NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

Military and security developments

Nov. 4.

On 3 November, the deputy head of the Kherson occupation authority Kirill Stremousov stated that Russian forces ‘will most likely leave for the left [southern] bank’ of the Dnieper River, while urging civilians to evacuate from Kherson city as quickly as possible. His statement came amid reports of Russian flags being removed from administrative buildings and the closure of certain military checkpoints in Kherson city. However, it remains unclear whether Russian forces are preparing for a mass withdrawal across the river or intend to defend Kherson city. Please see the Forecast below for further analysis.
The most intense fighting continues to take place in eastern Ukraine as Russian forces step up offensives along the Bakhmut and Donetsk lines. General Valery Zaluzhny, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, stated on 3 November that Russian forces have ‘tripled’ the intensity of hostilities on certain unnamed fronts. Given wider reports from other Ukrainian officials, it is highly likely this refers to the Bakhmut, Donetsk and Vuhledar fronts.
Russian sources have continued to claim incremental progress around Bakhmut, Soledar and west of Donetsk city over the last 24 hours, but we cannot confirm any gains at this stage given contradictory Ukrainian reporting. What is clear, however, is that intense fighting is ongoing across multiple axes and further details will likely emerge over the weekend that could clarify how successful the Russian offensives have been. Nevertheless, as reported yesterday, it is likely that Russian assaults against Pavlivka and Vuhledar further south are not achieving significant results considering the rates of casualties likely being sustained. However, geolocated footage emerging on 3 November does indicate that Russian forces have advanced beyond Yehorivka, 4 miles (7km) south of Vuhledar, to the outskirts of Pavlivka.
While not as intensive as the Bakhmut-Donetsk front, Russian forces have also launched limited counterattacks at a slower pace along the Oskil-Kreminna line further north. On 3 November, Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Oleksiy Hromov reported that Russian forces had launched three offensive operations at unspecified locations in the direction of Kharkiv. The General Staff has claimed that their forces have repelled various Russian attacks, but it remains unclear if they have succeeded in regaining any territory. This morning, 4 November, Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast, Serhiy Haidai, confirmed that Russian forces are still attempting to break through Ukrainian defences between Kreminna and Svatove. As previously assessed, these are likely spoiling attacks aimed at repulsing Ukrainian forces from the R-66 highway and undermining preparations for future assaults towards Kreminna and Svatove. Nevertheless, the Russian Ministry of Defence also reported on 3 November that Ukrainian forces are continuing to launch attacks themselves on this front, with Ukrainian officials claiming on 3 November that they have liberated the town of Stelmakhivka, 11 miles (18km) northwest of Svatove.
Aligning with our assessments in recent months, British Defence Intelligence reported on 4 November that Russian forces are experiencing severe morale problems across the frontline, leading to widespread reluctance to fight. Russian forces are reportedly now deploying ‘barrier troops’ or ‘blocking units’ that threaten to shoot their own forces to deter them from retreating or refusing to launch offensives. Such tactics have been used frequently in Russian and Soviet military history, and we have previously written about the deployment of Chechen and Rosgvardia units that have seemingly served similar deterrent roles, though stopping short of issuing orders to shoot deserters up until now. If true, the deployment of such blocking units is the latest confirmation of the extremely poor morale and discipline within the Russian military – issues which the deployment of increasing numbers of ill-equipped, unmotivated and poorly trained mobilised men will only exacerbate going forward.
This morning, 4 November, Belarusian border guards claimed to have intercepted a Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) one kilometre inside the Belarusian border in the Gomel region. Belarusian authorities claim they successfully forced the UAV to land, whereafter they learned that it was used for training in dropping explosive devices and conducting reconnaissance to film border security. This development is unlikely to seriously change the threat environment along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, with the Belarusian response likely to be primarily rhetorical, backed up by military posturing. Earlier this week, Russia deployed three MiG-31Ks to Machulishchy, just south of Minsk, armed with Kinzhal ‘hypersonic’ missiles (which in reality are nothing more than air-launched Iskandr ballistic missiles). Such deployments are highly likely to be designed as a message to NATO as well as Ukraine, but we maintain that Belarus and Russia currently cannot open up a new front along the northern Ukrainian border (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 30 June).

Political developments

Following Moscow’s U-turn earlier this week on the Black Sea Grain Initiative, a senior United Nations negotiator involved in the deal stated on 3 November that ‘important steps forward’ have been made relating to unblocking fertiliser exports from Russia. On 3 November, Russian Foreign Secretary Sergei Lavrov called on UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to ensure that the indirect restrictions on Russian agricultural and fertiliser exports be resolved ‘in the very near future’, indicating that this remained a potential condition for Russia’s agreement to extend the deal beyond 19 November. UN negotiator Rebeca Grynspan did acknowledge that Russian fertiliser exports continue to face significant obstacles and that she is working closely with the EU, US and UK on the issue. Without concessions in this area, it remains possible that Russia will once again withdraw from the deal, which despite the UN and Turkey’s determination to continue grain exports without Russian approval, would nevertheless once again destabilise global food prices and the stability of global food supply chains.
Smaller numbers of long-range strikes and kamikaze drone attacks have continued to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure over the last 24-48 hours, but existing instability within the national grid is still causing widespread disruption. A kamikaze drone was notably shot down this morning, 4 November, over Lviv oblast, highlighting that western Ukraine remains vulnerable to drones launched from Belarus as well as other parts of the country. Over 4.5 million Ukrainians have been without power overnight and as of this morning – a notable increase in the numbers affected at any one time up until now. Today, 4 November, Ukrenergo has imposed rolling blackouts on Kyiv city and ten oblasts outside the planned schedules of load sharing: Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr.
Amid the rolling blackouts, the parliamentary Tax Committee announced on 4 November that it is currently developing a package of measures designed to support industrial resilience in the country. The chief measure set to be introduced will be allowing companies to import electric generators without paying import VAT, aimed at allowing businesses to source backup power systems in the event of prolonged blackouts.
On 3 November, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed their inspection of three locations in Ukraine and reported that they have found no evidence or indication of any undeclared nuclear activities and/or materials. Ukraine requested the inspections after Russia alleged without evidence that Ukraine was likely preparing to set off a dirty bomb (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 24 October). The IAEA confirmed they were given unfettered access to all sites that they inspected.

Forecast

Kirill Stremousov’s statement on 3 November that Russian forces ‘will most likely leave for the left [southern] bank’ of the Dnieper River has once again raised the question of whether Russia intends to hold Kherson city or not. Amid growing speculation and ample evidence of Russian forces fortifying the southern bank of the river, we have seen no indications that elite Russian forces currently operating on the northern bank of the river, including airborne VDV, naval infantry and Spetsnaz units, have withdrawn. Indications in recent weeks have rather pointed to additional mobilised forces being brought up to boost troop numbers on the Kherson frontline. As a result, Ukrainian officials have expressed scepticism around Stremousov’s statement and wider speculation about an imminent Russian withdrawal. President Volodymyr Zelensky had previously described reports of a Russian withdrawal from Kherson as ‘misinformation’. Maskirovka (military deception) has always remained a central pillar of Russian military planning and strategic communications. As a result, we remain cautious in drawing definitive conclusions from such statements, particularly as statements from Russian officials have often proven false. Stremousov has consistently issued contradictory statements in the past, including oscillating between warning of a Ukrainian attack against the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric dam and downplaying the prospect at regular intervals. He furthermore speculated on 3 November that fighting could take place in Kherson city in the next two weeks, which suggests he may be anticipating a Russian defence of the city, despite his other comments. Furthermore, some Russian sources have suggested that the removal of the flag above the Kherson Oblast Administration headquarters reflects plans for the administration to relocate to Henichesk near the Crimean border. Rather than an indication of an imminent withdrawal and abandonment of Kherson, this could also suggest the need to relocate the civilian administration behind the frontlines amid preparations for protracted urban fighting in the city. We have also previously seen indicators that suggest Russian service personnel have been moving into civilian areas on the northern bank of the Dnieper, wearing civilian clothes. This could ultimately aim at setting traps for Ukrainian forces, which would likely be designed to inflict as heavy casualties as possible on Ukrainian forces before ultimately withdrawing at a later date if needed. In conclusion, it remains to be seen whether Russian forces will fight for Kherson city given these contradictory indicators. Looking ahead, the withdrawal of elite Russian forces from the northern bank of the Dnieper will likely be amongst the most significant indicators that Russia intends to withdraw from Kherson. Moscow is unlikely to risk losing its most capable units (it is probably more willing to sacrifice large numbers of ill-trained mobilised forces in the city’s defence).

Moldova: Tensions between Chisinau and Transnistria will likely increase following energy supply restrictions on both sides. On 3 November, the Russian-backed separatist republic of Transnistria has accused the government of Moldova of creating a humanitarian crisis after it restricted gas supplies to the region in response to Transnistria suspending electricity supplies to Moldova-proper earlier this week. Officials in Transnistria intend to approach Russian authorities to force state-owned Moldovgaz to transfer more energy if necessary, as Transnistria’s power plants burn the Russian gas which also supplies Moldova. Moldova’s heavy reliance on electricity from Transnistria has contributed to the growing energy crisis facing the nation, with rising electricity prices forcing Chisinau to turn to expensive (but still discounted) Romanian imports. As tensions increase between the Moscow-backed separatist region and the central government in Chisinau, the risk of false-flag operations along the border, bombing threats akin to those witnessed in early October and other instances of pro-Russian destabilisation efforts within Moldova are all likely to remain high in the weeks ahead.

Russia: Proposed removal of directly elected mayors will increase Kremlin control over anti-Moscow hotspots, with mass unrest unlikely under martial law. On 3 November, certain regions in Russia began discussions with the Presidential Administration over the potential abolition of directly elected mayors of several major cities. Currently, citizens directly elect the mayors of Khabarovsk, Yakutsk, Abakan, Novosibirsk, Anadyr and Ulan-Ude, and it is highly significant that all of these cities are traditionally centres of anti-Moscow and regionalist sentiment – particularly Khabarovsk. By abolishing direct elections of mayors, the power of regional governors will increase. Given the fact that regional governors ultimately remain beholden to the Kremlin, the move will further consolidate Moscow’s centralisation drive. However, the abolishment would also deprive local residents of an opportunity to express their discontent through votes, which could in turn funnel public anger towards anti-government protests. Ultimately, however, the prospect of mass unrest in response to the potential electoral change remains low, as all regional governments may use the new martial law to suppress any dissent.

Nov. 3.

Russian sources claim that their forces successfully repelled a number of Ukrainian counter-attacks across the Kherson frontline in the last 24 hours. This took place primarily along the northern section of the frontline to the east of Davydiv Brid. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also reported that fighting took place on 2 November between Russian reconnaissance forces and Ukrainian troops near Dudchany, located around 28 miles (45km) north-east of Beryslav. In addition, Ukrainian officials claimed on 2 November that their forces struck highly significant military targets in Kherson city, including air defence systems and the Antonivsky Bridge.
It is clear that Russian forces have continued to prioritise fortifying their various positions on both sides of the Dnieper river. Social media footage indicates that they are constructing concrete pillboxes in Hola Prystan, a settlement located around 7 miles (12km) south-west of Kherson that sits on the southern bank of the Dnieper and overlooks much of the estuary delta. Serhiy Khlan, an advisor to the Kherson regional administration, also reported on 2 November that Russian forces are constructing wood-and-earth firing points (DZOTs) in urban areas of Nova Kakhovka, again on the southern banks of the river.
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct steady counter-offensive operations along the Oskil-Kreminna line in the east of the country. The Russian defence ministry claimed on 2 November that its forces repelled a series of attacks north-west of Svatove, as well as attacks to the west of Kreminna; Ukrainian progress cannot be confirmed at this stage. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a number of Russian attacks from the direction of Kreminna towards Makiivka and Nevske, located around 15 miles (25km) north-west of Kreminna. These likely constitute Russian ‘spoiling’ attacks aimed at disrupting Ukrainian lines and slowing Ukrainian preparations for further advances towards the R-66 highway and Kreminna itself.
On 2 November, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, Hanna Malyar, stated that the ‘epicentre’ of the fighting in Ukraine is currently taking place around Bakhmut, Soledar and Donetsk city. This follows earlier reports that Russian, Wagner and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces launched a series of intense offensives along this axis, claiming some incremental progress. In particular, Wagner forces claimed in the last 24 hours that they are trying to break through Ukrainian positions in both Soledar and Bakhmut. The Ukrainians claim to be holding their current positions and repelling Russian assaults. Further south, intense fighting is ongoing around Vuhledar, though various Russian sources acknowledged that efforts to seize Pavlivka, located around 30 miles (47km) to the south-west of Donetsk city, have largely slowed.
According to the most recent update from the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI), Russian armoured and artillery units are currently struggling to source both artillery ammunition and sufficient serviceable replacement armoured vehicles. This comes amid growing equipment losses. During Ukraine’s October offensives, Russian forces were reportedly losing over 40 armoured vehicles per day, which is roughly equivalent to a battalion’s worth. Notably, the White House accused North Korea on 2 November of covertly supplying Russia with ‘significant’ quantities of artillery ammunition under the cover of shipments via the Middle East and Africa. These reports remain credible given previous indications that Pyongyang is ready to support Russia’s war effort. It also comes amid Moscow’s growing reliance on Iranian-produced drones, which is likely to extend to short-range ballistic missiles.

Political developments

The UN Security Council rejected a Russian resolution on 2 November calling for an investigation into the unfounded accusations that the US is involved in a Ukrainian biological weapons programme. Notably, China voted in favour of the resolution. Moscow has accused Ukraine of trying to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as making preparations for a ‘dirty bomb’. A team of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) specialists began inspections of various Ukrainian sites on 31 October, at the invitation of Kyiv.
In a related development, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Andrey Rudenko, confirmed on 2 November that work has begun on formally integrating the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) under the control of Rosenergoatom. He claimed that Ukrainian workers at the plant have signed contracts with the company. Rosenergoatom is a subsidiary of Atomenergoprom, the state-owned holding company that combines Russia’s civil nuclear industry. Rudenko also reported that Rosenergoatom is currently considering establishing a ‘security zone’ around the plant. This comes amid Ukrainian reports earlier this week that Russian workers have begun constructing unidentified structures on the roof of the ZNPP. In addition, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, claimed on 2 November that Russian forces prevented a Ukrainian ‘terrorist attack’ at the ZNPP. This is the latest unfounded claim by Russia that Ukraine is trying to attack the plant.

Forecast

As of the morning of 3 November, seven vessels carrying Ukrainian grain had left Ukrainian ports following Russia’s reversal of its decision to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In what amounted to an embarrassing turnabout after the UN and Turkey effectively called Russia’s bluff on the safety of the grain corridor, President Vladimir Putin stated on 2 November that Russia could once again withdraw from the deal if Kyiv violates its security guarantees – namely not to use the grain corridor for military operations against Russia. In addition, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, called on UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres earlier on 3 November to ensure that the section of the initiative aimed at easing Russian fertiliser and grain exports is fulfilled. Lavrov reiterated Moscow’s accusations that the obstacles to Russian exports have not been removed and that the situation needed to be resolved ‘in the very near future’ – likely an allusion to the expiration of the current grain deal on 19 November. Russian agricultural exports are not explicitly targeted by US or EU sanctions, though the Kremlin claims they are badly hindered by restrictions imposed on the financial and logistics sectors. Notably, when asked whether Russia’s U-turn meant it was ready to renew the grain deal from 19 November, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated ‘no, it does not mean that’, underscoring that the deal would have to be assessed before a decision was made. As such, the absence of further concessions relating to Russian agricultural exports will possibly be used as a pretext for another withdrawal, as will additional Ukrainian drone attacks against Crimea. The prospect of Russian false-flag operations targeting grain shipments will also remain an enduring threat to the grain initiative for the foreseeable future, despite Moscow’s apparent unwillingness to escalate. This threat has actually increased following Russia’s humbling U-turn; at home, Moscow will possibly be expected to project strength in order to save face. In this respect, certain pro-war hawks inside Russia have already criticised the move. Prominent pro-Russian Ukrainian commentator Yuri Podolyaka decried the decision as weakness to his 2.8 m Telegram followers, claiming it will have a negative impact on Russia’s war effort. The fact that Russia’s bluff was called is likely to have important implications on future negotiations and perceptions of Moscow’s wider threats. By re-joining the deal so soon, Moscow seemingly acknowledged that it stood to lose more than it would gain if it followed through with implied threats to reimpose a naval blockade and/or attack grain shipments – at least for now. Indeed, it also likely suggests that Russia’s naval forces have not been capable of imposing a total blockade for several months amid growing Ukrainian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These capabilities are steadily restricting the Black Sea Fleet’s room for manoeuvre and ability to project power in the Black Sea. During his daily address to the nation on 2 November, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, called Moscow’s Black Sea U-turn a ‘failure of Russian aggression’. Russia was not prepared to follow through with its implied threats, underscoring that Moscow does not retain the diplomatic authority to prevent exports from continuing without resorting to military means. Although the 19 November deadline will be another opportunity for Russia to withdraw, the recent U-turn will embolden Kyiv to resist future Russian threats. However, it is also likely to set an important precedent in how the US, Europe and NATO perceive Russian threats and escalatory rhetoric, with many likely to conclude that Russia’s bluffs can (and must) be called to deter further aggression. This alone means that an escalation in the Black Sea ahead of 19 November cannot be discounted if Moscow feels its coercive credibility is at stake. It is nevertheless important to recognise the unique context of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, where the stakes for Russia remain relatively low and the Kremlin likely recognises it does not stand to gain much through escalation. In the first instance, this reaffirms our assessment that Putin remains a rational actor capable of backing down if necessary. However, the relatively low stakes of the Black Sea deal stand in contrast to more existential and high-stakes issues driving Russia’s escalatory rhetoric and wider strategic deterrence campaign. These include the prospects of successful Ukrainian counter-offensives, the long-term security of Crimea and perceptions of growing US-NATO involvement in Ukraine. It is therefore important not to interpret the Kremlin’s willingness to back down over the Black Sea deal – which it could still scupper ahead of 19 November – as a general willingness to back down on more fundamental and existential issues, especially if the military situation deteriorates markedly for Russia.

Nov. 2.

Cyber Update

Pro-Russia cyber campaigns against Ukraine’s allies maintained pace throughout this monitoring period. They targeted key political infrastructure and actors in the UK, Poland and Slovakia, among others. Low-level malicious cyber attacks, specifically distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, remain the preferred tactics of pro-Russia hacktivist groups. The volume of attacks has reportedly increased significantly in Latvia since the onset of war in Ukraine. Nonetheless, national cyber security bodies across Ukraine’s allies are facing an overall deterioration in their cyber threat environments.
Meanwhile, the launch of Operation World Cup, or Operation FIFA, by the pro-Kyiv Anonymous hacktivist collective highlights the expansion of the scope of pro-Ukraine cyber campaigns and activities as a result of Iran’s military ties with Russia. This will increase threats towards FIFA, Qatari entities and sponsors or partners of the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 in the coming weeks.

Pro-Russia cyber campaigns continue to attack key industrial, political targets across Ukraine’s allies

On 31 October, reports emerged from the UK regarding a potential Russian hack against the former prime minister Liz Truss’s personal mobile phone. The hack reportedly occurred while Truss was serving as foreign minister during the Conservative Party leadership campaign in August 2022. The attackers gained access to top-secret details regarding negotiations with international allies over Ukraine and potential arms shipments. Further information stolen from the device includes private messages between Truss and the former chancellor of the Exchequer, Kwasi Kwarteng. The British government has so far declined to comment on the specific case. However, it has said that there are robust systems in place to protect government officials against threats of this calibre, including regular briefings on the mitigation of personal cyber threats. Many MPs have called for an investigation into the hack, following accusations that the government is failing to take national security seriously, especially regarding cyber threats.
Also on 31 October, the deputy manager of Latvia’s Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) announced that the rate of cyber attacks against Latvia increased by 30 percent since the war began in February. The country has mainly been targeted by state-inspired nominal hacktivism, predominantly by groups such as Killnet and XakNet, which have dominated the cyber threat landscape across the country. Despite having increased in frequency, the majority of attacks are still DDoS attacks and therefore have minimal long-term impacts on their intended targets.
On 28 October, the EU’s largest copper producer ‘Aurubis’ suffered a cyber attack that forced the shutdown of its IT systems. Production has reportedly not been impacted by the attack, though the company is still assessing the full extent of the incident with assistance from the German authorities. Aurubis has yet to confirm the nature of the attack, though it stated that it was likely part of a wider cyber campaign against the metals and mining industry. Germany’s cyber security agency has warned that cyber risks are currently at their highest-ever levels, due largely to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Although the attack itself has yet to be attributed to a certain group, it does indicate a heightened cyber risk for private industries.
On 27 October, the parliaments of both Slovakia and Poland were the subject of cyber attacks that brought down various parliamentary networks, including those needed for telecommunications and voting. Initial assessments of the incident point to a DDoS attack. The targeting of parliamentary buildings in both instances means they were part of a Russian operation designed to retaliate against Slovakia and Poland’s support for Ukraine in the ongoing war. This is in keeping with our previous assessment that Russia will continue to target the cyber infrastructure of Ukraine’s allies.

Convergence of cyber campaigns against Russia, Iran; pro-Kyiv groups continue to target Russia-based organisations supporting Moscow’s war effort

On 29 October, a Twitter account claiming to represent the Anonymous hacktivist collective posted two cartoon images indicating the merging of objectives in their operations targeting the Iranian and Russian governments, labelled #OpIran and #OpRussia. In one post, Anonymous claimed that ‘Iranians and Ukrainians are fighting different heads of the same monster’, with an attached image highlighting reports of Iran supplying drones used by Russia to support their military operations in Ukraine.
On 26 October, the IT Army of Ukraine, a pro-Kyiv hacking group with alleged links to the Ukrainian government, announced the success of cyber attacks (dubbed ‘technical work’) against the ‘online services of [Russia’s] Federal Tax Service’. The cyber attacks were first announced on 19 October and reportedly lasted an entire week, disrupting online services linked to the Federal Tax Service and the delivery of Federal Tax Service reports ahead of deadlines (see Sibylline Weekly Ukraine Cyber Update – 26 October 2022). The pro-Kyiv threat actor has refrained from providing additional details of this incident. In the same post, the IT Army of Ukraine announced the launch of cyber attacks against BCS Financial Group, a Russian financial service and brokerage company.
On 25 October, a Twitter account claiming to represent the Anonymous collective published a video calling on the sporting governing body FIFA to suspend Iran from the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, which is set to take place in November and December. The hacktivist group’s declaration of Operation World Cup comes in response to Tehran’s reported supply of drones to Moscow, with the collective calling for Ukraine to replace Iran’s national team in World Cup tournaments. In the days that followed, Anonymous Twitter accounts reported the alleged launch of cyber attacks resulting in disruption to online services of the Qatari government’s communications office, Al Daffa Aluminium, Upvc & Steel Works, Qatar Central Bank National Payment and the Iran Football Federation websites. They have threatened to target FIFA if the organisation does not ban Iran. The level of disruption indicates that these were likely DDoS attacks.

FORECAST

Over the past week, patterns of pro-Russia cyber activity remained in line with our assessment that the threat to European and other Western countries supporting Ukraine against Russia is high. Pro-Russia cyber actors continued to target key political and industrial infrastructure, including parliament buildings in both Slovakia and Poland, as well as Europe’s biggest copper smelter Aurubis. We assess that all Western (and particularly NATO) countries will remain exposed to pro-Russia DDoS attacks in the coming six months. Furthermore, Russia is likely to resume attacks against energy infrastructure and power grids in Ukraine as the winter season sets in, which will likely have a significant impact given the typically heightened energy demands during this season. Overall, pro-Russia cyber actors are likely to continue executing low-level malicious cyber attacks against the aforementioned targets, most likely in the form of DDoS attacks. However, these are relatively unsophisticated and will likely only disrupt targets temporarily (lasting from a few hours to a few days). In line with our previous assessment, it remains highly likely that pro-Russia cyber attacks will occur after Western governments make public announcements in support of Ukraine. These announcements could pertain to military or financial support, as well as sanctions against Russia. Government agencies and critical infrastructure operators in the telecommunications, energy and technology sectors are the most vulnerable to any such cyber attacks. In previous weeks, we have observed a decline in cyber attacks and campaigns by pro-Ukraine groups such as the Anonymous collective, which has focused its attention on ‘Operation Iran’ amid the Iranian government’s ongoing crackdown on mass protests. Statements by Anonymous and the launch of Operation World Cup (also labelled Operation FIFA) highlight the convergence of Anonymous-led cyber campaigns targeting Iran and Russia. This has been attributed to Iran’s reported supply of weapons, namely drones, used by Russia in its war against Ukraine. This represents a shift in pro-Ukraine cyber campaigns and activities and widens the scope of businesses and entities vulnerable to cyber attacks beyond those directly associated with the Russian government or its military endeavours in Ukraine. Current threats are focused mostly towards Iranian and Qatari organisations, as well as FIFA. However, cyber threats are likely to extend to sponsors and event partners of FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 in the coming weeks, particularly if FIFA refuses to suspend Iran’s participation.

There were few notable developments on the Kherson frontline over the last 24 hours, with reports largely aligning with trends we have been monitoring closely in recent weeks. Russian forces are continuing to dig in on both sides of the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that their forces had successfully repulsed several Ukrainian counter-attacks across the front, including attempted advances towards Mylove, 18 miles (29km) northeast of Beryslav.
There were similarly few confirmed developments in eastern Ukraine on 1 November, with the pattern of reporting indicating a continuation of steady Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along the Oskil-Kreminna line, though any Ukrainian progress cannot be confirmed at this stage. Various Russian sources, including the commander of the Russian BARS-13 combat reserve which is currently defending Svatove, have claimed that

Ukrainian forces are massing west of Svatove and intend to take the city as early as this week. Other Russian sources have also reported on continued Ukrainian attacks west and northwest of Kreminna, anticipating a Ukrainian thrust to cut off the R-66 highway to separate Kreminna and Svatove.

Further south along the Bakhmut line, fighting remains intense as Russian forces continue ground assaults in an attempt to make further progress to the east and south of Bakhmut town. However, few indications would confirm any notable Russian or Ukrainian progress on this front over the last 24 hours. By contrast, Russian sources have claimed that their forces are making incremental progress west and southwest of Donetsk city. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces claimed on 1 November that they have taken ground in Nevelske, 8 miles (13km) northwest of Donetsk city, and took an unspecified number of Ukrainian prisoners during the attack. Russian sources also made further unconfirmed claims that Russian forces advanced into Marinka, a town 14 miles (22km) southwest of Donetsk. Further south still, Russians have claimed that fighting around Vuhledar has continued to intensify, though it remains unclear whether Russian forces are succeeding in their apparent aim of encircling various Ukrainian positions and gaining total control over Pavlivka, 30 miles (47km) south-west of Donetsk city.
On 1 November, Russian sources claimed that the commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army Lieutenant-General Andrey Mordichev has replaced Colonel-General Alexander Lapin as the commander of the Central Military District, and by extension commander of Russia’s central grouping of forces in the Donbas. The Russian Ministry of Defence has not confirmed the appointment. Mordichev remains highly popular among various pro-war hardliner factions, including Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. He has reportedly pledged to report objectively the realities at the front, after widespread criticism among milbloggers of Lapin and the wider Ministry of Defence for military reporting that has consistently failed to reflect the realities on the ground.
Overnight Russian long-range strikes and kamikaze drone attacks continued to target energy and military installations, including in Cherkasy, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts. This morning, 2 November, Ukrainian air defences interdicted and destroyed three Kh-59 cruise missiles that were headed towards Odesa. Russian officials also confirmed that during strikes on 1 November, Tu-22M3 strategic bombers fired numerous Kh-32 air-to-surface cruise missiles, which they claim have only been used once before in the war during a strike on Kramatorsk in May. The Kh-32 is a modernised version of the Kh-22 designed to penetrate advanced air defence systems through a combination of high speed and a varied flight path that utilises both high and low altitudes to avoid interdiction. It remains unclear how large Russia’s stockpile of Kh-32s is, but it is unlikely to be extensive.
In related developments, the head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Andriy Yermak stated on 2 November that Kyiv is currently ‘engaged in dialogue’ with an unnamed party to supply much more modern air defence systems to interdict Russian and Iranian-produced ballistic and cruise missiles. The Pentagon on 1 November reiterated its concerns that Russia is seeking advanced surface-to-surface ballistic missiles from Iran and advanced attack drones. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on 1 November that a shipment of over 200 Shahed-136, Mohajer-6 and more advanced Arash-2 drones was being prepared. Unnamed Western officials also estimated on 1 November that approximately 1,000 Iranian ballistic missiles are currently preparing to be shipped to Russia – which would be the first confirmed transfer of Iranian precision-guided weapons to Russia. Ukrainian intelligence anticipates many of these missiles will be stationed in Belarus to fire against targets in northern and western Ukraine, and will likely go a long way towards boosting dwindling supplies of Russian Iskandr missiles to enable Russia to continue its long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure over the winter.

Political developments

The head of the Kyiv Regional Military Administration Oleksiy Kuleba stated on 1 November that a total power outage across Kyiv oblast remains possible if Russia continues attacking the country’s energy infrastructure. Kuleba stated that in the event of a major disruption, Kyiv oblast could be without electricity and heating for up to two weeks, though the regional administration is actively planning for such an eventuality. 1,000 stationary ‘heating points’ will be set up across Kyiv oblast if there is a prolonged blackout, which will be equipped with generators, food and water supplies. Kuleba also confirmed that the State Emergency Service is also building contingencies for mobile heating points. While it remains to be seen whether Russia’s aerial campaign will trigger prolonged regional blackouts for a period of weeks, it is clear that Ukraine’s energy security is deteriorating as the winter approaches, which will place extreme pressure on business operations across the country as energy rationing and blackouts are only set to worsen.
On 1 November, the Washington Post cited unnamed US defence officials claiming that US monitors have conducted in-person inspections for only 10 percent of weapons the US has supplied to Ukraine that expressly require oversight, which include Stinger surface-to-air and Javelin anti-tank missiles. This follows the formal establishment of the US Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe last week (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 28 October). This forms part of a wider US push to improve oversight of US-supplied weapons to prevent their proliferation across Europe and elsewhere, particularly of small arms and ammunition. Notably, on 31 October, Finnish police raised concerns that the smuggling of Western-supplied weapons by organised crime groups is now a growing issue in Finland. Boosting oversight and accountability of weapons is also likely to become increasingly important following the US Midterm elections, particularly if the Republicans gain control of both the House and Senate and scrutiny over weapons transfers increases.
The UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee is this week conducting an inquiry into the Russian Wagner Group private military company (PMC), with a case against the group now to be brought before the High Court in London. A group of Ukrainians in the UK have launched an unprecedented legal case accusing the Wagner Group of perpetrating ‘terrorism’ in Ukraine, which aims to uncover bns of dollars in reparations for the victims of said terrorism. Evidence provided to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 1 November accused Wagner and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of engaging in terrorism via murder, rape, the targeting of infrastructure and the planting of explosives near nuclear facilities. The case has the potential to result in the formal recognition of the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation by British courts. If supported by other international courts, this would likely have a significant impact on the group’s operations outside Ukraine, particularly its involvement in security operations in various Sub-Saharan African countries, such as Mali and the Central African Republic.
On 2 November, unnamed senior US officials cited in the New York Times reported that the US received intelligence that senior Russian military leaders had discussions around when and how Russia might use low-yield nuclear weapons in Ukraine. These discussions allegedly occurred in mid-October and did not involve President Putin. While US officials have stated that such discussions are concerning, they are to be expected given the ramping up of nuclear rhetoric and the nature of Kremlin power structures. Putin is the only person with authority to authorise a nuclear strike, and given Putin regularly fails to inform even senior ministers and power brokers of his decisions, it is likely that Russian military planners will be considering contingencies for if a nuclear strike order is made. This report does not change our assessment of the threat of nuclear escalation in Ukraine. Please see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – Nuclear Escalation: Scenarios, Triggers, Implications – 25 October.

Forecast

On 2 November, the Kremlin confirmed that it was resuming its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, following its withdrawal on 29 October after the Ukrainian raid on Sevastopol (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 31 October). The Russian Ministry of Defence has confirmed that it has received written guarantees from Kyiv that it will not use the grain corridor to launch military operations against Russia. While no further details have been released, the geography of the Black Sea and the location of the grain corridor east of Odesa means that future Ukrainian drone strikes against Crimea could be used as a pretext for Russia to once again withdraw from the agreement. The Russian U-turn came after a series of meetings with Turkish and United Nations officials and notably came just hours after Ukraine, Turkey and the UN announced that it would temporarily suspend transit through the grain corridor from today, 2 November. This followed statements that all three parties had been determined to continue with the grain export deal even without Russian involvement, in an apparent calling of Russia’s bluff regarding the issue of the grain corridor’s safety. Russia’s acquiescence is likely in part a tacit acknowledgement that Moscow does not in reality retain the authority to prevent grain exports through the Black Sea, without resorting to overt military means. Russia had previously stated on 1 November that it would not re-enter the deal before an investigation into the Sevastopol raid had been completed. As such, the rapidity with which Moscow has U-turned and resumed its participation in the deal suggests Russia recognised its coercion would not work and furthermore indicates that an escalation targeting the grain corridor was not something with which the Kremlin intended to follow through at this stage. This is ultimately a positive development for global food security and will allow exports to continue flowing in the short term at least, easing grain prices. The deal is nevertheless up for renewal on 19 November, and as such further negotiations are likely before Russia agrees to extend the deal for a further four months. As stated above, the vague nature of Ukraine’s ‘guarantees’ means that Russia could terminate its involvement once again at any point in an attempt to extract further concessions. Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s U-turn has clearly shown the limitations of Russian coercion in the Black Sea, and Moscow may be reticent to repeat the withdrawal for fear of the UN and Turkey once again calling their bluff and continuing exports regardless.

US: Inspections of weapons shipments in Ukraine by US servicemembers raises risk of casualties. On 1 November, defense officials confirmed that a small number of US military personnel in Ukraine have begun carrying out inspections of weapons shipped to Ukraine by Kyiv’s Western allies. Currently, only 10 percent of US high-risk weapons requiring oversight have been inspected. The Pentagon indicated that US servicemembers are not carrying out their duties near the frontlines. However, it did not disclose their locations so as to ensure their security. Russian forces have significantly increased the number of rocket attacks targeting critical infrastructure and populated areas. The presence of US servicemembers in Ukraine increases the risk of US casualties in the conflict, which would increase the likelihood of a serious escalation between the US and Russia. This risk will increase dramatically if Russia deliberately targets areas where it knows US servicemembers are carrying out inspections.

Azerbaijan-Iran: Detention of Shia guerrillas will increase bilateral tensions in short-to-medium term. On 1 November, Azerbaijan announced the detention of Shia Islamist guerrillas which it claims are allegedly backed by Iran. Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (SSS) reported that 19 individuals have been detained. They are accused of being part of an illegal armed group founded by the Shia Islamist movement ‘Huseyniyyun’, which is heavily critical of President Ilham Aliyev’s regime. Huseyniyyan’s leader, Tohid Ibrahimli, has been afforded sanctuary in Iran since 2018. The detention of the individuals will likely exacerbate growing anti-Iranian rhetoric and ethnic tensions amid a broader deterioration in bilateral relations. This was evidenced by Iranian military drills which took place last month near the Azerbaijani border.

Armenia-Azerbaijan: Delayed Nagorno-Karabakh resolution will raise threat of further border clashes. Earlier on 2 November, Armenia’s prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, announced his support for a Russian proposal to postpone the discussion regarding the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russian ambassador to Armenia specified that the region’s status should be left to future generations when conditions can be created for an acceptable and equitable solution for all parties involved. Azerbaijan is highly unlikely to accept this proposal. Indeed, Baku is keen to resolve the status of the region much sooner, potentially via military means if necessary. Postponement will only increase the prospect of further serious border clashes and possibly the resumption of a full-scale war, especially if negotiations collapse.

Nov. 1.

Russian forces continued to fortify their positions across the Kherson front over the last 24 hours. Senior Russian occupation officials confirmed that their forces are constructing defences along the outskirts of Kherson city, including in Chornobaivka, located less than one mile (1.6km) north of the city. The settlement sits just north-east of Kherson International Airport (KHE) along the M-14 highway that leads into Kherson. Given the current levels of mud and the poor weather, Ukrainian forces hoping to assault the city likely view the highway as their primary approach. As such, preparations for its defence once again indicate that Russia plans to hold the city against the anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive, at least initially.
On 31 October, the head of the Kherson occupation administration, Vladimir Saldo, expanded the civilian evacuation zone by nine miles (15km) along the banks of the Dnieper river. Saldo justified the evacuation order by claiming once again that Ukrainian forces are preparing a ‘massive missile attack’ against the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam to cause widespread flooding. Saldo previously stated that destroying the dam would be ‘practically impossible’ and would only cause water levels to rise by two metres. This shows that the Russian authorities are issuing contradictory and confusing messaging.
In eastern Ukraine, Russian sources continue to report on Ukrainian counter-offensive operations along the Oskil-Kreminna line. The Russian defence ministry claimed its forces have repelled all Ukrainian attacks, though evidence points to steady Ukrainian progress towards both Svatove and Kreminna – Kyiv’s primary objectives in Luhansk oblast. The Ukrainian governor of Luhansk, Serhiy Haidai, reported on 31 October that Ukrainian forces have liberated nine unnamed settlements in Luhansk, claiming that they successfully foiled Russian preparations for a counter-attack west of Kreminna and Svatove. Most notably, the Ukrainian General Staff reported on 31 October that Russian forces attacked Mykolaivka, Novoselivkse and Ploshchanka – all of which suggests that Ukrainian forces have taken these settlements and are edging closer to the R-66 highway. Novoselivkse, located ten miles (17km) north-west of Svatove, sits on the N-26 highway, the northern branch of the R-66 running towards Kupiansk. As such, Ukrainian forces are clearly advancing steadily towards Svatove.
Further south, the most notable developments along the Bakhmut-Donetsk lines were apparent Russian ground assaults to the south-west of Donetsk city. Russian sources claim their forces made incremental progress around Donetsk-Avdiivka. The Russian defence ministry claims that its forces launched an offensive towards Vuhledar and that they reached the outskirts of Pavlivka, located 30 miles (47km) south-west of Donetsk city. However, other sources claim that Russian forces are conducting clearing operations in the town. Nevertheless, the commander of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Vostok Battalion, Alexander Khodakovsky, noted on 31 October that Russia’s attacks along this axis are premature, and that advances on the Vuhledar-Pavlivka line will be difficult to hold.
During a televised interview on 31 October, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, stated that he had not given any thought to ending formally the partial mobilisation via a presidential decree. His comments come after he announced on 28 October that the partial mobilisation had finished. The absence of a formal presidential decree means that the order will remain in place indefinitely and could be used to call up further reservists over the winter and/or in the new year. The Autumn conscription cycle begins today, 1 November, with the defence ministry making various statements in recent days assuring the Russian public that conscripts will not be sent to Ukraine. However, this remains to be seen, especially as the annexation of four Ukrainian regions means the deployment of conscripts to the frontlines is now perfectly legal under Russian law.
In a further related development, Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin openly criticised Russian oligarchs and elites for preventing the full mobilisation of the state. He argued that until the children of the elite go to war, full mobilisation is impossible. Until now, metropolitan centres like Moscow and St Petersburg have disproportionately avoided the burdens of mobilisation and volunteer ‘recruitment’. Prigozhin’s direct criticism of oligarchs’ privileges is likely to still further complicate Prigozhin’s relationship with the Russian elite establishment as he clearly tries to increase his own popularity and platform as a patriotic hardliner and leader of Wagner forces.

Political developments

Earlier on 1 November, Kyiv’s mayor, Vitali Klitschko, confirmed that water and electricity supplies have been fully restored in the capital. This follows Russian attacks which caused widespread electrical failures that left around 270,000 homes without power and 80 percent of the population without water. The local authorities also stated that 450 mobile telecommunications stations were left without power following strikes yesterday, warning that major disruption to mobile networks was possible as a result. The power and utilities giant DTEK warned on 31 October that it is running out of critical equipment needed to repair damaged power facilities, having already used its reserve stocks to repair facilities after the first two waves of attacks in October. Although DTEK is purchasing additional equipment, rising costs mean this will amount to hundreds of ms of USD. Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, confirmed that a dozen countries will send electrical substation components to Ukraine, though sustained Russian strikes will continue to test Ukraine’s resilience and increase Kyiv’s reliance on international imports for its critical services.
Russia’s defence ministry stated on 1 November that it is waiting for a comment from the British government after claiming that the UK’s former prime minister, Liz Truss, sent a message to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken saying ‘it’s done’ immediately after the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in September. Moscow formally accused the Royal Navy of orchestrating the sabotage despite almost all indicators pointing to Russia’s involvement. However, these allegations fit broader Russian accusations that London is becoming increasingly involved in fighting Russia directly in Ukraine. Moscow blamed the Royal Navy for orchestrating the raid against Sevastopol on 29 October, and has repeatedly alleged that ‘British specialists’ are working with Ukrainian special forces to seize the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
On 1 November, Finland’s prime minister, Sanna Marin, urged Hungary and Turkey to approve Finland’s and Sweden’s applications to join NATO ‘sooner rather than later’. While both Scandinavian countries intend to join the alliance, it remains unclear how long the ratification process will last given Hungarian and Turkish concerns. Ultimately, the accession of Helsinki and Stockholm to the alliance will likely constitute a trigger for renewed Russian grey zone activity in the Baltic Sea. As we previously assessed, the Balticconnector pipeline connecting Finland to the Estonian (and by extension the EU) gas grid will remain a potential target for retaliatory action (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 28 September for further analysis and grey zone maritime triggers).
Norway increased the readiness level of its armed forces on 31 October to bolster its maritime surveillance and preparedness to protect its critical maritime and energy infrastructure. In light of growing Russian espionage activity in the north of the country (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 17 October) and the credible threat posed by Russia’s undersea and wider maritime sabotage capabilities, Norway’s move forms part of a wider NATO effort to increase activity in the Arctic to deter further Russian grey zone activities.

Forecast

31 October marked the 250th day since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, with all indicators pointing to continued fighting by both sides over the winter and well into 2023. On 31 October, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, held discussions with his Turkish counterpart, Mevlut Cavusoglu, about conditions for resuming Russia’s participation in the Black Sea grain deal. Lavrov stated that Moscow would need ‘necessary guarantees’ from Kyiv before re-entering the deal, including pledges that Ukrainian forces will not use the humanitarian corridor and/or Ukrainian ports to stage ‘actions against Russia’. However, despite Russia’s withdrawal from the deal, the UN, Ukraine and Turkey are determined to continue facilitating grain exports. The Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul confirmed that 14 vessels used the grain corridor on 31 October. Three further vessels already left the Ukrainian ports of Chornomorsk and Yuzhne earlier on 1 November, with around 85,000 tonnes of grain destined for Germany, Libya and Morocco. The decision by the UN, Ukraine and Turkey to continue with the exports is likely to be seen as an attempt to call Moscow’s bluff regarding the issue of the grain corridor’s safety. This will likely force Russia to do one of two things: backdown and acknowledge that it does not have the authority to prevent exports (though this remains unlikely) or escalate and attack Ukrainian ports and/or commercial vessels (this is the most likely scenario; Russia is likely to carry out plausibly deniable grey zone operations, blaming sea mines). The second option will allow Russia to illustrate the deal cannot proceed without Moscow’s acquiescence and security guarantees. Given Russian rhetoric around the issue, it is not in the Kremlin’s interests to allow the Black Sea grain deal to succeed without their express involvement and approval. However, openly attacking commercial vessels would highly likely alienate the Global South and other states heavily reliant on grain imports. Nevertheless, despite the UN and Turkish determination to continue facilitating exports, there are other more practical considerations that may ultimately scupper the deal, even without a military escalation. On 31 October, the Lloyd’s of London insurer Ascot suspended writing cover for new shipments using the grain corridor through the Black Sea. While it confirmed that insurance cover which has already been issued remains valid, Ascot will temporarily terminate new underwriting until they ‘understand the situation better’. UN Aid chief Martin Griffiths stated during a Security Council meeting on 31 October that insurance premiums may increase by a quarter or even a half for all shipping crossing the Black Sea as a result of the Russian withdrawal. As such, there are serious questions around the financial viability of grain exports in the short term without a resolution and/or compromise – potentially involving the easing of sanctions imposed on Russian agricultural exports. However, given that Lavrov’s demands for Ukrainian ‘guarantees’ would essentially prohibit Ukraine from launching drones and other offensive capabilities from its coastline towards Crimea, Kyiv is highly unlikely to agree to Moscow’s vague demands as they currently stand.

Ukraine: Forced nationalisation of private property in Crimea poses an increased threat to immovable assets. On 31 October, the head of the government in Russian-annexed Crimea ordered a nationalisation of private property that they claim belongs to organisations or people linked to the regime in Kyiv. The corresponding documents are due to be signed today and will then be submitted to the State Council of Crimea before becoming formal legislation. If passed, the authorities will likely confiscate a wide variety of immovable commercial property and assets, including the Zaliv ship-building plant and the Bakhchysarai cement plant. This comes as the Russian government last week announced the creation of a commission to facilitate the transfer of non-functioning and abandoned enterprises under external management in the four annexed Ukraine regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. There remains a high risk of confiscation for any private immovable assets in the region in the short-to-medium term.

Norway: Increased level of military alert will bolster protection of critical infrastructure. On 31 October, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere announced that the country’s military would be placed on a raised level of alert as of today, 1 November, as part of increased security measures in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Stoere stated that the is no clear sign that Russia will expand its invasion beyond Ukraine, he warned that heightened tensions have made the country more exposed to intelligence operations. The announcement comes amid concerns over sabotage against the country’s infrastructure after numerous drone sightings and the detention of several Russian nationals and one suspected Russian intelligence operative in October. The raised alert level means the military will spend more time on operational duty and such measures will be more actively supported by the Home Guard, a rapid mobilisation force. The development is likely to improve security around the country’s critical energy infrastructure in the short term.

Sweden-Finland: Regional tensions will remain elevated as Turkey continues to block their NATO membership. On 4 November, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg will visit Turkey, followed by Sweden’s new prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, on 8 November. Ahead of the visits, Turkish government officials stated that Sweden has to implement promises to assist Turkey in combating terrorism before Turkey can support their NATO accession. This refers to Turkish demands for Sweden to extradite further Kurdish individuals with Swedish citizenship whom President Erdogan accuses of terrorism. During the summer, we saw moderate progress on the two countries’ NATO membership, however, Hungary and Turkey are the only countries that have failed to approve the accession on a national level. Regional tensions will remain elevated in the coming months as both Hungary and Turkey continue to undermine Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession, using their position as political leverage.

Oct 31.

On 29 October, seven autonomous maritime drones and nine unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) attacked the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s headquarters in Sevastopol according to the Russian Ministry of Defence. Though Kyiv has not claimed responsibility for the attack Ukrainian forces likely staged the raid. While the numbers involved cannot be independently verified, footage from the attack clearly showed an unmanned maritime vessel similar to one that washed ashore in Crimea on 21 September. The footage circulated on social media shows at least one such drone attacking a Grigorovich-class frigate in Sevastopol, possibly the Admiral Makarov – the new flagship of the Black Sea Fleet following the sinking of the Moskva.
Despite targeting Russian naval assets in a wartime context, Moscow has described the raid as a ‘terrorist attack’. Moscow has also claimed that British Royal Navy personnel orchestrated the raid from the Ukrainian port of Ochakiv, without providing evidence. This is consistent with previous statements from Russian officials trying to equate Ukrainian military operations to terrorist actions, such as the alleged attacks on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
As of 31 October, Russian officials have acknowledged that a minesweeper, the Ivan Golubets, suffered minor damage during the attack, but they have made no mention of a Grigorovich-class frigate. However, following the attack on the Moskva in April, Russian officials initially denied it had sustained damage, and so the full impact of the Ukrainian raid remains unconfirmed. The Black Sea Fleet operates three Grigorovich-class frigates, which are amongst the most modern and capable frigates operated by the Russian Navy. In particular, the vessels have been heavily utilised during the war as launch platforms for Kalibr cruise missiles. Following this month’s nationwide strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, taking out or damaging such Kalibr platforms likely remains a high priority for the Ukrainian Navy. The maritime drones are estimated to have a payload of 40kg of explosives, which is unlikely sufficient to cause major damage to a well-armoured vessel, though some unconfirmed Ukrainian reports claim the drone succeeded in penetrating the hull of the warship and destroyed its radar systems. However, its payload would nevertheless be likely enough to force its temporary withdrawal for repairs – during which time it cannot support Russia’s long-range strike campaign.
The Sevastopol raid has had two principal implications: the first being Russia’s decision to pull out of the Black Sea grain deal (see below for analysis); the second being an intensification of long-range strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure. This morning, 31 October, Russia launched over 50 missiles in apparent response to the Sevastopol raid, hitting targets in Chernivtsi, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Vinnytsia and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Ukrainian authorities have claimed that Ukrainian air defences interdicted 44 cruise missiles, which if true would indicate Ukraine’s growing anti-air capabilities. Numerous missiles were reportedly shot down over Khmelnytskyi and Lviv oblasts in the west, preventing them from hitting their targets. Notably, however, one Russian missile interdicted by Ukrainian air defences came down near Naslavcea inside Moldovan territory, just south of the Dniester Hydroelectric Power Plant – clearly the intended target. The incident highlights the dangers of proximity to Ukrainian energy infrastructure and comes after several Russian cruise missiles violated Moldovan airspace earlier this month.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal has confirmed that 18 facilities, most of which are energy infrastructure, have been damaged during this morning’s strikes. The strikes, together with existing vulnerabilities in the power network, have caused widespread blackouts across the country today, including in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblast. An estimated 80 percent of Kyiv residents are also without water access this morning.
On 28 October, President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that the partial mobilisation had been completed. Of the 300,000 troops reportedly mobilised, 82,000 are now deployed in Ukraine in both frontline and support roles, with 218,000 currently undergoing training. As we have previously assessed (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 17 October), the end of partial mobilisation was likely necessary to free up bureaucratic capability to begin the delayed Autumn conscription cycle, which will begin tomorrow, 1 November. The Kremlin is prioritising quantity over quality in terms of force generation, and while the influx of tens of thousands of poorly trained reservists has seemingly helped stabilise the frontlines, Ukrainian forces will likely continue launching counter-offensive operations as the winter approaches.
Beyond the Sevastopol raid, the military situation on the ground has broadly remained in line with military activity over the last few weeks. Ukrainian officials have reported that Russian forces are continuing to dig in across Kherson oblast, including fortifying Kherson city by heavily mining the outskirts and strengthening the ground floors of various buildings – indicating Russian forces are preparing for heavy street-to-street fighting. The head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov stated on 28 October that his agency estimates 40,000 Russian service personnel remain in Kherson oblast, including some of Russia’s most experienced and theoretically capable airborne VDV, naval infantry and Spetsnaz units. Nevertheless, reports emerging on 30 October indicate that Russian forces are preparing to withdraw artillery units from unspecified locations on the western bank of the Dnieper, confusing the picture still further. Kyiv nevertheless hopes to retake Kherson by the end of the year, but it remains to be seen how stiff Russian resistance will be if and when Ukraine launches an all-out counteroffensive against the city.
In terms of fighting along the wider Kherson frontline, information flows remain limited, making it difficult to confirm any Ukrainian or Russian advances. Nevertheless, heavy fighting is likely taking place south of Davydiv Brid, with the Russian Ministry of Defence reporting that their forces have been repelling numerous Ukrainian ground assaults across the full breadth of the frontline. Notably, the Ukrainian General Staff also reported on 29 October that Russian soldiers are wearing civilian clothing and moving into private residences in the key town of Beryslav in significant numbers. Under the international laws of war, the simulation of civilian status as a perfidy tactic is illegal – i.e., claiming to act in good faith to trick an adversary through deception.
In eastern Ukraine, heavy fighting has continued along the Oskil-Kreminna line, with various conflicting reports about Ukrainian assaults against various Russian positions. Nevertheless, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces Colonel Serhiy Chervaty claimed on 29 October that his forces have now established full fire control over the main stretches of the R-66 highway that connects Kreminna to Svatove. Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast Serhiy Haidai also reported on 30 October that Russian forces blew a bridge over the Krasna River near the village of Krasnorichenske, which sits roughly equidistant between Kreminna and Svatove east of the R-66 highway. Together with unconfirmed Russian milblogger reports over the weekend, this suggests that Ukrainian forces have made steady progress west of Kreminna and the Russians are preparing for further advances as the Ukrainians build forces to prepare for an assault at some point in the coming days and weeks.
In a related development, unconfirmed reports emerged over the weekend that Colonel-General Alexander Lapin is no longer in command of Russian forces in northern Luhansk oblast. The Kremlin has not confirmed any command changes, and conflicting reports from various pro-war factions within Russia suggest that either: the Kremlin relieved him of his command due to failures to deploy mobilised forces to the frontline; he resigned of his own accord; or that he has taken a short medical leave of absence. If Lapin lost his command in northern Luhansk, it remains unclear whether he is also no longer commander of the Central Military District. Following failures during the Kharkiv counter-offensive in September, Lapin has received significant criticism from various pro-war factions, including Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. What is clear, however, is that Russian forces in Luhansk oblast are suffering from major moral issues, with unconfirmed reports that recently mobilised units are refusing orders and are being placed in second and third-echelon defences due to their commanders’ doubt over their willingness to fight.
Finally, along the Bakhmut and Donetsk lines, Russian sources have claimed Russian forces began a series of ground assaults east of Bakhmut and along various positions further south to the west and southwest of Donetsk city. Various sources claimed Russian successes, but these remain unconfirmed. In particular, Russian forces claimed to have captured Vodyane in Donetsk oblast on 30 October, which sits less than 3 miles (5km) northwest of the Donetsk International Airport and north of Pisky.

Political developments

Following the attack on Sevastopol, Moscow formally withdrew from the Black Sea grain deal on 29 October. Russia has claimed, without evidence, that one of the drones used to attack the Black Sea Fleet headquarters might have originated from a grain ship that is part of the Black Sea deal. It has also claimed that as a result of the attack, it is no longer able to ensure the safety of civilian vessels transiting the grain corridor over 120 miles (200km) to the west. According to the UN’s Black Sea Grain Initiative which helped broker the deal, Russia has only temporarily suspended its participation in the deal. Nevertheless, the Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul, which oversees the implementation of the grain deal, confirmed on 30 September that the UN, Turkey and Ukraine will move 16 vessels today, 31 October, despite the Russian withdrawal. Moscow has been informed of the intended ship movements, and under the terms of the original agreement all parties agreed not to attack merchant and civilian ships. See the Forecast below for further analysis and implications.
On 28 October, following his first visit to Kyiv since February, Germany’s President Frank-Walter Steinmeier gave a notable speech which condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as ‘despicable’. He also admitted that Russia’s actions had demonstrated that Germany’s Russia policy up until February has been a ‘bitter failure’. Steinmeier’s comments are notable as he was one of Germany’s key proponents of rapprochement with Russia over the past 15 years, including after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. In his speech, Steinmeier suggested that any potential peace settlement that recognises Russia’s land grab would be ‘no peace’ – though he did not specify whether these comments included Russia’s control of Crimea or the parts of the Donbas before February. The speech also strongly indicated that Germany – often criticised for its desire to seek compromise with Moscow – will maintain its support for Kyiv as the winter approaches, despite Vladimir Putin’s hope that Western unity will begin to crack.

Forecast

The most significant global implication of the Sevastopol raid has been to provide Moscow with a convenient reason to terminate its involvement in the Black Sea Initiative, from which it has continually signalled it wanted to withdraw in recent weeks. Over 200 vessels are expected to be impacted by Russia’s withdrawal, with wheat prices having already risen by as much as 7.7 percent at time of writing on the morning of 31 October. It remains to be seen whether Russia will attack any of the vessels involved in the grain deal in a bid to ensure grain shipments stop without Russian approval, though Turkey confirmed this morning that they are in negotiations with Russia on resuming the deal. Both Moscow and Kyiv are attempting to frame the breakdown of the Black Sea grain deal in terms of its impact on poorer nations as both sides attempt to rally diplomat support. In recent weeks Putin has criticised the grain deal for not benefitting poorer countries and on 29 October Russia’s Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev stated that Russia would be willing to supply 500,000 tonnes of grain to the poorest countries free of charge for the next four months. The Kremlin is likely to persist with this line of argument as it seeks to curry favour with poorer nations where Russian and before that Soviet influence has traditionally been strong. However, in the meantime, food insecurity risks will only worsen for countries highly reliant upon Black Sea grain, including Lebanon, Ethiopia and various states in West Africa. On 29 October, President Volodymyr Zelensky renewed allegations that Moscow is ‘blackmailing the world with hunger’ by withdrawing from the deal. EU, US, NATO and UN officials all urged Russia to reverse its decision, but this remains unlikely in the short term without Western concessions easing sanctions on Russia’s agricultural and fertiliser exports. In the immediate term, long-range strikes are set to continue across Ukraine, including potentially against Black Sea ports. Given Russian accusations that British Royal Navy personnel had orchestrated the Sevastopol attack from Ochakiv, strikes against the small town are possible in the coming days. In relation to the Black Sea grain deal, the three principal ports facilitating grain exports, namely Yuzhne, Odesa and Chornomorsk, will also be more vulnerable to strikes in the coming days – with the potential justification that Russia is targeting ‘decision-making centres’ orchestrating alleged attempts to jeopardise civilian grain shipments and conduct terrorist attacks against the Russian fleet.

Russia: Withdrawal from UN grain deal triggers sharp increase in wheat prices, jeopardising global food security. On 29 October, Russia suspended its participation in the UN-backed grain deal that facilitated the movement of grain through the Black Sea. The Kremlin justified its withdrawal as a response to a Ukrainian attack against the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Russia has claimed the attack has rendered it unable to guarantee the security of civilian cargo ships involved in the export of Ukrainian agricultural products, and made unsubstantiated claims that drones involved in the attack may have originated from grain vessels. The price of wheat has already risen by 7.7% and reached USD 8.93 a bushel on 31 October, with the suspension having impacted 218 ships today alone. This sudden termination is likely to sustain high prices in the short-to-medium term and whilst Turkey and Ukraine are reportedly pressing ahead to implement a new deal, the threat to global food security and ongoing humanitarian efforts remains high. (Source: Sibylline)

04 Nov 22. Pentagon, U.S. arms makers to talk Russia, labor and supply chain. Pentagon leaders plan to meet with defense industry executives next week to discuss ways to tackle supply-chain problems, a U.S. official told Reuters, amid an expected surge in demand for weapons from U.S. allies due to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Kath Hicks will host a classified meeting with top U.S. defense contractors to discuss the National Defense Strategy, securing supply chains and shoring up the defense industrial base, including workforce challenges, spokesperson Eric Pahon told Reuters earlier this week.

Concern among Pentagon officials is growing that top U.S. defense suppliers will struggle with a surge in orders for weapons from European nations like Germany and Poland, amid growing fears of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions in the region.

Prior meetings between Pentagon officials and top arms makers including Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N), Raytheon Technologies Corp (RTX.N) and General Dynamics Corp (GD.N) were focused on Ukraine and hypersonic weapon development.

Despite global interest in weapons, major U.S. arms makers continue to cite a tight labor market and lingering supply-chain problems from the coronavirus pandemic to tamp down expectations about how quickly they will be able to deliver on those expected orders.

“We have heard the concerns from industry regarding supply-chain challenges and workforce issues – and we share them,” the Pentagon’s chief weapons buyer Bill LaPlante told Reuters in a statement.

Pandemic related supply-chain issues are still hurting defense contractors because components and materials fail to arrive on time, which delays production and ultimately payment.

The Pentagon plans $500m in workforce training and retention programs coupled with over $2bn in supply-chain investments in the coming years as part of an effort to tackle the problems.

But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted countries like the United States and Germany to raise their defense spending budgets to record levels.

THE LONGEST POLE

In the meantime, the defense industry is taking steps on its own to shore up supplies and labor.

“If I had to boil it down to the longest pole in the tent, it’s the labor issues that are pervasive throughout the supply chain,” Raytheon Chief Financial Officer Neil Mitchill told Reuters.

Raytheon’s head, Greg Hayes, told investors last week the company had deployed teams to work with 400 problematic suppliers “on a daily basis, getting them raw material, giving them contract labor, giving them technical support.”

Northrop Grumman Corp’s (NOC.N) Chief Financial Officer Dave Keffer told Reuters the company had “added a lot of resources and focus on hiring,” with net new hires of 2,700 in the third quarter alone. read more

Last month, Lockheed head Jim Taiclet, told investors the company was “cross-training” employees to allow them to shift between product lines as demand grows and changes in the coming years.

Demand is real. Last month, Poland agreed to buy 288 artillery rocket launchers from South Korea, although it has said it wants many more.

(Source: Reuters)

04 Nov 22. Ukrainian troops fire on Russians with captured weapons near key city.

Ukrainian forces using captured weapons fired at Russian targets near the key eastern city of Bakhmut on Friday as fighting dragged on in an area that Moscow is trying hard to capture.

Russian forces have repeatedly launched attacks against Bakhmut and nearby Avdiivka in the Donetsk region but are being pushed back with what Kyiv says are heavy losses.

“Last week there was very intense fighting … there are a lot of them (Russians), both people and equipment,” said a soldier who gave his name only as Moriak, the Ukrainian word for sailor.

Reuters journalists saw a captured Russian T-80 tank and a 2S23 Nona SVK self-propelled mortar, now controlled by Ukrainian crews, firing at targets outside Bakhmut.

Ukraine’s military says both were seized in March and took months to be refitted. The eight-wheel Nona – commanded by Moriak – has a 120 mm mortar capable of firing a maximum of 10 rounds per minute.

“They left us this gift, and it has high, very high (precision), and it now works against them, it helps us push them away,” he said.

Bakhmut has been an important target for Russia’s armed forces in a slow advance through the Donetsk region since Russia took the industrial towns of Lysychansk and Sievierodonetsk in June and July.

Britain’s defence ministry says the Wagner Group private military company “likely remains” heavily involved in the Bakhmut fighting. Wagner, staffed by veterans of the Russian armed forces, was founded in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea and started providing support to pro-Russia separatists. (Source: Reuters)

04 Nov 22. $400m in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. On November 4, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced approximately $400m in additional security assistance for Ukraine under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).

This USAI package underscores the continued U.S. commitment to supporting Ukraine by meeting their most urgent needs, while also building the capacity of Ukraine’s Armed Forces to defend its sovereignty over the long term.

Unlike Presidential Drawdown authority (PDA), which DoD has continued to leverage to deliver equipment to Ukraine from DoD stocks at a historic pace, USAI is an authority under which the United States procures capabilities from industry. This announcement represents the beginning of a contracting process to provide additional priority capabilities to Ukraine. Capabilities include:

Funding to refurbish HAWK air defense missiles for inclusion in future Presidential Drawdown packages;
45 Refurbished T-72B Tanks with advanced optics, communications, and armor packages;
1,100 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
40 Armored Riverine Boats;
Funding to refurbish 250 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles;
Tactical secure communications systems and surveillance systems; and
Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.

In total, the United States has now committed more than $18.9bn in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration. Since 2014, the United States has committed more than $21bn in security assistance to Ukraine and more than $18.2bn since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion on February 24.

Through both PDA and USAI, DoD continues to work with Ukraine to meet both its immediate and longer-term security assistance needs. With Russia’s unrelenting and brutal air attacks on Ukrainian civilian critical infrastructure, additional air defense capabilities are critical. Funding to refurbish HAWK missiles will complement Spain’s recent commitment of HAWK launchers to help Ukraine meet this threat.

The overhauled T-72B tanks included in this package are part of a trilateral, coordinated effort with the Netherlands and Czech Republic. Alongside the United States, the Netherlands will provide 45 additional T-72B Tanks with the support of the Czech Ministry of Defense and in cooperation with Czech industry.

Together with our Allies and partners, our efforts will help Ukraine continue to be successful today while building the enduring strength of Ukraine’s forces to ensure the continued freedom and independence of the Ukrainian people. (Source: US DoD)

04 Nov 22. Russia ‘probably’ deploying special units that threaten to shoot own retreating troops, MOD says.

The Ministry of Defence attributed the action to “low morale and a reluctance to fight” from Russian personnel.

on the back foot in the Kherson region in October (Picture: Russian MOD).

Russia has “probably” started to deploy special units that threaten to shoot their own troops trying to retreat in Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has said.

In an intelligence update on Twitter, the MOD said, “due to low morale and reluctance to fight”, Moscow has “probably started deploying ‘barrier troops’ or ‘blocking units'”.

“These units threaten to shoot their own retreating soldiers in order to compel offensives and have been used in previous conflicts by Russian forces,” the update said.

“Recently, Russian generals likely wanted their commanders to use weapons against deserters, including possibly authorising shooting to kill such defaulters after a warning had been given.

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Watch: Ukraine ‘will achieve their military objectives’ providing the West continue to provide.

“Generals also likely wanted to maintain defensive positions to the death.

“The tactic of shooting deserters likely attests to the low-quality, low-morale and indiscipline of Russian forces.”

The latest intelligence update comes after a former Nato commander told Forces News that Ukraine “will achieve their military objectives” so long as the West continues to provide the support necessary “and indeed ramps it up”.

“All the indications are that Russian morale is rock bottom, whereas the Ukrainian tails are very firmly up,” Richard Shirreff, a former Nato Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, told the Sitrep podcast.

The former Nato commander believes that the Ukrainians should be supplied with “whatever they need to beat the Russians”. (Source: forces.net)

04 Nov 22. Aid Package to Ukraine Includes T-72B Tanks.

Today, the Defense Department announced approximately $400m in additional security assistance for Ukraine under the Ukraine security assistance initiative.

This USAI package includes:

Funding to refurbish HAWK air defense missiles for inclusion in future presidential drawdown packages;
45 refurbished T-72B tanks with advanced optics, communications and armor packages;
1,100 Phoenix Ghost tactical unmanned aerial systems;
40 armored riverine boats;
Funding to refurbish 250 M-1117 armored security vehicles;
Tactical secure communications systems and surveillance systems; and
Funding for training, maintenance and sustainment.

Unlike presidential drawdown authority, which the department uses to deliver equipment to Ukraine from DOD stocks, USAI is an authority under which the United States procures capabilities directly from industry.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh, who held a press briefing today, said overhauled T-72B tanks included in this USAI package are part of a trilateral, coordinated effort with the Netherlands and Czech Republic.

This trilateral project is a direct outcome of cooperation forged through six meetings of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, the Aug. 11 Copenhagen Ukraine Donors Conference, and the Sept. 28 National Armaments Directors meeting, according to a DOD press release.

Some of the tanks will be available to Ukraine before the end of December, with additional deliveries to be completed by next year, according to the press release.

“The United States remains committed to supporting Ukraine’s near-term needs on the battlefield, and its long-term requirements to deter and defend against future Russian aggression,” Singh said.

(Source: US DoD)

04 Nov 22. US, Netherlands go Dutch to refurbish Czech tanks for Ukraine.

The U.S. and Netherlands are splitting the cost of refurbishing 90 more Czech T-72B tanks for Ukraine in Kyiv’s fight to repel Russia, the Pentagon announced Friday.

The agreement is part of a $400 million U.S. aid package to Ukraine that includes funding to refurbish and donate an undisclosed number of the U.S. military’s outdated Hawk air defense systems. It includes a mix of U.S. stockpiled equipment and new contracting under Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

The package includes more than 1,100 more Aevex Aerospace-made Phoenix Ghost kamikaze drones, almost twice the 580 pledged earlier this year. Also included is funding to refurbish 250 M1117 armored vehicles, which the U.S. would provide Ukraine for the first time, 40 riverine boats and unnamed tactical secure communications and surveillance systems, as well as unspecified training, maintenance and sustainment funding.

The U.S. is sending the Hawk mid-range surface-to-air guided missiles after Ukraine pleaded for air defenses. Russia has for weeks been bombarding the country’s infrastructure, including power stations, with missiles and Iranian drones as Ukraine pressed a counteroffensive.

The three-way deal for the Soviet-era T-72 tanks would upgrade their optics and armor. Some of Ukraine’s neighbors, including the Czech Republic and Poland, have previously sent aged Russian-made tanks.

Deputy Defense Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters the U.S. purposely opted against sending U.S. tanks.

“Introducing a new main battle tank is extremely costly, it’s time sensitive and it would be a huge undertaking for Ukrainian forces,” Singh said. “We do continue to consult with our allies and partners to assess … what we can provide in terms of Western platforms, but these tanks, we believe, will make a difference on the battlefield.”

The first batch of tanks is expected to be delivered to Ukraine as early as next month, according to the Dutch Defense Ministry.

Kyiv has reportedly been seeking main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers, which would provide its forces ground maneuver and mobile protected firepower capabilities necessary to exploit opportunities created by artillery fire, according to the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

“These transfers would allow the Ukrainian military to use the systems in battle immediately and could even provide additional benefits to U.S. national security objectives by weaning other countries off Russian weaponry,” FDD’s Bradley Bowman and Ryan Probst wrote in a report.

The Pentagon also announced the creation of a Security Assistance Group – Ukraine, headquartered in Wiesbaden, Germany under U.S. European Command. The SAG-U will be responsible for managing short- and long-term support for Ukraine. Singh said the arrangement would streamline an existing mission. The U.S. has pledged more than $18.9bn in security aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration. (Source: Defense News)

04 Nov 22. Putin endorses evacuation of parts of Ukraine’s Kherson region.

Summary

Putin says evacuation zone is dangerous
Moscow has been moving people from Kherson
24-hour curfew announced for Kherson city
U.S. sending more military aid, top official visits Kyiv

Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly endorsed the evacuation of civilians from parts of Ukraine’s southern Kherson region on Friday, the latest sign of Russia’s retreat in one of the most bitterly contested areas in Ukraine.

“Now, of course, those who live in Kherson should be removed from the zone of the most dangerous actions, because the civilian population should not suffer,” Putin told pro-Kremlin activists as he marked Russia’s Day of National Unity.

Moscow has already been ferrying people out of an area it controls in Kherson on the west bank of the Dnipro River, and this week announced that the evacuation zone would also include a 15 km buffer area on the east bank. But the comments appear to be the first time Putin has endorsed the evacuations personally.

Russia says it has been taking residents to safety from the path of a Ukrainian advance. Kyiv says the measures have included forced deportations of civilians, a war crime, which Russia denies.

Putin’s comments came amid signs Russia could be preparing to abandon its military foothold on the west bank of the Dnipro River, including Kherson’s regional capital – potentially one of the biggest Russian retreats of the war.

On Thursday, Kirill Stremousov, deputy head of the Russian-installed occupation administration in Kherson, said Russia was likely to pull its troops from the west bank. In later remarks, he was more equivocal, saying he hoped there would be no retreat but “we have to take some very difficult decisions.”

Late on Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said the fiercest fighting over the last week had taken place around Bakhmut and Soledar, in the eastern Donetsk region about 500 km northeast of Kherson.

“We are holding our positions in these and a few other areas in the Donetsk region,” he said in a video address, accusing Russia of insane stubborness for sending “tens or hundreds of thousands more people to the meat grinder.”

During the day Ukrainian forces had downed eight Iranian drones and two Russian missiles, Zelenskiy said.

CURFEW

Pictures have circulated on the internet showing the main administration building in Kherson city with Russia’s flag no longer flying atop it. Kyiv has been wary, saying such signs could be Russian deception to lure Ukrainian troops into a trap.

A 24-hour curfew was imposed on the city on Friday, Stremousov said, adding the measure was necessary to defend Kherson from a likely Ukrainian offensive.

Ukrainian soldiers in a mechanized infantry company dug in on a tree line west of Kherson city were confident the Russians would eventually retreat, but would fight as they fall back.

Vitalyi, 48, the company’s deputy commander, said recent Russian efforts to beef up their defences appeared aimed at protecting a withdrawal rather than holding Kherson.

“They have large amounts of tanks and people, but I don’t think they have a realistic plan to stay more than one or two weeks,” he said, as his men took advantage of unusually mild weather to improve bunkers and clean weapons amid thumps of intermittent artillery fire.

Vladyslav, a 27-year-old soldier, said he expected the Russians would fight: “We will fight as well. We have nowhere else to go. This is our home. This is our land.”

The regional capital, on the west bank at the mouth of the Dnipro, is the only big city Russia has captured intact since its invasion in February. Its loss for Russian forces would be one of the severest blows of the war.

MORE U.S. MILITARY AID AND OFFICIAL VISITS

The United States announced $400m worth of additional security assistance for Ukraine, including refurbishing T-72 tanks from the Czech Republic and missiles for HAWK air defenses that could be used against Russian drones and cruise missiles.

The new assistance brought the amount of U.S. military aid sent to Kyiv to more than $18.2bn since the invasion. As it was announced, President Joe Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, met with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and his chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, in Kyiv.

Sullivan affirmed that Washington will continue to provide economic, humanitarian and military aid with support from both Biden’s Democrats and opposition Republicans.

“We fully intend to ensure that the resources are there as necessary and that we’ll get votes from both sides of the aisle to make that happen,” he told reporters at the Ukrainian presidential administration.

Sullivan’s remarks came days before U.S. midterm elections in which Republicans are given a good chance of taking control of Congress. This has raised concerns that close allies of former President Donald Trump, who is known for an “America First” agenda, could cut or even block Ukraine aid, which must be approved by the House of Representatives and Senate.

Sullivan’s visit came a day after Democratic Senator Chris Coons and Republican Senator Rob Portman traveled to the Ukrainian capital in a bid to signal bipartisan U.S. support.

(Source: Reuters)

04 Nov 22. Lithuania delivers commander training course to Ukrainian cadets. The Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence has announced the completion of a distance learning course on commander training for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The fourth edition of the course delivered by the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania focused on strengthening battlefield management competencies of Ukrainian cadets and junior officers.

It also covered basic theoretical knowledge and practical skills in unit commanding.

Dubbed ‘Troop Leading Procedures in Movement Course’, the initiative is part of the Nato Defence Education Enhancement Program.

With English as a medium of instruction, the course is delivered through technology to nearly 30 troops.

Lithuanian Military Academy instructor major Gintautas Razma noted that the course uses demonstrations to guide soldiers ‘on assessing the terrain correctly and to use it for modelling variations of hostile and then friendly force move sequences’.

Razma added that the course, which was held at the request of Ukraine, highlights the quality of officer education provided by Lithuania.

So far, the Military Academy of Lithuania has completed training nearly 120 Ukrainian junior commanders in battlefield command skills for small units. (Source: army-technology.com)

02 Nov 22. Russia has said preventing a military clash between nuclear powers is its “highest priority” and — despite recently making nuclear threats — called on other countries with such weapons to reaffirm their commitment to avoiding an atomic war. The foreign ministry said on Wednesday that Russia “fully reaffirmed” its commitment to preventing nuclear war and avoiding an arms race under a joint statement signed with the US, UK, France and China in January. Russian president Vladimir Putin has repeatedly made veiled threats to use nuclear weapons as his eight-month invasion of Ukraine falters, as part of a strategy that western officials have said was designed to deter western military aid to Kyiv. The rhetoric has alarmed western powers, particularly after Russia made baseless claims last week that Ukraine was developing a “dirty bomb” — a conventional weapon laced with radioactive material. Putin repeated the warnings but then said there was “no military or political sense” in Russia using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine. Russia’s foreign ministry said on Wednesday: “We are firmly convinced that in the current difficult, turbulent situation, which is the consequence of irresponsible and impudent actions aimed at undermining our national security, preventing any military clash between nuclear powers is the highest priority.” Putin’s message comes as US officials say they believe a series of high-level conversations between American and Russian defence officials have helped to calm tensions somewhat. “There’s a temporary feeling of reassurance,” one US official said. Last month US officials saw worrying signs in intelligence monitoring Russia’s possible nuclear use, but said that the information they picked up did not suggest Moscow was making any preparations to use a nuclear weapon. The New York Times reported on Wednesday that Russian military leaders last month discussed the possibility of using a tactical nuclear weapon. Officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden say they are concerned that increasing desperation on Putin’s part might lead him to consider using such a weapon. Speaking in London, British defence secretary Ben Wallace said the Russian claim that Ukraine was developing a dirty bomb was completely untrue and that the UK, alongside the US and France, “absolutely felt the obligation to uphold the taboo” on using nuclear weapons. (Source: FT.com)

03 Nov 22. US ‘increasingly concerned’ sabre-rattling Russia will use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Alarm bells as American intelligence monitors Kremlin military officials discussing when and how to use tactical devices.

The United States has said it is “increasingly concerned” after it emerged senior Russian military officials discussed when and how to use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine.

US intelligence monitored the conversations, which did not involve Vladimir Putin but caused unease in Washington in the wake of aggressive nuclear rhetoric from the Russian president.

John Kirby, the White House national security spokesman, said there was “no indication” the Russian president had decided to use a nuclear weapon – but warned: “We may not pick up every single indicator.”

He added: “We have grown increasingly concerned about the potential as these months have gone on. It’s increasingly unsettling in terms of the degree to which he feels he has to stretch to prosecute this war.”

It came as Dmitry Medvedev, the senior security council official and former Russian president, said Ukraine’s objective to reclaim all its Russian-occupied territories – including the Donbas region and Crimea – would be a “threat to the existence of our state”.

Mr Medvedev said that would be a “direct reason” to invoke Russia’s nuclear deterrence.

The Russian foreign ministry also claimed the world was teetering on the brink of nuclear conflict and accused the West of provocation that could lead to “catastrophic consequences”.

In a statement, the ministry denounced “irresponsible and impudent actions aimed at undermining our national security” and called on other nuclear powers to “abandon dangerous attempts to infringe on each other’s vital interests”.

The statement called on nuclear powers – the US, UK, France and China – to “work together to solve the priority task” of “avoiding any military clash”. (Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)

03 Nov 22. UN rejects Russia’s call for biological weapons investigation.

The Security Council has rejected a resolution drafted by Russia calling for an investigation into its accusations of Washington’s involvement in the alleged development of biological weapons in Ukraine.

Russia had officially requested a UN investigation into the accusations, which it has regularly made since the start of its war in Ukraine.

The resolution it put to the vote on Wednesday received two votes in favour (Russia and China), three against (the UK, France and the US, which have veto power) and the 10 non-permanent members of the Council all abstained.

The text provided for the “establishment of a commission composed of all members of the Security Council to investigate the allegations against the United States and Ukraine” regarding their obligations under the convention that prohibits the development, production and use of biological weapons.

Deputy Russian ambassador Dmitry Polyanskiy regretted the outcome of the vote, saying: “Western countries demonstrated in every way that the law does not apply to them.”

“This is a usual colonial mentality that we’re used to and we’re not even surprised by it.” (Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)

02 Nov 22. Hardened Ukrainian brigade sees Russian vulnerability in Kherson City. It’s now been over eight months of full-scale warfare since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But while the war continues, the features of the battlefield have changed significantly — both in the systems employed, and the tactics used to counter them.

Ukraine’s military, which began the war with largely Soviet-era equipment, has transitioned into an ever-more Western-armed and -trained force. By contrast, much of Russia’s best equipment — and its most professional troops — have been destroyed or killed in months of relentless combat, leading Moscow to draw on older stocks as the Russian force regresses.

Few people, or units, know this better than Ukraine’s 59th Motorized Brigade. Stationed in Kherson oblast at the start of the war, the 59th was subjected to the full force of one of Russia’s best-prepared strike groups, an armored thrust northwards from occupied Crimea. But while they were forced to cede Kherson City in early March, the 59th held back Russia’s spearheads from seizing Mykolaiv, the next city along the coast towards Odesa. Now, after seven months of largely static warfare, the changing balance of power sees the 59th poised to play a major role in the upcoming battle to liberate Kherson.

The soldiers of the 59th are bullish on their prospects of beating the Russians back at Kherson City. They talk dismissively of the battlefield effectiveness of the Iranian drones that have made headlines in recent weeks — weapons well-suited to harassing civilian infrastructure but less effective against prepared military units. Consistent degradation of Russian logistics and supply lines has hampered the enemy’s ability to effectively contest the battlefield. Russian leaders’ desperate moves to staff their front line with unwilling conscripts, their focus on looting Kherson of anything moveable, and even their use of air defense systems to attack ground targets, all buoy the 59th’s morale. They smell blood in the water.

On a sunny day in late October, one platoon from the brigade was catching some sleep during a break in the action at a disused gas station a few kilometers back from the frontline. The soldiers and officers present shared with Military Times their impressions of how the war has changed — for them, often for the better — over the past few months.

One of the hot topics in recent weeks has been Russia’s heavy deployment of Iranian-made Shahed 136 loitering munitions. Carrying a warhead of up to 50 kilograms and with a range of 1,500 kilometers, these ‘kamikaze drones’ have been employed across Ukraine, in particular to strike heating and power infrastructure in Kyiv and other cities. While they have been used on the battlefield as well, soldiers say they have not been particularly effective militarily.

“Iranian drones are attacking Mykolaiv constantly,” says Vadym, a senior lieutenant in the 59th. “They’re active over the entire region, but most of them are shot down. They are only really useful against civilian targets, when they can slip past air defense,” he says.

One of the difficulties drones present to many air defense systems is a small radio and heat signature, which can make it difficult to achieve lock-on. With advance warning of an approaching drone, however, this can be mitigated — and there are other tools that work even better.

“It’s difficult to hit [a Shahed] with any system that works by heat lock, such as a Stinger [MANPAD], unless you have extra time to track it,” Vadym says. “But our foreign partners have provided us with some very effective systems. The German Gepards [self-propelled anti-aircraft guns] are very good against them. They see the [drone] and can easily shoot it down. Even machine guns can down [Shaheds] quite easily if they are not flying too high — they are quite large and slow,” he explains.

Other troops agree with Vadym’s estimation.

“These drones [Shaheds] are not a problem at all,” says Zhenya, a sergeant major. “If you have warning and anti-aircraft weapons, you can down them quite easily. That’s why [Russia] uses them against cities — they are not useful on the battlefield,” he says.

The use of these systems speaks to the difficulties Moscow is facing in maintaining a steady level of long-range strikes eight months into the war. As its stocks of precision-guided munitions deplete, Russia has turned to other methods, some not designed for the task: soldiers say that S-300 missiles, originally designed for air defense, are now one of the primary weapons used to strike Mykolaiv. Despite their poor accuracy when used against ground targets, the missiles are still fired at the city regularly at night.

Ukraine’s efforts to degrade Russian logistics and supply routes in Kherson are also paying dividends.

“American HIMARs [precision rocket artillery] have been incredibly useful for us. Once we started hitting the bridges, the intensity of the [Russian] shelling decreased a lot,” says Vadym, describing the Ukrainian shelling of the Antonovsky and Nova Kakhovka bridges, the only two connections between Kherson and the rest of Russian-held southern Ukraine. “We destroyed a lot of their artillery and ammunition warehouses as well. Before, [the Russians] used to shell everything, just firing as much as they wanted at any targets. Now, they are forced to economize,” Vadym says.

American-provided long-range artillery systems have been crucial to shifting the tide here as well. Vadym specifically names the M109 Paladin self-propelled howitzer and the M777, whose guided Excalibur shells can hit targets up to 40 kilometers away with high accuracy.

“Before we had the M777, we couldn’t reach their [artillery] systems, but now we can,” he says.

Finally, it is not just Russian equipment that has been depleted. Much of Moscow’s professional infantry corps, many of whom were transferred from eastern Ukraine to Kherson over the summer in anticipation of an impending Ukrainian assault, has been put out of action. With competent manpower consistently lacking and contract servicemen, many of whom have been fighting without a break since Feb. 24, increasingly dwindling, Russia has thrown in a new stopgap to bolster the lines: conscripts.

The men of the 59th are unimpressed by what they have seen.

”We’ve already gone up against their mobilized men here,” says Mikhail, another senior lieutenant at a post closer to the front. “They are nearly useless. Many of them can hardly hold a gun, let alone a position. We have killed their professional soldiers, and now [Russia] is hoping to slow us down with bodies,” he says.

As the situation shifts in Ukraine’s favor, the soldiers want for only one thing: extra artillery and tanks to crack Russia’s defenses and exploit breakthroughs in the inevitable assault on Kherson.

“We have almost everything we need,” Vadym says. “We just need a bit more artillery, to fight against their guns, and especially tanks — maybe the most important element in an attack. There will be positive developments here [in Kherson] very soon.” (Source: Army Times)

03 Nov 22. Ukrainian nuclear plant disconnected from grid by Russian shelling.

Summary

Companies
Russia rejoins pact, says received guarantees from Ukraine
Erdogan, Zelenskiy discuss sending grains to African countries
Russia gives some residents of Kherson region days to leave

Russia attacks were reported across large areas of Ukraine on Thursday, with heavy shelling in numerous regions damaging infrastructure, including power supplies to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, Ukrainian officials said.

The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine has again been disconnected from the power grid after Russian shelling damaged the remaining high voltage lines, leaving it with just diesel generators, Ukraine nuclear firm Energoatom said.

The plant, in Russian hands but operated by Ukrainian workers, has 15 days’ worth of fuel to run the generators, Energoatom said.

Russian strikes were also reported in Kriviy Rih, in central Ukraine, and in Sumy and Kharkiv, in the northeast. Heavy fighting was ongoing in the eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk.

“The enemy is trying to keep the temporarily captured territories, concentrating its efforts on restraining the actions of the Defence Forces in certain areas,” Ukraine’s general staff said on Thursday.

Russia has said it targeted infrastructure as part of what it calls its “special military operation” to degrade the Ukrainian military and remove what it says is a potential threat against Russia’s security.

As a result, Ukrainian civilians have endured power cuts and reduced water supplies in recent weeks. Russia denies targeting civilians, though the conflict has killed thousands, displaced ms and left some Ukrainian cities in ruins.

GRAIN DEAL RESUMES

The attacks come after Russia said it would resume its participation in a deal freeing up grain exports from Ukraine, reversing a decision that world leaders warned would increase hunger globally.

Russia, whose forces invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, announced the reversal on Wednesday after Turkey and the United Nations helped keep Ukrainian grain flowing for several days without a Russian role in inspections.

The defence ministry justified the resumption by saying it had received guarantees from Ukraine that it would not use the Black Sea grain corridor for military operations against Russia.

“The Russian Federation considers that the guarantees received at the moment appear sufficient, and resumes the implementation of the agreement,” the ministry said in a statement.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said it was important to stand up to “crazy Russian aggression that destabilises international trade”.

“After eight months of Russia’s so-called special operation, the Kremlin is demanding security guarantees from Ukraine,” Zelenskiy said in his nightly video address.

“This is truly a remarkable statement. It shows just what a failure the Russian aggression has been and just how strong we all are when we maintain our unity.”

The grain deal, originally reached three months ago, had helped alleviate a global food crisis by lifting a de facto Russian blockade on Ukraine, one of the world’s biggest grain suppliers. The prospect of it collapsing this week revived fears of a worsening food crisis and rising prices.

The prices of wheat, soybeans, corn and rapeseed fell sharply on global markets after Russia’s announcement.

Zelenskiy credited Turkey and the United Nations for making it possible for ships to continue moving out of Ukrainian ports with cargoes after Russia suspended participation on Saturday.

Russia suspended its involvement in the deal saying it could not guarantee safety for civilian ships crossing the Black Sea after an attack on its fleet. Ukraine and Western countries called that a false pretext for “blackmail”, using threats to the global food supply.

KHERSON COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

In the south, a Ukrainian counter-offensive has left Russian forces fighting to hold their ground around the city of Kherson, where Russian-installed authorities are urging residents to evacuate, the Ukrainian military said.

Residents who had collaborated with occupying forces were leaving and some departing medical staff had taken equipment from hospitals, it said.

Residents of the town of Nova Zburivka had been given three days to leave and were told that evacuation would be obligatory from Nov. 5.

Russian authorities have repeatedly said Ukraine could be preparing to attack the massive Kakhovka dam, upriver on the Dnipro, and flood the region. Kyiv denies that.

“Obviously, we are afraid of this. That is why we are leaving,” resident Pavel Ryazskiy, who was evacuated to Crimea, said of the possibility the dam could be destroyed.

Reuters was unable to verify the battlefield reports.

In Washington on Wednesday the United States said it had information that indicated North Korea is covertly supplying Russia with a “significant” number of artillery shells for the war.

White House national security spokesperson John Kirby did not provide evidence but he told a briefing that North Korea was attempting to obscure the shipments by funnelling them through the Middle East and North Africa. (Source: Reuters)

01 Nov 22. Russia’s Reliance on Iran, Sign of Putin’s Isolation. Russian President Vladimir Putin is relying on Iran to supply weapons for his war in Ukraine, which is a sign of his isolation, Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said during a news conference today.

Ryder could not confirm news reports that Russia has asked Iran for ballistic missiles and other capabilities, but he did confirm that Iran has provided hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia. And Russian forces have used them to attack Ukraine.

“Iran has provided Russia with UAVs, which we anticipate they’ll likely seek more of those,” the general said. “We do have concerns that Russia may also seek to acquire additional advanced munition capabilities from Iran — for example, surface-to-surface missiles — to use in Ukraine. If we see Russia employing such capabilities on the battlefield, we’ll certainly do what we can to illuminate that.”

This “continued collusion” between Russia and Iran is disturbing, officials said.

It also offers insight into the state of Russian supply chains and the cost of its illegal war on Ukraine. “I think it does speak to the state of Russia’s munitions capability,” Ryder said. “We’ve said before that we assess that they continue to experience supply shortages when it comes to munitions — particularly guided munitions.”

The fact that Russia must seek munitions from Iran — already an international pariah — “says a lot about the kind of company they keep and where they stand in the world right now in terms of isolation,” he said.

Again, Ryder stressed that the United States, its allies and partners are doing all they can to get Ukraine additional air defense capability.

The first National Advanced Surface to Air Missile Systems will be delivered to Ukraine “very soon.” Ukrainian forces are already receiving training in the air defense system, which would be effective against any number of airborne targets, including drones, jets, helicopters and more.

Partners are working to help Ukraine integrate the diverse air defense systems that have received from a number of countries, the general said. “I would submit to you they’ve done a very good job of integrating air defenses, particularly for example, when it comes to taking down a significant percentage of the Iranian drones,” he said. “But again, that’ll be an area that we’ll continue to work with them on.”

(Source: US DoD)

31 Oct 22. US, Allies Rush Anti-Drone Equipment to Ukraine, Conduct On-Site Weapons Tracking. The official also said the U.S. military has increased its efforts to track aid delivered to Ukraine. A senior military official confirmed recent reports that Russia is using kamikaze drones supplied by Tehran to inflict “widespread” damage. Friday’s announcement of additional aid brings the total of air-defense gear to 1,400 Stinger short-range shoulder-fired missiles and eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, or NASAMS, launchers and their missiles, the defense official said.

“Two of those will be in Ukraine in the very near future with six more to be provided later,” the defense official said.

The United States has also sent Vehicle-Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment, or VAMPIREs, to Ukraine.

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Allies and partners have also sent air-defense weapons, including the German IRIS-T and a Slovakian S-300 anti-aircraft radar and missile battery in April.

“The U.S. also sources many spare parts to keep Ukraine’s Soviet-type air-defense systems up and running,” the defense official said.

Spain has agreed to provide a medium-range surface-to-air HAWK system, the defense official said, adding: “And this is also a system that we are encouraging other countries to provide.”

But as more military aid makes its way to Ukraine, some lawmakers have been complaining that the Pentagon is failing to oversee where the weapons and aid are going. Last week, the State Department released a plan to “counter illicit diversion” of weapons given to Ukraine to other sources.

The defense official said the Defense Department has restarted onsite visits to make sure that aid is being used correctly.

“DOD fully supports this plan and is taking an active role as a key implementer,” the official said.

But while lawmakers may have concerns, the Ukrainians haven’t given the Defense Department any reason for pause, the official said. “I will tell you that in each instance, our team from Kyiv, from the U.S. Embassy, has found the Ukrainians to be very transparent and able to support inspection.”

The official said that “the [Defense] Department has not seen credible evidence of the diversion of U.S.-provided weapons. Instead, we see Ukraine’s frontline units effectively employing security assistance every day on the battlefield.”

That’s in line with the experience of U.S. forces on the ground, who reported to Defense One last month that Ukrainians are using military aid as soon it’s given, with little room to spare. (Source: Defense One)

01 Nov 22. Drone-killing Vampires due in Ukraine next year, Pentagon says. The U.S. is aiming to send Ukraine the “Vampire” counter-drone system by mid-2023, with a contract award expected within months, a Pentagon spokesman said Tuesday. The Pentagon on Aug. 24 announced it would send the system, a laser-guided-missile launcher that can quickly be installed in a civilian truck bed, as part of a larger arms package. But despite Russia’s expanded use of Iranian-made kamikaze drones to target Ukraine’s power stations and other key infrastructure, the Pentagon hasn’t yet approved a contract to deliver the system.

“Air defense continues to be a priority, it’s something we’re going to continue to stay focused on and work as quickly as we can,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said. “In reference to the Vampires, we do expect a contract award within the next few months, and right now we’re anticipating delivery to be in mid 2023.”

The L3Harris-made Vehicle-Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment uses laser-guided munitions to hit ground or air targets, including unmanned aircraft systems.

L3Harris expects to deliver the Vampire within the 9-month window requested by the Pentagon once the company is under contract, according to a company spokesman.

In recent days, the Biden administration has said Iranian troops are directly engaged on the ground in Crimea supporting Russian drone attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure. Russia has been using a mix of missiles and loitering munition strikes over the last four weeks to deprive Ukraine of electricity as the temperature falls at the onset of winter.

For Ukraine and its allies, time is of the essence. Because new Russian units aren’t yet available, Russia’s ability to conduct ground operations is at an ebb. “Now is when Ukraine’s partners must lay the groundwork for a military victory in 2023,” the London-based Royal United Services Institute said in a new assessment.

Even as Ukraine’s armed forces have claimed to have downed more than 1,400 enemy drones over the course of the war, Kyiv has pleaded for additional air defense systems. The U.S. and NATO have responded positively, as U.S. Defense Secretary cited the need at a NATO press conference last month and said Washington is working to link the patchwork of air defense systems in Ukraine.

Those systems include anti-aircraft Stinger missiles from the U.S. and others, Russian-made S-300 medium-range air defenses, Hawk medium-range air defenses from Spain and truck-mounted IRIS-T systems from Germany. The U.S. is on the verge of delivering the medium-range National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, which is jointly produced by Raytheon and Norway’s Kongsberg.

On Tuesday, Ryder noted that Ukrainian forces have already shown that they can integrate air defenses, “particularly, for example when it comes to taking down a significant percentage of Iranian drones.” (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)

02 Nov 22. ‘Quadcopters!!! Urgent!’ – Russian Soldiers Plead for Drones in Eastern Ukraine. A Russian battalion in Balakliia, Kharkiv, sent pleas for more drones in late July as Ukraine ramped up its eastern counter-offensive supported by American weaponry, and some troops were ultimately held back by a software installation, according to a new investigation by Reuters. A trove of thousands of military documents left behind by the defeated Russian forces in Kharkiv, who retreated in mid-September, and obtained by Reuters illuminated their brief regime of torture and later, failing aerial capabilities.

The troops asked their superiors in Russia for more drones as Ukrainian forces increasingly and effectively relied on American HIMARS missile launchers the summer before their northern counter-offensive, according to Reuters.

“Quadcopters!!! Urgent!” one soldier wrote to his superior on July 19, according to Reuters. Quadcopter drones are not military-grade, which provided a sign of the troops’ desperation prior to the Ukrainian counter-offensive. The drones are frequently used by Russia as they are low-cost, short-distance, rechargeable drones meant to launch small weapons. They’re also used in part to offset the high costs of explosive, hi-tech surveillance drones like the Iranian kamikaze drones, according to the New York Times.

According to Reuters, the next day, the forces received four Mavic-3 quadcopter drones, but they couldn’t be used immediately as needed. The soldiers, while under missile fire, had to install new software for the drones, and then train 15 soldiers on how to use them.

Other notes sourced by Reuters showed the soldiers pleading for munitions, with one soldier complaining that “the machine gun still won’t work if it has no bullets inside.” (Source: UAS VISION/Business Insider)

01 Nov 22. UK boosts Ukraine’s cyber defences with £6 m support package. The UK’s Ukraine Cyber Programme is utilising world-leading expertise to protect Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure and vital public services from cyber attacks.

UK’s Ukraine Cyber Programme is protecting the Ukrainian Government and its critical national infrastructure from malicious cyber attacks.
Partnership with industry is preventing Russian malign actors from accessing vital networks and providing forensic capabilities to the Ukrainian authorities.
An initial £6.35 m package was mobilised in response to an increasing tempo of Russian cyber activity in the days following the invasion of Ukraine.

A £6.35 m support package from the UK Government is protecting Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure and vital public services from cyber attacks, Foreign Secretary James Cleverly has revealed.

The UK’s Ukraine Cyber Programme was mobilised shortly after Putin’s invasion in February to protect against increased Russian cyber attacks. The programme has not been made public until now to protect its operational security.

Utilising the expertise of world-leading cyber security providers, the UK’s Ukraine Cyber Programme has to date:

Provided incident response support to Government of Ukraine entities, protecting them against destructive cyber attacks, including malware such as Industroyer2. This is preventing malicious actors from accessing vital information relevant to the war effort.
Limited attacker access to vital networks and supported Ukraine to harden their critical infrastructure against future attacks.
Delivered frontline cyber security hardware and software including: firewalls to prevent attacks taking hold; DDoS protection to ensure Ukrainian citizens can continue to access vital information; and forensic capabilities to enable Ukrainian analysts to fully understand system compromises.

Foreign Secretary James Cleverly said: “Russia’s attack on Ukraine is not limited to its horrific land invasion. It has also persistently attempted to invade Ukraine’s cyberspace, threatening critical information, services and infrastructure. The UK’s support to Ukraine is not limited to military aid – we are drawing on Britain’s world-leading expertise to support Ukraine’s cyber defences. Together, we will ensure that the Kremlin is defeated in every sphere: on land, in the air and in cyber space.”

Lindy Cameron, CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre, said: “The NCSC is proud to have played a part in supporting Ukraine’s cyber defenders. They have mounted an impressive defence against Russian aggression in cyberspace, just as they have done on the physical battlefield. The threat remains real and the UK’s support package is undoubtedly bolstering Ukraine’s defences further.”

Russian actors have a long history of hostile and destabilising activity against Ukraine, including:

Shutting off part of Ukraine’s electricity grid in December 2015, leaving 230,000 people without power for up to 6 hours.
Destructive cyber attacks in 2017 targeting Ukraine’s finance and energy sectors and government services, leading to knock-on effects on other European partners.
Kyiv metro and Odessa airport disrupted by ransomware that encrypted hard drives.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on 15-16 February 2022, which the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) judge were the work of Russia’s GRU military intelligence agency.
A series of cyber attacks since the invasion, including against commercial operators such as Viasat in March which had a serious impact on access to internet and other services across both Ukraine and other parts of Europe.

The tempo of Russian cyber attacks against Ukraine increased significantly following its illegal invasion in February 2022, seeking to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and strategic advantage in the war.

The UK’s support is strengthening Ukraine’s cyber defences and improving collective long-term cyber resilience. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

31 Oct 22. US sending satellite antennas to Ukraine after Musk’s Starlink U-turn. The U.S. said it will send Ukraine satellite communications antennas that can work without Elon Musk’s Starlink network to assist the battered country in its fight against Russia.

The four antennas, to be taken from the Department of Defense’s own shelves, were included in a $275m aid package announced Oct. 28. It’s the Biden administration’s twenty-fourth drawdown of equipment for Ukraine since August 2021.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said the antennas will make Ukrainian troops more effective while affording leaders better command and control capabilities.

“These SATCOMs are not intended to serve as a substitute for a service like Starlink,” she said during a Pentagon briefing. “They help increase communication efforts on the battlefield.”

Russian forces harassed Ukrainian lines of communication before the Feb. 24 invasion and have stepped up attacks on the country’s infrastructure to undermine its ability to launch counteroffensives. The telecommunications and security sectors are prime targets for Russian attacks, according to officials in Washington and Kyiv.

“We’re seeing Ukrainian infrastructure and electrical grids being targeted by the Russians,” Singh said, “and these antennas provide an additional capability on the ground at a critical time when Ukraine’s infrastructure is being hit.”

The SATCOM antennas are not associated with Starlink, a satellite constellation operated by Musk’s SpaceX and used by the Ukrainian military. The Starlink arrangement of more than 2,200 low-orbiting satellites has provided broadband internet to more than 150,000 Ukrainian ground stations, serving as a lifeline as other systems are damaged or demolished, Defense News reported.

Musk, a bnaire, at one point announced that SpaceX could no longer afford to provide Starlink service to Ukraine, but later reversed course, saying the funding would continue.

Singh on Friday said the equipment would augment Ukrainian connectivity and is “separate from what Starlink provides.”

“Now, antennas can work with different types of satellites, so it’s not just that they could work with Starlink,” Singh said. “While the Ukrainians do have access to the Starlink capabilities, having additional SATCOM capabilities on the ground is certainly” helpful to them.

Washington has promised Ukraine more than $20.3 bn in security assistance since 2014, including some $18 bn since late February. Equipment and other assets the U.S. has committed include Javelin anti-armor systems, drones, electronic jamming kit, radars and hardened communications equipment.

The Defense Department in June said it would dispatch thousands of secure radios to the frontlines in Eastern Europe, but declined to specify models or manufacturers. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

01 Nov 22. Baykar Plans to Counter Kamikaze Threat in Ukraine.

Turkish combat drone maker Baykar hopes “soon” to be able to counter “kamikaze” drones in Ukraine, such as the Russian-operated Iranian drones recently threatening critical infrastructure, the company’s CEO told Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa).

“Soon our Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncıs will have air-to-air missiles; not only to engage drones but other enemy aircraft… we are conducting our tests,”

Haluk Bayraktar said during a defense fair in Istanbul.

During the fair, SAHA Expo, a contract was signed between Turkish rocket and missile-making giant Roketsan and Baykar for the integration of the Sungur air defense missile to combat drones.

Sungur is “a proven ammunition, especially against moving targets such as helicopters and drones. Using it from our unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as an air-to-air missile will be a game changer,”

Murat Ikinci, Roketsan general manager said at the fair.

Integration of such missiles to Akıncı and Bayraktar TB2 combat drones can lead to the creation of a low-cost air patrol concept in eliminating threats such as attack helicopters and enemy drones, including kamikaze drones, instead of using high-cost air-to-air missiles.

Ukraine currently tries to intercept kamikaze UAVs used by Russia with fighter jets in its inventory but the use of UAVs will be a cost-effective solution for them.

The Ukrainian army have largely been successfully using Baykar’s TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) against the Russian invasion since February.

Meanwhile, the recent introduction of Iranian “Shahed-136” drones by Moscow has complicated the situation for Kyiv.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned against a “large-scale disaster” should the wave of kamikaze attacks on energy facilities continue through winter.

“In any case, you need to be ready with your countermeasures… We fully support Ukraine to defend their sovereignty,” Bayraktar said.

The kamikazes are slow, noisy and deployed at low altitudes, making them “easy targets,” Bayraktar said.

Russian criticism against Baykar had spiked in particular after reports of Bayraktar TB2’s alleged role in helping Ukraine sink the flagship missile cruiser Moskva in April. Bayraktar himself was reportedly targeted by Russian intelligence, using deepfake technology.

“Unfortunately such things happen… but we are a huge team, we focus on our targets, not other noises,” Bayraktar said.”We hear such reports of TB2’s role,” Bayraktar said of the Moskva incident.

The drone reportedly initially used components made in the United States, Canada and Europe, including Germany, pushing some lawmakers in NATO allies Germany and the U.S. to call for restricting technology transfer to Baykar. Those calls had no effect on the production of the famed drones, on the contrary, the company immediately replaced the imported parts with those produced domestically within the country.

Today, 93% of Bayraktar TB2’s parts are locally made, the firm said, adding that the combat drone is exported to 24 countries from Africa to Central Asia and Europe, bringing in a $1bn surplus. Bayraktar said he disagrees with criticism that “dronified warfare” lowers the threshold for war.

He argued that drone technology rather helps “eliminate collateral damage” thanks to advanced precision and surveillance. (Source: UAS VISION/The Daily Sabah)

31 Oct 22. Russia Continues Attacks on Ukraine Civilian Targets. Russia is continuing its campaign of terror attacks on Ukraine as it targets civilian infrastructure, said senior defense officials.

The Ukrainian military has been able to defend against some of the Russian attacks, but air defense remains a priority. “Damage to the electric grid and water supply are serious concerns directly harming the civilian population,” a senior defense official said.

The United States is working with the Ukrainian military, allies and partners to improve Ukraine’s defenses.

The United States has already provided 1,400 Stinger short-range air defense weapons. Allies and partners have also provided short-range air defense.

The U.S. has committed to sending eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems – NASAMs – to Ukraine. Two of those systems are being sent in the next few weeks with the others following. Ukrainian soldiers are already being trained to use the system, which shoots many different missiles. NASAMs can defend against a wide range of airborne threats.

“We also have committed to a suite of counter, unmanned aerial systems, including the Vampire system and other radar systems,” officials said.

And more is being done. “The U.S. also helped support Slovakia’s donation of an S-300 system earlier in the war,” the official said. “This was incredibly important to protect Ukrainian infrastructure at that point in time, and the U.S. also sourced many spare parts to keep Ukraine’s Soviet-type air defense systems up and running.”

Germany and Spain have recently sent air defense systems to Ukraine. A key to this is integrating all of these systems from many different nations to protect Ukraine, and that remains an on-going effort.

The senior defense official said the latest tranche of security assistance the United States will provide Ukraine includes additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS; 500 rounds of precision-guided 155 millimeter artillery rounds; and more than 1,300 anti-armor systems, including the shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon. The package – valued at $275 m – also includes Humvees and satellite communications antennas.

On the ground, the battle continues with Russia’s attack on infrastructure causing widespread power outages. In and around Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city, Ukrainian forces have liberated some additional villages as they continue to press toward the east. Russian forces in this area are focused on reinforcing their defensive lines.

Farther south, Russian forces are attempting to pursue offensive operations. In Kherson, “we continue to see deliberate and calibrated operations by Ukrainian forces as they press Russian forces along the three main axes,” a senior military official said. “We assess that the Russians in this area continue to reinforce their defensive lines, as well.”

U.S. officials said they’re tracking the reports and Russian statements regarding an alleged attack against Russian navy vessels in Sevastopol, a city in Crimea. (Source: US DoD)

31 Oct 22. Swiss veto of weapons re-exports to Ukraine angers Germany. Bern claims transfer of ammunition to Kyiv would jeopardise its neutrality. political dispute deepens over Bern’s refusal to allow arms to be shipped to Ukraine. Swiss lawmakers responded on Monday with accusations — and thinly veiled references to the second world war — that Germany “no longer respects” Switzerland’s political neutrality. The issue has become more urgent since Russia escalated an aerial campaign targeting Ukraine’s infrastructure and as Kyiv’s weapon stocks have dwindled, German officials said. German defence minister Christine Lambrecht wrote to the Swiss government 10 days ago, urging it to lift a re-export veto on anti-aircraft shells for German-made “Cheetah” flak guns that Berlin has donated to Kyiv. Bern first refused a request by Berlin to lift the veto in April. Germany wants to send 12,000 Swiss-made 35-milimetre rounds that were bought by Berlin decades ago to restock the 50 Cheetah flak cannons it has pledged to Ukraine. The Swiss government, as part of the original sales contract with Germany, has a veto over the munitions’ resale or donation. Politicians in the wealthy alpine state believe that sending them to Ukraine would jeopardise its neutrality. Switzerland refused a request from Denmark for the re-export of two dozen Swiss-made “Piranha” armoured personnel carriers to Ukraine in May. The German government has been struggling to find more shells to send to Kyiv. Brazil, which makes suitable munitions for the Cheetah guns, has also refused to allow their re-export. German defence minister Christine Lambrecht, centre, speaks to special forces soldiers in Calw © Thomas Lohnes/Getty Images The Cheetah system, though phased out of Germany’s military in 2010, has proved effective against the slow-moving Iranian “kamikaze” drones that have been used to pummel Ukrainian civilian targets this autumn. The Swiss company that manufactured the ordnance for them, Oerlikon-Bührle, no longer exists. It was a major supplier of arms to the Third Reich at time when the safeguarding of Swiss neutrality was even more important. “For once, the Swiss government is right,” said Thomas Borer, former Swiss ambassador to Germany and an architect of Switzerland’s current laws on neutrality. “It’s clear that delivering arms of weapons into a conflict would infringe the core principle of what neutrality means for Switzerland. As a friendly neighbour that is aware of our laws and obligations, Germany shouldn’t put Switzerland in this position.” Lambrecht wrote to her Swiss counterpart Viola Amherd saying the Cheetah munitions were purely defensive. In the letter, she said the weapons were “vital” for the protection of Black Sea grain exports from potential bombardment, according to Ukraine’s military. Bern has yet to formally respond to Berlin’s renewed request, which has been made in parallel with diplomatic lobbying from Ukrainian officials. The Swiss defence ministry has passed the new German request on to the finance ministry, which handles export licences, a Swiss government spokesperson said, declining to comment further. A spokesperson for Germany’s defence ministry said: “We are always actively finding ways to support Ukraine through our partners and alliances.” Discussions with Switzerland were part of that process, they added. (Source: FT.com)

01 Nov 22. Russia extends evacuation zone in Ukraine’s Kherson region.

Russian-installed officials in Ukraine’s southern Kherson region said on Monday they were extending an evacuation zone from the Dnipro river, repeating claims rejected by Kyiv that Ukraine could be preparing to attack the Kakhovka dam and flood the region.

In a post on Telegram, Vladimir Saldo, the Russian-backed head of the region, which is partially occupied by Russian forces, said he was extending the area covered by an order for civilians to evacuate by an additional 15 km (9 miles) to include another seven settlements.

“Due to the possibility of the use of prohibited methods of war by the Ukrainian regime, as well as information that Kyiv is preparing a massive missile strike on the Kakhovka hydroelectric station, there is an immediate danger of the Kherson region being flooded, (resulting in) the mass destruction of civilian infrastructure and humanitarian catastrophe,” Saldo said in a video message posted on Monday evening.

“Given the situation, I have decided to expand the evacuation zone by 15 kilometres from the Dnipro … the decision will make it possible to create a layered defence in order to repel Ukrainian attacks and protect civilians.”

Kyiv has denied it plans to attack the Kakhovka dam, a 30-metre (100 ft) high, 3.2-kilometre long facility and unleash a reservoir the size of the Great Salt Lake across southern Ukraine, flooding towns and villages, several of which Russian forces seized at the start of the war.

Ukraine said repeated Russian claims that Ukraine is preparing an attack on the dam, which regulates water supplies to the annexed Crimean peninsula and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, were a sign that Russia itself was considering staging an attack and blaming it on Kyiv and its Western supporters.

Russia has been evacuating tens of thousands of civilians from the western bank of the Dnipro river in recent weeks, under an advancing Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russian-installed officials are offering civilians one-time payments of 100,000 roubles ($1,628) to leave, and Moscow is providing housing in other regions of Russia, Saldo said.

President Vladimir Putin moved to annex the Kherson region last month after staging referendums in four Ukrainian regions that were slammed as sham and illegal by Kyiv and the West. (Source: Reuters)

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