NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

Sponsored by Exensor

www.exensor.com

————————————————————————-

Ukraine October 3rd.

Military and security developments

Sept. 30.

Over the last 24 hours, Ukrainian forces are likely to have completed the encirclement of Russian forces in the Lyman area. Russian sources reported that by the evening of 29 September Ukrainian forces had broken through Russian defences around Stavky (10km north of Lyman), and had cut off the Drobysheve-Torske road north of the city. Russian sources also reported that Ukrainian forces had also cut off access to the 00528 highway through Zarichne, the last remaining Russian-controlled road supplying Russian forces in Lyman.
This morning, 30 September, unconfirmed footage supported earlier reports that Ukrainian forces have taken Yampil, a town 13km southeast of Lyman, which has likely completed the encirclement. Russian military bloggers have predicted the imminent fall of Lyman without major Russian reinforces, but such reinforces are unlikely to materialise, and if they do are likely to be poor-quality. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 29 September that seven Russian tank units made up of newly mobilised personnel were deployed to the Lyman axis, but got into a road accident due to their lack of training. The likely imminent collapse of Russian positions around Lyman is highly likely to undermine the Kremlin’s annexation of the occupied territories (see below).
Military developments on the other key fronts, including along the Oskil River, east of Bakhmut and along the Kherson axis remained broadly on trend over the last 24 hours. No major developments beyond patterns we have been monitoring in recent weeks.
Rumours around Belarusian involvement and potential mobilisation have proliferated over the last 24 hours. However, as reported yesterday (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 29 September), we are seeing little to indicate that this is a sign of an impending Belarusian involvement in the war – which remains highly unlikely. While Belarusian airfields and military bases are reportedly being prepared to receive recently mobilised Russian troops, this is most likely aimed at easing the load on Russian military logistics and barracks during training. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksiy Hromov, has stated that these developments do not indicate that Russia and Belarus are forming a strike group to target northern Ukraine. As such, our assessment remains unchanged at present.

Political developments

On 30 September, President Putin formally recognised the independence of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. As anticipated, this is the first step in the most likely sequence of events which will see Russia formally annex all the occupied territories in Ukraine. A ceremony signing the accession treaties with the regions is set to take place at 1500 (Moscow time) today, 30 September. For further details of the most likely process for annexation, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 29 September.
On 29 September, President Putin publicly demanded regional authorities correct all ‘mistakes’ made during the partial mobilisation and ‘not allow a repeat of them in the future’. During his speech to the Russian Security Council, Putin made it clear that mobilisation should only apply to citizens in the reserve and specifically those with military and combat experience. He stated that those unlawfully mobilised should be sent home. His intervention comes after a week of the highly chaotic roll-out, which has seen mobilisation orders handed to thousands of men without military experience – triggering notable backlash across the Russian Federation. Regional governors have already begun responding to Putin’s order, stating that some men who had been called up unlawfully are now being sent home. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether Putin’s public order will result in a significant change on the ground, where public anger remains palpable, though diminishing.
Nevertheless, later today, at 1500 (local time) on 30 September, a large-scale anti-mobilisation protest is due to take place after Friday prayers in Dagestan, specifically in Makhachkala and Khasavyurt. The aim of the protest is to stop the mobilisation in the North Caucuses and to secure the release of anti-draft activists detained in previous protests over the past week. Historically contentious relations between ethnic minorities in Dagestan and the Kremlin predate Putin’s presidency. However, the scope of Moscow’s mobilisation is driving unrest in the region. On 29 September, regional head Sergei Melikov criticised recruitment officers for driving around Dagestan with megaphones stating all men must present themselves to conscription centres, despite this not being official policy. Recruitment officers on the ground are therefore actively exacerbating the situation beyond the Kremlin’s orders. As such, today’s protest is likely to prove a key test of whether protests will escalate further and towards violence, or whether security forces can contain and deter such an escalation.

Forecast

This week Vadym Skibitsky, spokesman for Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, stated that Ukrainian intelligence considers the threat of tactical nuclear weapon use in Ukraine to now be ‘very high’. While the threat of nuclear weapon use is increasing, we do not see the likelihood as ‘very high’, and there are very limited indications that a nuclear strike is imminent. We are nevertheless revising our threat assessment of nuclear weapons use upwards, from highly unlikely to unlikely, in light of the apparent Nord Stream sabotage and growing nuclear rhetoric. While the Pentagon has stated that it is too early to say who was behind the apparent sabotage, all indicators point to Russia’s involvement. Russia likely used the incident to signal its capability and will to escalate the war beyond Ukraine’s borders, as part of a strategic deterrence campaign primarily designed to deter greater NATO involvement in Ukraine. Given this signalling of both capability and will to escalate, the threat of further escalation is credible and is increasing. However, our assessment remains that nuclear weapon use in Ukraine remains unlikely in the short term, though we are highly likely to see further nuclear signalling from Moscow.

Further pre-nuclear signalling will remain key trigger points to determine whether another increase in the threat and likelihood level of nuclear weapon use is needed. Such nuclear signalling can include, but will not be limited to:

Raising military readiness levels;
Putting Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, the Northern and Pacific fleets and the Long-Range Aviation Command on high alert or enhanced combat duty, with potential personnel reinforcements beforehand;
Increased naval incursions into NATO/EU waters, reinforcing Russia’s capability to target maritime assets following the apparent sabotage against Nord Stream;
Escalation against conventional targets outside of Ukraine, namely deniable attacks (whether kinetic or cyber) against maritime and critical infrastructure in international waters or on NATO soil;
Warhead mating (attaching warhead sections to missiles or other delivery vehicles). The US and its allies have already stepped-up intelligence gathering efforts using satellite imagery to monitor for this. However, Russian dual-use weapon systems will mean detecting low-yield tactical nuclear weapon mating will be very difficult even for NATO intelligence services.

Misinterpretation of any of these signals will increase the risk of an unwanted escalation, with both Russia and NATO now likely to be considering, if not already engaged in, escalation control strategies. However, NATO’s response to the apparent sabotage against the Nord Stream pipelines will likely determine Russia’s next move and whether Moscow employs a further ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy.

On 29 September, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau stated that NATO would respond with a ‘devastating’ conventional response against Russia if Moscow used nuclear weapons in Ukraine. NATO is understood to be signalling such warnings to Moscow directly, with Rau adding that conventional NATO weapons such as aviation assets and missiles wouldn’t necessarily have to be launched from Ukrainian soil. NATO’s conventional superiority, particularly the US’s deep strike capabilities, has long loomed large in Russian military planning, and Russian doctrine places emphasis on deterring such strikes from occurring in the first place. As such, questions remain as to whether a conventional NATO response to any Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons could be controlled, given that any war with Russia is inevitably nuclear in nature. Given these unavoidable uncertainties, posturing and rhetoric will likely increase in the coming days and weeks as both Russia and NATO step up strategic deterrence across multiple domains.

Latvia: Parliamentary election could drive ethnic tensions in the country. On 1 October, parliamentary elections will take place in Latvia with the centre-right New Unity alliance leading in the polls with 21 percent of the votes. New Unity is currently a member of the centre-right governing coalition, along with the populist National Alliance. While inflation reached a record 21.5 percent in July and household gas prices were the fourth highest in the EU in the same month, the right-wing alliance focused on the issue of Russian minorities during their campaigns, with National Alliance pledging to ban Russian-language education in the country. The Russian minority constitutes around 25 percent of Latvia’s population, suggesting that ethnic tensions could increase in the country, Furthermore, as 19 parties will be competing in the election, there is likely to be another fractured parliament, potentially under a new right-wing coalition.

Germany: Government’s gas price cap unlikely to help demand reduction efforts but will improve socio-economic health On 29 September, the German government announced that they were launching a EUR 200 billion support plan for households and businesses by introducing a gas price cap. The new plan will subsidise part of households’ and businesses’ electricity bills and introduce a price gap, with the government paying for the difference between market prices and consumer bills. The support package will be financed through Germany’s Economic Stabilisation Fund which was set up at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, in order to avoid violating Germany’s debt brake. The new measures will almost certainly mitigate socio-economic health risks in the country and boost manufacturing, however, they will also hamper efforts to reduce gas demands in the near term.

Russia: Anti-mobilisation protests in Dagestan will likely prove key test for escalation of unrest. On 30 September at 1500 (local time), a large-scale anti-mobilisation protest is due to take place after Friday prayers in Dagestan, specifically in Makhachkala and Khasavyurt. The aim of the protest is to stop the mobilisation in the North Caucuses and to secure the release of anti-draft activists detained in previous protests over the past week. Historically contentious relations between ethnic minorities in Dagestan and the Kremlin predate Putin’s presidency. However, the scope of Moscow’s mobilisation is driving unrest in the region. On 29 September, regional head Sergei Melikov criticised recruitment officers for driving around Dagestan with megaphones stating all men must present themselves to conscription centres, despite this not being official policy. Recruitment officers on the ground are therefore actively exacerbating the situation beyond the Kremlin’s orders. As such, today’s protest is likely to prove a key test of whether protests will escalate further and towards violence, or whether security forces can contain and deter such an escalation.

Armenia: Military expenditure plans and waning Russian influence reinforce destabilisation in South Caucasus. On 29 September, Armenian officials confirmed that the country will significantly increase its defence budget, following the country’s defeat in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan. Yerevan announced the 2023 military budget will be increased by almost 50 percent to USD 1.2 billion. The announcement follows a major escalation of Azerbaijani incursions into Armenian territory earlier this month. However, Armenia’s procurement of military equipment has been complicated by Russia’s war against Ukraine, specifically through interrupted arms supplies from Moscow. Growing Azerbaijani territorial claims and military action will likely continue to fuel hostilities between Baku and Yerevan and the threat of a resumption of full-scale war. However, Yerevan’s decision also reflects a much broader trend of increasing defence expenditure across the globe, underscoring growing defence and dual-use opportunities for businesses, particularly as Armenia has begun to question whether its alliance with Russia is meeting Armenian security needs.

Sept. 28

* Ukrainian forces have continued to make significant progress in eastern Ukraine. Over the last 24 hours, Russian military commentators have reported with growing concern on Ukrainian advances around the city of Lyman. Numerous sources, including Russian reporting and geolocated footage, indicate that Ukrainian forces have taken numerous positions to the northeast, northwest and southeast of Lyman. Most notably, Ukrainian forces are likely to have retaken Zelena Dolyna, a settlement 14km northeast of Lyman, and have pushed southeast to retake Kolodiazi (10km northeast of Lyman). This indicates that Ukrainian units are now only a few kilometres away from the Zherebets River and are pushing ever closer to the Luhansk oblast administrative border.

* However, Russian sources have also reported that Ukrainian forces have been concentrating around Yampil (13km southeast of Lyman) and have broken through Russian lines to push towards Torske. With reports of Ukrainians pushing south of Kolodiazi towards Torske, Russia’s position in Lyman is now at serious risk of being cut off and entirely surrounded in the coming days. If the town of Zarichne is taken (8km east of Lyman), the last remaining road (00528) to Russian-controlled territory will be severed.

* Further north along the Oskil River, Ukrainian forces have likely retaken Kivsharivka, a settlement 10km southeast of Kupiansk. Unconfirmed Russian reports claim that Russian forces withdrew all of their remaining units from Kupiansk on 28 September, indicating still further that Ukrainian forces are successfully consolidating their position on the eastern bank of the river.

* Conflicting reports continue to confuse the situation further south along the Bakhmut line, where Russian forces continue to launch largely unsuccessful attacks. Russian sources, including Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, claimed on 28 September that they have taken positions in Zaitseve (8km southeast of Bakhmut) and Spirne (25km northeast of Bakhmut). However, this remains unconfirmed given Ukrainian General Staff reports that their forces had successfully repelled attacks around Zaitseve.

* On 29 September, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Belarus is preparing to house 20,000 newly mobilised Russian soldiers on its soil. This is likely a reflection of the strains the mobilisation is placing on existing Russian military facilities and barracks to house and train the influx of ‘reservists’. This is highly unlikely to represent any major change in policy in Minsk or change the low likelihood of Belarusian entry into the war. Last week President Alyaksandr Lukashenka stated that mobilisation would not occur in Belarus, and this is likely to remain true given the instability and backlash this would generate.

* Notably, however, further evidence continues to emerge to indicate that Russia is also sending newly mobilised troops directly to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff has claimed that newly mobilised troops with no training have arrived to reinforce the 1st Tank Regiment of the 2nd Motorised Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army – one of the most prestigious units in the Russian Army before the invasion. The fact that even traditionally ‘elite’ forces like the 1st Guards Tank Army are being reinforced with poorly trained, and likely poorly motivated, mobilised forces means that Russia’s combat effectiveness is likely to decline still further as the Kremlin appears to be favouring quantity over quality.

* Overnight on 28-29 September, missiles struck civilian infrastructure targets in Kryvyi Rih and Dnipro, while strikes also continued in cities closer to the frontline, namely Kramatorsk, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia.

Political developments

* On 28 September, the Swedish Coast Guard discovered a fourth leak on the Nord Stream pipelines. German officials have furthermore stated that three of the four Nord Stream pipelines are now damaged beyond repair, and will become useless if not repaired rapidly to prevent saltwater from corroding the inside of the pipes. This is largely irrelevant given that Germany has already committed to divest completely from Russian gas and suspended the Nord Stream 2 project.

* This morning, 29 September, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the ‘incident on the Nord Stream occurred in a zone controlled by American intelligence’, claiming both Denmark and Sweden, in whose EEZ the incident occurred, are ‘completely controlled by the US intelligence services’. The Russian embassy in Washington had already promoted statements made by US President Joe Biden to ‘bring an end’ to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline – a statement clearly made about suspending the pipeline (which did happen before the invasion) rather than a threat to attack it. All indicators point to Russian involvement in the incidents, but as previously assessed Moscow is now seeking to blame NATO and the US for the incident. This will increase pressure on the US and EU to label Russia a state sponsor of terrorism, and while there is currently no evidence to confirm Russian involvement, an investigation remains ongoing. For further analysis and implications of the Nord Stream incidents, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 28 September.

* The independent pollster Levada Centre published its latest public opinion poll on 28 September, which saw the second-largest drop in President Putin’s approval ratings in his two-decade rule. Of those Russians surveyed in the poll, 77 percent stated that they approve of Putin’s actions as president – down from the steady 83 percent recorded over the last six months. The drop is the largest since 2018 when Putin raised workers’ retirement age and faced large nationwide protests. Putin’s decision to initiate ‘partial’ mobilisation last week has triggered a nationwide backlash and has impacted his popularity, but the number of and turnout at protests have diminished over the last 24-48 hours.

Ukraine-Russia: Accession agreements will be signed on 30 September, beginning formal annexation process of four occupied oblasts. Russia announced that it will begin the formal legislative process of annexing four Ukrainian oblasts on 30 September. Moscow-installed election officials reported that ‘98 percent’ of voters in these territories opted to join Russia. The signing ceremony is likely to be the first step of the formal annexation process, and will likely culminate early next week. The treaties signed during the 30 September ceremony will then pass through the Constitutional Court and the State Duma and Federation Council. State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said that parliamentary approval will take place on 3-4 October. It is likely that President Vladimir Putin will sign them formally into law, officially annexing the territories. However, Putin will possibly recognise the independence of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts during his speech on 30 September, aligning them with the Donbas (whose independence has already been recognised by Russia).

Ukraine-Russia: Accession agreements will be signed on 30 September, beginning formal annexation process of four occupied oblasts. Russia announced that it will begin the formal legislative process of annexing four Ukrainian oblasts on 30 September. Moscow-installed election officials reported that ‘98 percent’ of voters in these territories opted to join Russia. The signing ceremony is likely to be the first step of the formal annexation process, and will likely culminate early next week. The treaties signed during the 30 September ceremony will then pass through the Constitutional Court and the State Duma and Federation Council. State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said that parliamentary approval will take place on 3-4 October. It is likely that President Vladimir Putin will sign them formally into law, officially annexing the territories. However, Putin will possibly recognise the independence of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts during his speech on 30 September, aligning them with the Donbas (whose independence has already been recognised by Russia).

Sept. 27

* Over the last 24 hours, Russian and Ukrainian operations in Ukraine remained broadly on-trend with what we’ve been assessing in recent weeks. Russian sources have reported further Ukrainian advances in eastern Ukraine, particularly around Lyman. Ukrainian forces have reportedly taken a number of further villages to the north and northwest of the city, indicating steady southward progress towards Lyman itself as the encirclement continues to build.

* Unconfirmed reports indicate other Ukrainian advances further north, including the reported capture of Pisky-Radkivski, a village 30km northwest of Lyman which is notably on the eastern ban of the Oskil River. If confirmed, this would indicate that Ukrainian forces have now entered Kharkiv oblast east of the Oskil River from the south, and are pushing towards the Luhansk oblast administrative border. This will further increase pressure on weakened Russian forces guarding the Kharkiv-Luhansk border region, as Moscow now faces the prospect of further Ukrainian thrusts from the south. Svatove likely remains the ultimate objective of Ukrainian forces on this axis, though progress is likely to remain more steady as Russian forces establish secondary defensive lines along the Luhansk border. Russian sources on 26 September reported that elements of Russia’s 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) have reinforced this axis, including both the defence of Lyman, Svatove and the wider Oskil River line.

* Russian forces have also continued offensive operations further south around Bakhmut, with Russian sources claiming some notable, if still relatively modest, progress. According to unconfirmed Russian reports, Wagner Group forces have entered the northern sections of Otradivka, a settlement 10km south of Bakhmut along the T-0513 highway, while other Russian forces have also made progress around Zaitseve to the northeast of Otradivka. Bakhmut clearly still remains the priority for the Russian military leadership, and while progress is being made, it is slow and likely resulting in high casualties on both sides for relatively small gains.

* Russian long-range and drone strikes have continued to step up in recent days, with civilian infrastructure in Odesa, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia the primary targets. Overnight on 27 September, Russian Smerch rockets hit targets in the centre of Mykolaiv, including a water supply facility, while various civilian infrastructure facilities in Zaporizhzhia and Odesa were also targeted. As previously assessed, Russian forces are highly likely to sustain such attacks on civilian infrastructure across the country, though Odesa, in particular, appears to be a particular priority for Russian forces this week.

* Ukrainian sources have claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully destroyed a Russian drone control and training centre, located in Chulakivka on the Kinburn Spit (Kherson oblast). According to this unconfirmed report, Ukrainian strikes against the facility killed four dozen Russians as well as two dozen Iranian trainers. The Iranian-made Shahed-136 drone, among other systems, has been used to target civilian infrastructure in Odesa, as well as military targets across the Kherson frontline. Reports indicate that they have been successfully penetrating Ukrainian air defences in places, though Ukrainian forces have claimed numerous kills. The potential death of Iranian trainers would be highly notable and indicate a much more active Iranian involvement in the war than previously understood. In the meantime, drone strikes against Odesa and other locations far from the frontline will continue, despite the possible destruction of the Chulakivka site.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* On 27 September, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced that the country will seek to ensure the safety of Russian men who are fleeing across the border in response to President Vladimir Putin’s partial mobilisation order. The mobilisation, described by Tokayev as a ‘hopeless situation’, has already prompted a mass exodus of citizens from Russia, with Kazakh officials stating that 98,000 Russians have entered Kazakhstan since the order was given. This latest development follows unconfirmed reports that Moscow plans to close its borders to all men of military age as early as 28 September. Kazakhstan’s stance on assisting what in effect are draft dodgers will strain relations still further between Astana and Moscow, with officials already reporting tense situations at border checkpoints as Russian security forces begin turning away military-aged men.

* However, the Kremlin looks poised to introduce further border restrictions elsewhere. The Kremlin on 26 September stated that ‘no decisions have been made’ on the potential of a ban on all military-aged men leaving the country. The Kremlin normally flatly denies something it wishes to dispel, so this could indicate that rather a decision has been made and will be introduced in the coming days. Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs announced on 27 September that a mobilisation point and enlistment office will be opened on the Georgian-Russian border in North Ossetia, in a clear attempt to prevent men eligible for mobilisation from leaving. Notably, much of this section of the border is controlled by Russian forces on both sides, given the South Ossetia breakaway region.

* Resistance to mobilisation has furthermore continued on 26 September, though as before security forces appear to be containing the unrest and preventing it from spreading and further escalating. Nevertheless, anti-mobilisation protests took place in at least 10 separate locations on 26 September, including in Yakutsk where hundreds of women were arrested. Further enlistment offices were targeted by arsonists, with one man setting himself on fire in Ryazan oblast in protest against his own mobilisation.

* Russian officials, governors and pro-Kremlin media pundits have over the last 24 hours openly acknowledged the widespread problems and mishandling of the country’s ‘partial’ mobilisation. The Kremlin itself has been blaming the apparent widespread call-up of ineligible people on individual bureaucratic mistakes and incompetence, though the scale of the issues makes this highly unlikely.

* Meanwhile, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill has this week stated that Russian soldiers who die in the war against Ukraine will have their sins cleansed. Kirill remains a strong supporter of the war, and his stance has compounded growing tensions with the other Orthodox patriarchates, irrespective of the 2018 Schism with Constantinople. He stated that ‘I am sure that such a sacrifice washes away all sins that a person has committed. This is the latest attempt by the Russian state to mitigate growing opposition to the war and is likely an attempt to reframe the war as a necessary sacrifice. Amid the beginning of a shift in narrative, influential Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov openly stated on 26 September that the war in Ukraine is Russia’s ‘New Great Patriotic War’. Such messaging will likely continue in a bid to stem opposition to mobilisation and increase engagement with the war.

* Nuclear rhetoric continues to grow after the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, stated on 27 September that NATO would not respond if Russia used nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine. Medvedev, who has in recent years become the highest profile ‘ultra-hawk’ in the Kremlin, has regularly been the leading voice in anti-western nuclear threats. On Telegram Medvedev claimed that Russia would be within its rights to use nuclear weapons if Ukraine posed a threat to the existence of the state, and reiterated Putin’s previous statement that ‘this is not a bluff’. He predicted that NATO would ultimately have to ‘swallow’ the use of any nuclear weapon in the conflict, given that Washington, London and Brussels would not be prepared to fight a nuclear war over the fate of Ukraine. This comes after Washington warned Moscow of ‘catastrophic consequences’ for Russia if it used nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and so further rhetoric and efforts to deter one another are highly likely in the coming days and weeks.

Forecast

Today, 27 September, marks the final day of voting in Russia’s referenda in the occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Results are expected to come in as early as this evening. The precedent of the referendum held in occupied Crimea in 2014, which maintained 97 percent in favour of joining Russia, is likely to be the model, with overwhelming support for annexation almost a certainty. The Russian Electoral Commission stated on 27 September that ‘turnout’ had exceeded 83.61 percent in the LNR, 86.98 percent in the DNR, 66.43 percent in Zaporizhzhia and 63.58% in Kherson. Such a high turnout and the likely overwhelming support for annexation is of course highly unlikely to be accurate, given that Russian forces do not control all of the given territories and turnout in peacetime Ukrainian elections is always much lower. Russian media and occupation authorities have over the last few days stepped up claims of Ukrainian attempts to disrupt or falsify the referenda results, including accusations of double voting for those voting ‘no’ to annexation. LNR authorities furthermore announced two voting stations had temporarily closed on the morning of 27 September due to Ukrainian attempted ‘provocations’. According to an unnamed Russian senator and sources close to the Crimean administration, the four Ukrainian regions could become a single Russian federal district, as we had previously reported on in the past. Moscow’s current political overseer of the occupied territories, Sergei Kiriyenko, had previously been touted as a potential head of a new ‘Novorossiya’ federal district. However, Russian media are also this week reporting pro-war hawk and former Director General of Roscosmos Dmitry Rogozin as a potential presidential envoy to the new region. President Putin is due to address both houses of the Russian parliament on 30 September. Putin’s previous address to the Security Council just before the invasion in February was similarly used to formally recognise the independence of the DNR/LNR. As such, Putin’s address on 30 September is the most likely occasion for an announcement on Russia’s annexation of the occupied territories.

Ukraine-Russia: Kyiv warns of escalating Russian cyber activity amid Moscow’s declining military success in Eastern Ukraine. On 26 September, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (HUR MO) warned that Russia is planning to launch “massive cyber attacks” against the critical infrastructure of Ukraine and its allies. The HUR MO claimed that these cyber attacks will likely particularly focus on disrupting the operations of energy sector organisations and be similar in nature to the cyber attacks launched by Russian state-linked hacking group Sandworm against Ukraine’s power grid in 2015 and 2016. The HUR MO also claimed that Moscow-directed hacking groups would increase “the intensity of DDoS attacks on the critical infrastructure of Ukraine’s closest allies, primarily Poland and the Baltic countries” to disrupt the Ukrainian military’s ongoing counteroffensive and energy supplies routes to East and South Ukraine. This aim is indicative of how Russia has utilised its cyber capabilities throughout the invasion, with these cyber attacks closely coordinated with the Russian military’s offensive campaigns. Given Russia’s currently limited funding, time, and manpower, these cyber attacks will most likely remain cyber attacks such as DDoS or intelligence campaigns. However, there will remain a realistic probability of wiper attacks being launched as well, which would cause long-term disruptions to the targeted organisations’ operations.

Eurasia: Russian Setbacks.

Key Takeaways

* Russia’s operational defeat in Ukraine’s Kharkiv oblast earlier this month has exposed growing perceptions of Russian weakness not only in Ukraine, but also right across the Former Soviet Union.

* In light of the Kharkiv counteroffensive’s impact on the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, further Russian military setbacks will prompt numerous second- and third-order effects which are likely to destabilise additional geopolitical flashpoints across Eurasia.

* In the wake of Russia’s Kharkiv defeat, intense fighting has already broken out between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Amid a growing threat of war in these regions and Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine, Moscow’s ability to stabilise areas over which it claims to be the principal guarantor will be severely tested. If Russia is perceived to fail these critical tests, the risk of armed conflict, Islamist extremism and regime instability will likely rise across the Former Soviet Union.

Context

Earlier this month, Ukraine’s armed forces inflicted a major operational defeat on Russia in Kharkiv. In co-ordination with another ongoing counteroffensive in Kherson, the Kharkiv counteroffensive has decidedly put Russia on the defensive in Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s subsequent decision on 21 September to initiate partial mobilisation in Russia has illustrated the extent to which the defeat has forced the Kremlin to adapt its strategies. It has also exposed the perceived military weakness of Russia (for further context and analysis around the partial mobilisation.

Given Russia’s prominent security role across the Former Soviet Union as de facto head of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the military and psychological impact of the defeat will not be limited to Ukraine and Russia. The precedent threatens to undermine Russia’s claims to be the primary security guarantor in the region, which will possibly destabilise additional geopolitical flashpoints across Eurasia.

Intense fighting broke out this month between Armenia (Russia’s CSTO ally) and Azerbaijan, as well as between CSTO member states Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, both of which host an ever-diminishing number of Russian troops. These flashpoints will be key tests of Russia’s influence across the region, particularly as traditional allies like Kazakhstan are seeking to distance themselves from Moscow. This comes just nine months after Russia-led CSTO forces intervened to prop up the regime in Kazakhstan. If Russia is perceived to fail these key security tests amid the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, Moscow’s status as a security guarantor across the wider Eurasia region is likely to be called into question. This will increase the risk of second and third-order effects impacting stability across the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Growing Azerbaijani irredentism will test Russian security commitments in the South Caucasus, threatening the resumption of war. In the early hours of 13 September, Armenia’s defence ministry accused Azerbaijan of launching artillery strikes and incursions against several Armenian border towns, including Goris, Jermuk and Sotk. Notably, these settlements lie in Armenia-proper and outside the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The resumption in fighting marked one of the most serious escalations between the two sides since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Moscow subsequently mediated a ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan on 13 September, preventing further escalation. Around 150 people were killed in the fighting, including Armenian civilians.

Accusations of limited ceasefire violations since the signing of the Russia-brokered agreement in 2020 have been relatively frequent. Nevertheless, the most recent violations prompted Yerevan to announce that it would formally seek Russian military assistance through the CSTO. However, the CSTO subsequently stated that military peacekeepers would not be sent to Armenia.

Russia’s state-run news agency TASS confirmed Armenia’s appeal for assistance, with Russia and Armenia reportedly agreeing on ‘joint steps to stabilise the border’. However, the CSTO’s failure to come to Armenia’s aid following the border clashes led to protests in Yerevan in the days that followed. During the demonstrations, hundreds of people gathered to argue that the CSTO had violated its treaty obligation to condemn Azerbaijani aggression.

The latest fighting is especially notable, as Azerbaijani state-aligned media pushed an irredentist project known as the ‘Goycha-Zangazur Republic’ (GZR) during the hostilities. While Baku has subsequently disowned the project, the GZR would have involved the seizure of large swathes of southern and eastern Armenia, creating a land corridor to Azerbaijan’s exclave in Nakhichevan. The fact that fighting occurred along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, and not in the vicinity of Nagorno-Karabakh, likely illustrates the growing irredentist ambitions of Baku. Baku may exploit Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine to undermine and test Russia-led peacekeeping efforts, establishing conditions for a possible military resolution to the conflict at a later date.

The fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan therefore stands as the first major test of Russia’s role as the principal security guarantor in the Caucasus; more challenges are likely to follow. Although Russian peacekeepers remain in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow’s operational military defeat in Kharkiv has exposed growing perceptions of Russian weakness across the region. This raises serious questions as to whether Russian peacekeepers can ensure stability in the region. Similarly, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Armenia on 18 September prompted Armenians to question the relevance of their military alliance with Moscow and the CSTO’s ability to safeguard Yerevan’s security. As such, Russia’s position in the south Caucasus remains at stake, with growing Azerbaijani irredentism and Armenian disillusionment with the CSTO threatening to test Moscow’s influence even further. The resumption of a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan could therefore still be triggered.

Diminishing Russian capabilities in Central Asia will undermine Moscow’s ability to stabilise any potential conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On 14 September, military personnel along the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border began to exchange gunfire in the latest confrontation between the two countries. A major escalation then took place on 16 September despite a ceasefire agreement. The fighting marks a significant shift in intensity from previous border incidents, including a brief conflict in April 2021, when over 50 people died and hundreds were injured. By 17 September, fighting had spread along the border to more than a dozen locations. Rocket-launcher systems, artillery and armoured vehicles were reportedly used by both sides. The authorities in both countries continue to evacuate citizens living in affected areas of the restive Fergana Valley; the estimated total number of displaced persons has surpassed 150,000.

On 16 September, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov both attended a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a Eurasian security, political and economic body. Both countries are members of the SCO. However, the topic of the ongoing border escalation was absent in speeches given at the summit by SCO member nations, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Russia retains military bases in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, the leaders of the two countries met afterwards to try to agree on the terms of a ceasefire. Although they both signed a demilitarisation protocol on 25 September in a bid to resolve the conflict, precedents of failed ceasefire agreements and the intensity of this month’s fighting mean that a long-lasting peace is unlikely. In addition to the SCO, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Moscow-led CSTO, which has faced increasing scrutiny in recent months over its ability to guarantee security across Central Asia. Neither the SCO nor the CSTO has demonstrated a willingness to mediate the Tajik-Kyrgyz border conflict, despite the serious risk of escalation towards open war.

An investigation by Radio Free Europe estimated that as of 14 September, around 1,500 Russian troops had been withdrawn from Moscow’s 201st Military Base in Dushanbe (Tajikistan). Further withdrawals are likely in the coming months. While around 7,000 Russian personnel were estimated to be in Tajikistan before the war (with a further 500 in Kyrgyzstan), it is highly likely that the vast majority of remaining forces are made up of poorly trained conscripts; their professional predecessors are likely to have been deployed to Ukraine months ago. It therefore remains unclear whether Russia would retain any deployable combat power to help stabilise the situation in the event of a major escalation. It is even less clear whether Moscow would attempt to intervene given its priorities in Ukraine.

The domestic impact of Russia’s partial mobilisation will exacerbate other second-order impact threats across Eurasia, including Islamist extremism and Belarusian stability. The backlash to Russia’s partial mobilisation will drive domestic instability, compounding the likelihood of further destabilisation across the region. This will likely include growing stability risks for traditionally pro-Moscow regimes in Central Asia that can no longer rely upon CSTO intervention to prop up their governments. Resistance to mobilisation in restive Russian regions, including Dagestan and the wider North Caucasus, will also increase the threat posed by Islamist groups, who will exploit the issue to drive recruitment and engage in anti-government terror attacks.

Given the presence of interconnected transnational terror networks across Eurasia, growing Islamist activity in the North Caucasus and/or along Afghanistan’s border will risk inspiring radicalisation across the region. Reduced Russian security capabilities in Central Asia combined with destabilisation in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will drive the risk of the extremist Islamic State (IS) group and its affiliates exploiting vacuums in Afghan border areas. For further analysis of the Islamist threat in the North Caucasus and its links to border security in Central Asia, see Sibylline Extremism Quarterly Q4 2021.

Finally, Russian military setbacks in Ukraine, the CSTO’s diminishing credibility as a stabilising force and internal instability caused by Russia’s partial mobilisation will threaten to destabilise neighbouring Belarus. Following the 2020 presidential election and subsequent crackdown on pro-democracy protests, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime is now almost entirely reliant on external Russian security support. Given the widespread opposition to Lukashenka’s government inside Belarus, any further blows to Russia’s perceived ability to project power to support its allies will risk knock-on impacts on the stability of the Lukashenka regime, including domestic unrest and partisan activity. Maintaining internal stability in Belarus will remain a priority for the Russian security forces, mitigating the risk of regime collapse. Still, if the military situation in Ukraine deteriorates further for Moscow, Belarus will be a key flashpoint to watch.

Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Risk of short-to-medium term escalation remains, despite demilitarisation deal. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan reached an agreement on 25 September to demilitarise a section of their shared border impacted by conflict over the past fortnight. The new protocol requires both countries to remove troops from four key border posts situated close to the areas in which the fighting initially broke out. However, the agreement is contentious; Kyrgyz officials claim that it constitutes a form of Tajik intimidation. Similarly, there have been small-scale protests against the new protocol in Batken (Kyrgyzstan). While the newly established demilitarisation deal is intended to lead to de-escalation, early signs of discontent among Kyrgyz communities will possibly jeopardise the protocol’s effectiveness. As a result, and despite these mediation attempts, further provocations or direct military confrontation remain a realistic possibility in the short term, especially in light of the failure of previous ceasefire agreements.

Regional: Kazakh pledge to assist Russian draft dodgers will increase tensions in borer areas, worsening bilateral relations.

Cyber Update

On 27 September, Kazakhstan’s president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, announced that Astana will ensure the safety of those men fleeing Russia’s partial mobilisation order. The mobilisation, described by Tokayev as a ‘hopeless situation’, has already prompted a mass exodus of Russian citizens; Kazakh officials stated that around 98,000 Russians have entered Kazakhstan since the order was given. The latest development follows unconfirmed reports that Moscow plans to close its borders to all men of military age as early as 28 September. Kazakhstan’s willingness to assist ‘draft dodgers’ will further strain relations between Astana and Moscow; officials have already commented on tense conditions at border checkpoints, with the Russian security forces reportedly turning away military-aged men.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

* Publicly-disclosed pro-Russia cyber campaigns maintained pace during this monitoring period. However, the Ukrainian government warned that “massive cyber attacks” against the critical infrastructure operators in Ukraine and its allies, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, are likely over the coming months. However, given the Moscow-backed hacking groups’ activities throughout the Ukraine conflict so far and several factors limiting its ability to ramp up the intensity of their cyber attacks, there is a realistic probability that this activity will remain low-level cyber attacks, such as DDoS. However, there is a low likelihood, but high impact scenario that Russian hackers could be preparing a wave of destructive cyber attacks, such as data wipers, which would heighten the risk of “cyber spillover” incidents emerging in Ukraine and Europe and exacerbating energy and socio-economic instability.

* Meanwhile, pro-Kyiv hacking groups, such as Anonymous and the IT Army of Ukraine, have continued to focus their attention on countering Russia’s misinformation/disinformation campaigns by targeting Russian media outlets. Organisations perceived to be propagating Russian and pro-Kremlin actors’ propaganda will be the most at-risk for these pro-Kyiv cyber campaigns. These groups’ attacks will likely take the form of either DDoS or defacement campaigns.

Ukrainian cyber security service warns of “massive cyber attacks” against Ukrainian and Western critical infrastructure, heightening the risk of “cyber spillover” incidents emerging

* On 26 September, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (HUR MO) warned that Russia is planning to launch “massive cyber attacks” against the critical infrastructure of Ukraine and its allies. The HUR MO claimed that these cyber attacks will likely particularly focus on disrupting the operations of energy sector organisations and be similar in nature to the cyber attacks launched by Russian state-linked hacking group Sandworm against Ukraine’s power grid in 2015 and 2016. The HUR MO also claimed that Moscow-directed hacking groups would increase “the intensity of DDoS attacks on the critical infrastructure of Ukraine’s closest allies, primarily Poland and the Baltic countries” to disrupt the Ukrainian military’s ongoing counteroffensive and energy supplies routes to East and South Ukraine. This aim is indicative of how Russia has utilised its cyber capabilities throughout the invasion, with these cyber attacks closely coordinated with the Russian military’s offensive campaigns.

* On 26 September, industry reports claimed that the Russian state-linked hacking group Fancy Bear (also known as APT 28) is utilising a new code execution technique to trigger a malicious PowerShell Script and engage in cyber espionage. This new technique reportedly does not require any malicious macros to execute and download payloads. During the initial stage of these cyber attacks, the threat actor uses a PowerPoint file purporting to be from the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a lure. This malicious document contains a hyperlink that launches the malicious PowerShell. This campaign – which is believed to have been active since at least August – has been targeting EU-based and Eastern Europe-based government agencies and defence sector organisations.

Pro-Ukraine cyber campaigns remain focused on countering pro-Moscow actors’ propaganda activities

* On 27 September, a Twitter account purporting to represent the IT Army of Ukraine – a group of hackers loosely linked to the Ukrainian government – claimed that it had “paralysed the work of personal accounts of gas stations and fuel cards of Russians”. The hacktivist group did not provide any further details of this cyber campaign, including what type of cyber activity was launched against these targets. However, given that the disruptions to these services appear to only be temporary, there is a realistic probability that they were targeted with Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks.

* On 23 September, Ukraine’s Security Service (SSU) disclosed that they shuttered a hacking group that stole and sold nearly 30 million individuals’ accounts on the dark web. These hackers targeted accounts linked to both Ukraine and EU-based individuals and then sold the data in packages to several cyber threat actors, including pro-Kremlin propagandists. These propagandists reportedly then utilised the data to create disinformation/misinformation campaigns aimed at instilling unrest and destabilising Western countries supporting Ukraine against Russia. This is the latest such campaign since the SSU took down a suspected Russian Special Services bot farm used to disseminate disinformation in August.

* Meanwhile, the Anonymous hacktivist collective also claimed on 23 September that they leaked the personal information of over 300,000 individuals suspected of being mobilised to fight in Ukraine by the Russian government. This alleged cyber campaign follows the Kremlin’s recent decision to enact a “partial mobilisation” of its reservist troops following the growing success of the Ukrainian military’s counter-offensive operations in Eastern Ukraine (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 23 September 2022). The collective claimed that they gathered this information after hacking into “the website of the Russia Ministry of Defence”; however, the group’s allegations cannot be officially confirmed given that investigations into the troves of leaked data are still ongoing.

FORECAST

While the HUR MO warned that Russia is planning to launch “massive cyber attacks” against critical infrastructure in Ukraine and its allies, the information provided in its alert does not indicate that these cyber attacks will be particularly sophisticated. Indeed, the HUR MO’s claim that Russian state-linked hackers are aiming to launch DDoS attacks against Baltic and Polish critical infrastructure, especially energy sector firms, is consistent with our current assessment of Russia’s cyber capabilities and trends. Throughout the conflict, Russia has used its cyber capabilities quite sparingly compared to initial predictions. However, Moscow-linked hackers have launched a series of intelligence gathering operations and disruptive cyber campaigns prior to the Russian armed forces’ conventional military operations in Ukraine to increase their chances of success. However, as the war progressed, issues such as financial constraints, dwindling manpower, and other resources have forced Russian hackers to engage in very low-level cyber attacks with limited success. Given that the Russian government is unlikely to have properly resolved these constraints, there is a realistic probability that the country’s cyber threat actors will continue primarily launching low-level cyber campaigns, such as DDoS or intelligence-gathering operations.

While the aforementioned section is the most likely scenario, there will remain a lower likelihood, but higher impact scenario that Russian state-linked hackers ramp up their cyber activity by launching a series of wiper attacks against Ukrainian and Western countries’ critical infrastructure. Indeed, Russian state-linked hackers have attempted to deploy nine distinct wiper malware throughout the Ukraine conflict – namely WhisperGate, Hermetic Wiper, IssacWiper, Desertblade, ACIDRAIN, CaddyWiper, DoubleZero, AwfulShred, and SoloShred – but with limited success. The frequency of these wiper attacks has notably decreased in recent months due to several factors, including the Ukrainian government’s robust cyber defences and the reportedly limited number of vulnerabilities prepared by Moscow-backed hacking groups during the initial phase of the conflict. If the Ukrainian government’s warning does indicate an increase in data wiper attacks, then it is likely that the recent lag in notable Russian cyber campaigns was caused by Russian hackers’ biding their time while they searched for adequate vulnerabilities and exploits – such as zero-days – to conduct a series of high-profile cyber attacks in quick succession. The impacts of such cyber attacks would likely be significant given their targeting of critical infrastructure operators and result in “cyber spillover” incidents. These spillover events would likely further exacerbate Europe’s ongoing energy crisis and socio-economic instability and partially halt the Ukrainian military’s ongoing counteroffensives due to critical communication lines and energy facilities being taken offline. Nevertheless, this worst-case scenario is still considered a low likelihood scenario at this point.

Organisations operating in industries of typical interest for these groups, such as government agencies, energy, IT, or telecoms, are advised to consult Western government agencies’ “quick guides”, indicators of attack (IoA), and indicators of compromise (IoC) reference guides to minimise their exposure to these threats.

Sep. 26.

Between 24 and 25 September, Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, with the Lyman-Yampil axis remaining the focus. Russian sources claim that Ukrainian forces are making steady progress to the north and west of Lyman, which is slowly being encircled. Ukrainian forces have reportedly advanced to the rear of various Russian positions north of Lyman after allegedly breaking through Russian lines around Ridkodub, roughly 12 miles (20km) north of Lyman. If confirmed, this would indicate that Ukrainian forces are making good progress eastwards towards the Luhansk oblast administrative border north of Lyman. Russian sources also report that the Ukrainians took control of the village of Nove, roughly 11 miles (18km) north of Lyman, and are now pushing south towards the city itself. If this progress is maintained, there remains a realistic possibility that Ukrainian forces will take Lyman in the coming week.
Ukrainian forces are also continuing to push further north along the Oskil river. Russian sources claim that Ukrainian forces have consolidated control of Horobivka and Hryanykivka, two villages on the eastern banks of the Oskil near the river crossing at Dvorichne. Furthermore, the Ukrainian General Staff reported on 24 September that their forces repelled a Russian attack against Petropavlivka, a settlement roughly four miles (7km) east of Kupiansk. This is the strongest indication yet by Ukrainian officials that Ukrainian forces have made (and are continuing to make) gains east of the Oskil river, including along the H-26 highway that leads towards the Luhansk oblast border.
The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces once again unsuccessfully targeted a dam at the Pechenihy reservoir along the Siverskyi Donets river, roughly 29 miles (46km) east of Kharkiv. Efforts to flood downstream areas of the Siverskyi Donets will likely continue in the coming weeks. However, heavy rains in eastern Ukraine have deteriorated ground conditions across this axis. Mud appears to be limiting Ukrainian advances along roads, which will likely allow Russian forces to concentrate at critical points for as long as the mud prevents large-scale Ukrainian manoeuvre operations to outflank Russian positions.
Meanwhile, Russian forces have continued to launch ground assaults to the south of Bakhmut and west of Donetsk city. Russian regular forces, Wagner Group mercenaries and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) militia continue to engage in intense fighting across this axis, though it is unconfirmed whether they made any progress over the weekend.
On the southern Kherson axis, fighting remained broadly on trend over the weekend given Kyiv’s continued operational silence amid the slow and steady counteroffensive. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Southern Operational Command did report on 24 September that Russian forces are attempting to rotate units along the frontline and to establish secondary defensive lines behind the frontline. Throughout the war, Russia has repeatedly failed to rotate forces effectively and sufficiently in order to maintain combat effectiveness at the operational and tactical levels. Russian units have frequently been deployed for prolonged periods of time with little respite to recuperate and reconstitute. DNR forces, which are also fighting on the Kherson frontline, have been among the worst affected, and are often exhausted by prolonged periods of holding the line. Rotation along the Kherson frontline will provide some forces with an opportunity to recuperate, though Ukraine’s relentless campaign of interdicting Russia’s ground lines of communication will compound worsening fighting conditions on the western bank of the Dnieper river.
On 24 September, the Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed that General Dmitry Bulgakov had been fired from his role as Deputy Minister of Defence overseeing the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces. He has been replaced by Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev, who reportedly oversaw the siege of Mariupol as well as numerous Russian operations in Syria, including the siege of Aleppo. Bulgakov had been increasingly sidelined in recent months and was blamed for widespread logistical failures since the beginning of the war. Mizintsev, meanwhile, is a broadly popular figure among pro-war hardliners; given his operational background, he will likely push for the systemic destruction of Ukrainian hard targets, similar to the approach employed at both Mariupol and Aleppo.
Mizintsev also previously served as head of the National Defence Management Centre (NTsUO), which ostensibly oversees intra-military and inter-agency co-ordination in military planning. This has largely been absent from the war in Ukraine; Mizintsev’s appointment could therefore provide a genuine opportunity to learn lessons and improve logistics and planning. A key challenge will be preparing Russia’s military for winter and effectively dispersing supply depots, which Ukrainian High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) have so far effectively interdicted given the concentrated supply system favoured under Bulgakov. Nevertheless, Mizintsev’s appointment once again illustrates the failures within the Russian high command; the high turnover of senior officers underscores the extensive command and control issues undermining Russian operations in Ukraine.

Political developments

Opposition to Russia’s partial mobilisation continued over the weekend, with the most severe protests materialising in the North Caucasus region of Dagestan on 25 September. The police clashed with protesters and arrested at least 100 people during a rare example of open violence against the authorities in the republic’s capital, Makhachkala. The security forces used stun guns and truncheons, and also fired automatic rifles in the air to keep order. However, protesters continued to rally, blocking a major federal highway to stymie recruiters.
Notably, Sergei Melikov, the governor of Dagestan, stated on 25 September that mistakes were made during the partial mobilisation, acknowledging that many men who should have been exempted still received call-up papers. Other governors made similar statements over the weekend, underlining a growing discrepancy between the promise that only those with ‘military experience’ would be mobilised and the reality on the ground. In addition, the Ministry of Defence issued reprimands over the weekend to numerous military commissars for gross negligence and/or sending out excessive numbers of mobilisation summons.
According to reports published on 23 September by the independent news outlet Meduza (among others), mobilisation will be conducted over three periods: 26 September to 10 October, 11 to 25 October and 26 October to 10 November. If confirmed, this indicates that the Kremlin aims to complete this first phase of partial mobilisation by 10 November. Opposition reports claim that the Kremlin really intends to mobilise some 1.2 million troops during this first phase. However, amid widespread reports of jurisdictional confusion, unmotivated bureaucrats and ineffective mobilisation procedures, it remains to be seen whether the Kremlin would be able to do so even if this is the official goal. The deadline may even have contributed to a largely chaotic mobilisation process, which is likely causing military commissars to issue mobilisation orders to large numbers of ineligible individuals so as to reach quotas. These reports indicate that the Ministry of Defence wields limited control over the mobilisation efforts; this has led to a largely haphazard and uneven process.
Activists set a further three enlistment offices on fire across Russia on 25 September, including in Kaliningrad, Kirovsk and Mordovia, bringing the total number torched enlistment facilities to 17 in the last five days. The independent watchdog OVD-Info reported that the security services have detained at least 2,352 people since the announcement of partial mobilisation. On 24 September, over 700 people were arrested. On 25 September, at least 128 people were arrested in five cities, including Irkutsk, Kotlas, Makhachkala, Reftinsky and Yakutsk.
While the security services and police are largely containing the current unrest in Russia, there is growing scope for escalation in the coming days, particularly if promises to rein in illegal mobilisation efforts are not kept. Earlier on 26 September, video footage emerged showing a 25-year-old Russian man attempting to kill the military commandant at a conscription office in the centre of Ust-Ilimsk (Irkutsk oblast). At the time of writing, the commandant is in a critical condition in hospital. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the attacker was aggrieved that his best friend had been called up to serve in the army, while he himself had not been issued draft papers. Also on 26 September, a school shooting in Izhevsk (Udmurtia) left at least six people dead, though it is not believed to be related to mobilisation drives at this time.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 25 September that newly mobilised men without training are being sent straight to the frontline. Specifically, they claim that men mobilised in Sevastopol have already been deployed to Kherson region. If large numbers of mobilised men are sent directly to the frontline in the coming weeks, the risk of unrest will increase. In addition, pro-war hardliner commentators have directly appealed to the Kremlin and Ministry of Defence in the past few days to ensure mobilised men receive sufficient training before they are deployed. This suggests there are serious concerns within military circles that mobilised men will be sent directly to the front en masse.

Forecast

Amid the backlash to Russia’s partial mobilisation and the ongoing referenda in the occupied territories of Ukraine, nuclear rhetoric continues to loom large. Last week, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, accused the West of ‘nuclear blackmail’ and threatened to respond with the full extent of Russia’s arsenal if this continued. On 25 September, White House security advisor Jake Sullivan stated that the US president, Joe Biden, had privately warned Putin that ‘catastrophic consequences’ would result for Russia if Moscow used nuclear weapons during the war in Ukraine. Sullivan maintained that the White House has articulated to Moscow that the US and its allies would ‘respond decisively’ in the event of nuclear weapons being used, without specifying what this response would entail. The US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, confirmed on 25 September that Washington DC has a plan in place if Moscow uses nuclear weapons. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, stated he believes Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons are serious. Putin himself stated last week that ‘this isn’t a bluff’, with the international response indicative of the seriousness of the current tensions.

Ultimately, if Russia’s partial mobilisation fails to turn the tide in Russia’s favour early next year, Moscow will have exhausted one of its last remaining conventional options to win the war in Ukraine. While the threat of tactical nuclear weapons being used remains low at present, it will increase if the military and domestic situation inside Russia continues to deteriorate. As a result, deterrence is likely to become a priority for all sides in the coming weeks and months. As Russia’s partial mobilisation ushers in the next phase of the war in Ukraine, nuclear rhetoric and strategic deterrence exercises are likely to drive, or at the very least sustain, the current nuclear tensions.

Kazakhstan: Mass immigration following Russia’s mobilisation announcement will likely increase instability and border traffic across the Post-Soviet Space. On 26 September, long queues of cars formed at Russian border checkpoints near the regions of Kostanay and Western Kazakhstan. This is the first wave of Russian immigration to Kazakhstan since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a partial military mobilisation last week. Real estate agents in Kazakhstan are already reporting an overnight increase in rental prices in Astana and Almaty, which may stoke inflationary trends and drive tensions with locals. The influx of Russians seeking to avoid mobilisation will contribute to increased levels of traffic on international borders in the short to medium term, including increased congestion at hotels, airports, and border towns. While violence is highly unlikely on the Kazakh side of the border, there remains a moderate and growing risk of domestic unrest in Russia having knock-on impacts on the stability of the wider Post-Soviet Space if things escalate inside Russia, which remains a realistic possibility given the scale of the backlash to the mobilisation.

Moldova: Anti-government protests and political tensions reinforce growing threat of domestic unrest in the short-to-medium term. On September 25, several thousand people attended a mass anti-government protest in the nation’s capital, Chisinau, organised by the opposition party of Ilhan Shor. Protestors demanded the resignation of the country’s pro-Western president Maia Sandu, alongside action to achieve a more equitable gas deal with Russia, which is Moldova’s main supplier. The crowd reportedly reached 5000 people, making it the largest protest since Sandu won a landslide election victory in 2020. This latest development comes as political tensions have risen significantly in recent months within Moldova, partly due to soaring energy prices. This also follows a series of bomb threats throughout August, allegedly originating from Russia and Belarus, that targeted the nation’s parliament and judicial buildings. There remains a high threat of pro-Russian forces mobilising further demonstrations in the short to medium term, with activists having vowed to take weekly protest action until Sandu’s current government leaves office.

Kazakhstan: Mass immigration following Russia’s mobilisation announcement will likely increase instability and border traffic across the Post-Soviet Space. On 26 September, long queues of cars formed at Russian border checkpoints near the regions of Kostanay and Western Kazakhstan. This is the first wave of Russian immigration to Kazakhstan since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a partial military mobilisation last week. Real estate agents in Kazakhstan are already reporting an overnight increase in rental prices in Astana and Almaty, which may stoke inflationary trends and drive tensions with locals. The influx of Russians seeking to avoid mobilisation will contribute to increased levels of traffic on international borders in the short to medium term, including increased congestion at hotels, airports, and border towns. While violence is highly unlikely on the Kazakh side of the border, there remains a moderate and growing risk of domestic unrest in Russia having knock-on impacts on the stability of the wider Post-Soviet Space if things escalate inside Russia, which remains a realistic possibility given the scale of the backlash to the mobilisation.

Moldova: Anti-government protests and political tensions reinforce growing threat of domestic unrest in the short-to-medium term. On September 25, several thousand people attended a mass anti-government protest in the nation’s capital, Chisinau, organised by the opposition party of Ilhan Shor. Protestors demanded the resignation of the country’s pro-Western president Maia Sandu, alongside action to achieve a more equitable gas deal with Russia, which is Moldova’s main supplier. The crowd reportedly reached 5000 people, making it the largest protest since Sandu won a landslide election victory in 2020. This latest development comes as political tensions have risen significantly in recent months within Moldova, partly due to soaring energy prices. This also follows a series of bomb threats throughout August, allegedly originating from Russia and Belarus, that targeted the nation’s parliament and judicial buildings. There remains a high threat of pro-Russian forces mobilising further demonstrations in the short to medium term, with activists having vowed to take weekly protest action until Sandu’s current government leaves office. (Source: Sibylline)

03 Oct 22. Thousands of mobilised Russians sent home, unfit for military duty.

Chaotic mobilisation, thousands unfit for duty, sent home
Ukraine captures Russian supply hub Lyman
Russian hawks criticise loss, some demand tougher measures
Pope calls for end to ‘spiral of violence and death’

Thousands of Russians mobilised for military service in Ukraine have been sent home and the military commissar in Russia’s Khabarovsk region removed in the latest setback to President Vladimir Putin’s chaotic conscription of 300,000 servicemen.

On the battlefield, Putin suffered a stinging setback on Sunday with Ukrainian forces claiming full control of Russia’s eastern logistics hub of Lyman, their most significant gain in weeks.

Russia’s first mobilisation since World War Two, after its forces suffered major battlefield defeats in Ukraine, has led to widespread discontent and forced thousands of men to flee abroad.

Mikhail Degtyarev, the governor of the Khabarovsk region in Russia’s Far East, said several thousand men had reported for enlistment in 10 days but many were ineligible.

“About half of them we returned home as they did not meet the selection criteria for entering the military service,” Degtyarev said in a video post on the Telegram messaging app.

He said the region’s military commissar was removed but that his dismissal would not affect the mobilisation.

The mobilisation was billed as enlisting those with military experience but has often appeared oblivious to service records, health, student status and even age.

The taking of Lyman by Ukrainian forces sets the stage for further advances aimed at cutting Russia’s supply lines to its battered troops to a single route.

Days earlier, Putin proclaimed the annexation of four regions covering nearly a fifth of Ukraine, an area that includes Lyman. Kyiv and the West have condemned the proclamation as an illegitimate farce.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the capture of the town, where Ukrainian flags were raised over civic buildings on Saturday, demonstrated that Ukraine was capable of dislodging Russian forces and showed the impact Ukraine’s deployment of advanced Western weapons was having on the conflict.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said the success of the country’s soldiers was not limited to Lyman and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Washington was “very encouraged” by Ukrainian gains.

Russia’s defence ministry said on Saturday it was pulling troops out of the Lyman area “in connection with the creation of a threat of encirclement”.

It did not mention Lyman in its daily update on Sunday, although it said Russian forces had destroyed seven artillery and missile depots in the Ukrainian regions of Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv and Donetsk

ABSORBING REGIONS

The recapture of Lyman by Ukrainian troops is Russia’s largest battlefield loss since Ukraine’s lightning counteroffensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region in September.

Control over Lyman could prove a “key factor” in helping Ukraine reclaim lost territory in the Luhansk region, its governor, Serhiy Gaidai, said.

Lyman commands a crossing of the Siverskyi Donets River, behind which Russia has been attempting to consolidate its defences, Britain’s Ministry of Defence said.

“Thanks to the successful operation in Lyman we are moving towards the second north-south route … and that means a second supply line will be disrupted,” said reserve colonel Viktor Kevlyuk at Ukraine’s Centre for Defence Strategies think tank.

“In that case, the Russian group in Luhansk and Donetsk could only be supplied strictly through (Russia’s) Rostov region,” Kevlyuk told media outlet Espreso TV.

Ukraine’s military said early on Monday Russian forces had used missiles, air strikes and artillery in attacks on 35 settlements in the previous 24 hours. Ukraine’s air force had attacked a command post, weapons caches and an anti-aircraft missile complex, as well as bringing down one helicopter, one attack aircraft and eight drones, it said.

The governor of the Zaporizhzhia region, said Russian forces had attacked Zaporizhzhia city and nearby villages overnight, with at least 10 missiles.

Reuters could not independently verify battlefield reports.

The areas Putin claimed as annexed just over seven months into Russia’s invasion of its neighbour – Donetsk and Luhansk plus Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in the south – are equal to about 18% of Ukraine’s total surface land area.

Russia’s parliament is to consider on Monday bills and ratification treaties to absorb the regions, the speaker of the lower house of parliament said.

A pomp-filled Kremlin signing ceremony with the regions’ Russian-installed leaders on Friday failed to stem a wave of criticism within Russia of how the military operation is being handled.

Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Russia’s southern Chechnya region, on Saturday called for a change of strategy “right up to the declaration of martial law in the border areas and the use of low-yield nuclear weapons”. The United States says it would respond decisively to any use of nuclear weapons.

Other hawkish Russian figures on Saturday criticised generals and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu on social media for overseeing the setbacks but stopped short of attacking Putin. (Source: Reuters)

03 Oct 22. Germany says it will supply Ukraine with air defence system in days. Germany will deliver the first of four advanced IRIS-T air defence systems to Ukraine in the coming days to help ward off drone attacks, its defence minister Christine Lambrecht said during an unannounced visit to Odessa on Saturday.

As air raid sirens sounded in the port city above, Lambrecht held talks with her Ukrainian counterpart Oleksii Reznikov in an underground bunker. Lambrecht had extended a visit to nearby Moldova for the meeting.

“In a few days, we will deliver the very modern IRIS-T air defence system,” she told ARD television. “It is very important for drone defence in particular.”

Ukraine has been seeing more attacks from Iranian-made kamikaze drones in recent weeks, costing lives and causing serious damage to infrastructure.

It first emerged in May that Berlin was considering sending the IRIS-T surface-to-air defence system, which costs 150 million euros ($147 million) apiece.

The German armed forces themselves do not currently own the system, reckoned among the world’s most advanced system.

Earlier, meeting her Moldovan counterpart Anatolie Nosatii in Chisinau, she urged Western countries not to be deterred from arming Ukraine by threats that Russia could use nuclear weapons.

“We have to be very careful,” she said. “But we mustn’t let ourselves be paralysed.”

Germany is facing calls to step up its support for Ukraine, including by sending offensive weapons such as the modern tanks Kyiv says it needs to take the fight to Russian forces.

Berlin has so far resisted such calls, arguing that such moves would escalate the situation and pointing out that no other country has so far sent tanks more modern than old Soviet stock sent by former Warsaw Pact countries. ($1 = 1.0205 euros) (Source: Reuters)

01 Oct 22. France could deliver up to 12 more Caesar howitzers to Ukraine, Le Monde reports. France could deliver six to 12 new Caesar howitzers, originally destined for Denmark, to Ukraine, French newspaper Le Monde reported on Saturday.

A French Defence Ministry spokesperson said that while France supports Ukraine the details of this are “not meant to be communicated” when asked to comment on the report.

The Elysee Palace also declined to comment.

Le Monde reported that the three countries have agreed in principle to the delivery, although technical talks are ongoing.

Advertisement · Scroll to continue

The newspaper said that French President Emmanuel Macron discussed the topic with Ukraine’s President Volodimir Zelensky and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen in recent weeks.

Paris has already delivered 18 Caesar howitzers, manufactured by the French group Nexter, to Kyiv.

The weapons were collected from the French army’s stockpile. (Source: Reuters)

28 Sep 22. With a mix of donated weapons, Ukraine’s defenders adapt in war. Following Kyiv’s successful counteroffensive against Russia’s invading forces, U.S. defense officials say Ukrainians have found new ways to use a patchwork of donated weaponry more effectively.

The war has edged closer to a stalemate as it passes the seven-month mark. Faced with recent battlefield setbacks for his forces in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has tried to raise the stakes by threatening to use the nuclear arsenal and calling up military reservists.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy vowed Monday that the Ukrainian military will take back its “entire territory,” and has drawn up plans to counter “new types of weapons” used by Russia. He decried the Russian mobilization as nothing more than “an attempt to provide commanders on the ground with a constant stream of cannon fodder.”

Read all Military Times coverage of the war in Ukraine

With the mobilization, observers say Putin likely aims to stabilize his defensive lines and protract the conflict beyond 2023. Because Russia could assemble new formations by February, there’s a “need to reinforce success now by continuing to expand training and equipping of Ukrainian troops,” Jack Watling of the U.K.-based think tank Royal United Services Institute recently argued.

The comments come amid U.S. military assessments that Ukrainian forces have used a combined arms approach to great success. Gen. James Hecker, the head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, told reporters Sept. 19 that Russia had lost more than 60 fighter jets in the war so far, nearly all of which were taken out by the Russian-made air defenses that Ukraine uses.

The U.S. believes one Russian aircraft crashed upon takeoff because of shoddy maintenance, and that another was shot down. Others were hit while sitting on the ground.

Hecker estimated that less than 20% of Ukrainian fighters have been destroyed, but did not provide more specifics about the size of the fleet.

Because neither side has established clear control of the skies, “they now stay away from one another and it ends up being a ground war,” he said.

In lieu of supplying longer-range weapons and advanced American fighter jets, the U.S. is focusing on other kinds of support as the conflict enters a new phase. Russia’s Foreign Ministry said earlier this month that supplying longer-range weapons would cross a “red line,” and make the U.S. a party to the conflict.

“Put yourself in the position of the Secretary General of NATO or President Biden: You’re trying not to make this bigger than what it is right now,” Hecker said. “That’s a very difficult tightrope to walk down, to make sure that Ukraine has what they need to survive and fight and try to protect their sovereign country, without turning this into World War III.”

Defense contractors are toeing that line by equipping Ukrainian MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft with anti-radar missiles designed for more capable Western jets.

It typically takes the U.S. military a year or two to integrate new weapons onto a jet for the first time. In Ukraine’s case, the process took just a couple of months.

“When you take a Western HARM anti-radiation missile that’s designed for F-16s … to put them on an Eastern Bloc MiG-29 or Su-27 is no easy feat,” Hecker said. “Is it as integrated as it is on an F-16? Of course not. So it doesn’t have all the capabilities that it would on an F-16. But we’re able to do it.” (Source: Defense News)

29 Sep 22. Russian sham referenda in Ukraine: UK statement to the OSCE. Minister Docherty says the UK will never recognise the results of Russia’s sham referenda, nor any attempts to illegally annex Ukrainian territory. Vladimir Putin’s sham referenda must be seen for what they are. A brazen and desperate attempt, to justify an unprovoked and illegal land grab, of sovereign Ukrainian territory. They are a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter. And wholly illegitimate. That is why the United Kingdom will never recognise the supposed results. Nor any Russian attempt to illegally annex Ukrainian territory. We have seen Vladimir Putin use this playbook before, in Crimea. As then, Russia will try to claim that these latest votes were free and fair.

But no amount of Russian lies can hide what we all see plainly: A sham. A propaganda exercise. Without a shred of legitimacy. Conducted down the barrel of a gun, by soldiers accompanying ballots door-to-door, forcing Ukrainians to vote.

For 7 months, in an attempt to destroy Ukrainian identity, Vladimir Putin’s forces have ruthlessly used violence and torture against civilians – and forced deportations – to exert control.

Sham referenda held under such fear and harassment can never be free, nor fair.

As highlighted by my Foreign Secretary last week, we know Vladimir Putin planned to rig the outcomes. Russia has no choice but to fabricate the results. These regions voted overwhelmingly to join an independent Ukraine in 1991, and for President Zelenskyy in 2019.

Earlier this week, the United Kingdom announced sanctions against those behind these bogus votes, including 33 officials and collaborators deployed by Russia to conduct them.

This latest Russian deception, and Putin’s decision to partially mobilise Russia’s population, only serve to highlight one thing: his invasion is failing.

His war machine is depleted. His supply of volunteers willing to fight in Ukraine has been exhausted. Partial mobilisation will only send many more thousands of innocent Russians to die in Putin’s war-of-choice. A war which he could end right now.

Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats are irresponsible and will not work. Ukrainians are highly motivated. The international alliance is cast-iron strong. We and our allies are clear that any use of nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences.

The United Kingdom’s approach will not alter. We will be steadfast in support of Ukraine – and its right to defend its sovereign territory – for as long as it takes.

We call on all participating States to join us in unequivocally rejecting the results of these illegitimate referenda, and any Russian attempts to illegally annex Ukrainian territory.

If we allow Russia to change sovereign borders by force, then the core principles on which the OSCE was founded – of sovereign equality; the inviolability of frontiers; and respect for territorial integrity – lie in tatters. And all of our borders become less secure. This is about freedom and security for the people of Ukraine. But also about freedom and security across Europe and the World. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

28 Sep 22. Ukraine’s Unmanned Air War. UAVs are being used at the centre of air operations conducting ISTAR missions on a daily basis. We have recently seen extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Armenia, so when Russia invaded Ukraine in February, it was obvious that they would be a vital asset to both sides. After three months of conflict (at time of writing), Ukraine has been seen to be winning the UAV war.

Russia has the overwhelming force on the ground and in the air but its command and control (C2) of joint operations have been an abject failure to date. One of the vital assets of any battlefield commander is their ability to carry out effective and sustained intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions and the most effective and economical ways of carrying them out tactically is with the use of UAVs.

For all Russia’s contention that its military aerospace industry is equal to that of the West, it has not produced a single operational unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) and relies on small unarmed tactical UAVs such as the Forpost, a licence-built IAI Searcher, and the Orlan-10. Since the conflict began, Russia has reportedly been losing at least one Orlan-10 a day on average, with losses increasing which have been confirmed by pictures from the battlefields. Fewer Forposts have been claimed, but other types including an Orlan-30s, a larger and heavier version of the Orlan-10 with a 15lb (7kg) payload, have been lost, and more importantly, a Kronshtadt Orion reportedly came down in Ukraine on 7 April. This is the first Russian-built MALE UAV that had been tested in Syria and its loss in Ukraine would be very bad news for the Russians.

Although the most successfully operated Ukrainian UAV has been the Turkish Bayraktar TB2, a number of indigenous designs have been used in the conflict. These include the UJ-22 Airborne, a multi-purpose mini-UAV manufactured by SPE UKRJETl; the A1-SM Furia UAS developed by SPC Athion Avia; and the Leleka-100 manufactured by UkrSpec Systems which has been in service with the Ukrainian Armed Service since 2015. The same company builds the PD-1 UAS which was purchased by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2016. Featuring a modular airframe, the PD-1 has a length of 2.5m and a wingspan of 4.7m. Its maximum take-off weight and payload capacities are 100lb (45kg) and 15lb (7kg) respectively. Powered by a 100 cc two-cylinder four-stroke engine, the PD-1 can fly at speeds between 38 knots (70km/h) and 75kts (140km/h). The UAV can reach a maximum altitude of 9,800 feet (3,000m) and execute missions for up to 10 hours. The PD-1 can be converted from fixed-wing to VTOL configuration within 15 minutes.

The Punisher is a Reaper-class UCAV with a 21.5m wingspan manufactured by UA Dynamics that has been used by the Ukraine forces, with over 60 successful flights. It has a maximum operational range of approximately 45km, and a speed of 107kts (198km/hr) at a cruising altitude of 13,100ft (4,000m). The Punisher works in tandem with the Spectre ISR UAV, which detects and identifies stationary targets for engagement by the former, with a 6lb (2.7kg) explosive payload, delivered together or on different targets.

Unfortunately only a small number of the Punisher had been produced before the company had to evacuate its technical team and production facilities from Kharkiv and Kyiv.

A team of Ukrainian special forces, with UAV operators drawn from the Aerorozvidka unit, played a major role in halting the 64km Russian convoy heading to mount attack on Kyiv from the north at the beginning of the war. Its fleet of UAVs ranges from small affordable consumer drones to large octocopters built by their own engineers.

The R18 is their top model, an octocopter VTOL UAV with a range of 4km, can be in the air for about 40 minutes, and most importantly, can carry 11lb (5kg) of free-falling bombs. Aerorozvidka has been conducting around 300 UAV missions each day to monitor Russian troop movements and to collect data for Ukraine’s Nato-supported intelligence system, Delta thato identifies high value Russian targets the coordinates of which are handed over to the Ukrainian kills squads who fly their bomb-dropping UAVs at night.

However, on 19 April AeroVironment announced its intention to donate more than 100 Quantix Recon mini UAVs to the Ukrainian MoD. With its unique hybrid design, Quantix Recon combines the VTOL advantages with the range and speed of a fixed-wing unmanned aircraft.

On the same day a Russian Gorizont Air S-100, a Russian license-built version of the Austrian Schiebel Camcopter S-100, was reportedly shot down by Ukrainian armed forces. Coincidently, the Romanian Border Police have been operating a Schiebel Camcopter S-100 for surveillance flights over the Black Sea off the coast of Romania. Based at Mangalia south of Constanta, the rotary-wing UAV has a range of 200km and an endurance of up to six hours.

On 25 April Russian sources showed a Ukrainian TB2 shot down over Kursk Oblast allegedly after a missile strike within Russia on its way back to Ukraine. Another TB2 was reportedly shot down in Belgorod Oblast by a Russian Pantsir-S1 after another raid within Russia. Two more attacks were also suspected to have been carried out by Ukrainian UAVs with reports of explosions in the regions of Voronezh and Kursk on the Russian border of Ukraine.

On 12 April Russian forces had shot down a Ukrainian Tu-141 in the Kharkiv area. These obsolete UAVs are believed to be used to draw out the positions on Russian air defence systems and another one was reportedly used to distract Russian air defences around Kherson on 28 April. Kyiv claimed on 2 May that its drones sank two Russian patrol boats near the Black Sea’s Snake Island where Ukrainian forces rebuffed Moscow’s demands to surrender at the start of its invasion. “The Bayraktars are working,” said Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, the commander in chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,

On 23 May, Russian Ministry spokesman, Major General Igor Konashenkov claimed (without any verification) that since the beginning of the “special military operation”, Russian forces had destroyed 858 Ukraine drones! (Source: Armada)

29 Sep 22. Russia to annex four Ukrainian regions. Vladimir Putin will claim territory on Friday in escalation of conflict with Kyiv. Vladimir Putin will annex four regions in south-eastern Ukraine — none of which Russia fully controls — at 3pm local time in the Kremlin on Friday, in a substantial escalation of the conflict with Kyiv. Dmitry Peskov, the Russian president’s spokesman, told reporters on Thursday that Putin would make a “substantial speech” during the ceremony and sign “treaties” with Russia-appointed occupation officials, state newswire Ria Novosti reported. Putin’s decision to annex the territories, seven months after his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, comes after Russia’s troops have suffered substantial losses and as the Kremlin faces a public backlash against his mobilisation of the army’s reserves. In a fiery speech last week, he threw down a gauntlet to the west, vowing to use all weapons at his disposal — including nuclear — if Ukraine continued its offensive to reclaim what Putin now declares is part of Russia. Occupation forces held highly stage-managed votes last weekend in parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, which are under its control, claiming locals had overwhelmingly voted to join Russia by margins of up to 99 per cent. Ukraine and its western allies have refused to accept the “sham referendums”, which were in some cases run by armed “brigades” that brought ballot boxes to locals’ homes. Western nations have vowed to continue providing military support to Ukraine as its army seeks to recapture the territories now under Russian control, despite Putin’s threats. (Source: FT.com)

29 Sep 22. Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the damage to gas pipelines. Issued on 29 September 2022 The NATO Invitees associate themselves with this Statement.

The damage to the Nordstream 1 and Nordstream 2 pipelines in international waters in the Baltic Sea is of deep concern. All currently available information indicates that this is the result of deliberate, reckless, and irresponsible acts of sabotage. These leaks are causing risks to shipping and substantial environmental damage. We support the investigations underway to determine the origin of the damage.
We, as Allies, have committed to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors. Any deliberate attack against Allies’ critical infrastructure would be met with a united and determined response. (Source: NATO)

28 Sep 22. Latest U.S. Support for Ukraine Targets Long-Term Security Investment. The Defense Department today announced an additional $1.1bn in aid to Ukraine that is part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. An array of important warfighting equipment is included in the package, but one portion is aimed at supporting Ukraine’s defense needs long-term, a senior defense official said during a background briefing today.

The latest USAI package includes 18 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, along with associated ammunition. Being part of USAI, the United States will purchase those systems from the manufacturer in order to provide them to Ukraine, rather than pull them directly from U.S. military inventory, as has been done previously with the 16 HIMARS sent to Ukraine under presidential drawdown authority.

It may take a while for the latest HIMARS promised to Ukraine to arrive, the senior defense official said.

“The procurement and delivery of these HIMARS systems and associated ammunition will take a few years,” the official said. “Today’s announcement is only the beginning of a procurement process.”

While the long-term purchase of newly manufactured HIMARS for Ukraine doesn’t preclude the U.S. from continuing to pull existing systems from inventory if need be, it does serve a larger purpose to have those systems on contract and in the pipeline for delivery at a later date, the official said.

“If we don’t invest today to procure HIMARS for the future, they won’t be there when the Ukrainian armed forces need them down the road,” the official said. “This is a really sizable investment and it’s intended so that down the road, Ukraine will have what it needs for the long-haul to deter future threats. It in no way rules out us continuing to invest in their current force with capabilities that are available today, and that we can draw down today from U.S. stocks.”

Planning now for Ukraine’s future defense needs, post conflict, is not a new concept. In April, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III hosted the first of what has been an ongoing series of meetings by the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. The first meeting was held in Germany. Back then, the secretary alluded to the need to not only provide for Ukraine’s immediate needs, but also for its future defense needs.

“Ukraine needs our help to win today,” the secretary said at the time. “And they will still need our help when the war is over.”

The senior defense official pointed out that in addition to the 16 HIMARS systems that the U.S. has already provided to Ukraine, allies have provided Ukraine with another 10-equivalent multiple-launch rocket systems. The official said the Ukrainians have used these systems to great effect.

“We’ve all seen how Ukraine has leveraged this system to push back against Russia’s war of aggression, disrupting ammunition depots, supply lines and logistical hubs far behind the frontlines,” the official said.

Also included in the latest USAI package are 150 Humvees, 150 tactical vehicles, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, body armor and an array of tactical secure communications systems, surveillance systems and optics.

The official also said the package includes 20 multi-mission radars that can track airborne objects and threats, including mortar and artillery fire, along with enemy unmanned aerial systems.

“As with every package, we provide funding for training, for maintenance and sustainment of this equipment,” the official said.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, the U.S. has provided approximately $16.2bn in aid to Ukraine, both as part of presidential drawdown authority and USAI.

The Russians have also recently announced that they plan to pull up some 300,000 conscripts from Russian society to send into the fight in Ukraine. The reaction among the Russian population has not been positive to the announcement.

A senior military official said it’s not the first time the Russian’s have done something similar, and that dipping into the civilian population to find new warfighters demonstrates the challenges they are facing in meeting their goals with the military they have in place already.

“They’ve mobilized twice before this, one was in 1914 and one was in 1941,” the senior military official said. “If you think about the consequences that they kind of feel that they’re in right now and you compare that to World War I and World War II, that certainly says a lot about what the Ukrainians have been able to do … to the Russian army.”

That same senior military official said there might be challenges with outfitting so many civilians for military service so quickly, and said that many of the military personnel who would need to train those new conscripts are unavailable now because they are already in Ukraine. The official reported having seen one open-source report online that said conscripts might have seen as little as one day of training before being shipped off to Ukraine to enter the fight.

“I just think about the level of training that we put in our own armed forces and know that that’s … pretty inadequate,” the official said. (Source: US DoD)

28 Sep 22. $1.1bn in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced approximately $1.1bn in additional security assistance for Ukraine under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). This USAI package underscores the U.S. commitment to continuing to support Ukraine over the long term. It represents a multi-year investment in critical capabilities to build the enduring strength of Ukraine’s Armed Forces as it continues to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and territory in the face of Russian aggression.

Unlike Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), which DoD has continued to leverage to deliver equipment to Ukraine from DoD stocks at a historic pace, USAI is an authority under which the United States procures capabilities from industry. This announcement represents the beginning of a contracting process to provide additional priority capabilities to Ukraine in the mid- and long-term.

Capabilities include:

* 18 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and associated ammunition;

* 150 Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);

* 150 Tactical Vehicles to tow weapons;

* 40 trucks and 80 trailers to transport heavy equipment;

* Two radars for Unmanned Aerial Systems;

* 20 multi-mission radars;

* Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems;

* Tactical secure communications systems, surveillance systems, and optics;

* Explosive ordnance disposal equipment;

* Body armor and other field equipment;

* Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.

In total, the United States has now committed approximately $16.9bn in security assistance to Ukraine since January 2021. Since 2014, the United States has committed approximately $19bn in security assistance to Ukraine more than $16.2bn since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion on February 24.

Through both PDA and USAI, DoD continues to work with Ukraine to meet both its immediate and longer-term security assistance needs. Together with our Allies and partners, our unified efforts will help Ukraine continue to be successful today while building the enduring strength of Ukraine’s forces to ensure the continued freedom and independence of the Ukrainian people. (Source: US DoD)

28 Sep 22. Ukraine ‘sham’ referendum results point to Russia annexation.

Summary

* Russia says majority vote for annexation

* ‘Welcome home, to Russia!’ says Medvedev

* Russian parliament says may consider annexation Oct. 4

* US plans UN resolution to reject any change to Ukraine

* Undersea Russian gas pipelines mysteriously damaged

Russian-installed officials in four occupied regions of Ukraine reported huge majorities of votes in favour of joining Russia as the United States planned a U.N. resolution condemning the referendums as shams and Russia remained defiant.

The United States was also preparing a new round of sanctions against Russia should it annex Ukrainian territory and a $1.1bn arms package for Ukraine that will be announced soon, U.S. officials said.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said the United States and its allies remained committed to European energy security, after Germany, Sweden and Denmark said attacks caused major leaks from two Russian energy pipelines. It remained far from clear who might be behind the leaks.

Hastily arranged votes took place over five days in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, and in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson to the south, that together make up about 15% of Ukrainian territory.

Vote tallies from complete results on Tuesday in the four provinces ranged from 87% to 99.2% in favour of joining Russia, according to Russia-appointed officials. The head of the upper house of the Russian parliament said the chamber might consider annexation on Oct. 4.

“The results are clear. Welcome home, to Russia!,” Dmitry Medvedev, a former president who serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council and an ally of President Vladimir Putin, said on Telegram.

Within the occupied territories, Russian-installed officials took ballot boxes from house to house in what Ukraine and the West said was an illegitimate, coercive exercise to create a legal pretext for Russia to annex the four regions.

“This farce in the occupied territories cannot even be called an imitation of a referendum,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in video address late on Tuesday.

The United States will introduce a resolution at the U.N. Security Council calling on member states not to recognise any change to Ukraine and obligating Russia to withdraw its troops, U.S. envoy Linda Thomas-Greenfield said.

“Russia’s sham referenda, if accepted, will open a pandora’s box that we cannot close,” she said at a council meeting.

Russia has the ability to veto a resolution in the Security Council, but Thomas-Greenfield said that would prompt the United States to take the issue to the U.N. General Assembly.

“Any referenda held under these conditions, at the barrel of a gun, can never be remotely close to free or fair,” Britain’s Deputy U.N. Ambassador James Kariuki said.

Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia, told the meeting that the referendums were conducted transparently and in line with electoral norms.

“This process is going to continue if Kyiv does not recognise its mistakes and its strategic errors and doesn’t start to be guided by the interests of its own people and not blindly carry out the will of those people who are playing them,” he said.

If Russia annexes the four Ukrainian regions, Putin could portray any Ukrainian attempt to recapture them as an attack on Russia itself.

Putin said last week he was willing to use nuclear weapons to defend the “territorial integrity” of Russia.

But Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelenskiy, told Reuters that Kyiv would not be swayed by nuclear threats or by the annexation votes, and would press on with plans to retake all territory occupied by invading Russian forces.

He said Ukrainians who helped organise the referendums would face treason charges and at least five years in jail. Ukrainians who were forced to vote would not be punished.

US ARMS PACKAGE

The new U.S. arms package will include HIMARS launcher systems, accompanying munitions, various types of counter drone systems and radar systems, along with spares, training and technical support, a source briefed on the plan said.

Russia again warned the United States against arming Ukraine.

“In instigating Kiev to continue using the military equipment received from the West, Washington does not realise the riskiness of its actions … Our steps to defend the Fatherland will be firm and decisive,” Russia’s U.S. envoy Anatoly Antonov said on the embassy’s Telegram channel.

Diplomats say the nuclear sabre-rattling is an attempt by Russia to scare the West into reducing its support for Ukraine.

None of the four regions which held referendums is fully under Russia’s control, with Ukrainian forces reporting more advances since they routed Russian troops in a fifth province, Kharkiv, this month.

Zelenskiy said the Donetsk region in the east remained his country’s – and Russia’s – top strategic priority, with “particularly severe” fighting engulfing several towns.

The general staff of Ukraine’s military said late on Tuesday that Russian forces had shelled seven towns in Donetsk.The military said 20 towns in the Zaporizhzhia region in south-central Ukraine and 35 towns and villages in the Kherson region in the south were also hit.

Leonid Pasechnik, a separatist leader of Luhansk, said on Telegram three municipal gas workers were killed and one wounded by Ukrainian shelling in Brianka.

“The missiles supplied by NATO countries are killing unarmed children, women, elderly people and municipal utility workers,” he said.

Reuters could not immediately verify battlefield reports. (Source: Reuters)

27 Sep 22. Kazakhstan and Georgia welcome Russians fleeing conscription. Humanitarian border policies complicate countries’ relations with Moscow Russians enter Georgia after passing through customs at the Verkhnii Lars border checkpoint on Tuesday © Zurab Kurtsikidze/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock Share on twitter (opens new window) Share on facebook (opens new window) Share on linkedin (opens new window) Share Save Polina Ivanova in Berlin 20 MINUTES AGO 1 Print this page Stay across the latest Ukraine coverage.Join the FT’s Telegram channel Kazakhstan and Georgia will welcome Russians fleeing conscription, both governments said on Tuesday, as queues of thousands of mainly young men unwilling to fight in Ukraine build up on their borders. The massive exodus, triggered by President Vladimir Putin’s announcement last week of a wide-ranging mobilisation and by fears that Russia may soon shut its borders, poses challenges to all of its neighbours, with some countries such as Finland taking steps to restrict access. But Kazakhstan’s president said on Tuesday that keeping the country’s doors open to Russians was a humanitarian issue, signalling an indirect condemnation of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine as well as of its conscription laws by one of its closest economic partners. “In recent days, many people are arriving from Russia,” said President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Most of them have been forced to leave because they have no other way out of the situation. We must show them care, and ensure their safety. It is a political and a humanitarian question.” Tokayev added that he would discuss the matter with Moscow. Kazakhstan, which shares a border of more than 7,500km with Russia and has traditionally been one of its most reliable economic and political partners in the wider ex-Soviet region, has increasingly demonstrated its disapproval of Moscow’s war in Ukraine. On Monday, Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry said it would not recognise the possible annexation of occupied regions of south and eastern Ukraine where Russia was staging referendums. Voting in the ballots, which have been widely decried as a sham, ends on Tuesday. (Source: FT.com)

27 Sep 22. Heavy fighting as annexation vote in Ukraine enters final day.

Summary

Heavy fighting as Russian referendums enter last day
Russian conscription sparks protests, exodus
No decisions taken on closing Russian border, Kremlin says

Ukrainian and Russian forces were locked in heavy fighting in different parts of Ukraine on Tuesday as Russian-organised referendums in four regions Moscow hopes to annex drew to a close.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said the Donetsk region in the east remained his country’s — and Russia’s — top strategic priority, with fighting engulfing several towns as Russian troops try to advance to the south and west.

There were also clashes in Kharkiv region in the northeast — focus of a Ukrainian counter-offensive this month. And Ukrainian forces pressed on with a campaign to put out of action four bridges and other river crossings to disrupt supply lines to Russian forces in the south.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces southern command said on Tuesday that its counter offensive in Kherson had resulted in enemy losses of 77 servicemen, six tanks, five howitzers, three anti-aircraft installations and 14 armoured vehicles.

Reuters could not immediately verify battlefield reports.

Moscow hopes to annex the provinces of Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, in the east and south, which make up about 15 percent of Ukraine.

None of the provinces are fully under Moscow’s control and fighting has been under way along the entire front line, with Ukrainian forces reporting more advances since they routed Russian troops in a fifth province, Kharkiv, earlier this month.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has issued a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons to protect Russian soil, which would include the four provinces if annexed.

Voting on whether to join Russia began on Friday in the regions and is due to end on Tuesday, with the Russian parliament possibly approving the annexation within days.

Kyiv and the West have dismissed the referendums as a sham and pledged not to recognise the results.

CONSCRIPTION

In Russia, the call-up of some 300,000 reservists has led to the first sustained protests since the invasion began, with one monitoring group estimating at least 2,000 people have been arrested so far. All public criticism of Russia’s “special military operation” is banned.

Flights out of Russia have sold out and cars have clogged border checkpoints, with reports of a 48-hour queue at the sole road border to Georgia, the rare pro-Western neighbour that allows Russian citizens to enter without a visa.

Asked about the prospect of the border being shut, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Monday: “I don’t know anything about this. At the moment, no decisions have been taken on this.”

Russia counts millions of former conscripts as official reservists. The authorities have not spelled out precisely who is due to be called up, as that part of Putin’s order is classified.

The mobilisation has also seen the first sustained criticism of the authorities within state-controlled media since the war began.

But Sergei Tsekov, a senior lawmaker who represents Russian-annexed Crimea in Russia’s upper house of parliament, told RIA news agency: “Everyone who is of conscription age should be banned from travelling abroad in the current situation.”

Two exiled news sites – Meduza and Novaya Gazeta Europe – both reported that the authorities were planning to ban men from leaving, citing unidentified officials.

Moscow says it wants to rid Ukraine of nationalists and protect Russian-speaking communities. Kyiv and the West describe Russia’s actions as an unprovoked war of aggression.

Late on Monday, Zelenskiy described the military situation in Donetsk as “particularly severe.”

“We are doing everything to contain enemy activity. This is our No. 1 goal right now because Donbas is still the No. 1 goal for the occupiers,” he said, referring to the wider region that encompasses Donetsk and Luhansk.

Russia carried out at least five attacks on targets in the Odesa region using Iranian drones in the last few days, according to the regional administration.

Russian missiles hit the airport in Kriviy Rih, Zelenskiy’s home town in central Ukraine, destroying infrastructure and making the airport unusable, Valentyn Reznichenko, governor of Dnipropetrovsk region, said on Telegram.

More U.S. funding looks to be on the way as negotiators of a stop-gap spending bill in Congress have agreed to include nearly $12bn in new military and economic aid to Ukraine, according to sources. (Source: Reuters)

26 Sep 22. Moldova can’t rely only on neutral status, security aide says. Moldova can no longer rely only on its neutral status and must ramp up its defensive military power, a security aide to pro-Western President Maia Sandu said on Monday.

The ex-Soviet nation, one of Europe’s poorest countries, allocated just over 1bn leu – or 0.45% of GDP – for defence spending this year.

It applied for European Union membership this year and strongly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but has Russian troops and peacekeepers based in its Transdniestria breakaway region and relies heavily on Russian energy.

“Moldova can no longer rely exclusively on foreign policy instruments, one of which is its neutral status, to ensure state stability,” said Dorin Recean, the security aide.

“Moldova must start work on increasing its defence potential… The authorities need to obtain the conscious support of citizens who should understand it is critical to the state’s survival,” he said, calling for funds to be allocated for this task. (Source: Reuters)

26 Sep 22. Is Ukraine’s Brimstone use behind the UK’s Project Wolfram. Mobile launchers are showing their effectiveness in Ukraine, which adapted the Brimstone missile to fire from a flat-bed vehicle earlier this year. Standing off to one side of what is in effect the main hall of the DVD 2022 event at the Millbrook vehicle testing centre was a six-wheeled transporter sporting an eight-pack Brimstone launcher, the epitome of capability delivered with cost in mind.

relatively inexpensive delivery platform, an extended Supacat HMT 600, the UK MoD could in fact deliver a mobile fires capability into service far faster than might be the case with other possible carriers of Brimstone, such as the Boxer (also exhibited at DVD with such a Brimstone module).

The combination of relatively simple but effective delivery of Brimstone has been seen earlier this year on the battlefields of Ukraine. Around the mid-May timeframe, social media imagery showed Ukrainian forces utilising Brimstone missile, fired from a flat-bed vehicle, towards Russian targets.

Also in May this year, UK Defence Minister James Heappey confirmed that hundreds of Brimstone missiles in UK stocks would be sent to Ukraine, with the system able to accurately target using its millimetric-wave radar seeker out to a range of around 25km and effective against ground-based targets. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies states that the missile has a 6.3kg shaped high explosive anti-tank charge as the warhead.

It appears that the lesson could have been well-learned, with the platform on display the result of a Project Wolfram (phonetically, its given name). While exact details of the programme remain undisclosed, it is understood to be a deliberate effort to take onboard lessons learned from Ukraine’s use of the Brimstone missile with a view to creating options for future procurement.

Mobile fires options

With the missile proven by Ukraine to be able to be integrated quickly and effectively onto a land-based platform, options for the UK MoD moving forward, should it choose to create a Brimstone-based mobile fires capability, include the Project Wolfram concept or a specific module for the Boxer infantry vehicle due to enter British Army service in the coming years. (Source: army-technology.com)

26 Sep 22. Ukraine receives surface-to-air missile systems from US.

Zelenskiy also thanked the US for providing HIMARS to strengthen the Ukrainian troops’ offensive stance. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has confirmed the delivery of national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS) from the US, according to media reports.

The development follows a recent announcement made by US President Joe Biden to commit $2.98bn in additional security aid under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).

The assistance is intended to help Ukraine in the long term and includes six more NASAMS with munitions and more than 245,000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition, among others. (Source: army-technology.com)

26 Sep 22. British Army’s KRH regiment to lead eFP Battlegroup in Estonia. The British Army’s King’s Royal Hussars (KRH) have taken charge of Nato’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battlegroup in Estonia as part of the 11th rotation of forces.

The latest rotation of troops in the Baltic State since the creation of the battlegroup in 2017 saw the transfer of authority from The Royal Welsh regiment to the KRH. An armoured tank regiment based in southern England, the KRH uses Challenger 2 main battle tanks. (Source: army-technology.com)

25 Sep 22. Russian forces step up pounding of Ukrainian cities. Voting on whether to become part of Russia continues in occupied eastern and southern provinces. A Mariupol resident casts her vote at a mobile ballot box. Ukrainian official page Stay across the latest Ukraine coverage. Russian forces have stepped up their bombardment of Ukrainian cities as voting entered a third day in referendums in four provinces of eastern and southern Ukraine on joining Russia. The southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhia was hit by 10 Russian rockets late on Saturday, damaging buildings and an electricity substation, but nobody was reported to have been killed, regional officials said. The nearby city of Nikopol and surrounding villages were pounded with rockets and shells. The south-western port city of Odesa was attacked by three exploding drones, or “loitering munitions”, on Sunday, officials said. They were reported to be Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, supplied by Iran, which have given Moscow a new long-range strike capability. Russia has lost several fighter jets in recent days, suggesting an uptick in sorties by its air force despite the risks from Ukrainian air defences and portable anti-aircraft missiles. Ukraine said it shot down four Russian jets on Saturday alone. Its claim could not be verified independently. Ukrainian officials have accused Russian-appointed administrators in the four occupied provinces of orchestrating fraudulent referendums, claiming residents have been forced to vote at gunpoint while public employees have been threatened with losing their jobs unless they take part.

Serhiy Haidai, the Ukrainian governor of Luhansk province, said on his Telegram channel that men in Luhansk were being given a choice: refuse to vote and face immediate detention, or take part and be issued with a Russian passport, which would make them liable to be conscripted. He said occupation officials had claimed turnout of up to 46 per cent in some towns in Luhansk, areas which had been almost emptied of people by the fighting. Voting ends on Tuesday and Moscow could proclaim the four provinces as formally part of the Russian Federation within days. Speaking at the UN general assembly in New York on Saturday, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the new territories would be afforded “full protection” by Moscow if incorporated into Russia. Ukraine and its western allies say Moscow has orchestrated the referendums to justify its escalation of the conflict and the first mobilisation of civilians since the second world war. In his nightly televised address, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged Russians to refuse conscription into the army but promised to treat Russian troops fairly if they surrendered on the battlefield. Recommended Alexander Gabuev Putin has once again overplayed his hand in Ukraine Speaking in Russian, Zelenskyy said that any of Moscow’s troops who surrendered “will be treated in a civilised manner in accordance with all conventions”. “The key moment has come for you: right now it is being decided whether your life will end or not,” he said. “It is better not to take a conscription letter than to die in a foreign land as a war criminal. It is better to run away from criminal mobilisation than to be crippled and then bear responsibility in the court for participating in the war of aggression.” (Source: FT.com)

————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————-

NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

EXHIBITIONS AND CONFERENCES

VETERANS UPDATE

MANAGEMENT ON THE MOVE