) east of Nova Kakhovka. While unconfirmed, if true this would likely indicate that Russian forces are continuing to strengthen defences along the Zaporizhzhia frontline in anticipation of a potential new Ukrainian counter-offensive in the coming weeks and months which aims at taking Melitopol. As previously reported, the apparent sabotage of a key bridge in Melitopol last week could indicate preparations for just such a counter-offensive now that ground conditions have improved following the frost.
On 16 December, Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, published a list of ‘legitimate military targets’ for Russian forces, which included ‘the armed forces of other countries that have officially entered the war’ on Ukraine’s side. He raised the question of whether NATO’s support for Ukraine was tantamount to the alliance’s entry into the war, and while he did not explicitly state that NATO assets were legitimate military targets, he alluded to the possibility. Medvedev has regularly issued extremely bellicose and escalatory comments, which have not necessarily aligned with official Kremlin policy. His comments are more likely part of an ongoing strategic deterrence campaign aimed at sustaining heightened fears of an escalation and undermining support for Ukraine, rather than an indication that Moscow intends to expand the war – which we maintain is unlikely in the short to medium term.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Russian drone strikes have continued to target Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure intermittently throughout the weekend of 17-18 December, with further Shahed-136 drones targeting Kyiv this morning, 19 December. Ukrainian air defences have reportedly shot down 18 out of 23 Shahed-136 drones over Kyiv this morning, though unspecified ‘infrastructure objects’ have been hit in the Solomyanskyi and Shevvchenkivskyi districts of the capital. The attacks follow the latest nationwide drone and missile strikes that caused major power outages nationwide on 16 December, where air defences interdicted 60 out of 76 cruise missiles (the vast majority of which were Kh-101s). President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on 18 December that electricity has now been restored to nine m Ukrainians, though Ukrenergo stated today (19 December) that power outages continue in at least 10 regions. Ukrainian military intelligence reported on 18 December that Russia has now received a new batch of Shahed-136 drones from Iran, they claimed that the numbers supplied remain smaller than previous batches and will be used more sparingly going forward.
On 17 December, Kyiv dismissed a suggestion made by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in an op-ed for The Spectator magazine that the time is approaching for a negotiated peace with Russia to avoid another world war. Kissinger also restated a proposal he made in May, namely that a ceasefire line be established along the pre-24 February lines of control, and that Russia relinquishes the territory it subsequently captured while retaining control of Crimea, which could be the subject of negotiations after any ceasefire. The adviser to the head of Ukraine’s presidential office Mykhailo Podolyak warned against a ‘bad peace’ that he insisted would only fuel further Russian aggression. Ultimately, in Sibylline’s assessment, political and military conditions are currently not conducive to peace or ceasefire negotiations of any kind, and both sides are likely preparing for fresh offensives and counter-offensives in early 2023, rather than preparing to negotiate.
Indeed, in a rare interview with PBS, CIA Director Bull Burns stated on 16 December that in his view Moscow is currently not serious about engaging in real negotiations. Burns’ comments underscore the extent to which Kissinger’s views diverge from prevailing thinking in Washington and among other major Western powers on the prospects of a negotiated settlement.
During his evening address on 18 December, President Volodymyr Zelensky called for a global peace summit this winter as part of ongoing efforts by Kyiv to galvanise global support for Ukraine. Zelensky hopes to propose a ten-point peace formula that would help create a new global security infrastructure that would also restore peace in Ukraine. The attempt to link the restoration of peace in Ukraine to a new global security framework is a further sign of the government’s efforts to bolster general diplomatic support among non-Western countries which have largely remained neutral throughout the conflict.
This morning, 19 December, the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council Oleksiy Danilov stated that the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria ‘will be free’ once Vladimir Putin is gone. Danilov was using the Islamic self-proclaimed name of the Russian region known as Chechnya, which the Ukrainian Parliament formally recognised as ‘temporarily Russian-occupied territory’ on 18 October. This is the latest attempt by Kyiv to openly appeal to ethnic minorities within the Russian Federation, likely aimed at destabilising the Russian Federation and undermining support for the war in regions disproportionately impacted, such as Chechnya.

FORECAST

Today, 19 December, Russian President Vladimir Putin is visiting his counterpart Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Minsk, his first visit to Belarus in three and half years. Various Ukrainian officials have over the weekend raised the possibility that Putin’s rare visit could be an attempt to pressure Minsk to finally join the war directly. These following warnings by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny on 15 December that Russian units could launch an attack on Ukraine between January and February 2023 from Belarus The two leaders will reportedly discuss a wide range of issues during their meeting, including political integration under the so-called Union State and the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. However, the timing of the visit is notable and could indicate preparations for fresh offensives in early 2023. On 17 December, President Putin held official meetings at the joint headquarters of the Russian Armed Forces, where he reportedly heard reports on the ‘special military operation’ and held meetings directly with commanders. This all could indicate that the Kremlin is preparing a new phase of the war, most likely the anticipated winter offensives Sibylline has previously reported on, which are expected in early 2023. While the target of any such new Russian offensive remains unclear, we maintain that a major invasion involving Belarusian forces towards Kyiv remains unlikely in the short to medium term. Russian forces face myriad military and logistical issues that would inhibit their ability to successfully attack Kyiv – which remains much more heavily defended than it was in March 2022. Indeed, amid growing concerns ahead of Putin’s visit to Minsk, President Zelensky stated on 18 December that fortifying Ukraine’s 673-mile (1,084 km) border with Belarus is one of the military’s top priorities. As previously reported, Ukrainian forces have made significant headway in this regard in preparing an active defence as well as static fortifications along the border. Nevertheless, Belarusian Telegram channels reported on 18 December that Russian forces are continuing to send forces into Belarus, including 50 Ural military trucks arriving on 16 December alone. However, beyond this, there is limited indication that Russia is forming a sizeable strike force inside Belarus that would be capable of seriously threatening Kyiv and/or taking land in north-western Ukraine. A combat readiness check ordered by Lukashenka on 13 December officially ended this morning, 19 December. While the drills focused on strengthening Belarusian capability along its western border with NATO member states, Belarusian military capability overall remains very limited and would not be capable of posing a serious invasion threat to Ukraine without substantial Russian military assistance. While a renewed attempt to strike towards Kyiv and/or western Ukraine remains possible in the new year, such a campaign would most likely result in a stalemate far from the capital, once again exposing Russian forces through overextended ground lines of communication which ultimately precipitated their withdrawal in April. Nevertheless, merely the fear and perception of an impending Russian invasion are likely to serve Russian military and strategic interests. As such, Putin’s visit to Minsk could equally play a broader political role in supporting a wider information operation. This operation is likely designed to sustain the perception in Kyiv and the West that Russian forces could re-invade from the north at any moment, forcing Ukrainian forces to screen the northern border while also aiming to undermine Western support for Ukraine over the longer term. Sibylline will continue to monitor for any further developments.

Azerbaijan-Georgia-Hungary-Romania: Black Sea electricity project will face conflict-related delays. On 17 December, the leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary and Romania signed an energy agreement to lay underwater cables which will facilitate the transport of energy supplies from the Caucasus to Europe via the Black Sea. The agreement will provide a financial and technical framework for the implementation of the project. The initiative involves the construction of nearly 745 miles (1,200km) of cables within six years to transport electricity from Azerbaijan to Romania, via Georgia, and subsequently to Hungary and the rest of Europe. The agreement will support Europe’s long-term efforts to diversify energy supplies from Russia and boost non-Russian Eurasian energy exports. The project will also likely attract investment in Georgia’s electricity sector, amid the prospects of Georgia becoming a regional electricity hub. However, the volatility of the Black Sea security environment amid the heightened threat of attacks linked to the conflict in Ukraine will likely hinder project planning and construction efforts through 2023. (Source: Sibylline)

21 Dec 22. $1.85bn in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. On December 21, as part of President Zelenskyy’s visit to the White House, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced $1.8n in additional security assistance for Ukraine. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $1bn, as well as $850m in assistance via the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).

The Presidential Drawdown is the twenty-eighth such drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine that the Biden Administration has authorized since August 2021. Capabilities in this package include:

One Patriot air defense battery and munitions;
Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
500 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds;
10 120mm mortar systems and 10,000 120mm mortar rounds;
10 82mm mortar systems;
10 60mm mortar systems;
37 Cougar Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles;
120 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
Six armored utility trucks;
High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
Precision aerial munitions;
Over 2,700 grenade launchers and small arms;
Claymore anti-personnel munitions;
Demolition munitions and equipment;
Night vision devices and optics;
Tactical secure communications systems;
Body armor and other field equipment.

Under USAI, the DoD will also provide Ukraine with:

45,000 152mm artillery rounds;
20,000 122mm artillery rounds;
50,000 122mm GRAD rockets;
100,000 rounds of 125mm tank ammunition;
SATCOM terminals and services;
Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.

Unlike Presidential Drawdown, USAI is an authority under which the United States procures capabilities from industry rather than delivering equipment that is drawn down from DoD stocks. This announcement represents the beginning of a contracting process to provide additional capabilities to Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

Russia’s unrelenting and brutal air attacks against critical infrastructure have only reinforced the need to provide Ukraine with sophisticated air defense capabilities. At President Biden’s direction, the United States has prioritized the provision of air defense systems to help Ukraine defend its people from Russian aggression. The Patriot air defense system in this security assistance package is one of the world’s most advanced air defense capabilities. Once operational, it will add to a layered defense to counter the full range of threats currently menacing Ukraine’s cities and civilians. The Patriot system will augment previous air defense capabilities the United States has provided Ukraine, which include NASAMs, missiles for HAWK air defense systems, Stingers, and equipment to counter the Russian use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

In total, the United States has now committed more than $21.9bn in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration. Since 2014, the United States has committed approximately $24bn in security assistance to Ukraine and approximately $21.2bn since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale invasion on February 24. Through PDA and USAI, DoD continues to work with Ukraine to meet both its immediate as well as its longer-term security assistance needs.

To meet Ukraine’s evolving battlefield requirements, the United States will continue to work with its allies and partners to provide Ukraine with key capabilities. (Source: US DoD)

22 Dec 22. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy tells U.S. Congress aid is ‘not charity’, urges more support.

Summary

Aid to Ukraine is an investment in democracy – Zelenskiy
U.S. announces new $1.85 bn military aid package
U.S. Patriot air defence battery part of new assistance
‘We would like to get more Patriots’ – Zelenskiy
Putin backs increasing size of Russian military by 30%

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy told the U.S. Congress that aid to Ukraine was an investment in democracy and “not charity” as he invoked American battles against the Nazis in World War Two to press for more assistance for his country’s war effort.

Zelenskiy’s comments on Wednesday come as Republicans – some of whom have voiced increasing scepticism about sending so much aid to Ukraine – are set to take control of the U.S. House of Representatives from Democrats on Jan. 3.

Some hardline Republicans have even urged an end to aid and an audit to trace how allocated money has been spent.

“Your money is not charity. It is an investment in the global security and democracy that we handle in the most responsible way,” Zelenskiy told a joint session of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, speaking in English.

The world is too interconnected to allow any country to stand aside and feel safe, Zelenskiy said as he appealed for bipartisan support.

Earlier, Zelenskiy, wearing his trademark olive green trousers and sweater on his first foreign wartime visit, met President Joe Biden, who called for support to keep flowing in 2023.

The United States also announced another $1.85bn in military aid for Ukraine, including a Patriot air defence system to help it ward off barrages of Russian missiles.

Zelenskiy said the Patriot system was an important step in creating an air shield.

“This is the only way that we can deprive the terrorist state of its main instrument of terror – the possibility to hit our cities, our energy,” Zelenskiy told a White House news conference, standing next to Biden.

“We would like to get more Patriots … we are in war,” Zelenskiy told reporters at the White House.

Russia says it launched its “special military operation” in Ukraine in February to rid it of nationalists and protect Russian-speaking communities. Ukraine and the West describe Russia’s actions as an unprovoked war of aggression.

Ukraine has come under repeated Russian strikes targeting its energy infrastructure in recent weeks, leaving millions without power or running water in the dead of a freezing winter.

TASS news agency cited Russia’s U.S. ambassador as saying that Zelenskiy’s visit confirmed that U.S. statements about not wanting a conflict with Russia were empty words.

America’s provocative actions in Ukraine were leading to an escalation the consequences of which were impossible to imagine, TASS cited Anatoly Antonov as saying.

Russia said last week, Patriot systems, if delivered to Ukraine, would be a legitimate target for Russian strikes.

INVOKES WORLD WAR TWO

Zelenskiy joined a long list of world leaders to address joint meetings of the U.S. Senate and House, a tradition that began in 1874 with a visit by Hawaiian King Kalakaua and included almost legendary wartime visits by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, kings, queens and one pope.

House members and senators from both parties leaped to their feet to cheer parts of Zelenskiy’s speech as he likened his country’s battle to World War Two and even the American Revolution.

Referencing former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who served between 1933 and 1945, and efforts to liberate Europe from Nazi occupation, Zelenskiy appealed to Americans as they gathered with family for Christmas.

“Just like the brave American soldiers, which held their lines and fought back Hitler’s forces during the Christmas of 1944, brave Ukrainian soldiers are doing the same to Putin’s forces this Christmas,” he said.

Congress is on the verge of approving an additional $44.9bn in emergency military and economic assistance, on top of some $50bn already sent to Ukraine this year as Europe’s biggest land conflict since World War Two drags on.

White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Washington was seeing no sign that Russian President Vladimir Putin was willing to engage in peacemaking.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said more Western arms supplies to Ukraine would lead to a “deepening” of the conflict.

Zelenskiy said a “just peace” with Russia meant no compromises on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

BAKHMUT

Russian forces attacked targets in the Zaporizhzhia region and pushed to advance near the battered eastern front-line towns of Bakhmut and Avdiivka, the focal point of fighting in the Donetsk region, Ukraine’s military said on Wednesday evening.

The commander of Ukraine’s “Freedom” battalion, Petro Kuzyk, helping to defend Bakhmut, told the website of Espreso TV: “Each day, there are anywhere from seven to 10 attempts to storm our positions. And it’s the same at night.”

“They won’t be able to take Bakhmut, but if they take the heights above it and set up their artillery and cut our logistical arteries, that will make the situation much more difficult,” Kuzyk said.

Putin has promised to give his military whatever it needs to prosecute the war nearing the end of its 10th month and backed a plan to boost the size of the armed forces by more than 30%. (Source: Reuters)

22 Dec 22. Rheinmetall supplying Ukraine with brand new logistic trucks. At the behest of the German government, Rheinmetall is supplying Ukraine with brand new HX 8×8 trucks. In total, 26 of these high-mobility hookloading vehicles will be transferred to Ukraine. The order is worth €12.5m. Delivery of the vehicles has already begun. Made by Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles, the HX family is among the most widely used range of military trucks anywhere. Over 15,000 vehicles are now in service worldwide. A military-off-the-shelf family of vehicles, HX trucks are systematically designed for maximum durability, mobility, ease of use and modularity, effectively placing them in a class of their own. Rheinmetall is already involved in several activities in support of Ukraine. In 2023, with the backing of the German government, Rheinmetall subsidiary Zeppelin Mobile Systeme GmbH will be supplying Ukraine with a turnkey field hospital.In addition, Rheinmetall is taking part in several “Ringtausch” operations. The “Ringtausch” is a procedure developed by the German government to support the Ukrainian war effort in cooperation with neighbouring European countries and NATO partner nations. Here, NATO countries transfer Soviet-era heavy equipment to Ukraine, receiving surplus Western-made systems in exchange. Rheinmetall is currently supplying various fighting vehicles from company reserves, including Leopard 2 A4 tanks and Marder infantry fighting vehicles, to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Greece. Furthermore, HX 8×8 trucks of the same type as the Ukraine gets now are supplied to Slovenia. In turn, these NATO countries are transferring tanks and IFVs to Ukraine.

21 Dec 22. Russia’s resources for Ukraine war are unlimited despite ‘issues’, says Vladimir Putin. Vladimir Putin has hit back at claims the Kremlin has left Russia’s armed forces fighting without key equipment, saying the war in Ukraine could be financed without “limits” and ordering the military to be open to criticism as his full-scale invasion of the country nears the 10-month mark. “The military operation has highlighted issues that we need to work on specifically,” including “communications” and “automatisation”, the Russian president said on Wednesday. Speaking to Russia’s defence ministry, which has faced unprecedented, Kremlin-sanctioned criticism for struggling to supply the front lines and retreating from the southeastern regions of Ukraine that Moscow had annexed only weeks earlier, Putin said Russia had “no limits” on financing the war effort. Putin’s comments are likely to be the most important prepared remarks the Russian president makes until the new year. The Kremlin admitted earlier on Wednesday that the president would not make his annual state of the union address, despite being required to do it within the calendar year under Russia’s constitution. Civilian officials such as Viacheslav Volodin, chair of the lower house of parliament, and even the Russian Orthodox Church patriarch Kirill attended Wednesday’s speech — a highly unusual step intended to mark its significance. Putin played down the war’s impact on Russia’s economy, which is set to contract 3.5 per cent — a far shallower fall than expected earlier this year when western sanctions were first introduced. He said Russia would not “militarise” its economy because “there is no need” for it, insisting he did not want to “repeat the mistakes of the past”, when “we destroyed our economy for defence purposes”. Despite the west’s efforts to deplete Putin’s war chest, Russia’s budget deficit in 2022 will reach just 2 per cent, according to the Russian ministry of finance. This is something it can easily cover with state borrowing and increased spending from its $187bn national welfare fund, the country’s sovereign wealth fund. In an attempt to respond to criticism of the supply efforts, which have seen soldiers forced to buy basic equipment such as socks and boots out of their own pockets, Putin insisted “the country provides everything, everything the army needs,” including “everything a soldier needs to be modern, comfortable and reliable”. Putin urged the defence ministry to “listen to the criticism and respond to it”. While Russia in March made “discrediting the armed forces” a crime punishable with up to 15 years in prison, the Kremlin has tacitly approved criticism of the military since then. Lawmakers, state television pundits and prominent bloggers embedded on the front lines have attacked the army for supply, logistical and strategic failures. While talking about the need to modernise the army, Putin said Russia “knows everything about Nato’s resources and abilities and needs to study it thoroughly and use it to increase its military capacity”. He vowed to maintain the combat readiness of Russia’s nuclear triad, which can fire missiles from land-based launchers, submarines and strategic aircraft. “This is the main guarantee of our sovereignty and balance of power in the world,” added Putin. Speaking right after Putin, Russia’s defence minister Sergei Shoigu said Russia’s nuclear force had successfully conducted a special exercise on carrying out a large-scale nuclear strike “in response to the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy”. Russia’s “nuclear triad is being maintained at a level that guarantees our ability to implement strategic deterrence”, Shoigu added. Recommended Constanze Stelzenmüller The west’s axis of prudence risks a Kremlin victory by default in Ukraine According to him, Russia needed to create a new military grouping in the north-west of the country, claiming that this was in response to Nato developments. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have requested to join the alliance. Shoigu admitted that Russia had run into problems attempting to mobilise 300,000 men for the frontline over the past two months. It was a “serious challenge” for the country and the armed forces, Shoigu said. “Mobilisation hasn’t been introduced since the Great Patriotic war,” he added, using the Russian term for the second world war. “The mobilisation system turned out not to be fully adapted to new economic relations, so we encountered problems”, Shoigu confirmed. There have been numerous reports of people being drafted despite legal immunity from it, as well as of equipment shortages, poor training and inadequate accommodation. The minister said 830,000 people had also been freed from military service duties in order to support the economy. (Source: FT.com)

20 Dec 22. Ukraine defence chief hopes Belarus won’t join any Russian offensive. Ukraine’s defence minister said on Tuesday that Russia could prepare an attack force in Belarus to launch a new offensive on Ukraine, but that he hoped Minsk’s troops wouldn’t take part. Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov and other Ukrainian officials have suggested Moscow could attempt a winter offensive after mobilising more troops.

A visit to Belarus by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday also increased speculation abroad that Moscow wants its ally to play a more direct role in the war in Ukraine.

Reznikov told Ukrainian television there was no evidence that Russia had already begun assembling an offensive-ready combat force in Belarus, which borders both Russia and Ukraine, or that Minsk would be dragged into the war.

“I think it’s not in the interests of the leadership of Belarus to waste its military potential,” Reznikov told Ukrainian television. “So I have hope that they will continue holding this balance.”

Russian forces used Belarus as a launch pad for an abortive attack on Kyiv in February but Minsk has not joined the war directly or sent its own troops into battle in Ukraine.

Reznikov spoke after another Ukrainian general said Russian aircraft were training in Belarusian airspace to identify targets in Ukraine for potential missile strikes.

“Accordingly, we are taking all measures to lower the threat level,” joint forces commander Serhiy Nayev said.

Ukrainian officials say Russian forces have continued using airfields in Belarus to launch attacks on Ukraine since the Feb. 24 invasion. (Source: Reuters)

20 Dec 22. Belarus says its Russian S-400, Iskander missiles enter ‘combat duty.’

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has announced the S-400 air defense systems and Iskander missiles the country has received from Russia have been put “on combat duty.”

The move comes as analysts are seeing Moscow’s rising pressure on Minsk to increase the satellite nation’s involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Lukashenko made the announcement during the authoritarian leader’s meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, during the latter’s Dec. 19 visit to Minsk.

“Today, we put on combat duty the S-400 complex, which you handed over to Belarus, and, most importantly, the Iskander complex, which you also, having promised it six months ago, handed over to us,” Lukashenko said, as quoted in a statement released by the Russian president’s office.

Lukashenko has long called on the Kremlin to provide his regime with Iskander missile systems. This would allow the Belarusian armed forces to expand their attack range from about 300 km (186 miles) to 500 km (311 miles), he has argued.

The distance between Minsk and Warsaw, the capital of NATO member state Poland, which has maintained strained ties with Belarus, is about 546 km (339 miles).

Last February, the Belarusian government organized a referendum which enabled the authorities to modify the constitution’s article describing the nation as a “nuclear-free zone” and a “neutral” state. The vote, which international organizations have broadly dismissed as rigged, allows Russia to deploy additional nuclear weapons along NATO’s eastern flank.

Meanwhile, the Institute for the Study of War, a U.S. think tank, said in a recent analysis that “Lukashenko uses the rhetoric of defending Belarusian borders against the West and NATO in an effort to avoid participating in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.”

Lukashenko had used similar hints about the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus on Feb. 17 in the context of claimed Western aggression, analysts wrote. (Source: Defense News)

20 Dec 22. Russia’s grim battle for Bakhmut may yield pyrrhic victory at best.

Summary

Russian win in Bakhmut would be pyrrhic victory – experts
Small city is, however, useful for Ukrainian supply lines
Much of city has been flattened, most residents have fled
Unquantified but heavy losses reported on both sides

The nearly five-month battle for the small city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine has ground on for so long and wrought so much death and destruction that, even if Russia does prevail, it will be a pyrrhic victory, military experts say.

Wrecked apartment blocks, badly wounded soldiers, mud-filled trenches and civilians cowering in cellars under incessant bombardment have become familiar scenes in and around Bakhmut since the fighting began.

Gaining control of the city, with a pre-war population of 70-80,000 that has shrunk to close to 10,000, could give Russia a stepping stone to advance on two bigger cities – Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.

It would also deprive Ukraine of a useful road and rail supply line intersection.

But with fierce fighting there since Aug. 1, and Russian shelling since May, much of Bakhmut lies in ruins, while Ukrainian forces to the west have had ample time to build defensive lines nearby to fall back to.

“If Bakhmut had been captured when they started their attack in August then it would have been significant. But it’s all about momentum,” said Konrad Muzyka, a Polish military analyst.

He said Bakhmut’s strategic value had been reduced by Ukraine’s fortification of the surrounding area in the months that followed, making it hard for Russia to convert the city’s capture, if it happens, into a broader breakthrough.

Still, the clash has taken on outsized significance on both sides because it is the main theatre of fighting as winter bites, major resources have been deployed and it is the first battle in months Russia appears to have a chance of winning.

Described as a “meat grinder” by commanders on both sides, some Russian, Ukrainian and Western experts liken the struggle to World War One, where Germany and Britain suffered huge losses in trench warfare for often scant territorial gain.

Igor Girkin, a Russian nationalist and former Federal Security Service officer who helped launch the original Donbas war in 2014 and is under U.S. sanctions, said this week he thought his own side’s strategy in Bakhmut was “idiotic”.

“What will happen next (after the potential Russian capture of Bakhmut)?” Girkin mused in a video, adding the Ukrainians would merely fall back to a second defensive line while continuing to build other defensive lines behind that one.

“It’s chewing through the enemy’s defences according to the World War One model,” said Girkin, arguing that Moscow needed to change battlefield strategy and deploy its forces differently.

Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military at the U.S.-based CNA think-tank, said Moscow appeared committed to the battle because of resources it had already spent rather than because of “sound strategy”.

“The fighting for Bakhmut is not senseless, but strategically unsound (for Russia) given weak offensive potential and no prospect of breakthrough even if the city is captured,” said Kofman.

‘CONVICT TROOPS’

Neither side discloses the full extent of fatalities in Ukraine.

But Kyiv says Russia has been taking heavy losses and that many of those killed were convicts recruited by Moscow’s Wagner private mercenary company.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s founder, who is sanctioned in the West, has confirmed his men are fighting there.

The deal he offered convicts was to fight and be pardoned in six months or, if they joined up and deserted, face execution.

In November, independent Russian news outlet Mediazona reported that publicly available data from Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service showed the overall prison population shrank by over 23,000 people in September and October, the biggest drop of its kind in more than a decade.

That suggested convicts had taken up Prigozhin’s offer. Reuters could not independently verify the data.

Prigozhin has cautioned against expecting rapid breakthroughs, and, in a Dec. 12 comment, said Wagner’s task in fighting for Bakhmut was to “kill as many enemy soldiers as possible, and bleed the Ukrainian army dry”.

Battlefield footage suggests intense fighting for relatively modest stretches of ground, with the frontline edging back and forth.

Russia, in its own battlefield updates, has spoken of Ukraine suffering heavy losses in men and hardware. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Monday that Bakhmut was the “hottest spot” on a 1,300-km (800-mile)frontline.

His office said on Tuesday that Zelenskiy had visited the city to meet military representatives and hand out awards to soldiers.

WAR OF ATTRITION

For Russia, Bakhmut, which it calls Artyomovsk, the city’s Soviet-era name, has long held political value.

Lying on the frontline that bisects Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region, taking Bakhmut would move Russia a step closer to full control of the Donbas, parts of which have been controlled by Russian proxies since 2014.

After Russian troops withdrew from Ukraine’s north in April in a humiliating retreat, Moscow publicly reframed its core war aim as the “liberation” of the largely Russian-speaking Donbas, of which Donetsk region makes up roughly half.

Muzyka, the Polish military analyst, said Bakhmut had become a battle of attrition.

“The Ukrainians are just wearing the Russians down and it’s quite effective in terms of manpower and equipment,” he said. “They are increasing the costs to the Russians.”

For Moscow, says British military intelligence, there is “a realistic possibility that Bakhmut’s capture has become primarily a symbolic, political objective”.

A win there would help lift morale and General Sergei Surovikin, overall commander of Russia’s forces in Ukraine since Oct. 8, could show he was right to redeploy his forces elsewhere after withdrawing from the southern city of Kherson.

It could also boost Prigozhin’s political capital in Moscow if he can take some credit for such a victory.

For Ukraine, say experts, the calculus in holding Bakhmut is partly about sustaining support from Western countries on whose arms supplies Ukraine’s war effort is dependent.

With Ukraine having scored a string of battlefield successes, even a relatively insignificant defeat risks creating the perception of stalemate, which could make Western countries less willing to extend support for Kyiv amid their own mounting economic problems stemming from the war.

“At this stage, Ukraine is the victim of its own recent success, and suffers from heightened expectations of sustained momentum,” said Kofman.

(Source: Reuters)

20 Dec 22. Vladimir Putin has called the situation in Ukraine “extremely complicated” in an apparent attempt to prepare Russia’s population for a long-lasting war as his sputtering invasion nears the 10-month mark. In an address to security officers on Tuesday, the Russian president admitted they faced difficulties in four regions of Ukraine partly occupied by Russian forces, saying working there was “hard.” Putin annexed four regions of eastern and southern Ukraine in September in an attempt to secure Russia’s gains on the ground and deter western support for Kyiv. But the gambit has backfired spectacularly as Ukraine’s counter-offensive, backed with supplies of advanced western weaponry, has retaken territory Putin claimed as Russian. Among the Ukrainian gains are the city of Kherson, the only regional capital Russia had captured during the invasion, which began in February. “The people living there, the Russian citizens, rely on your protection. And it is your duty to ensure their security, rights and freedoms,” Putin said. Putin’s comments marked the second time this month he has admitted the war in Ukraine — which he originally thought would be finished in less than a week — is set to go on for a long time. Earlier in December, he told his human rights council the invasion could be a “long process”. However, he also celebrated the territorial gains from the annexation. Putin appears to have little intention of climbing down from his maximalist goals — which essentially amount to destroying Ukraine in its current form — even as Russia struggles to gain ground, according to former senior Kremlin officials. Russia has repeatedly said it is open to peace talks with Kyiv, but only on the condition that all of its demands are accepted. (Source: FT.com)

20 Dec 22. U.S. Sends Gear to Repair Ukraine’s Electric Grid.

Russia’s struggle on the battlefields has led to attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, resulting in suffering and death for Ukrainian civilians.

Ukraine’s partners — including the United States — are doing all they can to alleviate the damage Russia’s missile attacks on critical infrastructure have caused.

Russia has sent waves of missiles into Ukraine targeting the energy grid. These attacks are exacerbated by Ukraine’s winter weather with the high temperature over the next week forecast to be 35 degrees Fahrenheit with lows of around 10 degrees.

“The administration has been working — in partnership with the National Labs, industry, utilities, and the Ukrainian government — to locate available equipment in the U.S. that can be delivered to Ukraine for emergency support,” Department of Energy officials said.

Officials have committed more than $53m in support for Ukraine’s electric grid. “The equipment we are providing is critical for Ukraine’s emergency repairs in the face of Russia’s attacks,” DOE officials said. “This support will help Ukraine rebuild the backbone of their power transmission system, which is critical in keeping the lights on and homes warm through the winter.”

The effort is part of the whole-of-government approach the United States is implementing in the wake of Russia’s unprovoked and cruel full-scale invasion of its neighbor. The Defense Department alone has committed almost $20bn in security assistance to Ukraine since February 24, 2022.

Ms of Ukrainians are feeling the effects of Russia’s missile attacks, and the United States is just one of many countries helping Ukraine repair and sustain its electrical grid. “We will continue to identify equipment that can be sent from the United States, in addition to ongoing efforts to locate and acquire equipment abroad that is compatible with Ukraine’s system,” officials said.

The Department of Energy located the equipment, and U.S. Transportation Command hustled the gear from the United States to locations in Europe where Ukrainian officials could take possession of it. The initial tranches of equipment are now inside Ukraine where electrical workers are using it to repair damaged infrastructure.

The United States and partner nations are also rushing air defense capabilities to Ukraine so it can defend itself against Russia’s attacks. “We have been sending a range of air defense equipment to Ukraine,” said a DOD official. “We delivered the first two NASAMS to Ukraine and we are making air defense a priority in our assistance,” the official said.

Ukrainian officials report U.S. systems have been extremely effective in countering Russia’s continued missile and drone assaults. (Source: US DoD)

19 Dec 22. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy asks European leaders for air defence, tanks, weapons. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Monday asked Western leaders meeting in Latvia, including British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, to supply a wide range of weapons systems to help end Europe’s deadliest conflict since World War Two sooner.

While Western allies, led by the United States, have been supporting Ukraine with funding, military training and weapons, Kyiv has said still more was needed to tip the balance in its 10-month-old campaign against Russia in Ukraine’s favour.

“A lot depends on you – how this war will end. The more successful our defence forces are, the faster the Russian aggression will fail,” Zelenskiy said during his video link address to leaders of countries in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a British-led grouping of Northern European countries.

“I ask you to increase the possibility of supplying air defence systems to our country, and to help speed up the relevant decisions to be taken by our partners,” Zelenskiy said, addressing Sunak.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda told Reuters after the meeting that there was not enough time to discuss Zelenskiy’s detailed list of requests. But responding earlier to Ukrainian leader’s plea, Sunak said the gathering aimed to focus on “how best we can continue to support you and get you everything that you need”.

Zelenskiy, in an apparent dig at Berlin, said “there is no explanation” why Ukraine is not supplied by German-made Leopard tanks, and asked the Netherlands, whose forces use the tanks, to “please talk about this decision together with your partners.”

“For our defence operations to be more successful we need armoured vehicles, primarily tanks,” said Zelenskiy. Germany is not part of the JEF grouping and was not present at the Riga meeting.

He asked Norway to supply more of Norway-made NASAMS launchers and missiles and Sweden for Swedish-produced Gripen fighter aircraft, RBS 98 missiles and Archer artillery.

Zelenskiy also asked Denmark to transfer Ceasar howizers to Ukraine, Finland for more ammunition shells, Lithuania for NASAM as well as Stinger missiles, Latvia for artillery, and Estonia for howizers and ammunition.

“The sooner we restore our border control, the stronger your security will be,” Zelenskiy said. “Ukrainian children in their letters to St Nicholas ask for air defence, for weapons, for victory,” he said, referring to the name used for Santa Claus in Ukraine.

Led by Britain, JEF is configured to respond rapidly to crises in the Northern Europe, and includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. (Source: Reuters)

19 Dec 22. Putin says situation extremely difficult in Russian-annexed Ukrainian regions.

Summary

Putin: Step up intelligence surveillance and secure borders
Putin warns of new threats from abroad and traitors at home
Drones inflict more damage on Ukraine’s energy grid
Putin visits Belarus, Kyiv fears he wants it to join war

President Vladimir Putin said the situation in four areas of Ukraine that Moscow has declared are part of Russia was “extremely difficult” and ordered security services to step up surveillance to secure its borders and combat new threats.

Putin’s comments made on Security Services Day, widely celebrated in Russia, came as Kyiv renewed calls for more weapons after Russian drones hit energy targets and as fears grow that Moscow’s ally Belarus could open a new invasion front against Ukraine.

Putin ordered the Federal Security Services (FSB) to step up surveillance of Russian society and the country’s borders to combat the “emergence of new threats” from abroad and traitors at home.

In a rare admission of the invasion of Ukraine not going smoothly, Putin cautioned about the difficult situation in Ukraine’s regions that Moscow moved to annex in September and ordered the FSB to ensure the “safety” of people living there.

“The situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions is extremely difficult,” Putin said late on Monday in comments translated by Reuters.

In September, a defiant Putin moved to annex a swath of Ukraine — some 15% of the country — in a Kremlin ceremony, but earlier this month, he said the war “can be a long process.”

Putin’s move to annex the areas was condemned by Kyiv and its Western allies as illegal.

On Monday, Putin made his first visit to Belarus since 2019, where he and his counterpart extolled ever-closer ties at a news conference late in the evening but hardly mentioned Ukraine.

Kyiv, meanwhile, was seeking more weapons from the West after Russian “kamikaze” drones hit energy targets early on Monday.

“Weapons, shells, new defence capabilities…everything that will give us the ability to speed up the end to this war,” President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in his evening address.

The Ukrainian military high command said their air defences had shot down 23 of 28 drones — most over the capital Kyiv — in what was Moscow’s third air strike in six days. Russia has targeted Ukraine’s power grid, causing blackouts amid sub-zero temperatures.

The “kamikaze” drones used in the attacks are cheaply produced, disposable unmanned aircraft that fly toward their target before plummeting at speed and detonating on impact.

BELARUS ACTIVITY

To the northwest of Ukraine, there has been constant Russian and Belarusian military activity for months in Belarus, a close Kremlin ally that Moscow’s troops used as a launch pad for their abortive attack on Kyiv in February.

Putin’s trip to Minsk has stirred fears in Ukraine about the broader involvement of Belarusian armed forces in the invasion. Putin and Lukashenko scarcely touched on Ukraine at a post-talks news conference, instead extolling the benefits of defence and economic alignment.

Lukashenko has said repeatedly he has no intention of sending his country’s troops into Ukraine, where Moscow’s invasion faltered badly with a string of battlefield retreats in the face of a major counter-offensive.

The Kremlin on Monday dismissed the suggestion that Putin wanted to push Belarus into a more active role. The RIA Novosti news agency quoted Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov as saying such reports were “groundless” and “stupid”.

Both Putin and Lukashenko were also at pains to dismiss the idea of Russia annexing or absorbing Belarus.

“Russia has no interest in absorbing anyone,” Putin said.

Asked about this comment, U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price said it should be treated as the “height of irony”, given it was “coming from a leader who is seeking at the present moment, right now, to violently absorb his other peaceful next-door neighbor.”

FIGHTING GRINDS ON

The 10-month-old conflict in Ukraine, the largest in Europe since World War Two, has killed tens of thousands of people, driven ms from their homes and reduced cities to ruins.

Ukraine’s General Staff said Russian artillery hammered 25 towns and villages around Bakhmut and Avdiivka in the east and several areas around Kupiansk, a northeastern town retaken by Ukraine in September.

It also said Ukrainian air and artillery forces carried out more than a dozen strikes on Russian troops and hardware, including ammunition dumps, and shot down two helicopters.

Alexei Kulemzin, the Russian-installed mayor of the city of Donetsk, said Ukrainian shelling hit a hospital wing, along with a kindergarten, posting on Telegraph a photo of what appeared to be a waiting room with smashed furniture and fittings.

Reuters could not independently verify the battlefield accounts of either side.

Russia says it is waging a “special military operation” in Ukraine to rid it of nationalists and protect Russian-speaking communities. Ukraine and the West describe the Kremlin’s actions as an unprovoked war of aggression. (Source: Reuters)

19 Dec 22. Putin due in Belarus for talks amid fears of new assault on Ukraine. Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin was due in Belarus on Monday amid fears in Kyiv that he intended to pressure his ex-Soviet ally to join a planned ground offensive that would open a new front against Ukraine.

Putin, whose troops have been driven back in Ukraine’s north, northeast and south since invading in February, is taking a more public role in the war and visited his operation’s headquarters to sound out military commanders on Friday.

His trip for talks with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko will be his first to Minsk since 2019 – before the COVID pandemic and a wave of pro-democracy protests in 2020 that Lukashenko crushed with strong support from the Kremlin.

Russian forces used Belarus as a launch pad for their abortive attack on Kyiv in February, and there has been Russian and Belarusian military activity there for months.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told Russian news agencies that Belarus was Russia’s “number one ally”, but that suggestions that Moscow wanted to pressure Minsk into joining what it calls its “special military operation” were “stupid and unfounded fabrications”.

Ukrainian joint forces commander Serhiy Nayev had said he believed the talks would address “further aggression against Ukraine and the broader involvement of the Belarusian armed forces in the operation against Ukraine, in particular, in our opinion, also on the ground”.

Ukraine’s top general, Valery Zaluzhniy, told the Economist last week that Russia was preparing 200,000 fresh troops for a major offensive that could come from the east, south or even from Belarus as early as January, but more likely in spring.

Moscow and Minsk have set up a joint military unit in Belarus and held numerous exercises. Three Russian warplanes and an airborne early warning and control aircraft were deployed to Belarus last week.

Foreign diplomats say Lukashenko, a pariah in the West who relies heavily on Moscow, knows it would be deeply unpopular at home for him to commit troops to Ukraine.

SANCTIONS

Already, Western sanctions have made it hard for Belarus to ship potash fertilisers, its top export, via Baltic ports.

Western military analysts say his small army lacks the strength and combat experience to make a big difference – but that by forcing Ukraine to commit forces to its north it could leave it more exposed to Russian assaults elsewhere.

The Pentagon said on Dec. 13 that it did not see “any type of impending cross-border activity by Belarus at this time”.

Putin’s visit was announced on Friday after a surprise Dec. 3 trip to Belarus by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, where he signed an agreement with his Belarusian counterpart whose details were not disclosed. Shoigu returned to Minsk on Monday, according to the Belarus defence ministry.

Adding to the ominous mood music, Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei, one of the few officials in Lukashenko’s government with any rapport with the West, died suddenly last month. No official cause of death was announced.

His successor, Sergei Aleinik, met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Monday.

Lukashenko said he and Putin would discuss a long-running effort to integrate their countries in a supranational Union State. The talks are seen by the Belarus opposition as a vehicle for a creeping Russian annexation.

At a government meeting after the talks with Putin were announced, Lukashenko unexpectedly said that any ceding of sovereignty would be a betrayal of the Belarusian people.

“Particularly after these large-scale negotiations, everyone will say: ‘That’s it, there are no longer any authorities in Belarus, the Russians are already walking around and running the country’,” Lukashenko said.

“I want to again underline this in particular: No one other than us runs Belarus.”

He said he would discuss economic cooperation, energy supplies, defence and security with Putin.

Russian agencies quoted Peskov as saying “no one is pressuring anyone to integrate”. (Source: Reuters)

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