NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military and Security Developments

Nov. 18

As the Kherson frontline stabilises along the Dnieper River, Ukrainian focus is rapidly switching to interdicting Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs), logistics hubs, and command and control centres on the eastern (left) bank of the river. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov stated on 17 November that Ukraine’s new positions on the western (right) bank of the river allow Ukrainian HIMARS and other artillery systems to maintain control, clearly medium-range fire control, over large swathes of territory north of occupied Crimea.
It is also notable that in recent weeks Russian forces have been steadily constructing fortified positions along these critical GLOCs, potentially as fall-back positions in the eventuality of further Ukrainian breakthroughs in the south. The head of occupied Crimea Sergei Aksyonov today, 18 November, ordered the construction of fortification works across the peninsula in order to strengthen the ‘security of transport infrastructure’ due to the threat posed by Ukrainian special operations.
On the eastern axis, Ukrainian counter-offensive operations continue to grind forwards along the Oskil-Kreminna line. The Russian Ministry of Defence has claimed its forces have repelled numerous Ukrainian assaults over the last 24-48 hours, including in the direction of Kolomychikha, 8 miles (13km) northwest of Svatove. Unconfirmed reports from an unnamed Russian BARS-13 combat reserve commander indicate that Ukrainian forces are currently testing Russian positions west of Kreminna and are preparing for a large-scale offensive along the Orlianka-Zatizhne-Svatove line, northwest of Svatove.
Further south along the Bakhmut and Donetsk city lines, Russian forces are continuing their gruelling offensive against heavily entrenched Ukrainian positions. Brigadier General Hromov stated on 17 November that this is the axis that is posing the ‘most difficult situation’ for Ukrainian forces at present, with 500 ‘combat clashes’ with Russian forces taking place in Donetsk over the last week alone. Over the last 24-48 hours, Russian sources have claimed some incremental progress, with the 100th Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia allegedly taking control of a key strongpoint along the outskirts of Nevelske, roughly seven miles (12km) west of Donetsk International Airport. Other sources have also claimed marginal gains southwest of Avdiivka, though all of these advances remain unconfirmed. The Russian Ministry of Defence has also claimed that Russian forces have taken control of the Pavlivka-Mykilske road, 28 miles (46km) southwest of Donetsk city. If true, this would indicate that Russian forces are consolidating their control over Pavlivka south of the small Kashlagach River.
On 17 November, Russian forces launched another large-scale wave of missile strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed 25 cruise missile strikes on unspecified civilian infrastructure across the country, including Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Four cruise missiles were reportedly shot down by Ukrainian air defences, along with five Shahed-136 drones and two Kh-59 missiles. During his evening address following the attacks, President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that over 10 million Ukrainians remained without power, with Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy and Vinnytsia oblasts the worst affected. Temperatures have declined dramatically this week in Ukraine, with many regions, including Kyiv, experiencing the first snowfall of the winter on 17 November. This change in weather is placing increased strain on the power grid, and as a result is complicating efforts to repair damage and stabilise the load on the grid.

Political developments

On 18 November, Swedish investigators reported that they have found traces of explosives at the site of the Nord Stream pipelines that ruptured in September, confirming it was sabotaged (see Sibylline Alert – 27 September 2022). Swedish and Danish investigations are still ongoing and are trying to establish whether any suspects can be identified, but as previously assessed it remains highly likely that the incident was an act of Russian grey zone sabotage. Looking ahead, European critical infrastructure will remain vulnerable to Russian grey zone operations over the winter, as Moscow seeks to undermine European support for Ukraine and deter growing NATO involvement in the war.
The European Parliament confirmed on 17 November that a draft resolution had been agreed on recognising Russia ‘as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state which uses means of terrorism’. The resolution will be put to a formal plenary vote on 22 November. If approved by a parliamentary majority, the vote will increase the threat of Russian retaliatory ‘military-technical measures’, and retaliatory accusations of terrorism – increasing the threat of false-flag operations in Ukraine and Russia. However, retaliation could also feasibly include grey zone operations designed to undermine European critical infrastructure, given recent precedents. For further analysis on Russian grey zone capability and the vulnerability of European energy infrastructure, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 28 September 2022.
A Dutch court found two Russians and a separatist Ukrainian guilty of mass murder during a trial on 17 November over the downing of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) over eastern Ukraine in 2014. Sergei Dubinsky, a former GRU military intelligence officer, separatist Leonid Kharchenko, and former FSB colonel and DNR commander Igor Girkin (also known as Igor Strelkov) were sentenced in absentia to life in prison. Girkin, an influential ultranationalist, is understood to currently be fighting in Ukraine and has been actively involved in establishing a volunteer detachment. Unless President Volodymyr Zelensky’s seventh demand of his ten-point peace plan is enacted (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 15 November 2022), namely the establishment of a special tribunal to investigate war crimes after the war ends, all three men are highly unlikely to serve their sentence.

Kazakhstan: Alleged ‘coup attempt’ highlights increased risk of domestic unrest ahead of presidential elections. On 17 November, Kazakhstan claimed to have prevented a coup allegedly orchestrated by allies of the exiled opposition figure Mukhtar Ablyazov ahead of this weekend’s presidential election on 20 November. Authorities have arrested seven individuals they accuse of planning ‘mass riots’, attacking administrative buildings, and proclaiming a provisional government. While it remains unclear the extent to which Ablyazov was involved, he has repeatedly encouraged anti-government protests in Kazakhstan from exile, and his opposition Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan remains banned. The upcoming presidential elections come after the mass unrest in January, avoiding a repeat of which has been a priority of the government of Kassim-Jomart Tokayev. Various populist policies and amnesties have likely eased anti-government sentiment in the country. However, yesterday’s arrests underline enduring anti-government sentiment and organisation that could trigger protests in major cities, though extremely heavy security and other pre-election raids will likely mitigate the risk of widespread violent unrest over the coming days.

Forecast

On 17 November, CNN cited three unnamed US defence officials as stating that stocks of certain advanced weapons systems and ammunition available for transfer to Ukraine are running increasingly low. The officials drew particular attention to diminishing stocks of 155mm howitzer ammunition and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. They also stated that stocks of HARMs anti-radiation missiles, GMLRS surface-to-surface missiles and Javelin anti-tank missiles also remain potential concerns in the future, though they stated that the US has increased domestic production of these particular systems in recent months. With the Russo-Ukrainian war entering its ninth month, the ability of not only the US, but also Ukraine’s other allies, to support a protracted high-intensity conflict will place growing pressure on domestic stockpiles and production capability, despite the Biden administration’s clear commitment to supplying long-term military support to Ukraine. Russia is also highly likely to be suffering from similar stockpile and production issues, as illustrated by Moscow’s contracts with Iran as well as intelligence reports indicating large-scale transfers of Belarusian and possibly North Korean artillery shells. However, their base military production remains much more extensive and resilient in contrast to Ukraine’s domestic production – which relies almost entirely upon Western support, including increasingly for basic air defence systems. As Russia seemingly prepares to fight a more attritional, protracted war, Ukrainian air defence stocks will become ever more crucial to ensure the operating environment in major cities does not deteriorate in 2023. Ukrainian air defences have in recent months proven increasingly effective at interdicting kamikaze drones, especially Iranian Shahed-136s, as well as cruise missiles. However, the munitions Ukrainian air defences are using to achieve these interdiction rates are mostly expensive Western imports that are available in only limited quantities, particularly Western-supplied SAM munitions. This stands in sharp contrast to the relative cheapness of Iranian-produced drones. The German-supplied anti-aircraft Gepard guns have proven highly effective against Shahed-136s and other UAVs, and similar self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAGs) are likely to prove the most cost and material-effective counter to cheap Russian/Iranian drones. However, the Swiss government has repeatedly refused German appeals to allow the re-export of Swiss-produced 35mm Gepard ammunition to Ukraine, citing its neutrality laws. This is just one example of the problems Kyiv is currently facing in ensuring a steady, and expanding, supply of Western anti-air munitions over the medium term Ukraine’s Soviet-era S-300 and SA-11 Buk SAM systems meanwhile form a large part of Ukraine’s existing air defence network. However, both Ukraine and Western states have very limited base capacity to produce the required numbers of 5V55 missiles for the S-300 and 9M39 missiles for the Buk. Without ramping up either production of these missiles or providing large numbers of Western SAM alternatives, steadily depleting stocks of Soviet-era missiles will threaten to lower Ukrainian air defence capability and likely force Kyiv to make difficult decisions over where to allocate increasingly scarce air defence assets. Stocks of air defence munitions will therefore remain the single most important issue that will determine whether the threat environment in Kyiv and other major cities remains stable, improves or deteriorates over the next six months. If Western military aid begins to slow and stocks of Soviet-era SAM munitions steadily decrease, the overall effectiveness of Ukrainian air defences will likely deteriorate. In the worst-case scenario, a major reduction in Western aid in 2023 and widespread air defence missile shortages would allow the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) to make use of its extensive fixed-wing bomber capabilities, capable of widespread medium-altitude strategic bombing of Ukrainian targets akin to Russia’s campaigns in Syria. The VKS had already largely lost its ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace very early in the war due to its failure to destroy increasingly effective and dispersed mobile surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs). The proliferation of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns like the Gepards have still further reduced the VKS’s room to operate in Ukrainian airspace, including at very low altitudes. As such, continued Western air defence supplies over the long term remain vital to contain Russian airpower and ensure Russia is forced to continue relying solely on extremely expensive ballistic and cruise missiles and relatively inaccurate (but cheap) kamikaze drones. Despite mixed US Midterm results, US and wider Western military aid is nevertheless likely to continue for the foreseeable future, but amid a worsening global economic crisis and pressures on reserve military stocks, the ability of the West to sustain this aid in the medium to long term remains to be seen.

Nov. 17

The southern Kherson frontline has continued to stabilise over the last 24-48 hours, with the front transitioning into steady artillery and multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) duels across the river. There have been no further reports or any indications to support earlier speculation that Ukrainian forces have attempted to gain a foothold on the southern (left) bank of the Dnieper River.
In any case, as the Kherson line stabilises along the Dnieper River, the most intense fighting and focus of the war has decidedly shifted eastwards as both sides likely see new opportunities to redeploy forces to support operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblast. However, this morning, 17 November, the head of the occupation movement ‘We Are With Russia’ Vladimir Rogov reported that Ukraine is moving large quantities of heavy equipment and artillery, as well as up to 40,000 service personnel, to the Zaporizhzhia frontline. On 16 November, Rogov also claimed that Russian forces had repelled a Ukrainian attack around Vasylivka, 27 miles (44km) south of Zaporizhzhia city and 33 miles (53km) east of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). While we cannot confirm this, any Ukrainian attacks along this front could be reconnaissance operations designed to test Russian defences in preparation for future attacks.
If Rogov’s reports are accurate, this would suggest that Ukrainian forces are prioritising redeploying a large portion of their forces freed up along the Kherson axis to potentially launch a new counter-offensive south of Zaporizhzhia city. This will be a key axis to watch in the coming weeks, and as previously assessed, such a counter-offensive would likely aim to cut off Russia’s crucial land corridor connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea – a more realistic and militarily plausible way to steadily increase pressure on Crimea than opposed landings across the Dnieper south of Kherson.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian counter-offensive operations along the Oskil-Kreminna line have continued over the last 24-48 hours. Several Russian sources, including the Ministry of Defence, have reported on numerous ground attacks west of Svatove and Kreminna, and while all Russian reports claim to have repulsed these attacks, Ukrainian sources are reporting incremental gains. Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast Serhiy Haidai stated this morning, 17 November, that ‘fierce fighting’ is focused around Svatove and Kreminna-Bilohorivka, but that Ukrainian forces are ‘managing to push the enemy back bit by bit’.
Further south, Russian forces have continued offensive operations along the Bakhmut and Donetsk city lines, but at a high cost for relatively incremental gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 16 November that the 1st Horlivka Battalion of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps lost half of its troops, both dead and wounded, during the battle for Mayorsk, which Russian forces claimed to have taken on 13 November. According to the Ukrainians, the DNR has subsequently disbanded the battalion due to its losses. This is the latest indicator that Russian, Wagner Group and DNR/LNR forces are suffering extremely high casualty rates in order to maintain offensive momentum across Donetsk oblast, but are so far only achieving marginal gains.
On 16 November the Belarusian Border Committee claimed to have shot down a Ukrainian UAV with a Kalashnikov rifle in the Kobrin district of the Brest Region (southwest), allegedly 100m from the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. A similar incident took place on 3 November (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 4 November 2022). While further exchanges of UAV and drone activity along the border are likely, such incidents have not changed our assessment that Belarus remains unlikely to enter the war formally. Ukraine is currently building a wall along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border to mitigate the potential for future ground invasions from the north, but we still maintain that neither Russia nor Belarus has the capability to take territory in northern Ukraine at this time.
This morning, 17 November, Russian officials confirmed that a drone had been shot down in occupied Crimea, over the Kafa substation in the east of the peninsula. Russian officials maintain that while the wreckage of the downed drone hit the substation, it did not lose power or sustain significant damage. Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the attack, but it comes after another drone attack successfully hit an oil depot near Oryol city in Russia (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 16 November 2022). It remains highly likely that Ukrainian forces are increasingly targeting Russian power and energy infrastructure in retaliation for Russia’s long-range missile campaign, and as such further attacks are likely in the coming weeks.

Political developments

This morning, 17 November, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres confirmed that all parties have agreed to extend the Black Sea Grain Initiative by a further 120 days, ahead of the 19 November expiration date. Russia had threatened to let the grain deal lapse later this week unless it observed progress on the easing of indirect international sanctions on its own fertiliser and agricultural exports. While details remain limited at the time of writing, Guterres confirmed that the UN is ‘fully committed to removing the remaining obstacles to exporting food and fertilisers from the Russian Federation’. While Moscow’s temporary withdrawal from the deal and embarrassing U-turn earlier this month underscored the limitations of Russian coercive influence in the Black Sea, the seeming concessions relating to Russian exports will be seen as an important victory for Russia. More fundamentally, however, the extension of the deal will alleviate food insecurity throughout the Northern Hemisphere’s winter, with wheat prices on the Chicago Board of Trade already down 1.6 percent following the announcement.
Russian long-range strikes have continued this morning, 17 November. At the time of writing, Kyiv air defences shot down two Russian cruise missiles and two Shahed-136 drones over the capital. However, cruise missiles successfully penetrated air defences in Dnipro, Kharkiv, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia this morning. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shymhal has confirmed that Russian missiles successfully hit the Pivdenmash missile factory in Dnipro and have hit UkrGasVydobuvannya gas production facilities in the east of the country. Following the significant series of missile strikes on 15 November, blackouts have continued across the country over the last 24 hours, with fresh energy restrictions impacting the capital. Notably, US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin confirmed on 16 November that US-supplied National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) had a 100 percent success rate at intercepting incoming Russian missiles.
Nevertheless, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed on 17 November that Russian strikes on 15 November damaged the Khmelnytskyi (KNPP) and Rivne (RNPP) nuclear power plants. While damage is understood not to be extensive, the KNPP did lose access to the Ukrainian power grid after the attack. The plant’s two reactors were shut down, though power was restored nine hours later. For further analysis and scenarios for a low-likelihood nuclear incident in Ukraine, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 18 August 2022

Forecast

Following the Przewodow missile incident on 15 November, both NATO and Poland have reiterated that their respective investigations have concluded the missile was highly likely to have been Ukrainian (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 16 November 2022). However, despite the consensus within NATO, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has contested this conclusion, reiterating his initial accusations that the missile was Russian, not Ukrainian. Zelensky has stated that ‘I have no doubt that it was not our missile’, citing reports from Ukrainian forces on the border that he ‘cannot but trust’. However, in response, US President Joe Biden stated on 16 November, ‘that’s not the evidence’. Zelensky has requested access to the missile site in Przewodow and has pledged to cooperate with the ongoing investigation. The rare public disagreement over the Przewodow incident is likely to reinforce low-level but rising friction between Kyiv and Washington, and between Zelensky and Biden. The disagreement is highly unlikely to impact US support for Ukraine, particularly given Biden’s request to Congress this week for a USD 37 billion aid package. However, it will further expose tensions over perceptions that Kyiv is demanding too much US and NATO support, as well as perceptions that Kyiv is not prepared to negotiate with Russia to end the war. The Przewodow missile incident has brought the prospect of a major escalation to the fore for many NATO governments, and is likely to reinforce demands among the international community for negotiations to prevent conflict spillover. In this respect, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley held a press conference on 16 November, where he stated that a political solution involving a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine remains possible. The general stated that the likelihood of Ukrainian forces achieving a military victory over Russia in the medium term remains low, unless the Russian military collapses – which he assessed as being unlikely. According to Milley, ‘the military task of kicking the Russians physically out of Ukraine is a very difficult task, and it’s not going to happen in the next couple of weeks’. He also reiterated Washington’s position that it remains up to Ukraine to decide how and when they enter negotiations with Russia. This largely aligns with our assessment, that despite mounting international pressure to begin negotiations, the political and military conditions are currently not in place to facilitate an end to the war for the foreseeable future.

Ukraine-Russia: Black Sea Grain Initiative is renewed, easing global food insecurity, stabilising wheat prices. On 17 November, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres announced the extension of the Black Sea grain deal that has facilitated Ukrainian agricultural exports to global markets since July. The deal, which was brokered by the UN and Turkey, will now be extended for another 120 days, despite Russia’s threats to abandon the agreement. Moscow this week reiterated that unhindered access to world markets for its own fertiliser and agricultural exports remains a precondition for cooperation on extending the deal. Guterres later underlined that the UN is ‘fully committed to removing the remaining obstacles’ to these exports, in a notable concession to Moscow. While wheat prices have fallen on the back of the news, the fragility of the deal and the threat of further Russian actions will likely ensure food prices remain high over the winter.

Uzbekistan: Natural gas exports ban will mitigate near-term shortage risk, but insufficient domestic production will continue to drive energy insecurity during winter. On 16 November, Uzbekistan announced that it has entirely suspended the export of natural gas and is increasing imports of the fuel amid a surge in domestic demand as winter takes hold. The country is already facing significant energy shortages with businesses, households and essential services being affected. Energy shortages are often a key driver of instability across Central Asia, though Tashkent’s decision to suspend the export of natural gas in order to meet domestic needs will likely mitigate this risk in the near term. The decision, nevertheless, highlights enduring energy insecurity issues faced by Uzbekistan, alongside its inability to meet domestic energy demands each winter.

Nov. 16

On the afternoon of 15 November, Russia launched the most intense series of missile strikes on Ukrainian cities since the beginning of the war. The Ukrainian Air Force confirmed that Russia had launched roughly 100 Kh-101 and Kh-555 air-launched cruise missiles at targets across the country, but primarily against critical energy infrastructure. At least 10 kamikaze drones also reportedly targeted various sites across Ukraine. Ukrainian sources confirmed that missiles hit targets in Kyiv, as well as Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia and Volyn oblasts. Kyiv claims that its air defences interdicted 73 of the cruise missiles, and knocked out all Russian drones, but 15 energy facilities were nevertheless still hit, triggering widespread power outages across the country.
The latest interdiction rate reflects the steady improvement of Ukraine’s air defences in recent months. However, in contrast to slower-flying cruise missiles, such as the Kh-101 and Kh-555s launched yesterday, Ukraine currently has very limited capability to intercept ballistic missiles, and as such they will continue to pose the most acute threat to Ukraine. While stocks of Russian Iskandr ballistic missiles have likely been depleted to a significant extent, Russia is currently looking to acquire as many as 1,000 Iranian short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, including Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar missiles. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force Yuriy Ihnat stated on 7 November that the only effective way to counter such missiles is to destroy them at their launch sites – sites that currently remain beyond Ukraine’s effective strike range. As a result, despite Ukraine’s growing ability to intercept cruise missiles and kamikaze drones, the threat from ballistic missiles over the winter will remain high. However, recent developments will likely boost Western support for Ukraine’s air defences and could yet see more potent air defence systems transferred.
The timing of the strikes was highly likely intended to coincide with the G20 summit, where less than 24 hours before President Volodymyr Zelensky had outlined a ten-point peace plan (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 15 November).
Amid the Russian bombardment, a missile crossed the Ukrainian border and hit a farm near the Polish town of Przewodow, around 5 miles (8km) west of the Ukrainian border (see Sibylline Alert – 15 November). The strike killed two civilians and marked the first time a NATO member state had been directly hit since the outbreak of the war. Numerous investigations are currently ongoing as Warsaw and other parties try to establish the cause of the incident. Initial reports claimed it was a Russian missile, but as identified in our report last night, it appears most likely that it was an accidental incursion rather than a deliberate strike. Warsaw had previously stated that the missile in question was ‘Russian made’, but this does not necessarily mean it was fired by Russian forces. As outlined in our alert, initial footage of the impacted site showed the remnants of a system that resembles a section of a 5V55 anti-air missile, which is used in Ukrainian S-300 air defence systems. Indeed, Polish President Andrzej Duda stated this morning, 16 November, that the blast at Przewodow was ‘very likely’ to have been caused by Ukrainian air defences.
The Associated Press earlier cited three unnamed US officials who stated that preliminary investigations suggested the missile was fired by Ukrainian air defence forces to intercept a Russian missile, but the White House has not confirmed this. This would support the 5V55 theory, though it should be noted that President Volodymyr Zelensky formally accused Russia of staging a ‘serious provocation’ on NATO soil. US President Joe Biden has nevertheless stated that it is unlikely the missile was fired from Russian territory. A NATO plane was reportedly tracking the missile before it landed in Przewodow, and this reconnaissance operation likely provided Washington DC and Warsaw the intelligence that has led both Biden and Duda to conclude Russian origin is unlikely. For further analysis and implications of the Przewodow incident, see the Forecast section below.
In a further development following the incident, the governor of Russia’s Oryol oblast confirmed this morning that a drone attacked an oil depot near the village of Stalnoy Kon, just north of Oryol city. The site is some 105 miles (170km) northeast of the Ukrainian border and while Russia has not formally attributed blame to Ukraine, if it was orchestrated by Ukrainian forces, the attack would represent one of the deepest strikes into Russian territory of the war so far, and could have been retaliation for yesterday’s missile strikes.
On the southern Kherson frontline, Russian forces continue to prioritise establishing new and hardening existing defensive positions on the southern (left) bank of the Dnieper River. However, there are very limited indications to support earlier speculation that Ukrainian forces had crossed the Dnieper and taken the town of Oleshky or even Nova Kakhovka. Russian military bloggers and other sources have refuted these claims, and an initial tweet by Ukrainian mayor of Oleshky Yevhen Ryshchuk implying that the town had been liberated was later deleted. Ukrainian military officials have continued to demand ‘operational silence’ regarding any potential operations on the southern axis, but there are no reports to support earlier claims that Ukrainian forces had landed on the Kinburn peninsula (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 14 November).
Meanwhile in the Donbas, fighting remains particularly intense though there have been few confirmed movements of the frontline over the last 24-48 hours. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia reported this morning, 16 November, that Ukrainian forces have intensified counteroffensive operations across the entire eastern frontline, from Popasna to Kharkiv oblast. Various Russian sources have reported that their forces have repelled numerous Ukrainian ground attacks west of Svatove and Kreminna, though it remains unclear if Ukrainian forces have made any further progress towards these two principal objectives. Russian forces are furthermore continuing probing attacks designed to disrupt Ukrainian preparations for further assaults, with various Russian sources reporting that Ukrainian units are massing near Makiivka, 16 miles (26km) north-west of Kreminna, in preparation for renewed attacks along the R-66 highway.
Further south, Russian forces are continuing offensive operations along the Bakhmut and Donetsk city lines, though there have been few reports of any notable progress in the last 24-48 hours. Nevertheless, backlash from the costly Pavlivka attack last week continues to dominate much of the discussion amongst Russian military bloggers and commanders. The commander of the DNR’s Vostok Battalion Alexander Khodakovsky claimed on 15 November that despite his and other local commanders’ realisation that poorly trained and equipped troops could not stage a coordinated two-pronged attack on the town, brigade-level commanders revised all previous plans and committed all Russian forces to the attack regardless. Khodakovsky claims that ‘innocent’ commanders should not bear responsibility for a failed attack that was ultimately due to poor planning of the military leadership, underlining enduring fissures between local commanders and the operational and General Staff.

Political developments

In perhaps the clearest indication that the US midterm election results have reinforced the Biden administration’s determination to continue supporting Ukraine, President Joe Biden formally asked Congress on 15 November to provide over USD 37 bn in emergency aid to Kyiv. The proposed package would include: USD 21.7bn in military, intelligence and wider defence aid; USD 14.5 bn in humanitarian aid and financial support for the Ukrainian government; USD 900 m for healthcare services for Ukrainian citizens living in the US; as well as USD 626 m in nuclear security support. The package would represent an enormous increase in US aid to date, and rapid disbursement of funds would go a long way to shoring up Ukrainian finances over the winter – particularly amid the current energy instability. However, the Republicans are currently poised to take a slim majority in the House of Representatives. House Republican leader Kevin McCarthy, who is likely to become the Speaker, has previously stated that the Republicans will not support a ‘blank cheque’ for Ukraine, and so it remains to be seen whether such a large aid package will get the congressional approval.
Today, 16 November, the G20 released a joint statement that featured strong criticism of the war in Ukraine and its impact on the global economy. While the statement focuses primarily on how the war has exacerbated existing fragilities in the economy, it also states that the ‘threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible’, in a clear reference to the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric. It is notable that the release states that ‘most [not all] members strongly condemn the war in Ukraine’, and unconfirmed reports claim that Beijing made a late attempt to adjust the language that was blocked by other countries. However, the statement is nevertheless highly significant and defies concerns that divisions between some G20 members were so deep that such a statement would not be possible. The summit has so far been dominated by discussions around the economic fallout triggered by the war in Ukraine and the statement also explicitly references the war’s impact on food insecurity.
Notably Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov today, 16 November, stated that Moscow had seen ‘certain progress’ towards addressing its concerns over the grain deal, which it has not yet committed to extending beyond the 19 November deadline. The joint statement issued by the G20 will add pressure on Moscow to renew the deal, particularly given that both China and India were signatories.
As a result of Russian strikes on Ukraine’s power infrastructure, at least seven m people have been left without power, especially in parts of Sumy, Kharkiv and Lviv oblasts. Ukraine’s electricity transmission operator, Ukrenergo, issued a statement warning of ‘longer power cuts’ as a result of the strikes, with cold weather complicating efforts to bring systems back online rapidly. However, the deputy head of the President’s Office, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, stated that Kyiv is not currently considering evacuating cities as a result of the latest barrage and that work would instead focus on stabilising the country’s power grid.

Forecast

This morning, 16 November, Polish President Andrzej Duda stated that the blast at Przewodow was ‘very likely’ caused by Ukrainian air defences, and not a Russian missile. Unnamed NATO officials have furthermore reported that US President Joe Biden has briefed G7 and NATO partners, concluding the same. An errant or malfunctioning 5V55 anti-air missile fired by a Ukrainian S-300 systems is the most likely cause. The incident is therefore highly likely to have been an accident, not a deliberate escalation. Nevertheless, the incident has proven a keen test of NATO’s response to a sudden and unclear military escalation, and has illustrated the clear risk of conflict spillover and collateral damage along Ukraine’s border region – particularly during intense Russian long-range strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure. The nature of the incident would in any case not have triggered NATO’s mutual defence Article 5. Article 5 is not an automatic process and the confused situation on the ground following the explosions led Poland instead to invoke Article 4. According to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4 means NATO members ‘will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’. Poland had requested a meeting of NATO ambassadors, which took place this morning. Warsaw’s conclusion that it was most likely an accident has clearly calmed the situation, and further escalations are unlikely along the border in the short term. However, initial accusations and disinformation from both sides illustrate the risks of miscommunication and speculation triggering an accidental escalation. Russia was quick to deny any involvement in the incident, claiming that it had not launched any strikes at targets near the Polish border, though it did hit energy infrastructure in Lviv roughly 45 miles (72km) south of Przewodow. However, the Kremlin rapidly accused Poland of orchestrating a ‘deliberate provocation in order to escalate the situation’. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev also claimed that the incident proved that the West was waging a hybrid war against Russia, and that the ‘West moves closer to world war’. Meanwhile, President Ukrainian Volodymyr Zelensky was similarly quick to blame Russia for orchestrating a provocation on NATO soil and demanded a strong response. The fact that the incident was most likely caused by a Ukrainian air defence missile will likely raise questions over Ukraine’s strategic communications and will likely increase pressure on Kyiv to show willingness to negotiate with Russia. Ultimately, however, Poland and NATO took a careful approach under Article 4 amidst these allegations, and the incident confirms that robust investigation processes can prevent unwanted escalation. Looking ahead, the Przewodow incident is highly likely to lead to renewed discussion of Ukrainian air defences. The Slovak Prime Minister Eduard Heger has stated that NATO is highly likely to discuss strengthening the alliance’s air defences on its eastern flank in a summit today, given the clear risk of accidental conflict spillover along Ukraine’s borders.

Hungary: Shoot-out involving human smugglers underscores increased organised crime risks. On 15 November, the police were involved in a shoot-out with six individuals who were caught smuggling 21 Syrian nationals to the Austrian border. All six individuals were arrested and no-one was hurt. The incident comes after an uptick in irregular migration and human smuggling activity in recent months along the Western Balkan routes. According to data published by the EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency, the number of illegal border crossings along the Western Balkan route has increased by 170 percent since last year. As such, organised crime (especially human smuggling) in the region is likely to increase in the short term.

Europe: Russian attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure increase risk of disruption to oil, gas flows. On 15 November, oil supplies to central and eastern Europe via the southern section of Russia’s Druzhba (‘Friendship’) pipeline were suspended. Hungary’s pipeline operator MOL stated that a Russian rocket struck a power station in Ukraine which provides electricity to a pump station linked to the pipeline. Slovakia’s pipeline operator Transpetrol also confirmed the suspension, though it did not comment on the alleged strike. Earlier on 16 November, Hungary’s foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, insisted that his country has several months’ worth of oil reserves and that supply is not at risk. He also suggested that repair works will likely be completed in a ‘short time’, though the extent of the damage remains unclear. If Russian attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure continue, the risk of disruption to oil and gas flows into Europe will be elevated.

Russia-Ukraine-Poland: Missile strike highlights threat of conflict spillover. On 15 November, a missile struck a farm inside Poland near the town of Przewodow, located around 5 miles (8km) west of the Ukrainian border. The strike killed two civilians (see Sibylline Alert – 15 November). The incident comes after the most intense Russian bombardment of Ukraine since the start of the war. US President Joe Biden stated that it is unlikely the missiles were fired from Russian territory, while Russia has characterised the event as a deliberate provocation aimed at escalation. It is possible that the missile was a Ukrainian anti-air weapon which strayed into Polish territory, though Kyiv continues to blame Moscow. Despite the uncertainty over the origin of the strike, the event marks a significant moment of escalation; it highlights the possibility of both accidental and deliberate conflict spillover along Ukraine’s borders. However, the incident is unlikely to trigger NATO’s collective defence principle, Article 5; it is more likely to result in Poland invoking consultations between alliance members under Article 4.

Russia-Ukraine-Poland: Missile strike highlights the threat of conflict spillover. On 15 November, a missile struck a farm inside Poland near the town of Przewodow, located around 5 miles (8km) west of the Ukrainian border. The strike killed two civilians (see Sibylline Alert – 15 November). The incident comes after the most intense Russian bombardment of Ukraine since the start of the war. US President Joe Biden stated that it is unlikely the missiles were fired from Russian territory, while Russia has characterised the event as a deliberate provocation aimed at escalation. It is possible that the missile was a Ukrainian anti-air weapon which strayed into Polish territory, though Kyiv continues to blame Moscow. Despite the uncertainty over the origin of the strike, the event marks a significant moment of escalation; it highlights the possibility of both accidental and deliberate conflict spillover along Ukraine’s borders. However, the incident is unlikely to trigger NATO’s collective defence principle, Article 5; it is more likely to result in Poland invoking consultations between alliance members under Article 4.

Cyber Update

During this monitoring period, pro-Russia cyber campaigns against Ukraine and its allies were consistent with levels identified in recent reports. Most notably, Ukraine’s key cyber security body, CERT-UA, warned of an increased cyber risk to organisations involved in the supply or transportation of military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. Elsewhere, Australia’s largest insurance firm, Medibank, suffered a data breach which has since been attributed to a Russia-linked ransomware group. Furthermore, the pro-Russia hacktivist group Killnet claimed responsibility for an attack against the website of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), though this reportedly inflicted minimal damage. While we observed no instances of pro-Russia attacks against critical infrastructure during this monitoring period, there remains an overall deterioration in the cyber threat environment.
In line with recent trends, pro-Ukraine hacking groups, primarily the IT Army of Ukraine, have continued to claim cyber attacks against Russian government-linked organisations and private entities. Meanwhile, cyber activity linked to the Operation World Cup and Operation FIFA campaigns (led by the Anonymous hacktivist collective) have continued to decline. However, cyber operations are likely to resume (and possibly intensify) following reports of more Iranian weapons being shipped to Russia and/or deployed in Ukraine.

LATEST SIGNIFICANT UPDATES

Pro-Russia cyber campaigns continue to target the private sector; NATO warns of sustained cyber threats amid calls for greater cyber co-operation between members

On 14 November, Killnet claimed to have defaced a website belonging to the FBI. This development forms part of a wider campaign of attacks against US government infrastructure by pro-Russia hackers. Killnet claimed responsibility for the attack via a telegram post, which was also shared by an account called RADIS. The attack appears to have been short-lived. Indeed, by the afternoon of 14 November, no functional issues on the website were reported. The incident comes roughly one month after Killnet claimed responsibility for a series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks which temporarily took US airport websites offline (and which also inflicted no long-term damage).
Also on 14 November, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) confirmed that Russian hackers were responsible for a data breach at Medibank, the country’s largest insurance provider. Investigators determined that those responsible for the breach are located in Russia and affiliated with a cyber criminal group linked to previous significant data breaches around the world. Medibank was listed on an extortion website previously operated by REvil, a Russia-linked ransomware group.
During the Cyber Defence Pledge Conference in Rome, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg promised to continue supporting Ukraine in the fight against malign Russian cyber actors. Stoltenberg used the war in Ukraine to highlight the increasing threat of cyber warfare targeting critical infrastructure and government departments in Western countries. He called on all NATO members to recommit to defending cyber space via increased investment and enhanced co-operation. The EU also announced plans to establish a cyber defence strategy that will foster closer co-operation between its own member states.
On 12 November, Microsoft acknowledged the return of the cyber unit ‘Sandworm’, which has reportedly deployed a new strain of ransomware (‘Prestige’) against targets in Ukraine’s transport and logistics sectors. CERT-UA has warned of an increased risk to organisations which are directly involved in supplying or transporting humanitarian or military assistance to Ukraine. Furthermore, Microsoft’s threat intelligence division has linked a series of ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure in Ukraine to an elite Russian military cyber espionage group.

Pro-Kyiv groups continue to target Russia-based organisations; cyber operations converge against Iran and Russia

On 14 November, a Twitter account claiming to represent the IT Army of Ukraine stated that it will resume cyber attacks against Alfa Bank services, Russia’s largest private bank. This follows reports of a four-day cyber campaign targeting the bank’s digital infrastructure which resulted in difficulties for customers trying to access online banking services, make payments or access Alfa investment services (see Sibylline Weekly Ukraine Cyber Update – 9 November 2022). On 16 November, the IT Army of Ukraine posted photos claiming to show evidence of ongoing disruption to Alfa’s online services.
The IT Army of Ukraine also reported on 11 November the launch of cyber activities targeting Russian trading platforms and online retailers; the purported aim of this activity is to reduce sales volumes. The hacking group listed its first target as Ozon, a major Russian online retailer. The IT Army of Ukraine did not provide further details of cyber activities or attacks targeting Ozon’s digital infrastructure. However, the group prefers to overwhelm websites and servers by launching DDoS attacks.

FORECAST

During this monitoring period, patterns of pro-Russia cyber activity matched our assessment that there remains a significant cyber threat towards Ukraine and its allies. However, we observed no new attacks levelled against key Western political and/or industrial infrastructure in the past week. Nonetheless, while there were no further reports of pro-Russia DDoS attacks during this monitoring period, we assess that the overreliance of pro-Russia actors on DDoS tactics will persist in the short-to-medium term. This unsophisticated mode of cyber attack has so far only inflicted limited damage against Ukrainian critical infrastructure companies and other targets. It is likely that cyber attackers only intend to disrupt these targets temporarily. NATO’s call for greater co-operation among its members to counter cyber threats points to a further deterioration in the cyber security environment, particularly as the threat from pro-Russia actors is likely to increase as long as Western governments continue to support Kyiv. Moreover, the extortion of Australia’s Medibank highlights the need for private companies to adopt tougher cyber security measures to protect sensitive data; indeed, personal and corporate data are fast becoming attractive targets for pro-Russia cyber attackers. The likelihood of pro-Russia cyber actors continuing to execute low-level malicious cyber attacks against these aforementioned targets is high. As per our previous assessment, it remains highly likely that pro-Russia cyber attacks will occur after Western governments make public announcements in support of Ukraine. These announcements usually pertain to military or financial support, as well as sanctions imposed against Russia. Government agencies and critical infrastructure operators in the telecommunications, energy and technology sectors will be the most vulnerable entities to any such cyber activity. We continued to observe a decline in cyber attacks and campaigns by the Anonymous hacktivist collective against Russian targets during this monitoring period. Anonymous has focused its activity on the Iranian government amid ongoing widespread anti-government protests. Self-proscribed supporters or members of the Anonymous collective continue to call on the sporting governing body FIFA to suspend Iran’s national football team from playing in the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022. The tournament lasts from 20 November until 18 December. Nevertheless, cyber activity related to this campaign has declined in the past week. Anonymous is likely to resume its campaign against organisations, entities and governments both directly and indirectly affiliated with Iran in the coming weeks, due in part to Tehran’s supply of military equipment and weapons to Russia. This will sustain the cyber threat to sponsors and event partners of FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 in the near term. This threat will likely increase ahead of, during or after football matches involving Iran’s national team.

Nov. 15

Over the last 24-48 hours, Russian forces have continued strengthening their defences on the southern (left) bank of the Dnieper river following their withdrawal from Kherson city. Earlier on 15 November, Natalya Humenyuk, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, reported that Russian forces have withdrawn between 9-12 miles (15-20km) south of the Dnieper’s left bank in order to protect themselves from Ukrainian artillery fire. Now that Ukrainian forces control the right bank of the Dnieper they are able to bring up not only short-range conventional artillery, but also High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). These will allow Ukraine to target critical Russian ground lines of communication (GLOC) much closer to occupied Crimea.
It is notable that the occupying authorities in Kherson have made Henichesk their new capital following their withdrawal from Kherson city. Henichesk is a town located in the far south-eastern corner of Kherson oblast close to the Crimean border, some 110 miles (178km) south-east of Kherson city. It is effectively the furthest location from current Ukrainian positions along the Dnieper that is still inside Kherson oblast; it was therefore almost certainly chosen due to being located outside the range of Ukrainian HIMARS.
Notably, geolocated footage on social media on 14 November appeared to indicate that Russian forces have at least partly withdrawn from the town of Oleshky, which sits at the southern end of the Antonivsky bridge to the south of Kherson city. The footage appears to show a car driving through the town with no visible sign of Russian troops. The vehicle comes across no Russian checkpoints and passes several abandoned bunkers. Speculation about a potential Ukrainian operation across the river in Oleshky cannot be confirmed at this time. However, if the apparent withdrawal of Russian forces is true, then this would provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to establish a bridgehead across the river. Nevertheless, this would risk overextending Ukrainian forces; furthermore, a bridgehead would remain highly vulnerable to being cut off by Russian forces. Ukrainian officials have officially remained silent on the issue, though cryptic statements indicate that an operation of sorts is ongoing. Nevertheless, we cannot confirm anything at this stage.
Although Ukrainian forces are continuing with ‘stabilisation’ efforts on the right bank of the Dnieper, they have also sustained counter-offensive operations along the Oskil-Kreminna line over the last 48 hours. However, the Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast, Serhiy Haidai, acknowledged that progress in recent weeks has been slower than hoped. Fighting nevertheless remains intense at various points, with the commander of the Russian combat reserve BARS-13 unit, Sergei Femchenkov, reporting on 14 November that the Svatove front has ‘sharply escalated’. Russian forces were subsequently made to withdraw from the village of Makiivka, located around 16 miles (26km) north-west of Kreminna. Femchenkov also reported that Ukrainian forces have continued to attack further east towards the R-66 highway; he reported they are steadily encroaching upon the outskirts of Kreminna. Furthermore, the Russian defence ministry reported on 14 November that Ukrainian forces are attacking Russian positions near Chervonopopivka, a village just five miles (8km) north-west of Kreminna along the R-66.
Further south, Russian forces have intensified offensive operations along the Bakhmut and Donetsk city lines, making incremental progress over the last 24-48 hours. Russian sources claimed on 14 November that Wagner forces in particular are making progress in the outskirts of Soledar. They are reportedly pushing deeper into Bakhmut town itself, though we cannot confirm this. Further south, Russian forces are also making slow but steady progress west of Donetsk city, with geolocated footage appearing to confirm that Russian forces have advanced to the southern outskirts of Opytne, located two miles (3km) north of Donetsk International Airport (DAK). The town of Avdiivka, around five miles (8km) north of Donetsk city, remains the principal Russian objective on this axis, though Ukrainian forces are heavily dug in along numerous positions; Russian forces have subsequently struggled to gain ground. It is likely that both sides are sustaining very heavy casualties.
The Russian defence ministry also claimed earlier on 15 November that its forces had made further progress around Pavlivka, located around 30 miles (48km) south-west of Donetsk city. It claims that around 1,400 Ukrainian soldiers were killed during the fighting, while other Russian sources claim that significant numbers of Ukrainian soldiers were taken prisoner. These numbers are highly likely to have been exaggerated in an effort to distract from the Kherson withdrawal and to emphasise the ‘successes’ being achieved along the Donetsk front; the true success of Russian attacks is unclear, especially given the contradictory Ukrainian reporting.
Most notably, the Ukrainian Border Service claimed on 14 November that Russian forces had dropped prohibited chemical weapons – namely K-51 aerosol grenades – on Ukrainian positions in Donetsk oblast. K-51 aerosol grenades are Soviet-era non-lethal tear gas grenades which are prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention. While there have been other accusations of Russian forces using banned chemical weapons in Ukraine, namely in Mariupol, this is a trend to watch; Russian commander General Sergei Surovikin has reportedly been given ‘free fire’ authorisation to use any offensive capability short of nuclear weapons, which could include chemical weapons. We will continue to monitor the situation for any change in the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) environment.
According to unnamed US officials cited by CNN, the White House is currently discussing whether to remove technologically sensitive components from advanced Gray Eagle MQ-1C drones in case they are shot down by Russia. Only last week, the Biden administration indicated that it had ruled out the transfer of such drones given the desire to avoid an escalation with Russia. Indeed, the Gray Eagle is able to hit targets deep inside Russia from Ukraine (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 10 November). The Gray Eagle is a modern, medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drone with a range of up to 2,500 nautical miles (4,630km). It can be armed with either Hellfire air-to-ground or Stinger air-to-air missiles. Kyiv has long coveted these systems to expand Ukraine’s strike capability. The ongoing discussions likely indicate that the US is now actively considering providing them in the future, though any modification process is likely to take some time. The better-than-expected midterm election results for the Democratic Party may have influenced the unofficial announcement; Washington DC will now likely continue, if not expand, its military support for Ukraine in the coming months.

Political Developments

The Russian withdrawal from Kherson has reduced the pressure on Mykolaiv, located around 35 miles (56km) to the north-west, due largely to the pulling back of Russian artillery and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). The city has been among the most consistently bombarded of the entire war. However, it will remain vulnerable to ‘kamikaze’ drone and cruise missile attacks for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the easing of artillery pressure has allowed Ukraine to resume rail services to and from the city for the first time since 24 February, with the first Kyiv-Mykolaiv train arriving on 15 November. As a result, operating in and around Mykolaiv will likely become easier, though the threat of missile and/or drone strikes will remain acute.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced on 14 November that it will send teams of nuclear safety and security specialists to three of Ukraine’s active nuclear power plants following a request from Kyiv. The IAEA will inspect the South Ukraine, Khmelnytskyi and Rivne Nuclear Power Plants, as well as the deactivated Chernobyl plant. We have not identified any triggers, warnings or indicators in recent weeks that suggest a change in the nuclear threat environment. The successful Russian withdrawal from Kherson has also reduced the already low-likelihood threat of a dirty bomb being detonated in the city.
This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree that allows Russians with dual nationality to be conscripted into the armed forces. Dual nationals have so far been exempt from military conscription. The amendment to service regulations will also now apply to individuals with permanent residency status abroad, as well as those who are stateless. This comes shortly after President Putin announced the end of partial mobilisation, though a second round of mobilisation is still possible as Moscow seemingly doubles down on a ‘quantity-over-quality’ military strategy in Ukraine. This is already impacting foreign nationals; the Zambian government on 14 November demanded an explanation from Moscow as to why one of its citizens who had been serving a prison sentence was recruited to fight in Ukraine.
Putin also introduced legislation this week that allows naturalised Russian citizens to be stripped of their citizenship for opposing the war in Ukraine, which includes spreading ‘fake news’ and ‘discrediting’ the Russian military. As such, dual citizens and naturalised Russians will face growing scrutiny amid the ongoing autumn conscription cycle, which is due to end on 31 January 2023.

Forecast

On 15 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addressed the G20 summit in Bali (Indonesia) and set out a ten-point peace plan for Ukraine:

Radiological and nuclear safety; Russia must withdraw its forces from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)
Food security; the Black Sea Grain Initiative must be extended indefinitely (it is due for renewal on 19 November)
Energy security; Russia must end its targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure to illustrate willingness to negotiate; a UN mission must inspect the damage caused to Ukraine’s infrastructure, while price caps on Russian energy should be introduced to prevent energy being weaponised
The release of all prisoners and deportees; a total prisoner exchange must take place, while all Ukrainian nationals forcibly deported to Russia must also be returned
The implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity; Russia must uphold the UN Charter and reaffirm Ukraine’s territorial integrity
The withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory
Justice; an international special tribunal to investigate war crimes must be established, with compensation provided for destruction wrought by Russian forces
Ecocide and environmental protection; as outlined during Zelensky’s COP27 speech, an international platform to assess the environmental damage of the war must be established, while the cessation of hostilities will allow apparent and potential environmental hazards to be contained
Prevention of escalation; Ukraine needs effective security guarantees under a proposed Kyiv Security Compact, wherein an international conference will be held to establish the post-war security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic area, including security guarantees for Ukraine
Confirmation of the end of the war; when all the above conditions are met, a document confirming the end of the war will be signed by all parties

In addition to the above ten points, Zelensky emphatically stated that there will be ‘no Minsk III’, referring to the previous two Minsk peace agreements signed in 2014-15 which attempted to reintegrate the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics into Ukraine and end the fighting. During his G20 speech, Zelensky reiterated the long-held consensus in Kyiv that any Minsk III agreement will be viewed in Ukraine as a process which merely provides Russia with an opportunity to rebuild its forces, forces which will then be employed to re-invade Ukraine at a later date. This ultimately aligns with our own assessment of any prospective peace agreement at this time; without serious concessions relating to Ukraine’s neutrality and future NATO membership (which Kyiv is unwilling to cede at this time without a Russian withdrawal), Moscow is likely to regard a peace deal as a temporary ceasefire. Russia is highly unlikely to accept the ten-point peace plan, as it effectively amounts to an acceptance by Moscow that it has lost the war in Ukraine, as well as the total failure of President Putin’s annexation ambitions. The Kremlin has nevertheless responded to Zelensky’s speech by claiming that Kyiv’s refusal to accept a Minsk III process underscores Ukraine’s unwillingness to negotiate, not Russia’s. Furthermore, Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak stated on 15 November that Russia cannot continue existing ‘in its current form’ and that it must ‘undergo political transformation’. This once again reinforces Kyiv’s stance that it will not negotiate with President Putin as things stand. On 14 November, the US defence department issued a briefing supporting our earlier assessment that despite the Russian withdrawal from Kherson and push for peace talks, Moscow ‘is not going to leave the other parts of occupied Ukraine, and there is no doubt that there are still heavy battles ahead’. As such, we see very limited political (and military) indicators to suggest that either side is ready to enter serious negotiations at this time, despite the ramping up of international pressure and peace proposals from Kyiv.

Russia: Putin expands mobilisation laws to include dual nationals, increasing risk for Western staff and naturalised Russians. On 13 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree that will allow Russians with dual nationality to be conscripted into the armed forces. Dual nationals have been exempt from military conscription, but the novel amendment to service regulations will now apply to individuals with permanent residency status abroad and those who are stateless. This comes shortly after President Putin announced the end of partial mobilisation, although there remains potential for a second round of call-ups, should Russia suffer further losses in Ukraine following its retreat from Kherson. Putin has also recently introduced legislation that would allow naturalised Russian citizens to be stripped of their citizenship for opposing the war in Ukraine. As such, dual citizens and naturalised Russians are facing growing scrutiny as the risk of conscription increases.

Nov. 14

On 11 November, Ukrainian forces took full control over Kherson city following the Russian withdrawal from the western (right) bank of the Dnieper River (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 11 November). President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the newly liberated city on 14 November. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence has meanwhile reported that its forces have recaptured 179 settlements and over 1,700 square miles (4,500 square kilometres) of territory along the right bank of the Dnieper River since the beginning of last week, though some clearing operations likely continue.
While the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed to have withdrawn 30,000 service personnel and some 5,000 pieces of equipment during its withdrawal, reports from Ukrainian forces retaking control of the right bank do indicate that some equipment has been left behind, including artillery pieces and S-300 air defence systems. However, such reports remain fairly limited at this stage. There are few indications so far to suggest that significant numbers of Russian troops had been left on the right bank of the river before the final crossing points were destroyed on 11 November. Ukrainian officials have reiterated their calls for Russian forces, including those potentially in civilian clothing, to surrender under promises of fair treatment under the Geneva Conventions. The absence of reports of Russian forces surrendering en masse supports the initial assessment that the Russian withdrawal was conducted with a relatively high degree of professionalism over a number of weeks prior to the announcement. Nevertheless, we will have to wait for official statements from Kyiv and/or any further reports to determine the extent to which the Russian Ministry of Defence’s claims are true.
This morning, 14 November, the Ukrainian General Staff issued fresh warnings that Russian forces may be preparing to intensify attacks across the newly liberated areas in the coming days. Russian aerial reconnaissance has intensified over the last 24 hours, and Russian artillery on the southern (left) bank of the river still retains fire control over much of Kherson city and the right bank. The governor of Kherson oblast has reaffirmed a curfew from 17:00-08:00 and a ban on individuals leaving or entering the city as Ukrainian forces undertake extensive demining operations throughout the city. As such, NGO and other operations seeking to return to Kherson will face significant security challenges as the city is now very much on the frontline, with Russian artillery and aerial bombardment likely to ramp up in the coming days.
Given the Dnieper River represents a significant natural barrier, both sides are likely to see the withdrawal as an opportunity to consolidate and stabilise the frontline, and as a result, major offensive operations in either direction across the river are unlikely in the short term. The Russians seemingly dropped numerous bridges across the Dnieper as the final stage of their withdrawal last week, including destroying numerous spans of the Antonivsky, the Kherson railway and Nova Kakhovka hydroelectric dam bridges. This will clearly make any Ukrainian attempt to cross the river even more challenging, particularly given the newly established layered defences on the southern (left) bank of the river, as Russia retains artillery fire control over the full length of the river. However, this has also reduced still further the threat posed to Mykolaiv and other western Ukrainian cities, namely Odesa. By withdrawing from the right bank of the Dnieper, Russian forces have effectively forgone the option of easily renewing offensive operations towards Odesa in early 2023.
On 13 November, unconfirmed reports began to emerge indicating that fighting was taking place on the Kinburn peninsula – a Russian-controlled strip of land 31 miles (50km) south of Mykolaiv at the estuary of the Pivdenniy Buh and Dnieper rivers that controls the Dniprovska Gulf. The peninsula has remained an important launching post for Russian drone strikes against Odesa and Mykolaiv and is just 28 miles (45km) east of Yuzhne, one of the principal Ukrainian ports exporting grain under the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
Rumours of a Ukrainian landing on the Kinburn peninsula remain unclear, with unconfirmed reports in Russian media that Ukrainian forces had reached the town of Heroiske, 34 miles (54km) southwest of Kherson. If Ukrainian forces have conducted a landing on the peninsula, this would threaten to flank the Russian positions on the southern (left) bank of the Dnieper. However, resupplying any Ukrainian force operating on Kinburn will be extremely difficult. The geography of the region will threaten to put Ukrainian forces under similar logistical difficulties that ultimately precipitated the Russian withdrawal from the right bank of the Dnieper. As such, any landing on Kinburn is likely to comprise primarily light or special forces. However, it remains to be seen whether these reports are accurate and whether Ukrainian forces can establish – and crucially maintain – a foothold on the peninsula, with which to threaten Russia’s western flank.
Elsewhere, fighting remains intense in Donetsk oblast, where various Russian sources claimed their forces had made incremental progress east and south of Bakhmut, as well as west of Donetsk city. This morning, 14 November, the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that their forces had successfully taken the village of Mayorsk, 25 miles (41km) north of Donetsk city, as well as Pavlivka – a village 30 miles (48km) southwest of Donetsk city. The Russian assault on Pavlivka had resulted in major losses for the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 7 November), but we cannot confirm at this stage whether Russian forces have indeed cleared the village. If they have, this will allow Russian forces to push north towards Vuhledar, but it remains to be seen in what condition Russian forces are in after seemingly such a pyrrhic victory.
Fighting in Donetsk oblast is likely to continue intensifying in the weeks ahead as Russian forces freed up following the withdrawal from Kherson are redeployed to support ongoing offensives along the Bakhmut and Donetsk city lines. Chairman of the Ukrainian Centre of Defence Strategies Andriy Zagorodnyuk has suggested that President Vladimir Putin allowed the commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergei Surovikin, to withdraw from Kherson on the condition that he then take the remainder of Donetsk oblast. Donetsk oblast has clearly remained the political priority for the Kremlin amid various setbacks in Kharkiv and now Kherson oblast, despite the limited operational advantage taking additional ground here would likely achieve. The continued deployment of mobilised forces together with regular units from the Kherson front will likely allow Russian forces to make incremental gains, but at significant cost – particularly as Ukraine will likely need to redeploy some of its own forces to Donetsk to counter the intensifying Russian offensive.
Ultimately, neither side is showing any indication of drawing down combat operations as the winter approaches – quite the contrary. As temperatures drop and the ground hardens, we are likely to see both an intensification of Russian offensives in Donetsk oblast as well as Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in northern Luhansk oblast.

Political developments

On 11 November, senior UN officials met with a Russian delegation in Geneva to discuss Moscow’s grievances with the Black Sea Grain Initiative following the Kremlin’s four-day withdrawal and subsequent U-turn in November. Moscow complains that Western financial sanctions have hindered Russian food and fertilizer exports, which were a critical precondition for Russia’s participation in the initiative. In a statement following the talks, the UN released a statement describing the talks on the continuation of the deal, which is set for renewal on 19 November, as ‘constructive’. There was some indication of progress on this issue as the Dutch government, following a request from the UN, stated on 11 November that it would permit the release of a consignment of 200,000 tonnes of Russian fertilizer destined for Malawi that had been stuck in Rotterdam port due to sanctions.
While the final results of the US mid-terms are yet to be announced, the Democrats have retained control of the Senate and the Republican Party is likely, but not certain, to gain a slim majority in the House of Representatives. The election has eased concerns in Kyiv over the possibility that a so-called Republican ‘red wave’ would jeopardise continued US military assistance to Ukraine. Indeed, on 13 November, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan confirmed that Washington plans to announce a new military assistance package ‘in the next few weeks’, indicating that the administration does not believe the election results will significantly affect the continuation of aid to Ukraine.
On 12 November, US Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry and Ukraine’s Minister of Energy German Galushchenko announced the launch of a pilot project for the construction of a small modular nuclear reactor (SMR) in Ukraine. The project was announced at the ongoing UN Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Egypt and would facilitate de-carbonisation and clean energy generation in Ukraine. However, the project will play an important role in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts and bolster its long-term energy security. However, no timeline for the project has been announced, and it is unlikely to proceed while Russia continues to prosecute its invasion.
Finally, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported this morning, 14 November, that Russian and American delegations are meeting today in Ankara. The Kremlin refused to either confirm or deny the meeting is taking place, though the Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Sergei Naryshkin reportedly flew to Ankara as part of the Russian delegation. While further details remain limited, such a meeting would be the latest indicator that back-channel negotiations do remain open between Russia and the West, and will likely aim at facilitating dialogue to prevent escalation, rather than efforts to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table (see below for further analysis).

Forecast

On 13 November, further reports emerged indicating that US and some European officials are urging Kyiv to consider peace talks in the event that winter stalls the recent progress made by the Ukrainian military. While the US and its allies pledged to continue supporting Ukraine, some US officials have begun to openly question whether either side of the conflict can make further territorial gains in the coming months. For example, on 9 November, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley stated that ‘there has to be a mutual recognition that military victory, in the true sense of the word, is maybe not achievable through military means’ and that ‘there’s also an opportunity here, a window of opportunity, for negotiation’. Although Western support for Ukraine will almost certainly continue, it also appears increasingly likely that with the imminent onset of winter, pressure on Kyiv to at least signal a willingness to negotiate with Russia will continue to grow. However, as assessed above, all political and military indicators point to an intensification, not a reduction, of military operations in eastern Ukraine in the coming weeks. A temporary ceasefire over the winter would serve Russian, not Ukrainian, interests at this stage. It ultimately remains in Kyiv’s military and strategic interest to maintain pressure on Russian forces over the winter and capitalise on the momentum it has built in recent months to push forward with counteroffensive operations in northern Luhansk oblast. However, the Russians are also showing very limited appetite for negotiations at this stage, despite (and perhaps because of) the setbacks in Kherson. Today, 14 November, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko insisted that Moscow will not accept preconditions for negotiations with Kyiv and that talks must take place in light of the realities on the ground. Grushko’s comments were a rejection of calls from Finland’s Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto that peace talks could only take place if Russia withdraws all its troops from Ukraine. Additionally, Grushko stated that recent statements from French and Austrian officials on the need for negotiations were just rhetoric and that the Kremlin sees no tangible diplomatic efforts being made. The hard-line positions adopted by both Kyiv and Moscow underscore the difficulties the international community will face in bringing both sides to the negotiating table. Nevertheless, Washington has repeatedly insisted that it will not apply undue pressure on Kyiv to negotiate with Russia at this stage. National Security Advisor Sullivan has stated that Washington instead aims to ensure the strongest Ukrainian military position to provide Kyiv with the ‘best possible position at the negotiating table’ – a policy Democratic control of the Senate will likely facilitate more easily over the winter

Kazakhstan: Divestment from Russia-controlled pipelines will strengthen energy exports . On 11 November, officials announced that Kazakhstan will begin to export larger quantities of oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in the new year as part of a move to utilise export routes bypassing Russia. Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov specified that around 1.5 m tonnes of oil will transit along the route, with overall annual shipments expected to reach between 6-6.5 m tonnes. Currently, around two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s oil exports are sent to the European continent via Russia. For Kazakhstan, reducing its reliance on Russia-controlled routes will likely improve export stability, especially as Russia unilaterally shut down the Novorossiysk export terminal earlier this year. This resulted in a significant decrease in Kazakh oil output, hurting export revenues. As Europe looks to diversify its energy sources, Kazakh energy exporters will likely enjoy more opportunities to develop and expand alternative export routes, including via rail and across the Caspian Sea.

Russia: Impending publication of information about ‘foreign agents’ highlights personal data risks. Earlier on 14 November, the authorities announced that they will begin to publish data pertaining to individuals and groups labelled as ‘foreign agents’. From 1 December, the individual insurance account numbers, taxpayer identification codes, names and birth dates of those on the list will be displayed on the Russian justice ministry’s website. Also from 1 December, current legislation will be expanded to include anyone that the government deems to have been susceptible to foreign influence of any kind, not just in terms of receiving funding. This follows legislation introduced earlier this month which requires a number of state-owned companies, enterprises and large private banks to inform the Kremlin about the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). There is an increased risk to the security of personal data related to the many journalists, civil society figures and activists named on this list. The latest legislation underscores the risk to information security in Russia.

Cyber Update

Russia-Ukraine: New ‘Somnia’ data wiper will sustain threat of operational disruption to Ukrainian critical organisations. On 11 November, the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) confirmed a new wave of cyber attacks by Russian hacktivist group From Russia with Love (FRwL), also known as Z-Team, with a new malware called ‘Somnia’. The disclosure came a day after Microsoft Security Threat Intelligence (MSTIC) attributed a spate of ransomware attacks against Ukrainian and Polish transport and logistics organisations to Russian military-linked threat actors (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 11 November 2022), underscoring the sustained threat of Russian cyber attacks against Eastern Europe-based targets. CERT-UA has revealed that FRwL tricks targets to install the Vidar malware to steal users’ Telegram data in order to seize control of their accounts and later the victims’ corporate network. However, Somnia does not provide a ransom notification in exchange for a decryptor, suggesting that the malware is created as a data wiper to disrupt the targets’ operations. While the number of afflicted targets remains undisclosed, CERT-UA noted that attacks with Somnia originated in the spring of 2022. The timing of the disclosure suggests that the CERT-UA was only recently able to comprehend the nature of the attack. Hence, FRwL’s campaign against Ukrainian organisations, especially those critical to national security, is likely to sustain for the foreseeable future. (Source: Sibylline)

18 Nov 22. Sunak announces new air defence for Ukraine on first visit to Kyiv. Prime Minister confirms UK will bolster Ukraine’s air defence against barbaric aerial assault. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has said it is “deeply humbling” to be in Kyiv and pledged that the UK will continue to stand by Ukrainians in their fight, on his first visit to the country today [Saturday 19th November]. Meeting President Zelenskyy, he confirmed that the UK will provide a major new package of air defence to help protect Ukrainian civilians and critical national infrastructure from an intense barrage of Russian strikes. The £50m package of defence aid comprises 125 anti-aircraft guns and technology to counter deadly Iranian-supplied drones, including dozens of radars and anti-drone electronic warfare capability. It follows more than 1,000 new anti-air missiles announced by the Defence Secretary earlier this month.

In the last week, Ukrainian forces say Russia has rained down more than 148 missile strikes on critical infrastructure, leaving approximately 10 million people without power. The UK is also bolstering our training offer to Ukrainian’s armed forces, sending expert army medics and engineers to the region to offer specialised support.

In Kyiv, the Prime Minister laid flowers at a memorial for the war dead and lit a candle at a memorial for victims of the Holodomor famine, before meeting first responders at a fire station. The team of emergency responders described their harrowing work rescuing survivors from the rubble and fighting fires in the aftermath of Russian airstrikes and mortar attacks. He also saw captured Iranian-made drones which have been used to target and bomb civilians in recent months.

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said:

I am proud of how the UK stood with Ukraine from the very beginning. And I am here today to say the UK and our allies will continue to stand with Ukraine, as it fights to end this barbarous war and deliver a just peace.

While Ukraine’s armed forces succeed in pushing back Russian forces on the ground, civilians are being brutally bombarded from the air. We are today providing new air defence, including anti-aircraft guns, radar and anti-drone equipment, and stepping up humanitarian support for the cold, hard winter ahead.

It is deeply humbling to be in Kyiv today and to have the opportunity to meet those who are doing so much, and paying so high a price, to defend the principles of sovereignty and democracy.

Recognising that Ukrainians face a very difficult winter, with widespread blackouts of destruction of homes, schools and hospitals, the Prime Minister has also confirmed £12 million for the World Food Programme’s response, as well as £4 million for the International Organisation for Migration. The funding will help provide generators, shelter, water repairs and mobile health clinics. The UK is also sending tens of thousands of extreme cold winter kits for Ukrainian troops.

Working with the Government of Ukraine, the UK has identified an initial eight construction projects to be supported by UK Export Finance, helping to repair Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and lay the foundations for economic recovery. The projects include six bridges and two housing projects, including a development in Bucha for some 2,250 residents. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

16 Nov 22. Full Ukrainian victory over Russia unlikely, warns top US general. Army General Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, cautioning Russia still had significant combat power

The US’ top general played down the odds of any near-term military victory by Ukraine, in a rare assessment of the war on Wednesday, cautioning that Russia still had significant combat power despite recent setbacks.

Army General Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it is unlikely that Kyiv can militarily force Russia out of all of the territory it occupies, in a Pentagon press conference.

“The probability of a Ukrainian military victory – defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they claim as Crimea – the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily,” Gen. Milley said.

“Politically, there may be a political solution where, politically, the Russians withdraw. That’s possible,” he added, saying Russia “right now is on its back.”

However, he also acknowledged that Moscow is “hurting bad” and will likely struggle through the cold weather in the coming months, when operations “naturally slow down”.

Russia is “imposing a campaign of terror, a campaign of maximum suffering on the Ukrainian civilian population in order to defeat Ukrainian morale,” Gen. Milley said.

Many of the recent strikes – including a barrage of dozens of missiles across Ukraine on Tuesday – have targeted the country’s energy infrastructure.

Gen. Milley said he attempted to call his Russian counterpart, Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov, to avoid escalation over the missile in Ukraine, but his staff were “unsuccessful” in getting through.

Moscow’s attacks on civilian infrastructure – which Gen. Milley said are likely to increase suffering this winter – came after a string of Russian failures to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine.

“The Ukrainians have achieved success after success after success. And the Russians have failed every single time. They’ve lost strategically, they’ve lost operationally, and I repeat, they lost tactically,” the general said.

He called Russia’s invasion “one of the most significant attempts to destroy the rules-based order that World War Two was fought all about.”

Gen. Milley said the US and its allies will continue to support Ukraine for as long as is needed for Ukraine to be “free, sovereign and independent with its territory intact.”

Ian Bremmer, president and founder of global political risk firm Eurasia Group, tweeted on Wednesday, “The US government is now saying out loud what everyone has been saying privately for months: the complete removal of Russian troops from Ukraine territory (read particularly: Crimea) is extremely unlikely.

“At some point negotiations are the best option. Ultimately, negotiations have no chance of succeeding unless the Nato alliance stays together and Ukraine is in a strong military position,” Mr Bremmer said.

(Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)

16 Nov 22. Ukraine Contact Group Is Key to Helping Ukraine’s Defense. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III convened the seventh Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting today, telling the assembled international partners that their efforts have made a difference in helping the Ukrainian military fight the Russian invaders.

Army Gen. Mark A, Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attended with Austin. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov also attended.

The virtual meeting came the day after reports of an explosion in Poland near its border with Ukraine. “We will continue to work closely with our ally, Poland, and others to gather more information,” Austin said during introductory remarks. “And we’ll continue to consult closely with our NATO allies and our valued partners.”

The invasion has been a tragedy for the Ukrainian people, and it has been disastrous for Russia. The Russian military has been launching barrages of missiles at Ukrainian cities seeking to knock out critical infrastructure and sap the will of the people.

“Russia is facing setback after setback on the battlefield,” Austin said. “And Russia is putting Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure in its gun sights. Both of these things only deepen the resolve of this contact group, and they only intensify Ukraine’s determination.”

The secretary said the Ukrainian people have not broken in the face of the attacks and said they “have responded with the magnificent defiance that the world now knows so well.”

The Russians hoped for a quick victory when they invaded Ukraine in February. They lost the battle of Kyiv. The Russians tried to take Ukraine’s second city of Kharkiv and ended up being pushed back by a Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Russians succeeded in taking the regional capital of Kherson in the southern part of the country, and that city was liberated by Ukrainian troops last week.

“Kherson was the only regional capital that Russia managed to temporarily occupy, and the dramatic scenes of Ukrainian forces liberating Kherson further galvanized the international community,” Austin said. “Neither shear force nor sham annexation attempts can defeat the determination of Ukrainian people to live in a free and sovereign country.”

The Ukraine Defense Contact Group has been instrumental in delivering the military capabilities the Ukrainians need to turn back the Russians. Contact group members are also helping train Ukrainian service members in the use of these capabilities, and many nations are now looking at ways to help Ukraine defend itself in the long term.

“We’re going to maintain our momentum throughout the winter so that Ukraine can continue to consolidate gains and seize the initiative on the battlefield,” the secretary said. “Ukrainian troops are fighting with even greater tenacity and determination.”

Austin said the newly arrived National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System — NASAM — is helping Ukraine knock down the threats of Russian aircraft, missiles and drones.

Since the last contact group meeting, the United States has announced another Ukraine security assistance initiative package of $400m. Last week, there was an additional $400m in presidential drawdown authority. The assistance initiative looks to longer range spending, while the drawdown authority allows the United States to deliver systems quickly.

All told, the United States has pledged $18.6bn to support Ukraine since the Russian invasion.

And the United States is not the only country providing support. “Since our last contact group, seven countries have either delivered critical air defense systems to Ukraine or committed to sending them,” Austin said. “That will save the lives of innocent Ukrainian men, women and children and help Ukrainian armed forces defend their skies.”

Another outgrowth of the contact group is the United States, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic working together to modernize 90 T-72-B tanks for Ukraine.

Austin said the contact group will build on previous discussions and meetings. “We’ll discuss how we can best train and prepare the Ukrainian armed forces to defend their country,” he said.

The nations will discuss the efforts needed to “ensure that Ukraine can continue to consolidate its gains and keep up its momentum on the battlefield even throughout the winter,” Austin said. (Source: US DoD)

16 Nov 22. Biden seeks USD37.7bn more for Ukraine. The administration of US President Joe Biden asked Congress on 15 November to approve USD37.7 bn in additional Ukraine-related military, economic, and humanitarian assistance, including USD21.7bn for defence.

The defence funding would provide equipment and other support to Ukrainian forces and replenish US stocks of weapons sent to the war-torn country, the administration said. The requested sum is intended to last until the end of US fiscal year (FY) 2023.

The administration said the new round of money is needed because about three-quarters of the USD12.3bn in Ukraine aid that Congress approved in September 2022 has been disbursed or committed and much of the remaining amount will be used by the end of December.

“That is why we are urging the Congress to provide additional appropriations to ensure Ukraine has the funding, weapons, and support it needs to defend itself, and that vulnerable people continue to receive lifesaving aid,” Shalanda Young, director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, wrote in a letter to congressional leaders. (Source: Janes)

16 Nov 22. Ukraine air strikes statement. Foreign Secretary James Cleverly gave a statement to the House following yesterday’s air strikes in Ukraine by Russia.

Thank you Madam Deputy Speaker,

with permission I will make a statement about the missile strike in Poland overnight.

At approximately 19:00 local time last night, there were missile explosions in a village in eastern Poland, approximately four miles from the border with Ukraine, killing two civilians and wounding four, during an extended Russian bombardment of Ukrainian territory.

As soon as I received the report, I contacted my Polish counterpart to express the sympathy and solidarity of the United Kingdom – and I am sure the whole House will share that sentiment – and also to offer practical support.

I then spoke to my Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister in a trilateral call with my Right Honourable friend the Defence Secretary, while the Prime Minister was attending the G20 Summit in Indonesia.

My Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister immediately called President Duda of Poland to convey the UK’s condolences for the tragic loss of civilian life and to assure him of our unwavering support to a steadfast NATO ally.

My Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister then spoke to President Zelenskyy about the latest situation and also attended an ad hoc meeting of G7 leaders called by President Biden to discuss the evolving situation.

This morning I spoke to the Polish foreign minister and I commended Poland’s decisive, determined, but calm, professional response to the situation.

It is wise to advise the house that at this point the full details of the incident are not complete, but earlier today Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary General, said there was – and I quote – “no indication that this was the result of a deliberate attack”.

He added that the incident was – and I quote again – “likely caused by a Ukrainian air defence missile fired to defend Ukrainian territory against Russian cruise missile attacks”.

Poland will lead the investigation to establish exactly what has happened and the UK stands ready to provide any practical or technical assistance.

In the meantime, we are not going to rush to judgement: our response will always be led by the facts.

But the House should be in no doubt that the only reason why missiles are flying through European skies, and exploding in European villages, is because of Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine.

Secretary General Stoltenberg was absolutely right when he said today that what occurred in Poland is “not Ukraine’s fault” and that “Russia bears the ultimate responsibility”.

Yesterday Putin launched one of the heaviest attacks since the war began, firing wave upon wave of more than 80 missiles at Ukrainian cities, obliterating homes of ordinary families, destroying critical national infrastructure and depriving ms of Ukrainians of power and heat just as winter sets in.

This brutal air campaign is Putin’s revenge for Ukraine’s successes on the battlefield, where Russian forces have been expelled from thousands of square miles of territory.

Now he is trying to terrorise the people of Ukraine and break their will by leaving them shivering in cold and darkness. I have no doubt he will be unsuccessful in that endeavour

But this is why Britain is helping Ukraine to strengthen its air defences. We have provided over 1,000 surface-to-air missiles thus far.

And I know the House will be united in our support for Ukraine’s right to defend her territory and her people.

On Monday, I signed a Memorandum of Understanding as part of our £10 m commitment to help Ukraine rebuild its critical energy infrastructure.

The tragic incident in Poland last night is ultimately the result of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

That is the only reason why it has happened and it would not have happened otherwise.

That is why the UK and our allies stand in solidarity with Poland.

And that is why we are determined to support Ukraine until they prevail and their country is once again free. Madam Deputy Speaker, I commend this statement to the House. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

16 Nov 22. Poland has said there is “no indication” that a missile which struck the country, killing two people, was “an intentional attack” and there is no evidence it was launched by Russia. Moscow denied responsibility for the strike in the village of Przewodów near the Ukrainian border on Tuesday afternoon, which came during Russia’s biggest missile attack on Ukraine in weeks. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and some western nations initially blamed Russia for launching the missile, which Warsaw initially said was a strike by a “Russian-made missile”. Photographs posted on social media showed a damaged farm vehicle lying on its side next to a large crater. Local media reported the casualties were farm workers. Andrzej Duda, Polish president, told a press conference on Wednesday: “There is no indication that this was an intentional attack on Poland,” adding that there was “a high probability” the weapon was fired by the Ukrainian defence forces at a Russian missile. Duda said investigators believed that “most likely” it had been a Russian-made missile produced in the 1970s, the S300. “We have no evidence that it was launched by Russia,” he added. Based on the latest findings, prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki said that “most of the evidence we have collected indicates that perhaps the activation of article 4 [of the Nato treaty] will not be needed”. In the immediate aftermath of the attack Polish officials indicated they would invoke article 4 of the Nato treaty, which concerns discussions on a potential threat to an alliance member. Nato ambassadors met in Brussels on Wednesday to discuss the attack. (Source: FT.com)

15 Nov 22. Germany to set up hub in Slovakia to repair arms for Ukraine. Germany will establish a maintenance hub in Slovakia to service and repair weapons it has delivered to Ukraine, German Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht said on Tuesday.

“We have reached agreement, and work can start immediately so that all the equipment which has been supplied (to Kyiv) can be repaired after coming out of battle,” she told reporters as she arrived for a meeting with her EU counterparts in Brussels. Slovak Defence Minister Jaroslav Nad said repair work would start in the next several weeks, and would focus mainly on howitzers and anti-aircraft systems.

Talks on the arrangement, funded by Germany, began in September, Nad said, adding the two countries sought a quick agreement to aid Ukraine as it fights Russia’s invasion.

“Because Russian aggression in Ukraine does not let up, our help cannot be delayed either,” Nad said in a statement.

Lambrecht also said Berlin was planning to train some 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Germany by next June as part of a European Union training mission. (Source: Reuters)

15 Nov 22. Russian missiles plunge Ukraine into darkness hours after Zelensky’s G20 speech.

More than 100 missiles destroy electricity systems across several cities in apparent retaliation against Ukrainian president’s address

The massive bombardment came after Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, confronted Russia via videolink during a speech at the G20 summit.

Moscow’s forces fired more than 100 missiles targeting electricity and heating infrastructure, with large swathes of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv and Sumy hit by power outages.

At least three residential buildings were hit in Kyiv’s city centre, and explosions were also reported in Lviv, Rivne, Kharkiv, Kryvyi Rih, Poltava, Odesa and Zhytomyr.

One missile strayed into Poland, killing two people according to US intelligence, triggering a major diplomatic scramble. In southern Ukraine, the Russian armed forces continued to abandon positions on the Dnipro River, as Kyiv’s military continued its counter-offensive in the Kherson region.

Western sources said that Moscow was likely relocating about 10,000 troops to the Donbas in an attempt to increase pressure on the eastern front. On Tuesday, Russia’s strikes on Ukraine were reportedly launched in multiple waves. The use of Iranian-made kamikaze drones was also reported.

“The Russians fired about 100 missiles during the massive strike, surpassing October 10, when 84 rockets were fired,” said Yuriy Ignat, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force.

Huge plumes of black smoke could be seen rising from buildings in Kyiv after strikes hit the central Pecherskyi district. (Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)

15 Nov 22. Ukrainian soldiers put through their paces on British-led crash course. The UK has been training thousands of Ukrainian recruits using battle-proven British Army expertise.

Ukrainian soldiers have been undergoing training at an undisclosed location in the north of England – enrolled on a British-led five-week crash course.

They are learning everything from weapon handling, tactics, and trench warfare to battlefield first aid and the law of armed conflict.

Since June, the British Army and its international colleagues have overseen the training of 7,000 Ukrainians across four sites in the UK.

The first cohort of Ukrainian troops came to the end of their training in the UK back in July.

Ukrainian recruits have been flown in, kitted out with everything a soldier needs and put through their paces in a condensed version of what would ordinarily take a British recruit six months to achieve.

After the completion of the training they return to Ukraine, and they fight.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace visited the training troops and spoke to Forces News about the UK’s “enduring” support of Ukraine.

“We’re not in it for a calculated win-loss, we’re in it because what Russia is doing is challenging our values, the human rights, the rule of law, the international rule of law, and the very concept of the sovereignty of a country.

“We are in it to help Ukraine until they are successful and that support is enduring.

“Whether that is the software of how to do things which is what you see here, the training or whether it’s hardware or whether it’s just defence reform within Ukraine to make sure they can see through the winter and see into the long term.”

Mr Wallace added: “We’ll be there standing by them shoulder to shoulder.”

British Army personnel are also providing training for junior commanders, something typically aimed at developing the battlefield leadership skills required by effective junior non-commissioned officers.

Training Delivery Unit Commanding Officier Lieutenant Colonel Jon Harris highlighted that the Ukrainian recruits have come from “all sorts of walks of life” before the UK training.

“Many of them (Ukrainians recruits), up until about 10 days or two weeks before getting here, were butchers, they were lawyers, they were doctors, they were internet analysts, all sorts of walks of life,” he said.

Lt Col Harris added: “They come here and spend five weeks with us and what I expect to see at the end of the training, is 200 people leaving with the skills they need to survive, fight and win against Russia when they return to Ukraine.”

The Defence Secretary believes that the training is also beneficial to the UK.

“We shouldn’t forget 1,800 Ukrainians have lost their lives since 2014. To them, they have been at war ever since then. It wasn’t just on February 24th.

“So they’re bringing their skills, I’ve met today some platoon commanders who’ve been out on the battlefield, they’re bringing their skills. And that’s helping us as well, that’s helping us modernise, so there is a mutual benefit here.” (Source: forces.net)

15 Nov 22. Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has outlined his conditions for a peace settlement to end the war with Russia, pushing back against some western suggestions that Kyiv should compromise with Moscow over its borders. While Zelenskyy said on Tuesday that he was open to peace talks, he stressed he would not pause the fighting over winter. His comments follow suggestions by some US officials, including military chief Gen Mark Milley, that Ukraine might not expel Russian forces out of all its territory and that winter may provide an opportunity to begin negotiations with Russia. “We will not allow Russia to wait it out, build up its forces, and then start a new series of terror and global destabilisation,” Zelenskyy said in a video address to the G20 summit in Bali. “I am convinced now is the time when the Russian destructive war must and can be stopped.” Snubbing Russia by addressing leaders of the “G19”, Zelensky said his “path to peace” was “not only for us, but also for all of you, your allies and partners”. Some western diplomats have privately discussed the February 24 lines as a likely starting point for talks. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Zelenskyy’s plan was confirmation that Kyiv had “no desire to hold negotiations”, state newswire Ria Novosti reported. Russian president Vladimir Putin did not attend the G20 and was represented by his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov. Zelenskyy said his 10-point plan was created “on the basis of the UN charter and international law”. Repeating his previous calls for the total withdrawal of Russian troops, Zelenskyy called for the cessation of hostilities and the release of all prisoners of war and Ukrainians forcibly deported by Moscow. He also said that energy security would be key to Ukraine’s success and a lasting peace. “All of you can witness what the Russian terror is aimed at now,” he said. “This is an attempt to turn the cold into a weapon. A weapon against ms of people.” About 40 per cent of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been destroyed by Russian missile and drone strikes since early October. “Every week, Russia blows up our power plants, transformers, and electricity supply lines,” Zelenskyy added. The president’s call followed his unannounced visit to Kherson on Monday, three days after Ukrainian troops liberated the city from Russian forces in one of the most significant military achievements since Putin launched the all-out invasion of Ukraine in February. “It is like, for example, D-Day — the landing of the Allies in Normandy,” Zelenskyy said as he greeted Kherson residents and oversaw the return of the Ukrainian flag over the city. Kherson was the only provincial capital that Russian forces had captured. Ukrainian officials have stressed in recent days that they intend to keep fighting, despite mixed messages from the west about whether it was time to more seriously consider negotiations with Russia. Ukraine’s military chief Gen Valerii Zaluzhny spoke with his US counterpart Milley on Monday and told him that “we will fight as long as we have the strength”, and that Ukraine would press ahead with the government’s goal to liberate all Ukrainian territory occupied by Russian forces. Milley has been a vocal proponent of finding an opportunity for peace talks this winter. “We will not stop on this path under any circumstances. The Ukrainian military will not accept any negotiations, agreements or compromises,” Zaluzhny told Milley. A debate among US officials about when Ukraine should hold negotiations with Russia has spilled into the open, with Milley saying last week that a pause in winter fighting would create “a window of opportunity for negotiations”. US national security adviser Jake Sullivan later told reporters that “as long as Russia holds the position that it simply gets to grab as much territory as it wants by force, it’s hard to see them as a good-faith counterparty in a negotiation”. (Source: FT.com)

14 Nov 22. Canadian Prime Minister announces additional military assistance for Ukraine and additional sanctions against Russia.

As Russia continues its brutal, unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine, Canada will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Ukrainian people and our allies, in defence of our shared values of peace, democracy, and human rights. We will continue to use every tool at our disposal to support Ukraine and hold Russia accountable.

Today, at the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, the Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, announced that Canada will provide $500 m in additional military assistance for Ukraine, to assist the Armed Forces of Ukraine in defending their country against Russia’s brutal and unjustifiable invasion.

This commitment builds on the $500m in military aid for Ukraine announced in Budget 2022 and will go toward military, surveillance, and communications equipment, fuel, and medical supplies.

Canada is also imposing additional sanctions against Russian individuals. These sanctions target 23 members of the Russian justice and security sectors, including police officers and investigators, prosecutors, judges, and prison officials, involved in gross and systematic human rights violations against Russian opposition leaders. These new measures build on the sanctions Canada has imposed on over 1,400 individuals and entities since Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

This builds on the $3.4bn in assistance to Ukraine Canada has committed so far this year, and we will continue our unwavering support for Ukraine as it defends its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. We will continue to work with our international partners to increase pressure on Russian officials and hold Vladimir Putin accountable for his illegal invasion as well as the war crimes and human rights violations that have been committed by his regime.

Quotes

“Canada continues to support Ukraine as it defends its territory, sovereignty, and independence from Russia. This additional military assistance will support Ukrainians as they bravely continue to fight against Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion, while these new sanctions will put added pressure on those who support these acts of war. We, along with other members of the international community, will continue to use every tool at our disposal to hold Russia accountable for its brutal actions against Ukraine.”

— The Rt. Hon. Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada

“Today, we are sanctioning those responsible for the persecution of the brave Russian dissident Vladimir Kara-Murza. Canada will continue to be unwavering in our support for Ukraine in its fight for freedom.”

— The Hon. Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs

“Canada’s commitment to providing Ukraine with comprehensive military aid is unwavering. With today’s announcement, Canada has committed over $1bn worth of military aid to Ukraine, and our Canadian Armed Forces continue to transport aid, as well as train their Ukrainian counterparts under Op UNIFIER. Ukraine’s military has made incredible progress reclaiming ground and Canada’s military contributions have been integral in their counter offensive to-date. The $500m in new military aid announced today will ensure that we continue to meet Ukraine’s military momentum with the military aid that it needs to fight and win.”

— The Hon. Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence

Quick Facts

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Canada has imposed sanctions on more than 1,400 individuals and entities complicit in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, including those announced today. Many of these sanctions have been undertaken in coordination with Canada’s allies and international partners.
Canada has provided over $600m in military support to Ukraine since February 2022, including armoured vehicles, artillery and ammunition, drone cameras, and winter clothing.
In August 2022, the Government of Canada announced the deployment of CAF members under Operation UNIFIER to provide training to the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the United Kingdom in collaboration with the United Kingdom’s Operation INTERFLEX.
Canada was among the first of a number of Allies and partners that committed to contribute to the United Kingdom-led training initiative.
Operation UNIFIER was launched in 2015 at the request of the Government of Ukraine, and earlier this year, was expanded and extended until March 2025.
Since the start of Operation UNIFIER in 2015, the CAF has trained over 34,000 Ukrainian military and security personnel in battlefield tactics and advanced military skills.
Since late March 2022, the CAF has been assisting with the delivery of military aid for Ukraine within Europe and has now transported over 4 m pounds of donations from Canada and on behalf of our Allies and partners. (Source: PR Newswire)

14 Nov 22. Ukraine asks U.S. for big drones, hoping to overcome opposition. Ukraine has made a new appeal for the United States to supply it with powerful drones and anti-drone missiles, hoping Washington will reverse its previous rejection as Russia increasingly turns to kamikaze drones and attacks civilian infrastructure.

With Moscow’s invasion in its ninth month, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov in a Nov. 2 letter requested four MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aerial systems or drones, and in a separate document, asked for the first time for a counter-drone missile, according to a document seen by Reuters and people familiar with the request said. The drones, which cost about $10 m each, and the counter-drone AGM-114L or LONGBOW would bolster Ukraine’s civilian air defenses and help counter Russia’s growing use of Iranian-made kamikaze drones far from the front lines.

The United States rejected Kyiv’s prior request for the drones, concerned they could be shot down, were not essential to Ukraine’s war effort and could escalate the conflict.

But Ukraine is hoping that its latest pitch will change minds in Washington since it was coupled with the LONGBOW request and explicitly aimed at protecting civilians and infrastructure.

As its forces were pushed back by Ukrainian troops in some areas, Russia ramped up attacks last month on civilian infrastructure such as the power grid and water systems, causing outages. Kyiv has said that the attacks destroyed more than a third of its energy infrastructure.

Moscow has acknowledged targeting energy infrastructure but denies targeting civilians.

The United States has extended about $17.9bn of military aid to Ukraine since Russia launched what it calls a “special military operation” on Feb. 24.

Lieutenant Colonel Garron Garn, a Pentagon spokesman, declined to comment on specific Ukrainian requests. “Our support focuses on equipment that is relevant for the current fight,” Garn said in a statement.

TECHNOLOGY ADVANCE

In the letter, Reznikov acknowledged the transfer of the MQ-1C Gray Eagle, made by General Atomics, was “complicated”, but said the large unmanned aerial system would frustrate Russia’s ability to strike deep into Ukrainian territory and potentially deny Russia the ability to attack from Belarus.

If paired with a counter-drone Hellfire missile variant, the Gray Eagles could patrol civilian air space far from front-line areas defended by Russian anti-air systems and possibly avoid antagonizing Moscow, people familiar with the request said.

Strikes behind the front lines pose a big challenge for current air defense systems, Reznikov added in his letter.

Kyiv has so far relied on a mix of Soviet-era technology and weapons sent by Western allies, but does not have an integrated system of air defenses to coordinate shootdowns across platforms, leaving civilian infrastructure vulnerable.

In the early days of the invasion, Ukraine requested the MQ-1C Gray Eagle system to employ Hellfire missiles to shoot down Russian planes and cruise missiles.

But the Pentagon rejected the plan earlier this autumn, sources said, as U.S. officials worried the Russians might capture the drone and steal the technology.

Defense officials briefed lawmakers privately about that decision last week, making similar arguments and stressing that Russia could view the drones as a provocation, according to people familiar with the matter.

The Gray Eagle, the Army’s version of the more widely known Predator drone, has an operational ceiling of 25,000 feet and would represent a great technological leap forward for Ukraine.

It can fly up to 30 or more hours, gather huge amounts of intelligence data and carry up to eight powerful Hellfire missiles. (Source: Reuters)

14 Nov 22. Liberation of Kherson ‘Significant Accomplishment’ for Ukraine. Over the weekend, Russian forces withdrew from Kherson in Ukraine, a city of more than 280,000. It’s a big win for the Ukrainian people and for its military, one senior military official said during a briefing today at the Pentagon.

“The most significant development over the weekend was the Russian military’s withdrawal from Kherson City and the west bank of the Dnipro River,” the official said. “While we continue to monitor, we do assess that Russian forces have relocated onto the eastern side of the river and established their defensive lines, thus ceding a significant amount of territory to the Ukrainians to include your Kherson City.”

The official said Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate gains and are now busy clearing obstacles and mines left behind by the Russians. The Ukrainians are also assessing the damage done by the Russian occupiers before they departed; the official said indications are that the Russians did significant damage to civilian infrastructure in Kherson, including water and other utility systems.

“The Russians don’t appear inclined to depart the rest of occupied Ukraine, there’s undoubtedly still tough fighting ahead,” the official said. “But the liberation Kherson City is a significant accomplishment and a testament to the grit, determination and tenacity of the Ukrainian people and their armed forces as they fight to defend their nation.”

As winter approaches, it’s possible that fighting in Ukraine might slow. But official said plans for U.S. support isn’t predicted to slow, as that support is not predicated on weather, but on what the Ukrainians say they need.

“We will continue to work with them, alongside our international allies and our partners, to ensure that they have what they need to succeed on the battlefield,” the official said. We’re prepared to do that for as long as it takes.”

The official said the department has seen Russian missile and drone strikes slow down some since the end of October, but that the Russians do continue to strike at civilian infrastructure, such as the Ukrainian electrical grid.

“Air defense continues to be a priority for the Ukrainians,” the official said. “This continues for us to be an area of discussion in terms of how the United States and the international community can continue to support them when it comes to their defense needs.”

Last week, the U.S. announced an additional security package for Ukraine that’s valued at $400 m. That package is part of some $18.6 bn in assistance the U.S. has committed to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked invasion.

Included in that presidential drawdown package were missiles for the HAWK air defense system, along with four Avenger air defense systems and Stinger missiles. Both of those contributions to Ukrainian defense assist them with air defense. The Avenger system, for instance, can help protect against cruise missiles, helicopters and unmanned aerial systems.

The package also included, among other things, 20,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and cold weather protective gear. (Source: US DoD)

08 Nov 22. Russian loitering munitions ‘resistant’ to laser weapons – media reports. Advanced counter drone systems like the German IRIS-T, Soviet-origin S-300, Buk, and Osa are inadequate in dealing with Russian loitering munitions and Iranian Shahed-136 suicide drones, according to reports in the EurAsian Times and UAS Vision.

“Manufactured by Zala and Kalashnikov, the Russian Lancet-3 is a lightweight loitering munition with a three-kilogram warhead and a 40-minute endurance. It is a further development of the KYB Kub (Cube) loitering munition, a flying-wing design that was combat tested in Syria in 2019. The Lancet-3 has a take-off weight of 12 kilograms and is launched via a rail-mounted catapult system, capable of hitting targets up to a distance of 40 kilometers. It has two sets of X-shaped wings that can be folded and packed into a carrier trunk.

“The Lancets are now reported to be present with nearly all Russian units in south and eastern Ukraine, defending against Ukrainian counterattacks and consolidating their hold in the pro-Russian regions that recently voted in a referendum to remain with Moscow. Ukraine claimed on October 12 that it had shot down two Zala Lancet drones, besides many Iranian-origin Shahed-136 kamikaze drones.

EurAsian Times quotes ROSTEC: “The Russian Lancet kamikaze drone cannot be harmed by the latest laser weapons due to the built-in anti-laser protection. It is almost impossible to intercept and destroy. Thanks to the built-in anti-laser protection, even the latest laser weapons against drones are not afraid of this drone [sic],”

“While there have not been any reports of laser-based C-UAS systems with Ukraine, Russia’s laser-resistant technology on the Lancet still makes it ‘future-proof.’ Such weapons are likely to become commonplace, considering the scale of military aid pouring into Ukraine,” says EurAsian Times. For more information: www.uasvision.com; www.eurasiantimes.com (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

10 Nov 22. RUSI paper underlines ongoing role, and need for missiles and counter drone systems in Ukraine.

A report published by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies highlights the need to continue use of Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to counter Russian loitering munitions and airborne attacks. The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence takes a detailed look at air-defence capabilities.

Summary:

Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks.
During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.
From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long-range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.
Numerous man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.
Throughout the war, most Russian airstrikes have been against pre-designated targets with unguided bombs and rockets. The Su-34 fleet has regularly also fired standoff missiles such as the Kh-29 and Kh-59 against fixed targets, and Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have regularly fired Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress and target Ukrainian SAM radars.
Without air superiority, Russia’s attempts at strategic air attack have been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These failed to achieve strategically decisive damage during the first seven months of the invasion. However, the latest iteration is a more focused and sustainable bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid, blending hundreds of cheap Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions against substations with continued use of cruise and ballistic missiles against larger targets.
The West must avoid complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air defence capacity. It is purely thanks to its failure to destroy Ukraine’s mobile SAM systems that Russia remains unable to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing bomber and multi-role fighter fleets to bombard Ukrainian strategic targets and frontline positions from medium altitude, as it did in Syria.

Link to the report here: SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf

For more information:: www.rusi.org (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

16 Nov 22. Czechs plan to train up to 4,000 Ukrainian troops. The Czech government plans to provide training to as many as 4,000 Ukrainian troops over the next year, Czech Defence Minister Jana Cernochova said on Wednesday. The training would be done in five four-week cycles with up to 800 troops attending each, and cost 975m crowns ($41.60m), the Defence Ministry said.

NATO member Czech Republic has strongly backed Ukraine since Russia’s attack in February this year, and has sent it light and heavy weapons and ammunition.

The training programme would be started with the first batch of troops this year and eventually be folded under a planned European Union training scheme for Ukraine.

European Union foreign ministers agreed to set up a mission to train some 15,000 Ukrainian troops and to provide an extra 500m euros worth of funding for arms deliveries to Kyiv at a meeting in Luxembourg on Monday.

Ukraine has shown interest in training of mainly mechanised battalions and also medics, engineering and chemical troops, Cernochova said.

The Czech Republic will also send 55 troops as instructors or members of command structures of the planned EU training mission in other EU member states. Both parts of the plan require parliamentary approval. (Source: Reuters)

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