NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military and security developments

11 Nov 22.

This morning, 11 November, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that the withdrawal from the right (western) bank of the Dnieper River had been completed. The MoD claim that as of 05:00 (Moscow time) this morning, all Russian units and equipment had been successfully transferred, incurring no losses and leaving ‘not a single piece of military equipment or weaponry’ on the far bank of the river. If true, this would represent one of the most successful military operations conducted by Russian forces since their withdrawal from Kyiv oblast in April – though of course this most significantly represents a vindication of Ukraine’s southern strategy and marks a massive blow to Moscow.
Local Ukrainian officials this morning would ‘neither confirm nor deny’ reports that Russian forces had completely withdrawn from Kherson city, amid Kyiv’s ‘operational silence’ on this axis. Only yesterday, 10 November, Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksiy Reznikov predicted that the Russian withdrawal would take at least a week, and estimated that Russia still had around 40,000 service personnel in the area. Ukrainian officials furthermore stated on 10 November that while there were reports of Russian withdrawals across the river, Russian units were still conducting manoeuvres on the western (right) bank, seemingly indicating that some Russian forces were potentially establishing rear guards to conduct a phased fighting withdrawal. Given these contradictory reports, we cannot confirm at the time of writing whether Russia has made a decision to abandon certain positions and units to their fate, or whether they have indeed completed a total withdrawal. However, numerous indicators point to the latter being the case.
Footage circulating on social media this morning shows that the withdrawing Russians have destroyed numerous spans of both the Antonivsky and the Kherson railway bridges. While both bridges remained heavily damaged by Ukrainian strikes, limiting their utility as crossing points, their destruction is clearly aimed at reducing the prospects for Ukrainian infiltration of the southern (left) bank of the Dnieper once the Russian withdrawal is complete. The reserve demolition of the bridges likely represents the final phase of the withdrawal and would support Russian claims that the process has now been completed. A Russian military reporter filming from the southern side of the Antonivsky bridge also claimed this morning that no Russian troops remain on the far bank, but that Ukrainian forces had not yet reached the river on the northern (right) side.
Further unconfirmed social media images and footage emerging suggest that Ukrainian forces have liberated Bilozerka, a settlement just six miles (10km) west of Kherson city, though it is increasingly clear that Ukrainian forces have also now reached the outskirts of Kherson city itself. Further reports prior to publication indicate that Ukrainian inhabitants of Kherson city are gathering in the central square and raising Ukrainian flags in preparation to welcome Ukrainian forces. While unconfirmed, other geolocated images suggest Ukrainian forces have reached the outskirts of Kherson city, where locals are welcoming them en masse. If the Russians have indeed withdrawn across the river, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will likely take their time in moving into the city, given widespread fears of booby traps and extensive mining across the city.
Almost all reports are currently coming in from Kherson city and the more heavily populated areas of western Kherson oblast, and as such the situation further east remains much less clear. Nevertheless, it is clear that Ukrainian forces have made substantial gains east of Kherson city as well over the last 24 hours. During his nightly address on 10 November, President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces had successfully liberated 41 settlements across northern Kherson oblast. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian General Staff this morning, 11 November, more cautiously confirmed they had retaken 12 settlements over the last 24 hours.
The strategic town of Nova Kakhovka, which controls the hydroelectric dam and key crossing point over the river, is likely to become a focus of reporting over the next couple of days, as it is the location Ukrainian and Russian forces will likely be in closest proximity to each other following the Russian withdrawal. Given the apparent success of the Russian withdrawal, the likelihood of a false-flag operation against the hydroelectric dam has been reduced still further.
There remains much uncertainty at the time of writing as to whether any Russian forces remain on the right bank. However, if the Russians have succeeded in withdrawing all of their forces and equipment across the river in such good order and so quickly, it tells us a great deal about the capability of Russian forces on the southern axis. Conducting such a large-scale withdrawal across a river remains an extremely difficult military operation. Extensive planning, robust command and control, and military discipline are all vital to ensure rear guards hold their positions until their appointed withdrawal time, to allow other units to withdraw in good order. The final stages of such a fighting withdrawal are often highly chaotic. However, the above indicators and the Russian MoD’s statement appear to suggest that the Russians have not had to conduct a fighting withdrawal. This in turn would suggest the Ukrainians gave Russian forces space and allowed them to withdraw without interfering, in a similar way to the conditions that allowed Russian forces to successfully execute the orderly withdrawal from Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts in April.
While the comparison to the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv is an important one, there are two key differences when compared to Kherson. The first is that in northern Ukraine, Russian forces did not have one of the largest rivers in Eastern Europe at their back, with degraded crossing points under Ukrainian long-range fire control. The second is that in April, Ukrainian forces were still very much on the defensive and were largely unable to intervene with the withdrawal and pursue Russian forces. The current situation in Kherson is very different, with a highly experienced and well-motivated Ukrainian force that has been conducting counteroffensive operations for two months.• If Russian forces have managed such a rapid and orderly withdrawal despite these challenges, it likely reflects highly competent planning under the command of Army General Sergei Surovikin. It will also mean those withdrawn forces are likely in relatively good shape to be redeployed to other fronts – namely the Donbas – to support offensive operations over the winter or early next year, as Surovikin had originally planned (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 10 November 2022). Given the size of the Dnieper River and the Russian layered defence along the southern (left) bank of the river, the prospects of Ukrainian forces being able to attack across the river remain very limited in the short term. As such, Russian commanders will likely be fairly confident of their ability to redeploy tens of thousands of troops to other frontlines as the Dnieper is likely to crystalise into a relatively stable front following the withdrawal from the right bank.
Military developments on the other principal fronts of the war, namely the Oskil-Kremmina, Bakhmut and Donetsk city lines, have remained broadly on trend with the patterns of military activity we have been monitoring over the last week. Russian assaults around Bakhmut in particular remain intense, with a representative of the National Guard of Ukraine, Mykola Urshalovych, stating on 10 November that Russian forces are launching suicidal attempts to attack Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut with ‘maniacal persistence’, and taking heavy losses in the process. Russian sources have claimed further incremental progress towards the eastern suburbs of Bakhmut as well as west of Donetsk city, but these remain unconfirmed.
Further north along the Oskil-Kreminna line, various conflicting reports from both Russian and Ukrainian sources indicate that the area west of Kreminna remains contested, with reconnaissance-in-force attacks on both sides. Notably, Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast Serhiy Haidai reported on 10 November that Russian forces were bringing up large quantities of supplies as well as reserves to the Svatove-Kreminna direction, though he did not provide further details. The Russian Ministry of Defence has continued claiming its forces are repelling Ukrainian ground assaults west of Svatove, but we cannot confirm whether Ukrainian forces have made any ground along this axis in the last 24 hours.
US military aid set to continue, midterm results will likely determine scale of support in 2023. On 10 November, the US Department of Defence announced that it will send USD 400m more in military aid to Ukraine. The package will include large quantities of ammunition and air defence systems. More specifically, the ammunition sent will be used for the high mobility artillery rocket system, HIMARS, which have proved essential for Ukrainian forces in their recent counteroffensive operations. The results of this week’s US midterm elections have yet to be fully confirmed, but if the Republicans gain control of the Senate the Biden administration will likely find it harder to authorise large quantities of military assistance and support to Ukraine going forward. Sustained military aid from Western nations will be vital to keep Ukraine in the fight in 2023, with air defences particularly important amid Russia’s acquisition of Iranian-made drones and ballistic missiles.
Moldova: EU support package aims to alleviate energy security pressures ahead of the winter. On 10 November, the European Commission announced the preparation of a new energy support package for Moldova amid the country’s worsening energy crisis. European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen announced the package, which includes grants and loans worth up to EUR 250 million, during a joint conference with Moldovan President Maia Sandu in Chisinau. This development comes as tensions between Chisinau and the Russian-backed separatist region of Transnistria have increased after the latter restricted energy supply to the former. The cost of the energy crisis is expected to reach up to EUR 1.1 billion, with the EC having said that it is working alongside the Energy Community Secretariat in order to create an energy rescue scheme for Moldova to facilitate donor support for energy purchases. This support package marks a positive step forward in mitigating Moldovan energy insecurity over the winter and reducing the likelihood of rolling blackouts.

Political developments

The Kremlin has thus far remained broadly silent on the Kherson withdrawal, with no statement from President Vladimir Putin – a clear attempt to distance the president from the decision. Nevertheless, during a press conference this morning, 11 November, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov did state that the Kremlin does not regret the decision to annex Kherson oblast in September, and maintained that the ‘Kherson region is enshrined in law as a subject of the Russian Federation, and this cannot change’. This clearly suggests that Moscow will still consider this Russian territory moving forward, and is the latest indication that Russia is far from abandoning its overall objectives in Ukraine, and is likely readying for a protracted conflict well into 2023 and potentially beyond that. Nevertheless, Peskov referred all further questions on the withdrawal to the Ministry of Defence, again trying to establish distance between the Kremlin and the military decision to withdraw.
On 10 November, the United States (US) Department of Defense announced that it will send USD 400 million more in military aid to Ukraine. The package will include large quantities of ammunition, along with mobile Avenger and other vital air defence systems. More specifically, the ammunition sent will be used for the high mobility artillery rocket system, HIMARS, which have proved essential for Ukrainian forces in their recent counteroffensive operations. The results of this week’s US midterm elections have yet to be fully confirmed, but if the Republicans gain control of the Senate, the Biden administration will likely find it harder to authorise large quantities of military assistance and support to Ukraine going forward – though the worse-than-expected results for the Republicans will likely mitigate this to an extent. The US also announced this morning that they will host the next Ramstein-7 meeting at an unspecified date next week to discuss the next phase of international military support for Ukraine, though no specific date was provided.

Forecast

The Russian withdrawal from Kherson marks arguably the most significant Ukrainian victory since the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv oblast in April. The withdrawal has ultimately vindicated Kyiv’s southern strategy, which has forced a Russian withdrawal and therefore avoided the need to launch highly costly frontal assaults on Kherson city during unfavourable weather and ground conditions. While still unconfirmed, Russia has seemingly lost the only oblast capital it had managed to seize in eight months of war. The Kremlin’s reiteration that Kherson remains Russian territory indicates Moscow has not abandoned its territorial ambitions (see above). Nevertheless, it is a major blow to the Russian project in Ukraine and will likely have a notable impact on Russian morale over the winter, despite the seeming professionalism and competence of the withdrawal, if Russian reports of a total withdrawal are accurate. Numerous Western outlets and politicians have raised the prospect of the Russian withdrawal from Kherson providing an opportunity for peace talks. This remains highly unlikely for various reasons. Under apparent US pressure to signal willingness to negotiate, President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated earlier this week that Kyiv has set various conditions before they will agree to enter into negotiations; chief among them the restoration of Ukrainian integrity (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 8 November 2022). This clearly remains a non-starter for Moscow in much the same way as Russian demands for concessions represent a non-starter for Kyiv. This morning, 11 November, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the goals of the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine can end through peaceful negotiations, but he explicitly stated that ‘peaceful negotiations are impossible due to the position taken by the Ukrainian side’. This indicates that Moscow’s conditions for negotiations would still mean large-scale concessions on the part of Ukraine – an unrealistic approach to negotiations given Ukraine is clearly on the front foot in both Kherson and Luhansk oblasts. Nevertheless, a ceasefire over the winter would more clearly serve Russian interests, as it would provide an opportunity to consolidate their lines and amass fresh forces for renewed offensives in early 2023. Meanwhile, however, it remains in Ukraine’s interests to maintain pressure on Russian forces throughout the winter before freshly mobilised Russian forces are deployed en masse to Ukraine in early 2023. As such, Kyiv is unlikely to agree to even a temporary ceasefire given the huge boost to morale the liberation of Kherson will likely create and the growing public appetite for further counteroffensive operations, particularly in northern Luhansk oblast.

Cyber Update

Russia-Ukraine/Eastern Europe: Moscow-linked threat actors pose sustained threat of destructive attacks against infrastructure and supply lines. Researchers at Microsoft Security Threat Intelligence (MSTIC) have attributed a series of ransomware attacks against transport and logistics organisations in Ukraine and Poland to a threat group affiliated with the Russian military. According to an update published by the US-based corporation on 10 November, the MSTIC identified evidence which suggests that the threat actor, under its moniker IRIDIUM, ‘very likely’ executed the attacks in October 2022 using the previously unknown Prestige malware (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 17 October 2022). Due to overlaps in victimology, tactics, capabilities and infrastructure, IRIDIUM is highly likely to be linked to Sandworm (also known as BlackEnergy, Voodoo Bear) hacking group, which is believed to be part of Russian military intelligence GRU’s Main Center for Special Technologies. Foreign cyber security and law enforcement agencies have attributed to Sandworm a number of high-profile destructive attacks targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure, such as power grid and banks. The US government has indicted six operatives of the group for allegations of hacking against the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics and the 2017 French elections. Microsoft’s latest findings are consistent with Russian state-sponsored hackers conducting destructive cyber campaigns in aid of Moscow’s war efforts in Ukraine. More attacks targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructures and military and humanitarian supply lines in Eastern Europe are highly likely in the coming week as Russian forces readjust their tactics for the winter.

10 Nov 22.

On 9 November, the Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu ordered Russian forces on the western (right) bank of the Dnieper River to withdraw across the river. A carefully choreographed televised meeting between Shoigu and Army General Sergei Surovikin, the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, emphasised that the withdrawal was a military necessity due to Ukrainian strikes against Russia’s ground lines of communication. Surovikin also maintained that a withdrawal would allow Russian forces to be redeployed elsewhere along the front – most likely a reference to supporting offensive operations in the Donbas, which Russian forces are seemingly continuing to prioritise (see below).
This morning, 10 November, the Russian Ministry of Defence reported that Russian units have begun carrying out a ‘manoeuvre to prepared positions on the left bank of the Dnieper’, according to the orders handed down by Shoigu. However, we still do not know on what timescale the planned withdrawal will take place. General Surovikin will be determined not to repeat the mistakes of the chaotic retreat during the Kharkiv counteroffensive in September, when retreating Russian forces abandoned large quantities of equipment. However, conducting an orderly withdrawal across a river the size of the Dnieper will be a significant challenge for Russian commanders, particularly if the Ukrainians intensify ground attacks in a bid to cut the Russians off and take large numbers of prisoners. As such, the withdrawal is likely to be a phased process in the coming days and potentially weeks, with Russian forces remaining in place at various locations in an attempt to slow Ukrainian counteroffensives to allow units to withdraw in good order across the river.
However, there remains scope for this announcement to be part of an elaborate exercise in military deception (maskirovka), designed to encourage the Ukrainians to overextend themselves and push forward into highly defensible areas. We have previously reported on various indicators suggesting Russian forces may have been preparing defences in and around Kherson city itself in recent weeks. The vast majority of evidence nevertheless clearly indicates that the focus of the fortification building has been on the left (southern) bank of the river, but it remains possible that Russian forces are preparing to defend certain critical points in a bid to inflict maximum casualties on Ukrainian forces before withdrawing at a later date.
The Ukrainians have themselves reacted to Shoigu’s order with particular caution, with President Volodymyr Zelensky stating that he does not believe the Russians will abandon Kherson city without a fight. As such, he emphasised during his nightly address on 9 November that Ukrainian forces are ‘moving very carefully, without emotion, without unnecessary risk’ in the area, given that the withdrawal announcement could be a ‘strategic move to regroup forces’. During an interview with CNN, Zelensky in particular highlighted earlier intelligence that Russian forces had occupied homes in anticipation of heavy street-to-street fighting (we earlier reported on intelligence suggesting Russian forces were wearing civilian clothing in Beryslav on the right bank. Indeed, presidential adviser Mykhaylo Podolyak stated that liberating Ukrainian territory must be based on ‘intelligence data, not staged TV statements’, and Zelensky had previously called any reports of an imminent Russian withdrawal across the river ‘disinformation’.
If the televised announcement is indeed maskirovka, it is much more likely to be aimed at only temporarily delaying the Russian withdrawal across the river. Drawing in Ukrainian forces into heavily defended urban areas will ultimately do nothing to change the long-term vulnerability of Russian forces on the left bank of the river, whose logistics and ground lines of communication will remain even more vulnerable under heavy Ukrainian fire.
Despite Kyiv’s caution, Ukrainian forces have clearly taken advantage of what is likely to be the initial Russian withdrawals from outlying villages and positions in northern Kherson oblast. The Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valery Zaluzhny reported this morning that Ukrainian forces liberated 12 settlements across Kherson oblast on 9 November. He also stated that since 1 October, Ukrainian forces have advanced 36.5km into Russian lines ‘in the Kherson direction’, reclaiming some 1,381 square kilometres as a result. In addition, the Presidential Office confirmed on 9 November that Ukrainian forces had liberated the town of Snigurivka in Mykolaiv oblast, 30 miles (48km) northeast of Kherson city on the western bank of the Inhulets River.
Despite the Kherson announcement, Russian forces have continued their offensive operations along the Bakhmut and Donetsk city lines over the last 24 hours. Geolocated footage indicates that Russian and Wagner Group forces have taken the southern half of Bilohorivka, a settlement located around seven miles (12km) north-west of Lysychansk. Intense fighting has also continued further south around Bakhmut, and while Russian sources claim marginal progress, the Ukrainian General Staff maintain that their forces are successfully repelling these attacks.
Further south still, the Russian positions in Pavlivka (south of Vuhledar) likely remain tenuous, though the Russian Ministry of Defence this morning, 10 November, published a video allegedly showing the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet breaking through Ukrainian defences around Pavlivka, with Russian forces allegedly now liberating the settlement. This remains to be seen given previous indications of the significant difficulty the 155th were in during the attack earlier this week.
The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley on 9 November estimated that both Russia and Ukraine had suffered ‘well over’ 100,000 casualties each during the course of the war, including both killed and wounded service personnel.
This morning, 9 November, the Ukrainian General Staff issued a statement outlining its preparations for an active defence of the northern border if Russian forces once again attack from Belarusian territory. From the outset, it is important to emphasise that we have observed no indications that have altered our assessment. Despite tens of thousands of Russian mobilised forces likely training in Belarus, we maintain that neither Russia nor Belarus currently has the capability to seriously encroach south of Kyiv’s northern border, and that such an attack would likely result in a net strategic loss for both Moscow and Minsk, particularly given the rationale that led to the decision to withdraw from Kherson. The Ukrainian General Staff have nevertheless emphasised that engineering units have established new defensive positions across the border region, with extensive mining and emplacements making this a much more challenging military target than it was in March.

Political developments

The Washington Post reported on 9 November that the Biden administration will not provide advanced Gray Eagle MQ-1C drones to Ukraine. According to unnamed US officials familiar with the issue, the decision was made due to fears that the drones could escalate the war since they could hit targets inside Russia. The Gray Eagle is a modern medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) UAV with a range of up to 2,500 nautical miles, armed with either Hellfire air-to-ground or Stinger air-to-air missiles. This suggests that despite earlier bipartisan US support to supply more advanced long-range systems to Ukraine, the Biden administration is unlikely to agree to the provision of Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) for a similar desire to avoid an escalation.
On 10 November, Moscow’s embassy in Jakarta announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the upcoming G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, on 15-16 November. Instead, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will be attending as the head of the Russian Federation’s delegation. Embassy officials have not yet ruled out Mr Putin’s virtual participation, although it is possible that the Kremlin will seek to insulate itself from Western condemnation over the ongoing war in Ukraine during the summit. Despite not being a member of the G20 group, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky is currently expected to attend virtually, although this has not yet been confirmed by officials in Kyiv.
While the decision to withdraw from Kherson has dominated the news over the last 24 hours, the Russian Kherson occupation authority suffered another symbolic blow on 9 November when the deputy head of the administration Kirill Stremousov died in an alleged road accident. Stremousov had emerged as the most prominent face of the Russian occupation of Kherson oblast, and while there is little indication to suggest his death was anything other than accidental, it is a notable blow to the regional administration – an administration which will now continue to govern the remaining parts of Kherson on the left bank of the Dnieper from a new regional centre closer to Crimea.

Forecast

As previously assessed, the Ukrainian strategy in Kherson was to force a Russian withdrawal by interdicting their ground lines of communication, command and control centres, and river crossing points to make the Russian presence on the western bank of the Dnieper untenable. Following yesterday’s withdrawal announcement, it would appear that this strategy has succeeded. If the Russians do indeed conduct a full withdrawal, it would avoid the necessity of Ukrainian forces launching major ground offensives and an urban assault into Kherson city itself, and therefore fulfil the principal objective of Ukrainian forces, which was to retake Kherson city by the end of the year. Surovikin placed significant emphasis on the importance of saving Russian lives in justifying the Kherson withdrawal. While this likely serves propagandistic purposes, it is equally likely to reflect Surovikin’s overall strategy of shortening and consolidating Russian lines in order to preserve forces and prepare for fresh offensives in early 2023. While the military rationale behind a withdrawal remains logical as part of a wider effort to stabilise the frontlines over the winter, it nevertheless marks a major political blow to the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin has yet to publicly comment on the withdrawal, and the scripted exchange between Shoigu and Surovikin is clearly aimed at presenting the withdrawal as a military decision, not a political one. Despite Putin’s apparent attempt to distance himself from the decision, a withdrawal nevertheless marks a major blow to the Russian project in southern Ukraine; according to the Russian constitution, Kherson is now Russian territory, and Kherson city was the only oblast capital Russia had managed to seize during eight months of war.

Nevertheless, the announcement does not come as a surprise as we have been monitoring Russian preparations for a withdrawal across the Dnieper closely for several weeks, and Moscow has taken pains to prepare the public in advance of such a decision. On 18 October, General Surovikin stated that Russian forces faced ‘difficult decisions’ in Kherson, which we anticipated was likely an attempt to prepare the population for a possible withdrawal. It is furthermore notable that several high-profile pro-war figures rallied around Surovikin’s decision on 9 November. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov both praised Surovikin for making a militarily necessary decision. This stands in stark contrast to their respective criticism of Colonel-General Alexander Lapin’s chaotic withdrawal during the Kharkiv counteroffensive. This is likely an attempt to present a united front that the decision was one driven by military necessity rather than incompetence. However, the decision has clearly generated backlash amongst other pro-war hardliners, and whichever way the Kremlin and Ministry of Defence spin it, a withdrawal from Kherson once again undermines the coherence of Moscow’s annexation policy and the overall logic of the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine.

As assessed above, we do not know on what timescale the withdrawal will take place, and there is yet still scope for this to be an exercise in military deception – hence the caution shown by President Zelensky up until now. However, if a full withdrawal does take place in the coming days and weeks, it remains likely that Russia will intensify long-range strikes across Ukraine in response. Previous military setbacks, including the Kharkiv counteroffensive and the Crimea Bridge attack, have triggered intense strikes against urban targets across the country. As such, renewed strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure are likely to be seen as a way to distract domestic audiences from the Kherson retreat and illustrate Russian offensive capability.

There is also the low-likelihood, high-impact possibility of Russian forces staging a false-flag attack on the Nova Kakhovka hydroelectric dam in a bid to cover their withdrawal. However, the southern bank of the river (and therefore the newly established Russian defensive positions there) would likely be much more heavily impacted by flooding compared to the northern (Ukrainian) bank. As such, this remains unlikely, but we will continue monitoring for any indications of Russian preparations for such an attack. For further analysis of this scenario,.

Russia: Absence of Russian president at G20 summit underscores low prospects of peace in Ukraine. On 10 November, the Russian embassy in Jakarta (Indonesia) announced that Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, will not attend the upcoming G20 summit in Bali (Indonesia). Instead, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, will attend as the head of the Russian delegation. Embassy officials have not yet ruled out Putin’s virtual participation, though it is possible that the Kremlin will seek to insulate itself from Western condemnation over the ongoing war in Ukraine during the summit. Despite not being a member of the G20 group, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, will possibly attend virtually, though this has not been confirmed by officials in Kyiv. In the short term, it is unlikely that any major diplomatic progress will be made with regard to peace in Ukraine or how to address the global fallout of the war.

Uzbekistan: Investment for citizenship scheme will raise FDI, but increase money laundering risks. On 9 November, the government drafted legislation allowing citizenship to be granted to individuals who invest at least USD 1 m in Uzbekistan. The legislation forms part of the government’s effort to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) amid the steady liberalisation of the Uzbek market. While the citizenship programme will likely attract FDI into Uzbekistan, including from Russia, ‘golden visas’ and the broader issue of residency permits in other jurisdictions have led to increases in money laundering, corruption and supervision quality risks.

09 Nov 22.

Cyber Update.

The rate of low-level pro-Russia cyber campaigns against Ukraine and its allies during this monitoring period remained consistent with levels identified in recent reports. Additionally, both the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the software company ‘Blackberry’ released assessments this week of recent cyber activity associated with pro-Russia hacking groups. Furthermore, the US Treasury Department countered another low-level malicious cyber attack against government cyber infrastructure. As anticipated, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks remain the preferred method of pro-Russia hacktivist groups. While we observed no pro-Russia attacks against critical infrastructure during this monitoring period, there remains an overall deterioration in the cyber threat environment.
Meanwhile, pro-Kyiv hacking groups such as the IT Army of Ukraine continue to claim cyber attacks against Russian government-linked organisations and private entities, with a specific focus on the banking and financial services sector. Despite a relative lull in the past week, Operation World Cup and Operation FIFA led by the Anonymous hacktivist collective are likely to persist in the coming weeks. Cyber operations are likely to intensify if there are further reports of Iranian weapons arriving in Russia and/or being deployed in Ukraine, and also if the Iranian football team is allowed to participate in the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022.

LATEST SIGNIFICANT UPDATES

Pro-Russia cyber campaigns continue to target the political infrastructure of key Ukrainian allies

On 4 November, the FBI released its most recent assessment of hacktivist groups it considers to be operating as Russian proxies in the ongoing war against Ukraine. Its assessment specifically identified pro-Russia cyber hacktivist groups like Killnet as having an overall limited impact on the cyber security of Ukraine and its allies, despite a steady stream of low-level malicious attacks since the onset of the war in February. As per our previous assessments, these groups are overly-reliant on DDoS attacks, a largely unsophisticated mode of cyber attack which has so far only inflicted small-scale damage against critical infrastructure in Ukraine and its allies. These opportunistic attacks will likely remain the primary method employed by pro-Russia actors going forwards; they will likely continue to inflict limited structural damage.
On 3 November, the US Treasury Department countered a DDoS attack which officials attributed to Killnet. Killnet previously claimed responsibility for targeting state infrastructure in October when more than a dozen US airports’ websites were taken offline in a similar network-traffic flooding incident. A day after the attempted attack against the US Treasury Department, the group claimed to have targeted JPMorgan Chase; this attack yielded similarly limited results. The targeting of US government infrastructure and prominent corporations likely reflects Russian efforts to retaliate against the US’s support for Ukraine in the ongoing war. This is consistent with our previous assessment that Russia will continue to target the cyber infrastructure of Ukrainian allies.
Also on 3 November, the software and technology company Blackberry described RomCom, a cyber threat actor group which presents itself as a financially motivated criminal organisation, as a likely representative of the Russian government. The group has intensified its attacks over the past few weeks, having previously utilised spoof versions of ‘Advanced IP Scanner’ and the remote access trojan ‘RomCat RAT’ to execute pro-Russia cyber campaigns targeting Ukrainian military institutions. These actions form part of a wider spearfishing campaign orchestrated by RomCom which reportedly began in October 2022. Furthermore, researchers at Blackberry have discovered that RomCom has expanded its operations to exploit the brands of PDF Reader Pro and KeePass Password Manager by scraping original HTML codes from these vendors and registering a malicious domain similar to the legitimate original.

Pro-Kyiv groups continue to target Russia-based organisations; cyber operations converge against Iran and Russia

On 8 November, a Twitter account claiming to represent the IT Army of Ukraine, a pro-Kyiv hacking group with alleged links to the Ukrainian government, posted photos showing alleged evidence of disruption to Alfa Bank services. Alfa Bank is Russia’s largest private bank. The hacking group claimed that cyber attacks caused difficulties for customers trying to access online banking services, as well as those wanting to make payments or access Alfa investment services. The pro-Kyiv threat actor refrained from providing additional details about this incident, but stated that it would ‘continue to work on the Alfa infrastructure’. In a post on Telegram, the IT Army highlighted its objectives of disrupting contractual obligations and the processing of payments, serving to undermine the bank’s reputation.
On 7 November, the IT Army posted photos on Twitter claiming to show evidence of cyber attacks against Russia’s Central Bank. The group reported that it had managed to access and ‘extract data about financial transactions’ of Russia’s defence ministry, including personal data, phone numbers and card numbers. In total, the IT Army claims to have leaked about 2.6GB of data containing around 27,000 files, including the personal data of current and former employees, and also information on the bank’s operations and security systems.
Also on 7 November, accounts belonging to alleged supporters or members of the Anonymous collective posted tweets claiming to show evidence that cyber attacks had led to the websites of Qatar’s transport and communications ministry and its commerce and industry ministry going offline. At the time of writing, the websites appear to be inaccessible, including via the use of a virtual private network (VPN). However, the claims that this was the result of cyber attacks linked to the Anonymous collective cannot be independently verified. The reported cyber actions follow the launch of Operation FIFA or Operation World Cup by the Anonymous collective on 25 October, after the group called on FIFA to suspend Iran’s participation in the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022. This follows reports that suggest Tehran is supplying Moscow with drones to support its war effort in Ukraine.

FORECAST

During this monitoring period, patterns of pro-Russia cyber activity have stayed in line with our assessment that there remains a significant threat to the cyber threat environments for both Ukraine and its allies. While no new attacks were levelled against key political and/or industrial infrastructure in Europe in the past week, it is highly likely that pro-Russia cyber actors are continuing to execute low-level malicious cyber attacks against these aforementioned targets, most likely in the form of DDoS attacks. These attacks are relatively unsophisticated and will only disrupt the intended target temporarily (from a few hours to a few days). In the past week, pro-Russia cyber activity has remained in line with our assessment that all Western (and particularly NATO) countries will remain exposed to pro-Russia DDoS attacks in the coming six months. It remains highly likely that pro-Russia cyber attacks will take place after public announcements by Western governments demonstrating support for Ukraine, as evidenced by the pro-Russia attack against the US Treasury Department this week. These pro-Kyiv announcements will usually outline military or financial support, as well as sanctions against Russia. Government agencies and critical infrastructure operators in the telecommunications, energy and technology sectors will be the most vulnerable to any resultant cyber attacks. In the past week, we observed a decline in cyber attacks and campaigns by the Anonymous hacktivist collective, including operations against Russian targets. There is a realistic possibility that this is due to the collective promoting their so-called ‘birthday’ on 5 November. The date is associated with Guy Fawkes, who inspired the iconic Anonymous mask that is the group’s logo. Nevertheless, supporters or members of the Anonymous collective claim to have continued engaging in cyber activities as part of Operation FIFA and Operation World Cup. This includes those targeting the websites of Qatari government ministries as Doha prepares to host the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022. In the coming weeks, the Anonymous collective is likely to resume its pressure campaign against organisations, entities and governments both directly and indirectly affiliated with Iran due to Tehran’s supply of military equipment and weapons to Moscow. Further reports of Iran supplying Russia with arms will likely result in an intensification of cyber attacks against the aforementioned targets in the coming weeks. This will sustain cyber threats to sponsors and event partners of FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 in the near term. These threats will likely increase if FIFA refuses to suspend Iran’s participation in the tournament, as well as before, during and after football matches involving Iran’s national team. However, groups like the IT Army of Ukraine, which focuses specifically on targeting the Russian government, as well as affiliated organisations and private sector firms, will continue to launch cyber campaigns against the aforementioned entities. Other triggers which are likely to prompt an intensification of pro-Ukraine hacktivism include Russian military strikes against Ukrainian and/or Western infrastructure, further Ukrainian battlefield victories and deteriorating domestic stability inside Russia as a result of battlefield defeats.

President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 8 November that the fiercest fighting continues to take place in Donetsk oblast, despite the relative lack of news coming from the front. He described the situation for Ukrainian forces as ‘difficult on the entire front’ where ‘brutal positional battles continue’ which are ‘especially difficult in Donetsk oblast’. As Zelensky suggests, few confirmed developments have taken place on this axis over the last 24 hours; even Russian sources claim that progress remains slow despite the intensity of fighting at present along the Bakhmut line and west of Donetsk city. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that their forces have successfully repulsed numerous Russian attacks along the full breadth of the frontline, including renewed Russian attacks around Pavlivka.
Following claims yesterday that Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia forces entered Bilohorivka, a settlement located around seven miles (12km) north-west of Lysychansk, various Russian sources have claimed over the last 24 hours that Wagner Group forces are in fact solely responsible for any advances on this axis. The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces, Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, confirmed on 8 November that Wagner Group units comprise the majority of Russian forces around Bakhmut. However, Wagner Group forces, as well as their financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, have frequently claimed sole credit for limited advances along the Bakhmut line, despite the presence of LNR, DNR and regular Russian forces in the area.
This illustrates the intense factionalisation within and between Russian forces fighting in the Donbas. Intense rivalries have contributed to the overall disjointed nature of Russia’s operational command and control for most of the war, and will continue to do so. The appointment of Colonel-General Sergei Surovikin as the overall commander of Russian operations in Ukraine will likely mitigate some of these issues. However, Russia’s commanders, its defence ministry and its General Staff still clearly have to manage competing interest groups on the ground. Some of these, namely the Wagner Group, sit decidedly outside the regular Russian military hierarchy.
Ukrainian counter-offensive operations have continued along the Oskil-Kreminna line, with Kyiv’s forces likely having made incremental progress west of Svatove in recent days. The Russian defence ministry effectively confirmed on 8 November that Ukrainian forces are now in control of Novoselivske, a settlement located about 11 miles (18km) north-west of Svatove and which sits along the key N-26 highway connecting Svatove with Kupiansk to the north-west. Further south, Ukrainian forces seemingly intensified their counter-attacks to the west of Kreminna on 8 November. Russian sources claim that Ukrainian forces are attacking Kreminna from a concentration area near Chervonopopivka, located about six miles (9km) north of Kreminna along the R-66 highway. This suggests that Ukrainian forces now control parts of (or are encroaching along) the R-66 highway. In this case, they will likely push southwards along the road to avoid mud that could slow down their counter-offensive in wooded areas to the west of Kreminna.
There were few confirmed developments on the southern Kherson front in the last 24-48 hours. Russian forces continue to prioritise the defence of the southern bank of the Dnieper river, with footage indicating that Russian pillboxes and other concrete defensive structures are being installed in various towns along the southern bank. Meanwhile, Russian sources claimed on 8 November that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks around Pravdyne, located about 18 miles (29km) north-west of Kherson city, as well as near a number of other locations around Davydiv Brid to the north-east. Earlier on 9 November, the Russian defence ministry claimed that Ukrainian attacks against Sadok and Pyatykhatky, located around 50 miles (82km) north-east of Kherson, resulted in heavy losses for the Ukrainians, who subsequently withdrew. However, we cannot confirm this at this stage.

Political developments

The Ukrainian Resistance Centre reported on 8 November that Russia is actively trying to procure dual-use equipment from Turkey, including electronic chips, bulletproof vests, commercial drones, sleeping bags and night-vision devices. In order to circumvent sanctions, Russia is using cryptocurrencies, including Ethereum (ETH), Tether (USDT) and Bitcoin (BTC), to prevent purchases being tracked. It is clear that Russia does not have the domestic military-industrial capacity to produce the quantities of equipment needed to sustain its operations in Ukraine; the shortage of chips will be particularly detrimental to its production of advanced munitions.
Turkish efforts to plug these dual-use gaps are particularly notable. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has turned Ankara into an increasingly powerful power broker in the war, and has also not been reticent in increasing economic ties with Moscow; this comes despite criticism from several Western states. The volume of Turkish trade with Russia has increased by over 198 percent, with imports from Russia increasing 213 percent since the start of the conflict in February. On 8 November, Turkey’s energy minister, Fatih Donmez, confirmed that Ankara has begun to pay for some of its natural gas imports from Russia in rubles. The overall share of payments in rubles is likely to increase in the coming months. The announcement follows Erdogan’s endorsement of a Russian proposal to establish a new ‘gas hub’ in Turkey, and underlines growing bilateral economic and energy ties, even as Europe prepares to introduce a partial oil embargo on Russia later this year.
On 8 November, President Zelensky formally submitted a draft bill to the Verkhovna Rada to extend martial law for another 30 days until 19 February 2023. The bill will pass through the parliament in the coming days.

Forecast

The Iranian state news outlet Nour News Agency announced on 8 November that the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, arrived in Tehran for a series of high-profile meetings. This includes a session with the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani. While details of Patrushev’s agenda remain limited, it is highly likely that his visit is part of a Russian drive to secure large quantities of Iranian-produced short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and other critical munitions to use in the conflict. On 9 November, Sky News reported that a Russian military aircraft carrying EUR 140 m in cash and an assortment of captured US and British munitions landed in Tehran on 20 August. Satellite footage appears to show two Russian IL-76 military cargo planes at Iran’s Mehrabad International Airport (THR) on 20 August. Citing unnamed security sources, the report claims British NLAW and US Javelin anti-tank missiles, as well as a Stinger anti-aircraft missile, were transferred to Iran. The weapons were allegedly destined for the Ukrainian military, but had fallen into Russian hands. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will likely study the weapons to increase their ability to counter their deployment in the future. It is also possible they will ‘reverse engineer’ the weapons to improve their own missile capabilities. Iranian military commanders have previously claimed that Iran successfully reversed engineered a US RQ-17 Sentinel reconnaissance drone captured in December 2011 to produce a copy of the drone. As such, it is likely that Tehran is actively seeking to source Western military equipment from Ukraine for similar purposes. Overall, Iran has an effective reverse-engineering system, though its likely ongoing reliance on illicit imports of key components will continue to hinder full indigenous production efforts. Nevertheless, the burgeoning Russian-Iranian relationship, which Tehran is clearly trying to emphasise in its coverage of Patrushev’s visit, will raise weapon-proliferation risks across the Middle East, especially as Iran looks to expand its own military capabilities with Russian assistance. Furthermore, it is of particular note that Russia’s Special Presidential Representative to the Middle East, Mikhail Bogdanov, stated on 8 November that Moscow is ready to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia following increased tensions involving Tehran and Riyadh in recent weeks.

Ukraine: International reserves increase, but Ukraine remains reliant on international aid. Data from the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) published on 9 November shows that Ukraine’s international reserves have increased by USD 1.315bn in October, up 5.5 percent, bringing the current total to USD25.2bn. The country has faced extreme difficulty in maintaining enough reserves to ensure the stability of the currency and the functioning of the economy amid the ongoing war with Russia. The NBU has allegedly spent more than USD20bn this year to support the currency, much of which came in the form of grants and loans from Ukraine’s international backers. However, Ukraine remains almost entirely reliant upon international funding to ensure a basic balance of payments amid a USD5bn monthly deficit. Such international payments will need to persist if Ukraine is to continue the war effort in 2023, but in the meantime, such funds are enabling Kyiv to stabilise the hryvnia.

08 Nov 22.

Over the last 24-48 hours, various Russian sources have claimed that Ukrainian forces are currently massing north of Kherson in preparation for the next phase of the counteroffensive. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported numerous Ukrainian ground attacks along the Kherson front on 7 November, but it remains unclear what strength of forces took part in the attacks. Notably, the deputy head of the Kherson occupation authority, Kirill Stremousov, stated on 7 November that organised evacuations of civilians have now ended in Kherson oblast, but that private evacuations will continue from 8 November. Russian forces continue to dig in across the region, particularly along the southern banks of the Dnieper River, but it remains to be seen whether Russian forces will withdraw if and when the Ukrainians launch renewed counteroffensive operations.
In eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian forces have continued counteroffensive operations along the Oskil-Kreminna line. The Russian MoD reported on 7 November that Ukraine had conducted ground attacks in the direction of Nizhnya Duvanka, a settlement 10 miles (16km) north of Svatove along the R-66 highway that is some 11 miles (17km) east of the currently estimated frontline along the Kharkiv-Luhansk oblast border. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to have reached Nizhnya Duvanka itself, but the MoD report suggests further Ukrainian advances in that direction in recent days. Meanwhile, Russian forces have continued launching spoiling attacks west of Kreminna in an attempt to undermine Ukrainian preparations for further offensives and retake lost positions west of the R-66 highway, particularly around Yampolivka, 12 miles (19km) west of Kreminna.
Further south still, Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) forces entered Bilohorivka, a settlement 7 miles (12km) northwest of Lysychansk south of the Siverskyi Donets River. Russian sources claim heavy fighting remains ongoing within the town, but the Ukrainian General Staff reported this morning, 8 November, that their forces have successfully repelled Russian attacks against Bilohorivka. As such, it remains unclear if Russian forces have indeed entered the town.
Various Russian sources have continued to claim incremental advances west of Donetsk city, with fighting seemingly particularly intense around Donetsk City Airport and Avdiivka over the last 24-48 hours. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Sparta Battalion claimed on 7 November that they had successfully cleared the airport and pushed Ukrainian positions back towards the E-50 highway to the west. However, this remains unconfirmed.
Further south, the Russian assault against Pavlivka (south of Vuhledar) continues to stall, with DNR First Deputy Information Minister Danil Bezsonov claiming on 7 November that poor weather and mud are slowing the offensive. On 7 November, the Russian MoD denied the claims of various members of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet that their unit had taken over 300 casualties during four days of fighting for Pavlivka. The MoD instead claimed that the unit suffered only one percent killed and seven percent wounded over the last 10 days. The Governor of Primorsky Krai, whom the marines of the 155th appealed to in a letter sent on 6 November, also published videos allegedly showing members of the 155th reassuring the public that the situation is not as dire as previously indicated, that they are inevitably taking losses but they remain within sustainable limits.
Additionally, the Kremlin responded to growing public anger over not only high casualty rates but the poor conditions mobilised forces are increasingly being subjected to – often with a total absence of basic food and water supplies. President Vladimir Putin confirmed that he would hold direct talks with the Russian people on support for mobilised forces, though it remains to be seen in what format such ‘talks’ will take place. The planned discussions nevertheless underline the Kremlin’s need to respond to growing public anger over the issue, and will likely attempt to reassure concerned relatives of mobilised soldiers and encourage greater public engagement and fundraising for the troops.
On 7 November, Yuriy Ihnat, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force, stated that given Ukraine has limited capability to interdict ballistic missiles, one of the only effective ways to counter such missiles is to destroy them at their launch sites. Ihnat made the comment in reference to the anticipated transfer of potentially thousands of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles, which will enable Russia to continue its long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure over the winter. The new Iranian Fateh and Zolfaghar missile systems have a range of 186 miles (300km) and 435 miles (700km) respectively, placing them outside Ukraine’s current strike range. Such statements are likely aimed at encouraging Western governments to supply longer-range missile systems, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) – something the Kremlin has established as a ‘red line’. Earlier in the war there was broad bipartisan support in the US for the supply of longer-range systems (Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 29 July), but the US Midterms will likely heavily influence whether such systems are ever transferred to Ukraine.

Political developments

Russian business daily Kommersant reported on 8 November that Russia and the US are discussing holding talks on strategic nuclear arms reductions, the first such talks since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) talks could potentially take place in the Middle East – as the Kremlin no longer sees the traditional site of such talks in Geneve, Switzerland, as sufficiently neutral after Bern imposed sanctions on Russia. The US is expected to raise the issue of restarting on-site inspections of Russian nuclear sites after Moscow suspended them in August. Notably, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan confirmed on 7 November that communication channels have and do remain open between Washington and Moscow. If the New START talks do take place it will be an important example of the continuation of communications designed to prevent escalation, despite and because of the war.
On 7 November, various assets of several prominent Ukrainian oligarchs, including Ihor Kholomoisky and Konstantin Grigoryshyn, were transferred to the state for reasons of defence. The decision to nationalise the strategically important enterprises was taken under powers allowing the transfer of property under martial law, though the assets will be returned to their owners after martial law ends. The seized assets include energy suppliers and distributors Zaporizhtransformator, Ukrtatnafta and Ukrnafta, and industrial manufacturers AvtoKrAZ and Motor Sich, all of which will now be run by the Ministry of Defence to support the war effort. The temporary confiscation of these assets marks the latest development in President Volodymyr Zelensky’s crackdown on the power and influence of Ukrainian oligarchs – something Ukraine’s international backers and creditors have been demanding for years. Zelensky furthermore stated on 7 November that he does not rule out similar decisions in the future. This will likely further indicate Kyiv’s determination to use its current wartime mandate and martial law powers to push through anti-corruption and anti-oligarch reforms to help ensure Western backing for Ukraine continues.
On 7 November, the Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin admitted (or at least claimed) to have interfered in the US Midterm election, which is taking place today, 8 November. Prigozhin told the US-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that ‘we interfered, we interfere and we will interfere’. As assessed in yesterday’s report, today’s Midterms mark a potential turning point in the US’s long-term involvement and support for Ukraine in the war. Russia hopes that a Republican victory will lead to a steady reduction in the amount of US military aid being sent to Kyiv. Whether or not Prigozhin or his associates have interfered in the election, the statement is likely aimed at undermining faith in the results of the election, coming as it did less than 24 hours before voting officially opened.

Forecast

Following reports that the Biden administration is encouraging Kyiv to signal a willingness to negotiate with Russia, various senior Ukrainian officials have issued statements over the last 24 hours broadly reiterating Kyiv’s existing stance. Adviser to President Zelensky Mykhailo Podolyak stated on 7 November that Ukraine has never refused to negotiate, but that talks will only take place once Russian forces withdraw from Ukraine. He stated that ‘obviously’ Putin is not ready to accept this, and so Kyiv stands ready to ‘talk with the next leader of [the Russian Federation]’. This indicates that Podolyak at present – at least in public – does not support a change to Kyiv’s earlier ruling out of negotiations with Putin. Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, also stated this morning, 8 November, that the main condition for Zelensky to enter into negotiations will be the ‘restoration of [Ukrainian] territorial integrity’. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko meanwhile stated on 8 November that Russia does not set any preconditions for peace talks with Ukraine. However, he failed to mention that the Kremlin has frequently indicated in recent months that negotiations would likely amount to an acceptance of Russian demands, rather than a genuine attempt at finding a workable compromise. Nevertheless, pressure on Kyiv to signal a willingness to negotiate is only likely to increase in the months ahead as the international community seeks an end to the war and its impact on the global economy. French President Emmanuel Macron stated on 8 November that Ukraine must ‘at some point’ resume negotiations with Russia to end the war. However, most importantly, he also stated that this should only take place when the time is right and under a framework of conditions outlined by Kyiv. Macron has maintained contact with the Kremlin throughout the war in a likely attempt to position himself as a potential mediator in the future. His acknowledgement that the military situation on the ground is not currently conducive to meaningful peace talks aligns with our short-term assessment. Short of a dramatic major shift on the battlefield to either side’s advantage, any talks that do materialise in the next few months are likely to largely pay lip service to international demands, rather than a willingness to move towards a genuine compromise deal.

Armenia-Azerbaijan: Further border clashes likely amid US-mediated peace talks. On 7 November, Armenia and Azerbaijan accused one another of provoking a shoot-out along their shared border. Fighting reportedly broke out in the eastern parts of the border region. Yerevan reported that there were no casualties and that the situation has since stabilised. The incident came shortly before US-mediated peace talks took place between the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers in Washington DC. This latest small-scale escalation comes less than one week after Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, hosted the leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan in an attempt to consolidate Moscow’s role as a power broker between the former Soviet republics. However, Putin’s suggestion that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh be delayed for the next generation to settle is likely to generate backlash in Azerbaijan. Further border clashes are possible as Baku attempts to maintain pressure on Yerevan to agree to concessions.

Ukraine: Nationalisation of strategic assets marks important development in crackdown on oligarchs. On 7 November, various assets belonging to several prominent Ukrainian oligarchs, including Ihor Kholomoisky and Konstantin Grigoryshyn, were transferred to the state for reasons of defence. The decision to nationalise the strategically important enterprises was taken in accordance with powers allowing the transfer of property under martial law. The assets will allegedly be returned to their owners after martial law ends. The seized assets include the energy suppliers and distributors Zaporizhtransformator, Ukrtatnafta and Ukrnafta, as well as the industrial manufacturers AvtoKrAZ and Motor Sich, all of which will now be run by the defence ministry to support the war effort. The temporary confiscation of these assets marks the latest development in President Volodymyr Zelensky’s crackdown on the power and influence of Ukrainian oligarchs – something Ukraine’s international backers and creditors have been demanding for years. It also underscores Kyiv’s determination to use its current wartime mandate to push through reforms.

Nov 7.

Over the weekend of 5-6 November, the most notable and intensive fighting remained focused in the Donbas, where Russian forces launched a series of offensives last week. Various Russian sources recently claimed that regular Russian, Wagner and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces have made incremental progress along the Bakhmut and Donetsk city lines. Geolocated footage from 6 November indicates that Russian forces captured Ivanhrad, located two miles (4km) to the south-east of the centre of Bakhmut town. Wagner forces are currently attacking Opytne, located one mile (1.6km) to the west of Ivanhrad, in a bid to cut off a section of the T-01513 highway.
Further north along the Oskil-Kreminna line, Ukrainian forces have continued their steady counter-offensive operations to the west of Svatove. The Russian defence ministry indicated on 5 November that Ukrainian forces had reached the village of Ivanivka, located around 20 miles (32km) to the north-west of Svatove. Russian sources also claim that their forces have continued staging spoiling attacks against Ukrainian positions west of Kreminna, while also repelling Ukrainian reconnaissance and ‘sabotage’ operations along Russian lines around Terny, located around 12 miles (19km) to the north-west of Kreminna.
There were few notable developments along the southern Kherson axis over the weekend. While Russian forces continue to fortify various positions along the southern bank of the Dnieper, there have been limited indications of an imminent Russian withdrawal. For further analysis regarding the situation in Kherson oblas.
Further indications emerged over the weekend which support our earlier assessment that the attack against Pavlivka ended in failure and resulted in Russian forces taking predictably high losses. On 6 November, members of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet wrote a letter to the governor of Primorsky krai claiming that they and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade had sustained more than 300 casualties (both killed and wounded) and had also lost over 50 vehicles in just four days. In the letter, they directly criticise the commander of the Eastern Military District, Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov, who is ostensibly in command of the Pavlivka offensive. They accuse him and other senior officers of suppressing real casualty figures for fear of being held responsible for the failed offensive. The 155th has called for the governor of Primorsky to explain the situation to Putin directly, avoiding the defence ministry which they claim is protecting Muradov and obfuscating the repeated failures of senior officers.
Other first-hand reports published on Russian Telegram channels illustrate the dire situation for Russian forces during the assault, with two understrength BTGs seemingly tasked with taking the heavily defended Pavlivka before a planned advance on Vuhledar, located around 30 miles (47km) to the south-west of Donetsk city. In particular, Russian reports on the ground have commented on the lethal accuracy of Ukrainian artillery fire. They claim it has even destroyed several deep rear areas, while Russia’s own counter-battery fire remains extremely inaccurate by contrast.
It remains unclear what rate of losses Ukrainian forces are currently sustaining on this front. However, given the intensity of ongoing fighting in Donetsk oblast, the rate is likely to be high. Nevertheless, the current rate of casualties for Russian units like the 155th is unsustainable and will inevitably undermine further offensive operations. Other Russian sources on the ground reported on 6 November that the situation in Pavlivka remains so tenuous that fresh forces will need to be brought in to allow exhausted units to withdraw. However, it appears that no such fresh forces are currently available, meaning Russia has very limited reserves for this particular axis. The situation underscores the detrimental impact of the ‘cult of the offensive’ on the overall shape of regular Russian and proxy forces in Donetsk.
Increasing numbers of mobilised troops have become involved in offensive operations across the Donbas, despite the apparent concentration of Wagner and proxy forces on this axis. If the Russian high command is prepared to continue sustaining extremely high casualties for limited gains, incremental progress remains possible in the coming weeks, particularly if large numbers of convicts are utilised as cannon fodder to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders, albeit steadily. However, in its latest briefing earlier on 7 November, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that their forces continue to repel attacks against Pavlivka. The offensive has therefore likely stalled and will be difficult for Russian forces to salvage in the short term.

Political developments

On 4 November, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, signed into law a decree allowing the mass conscription of prisoners and individuals with criminal records. Russian forces, in particular the Wagner Group, have already made widespread use of prisoner recruits, offering them their freedom or reduced sentences if they fight in Ukraine. This new law will increase Russia’s pool of manpower by several hundred thousand. However, those convicted of treason, spying, terrorism and various other crimes are reportedly excluded. Putin claimed on 4 November that Russia has already surpassed the stated goal of recruiting 300,000 people under partial mobilisation by about 18,000. Numerous indicators point to the Wagner Group’s increasingly heavy reliance on convict recruits; an article published on 4 November by the Russian opposition outlet Insider claimed that 500 prisoners working for the Wagner Group have died in Ukraine in the past two months.
The decree reinforces the Kremlin’s doubling down on quantity over quality. It will only exacerbate entrenched logistical, command and control and morale issues currently impacting not only military operations but also perceptions within Russia of the war. On 4 November, a large protest took place in the city of Kazan; unconfirmed reports indicate the event was possibly attended by as many as 2,000 Russian soldiers. The protesters demanded explanations and solutions with regard to the lack of basic provisions for troops, including food, water and heating.
Extensive evidence leaves little doubt that large numbers of mobilised individuals are regularly being dumped at both training bases and even inside Ukraine with little to no basic supplies. This issue is likely the most pressing domestic security threat to the Kremlin at present and will pose the most serious threat in terms of mutinies and desertions going forward. We have already highlighted various unconfirmed reports of Russian forces refusing orders and deserting en masse in Luhansk oblast. However, the deployment of ‘blocking units’ will likely mitigate this threat, albeit partially
Rolling power outages as a result of Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure continued over the weekend. On 6 November, during his evening address, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that more than 4.5m citizens in the country remained disconnected from electricity supply as a result of recent Russian missile and drone attacks. Rolling power outages continued in the capital, Kyiv, and six other regions.
Notably, Zelensky also warned that Russian forces were preparing to carry out another large-scale wave of attacks on the country’s infrastructure, in particular the energy system. Zelensky’s comments came after the mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, warned on 5 November that residents should be prepared to leave the capital and stay with friends or family in those parts of the suburbs which still have access to water and power in the event of a total loss of power in Kyiv. Kyiv’s security director, Roman Tkachuk, echoed Klitschko’s comments but stressed that evacuation was not currently necessary.
On 6 November, power and water outages were also reported in ten settlements across Kherson oblast. This includes Kherson city itself, which has not seen such a power outage since Russia launched its full-scale invasion on 24 February. Deputy Chairman of the Kherson Regional Council Yury Sobolvesky reported that Russian forces detonated a high-voltage transmission line, while the Russian-installed administration in Kherson claimed that Ukrainian forces sabotaged high-voltage power lines on the Beryslav-Kakhovka highway. The reports of power outages in Kherson came after Russian-backed officials alleged on the same day that Ukrainian forces attacked the Kakhovka Hydroelectric dam using US-supplied HIMARS. They also claimed the damage was not critical as five of the six missiles were intercepted by air defences.
On 7 November, Vadym Skibitsky, the spokesman for Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), stated that Ukrainian intelligence estimates that Russia only has 120 Iskandr ballistic missiles left, and that is has used around 80 percent of its pre-war stocks in Ukraine. While we cannot confirm this, Russian stocks of guided precision missiles have been steadily dwindling amid Moscow’s long-range strike campaign. However, all indicators point to Russia acquiring large numbers of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles, including Fateh and Zolfaghar family missiles. These have a range of 186 miles (300km) and 435 miles (700km), respectively. This will likely allow Russia to sustain its campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure over the winter, hence Zelensky’s latest warning that Russian strikes are unlikely to cease for the foreseeable future.
The Wall Street Journal reported on 6 November that the US national security adviser Jake Sullivan has in recent months held confidential talks with numerous top officials within the Kremlin, including Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. This is the latest confirmation that back channels remain open between the Kremlin and the White House, with the talks aimed at easing tensions and mitigating the threat of escalation. However, US sources maintain that a potential peace settlement was not discussed during Sullivan’s calls.

Forecast

On 5 November, the Washington Post cited unnamed US officials in reports that the Biden administration is privately encouraging Kyiv to signal an openness to negotiate with Russia. President Zelensky has previously ruled out the prospect of negotiating with President Putin amid a hardening of Kyiv’s stance since the summer. However, the prospect of a protracted war against Russia will strain appetites among Western nations for indefinite military and financial support for Ukraine throughout 2023 and beyond. The worsening economic and energy crises have already led many European and US politicians to question the end game in Ukraine. An anonymous US official reportedly stated that ‘Ukraine fatigue is a real thing for some of our partners’, acknowledging the backlash Zelensky’s ban on negotiations with Putin have generated among various states in Europe, Latin America and Africa. However, reports of US calls to signal an openness to negotiate are not aimed at forcing Kyiv to sue for peace at this stage; rather, they are a calculated attempt to maintain international support for Ukraine in the mid- to long-term. By illustrating a willingness to negotiate, the Biden administration hopes to ease international concerns that both sides intend to fight a protracted war until one or the other is militarily defeated – a scenario that would possibly last years amid a global recession. Defeating Russia on the battlefield is nevertheless the prevailing ambition for Kyiv, which believes that another compromise peace agreement akin to the 2014-2015 Minsk Protocols will merely provide Russia with an opportunity to rebuild its forces to invade once again at a future date. Zelensky has publicly stated the war will not end until all occupied territories – including Crimea – are liberated. While Zelensky may ultimately be prepared to accept a compromise deal to end the war, this will not happen in the immediate term given Ukraine’s current relative military strength. If Ukraine successfully pushes Russia back to the 24 February borders, it would likely face immense international pressure to enter into negotiations to prevent further escalation and the complete defeat of Russia. However, if the US, UK, Poland and other hawkish backers of Ukraine signal their continued support to retake Crimea, Kyiv would be unlikely to bow to international pressure and accept concessions to end the war. A protracted campaign to defeat Russia militarily will ultimately depend on the continued support of the US, which has provided around USD 18.2bn in military aid since February. Ukraine remains entirely reliant on external military and financial aid to sustain its war effort. If this support begins to falter or slow, Ukraine’s capability to sustain offensive (and indeed defensive) operations in 2023 is likely to be brought into question. As such, the upcoming US midterm elections on 8 November will possibly prove a highly significant turning point in terms of long-term US support for Ukraine and the prospects for peace. Current polling suggests the Republicans will win both the House and the Senate, and that various senior Republicans have already indicated plans to slow down US military aid to Ukraine if this happens. According to a poll published on 3 November by the Wall Street Journal, 48 percent of Republicans said that the US was doing ‘too much’ to support Ukraine, notably up from just 6 percent in March. This illustrates that the shift in opinion within the Republican Party is only likely to continue over the winter and into 2023. If the Republicans do win the midterms and follow through with their proposed drawing down of military support over the winter, Kyiv will likely be forced to signal its willingness to negotiate in an attempt to keep Western support flowing. However, this would not result in a lasting peace agreement. (Source: Sibylline)

10 Nov 22. Italy preps new Ukraine arms shipment. Is SAMP/T air defense included?

Italy plans to send air defense weapons to Ukraine, possibly including the SAMP/T system, Italian media reports have suggested, despite doubts over training and supplies.

Rome is gearing up for its sixth dispatch of arms to Ukraine since Russia invaded the country in February.

Italy has been tightlipped about what it sent so far. However, Stinger surface-to-air missiles, mortars, and Milan or Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons were reportedly planned for previous consignments, as well as Browning heavy machine guns, MG-type light machine guns and systems for countering improvised explosive devices. Italy also reportedly sent multiple-launch rocket systems, PzH 2000 howitzers and vehicles over the course of the year.

With Russia using Iranian-made drones to knock out vital infrastructure in Ukrainian cities, Kyiv has appealed for more air defense systems. Last month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera that he specifically asked Italy to send air defense capabilities it manufactured.

That interview increased speculation that SAMP/T batteries, built by Italy and France, could be on their way to the front line.

“Italy classified the arms it sends to Ukraine, but rumors suggest the next package will likely include air defense and missile defense, given Ukraine is gaining ground but has to defend its cities from drones,” Alessandro Marrone, who heads the defense program at the Rome-based think tank IAI, told Defense News.

Entering service with the Italian Army in 2013, SAMP/T is a truck-based tactical anti-missile system designed to counter cruise missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft, and tactical ballistic missiles.

In 2016, Italy sent a battery to Turkey as part of a NATO operation to protect the city of Kahramanmaras from the threat of Syrian missile attacks.

But an Italian analyst told Defense News there are two problems involved in sending the SAMP/T.

“It’s a complicated system and would need a large amount of training, and Italy simply doesn’t have many batteries to send,” the analyst on the condition of anonymity because the individual did not want to publicly discuss the government’s decision on this topic.

According to the Italian Army, the military currently has five batteries in service. That means it is more likely Italy will supply its older — and more abundant — Skyguard-Aspide air defense missile system, built by MBDA Italy and Germany’s Rheinmetall.

Italy’s first arms shipments to Ukraine were authorized by the government of then-Prime Minister Mario Draghi, who was replaced last month by hard-right leader Giorgia Meloni following elections. Meloni leads a coalition with League party leader Matteo Salvini and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

Both Salvini and Berlusconi have been strong admirers of Russian President Vladimir Putin in the past, and both backed his annexation of Crimea in 2014, raising fears that Meloni’s new administration might baulk at continuing the flow of weapons to Ukraine.

But Meloni has repeatedly committed to backing Kyiv and claimed the flow of arms will continue uninterrupted.

However, she does face a large number of voters who are against supplying weapons. Last weekend, at least 40,000 protestors took to the streets of Rome to call for peace in Ukraine, with many opposing arms shipments and carrying banners condemning NATO.

Giuseppe Conte, the leader of the Five Star party, has challenged the government to hold a debate over the next shipment in Parliament.

“Italy is one of [the] few countries to keep the list classified,” Marrone noted. “The inner circle in NATO knows what is being sent, but the wider foreign policy, defense and NATO communities do not have official data.

“If Italy were to declassify its donations, it would boost its profile in NATO.” (Source: Defense News)

11 Nov 22. Norway plans to add $145.87m to International Fund for Ukraine. The contribution is part of a commitment to provide military aid worth $291.75m to Ukraine this year. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence has announced that the government will donate more than $145.87m (Nkr1.5bn) to the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine.

The contribution is part of Norway’s commitment to providing military assistance worth $291.75m (Nkr3bn) to the Ukrainian Armed Forces this year.

UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said: “Norway has been unwavering in its support for Ukraine and this significant new contribution to the International Fund for Ukraine will make a material difference to providing further military aid.”

During a meeting with Wallace under the Joint Expeditionary Force framework, Norwegian Defence Minister Bjørn Arild Gram said the country’s previous donation to the fund, worth $38.9m (Nkr400m), was used to procure drones, drone jamming equipment, and artillery shells.

While allies have been urged to contribute to the fund, the Norwegian industry is invited to submit bids in this regard.

Gram said: “Norway has a world-leading defence industry within certain areas and produces systems that can supply Ukraine’s requirements. I am pleased that the Norwegian industry will be able to compete for contracts through this fund.”

Extending support in this direction, Netherlands Defence Minister Kajsa Ollongren announced that the government has decided to provide €100m to the fund.

The fund will be used to acquire military equipment necessary for Ukraine directly from the defence industry.

This ensures military support for Ukraine in the long term, without affecting the capabilities of the participating nations.

The US Department of Defense announced more security assistance, worth over $400m, to strengthen Ukrainian forces.

The 25th presidential drawdown of assistance will supply several capabilities, including missiles for Hawk air defence systems, four Avenger air defence systems, Stinger missiles, 21,000 155mm artillery rounds, and additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems.

According to US Pentagon deputy press secretary Sabrina Singh, the missiles for the HAWK air defence system and Avenger air defence systems, along with Stinger missiles, are headed to Ukraine.

Singh said: “The HAWK missiles, which will be refurbished using Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds, will complement Spain’s recent commitment of HAWK launchers to help Ukraine meet this threat.”

(Source: army-technology.com)

10 Nov 22. Ukraine to get Avenger Air Defense System in latest US military aid. The U.S. will send $400 million more in military aid to Ukraine, several U.S. officials said Thursday, amid concerns that financial assistance for the war against Russia could decline a bit if Republicans take control of Congress.

An announcement is expected Thursday, as the vote counting from Tuesday’s election continues, with Republicans inching closer to a narrow House majority and with control of the Senate hinging on tight races in Arizona, Nevada and Georgia.

According to officials, the aid package will contain large amounts of ammunition and, for the first time, highly mobile Avenger Air Defense Systems. Officials said there will be ammunition for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, known as HIMARS, which Ukraine has been successfully using in its counteroffensive against Russia. There also will be mortars and missiles for the Hawk surface-to-air anti-aircraft system.

At the White House, national security adviser Jake Sullivan said that the new aid package would include important air defense contributions.

“This increased air defense will be critical for Ukraine as Russia continues to use cruise missiles and Iranian-made drones to attack critical civilian infrastructure,” Sullivan said. He did not discuss the funding total, but noted it would include Stinger missiles for the Avenger system.

The additional ammunition and air defense capabilities come as Russian troops began pulling out of the key Ukrainian city of Kherson, in a widening retreat that could mark a turning point in the war. Kherson is the only provincial capital that Moscow captured, and the Russian withdrawal could allow Ukraine to win back territory in the south that it had lost. Ukrainian officials acknowledged that Moscow’s forces had no choice but to flee Kherson but remained cautious, fearing an ambush.

Including the latest aid, the U.S. has committed more than $18.6 billion in weapons and other equipment to Ukraine since Russia attacked on Feb. 24. The new package of aid will be done under presidential drawdown authority, which allows the Pentagon to take weapons from its own stock and quickly ship them to Ukraine, officials said.

The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss details of a package not yet made public.

When asked about ongoing aid to Ukraine on Wednesday, President Joe Biden expressed optimism that it will go on, even if Republicans take control of one or both houses of Congress.

“I hope we’ll continue this bipartisan approach of confronting Russia’s aggression in Ukraine,” the Democratic president told reporters. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

10 Nov 22. $400m Security Package Headed to Ukraine. Missiles for the HAWK air defense system, along with four Avenger air defense systems and Stinger missiles are headed to Ukraine as part of a presidential drawdown authority security assistance package worth up to $400 million, the Defense Department announced today.

Due to Russia’s continuing air attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, additional air defense capabilities are critical, said Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh during a briefing today.

“The HAWK missiles, which will be refurbished using Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds, will complement Spain’s recent commitment of HAWK launchers to help Ukraine meet this threat,” she said. “The Avenger short-range air defense systems will also provide Ukraine with capability to protect Ukrainian troops and critical infrastructure against unmanned aerial systems and helicopters.”

As part of this drawdown, Singh said, the U.S. will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of HAWK missiles from its own inventory, but that those missiles would first need to be refurbished. That refurbishment will be done using funds from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Once those missiles are refurbished, they will then be paired with HAWK system launchers that have been provided by Spain.

The Avenger air defense systems, which use Stinger missiles, is a capability the U.S. has not previously provided to the Ukrainians.

“These are mobile, short-range air defense systems that can … protect against cruise missiles, helicopters unmanned aerial systems,” she said. “They’re shorter in range, but with some of the additional capabilities that we and Spain and others have provided, like the HAWK missiles. This is something I think fits in well with some of the capabilities that are already using on the battlefield.”

The addition of the Avenger system to what the U.S. is providing to Ukraine comes after consultation with the Ukrainians on what they need in their fight against the Russians, Singh said.

“We discuss with them what they need in this fight. We assess what we can provide and what makes the most sense. This was a request that fulfilled a need … that they wanted,” she said. “I think this is an air defense system that’s going to complement the other air defense systems that not just the U.S. has provided, but other countries as well.”

The total list of equipment in the latest security assistance package also includes:

Ammunition for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
21,000 155 mm artillery rounds
500 precision-guided 155 mm artillery rounds
10,000 120 mm mortar rounds
100 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, or Humvees
400 grenade launchers
Small arms, optics and more than 20,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition
Demolition equipment for obstacle clearing
Cold weather protective gear

Singh also told reporters that next week, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III will host the seventh meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.

“This meeting will be hosted virtually, here at the Pentagon, and will allow for the secretary and ministers of defense from nearly 50 countries to discuss efforts to supply Ukraine with the means to defend its sovereignty from further Russian aggression,” Singh said.

Since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24, the United States has committed more than $18.6bn in security assistance. (Source: US DoD)

10 Nov 22. 100,000 Russians killed or wounded on battlefield, says US.

“Well over” 100,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded in the war in Ukraine, according to the US’s top army general.

“Same thing probably on the Ukrainian side,” said Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Wednesday. “There has been a tremendous amount of suffering, human suffering.”

An estimated 40,000 Ukrainian civilians have been killed or wounded and anywhere between 15 m and 30 m Ukrainians have been displaced, he added.

The UN refugee chief recently put the figure at 14 m. (Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)

10 Nov 22. Putin makes top brass take the fall for Kherson humiliation – and that’s no accident.

The Russian president is clinging on to other parts of southern Ukraine in the faint hope he will be painted as a tactical genius

On Russian state television, the scene was played on loop.

General Sergei Surovikin, the commander of Russia’s forces in Ukraine, said he believed that the time has come to withdraw from Kherson.

With his face in a deep frown, the man known as “General Armageddon” argued it will save the lives of Russian soldiers, who face being cut off if they do not retreat to the right bank of the Dnieper River.

General Sergei Shoigu, the defence minister, grunts his agreement.

This stage-managed tete-a-tete was how the Russian people learned of one of the worst setbacks their military has faced since the war began.

Television anchors appeared visibly upset even reading the news.

Nowhere to be seen in any of this was the man whose foolhardy ambition caused the mess: Vladimir Putin. That is no accident.

For months, the Russian president has deflected criticism of the war towards his generals, using them as convenient punching bags. Gen Shoigu, blamed by all and sundry, is now one of the most unpopular men in the Kremlin.

It would have been impossible for a man of Putin’s vanity to bear the bad news to his people, given it was only weeks ago he announced that Kherson had become part of Russia in a gaudy Kremlin ceremony.

He had joined hands on stage with the four men appointed to lead the annexed regions of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson, leading them in a boisterous chant.

One of those men, Kherson chief Kirill Stremuosov, died in mysterious circumstances on Wednesday.

Meanwhile, when Putin was seen on television that same day, he was touring a hospital, basking in the approval of doctors who told him they had everything they needed.

That is possible, but unlikely. Russia’s position to the north and west of the Dnieper River has been untenable for some months now.

Military commanders moved the headquarters to the other side of the river some time ago. This decision was tactically sound, given the rate of advance of Ukrainian troops, but a major blow to morale for those left behind, unless they had been sold on a fiendish Russian counter-offensive to come.

It didn’t come. It was never coming.

Instead, Russia has been taking steps to prepare to abandon the area over the past few weeks.

They have set up a hodge-podge defensive line on the south bank of the river, using precast concrete pillboxes. Images on social media suggested that these might be able to withstand small arms fire, small arms or small fires, but not much more.

Tanks, heavy machine guns and anti-tank missiles will chew these constructions up as if they were made out of plasticine – which may, in fact, be the case. (Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)

09 Nov 22. Moscow denies reports that North Korea is supplying weapons to Russia.

Summary

This content was produced in Russia where the law restricts coverage of Russian military operations in Ukraine.

Moscow on Wednesday denied reports that North Korea was supplying weapons to Russia, saying the claims were “false from start to finish.”

U.S. National Security spokesperson John Kirby said last week that Washington had information that North Korea was covertly supplying Russia with a “significant” number of artillery shells for use in Ukraine. (Source: Reuters)

09 Nov 22. Russia Suffers ‘Catastrophic Strategic Disaster’ in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been “a catastrophic strategic disaster,” Colin H. Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, told the Defense Writers’ Group yesterday.

Kahl briefed the group about the National Defense Strategy and said that the document lists China as the pacing threat for the United States, but that Russia poses an acute threat. “That term acute, was chosen very intentionally as signifying both immediate and sharp,” he said.

China has the will and resources to challenge the United States and the rule-based international order that has kept the peace since the end of World War II. But Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine shows it is a dangerous and reckless state.

Speaking on Election Day, Kahl was asked by reporters asked if U.S. support of Ukraine had bipartisan support. “I think there’s a widespread recognition that the stakes in Ukraine are just bigger than Ukraine,” he said.

He said elected officials from both parties understand that Ukraine is not only fighting to defend its independence and democracy but is also for a principle. “We don’t want to live in a world where big countries believe that they can swallow up their smaller neighbors,” Kahl said. “That is a recipe for global disorder and large countries going on the march. We’ve lived in a world like that before: it was called the 1930s. And it ended in the most catastrophic global conflict in human history.”

The rules-based order is in place to preclude this naked grab for resources and power. “We don’t want to live in a world where the rules of the international system are torn up, because the strong do what they will and the weak have to suffer what they must,” he said.

Kahl charted the progress Ukraine has made. The Ukrainian military defeated Russia’s initial campaign to grab the capital of Kyiv and forced the Russians to retreat to the east.

More recently, the Ukrainian military launched a counteroffensive against Russian troops in the northeastern part of the country outside Kharkiv. The Ukrainian military has also stabilized the lines in the Donbass and the army continues to make methodical progress around Kherson.

“There’s some indications that the Russians intend to withdraw to the east bank of the Dnieper River,” he said. “They are repositioning their forces in in some ways that could be interpreted as providing cover for an orderly withdrawal so that they don’t have the kind of disorderly withdrawal they had up in Kharkiv.”

Still he is cautious noting that there are still tens of thousands of Russian troops in Ukraine. “We’ll have to see how that plays out,” he said.

Winter may or may not close down the fighting in the country. The “mud season” has already started in Ukraine, making operations more difficult.

“But I can say one thing with confidence, which is, Russia has already suffered a massive strategic failure,” he said. “That’s not going to change.”

Putin’s goal was to extinguish Ukraine as an independent, sovereign democratic country, the undersecretary said. “He’s failed, and that’s not going to change. A sovereign, independent, democratic Ukraine is going to endure,” he said.

Putin wanted to prove that Russia was still a global power with an extraordinarily overwhelming military, Kahl said. Victory over Ukraine would allow Russia to coerce and intimidate its neighbors. “Putin has failed,” he said. “Russia will emerge from this war weaker than it went in.”

The Russian military has lost tens of thousands to Ukrainian guns and bombs. “They’ve … probably lost half of their main battle tanks,” he said.

And the Russians have expended the majority of their precision-guided munitions with no chance of replenishing stocks due to sanctions and export controls levied on the nation for the invasion. “They are not going to emerge from this war stronger; they are going to emerge from this war much weaker than they went in,” Kahl said.

Putin also figured the war would divide the West. “It’s produced the exact opposite,” he said. “NATO is more united than ever. We’re on the precipice of Sweden and Finland, probably joining the alliance, which … make the alliance much stronger vis-a-vis Russia.”

“I don’t know what winning looks like,” he continued. “But I do know that Russia will not have achieved the objectives that Vladimir Putin set out. And that’s pretty much a guarantee.”

The United States and like-minded nations will continue to provide the appropriate level of assistance to Ukraine. The United States will also work with like-minded nations to counter and deter Russia.

“Whatever that appropriate level of assistance is, we’re committed to making sure it continues, if for no other reason, than because … Vladimir Putin has a theory of victory here,” Kahl said. “And his theory of victory is that he’ll just wait us all out.”

Putin believes the West will tire from the war, the inflation the war causes and the high energy prices. “I think it’s incumbent upon all of us to signal to him, it’s not going to work,” Kahl said.  (Source: US DoD)

09 Nov 22. Long-term assistance command to oversee training mission with Ukraine. The Pentagon is standing up a new command devoted to helping Ukraine win its war against Russia. It will oversee not only the bns of dollars in aid that the country has received, but the ongoing U.S. training mission with Ukrainian troops, according to the announcement Friday.

The 300-person Security Assistance Group-Ukraine will take over the job that the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters recently turned over in Germany, the Defense Department’s policy chief told reporters Tuesday at a Defense Writers Group event.

While he wouldn’t call it a “permanent” command, Colin Kahl said, it signals a transition to a more “enduring capability” beyond the crisis response model from the XVIII Airborne Corps.

“We had a training mission with Ukraine before the war, right? So, the commitment to Ukraine is not new,” he said. “So, really, we just see this as a continuation of what we’ve been doing with the Ukrainians since 2014. It got dialed up as a consequence of Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine back in February, but, really, it’s kind of just institutionalizing what we’ve been doing since then.”

Kahl declined to say whether a three-star general would be appointed to lead the command, a move the New York Times reported Friday, but the mission had previously been overseen by a three-star, Lt. Gen. Christopher Donaghue, the corps’ commander.

The SAG-U would represent the Pentagon’s first move to create more long-term force structure in Europe since Russia’s invasion earlier this year. Senior officials have publicly discussed the possibly of more permanently based troops, or more heel-to-toe troop rotations, but without hinting at any impending announcements.

The U.S. military’s footprint in Europe has swelled from 80,000 to 100,000 since February, when the first of tens of thousands of troops were mobilized to NATO countries for reassurance missions.

Since then, troops have been training with local forces and helping coordinate the transport of aid to Ukraine, or training Ukrainian troops outside of their country, a mission that the SAG-U signals will continue.

Whether that means this surge of Europe deployments will also continue is up in the air.

“So, right now, the intent is to keep troop levels at the same level as they’ve been,” a senior military official told Military Times during a background briefing Oct. 31. “We have no announcements to make in terms of any changes to that in the near term.” (Source: Defense News)

09 Nov 22. Russian Black Sea Fleet Headquarters Hit With “Unprecedented” Drone Attack.’

Eight months after Russian President Vladimir Putin began his unprovoked “special military operation” against Ukraine, one of the most striking emerging aspects of the conflict has been the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ surprising and increasingly effective denial of Russian naval efforts to establish “command of the sea” in the Black Sea. On April 13, the Ukrainians, with an unexpected anti-ship missile attack, sank the Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) flagship, the Soviet-era Slava-class Moskva guided missile cruiser. In its most impressive operation yet, on October 29, the Ukrainian military launched a coordinated swarm of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval drones into Sevastopol, headquarters of the BSF for over two centuries. While the apparent level of damage was slight, the technological prowess of the attack on the highly symbolic target led Russia to assert that the Ukrainian military had received foreign assistance before and during the operation.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) briefed journalists that the attack occurred at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of October 29, when nine UAVs and seven unmanned robotic naval drones traveled 100 miles from their Ochakiv launch point, near Odesa, to Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula, which Russia has occupied since 2014. The MoD asserted, “As a result of the operational measures taken by the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, all air targets were destroyed.” Four marine drones were destroyed by BSF weaponry and aviation, while the remaining three were destroyed in the port’s roadstead. The MoD stated that only the Ivan Golubets minesweeper and the boom-mesh barrier in the South Bay experienced minor damage (TASS, October 29).

The implications of this attack reverberated throughout the war zone. In response, Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhaev said, “Tonight, the most massive attack in the history of the SVO [“special military operation”] by UAVs and remote-controlled surface vehicles on the waters of Sevastopol Bay was undertaken” (TASS, October 29). Razvozhaev added, “The enemy tried to strike at the military infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet. All unmanned vehicles were detected and destroyed in advance.” According to the Russian governor, Sevastopol’s BSF air defenses engaged the UAVs for several hours (T.me/razvozhaev, October 29). The assault proved to be a major embarrassment for the Russian Navy, as the BSF’s new flagship, the Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Makarov, was reportedly damaged and possibly disabled during the audacious drone raid—the consequences of which were as determinedly downplayed in the Russian media as much as they were highlighted in the Ukrainian information sphere (Novoye vremya, October 30)

In an explosive assertion, the MoD subsequently claimed that British specialists were directly involved in the Sevastopol attack. In a statement posted on October 29 on its Telegram account. the ministry declared, “It should be stressed that the ships of the Black Sea Fleet that were subjected to the terrorist attack are involved in ensuring the security of the ‘grain corridor’ as part of the international initiative to export agricultural products from Ukrainian ports. The preparation of this terrorist act and the training of the military personnel of the Ukrainian 73rd Special Centre for Maritime Operations were carried out under the guidance of British specialists located in the city of Ochakiv in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region” (T.me/mod_russia, October 29).

The raid swiftly produced consequences; on October 31, the Russian government announced that it was suspending its participation in the United Nations–brokered arrangement that allowed civilian merchants to export Ukrainian grain and fertilizer from several of Kyiv’s Black Sea ports, which were earlier under blockade by the Russian Navy. This came after the MoD reported that the drones had initially used the maritime “grain corridor” security zone before changing course toward Sevastopol (Izvestiya, November 1). As merchants nevertheless continued their participation in the transit of grain through the designated corridor, Russia rejoined the initiative two days later.

In the wake of the attack, the Russian military also quickly began to intensify its missile attacks on Ukraine’s aging and increasingly decrepit Soviet-era energy infrastructure, which quickly disabled up to a third of the country’s electricity generation capacity and began causing rolling blackouts (Tvzvezda.ru, October 31).

The Black Sea is proving to be a tactical and technological arena that is upsetting long-standing regional strategic assumptions, starting with Russia’s presumed prowess and naval superiority over Ukraine. The Moskva’s loss was the first time Russia had lost a flagship since the disastrous 1905 Tsushima battle during the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Navy’s largest warship sunk in combat since 1945. Ukraine’s innovative tactics reaffirmed that, since the 1982 Falklands conflict three decades ago, the ongoing and increasing combat value of sea-skimming missiles should not be disregarded. Russia’s entire BSF now appears vulnerable to remote warfare, as Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their ability to mount effective long-distance strikes as far as Crimea. Other strikes of this nature include strikes on the Kerch Bridge connecting the peninsula with Russia, on Crimea’s Saky airfield and, two months ago, on the BSF’s headquarters building in Sevastopol.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has vowed to liberate Crimea, together with all of the occupied southern and eastern territories of Ukraine, ambitious goals that were earlier derided by many in the international community. Now, in the wake of recent events, these fears seem marginally less implausible. What is certain, however, is that for Ukrainian civilians suffering intermittent reliability in the supply of water, electricity and gas, they are likely to suffer mot as the Russian military increasingly focuses on “softer” civilian infrastructure targets. (Source: News Now/https://oilprice.com/)

09 Nov 22. UK to provide 1,000 more surface to air missiles to Ukraine.

The UK has provided approximately 1,000 additional surface to air missiles to help counter the Russian threat to Ukrainian infrastructure.

UK has provided approximately 1,000 additional surface to air missiles to help counter the Russian threat to Ukrainian infrastructure
The Defence Secretary made the announcement while visiting training sites alongside the Secretary General of NATO and JEF Defence Ministers
The UK has now trained over 7,400 recruits from the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), and over 60 AFU Junior leaders

The Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has announced that the UK will shortly complete the delivery of approximately 1,000 additional surface to air missiles to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). This comes in response to Ukrainian requests for more air defence capabilities, and the missiles will play a vital role in the provision of air defence for Ukraine and the protection of its critical infrastructure which is being continually targeted by Russia.

The missiles can be used in conjunction with existing Armed Forces of Ukraine capabilities. The equipment consists of launchers and missiles and is capable of shooting down air targets, including Russian drones and cruise missiles.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said: “This commitment of hundreds more surface to air missiles continues our defensive support for Ukraine against Russian aggression – and will help Ukraine counter the threat from illegal targeting of critical national infrastructure.”

The announcement comes as Defence Secretary has today visited two training sites where over 7,400 Ukrainian recruits have been trained by UK forces alongside eight partner nations.

At the sites being used for training, the Defence Secretary welcomed the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in the morning, and his counterparts from the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) nations this afternoon, some of whom were able to see their own military personnel conducting the training.

Currently 1,900 Ukrainian recruits are in the UK taking part in the training programme and will soon return to their home country. When they complete the training, they are provided with items including combat clothing, body armour and ear defence, waterproofs and sleeping bags.

Recruits are also issued with a fully stocked individual First Aid Kit after learning how to use tourniquets, field dressings and chest seals during training. Recruits leaving the UK will now be provided with extreme cold weather kits, announced by the Prime Minister today, including 25,000 set of extreme cold weather clothing, 20,000 sleeping bags and 150 insulated tents.

The announcement comes in response to Ukrainian requests for more cold weather equipment. Ukraine’s troops continue to battle to liberate their country from Russian forces as winter rapidly approaches, when temperatures can sink to minus 20°C and below in parts of the country.

Heavy duty sleeping bags and roll mats, combined with heated accommodation and personal winter clothing, will help to prevent cold-related injuries and ensure troops can operate effectively and efficiently.

Brigadier Justin Stenhouse, Commander of the UK’s basic training for Ukrainian recruits said: “We have equipped more than 9,000 Ukrainian recruits to ensure they have the necessary personal protective equipment, including helmet, body armour and webbing, to aid them in fighting against Russian aggression. The effort to support this from across the entire logistic community has been hugely impressive and no small undertaking. The Ukrainian recruits, many of whom have little to no military experience, have shown exemplary courage, resilience, and a desire to learn which is deeply humbling to observe. Our instructors have done an excellent job in training these recruits to live and fight using their new equipment and transforming them from civilians to soldiers in just five weeks.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

09 Nov 22. Russia orders retreat from Kherson. Withdrawal would cap successful Ukrainian counteroffensive that began in August. Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu has ordered troops to withdraw from the city of Kherson in southern Ukraine, in another major setback for President Vladimir Putin’s nine-month invasion of the country. In footage shown on state television on Wednesday, Shoigu accepted a proposal from Sergei Surovikin, commander of Russia’s forces in Ukraine, to retreat from the town to the left bank of the Dnipro river. Surovikin said the withdrawal would happen “at the earliest possible juncture” and that Russia’s troops would set up defensive positions in the remaining parts of the Kherson region that they control east of the city. The decision to pull back marks a decisive moment in a Ukrainian counteroffensive started on August 29, with Kyiv’s forces pushing back Russian artillery with superior manpower and supplies of western-supplied advanced weaponry. Oleksiy Arestovych, an adviser in Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s administration, said the Russian army was “being knocked out of Kherson”. “Dear Kherson residents. We are returning. You are returning. Welcome back home,” he added, warning however that “fighting on the right bank will continue for some time”. However Mykhailo Podolyak, another Kyiv adviser, urged caution, telling the Financial Times that “it’s too early to talk about the surrender of Kherson today”. “The statement of the Russian command can mean both the adoption of a political decision, and it can be a trap — turning out to be blurring our eyes before being drawn into urban battles,” he added. If confirmed on the battlefield, the retreat would be one of the biggest blows yet to Putin’s attempt to subjugate Ukraine. The largely agricultural region is strategically important to Russia because it connects the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, which Moscow annexed in 2014, to the mainland. It also controls most of Crimea’s water supplies through a canal. In the early days of his full-scale invasion in February, the Russian president failed to seize the capital, Kyiv. In September Ukrainian troops forced Russia to abandon several military strongholds near Kharkiv in the east, a breakthrough that has cost Moscow significant losses of men and material. Putin subsequently declared a mobilisation of Russia’s reserves to boost the 1,100km frontline and threatened to use nuclear weapons. But Russia does not have full control of the four Ukrainian regions, including Kherson, which the Russian leader annexed in a pompous ceremony in the Kremlin in September. Surovikin on Wednesday told Shoigu the decision to retreat was “difficult” but justified it by saying Russia would “preserve the lives of our troops and the combat readiness of our units”. He claimed Russia was forced to retreat in the face of a supposed threat from Ukraine flooding the area by releasing water from nearby reservoirs or firing on a huge hydroelectric dam at Nova Kakhovka, which remains under Russian control. Ukraine has accused Russia of plotting to blow up the dam and blame Kyiv for the ensuing damage. Surovikin claimed retreating from Kherson would also allow Russia to free up forces to conduct offensives in other areas. Russian occupation officials had urged civilians to leave the area in recent weeks and moved their headquarters out of Kherson city to Skadovsk, a town deeper into Russian-controlled territory. Surovikin said 115,000 people had evacuated to the Russian occupied territory on the left bank of the Dnipro river. Shortly before the announcement of the retreat, the Russian occupation administration said Kirill Stremousov, a former anti-vaccine activist appointed the region’s deputy governor, had died in a car crash, without giving further details. (Source: FT.com)

09 Nov 22. Baykar to Complete Ukraine Plant in 2 Years. As part of an agreement between Turkey and Ukraine, signed just before Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion, Baykar had agreed to build its second manufacturing plant in Ukraine.

CEO Haluk Bayraktar told Reuters that plans were moving ahead despite some obstacles created by Russia’s invasion.

“Our plan is moving ahead,” the CEO said on the sidelines of the SAHA defense expo in Istanbul. “Right now we have architectural design. The detailed design phase is finished. And we will move ahead with construction actually … within two years we would like to finish it.”

Ukraine figures prominently in Baykar’s supply chain, especially with the new heavy-lifter drone Akıncı and unmanned fighter jet called Kızılelma, currently under development. Both use Ukrainian engines from Motor Sich and from Ivchenko-Progress.

Expanding orders

Deployment of the company’s Bayraktar TB2 drone has been a major factor influencing conflicts from Syria to Karabakh and Ukraine, pushing Baykar into the global spotlight and transforming it into a major manufacturer and exporter.

The battle-proven TB2 drone is being sold to 24 countries including NATO member Poland, while the company signed deals with five countries for exports of its much larger sibling Akıncı.

While the TB2 can lift off with up to 150 kilograms (330 pounds) of missiles or equipment, Akıncı, first delivered to Turkish armed forces last year, can fly much higher and take off with 10 times the weight.

The expanding order book is expected to net around $1 bn in export revenues this year, Bayraktar said, about 50% higher than last year’s $650m, with a further 50% growth expected in 2023.

Though Baykar is not the only military drone developer in Türkiye, the TB2 has figured so prominently in conflicts that it now spearheads the country’s global defense export push.

Founded in the 1980s by Bayraktar’s father, Özdemir Bayraktar, Baykar began to focus on unmanned aircraft in 2005 as Türkiye sought to strengthen its local defense industry.

Last year, the company made up a fifth of Türkiye’s $3.2 bn in defense exports, according to data from the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM).

The company will invest the revenues for the expansion of production lines, Bayraktar said. “Our production capacity with TB2, we do 20 units per month. For 2023 our target is to do minimum 30 (units) a month,” he said.

Baykar currently has a capacity to manufacture over 200 Bayraktar TB2s a year, he said earlier. It seeks to raise this figure to 500 for TB2s and reach a level where it produces 40 Akıncı drones a year.

Space technologies

Research and development on the fast drone fighter jet Kızılelma, which analysts say represents a significant expansion of capabilities for slow-moving reconnaissance and missile-carrying drones, will pick up as well, Bayraktar said.

Kızılelmawill be capable of taking off from and landing on short-runway aircraft carriers, with a maiden flight expected in the next few months.

The TB3, a short-runway-capable version of the TB2, is expected to finish its testing phase by the end of 2023, Bayraktar said.

The company plans to re-invest its revenues and expand its production lines, CEO Bayraktar said.

“Our production capacity with TB2, we do 20 units per month. For 2023, our target is to do a minimum of 30 [units] a month,” he said.

The company is also expanding its focus to space technologies to complement its unmanned vehicle system. “We are now investing in space technologies … Not well established segments, but new areas where you can bring new innovative solutions,” Bayraktar said.

Baykar is also investing in some companies in its expanding supply chain.

“We invest in companies which bring value added items to our systems … in the field of communications, optics, network architecture,” Bayraktar said. (Source: UAS VISION/Middle East Eye; Daily Sabah)

08 Nov 22. Russia hands captured British anti-tank missile to Iran in exchange for drones. The Kremlin gave Tehran over £120m in cash along with state-of-the-art weaponry seized from Ukrainian troops.

Iran was given a captured British anti-tank missile by Russia in exchange for unmanned drones used to attack Ukraine, the Telegraph understands.

The Kremlin handed over £120 m in cash along with state-of-the-art British and US weaponry seized from Ukrainian troops to pay for the drones, a security source has claimed.

The cash and weapons were flown into an airport in Tehran on a Russian military aircraft in the early hours of August 20, Sky News reported on Tuesday night.

On board the Russian military cargo plane were a British NLAW anti-tank missile, a US Javelin anti-tank missile and a US Stinger anti-aircraft missile. Satellite imagery showed two Russian aircraft at Mehrabad airport at 1.17am, having flown in under the cover of darkness. The aircraft remained at the airport for around three hours before taking off.

Iran could copy technology

According to Sky News, the weapons had been intended for the Ukraine military but “fell into the wrong hands”. The suspicion, according to the source, is that Iran will examine the hardware, pull it apart and try to build their own.

The source suggested that the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps possessed the capability to examine the weapons, understand the technology and then manufacture it themselves.

“They will probably be reverse-engineered and used in future wars,” the source told Sky.

A senior government source did not deny the Sky report when approached by The Telegraph.

On Tuesday night the Ministry of Defence said it was urgently trying to verify the veracity of the claims made on the television channel. “We have not had a chance to go through it [the report] yet and clarify anything that has been alleged. We are trying to assess this and verify the report,” said a British military source.

Western governments will hope to put pressure on Iran to shut down any future deals between Moscow and Tehran.

In exchange for the armaments and the cash, Iran handed over to Russia 160 unmanned aerial vehicles including 100 Shahed-136 drones that have been used to attack Ukrainian cities and infrastructure with devastating effect.

The drones – a cheap alternative to cruise missiles – were launched last month against cities including the capital Kyiv as well as Lviv and Dnipro, targeting the energy network and civilians. The drones, piloted from the ground, explode on impact.

The source told Sky News that a fresh deal worth £175 m for another batch of drones had been agreed between Moscow and Tehran. “That means there will be another big supply of UAVs from Iran soon,” the source said.

A fresh bombardment will cause alarm in Ukraine which has staged an effective counter-offensive against Russian troops in recent weeks. Ukraine has used up precious supplies of Western anti-aircraft missiles to repel incoming drones amid calls for the West to supplement stocks.

Justin Bronk, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think-tank, told Sky: “If Iran hadn’t supplied the Shaheds, it would be significantly less effective in terms of the Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian electrical infrastructure and water.”

Vadym Prystaiko, the Ukrainian ambassador to the UK, warned on Tuesday night that reports that Iran had also agreed a deal to supply ballistic missiles posed a real threat to his country.

Iran has denied the claim.

The security source told Sky that Russia supplied 100 Shahed-136 drones in August along with 60 smaller Shahed-131 drones and six Mohajer-6 drones. The Mohajer-6 drones can drop or launch bombs or missiles.

Iran copied US drone technology

The source further claimed that Iran had obtained its drone technology after capturing a US drone in 2011. That will further fuel fears it will in time be able to replicate the NLAW and other Western anti-tank and aircraft missile systems.

The source said: “It seems that Iran also wants to benefit from the war [in Ukraine] by receiving from the Russians Western capabilities that will be useful for them in the future – as happened in the past.”

Russia and Iran – both diplomatic outcasts – have intensified their relations since the outbreak of war. on Tuesday night a news agency reported that Nikolai Patrushev, Russia’s national security adviser, had arrived in Tehran for meetings with the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

Tensions between Iran and the UK are already heightened and were further strained over reports that a Tehran-backed hit squad was operating in London to assassinate British-Iranian journalists working for a Farsi-language television station broadcasting in Iran but based in the UK.

On Tuesday protesters against the Iranian regime urged King Charles to shut down Iran’s embassy in London while the monarch was in Bradford during a tour of Yorkshire. (Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)

08 Nov 22. Italy open to supplying air defence systems to Ukraine -official. The Italian government is readying a new arms package for Ukraine including air defence systems, a governing coalition official said on Tuesday. Western nations have been delivering more air defence hardware to Ukraine since President Volodymyr Zelenskiy last month asked the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) nations for help to stop Russian missiles raining down on Ukrainian cities.

The Italian coalition official, who declined to be named, said Rome was ready to provide Ukraine with a variety of air-defence systems, including the medium-range Franco-Italian SAMP/T and Italian Aspide, as well as portable Stinger missiles.

However, it remains unclear how many of these it could offer or when any shipment might be delivered, the official said.

Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto spoke by phone on Monday with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and pledged to support Ukraine against Russia’s invasion for “as long as necessary”, a statement said.

Italy approved its first weapons delivery to Kyiv late in February, under the national unity government of Mario Draghi. Giorgia Meloni’s newly installed right-wing coalition government is preparing a sixth round of supplies.

Meloni is a staunch supporter of Ukraine despite the ambivalence of her coalition allies, Matteo Salvini and Silvio Berlusconi, who both have historically close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Rome has never disclosed details of the arms it has sent to Kyiv since the Russian invasion, but Italian and Ukrainian media have said previous shipments included multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), Pzh2000 howitzers and armoured vehicles.

On Monday, Kyiv said it had received its first delivery of NASAMS air defence systems from the United States. French President Emmanuel Macron also pledged last week to boost Kyiv’s anti-air defences. (Source: Reuters)

08 Nov 22. U.S. Provides Advanced Air Defense Systems to Ukraine. Two National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems have been delivered to Ukraine, Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said today.

The Defense Department had indicated it would provide the advanced air-defense systems in July.

“The Ukrainians announced these systems will contribute to Ukraine’s air defense capabilities and will help protect the Ukrainian people against Russian aerial attacks to include those conducted by unmanned, aerial vehicles or cruise missiles,” he said.

“We continue to have an ongoing and robust dialogue with the Ukrainians, with our allies, and with our partners in terms of what Ukraine’s battlefield needs are,” Ryder added.

Elsewhere, the USS Gerald Ford carrier strike group is participating in Exercise Silent Wolverine in the eastern Atlantic Ocean, along with six other NATO nations. The exercise aims to enhance integrated interoperability and deterrence, he said.

The U.S., Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Spain are participating. The exercise will conclude Nov. 14.

Separately, Exercise Malabar 2022 commenced today and will be followed by scheduled exercises involving ships, aircraft and personnel from Australia, India, Japan and the United States in the Philippine Sea and off the coast of Japan. The exercise is designed to increase interoperability and to strengthen partnerships and security in the Indo-Pacific region, Ryder said. It will conclude Nov. 15. (Source: US DoD)

08 Nov 22. Prime Minister announces crucial winter kit delivery for Ukrainian Forces as he meets NATO Chief.

The Prime Minister will welcome the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, to Downing Street today.

The Prime Minister will welcome the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, to Downing Street today
Ahead of the UK’s Integrated Review refresh, the visit will cement the UK’s ongoing support for NATO and discuss how the alliance can evolve to meet continued and new threats
It comes as the Prime Minister announces the UK will send a further 12,000 extreme cold weather sleeping kits and 150 heated tents to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine as the temperatures plummet in the country

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak will host the NATO Secretary General in Downing Street today (Wednesday) to discuss the future of security and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Jens Stoltenberg will be the first international leader the Prime Minister has hosted at 10 Downing Street since he took office last month.

The leaders are expected to discuss the ongoing war in Ukraine and how best allies can support their courageous defence. They will also look to the future of the NATO alliance and how we can ensure it is fighting fit for generations to come.

The meeting will be an opportunity for to discuss the UK’s ongoing update to the Integrated Review. The update builds on the strategy published last year which highlighted NATO’s central role in the UK’s defence. The UK is the largest European contributor to NATO, and has committed both our aircraft carrier and our nuclear capability to the alliance.

Ahead of the visit, the Prime Minister has announced the UK will provide a package of winter kit to the Ukrainian Armed Forces to assist as they defend their country in gruelling winter conditions. NATO allies have been at the forefront of global support for Ukraine, after Russia’s invasion permanently shifted the dial on both Euro-Atlantic security and global relations.

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said: “NATO is the cornerstone of our security, and the security of our allies. As the war in Ukraine continues to rage, we must not take peace at home for granted. I am determined the UK will be the bedrock of NATO for generations to come. But in order to face the challenges future we must evolve as an Alliance to meet, and remain ahead of, the threat from our adversaries. We must also continue backing the Ukrainian people in their resistance to Putin’s brutality. I’m pleased that UK-donated kit will be keeping the Ukrainian Armed Forces warm and safe as they face a perilous winter fighting for their country.”

The Secretary General will arrive at Downing Street after visiting Ukrainian troops at Lydd Army Camp as part of Operation Interflex – the training programme for the Ukrainian Armed Forces pioneered by the UK. The recruits are being put through their paces by UK military trainers, ensuring they are front-line-ready as the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to push back Russian invaders.

The Secretary General’s visit comes as the Prime Minister announces that the UK will send a further 12,000 sleeping kits and 150 heated tents to help Ukrainian troops fight through the winter.

The UK is set to deliver more than 25,000 sets of extreme cold weather clothing by mid-December, ensuring troops are able to operate and survive the plunging temperatures in Ukraine.

The extreme cold weather kits are in addition to more than 7,000 sets of normal cold weather kit distributed to recruits on Operation Interflex.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said: “With winter fast approaching, this equipment will ensure that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are able to operate effectively through the next few months. Alongside our training programme and the provision of lethal aid, it demonstrates our commitment to making sure that the basic Ukrainian soldier is well trained, well equipped and given the best possible chance to fight and determine their own future.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

08 Nov 22. Ukrainian aircraft strikes Russian strong points and anti-aircraft defence systems. Ukrainian aircraft have carried out 8 airstrikes on Russian strong points, anti-aircraft defence systems and clusters of Russian military equipment in three districts in southern Ukraine. Quote: “The occupiers have taken hundreds of children with disabilities from a psycho-neurological institution in Dnipriany, Kherson Oblast, to Russia.

Children and staff of the Oleshky orphanage are being prepared for a forcible ‘evacuation’ to Moscow Oblast. Nursing home patients in Kakhovka have been relocated and the premises of the home are now being used to house Russian soldiers.

Occupation authorities are rendering life in the region impossible by cutting off power, water supply and mobile service.

The ruscists are continuing to loot, taking stolen valuables, food and cars to the Russian Federation by trucks.”

Details: Meanwhile, Ukrainian aircraft carried out 8 airstrikes on Russian forces in the Beryslav, Bashtanka and Kherson districts, including 2 strikes on Russian strong points, 4 on anti-aircraft defence systems and 2 on clusters of Russian military equipment.

Ukraine’s Rocket Forces and Artillery have carried out 180 firing missions over the course of the past 24 hours.

Russia’s confirmed losses include 32 military personnel, a Strela anti-aircraft missile system, a tank, 2 howitzers, 8 armoured vehicles and an ammunition storage point in the Beryslav district.

Additionally, the operational command confirmed that a substantial amount of the occupiers’ fuel reserves were destroyed on the night of 5–6 November in Hola Prystan.

The operational command further added that Russian forces carried out around 50 UAV sorties in order to conduct aerial reconnaissance and confirm the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and adjust artillery fire.

In search of anti-aircraft defence systems, the Russians launched an air-to-surface Kh-31 missile from a Su-35 jet on the Bashtanka district in Mykolaiv Oblast. There were no casualties.

Russian forces deployed Grad multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) to fire on Kutsurub hromada [an administrative unit designating the village of Kutsurub and its adjacent territories – ed.] in Mykolaiv Oblast; there were no casualties.

Over the course of 7 November, Russian forces attacked the recently liberated territories in Kherson Oblast. They conducted 4 airstrikes in the vicinity of Nova Kakhovka and launched several S-300 missiles on Zolota Balka, damaging a school building, but sparing civilians.

The Russians deployed Lancet attack drones to attack several other towns and villages on the liberated territory of Kherson Oblast, striking an unpopulated area in Novovoskresenske (no casualties). A kamikaze drone has been shot down on approach to a target in Chervone.

The Russians have deployed Uragan MLRS to fire on the Nikopol district (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) twice over the course of 7 November. Private residential areas in Myrove and Marhanets hromadas have been struck, with several private yards damaged. There were no casualties.

Seven Russian naval vessels, including one dock landing ship but no missile carriers, are on standby in the Black Sea, manoeuvring along the Crimean coast. (Source: News Now/https://www.pravda.com.ua/)

07 Nov 22. Russian airpower could overwhelm Ukraine unless West steps in, experts warn. More defence systems and fighter jets are needed to stop Kremlin strikes, new report says.

Russia could overwhelm Ukraine with airpower if the West does not supply defence systems and fighter jets, top military analysts have warned.

The West must “urgently bolster” Ukrainian air-defence capacity, including with American F-16 and F-18, and Swedish Gripen aircraft.

Russian pilots have been cautious throughout the war, so even a small number of Western fighters could have a major deterrent effect, according to the report by the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi).

It warns that Western military aid is focussed mainly on the ground war as Ukraine has been successful in holding back Russia’s air force.

However, “there is a real danger that this success leads to Western complacency about the threat that [Russian air power] can still pose to Ukrainian forces, infrastructure and cities if given an opening”.

Speaking to the Telegraph, Justin Bronk, the report’s lead author, said F-16, F-18 and Gripens could offer Ukrainian fighter pilots “far superior radar performance and the ability to use far longer ranged and more capable Western air-to-air missiles” compared with the Soviet-made Su-27 and Mig-29 models Ukraine is currently operating.

“They are currently having to fly against modern Russian Su-35S, Su-30SM and Mig-31BM fighters/interceptors [which] completely outclass their jets on a technical level,” he said.

Throughout the war, Russian fighters have frequently been able to launch radar-homing air-to-air missiles at Ukrainian fighters from over 100km away.

In the first weeks of the war the deeply unequal radar and missile performance compared with Russian fighters, as well as being tactically outnumbered by up to 15:2 in some cases, forced Ukrainian pilots to fly extremely low to survive and fire their own weapons.

Aggressive Ukrainian tactics and skillful flying during the first days of the invasion led to several likely kills against Russian aircraft, the report says, although many Ukrainian fighters were shot down or damaged in the process.

The report notes Russian maps are often “decades out of date” making low-level flight at night very hazardous since obstacles are unlikely to be mapped.

Unable to accurately hit Ukrainian military units, the Russian air force defaulted to simply bombarding besieged cities as it had in Syria.

In early March, however, Russian surface-to-air missile (SAM) defences became much better coordinated.

The threat from long-range S-400 “Triumph” SAM systems based in Belarus and Crimea forced Ukrainian aircraft to fly at an extremely low altitude – below 100 ft – for most of their sorties on the northern and southern axes.

The threat from these long-range SAMs was compounded by the presence of a Russian “Podlet-K1” all-altitude radar in Belarus covering the Kyiv axis, and another in the south.

These mobile radar systems, introduced in 2018, allowed Russian forces to track Ukrainian jets and helicopters at altitudes as low as 15 ft at well over 150km, although the radar in the south, near Nova Kakovkha, was later destroyed.

Mr Bronk said: “The latest series of strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure are more of a sustainable threat than previous iterations as it now blends hundreds of cheap and numerous Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions to hit small targets, with larger and more expensive cruise missiles and ballistic missiles against large targets.

“This means Ukraine needs both advanced air defence systems like [the US-Norwegian] NASAMS and [German] IRIS-T to protect cities and infrastructure against cruise missiles, but also a lot of cheaper [shoulder-launched missiles] and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns to engage the Shaheds.”

In its latest estimate of Moscow’s combat aircraft losses, Ukrainian authorities say they have destroyed 277 Russian jets and 260 helicopters.

(Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)

05 Nov 22. Iran says it shipped drones to Russia before Ukraine war.

Iran acknowledged for the first time on Saturday that it had supplied Moscow with drones but said they were sent before the war in Ukraine, where Russia has used them to target power stations and civilian infrastructure.

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian said a “small number” of drones had been shipped a few months before Russia’s Feb 24 invasion.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy accused Tehran of lying, saying Kyiv’s forces were downing at least 10 of the unmanned aerial vehicles every day.

In Iran’s most detailed response to date, Amirabdollahian denied Tehran was continuing to supply drones to Moscow.

“This fuss made by some Western countries that Iran has provided missiles and drones to Russia to help the war in Ukraine – the missile part is completely wrong,” the official IRNA news agency quoted him as saying.

“The drone part is true and we provided Russia a small number of drones months before the Ukraine war,” he said.

In recent weeks Ukraine has reported a surge in drone attacks on civilian infrastructure, notably targeting power stations and dams, using Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. Russia denies its forces have used Iranian drones to attack Ukraine.

In a video address, Zelenskiy dismissed talk of limited Iranian supplies to Russia, saying Ukraine had downed 11 drones on Friday alone.

“If Iran continues to lie about the obvious, it means the world will make even more efforts to investigate the terrorist cooperation between the Russian and Iranian regimes and what Russia pays Iran for such cooperation,” he said.

Separately, U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley tweeted it was untrue that Iran had sent a few drones.

“They transferred dozens just this summer and have military personnel in occupied Ukraine helping Russia use them,” he said.

Zelenskiy, who has repeatedly pressed allies to provide more defences against aircraft and missiles, said he expected “good news” in coming weeks but gave no details. Kyiv, he added, would next week launch a fund-raising campaign to buy marine drones.

Last month, two senior Iranian officials and two Iranian diplomats told Reuters Iran had promised to provide Russia with surface-to-surface missiles, in addition to more drones.

IRNA quoted Amirabdollahian as saying Tehran and Kyiv had agreed to discuss allegations about the use of Iranian drones but the Ukrainians did not show up for talks.

In a response on Facebook, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oleg Nikolenko said Amirabdollahian was spreading “insinuations about an alleged refusal by the Ukrainian side”.

Amirabdollahian repeated Tehran would “not remain indifferent” if it were proven Russia had used Iranian drones against Ukraine.

The European Union last month agreed new sanctions on Iran over drone deliveries, and Britain imposed sanctions on three Iranian military figures and a defence manufacturer. (Source: Reuters)

07 Nov 22. Advance work in Ukraine blunted Russian cyber advantage, US says. At the Aspen Security Forum this summer, a top Biden administration official said there are “any number of theories for what we saw and what, frankly, we didn’t see” regarding Russian employment of cyberattacks tied to its war against Ukraine.

“Some argue for the deterrence the U.S. has put in place,” Anne Neuberger, the deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, said at the time, pointing to President Joe Biden’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin following the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack. “Some argue that it was the result of the extensive cybersecurity preparations Ukraine did, supported by allies and partners.”

“And,” she added, “some argue that we don’t quite know.”

Three months later, in late October, Gen. Paul Nakasone, the chief of both the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, proffered his own opinion, in harmony with Neuberger’s second point: Among the many moving parts and influences, overseas preparations made by the U.S. military helped blunt Russia’s effectiveness in the digital domain.

“First lesson learned? Presence matters. We learned that again,” Nakasone said Oct. 12 at a Council on Foreign Relations event. “While I would certainly not say that’s the key reason, I think it’s a contributing factor.”

Headed east

The U.S. dispatched a group of cyber experts to Ukraine at the end of 2021, amid rising international tensions and predictions of virtual destruction.

The so-called hunt-forward operation — a defensive and cooperative measure, undertaken at the invitation of a foreign government — was designed to root out malicious actors, identify network weaknesses and gain a better understanding of the tools hackers use.

“We sent a team on Dec. 2, led by a Marine Corps major, and her guidance was this: Go help them, and make sure they’re ready, in terms of anything that may occur,” Nakasone said. “She called back within the first two weeks and said, ‘Instead of coming home for the holidays, we’re going to be here for awhile.’”

Having the right people in the right room at the right time, the four-star general said, is invaluable. And “being able to understand the tradecraft of an adversary? Presence matters. Real presence matters.”

Hunt-forward endeavors are part of CYBERCOM’s persistent engagement strategy, a means of being in constant contact with adversaries and ensuring proactive, not reactive, moves are made. The command, tasked with guarding Department of Defense information networks and coordinating cyberspace operations, has conducted dozens of such missions across a range of countries in recent years.

Cyber specialists were previously sent to Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Montenegro and North Macedonia. While some deployments were tied to the 2018 midterm elections in the U.S., efforts in Lithuania, specifically, were connected to the Russian onslaught.

The work in Lithuania lasted three months, beginning before Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, and concluded in May. It was the first shared operation between Lithuania’s cyber forces and U.S. experts in the country. Lithuania’s vice minister of national defense, Margiris Abukevicius, in a statement at the time applauded the endeavor for generating a “wealth of intelligence and skills.”

In Croatia, U.S. personnel worked hand-in-glove with the Croatian Security and Intelligence Agency’s Cyber Security Centre experts. Together, they hunted on “networks of national significance,” according to CYBERCOM. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

04 Nov 22. Send Ukraine C-RAMs and VAMPIREs to help defeat Iranian drones. A group of Iranian-provided Shahed-136 drones struck Kyiv on October 17, reportedly killing at least four people, including a woman who was in a residential building and six months pregnant. About a week earlier, a barrage of Russian cruise missiles destroyed at least five residential buildings, reportedly killing at least 13 people and injuring more than 87 others, including 10 children.

Moscow is using its remaining cruise missiles and recently-procured Iranian drones to destroy infrastructure such as electrical substations, increase political pressure on Kyiv, and break the will of the Ukrainian population to resist the unprovoked Russian invasion.

The United States is sending the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) to help Ukraine deal with the cruise missile threat, but these systems are not ideally suited to deal with Russian attacks using Iranian-provided drones. To deal with the drone threat and to protect the NASAMS once they arrive, Washington should expedite the delivery of Vehicle-Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment (VAMPIRE) systems and send Counter – Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) systems as an interim solution.

NASAMS, jointly developed by Raytheon and Norway’s Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace, consist of an AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel Radar, AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), a command center, and launcher. The first two NASAMS are now in the U.S. government’s hands, and Ukrainian troops are being trained on how to employ the system. Both firing units are expected to arrive in Ukraine in the next few weeks. Six more units are projected to arrive in Ukraine next year (probably much later next year).

NASAMS provides a robust cruise missile defense capability (it helps protect Washington, D.C. against cruise missiles), but the system may struggle to counter Iranian Shahed-136 drones. That’s because of the Iranian drones’ challenging combination of slow speed, low flight profile, limited radar cross-section, and ability to attack in swarms from multiple directions. Those capabilities could enable a group of Shaheds to overwhelm a single NASAMS. Even if NASAMS were more effective against the Iranian drones, it is worth noting the cost per AMRAAM that NASAMS fires dramatically exceeds the cost of a Shahed-136 drone (upwards of 30 to 1).

The Ukrainians, therefore, need a low-cost counter-drone capability – and fast. Such a system could better protect key infrastructure and the NASAMS themselves. In fact, Ukrainian planners should plan to put counter drone systems in the vicinity of NASAMS firing units to avoid the disaster of an inexpensive Shahed drone destroying a newly-arrived NASAMS due to insufficient protection. That’s a technique that the United States has employed in the Middle East to protect its Patriot Air and Missile Defense Systems there.

The over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems the U.S. has already provided can help, but we should expect to see more Iranian drones used in Ukraine. For that reason, Washington should be looking to send additional counter-drone capability to Kyiv.

The U.S. has two effective candidates, one in development and one already fielded. Washington should send both to Ukraine as soon as possible.

The VAMPIRE system is composed of an electro-optical and infrared sensor ball (to detect the drone), a laser designator (to track the drone), and a four-round launcher of 70mm short range rockets (to engage the drone) – all loaded on the back of a pickup truck. It is low cost at roughly $27,000 a round.

The problem with the VAMPIRE system is that a contract has not been awarded yet and is unlikely to arrive in Ukraine before May 2023, according to Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder. Meanwhile, Shahed-136 attacks continue, and Ukraine needs additional help countering Iranian drones immediately.

Congress would be wise to ask about delays in finalizing the contract and what can be done to expedite the VAMPIRE’s delivery. In the next breath, Congress should confirm that maximum possible quantities are being produced and sent.

In the meantime, the U.S. Army’s C-RAM system can help. It is a derivative of the U.S. Navy’s Phalanx Close-In Weapons System which is used to protect U.S. Navy ships against cruise missiles and other threats. Over the last forty years, the Navy has purchased and employed many of these systems. The Army purchased a total of 53 C-RAM systems by April 2022, primarily to protect U.S. bases in the Middle East.

The system consists of a 20mm gatling gun, integrated infrared and radar search and tracking systems, and power generators, all mounted on a trailer. Similar to VAMPIRE, its cost per engagement is a fraction of NASAMS’. U.S. Army C-RAM systems have engaged and destroyed hundreds of enemy rockets and mortars in Iraq and Afghanistan and apparently shot down two incoming drones in Baghdad in January of this year.

As Washington reduced force structure in the Middle East, a decision was made to halt C-RAM production. The Army, however, can provide 3 or 4 of its current C-RAM systems to Ukraine immediately to help Kyiv address the drone threat until the VAMPIRE systems arrive. The Army will need to procure more anti-drone systems to replace the ones sent to Ukraine and strengthen existing American vulnerabilities, with the goal of ensuring that U.S. Central Command has sufficient systems to protect U.S. troops when the next escalation comes from Tehran and its terror proxies.

As the Kremlin escalates its cruise missile and Iranian-drone attacks against the people of Ukraine, Americans can do more than just condemn the attacks. In addition to ensuring Ukraine receives the full allotment of NASAMS as quickly as possible, the United States should also send C-RAMS and VAMPIRE systems without delay. Together, they can save Ukrainian lives and ultimately help defeat the Kremlin’s unprovoked invasion. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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