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Military And Security Developments
Apr 28.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- OFFENSIVES: There are growing indications that Russian forces are increasing the scale of their attacks, potentially attempting to concentrate forces in preparation for their spring/summer offensive effort
- STRIKES: Long-range strikes are increasing against railway infrastructure, though Ukraine’s ability to intercept drones (rather than missiles) is actively increasing
- AID: On 23 April, the EU formally approved a EUR 90 billion (approximately USD 105.6 billion) loan to Ukraine, which will likely alleviate budgetary pressures in the medium term
- FORECAST: If US-facilitated trilateral negotiations remain stalled over the coming weeks or months, this will reduce the already-limited likelihood of a major breakthrough towards peace in Ukraine
- OFFENSIVES: There are growing indications that Russian forces are increasing the scale of their attacks across the frontline, potentially attempting to concentrate forces in preparation for their spring/summer offensive effort, which has largely stalled until now. On 24 April, a Ukrainian brigade operating near Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) reported that Russian forces are currently attacking in larger groups than two weeks prior. On the same day, another Ukrainian brigade operating near Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast) reported a similar intensification of motorcycle assaults without armoured vehicle support. Meanwhile on 27 April, Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps (of the Air Assault Forces) reported that Russian forces are attempting to accumulate heavy equipment including tanks and artillery to the south-east of Pokrovsk, which they assess are preparations for an attempt to consolidate and expand control to the north-west of Pokrovsk. However, the Ukrainian unit claimed that Russian forces are struggling with logistical problems.
- OFFENSIVES: We assess that the increase in foliage and warm weather is likely facilitating and encouraging Russia’s slow build-up, given the increased cover that it can provide forces against drones. The battlefield’s transparency, which the mass proliferation of drones has dramatically increased since 2023, has long remained the key limiting factor for attacking forces in the Russo-Ukrainian war. The transparency has often prevented either side from successfully concentrating sufficient materiel and personnel to launch large-scale attacks without first being discovered and subsequently struck pre-emptively. This has often resulted in the break-up of attacks before they have even been launched. However, the above-mentioned reports indicate that Russian forces are likely preparing for an intensification in the coming weeks or months. However, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to build momentum successfully to seize significant portions of territory this summer.
- STRIKES: Russian forces have continued to launch high-intensity combined strikes against Ukraine throughout our reporting period. The latest large-scale combined Russian strike took place overnight on 24-25 April, involving 47 missiles and 619 drones. The missiles included 12 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 29 Kh-101 cruise missiles, one Iskander-K cruise missile and five Kalibr cruise missiles. Ukrainian air defences reportedly downed 30 missiles and 580 drones, with Dnipro City (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) being the most heavily targeted area, alongside Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts. The attack against Dnipro City took place over the course of 20 hours, underscoring Russian forces’ attempt to maximise disruption and impact, including with constant pressure on air defence personnel.
- STRIKES: On 24 April, Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russia has steadily ramped up its targeting of railway infrastructure over the last year. In H1 2025, Russia damaged nine locomotives, 46 passenger wagons, 91 freight wagons, two bridges and 17 railway stations; while in H2 it damaged 119 locomotives, 153 passenger wagons, 135 freight wagons, 62 bridges and 21 railway stations. So far in 2026, Russia has damaged 81 locomotives, 40 passenger wagons, 145 freight wagons, 22 bridges and 12 railway stations. According to Ukrzaliznytsia, the total number of strikes against railway infrastructure in 2025 was around 1,200. However, between 1 March and 23 April alone, Russia has launched 352 such strikes, reflecting a clear uptick in such focused strikes.
- STRIKES: On 27 April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian air defences intercepted over 90% of the roughly 1,900 drones launched against Ukraine over the previous week, underscoring how interceptor drone capabilities are keeping pace with scaling Russian attacks. The uptick in Ukrainian drone interceptor production is supporting this high interception rate. Drone manufacturer General Chereshnya reported that the military used its drones in 11,473 interceptions throughout March, up from 5,800 in February. This reflects not only the sustained tempo of Russian drone attacks, but also Ukraine’s scaling interceptor capabilities – which are domestically produced and do not require direct Western support (except indirectly for funding). While this is an area where Ukraine is actively improving its air defence capabilities, its ability to intercept ballistic missiles is likely to decline amid the global shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- AID: On 23 April, the EU formally approved a EUR 90 billion (approximately USD 105.6 billion) loan to Ukraine, which will likely alleviate budgetary pressures in the medium term. The support is supposed to cover two-thirds of Ukraine’s budget and defence funding needs for 2026-2027, though reports claim that Kyiv’s funding gap has widened since the loan was originally planned. According to unspecified diplomats familiar with the matter, Ukraine needs an additional EUR 19 billion (approximately USD 22.3 billion) to cover its needs in 2027. While we cannot confirm this, Ukraine will almost certainly remain heavily reliant on external financing to address budgetary gaps and support its war effort over the long term. In turn, this reliance will sustain the risk of future budgetary uncertainty and shortfalls if future support is delayed or reduced, particularly if Ukraine’s partners face competing spending priorities.
- AZERBAIJAN: Azerbaijan’s pursuit of balanced relations with Russia will limit the likelihood of a significant increase in its support for Ukraine over the coming months. On 25 April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made his first official visit to Azerbaijan since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Ukrainian president met with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev; the two sides signed six bilateral agreements across various spheres, including defence co-operation. However, specific details about the agreements remain limited.
- AZERBAIJAN: Zelensky’s visit comes after Azerbaijan and Russia reached a settlement earlier in April over the downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) flight in December 2024, which precipitated a sharp decline in their relations. Azerbaijani-Russian ties have since improved, with Azerbaijan likely to pursue a pragmatic approach to its relations with Russia over the longer term. While the visit will possibly lead to a moderate increase in tensions with Moscow, it is unlikely that Russia will retaliate by launching long-range strikes against facilities belonging to Azerbaijan’s state-owned oil and gas company SOCAR in Ukraine in the near term (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 11 August 2025).
- MARTIAL LAW: The extension of martial law reinforces our assessment that elections are highly unlikely in Ukraine in the coming weeks. Earlier on 28 April, the Ukrainian parliament voted to extend martial law and mobilisation from 4 May for a further 90 days (until 2 August). Ukrainian lawmakers have consistently voted to prolong martial law since its introduction following Russia’s full-scale invasion. Various reports in recent months had detailed unconfirmed US efforts to pressure Ukraine to hold elections by spring or early summer (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 17 February 2026). Elections cannot be held under martial law in Ukraine. The extension of martial law conditions makes the prospect of elections taking place within the timeframes reportedly proposed by the US highly unlikely.
FORECAST
DIPLOMACY: If US-facilitated trilateral negotiations remain stalled over the coming weeks or months, the already-limited likelihood of a major breakthrough towards peace in Ukraine will reduce further. On 26 April, US President Donald Trump stated that he has had ‘good conversations’ with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Zelensky. However, Trump did not specify any further details. His administration’s preoccupation with the Israel-US-Iran war has halted the trilateral negotiations, and it remains uncertain if or when such talks will resume – though we continue to assess that the situation in the Gulf will heavily influence Russo-Ukrainian diplomatic timelines. While previous US-brokered talks failed to yield a tangible breakthrough, they at least facilitated semi-regular contact between the warring parties that could have built momentum towards a more significant phase of negotiations.
Ukraine is highly likely to remain proactive in its efforts to revive negotiations over the coming weeks; Russia is likely to demonstrate limited willingness to initiate negotiations (especially with US attention diverted elsewhere). On 22 April, Zelensky stated that Ukraine is prepared to hold discussions with Russian representatives ‘at any time’, in ‘any format’ and anywhere, except in Russia or Belarus. During his trip to Azerbaijan on 25 April, Zelensky proposed that this country could host peace talks, likely because Russia would be inclined to agree to this venue, as well as due to the Trump administration’s interest in regional development in the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha disclosed on 22 April that Zelensky asked Turkey to help arrange a summit between himself and Putin. However, Russia continues to emphasise that a meeting between the two leaders can only take place to finalise an agreement to end the war; we assess that the Kremlin is highly likely to maintain this position over the medium term. Ultimately, it is highly likely that Russia perceives that it does not need to make concessions or soften its war objectives in the coming months; the Israel-US-Iran war is likely to bolster its attritional strategy of waiting out Ukraine.
Bilateral contact between the US and the warring countries will nevertheless likely continue in some form while trilateral talks remain paused, though competing priorities for the Trump administration will limit the frequency and level of such engagement. On 23 April, the head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, Kyrylo Budanov, stated that Ukrainian officials expect US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner (Trump’s son-in-law) to travel to Kyiv. Budanov stated in early April that the two envoys could travel to Ukraine this month, though the prospect of this happening in the coming days is low given diplomatic engagement over Iran. Kushner and Witkoff have visited Moscow on different occasions; the pair met Putin during a visit in January. In contrast, they have yet to travel to Kyiv. Aside from the US’ likely current limited diplomatic bandwidth due to negotiations with Iran, we continue to assess that re-engaging with Russia is a longer-term objective of the Trump administration. As such, dispatching envoys to Ukraine will likely remain a lower priority for the US in the coming days or weeks. Despite this, Ukraine and the US will likely remain in contact on resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war through other channels.
Ap\r 24.
Ukraine: EU membership is highly unlikely in medium term due to ongoing war, reform constraints
On 23 April, an anonymous EU official quoted by Bloomberg stated that during a summit on the same day, EU leaders reportedly signalled their willingness to start accession negotiations for Ukraine in the coming weeks or months. However, the specific deadline remains unclear. Recent reports indicate that France and Germany want to offer Ukraine a ‘symbolic membership’, which would involve granting limited benefits in a pre-accession phase that would exclude EU farming subsidies and voting rights. Such a two-tier membership model, which various media reports already floated earlier this year, would face strong opposition from Ukraine as well as several EU member states, including Baltic states. On 23 April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky insisted that Ukraine must achieve full membership of the EU. However, we assess that this remains highly unlikely, as Kyiv’s ability to meet the EU’s extensive accession criteria remains heavily constrained by the ongoing war with Russia, making the country’s membership highly unlikely in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
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