NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Ukraine Conflict – July 11th.

Military and security developments

08 Jul 22.

Planned Changes To NATO Posturing

Key Takeaways

• NATO’s security environment has changed significantly in recent years due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and strategic competition with China. To reflect these changes, NATO has adopted a new ‘Strategic Concept’ which outlines the alliance’s plans for the next decade.
• In response to the war in Ukraine, NATO has proposed various changes to its defence and deterrence posture. These include increasing its high readiness ‘response force’ numbers to around 300,000 and establishing four new battlegroups in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, deteriorating relations with Russia, as well as the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal and Beijing’s development of “increasingly sophisticated delivery systems”, has prompted the alliance to limit its pursuit of international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. It will now shift its focus to risk reduction and conflict management.
• While these plans intend to reduce regional tensions and the risk of armed conflict with Russia through effective deterrence, they are also hugely ambitious. Increasing economic pressures in Europe are highly likely to hinder their implementation. Additionally, rising socio-economic pressures will discourage European governments from boosting defence and military investments in the coming years. This eventuality could reignite debates to do with ‘burden-sharing’. If NATO fails to implement its proposed reforms, the alliance will highly likely lose credibility internationally, undermining the effectiveness of its deterrence capabilities.

Context

In June, NATO published a new Strategic Concept for the first time since 2010 due to significant changes to the security environment following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February. The document sets out NATO’s plans until 2030 and defines the most pressing issues and threats facing the alliance. In the new Strategic Concept, it is evident that NATO’s approach to strategic stability is changing. These changes have triggered a substantial reshaping of the alliance’s defence and deterrence posture. International support for NATO increased significantly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This follows overt criticism of the alliance’s purpose in recent years by several Western leaders, including France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, and the former US president, Donald Trump. Due to the war in Ukraine, most Western governments have since boosted defence spending, with many states now envisaging a greater role for the region’s defence industry. Furthermore, NATO member states have pledged to bolster defences on the alliance’s eastern flank; they plan to increase rapid reaction troop numbers almost seven and a half times to around 300,000 by 2023. As such, the region’s defence and security policies are undergoing shifts not witnessed since the end of the Cold War. This reflects wider efforts to reduce regional tensions and the risk of armed conflict with Russia. Nevertheless, questions regarding the feasibility of NATO’s new defence and deterrence posture remain; member states’ socio-economic health is deteriorating, which could undermine public support for increased defence investments.

Significant changes in posturing signal notable shifts in approach to strategic stability

Compared to the 2010 Lisbon Strategic Concept, there has been a significant shift in NATO’s perception of Russia. While Russia was identified as a strategic partner in 2010, the 2022 document claims that Russia is the “most significant and direct threat” to the alliance. As such, NATO will establish four new multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia to bolster four existing battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The alliance intends to enhance these groups to brigade levels in the coming years.

The new plans not only envisage an increase in troop numbers. They also introduce new enablers for territorial defence through the permanent deployment of increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, as well as communications, logistics infrastructure, stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, interoperability between the eight multinational brigades will reportedly be improved according to statements at the Madrid Summit in June. This indicates a significant shift in NATO’s strategy regarding Russia from deterrence by ‘tripwire’ to deterrence by denial. In the event of an invasion, NATO has traditionally relied on an alarm being raised by small numbers of troops who are otherwise unable to defend the alliance’s territory by themselves. This formed the backbone of an ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’ that was established in 2017 in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The support for the expansion of NATO’s forces in Eastern Europe has been significant, especially in the Baltic states and Poland. These states are experiencing heightened tensions with both Russia and Belarus, which co-operates closely with Russia militarily. Belarus has also weaponised the issue of migration along the Polish border in the past year.

While the key focus of the Madrid Summit was the threat posed by Russia, China was also mentioned in the Strategic Concept for the first time. NATO asserted that China is “harmful for the Alliance’s security”. This significant shift mirrors a trend in recent years by the US and the UK, which have both moved their focus towards the Indo-Pacific region, despite the majority of European member states’ threat perceptions having been influenced by events in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and North Africa.

Additionally, the new document manages to clarify hybrid or ‘grey zone’ threats by explaining that hybrid attacks, including malicious cyber activity and hostile operations in space, are now sufficient to trigger Article 5. NATO’s ‘red line’ policies are consequently set to appear clearer following the ambiguity surrounding references to hybrid warfare in recent years.

Since February, Moscow has issued nuclear threats against both Ukraine and NATO. Over the past three decades, NATO’s member states have based their nuclear strategies on the assumption that a nuclear war would only take place amid miscalculation or miscommunication. Previous nuclear strategies therefore focused on building trust between nuclear states by establishing control mechanisms, increasing transparency and limiting nuclear weapons numbers. However, the Russian nuclear narrative has raised concerns regarding deliberate escalation ever since the invasion of Ukraine. The lack of dialogue about international arms control during the Madrid Summit suggests that NATO will place less emphasis on enhancing arms control and non-proliferation in the coming years. This is almost certainly due to increasingly hostile Russian rhetoric.

In the years since the previous Strategic Concept was published, Donald Trump withdrew the US from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in Fenruary 2019 following alleged Russian violations. In addition, the US also withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement related to Iran’s nuclear programme. Although the latest document details the erosion of international arms control and non-proliferation structures and their negative impact on strategic stability, it falls short of addressing the matter in significant depth. This further indicates a significant shift from arms control to risk reduction and conflict management. This development comes amid frailed relations with Russia and efforts by China to expand its nuclear arsenal rapidly, an environment in which NATO feels it can no longer rely on ‘good faith’.

Challenges will impede plans, despite alliance’s resolve

NATO’s proposed response force expansion will require significant investment from member states. This could reignite debates about burden-sharing, especially now that many member states are suffering from soaring inflation, worsening energy insecurity and deteriorating socio-economic health. Indeed, several officials have emphasised that the exact size, composition and scale of the propsed brigades still need to be discussed by member states, and that the 300,000 figure is simply an idea as opposed to a defnite target. NATO member states have gradually increased defence spending since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, the Swedish government announced an increase of USD 300 million to its 2022 defence budget. Italy is planning to inject a USD 1.7 billion boost to its defence budget, while officials from France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland also announced increased defence and military investment.

Nevertheless, increased defence spending and the expansion of NATO’s forces in Eastern Europe are still vulnerable to international events. This includes the election of leaders who do not support NATO, and/or a significant decrease in public support for military spending across

Europe and/or North America amid growing domestic economic challenges. Furthermore, deteriorating socio-economic health concerns could spark debates about burden-sharing, undermining member states’ resolve to carry out the proposed reforms.

The potential inability of member states to implement the planned changes to NATO’s force posture or to boost defence and military investment in the near term could damage NATO’s international reputation. This may ultimately dilute the effectiveness of the alliance’s deterrence capabilities. Potential clashes within the alliance regarding the accession of Sweden and Finland could also negatively impact NATO’s credibility on the international stage. This is especially likely if the two Scandinavian countries and Turkey remain unable to resolve the dispute regarding Turkey’s security concerns about Sweden’s and Finland’s alleged support for Kurdish paramilitary organisations.

Forecast

As economic pressures mount across NATO due to soaring inflation and energy prices, member states are likely to face challenges which hinder the feasibility of the proposed changes to NATO’s force posture. Domestic economic pressures will almost certainly reduce support for increased defence spending, while deteriorating socio-economic health is likely to drive anti-NATO and anti-government sentiment. Leaders are unlikely to support NATO’s plans if doing so comprises their domestic popularity. The re-emergence of burden-sharing debates is also a possibility and could weaken the alliance’s deterrence capabilities and global credibility, as could internal disputes concerning the accession of hopeful members. Anti-NATO sentiment will increase the risk of anti-government and anti-NATO protests, which could increase physical security threats to military bases in the near to long term.

• The Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed on 7 July that Russian forces in the Donbas are now pausing to allow troops to rest and regain their combat effectiveness. This aligns with our previous assessment and largely explains the relative lack of any significant military developments over the past week following the capture of Lysychansk.
• It should be noted, however, that armed hostilities have not stopped, and that the operational pause is not a ceasefire. Russian forces have continued low-level offensive operations along most axes, with some modest gains. Russian forces along the Luhansk-Donetsk border have now reached the eastern outskirts of the village of Spirne, 12km southeast of Siversk – a key target for Russian forces in the area. Fighting also continues around Verkhnokamyanka, along the main road connecting Lysychansk with Siversk.
• The Ukrainian General Staff this morning, 8 July, confirmed Russian forces are also advancing south of Bakhmut in the direction of Veselaya Dolyna, a village just 5km southeast of Bakhmut. Therefore, despite the operational pause, Russian forces are still pushing back the Ukrainians at certain points in order to set conditions for future assaults against Bakhmut and Slovyansk to the north. These operations include instances such as Russia’s missile strike on Kramatorsk yesterday, a city just south of Slovyansk, illustrating the mounting pressure that will be placed upon the area in the coming weeks.
• On 7 July, Ukrainian General Staff stated that over 70% of Russian projectiles, both guided and unguided, miss their target due to a combination of inaccuracy and Ukrainian air defence systems. This reinforces our own assessment that the risk of civilian collateral damage during Russian strikes has increased as stocks of precision weapons dwindle. Kyiv has emphasised the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defences, but the inaccuracy of older missile systems and “dumb bombs” likely account for the large majority of such misses – as illustrated by the recent Kremenchuk shopping centre strike. According to the General Staff, Russian forces have carried out 6,443 “operational-tactical sorties” since the beginning of the invasion, as well as 626 long-range strikes involving Iskandr and Kalibr ballistic and cruise missiles.
• The Belarusian government has once again extended military drills currently taking place along the southern border with Ukraine until at least 16 July. The drills are designed to ensure Ukrainian forces continue to screen the northern border and keep pressure up. However, as previously assessed they are highly unlikely to indicate any planned ground invasion or direct intervention in Ukraine in the coming months. See Sibylline Situation Update Brief for more analysis.

Political developments

• Today, 8 July, US and Western allies gathered at G20 talks in Indonesia. The high-profile meeting, which includes the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as well as his Western counterparts, comes shortly after the host, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, visited both Moscow and Kyiv last week. He reportedly delivered a message from President Zelensky to President Putin, though he did not specify what the note included. Prospects for any diplomatic breakthrough at the summit on key issues, including grain shipments, remain very low, with Lavrov stating that he would not “go running” after Washington for discussions, blaming the US for severing ties with Russia. Lavrov furthermore stated that there was “nothing” to discuss with the West, indicating the extent to which basic diplomatic communication remains difficult to non-existent, particularly in the case of US- and UK-Russian relation.

FORECAST

On 7 July Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the war might drag on until “the last Ukrainian is left standing”, warning that Russia has not yet “seriously started in Ukraine”. The statement is the latest indicator that Moscow has not abandoned its maximalist war goals in Ukraine, and that readiness to fight a much more protracted war if necessary is highly likely to remain Kremlin policy. Shortly after the statement, Kremlin spokesman Dimitry Peskov claimed that only a small portion of Russia’s potential has been used in Ukraine thus far. While this ignores the fact that the Russian Armed Forces have undeniably expended significant portions of their pre-war combat power, Peskov’s statement also likely alludes to the fact that Moscow has not issued general mobilisation. He is therefore likely reminding domestic and international audiences that Moscow still has options available to escalate its commitment to the war in the coming months. Putin’s statement is highly significant as Nikolai Patrushev, the hawkish Secretary of the Russian Security Council, reiterated at a conference on 5 July that the original war goals of a complete “denazification and demilitarisation” of Ukraine will be achieved, and that Ukraine will be forced to adopt neutral status thereafter. This reinforces our assessment that if and when the remainder of Donetsk oblast is conquered, a termination of military operations thereafter remains unlikely, and that the Kremlin would more likely continue the war in order to achieve wider political objectives, including the conquest of the so-called Novorossiya region. This assessment is furthermore supported by the current stance of the Kyiv government, which makes a ceasefire and peace agreement highly unlikely in the next three months. Following Putin’s statement yesterday, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that “Ukrainians are not ready to give away their land,” and urged the West to continue providing military support to Ukraine. This stance is unlikely to change in the coming months, and as such a termination of Russian military operations if and when Donetsk oblast falls is unlikely to serve the Kremlin’s interests. However, Russia’s ability to continue fighting will ultimately be determined by the military situation. As previously assessed, it remains to be seen whether Russian forces are able to translate the recent tactical victories in Luhansk oblast into wider operational and strategic ones that would facilitate a continuation and expansion of the war in the coming months.

05 Jul 22.

• Yesterday, 4 July, the Russian Ministry of Defence declared that Russian and separatist forces had taken full control of Luhansk oblast following the fall of Lysychansk over the weekend. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu furthermore claimed Russian forces had taken the villages of Bilhorivka and Zolotarivka on the administrative border with Donetsk oblast, which Ukrainian officials appeared to corroborate following reports that the Russians were fortifying their positions around Bilhorivka. However, Luhansk oblast regional head Serhiy Haidai this morning claimed that Ukrainian forces have in fact repelled Russian assaults against Bilhorivka, claiming that Russian forces have now left the frontline settlement. This remains unconfirmed at present, but if true would undermine President Vladimir Putin’s claim to have consolidated control over the entire Luhansk oblast.
• Nevertheless, the Ukrainian General Staff did confirm in its morning briefing today that Russian forces have continued pushing west past the Luhansk border, reporting “partially successful” Russian assaults against the village of Spirne, just west of the T-1302 highway. It should be noted for clarity that Ukrainian General Staff reports yesterday of a Russian river crossing across the Siverskyi Donets appear to have referred to crossings between Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, which are now far behind the frontline. As such, these crossings are unlikely to have a significant impact on current offensive or defensive operations given that the front has moved some 15km to the west.
• Further south along the Bakhmut line, Russian forces have continued assaults and reconnaissance-in-force probing attacks along the frontline east of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian General Staff yesterday, 4 July, confirmed that the Russians took the town of Klynove, which sits just east of the M-03 highway and just 10km southeast of Bakhmut itself, indicating that Russian forces are continuing to make incremental progress towards the town. However, it remains to be seen whether an operational pause following the fall of Lysychansk will impact operations on this axis, with further progress likely to remain slow in the coming weeks.
• Russian forces have also continued offensive operations northwest of Slovyansk. The Ukrainian General Staff have reported partially successful Russian assaults around the village of Mazanivka, about 20km northwest of Slovyansk, though Ukrainian forces have simultaneously repulsed attacks further east around the more strategically important village of Doyna. Dolyna lies directly on the M-03 highway, the main road connecting Izyum to Slovyansk.
• On the southern axis, Russian forces have continued operations to shore-up their tactical positions along the Kherson-Mykolaiv border region, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting numerous Russian attacks on settlements including Ivanivka, Potemkyne and Myrne, some 45km south of Kryvhi Rih. Intense artillery bombardments have continued along this axis, likely in an attempt to stall Ukrainian counterattacks and assist ground forces in reclaiming lost positions Ukraine had taken during last month’s limited counteroffensive in the area. However, much of the border zone remains heavily contested, and progress on either side remains incremental.
• Nevertheless, Ukrainian resistance behind the frontline remains ongoing in both Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblast. The Ukrainian Resistance Centre reported that earlier this week Ukrainian partisans had blown up a railway bridge between Melitopol and Tokmak, in Zaporizhzhia oblast. This is just the latest reported partisan activity, with the Centre also claiming that a Russian armoured train transporting ammunition to the front “accidentally” derailed between Yakymivka and Melitopol on 2 July, implying partisan involvement. The Russian military is far more reliant upon railways than other European countries, party explained by its geographic size. But such reliance has its disadvantages, as operating beyond railheads will place considerable strain on Russian logistics, as repeated Russian failures have testified throughout this war. This is despite the fact that the Russians have dedicated material-technical support brigades designed to support their combined arms armies in the field. As such, reliance upon railways means that partisan activity targeting railheads and rail infrastructure will continue to be an effective way of undermining Russian operations across the southern axis.
• On 4 July, the head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence’s Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian intelligence sees no serious threat of Belarusian troops crossing the border into Ukraine in the near future. Similarly, the State Border Guard Service stated on 4 July that they have identified no significant change on the border situation with Belarus (and Transnistria), stating that there are no signs of preparations for an offensive grouping in the region. This aligns with our own assessment provided last week as to the very low likelihood of Belarus being brought directly into the war (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 30 June).

Political developments

• President Zelensky said that talks with Turkey and the United Nations regarding grain exports are ongoing. The announcement follows yesterday’s reports that Turkey has detained a Russian vessel off its Black Sea coast following Kyiv’s claims that it was carrying stolen grain. Meanwhile, investigative reports also claim that contrary to Turkish claims that it does not buy Ukrainian grain from the occupied territories, satellite imagery appears to suggest otherwise. As such, the issue will remain highly contentious as Ankara has not yet announced the next steps regarding the halted Russian vessel. Meanwhile, Zelensky also stressed the need for a third nation to provide guarantees for the security of the ships, a request that remains difficult to meet given that the West is reluctant to come into a direct military confrontation with Russia and trigger and even larger escalation. However, further discussions are reportedly expected to be held in the short term in Turkey, which is likely to continue playing a key mediating role on the issue.
• Yesterday, Ukraine unveiled its funding needs, indicating that the country requires between USD 60 – 65bn this year – a figure far greater than its partners have so far been able to promise – with the ultimate price tag for rebuilding estimated at USD 750 bn. The reconstruction plan would extend over the next decade, with the most immediate phase being rebuilding of critical infrastructure. However, with the Russian offensive now set to focus on capturing Donetsk after taking Luhansk, the war is bound to extend for several more months at the very least, ultimately driving up the costs of reconstruction the longer the war goes on. More importantly, with a realistic possibility that Russia will cut gas supplies to Europe even further, the threat of rising inflation will remain elevated through the remainder of 2022. Subsequently, depressed socio-economic conditions on the continent will undermine the ability of most countries to continue financially contributing to Ukraine’s reconstruction.
• Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, reiterated at a conference today, 5 July, that the original war goals of a complete “denazification and demilitarisation” of Ukraine will be achieved, despite the provision of Western weapons. Patrushev remains one of the most influential members of the hawk faction in the Kremlin who likely remains in favour of expanding the war effort to achieve the Kremlin’s original extensive goals.

FORECAST

Following the capture of Lysychansk over the weekend, President Vladimir Putin held a televised meeting with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu on 4 July, where he congratulated Russian and separatist forces for “liberating” the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR). Putin also notably stated that the “Central” and “Southern” grouping of troops that took part in the operation, under the command of Alexander Lapin and Sergey Surovikin respectively, should rest in order to restore their combat effectiveness. This is a clear indication that the Kremlin has agreed to an operational pause for Russian and LNR troops in the area, which is highly likely to be necessary given the intensity of fighting in recent weeks. The move is also likely designed to serve domestic goals that present Putin as concerned for the welfare of the troops amid widespread reports of poor conditions at the front. However, influential pro-war hawk and former DNR commander Igor Strelkov (real name Girkin) heavily criticised the costs of the Russian victory in Luhansk oblast yesterday on Telegram. Reiterating his previous criticisms of the Kremlin’s strategy, Strelkov argued that despite the tactical victory in Lysychansk, Russian forces have failed to achieve the goals of the “second stage of the special military operation”, namely the destruction of significant portions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and conquest of the entire Donbas. He furthermore argued that the tactical victory in Lysychansk has been achieved at such high cost that Russian and separatist forces are now exhausted, and that Ukrainian forces have been able to achieve personnel and equipment superiority along other fronts, which are now vulnerable to Ukrainian counteroffensives. While Strelkov and other hardliners have been consistently calling for general mobilisation in order to offset Ukraine’s growing capability and manpower advantages, his analysis of the military realities on the ground align more closely with our own and wider Western assessments of the relatively poor performance of Russian forces. As previously predicted earlier during the Battle for the Donbas (see Ukraine Daily Update – 30-05-22), the conquest of Luhansk oblast has been achieved at such cost in terms of manpower, equipment and morale – and thus overall combat effectiveness – that it now remains unclear whether Russian forces will able to translate this tactical victory into a wider operational and strategic one. Strelkov has argued that it was a serious mistake to accept battle on the Ukrainians’ terms; it also remains our assessment that Kyiv’s “defend every square inch” strategy has effectively slowed the Russian advance and enabled Ukrainian forces to inflict significant casualties on Russian forces. This has ultimately necessitated the operational pause seemingly ordered by Putin, and it remains to be seen when and where the Russians will be able to regain the initiative given the attritional nature of the war.

• Over the weekend Russian forces secured Lysychansk, the last city in Luhansk oblast that had remained under Ukrainian control. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on 2 July that their forces had successfully withdrawn from the city to limit losses, as we had previously anticipated. However, Russian forces have likely been conducting clearing operations through 3-4 July to clear remnant Ukrainian forces that remain behind the frontline. Russian sources have this morning, 4 July, reported that an unspecified number of Ukrainian troops remain trapped south of Lysychansk. They have also reported that a ceasefire has been declared as of this morning around the pocket, indicating that negotiations for surrender may be taking place or have already been agreed upon. However, this remains unconfirmed. Nevertheless, the Russian Ministry of Defence did confirm on 3 July that their forces were still fighting in Lysychansk, though it remains likely that they will quickly clear the city in the coming hours and days.
• Following the Ukrainian fighting withdrawal from Lysychansk, Russian forces on 2-3 July pushed further west and have now reportedly taken control of the Luhansk oblast administrative borders, seemingly completing the Russian conquest of the oblast. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russian forces on 2 July captured Maloryazantseve and Novodruzhesk, both on the outskirts of Lysychansk, as well as the villages of Bilhorivka and Zolotarivka further west, which sit along the Luhansk-Donetsk border. Geolocated footage published on 3 July showed Russian forces walking inside these villages, indicating that Russian forces may have entered the villages uncontested following a wider Ukrainian withdrawal to the west. Both of these villages sit on two roads leading west towards Siversk, which is likely to remain the next target for Russian forces. For further analysis and our assessment of the unfolding military situation on this axis, see the Forecast below.
• Elsewhere along the frontline, the Russians are continuing to launch offensive operations against targets at either end of the M-03 highway, that connects Slovyansk in the northwest to Bakhmut in the southeast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed this morning that Russian forces have launched renewed assaults southeast of Izyum along the M-03 highway. Russian forces are currently attempting to assert control over the heavily fought-over village of Bohorodychne, which sits northwest of Slovyansk. East of Bakhmut, Russian forces have furthermore continued to apply pressure on the Ukrainian defence, pushing them further west in places, though progress remains slow and incremental.
• Elsewhere, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused Ukrainian forces on 3 July of striking the Russian city of Belgorod with three Tochka-U ballistic missiles and targeting the city of Kursk with an explosives-laden drone. The Ukrainians have not yet commented on the attacks; however, Moscow alleges it killed three people and struck residential buildings in the cities. In related developments, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka claimed on 3 July that Belarusian air defences intercepted Ukrainian missiles that had attempted to strike military facilities inside Belarus, without providing any evidence. The former accusations inside Kursk and Belgorod oblasts remain more credible given previous Ukrainian Tochka-U attacks in the regions, but it remains unlikely that Ukraine would seek to open hostilities with Belarus directly at this time. For further analysis and trigger points for a potential ground invasion from Belarus, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 30 June.

05 Jul 22 Cyber Update

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Pro-Russian cyber threat actors have continued to engage in malicious activities during this monitoring period. The cyber attacks launched against the Norwegian government and Ukraine’s largest private energy firm DTEK present the most significant incidents during this monitoring period. With Western countries not indicating that they plan on stopping their retaliatory activities against the Russian government over its invasion of Ukraine, there is a heightened risk that further cyber attacks will be launched against these countries in the coming weeks. Despite this, this activity will likely remain rudimentary and low-level cyber attacks – such as DDoS – and cause limited operational disruptions to the targeted organisations, such as government agencies or those in the energy, transportation, or telecommunications sectors.
• Elsewhere, Pro-Ukraine hackers’ data leak and disruptive cyber operations have maintained pace during this monitoring period. While Anonymous’ declaration of “cyber war” against the pro-Russian group Killnet will likely further heighten the two sides’ tit-for-tat cyber conflict, the groups’ limited technical capabilities will lower the level of disruption caused to Western organisations’ operations by their retaliatory cyber activities. Nevertheless, the persistent targeting of Western countries’ critical infrastructure will heighten the risk of sporadic and short-term disruptions occurring in the coming weeks.
• Russia-linked operations maintain pace; Pro-Moscow groups will continue launching disruptive cyber attacks against countries that engage in retaliatory activity against the Russian government
• On 1 July, industry reports claimed that the allegedly pro-Russian hacktivist group XakNet hacked Ukraine’s largest private energy firm DTEK. It currently remains unclear what type or how information has been compromised by this campaign. This incident follows Russian military forces’ shelling of the DTEK-owned thermal power plant in Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine. Moreover, this cyber attack also coincides with DTEK’s owner Rinat Akhmetov’s 27 June filing of a lawsuit against the Russian government for the financial damages he incurred as a result of Moscow’s shelling of DTEK’s properties. This incident further exemplifies the trend identified in Microsoft’s April 2022 report, which found that pro-Moscow hacking groups engaging in a wide range of cyber attacks to closely match and support Moscow’s conventional military activity in Ukraine (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 28 April 2022).
• On 30 June, Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection (SSSCIP) claimed that Ukrainian government and private sector organisations had been subjected to 796 cyber attacks since Russia’s invasion on 24 February. Of these attacks, the most impacted entities were those in government, defence, telecoms, and energy sectors. While these cyber intrusions have served several different purposes, most of the attacks (242 incidents) were aimed at exfiltrating sensitive information. These findings further confirm Microsoft’s report in April that Russian state-linked threat actors have launched more than 237 cyber operations against Ukraine aimed at a wide range of activities, including destructive and intelligence-gathering operations (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 28 April 2022).
• On 29 June, the National Security Authority (NSM) accused pro-Russian criminal groups of targeting public and private sector organisations in a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack over the past 24 hours. While the NSM Director, Sofie Nystrøm, told local media that “no sensitive information was taken” during the attack, the Labour Inspection Authority reportedly was among the affected institutions. The attack follows closely an ongoing DDoS campaign against Lithuania by the pro-Russian hacktivist gang Killnet (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 28 June 2022). Oslo, along with other Nordic governments, offered full support for Sweden and Finland’s applications to join NATO. Tensions between Oslo and Moscow have also risen amid a dispute over the blockade of Russian coal shipments transiting via Norway. The strong similarities between the campaigns against Lithuania and Norway suggest that it is highly possible that the same group was behind both attacks.
• Pro-Kyiv hackers continue data leak operations; Tit-for-tat conflict with pro-Moscow groups will heighten the threat posed to critical sector organisation.
• On 3-4 July, a Twitter account allegedly representing the Anonymous hacktivist collective claimed that the group hacked the Russian Space Research Institute and plans to leak its sensitive information online “soon”. The current lack of information over what type of information was allegedly accessed during this campaign makes it difficult to assess the veracity of Anonymous’ claim and its potential impact on the Russian Space Research Institutes’ operations. Anonymous claimed that this cyber attack was in response to the pro-Russian hacktivist group Killnet’s targeting of the Norwegian and Lithuanian governments with Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks in late June and early July. This is the latest retaliatory cyber operation against Killnet by Anonymous since the group alleged on 30 June to have hacked the Russian architectural and engineering service firm ASP-Proekt for similar reasons.
• On 29 June, a separate Twitter account purporting to be linked to Anonymous claimed that the collective – in concert with the IT Army of Ukraine – hacked the Russian Federation’s LTE router and took down 88 sites. This user did not provide any further details on this campaign, including which sites were impacted and/or which tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) they allegedly used to engage in this malicious activity. If officially confirmed, this incident would be indicative of the Russian government’s 20 June disclosure that “Russian information infrastructure” is increasingly being targeted by several cyber threat actors, such as the US, Ukraine, and EU member states (see Sibylline Weekly Ukraine Cyber Update – 28 June 2022).

FORECAST

Publicly-disclosed pro-Russian cyber attacks maintained pace during this monitoring period, with the DDoS attacks against the Norwegian government indicative of pro-Moscow hacking groups’ continued targeting of countries that engage in retaliatory activities against the Russian government. Despite these groups’ persistent targeting of the EU and NATO member states – such as Italy, Lithuania, Norway, and Romania – their cyber activities have consistently been low-level cyber attacks, such as DDoS. Indeed, the DDoS activity that targeted Norwegian government agencies’ websites caused short-term and limited disruptions and has largely been resolved as of the time of writing. This trend is indicative of cyber security firm Cloudfare’s findings that nearly 98 percent of network-layer DDoS attacks in Q4 2021 lasted under an hour. While further such disruptive cyber attacks are highly likely to be launched in the coming weeks, Moscow’s apparent lack of time, funding, and resources will likely limit both the success and sophistication of these cyber attacks. Organisations are advised to consult the “Quick Guide” checklists provided by Western governments’ cyber security agencies – such as the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) – to minimise their exposure to Russia-linked threats. Meanwhile, pro-Ukraine hacking groups have continued to engage in data leaking and disruptive cyber operations to express their political grievances over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The most notable development during this previous monitoring period has been Anonymous’ declaration of cyber war against the pro-Russian hacktivist group Killnet over its targeting of the Norwegian and Lithuanian governments’ infrastructure with DDoS activity. Given that neither group has physical assets that can be targeted, this tit-for-tat cyber conflict will likely result in retaliatory cyber attacks being launched against countries and organisations being supported by these groups, such as Western countries’ critical infrastructure. Despite this threat, neither side has shown the technical capability to launch cyber attacks that are more sophisticated than DDoS or data leak operations. As such, the overall disruption and impact of these attacks are expected to be limited. Nevertheless, these two groups’ persistent targeting of critical infrastructure operators – in sectors such as energy, telecommunications, or transportation – could cause short-term and sporadic business disruptions to organisations dependent on these services.

Political developments

• A two-day Ukraine Recovery Conference kicked off in Lugano, Switzerland today, 4 July. During the event, a comprehensive plan for rebuilding Ukraine is expected to be announced, with over 40 countries and more than 20 international organisations reportedly invited to partake in the conference. The plan includes a blueprint for investment into infrastructure, as well as climate and digital spheres, with the European Commission (EC) expected to present a plan on coordinating donations, which are largely anticipated to come from the European Union. However, given the immense scale of the project and finances required, the meeting in Lugano marks only the first such conference on the topic, with further reportedly planned for November.
• The reconstruction plans are also inevitably set to come under the close scrutiny of various member states, many of which are increasingly more concerned about adding debt amid a difficult economic situation and rising inflation in Europe. Moreover, concerns and demands regarding aid being linked to anti-corruption and democratic reforms will also likely be increasingly demanded by countries traditionally more sceptical about advancing Ukraine’s EU membership prospects. Concrete progress on these issues, however, will inevitably remain stalled in the short term given that the war is still ongoing. As such, it is bound to remain a sticking point during negotiations. The scale of rebuilding efforts will also ultimately depend on the length of the war, with the cost already estimated at USD 1 trillion, should it extend until the end of the year.
• On 3 July, Turkish authorities confirmed that they had detained a Russian vessel carrying grain from Ukraine, which Kyiv reported was stolen as it accuses Russian forces of widespread looting. Turkish authorities are expected to announce how they will deal with the detained ship, which was reportedly loaded in the occupied Ukrainian port of Berdyansk. The development will inevitably drive tensions between Russia and Turkey, with the latter previously more reluctant to intervene in these matters for the fear of angering Moscow. As such, diplomatic tensions between Moscow and Ankara will remain elevated, especially should Turkey refuse to release the vessel, which could subsequently result in Moscow retaliating by curtailing trade and energy links with Turkey.
• Late last week the Russian government submitted a draft amendment to a number of federal laws which would introduce “special measures in the economic sphere” to support the war effort in Ukraine. The amendment looks set to prevent all Russian companies, irrespective of ownership, from refusing to supply or support the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine as well as “counter-terrorist operations” when called upon. In this respect, the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on 3 July that numerous directors of Russian military repair firms are not accepting new Russian equipment for repair as the federal government has not paid them for previous work. The amendments would thus force companies to supply goods, perform work, and provide services for the special military operation, while also allowing the alteration of existing worker contracts to force them to work during weekends and holidays. This is the latest indication that the Kremlin is covertly mobilising not only manpower but also the economy to support the war in Ukraine. While Western-owned firms are comparatively unlikely to be providing critical military services to the Russian military, the new amendments, which are highly likely to pass, present profound reputational, legal, and sanctions risks for any firm called upon to directly support the war effort. In this respect, this is another step toward Russia enforcing a de facto wartime economy, which will reinforce the enduring risks for Western firms still operating inside Russia.

FORECAST

The fall of Lysychansk is set to provide Moscow with its most significant victory since the fall of Mariupol, and will allow President Vladimir Putin this week to declare that the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) has been fully “liberated”. However, this is only one-half of the Donbas region, with Russian forces now set for another gruelling and attritional fight for the remainder of neighbouring Donetsk oblast. Russian forces are now set to focus on pushing towards Siversk and Bakhmut from the east, with the ultimate aim of encroaching on the heavily fortified cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk along the M-03 (E40) highway. This will likely take many months of attritional fighting to accomplish, if Russian forces are able to accomplish it at all. All indicators nevertheless point to the Kremlin preparing to fight a longer war for at least several more months to achieve the conquest of the entire Donbas region. It remains unclear at this stage where precisely the Ukrainians will establish a new defensive line following the withdrawal from Lysychansk, though the ‘Bakhmut line’ remains the most likely. As previously assessed, this line would have various advantages for the defending Ukrainians, including a string of almost unbroken villages running between Siversk-Soledar-Bakhmut which can be (and likely already have been) fortified. In addition, the Bakhmutka River stands at the back of the line guarding the T-0513 highway, which in turn will provide stronger ground lines of communication to resupply and reinforce Ukrainian forces on the frontline.  The ‘Bakhmut line’ could thus provide a two-phased defence which would serve the overall Ukrainian strategy of slowing the Russian advance while inflicting heavy casualties. The Ukrainians could first establish defensive positions east of the riverbank, utilising the defensive advantages of the villages and fortified towns of Siversk and Soledar. After slowing the Russian advance here, the Ukrainians could then proceed with the option of withdrawing across the river to take up secondary defensive positions along the western bank of the Bakhmutka, utilising the natural defences of the (albeit small) river and the slightly elevated position of the western bank. However, the Ukrainian General Staff this morning, 4 July, confirmed that Russian forces had “forced” the Siverskyi Donets River, but did not specify where and in what force. Where specifically the Russians have succeeded in fording the river will likely determine whether the Russians will be in a position to unbalance this ‘Bakhmut line’ by threatening to flank from the north. There are a small number of possible fording points along the Siverskyi Donets, but if they have done so west of Siversk, this could seriously threaten the overall Bakhmut defence. One potential crossing point could be around Yampil, northwest of Siversk, or around Raihorodok, northeast of Slovyansk. The former would pose the most serious threat to Ukrainian forces as this would provide Russian forces with the opportunity to flank the Bakhmut line along the western bank of the Bakhmutka River, enabling a pincer movement against Siversk. The latter point around Raihorodok would support an offensive towards Slovyansk, around which Russian forces have struggled to build momentum over the last two months. It ultimately remains unconfirmed where the Russians have forded the river and in what strength, but developments here could determine how far Russian forces will push the Ukrainians and where the latter will establish a new defensive line. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Jul 22. Russia suffers ‘wild shell hunger’ as Ukraine hits arms depots with long-range Western rockets.

Vladimir Putin’s forces face ‘out of the blue’ ammunition shortages as warehouses destroyed ‘one by one’ using Himars and MLRS weapons

Russia is running short of ammunition for its armies fighting in Donbas after Ukraine hit several arms depots with new Western long-range artillery, a pro-Russia blogger has said.

The hits on at least five depots lying miles behind the frontline between Donetsk and Luhansk began on Friday and set off explosions at each site that lasted several hours.

Bloggers reported seeing fires burning for hours and Russian state media said that debris from the sites had been catapulted up to three miles away. Local authorities closed roads and evacuated civilians.

In his blog, Fighting Cat Murtz, a pro-Russia former rebel fighter, blamed Russian commanders who knew that Britain and the US were supplying Ukraine with long-range missiles but still stored ammunition within their range.

Russian air defences ‘ineffective’ against Himars

“Now we’ve lost these warehouses one by one,” he wrote. “Instead, out of the blue, a wild ‘shell hunger’ has just been created by the enemy who has mastered new foreign artillery systems and MLRS.” MLRS are British long-range artillery systems.

Fighting Cat Murtz is a supporter of the pro-Russia Donetsk People’s Republic, but is scathing of the Russian military leadership. In his latest blog, he called them “vile, petty and thieving”.

Igor Strelkov, a former commander of rebel forces in the Donetsk People’s Republic, who had strong links to Russia’s FSB, confirmed Fighting Cat Murz’s information. He said that 10 ammunition dumps had been hit over the past week by Ukrainian missiles, and that several oil depots and a dozen command posts had been destroyed.

“The Russian air defence system … turned out to be ineffective against massive strikes by Himar missiles,” he said on his Telegram channel, which has 400,000 followers. “There have been big losses in personnel and equipment.”

Ukraine’s strike against Russian command posts and ammunition supplies came after further US deliveries took the total number of Himars on the battlefield to nine.

Ukrainian forces had been begging for long-range artillery to even up the massive imbalance of weapons in the main Donbas war zone, where Russian forces have conquered town after town – mainly by bombing them into submission.

Kyiv has not attributed specific strikes to receiving US Himars, British M270 MLRS and French Caesar howitzers. However Serhiy Gaidai, the governor of Luhansk region, has said that the campaign had succeeded in slowing Russian offensive operations.

On Twitter, Ukrainian supporters were celebrating. “How can you sleep when it is so beautiful,” one Twitter user wrote against a video from Donetsk of several explosions.

‘Losses are very serious’

Russia’s Ministry of Defence has said that it has destroyed two Himars systems, although Ukraine denied this claim.

Unofficial Russian military propaganda channels urged them to intensify their hunt for the Western weapon systems or face “serious losses”.

“Himars are working. Very accurate work on command posts. Losses are very serious,” one used on the Telegram social messaging app. The post was shared by Military Informer, a generally reliable pro-Russian propaganda channel.

Starshe Eddie, a Telegram channel run by an author who often reports from Russian frontline forces, said on Friday that Western weapons should “neither be underestimated nor a reason for panic”. However, it urged Russian commanders to disperse and camouflage high-value targets, like command posts and ammunition depots.

“A number of systems supplied by Nato enable high-precision strikes far in the rear, especially with Nato satellite intelligence,” the author wrote in a post shared widely on pro-Russian war channels. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

11 Jul 22. Russia launches widespread shelling ahead of new assault, says Ukraine.

Summary

• Ukraine expects intensification of hostilities
• Rescuers dig by hand for rocket strike survivors
• Residents tell of miraculous escapes
• Ukraine says rocket strike is “terrorist attack”

Russia opened fire with artillery, multiple rocket launchers and tanks around Ukraine’s second-largest city Kharkiv and shelled cities in the east, where an earlier strike killed 15 people in an apartment building, Ukraine’s general staff said on Monday.

An apartment building in Kharkiv was hit by a missile overnight, but no casualties have been reported, authorities said.

A rocket strike on a five-storey apartment building in the eastern town of Chasiv Yar on Saturday night killed 15 people and left two dozen people feared trapped in the rubble.

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, said the strike was “another terrorist attack” and that Russia should be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Moscow denies it targets civilians, but Ukrainian cities, towns and villages have been left in ruins after Russian shelling, with basements and bomb shelters the only safe place for those who remain.

On Sunday, rescuers in Chasiv Yar used a crane to lift a concrete slab and their hands to dig through the debris, while dazed residents who survived the attack retrieved personal belongings and told stories of their escape.

One woman was seen walking out of the destroyed building carrying an ironing board under her arm, an umbrella and a plastic shopping bag. Others simply watched rescue efforts, fearing the worst as the dead were removed.

“We ran to the basement, there were three hits, the first somewhere in the kitchen,” said a resident who gave her name as Ludmila.

“The second, I do not even remember, there was lightning, we ran towards the second entrance and then straight into the basement. We sat there all night until this morning.” Another survivor, who gave her name as Venera, said she had wanted to save her two kittens.

“I was thrown into the bathroom, it was all chaos, I was in shock, all covered in blood,” she said, crying. “By the time I left the bathroom, the room was full up of rubble, three floors fell down. I never found the kittens under the rubble.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, calling the conflict a “special military operation” to demilitarise Ukraine and rid it of nationalists.

Ukraine and its Western allies say Putin’s war is an imperial land grab and has accused his forces of war crimes. Moscow denies attacking civilians.

The biggest conflict in Europe since World War Two has killed thousands, left cities and towns in ruins and seen more than 5.5 million Ukrainians flee their country.

Ukraine’s general staff said on Monday that Russian forces had launched a wave of bombardments in the east as they seek to take control of the Donbas industrial heartland.

It said the widespread shelling was preparations for an intensification of hostilities.

The Kremlin has declared victory in the Donbas’ Luhansk province and its troops are now concentrating on seizing control of neighbouring Donetsk.

Putin has promised to hand control of the Donbas to pro-Russian separatists who have declared independence from Kyiv.

Russia abandoned an early advance on the capital Kyiv in the face of fierce resistance bolstered by Western arms.

Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk warned civilians in the Russian-occupied Kherson region on Sunday to urgently evacuate as Ukraine’s armed forces were preparing a counter-attack there, not giving a timeframe for action.

“I know for sure that there should not be women and children there, and that they should not become human shields,” she said on national television. read more

Reuters was unable to independently verify the battlefield reports. (Source: Reuters)

 

08 Jul 22.  Precision Artillery Rounds Included in Latest Security Assistance Package to Ukraine.

The U.S. is planning to provide more assistance to Ukraine with another presidential drawdown authority security package valued at $400 million. Included in this latest set of gear and supplies is something the U.S. has previously not sent to Ukraine: 1,000 rounds of 155 mm artillery billed as having greater precision.

“This is a new type 155 mm artillery ammunition,” said a senior defense official during a background briefing today at the Pentagon. “It has greater precision. It offers Ukraine precise … capability for specific targets. It will save ammunition. It will be more effective due to the precision. It’s a further evolution in our support for Ukraine in this battle in the Donbas.”

The same official noted that the precision rounds, for use in howitzer artillery systems already in place in Ukraine, are something the U.S. military already uses and has in its own stock. The systems are new in that this is the first time the U.S. has sent them to Ukraine.

Also included in the latest package, are four additional High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems which will complement the eight already in place. There is also additional ammunition for those HIMARS systems, some tactical vehicles, demolition munitions, spare parts and other equipment.

The Russians illegally invaded Ukraine in February and the Ukrainians have been fighting since then to maintain their sovereignty. While it’s not clear how much longer the fighting will continue, the senior defense official said what is clear is a commitment by the U.S. to continue helping Ukraine maintain their independence.

“From a security assistance perspective, this is a steady drumbeat now, and it is a long-term commitment to Ukraine,” the official said. “We’ll be ready for whatever the experts tell us is required for the battlefield.”

The U.S., the official said, has been providing training to the Ukrainians since 2015. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. has provided, among other things, Stinger anti-aircraft systems, Javelin anti-armor systems, Switchblade unmanned aircraft system, howitzer artillery systems and rounds, helicopters, tactical vehicles, ammunition, radar systems, HIMARS, body armor, helmets and Harpoon launch systems for coastal defense. (Source: US DoD)

 

08 Jul 22.  $400m in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine.

Attributed to Acting Pentagon Press Secretary Todd Breasseale:

Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announces the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $400 million to meet critical needs for Ukraine’s fight. This authorization is the Biden Administration’s fifteenth drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.

Capabilities in this package include:

• Four High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and additional ammunition for HIMARS;
• Three Tactical Vehicles to recover equipment;
• 155mm artillery ammunition;
• Demolition munitions;
• Counter-battery systems;
• Spare parts and other equipment.

The United States has now committed $2.2 billion of security assistance to Ukraine in the last three weeks as we support their fight to defend their democracy. In total, the United States has committed approximately $8 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration. Since 2014, the United States has committed more than $9.2 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.

The United States continues to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with capabilities to meet its evolving battlefield requirements. (Source: US DoD)

 

08 Jul 22.  Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine. The United States has now committed $2.2 billion of security assistance to Ukraine in the last three weeks as we support their fight to defend their democracy. In total, the United States has committed approximately $8 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration.

On July 8, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $400 million. This is the fifteenth drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.

United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:

• Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
• Over 6,500 Javelin anti-armor systems;
• Over 20,000 other anti-armor systems;
• Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• 126 155mm Howitzers and up to 411,000 155mm artillery rounds;
• 36,000 105mm artillery rounds;
• 126 Tactical Vehicles to tow 155mm Howitzers;
• 22 Tactical Vehicles to recover equipment;
• 12 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition;
• Two National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
• 20 Mi-17 helicopters;
• Counter-battery systems;
• Hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles;
• 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
• Over 10,000 grenade launchers and small arms;
• Over 59,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition;
• 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets;
• 121 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Laser-guided rocket systems;
• Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;
• 26 counter-artillery radars;
• Four counter-mortar radars;
• Four air surveillance radars;
• Two harpoon coastal defense systems;
• 18 coastal and riverine patrol boats;
• M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions;
• C-4 explosives, demolition munitions, and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing;
• Tactical secure communications systems;
• Thousands of night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders;
• Commercial satellite imagery services;
• Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear;
• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;
• Medical supplies to include first aid kits;
• Electronic jamming equipment;
• Field equipment and spare parts;
• Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.

The United States also continues to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself.

 

08 Jul 22.  Ukraine Holding Its Own Against Major World Military Power, U.S. Official Says.

The Russians are making “slow and uneven advances” through northern Donetsk, a senior military official said speaking on background today.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused hard and brutal fighting, but the Ukrainians are making the Russians pay for every foot of territory they are taking.

What we have found is that Ukrainians are possessing a will and spirit that a good portion of folks just did not take into account.”

There are news reports that the Russians have paused their offensive, but the official did not confirm that. “I’ve got to think that if … I took the number of casualties that the Russians took to gain that portion of ground, I’d probably have to stop and refit,” he said.

The Ukrainians have given up ground to a much larger foe, but they have moved into better defensive positions. In this type of warfare, the advantage is with the defense, he said.

This is not a “rosy” description of the Russian-Ukraine war. There have been many pundits lately who see the Russians advancing slowly in Donetsk and they have accused officials of being too optimistic about Ukraine’s chances.

“If you’re going to describe assessments as ‘rosy,’ … I can recall, at the beginning of this thing as the Russians put 100-plus around Ukraine, the thinking was that the Russians were going to move pretty quickly,” he said. “That wasn’t ‘rosy,’ and it was wrong.

“What we have found is that Ukrainians are possessing a will and spirit that a good portion of folks just did not take into account,” the official continued.

The fighting has been intense and the Russians have gained about five miles, he said, and every foot has been contested in blood. “If you’re Ukrainian, and … you’re giving up any bit of ground, that has an impact to you,” he said. “And if you’re losing a man or a woman next to you, that has an impact you, there’s not a rosy way to address that.”

But overall, the Ukrainians are going toe-to-toe with one of the larger military powers of the world. “This small country, that didn’t have an enormous army beforehand, but this one small country has been able to hold this at bay in many cases and give up very little ground,” he said.

“I don’t want to appear overly optimistic here, but history is full of examples of small countries like this, who display their will and are able to hold their own,” he said. “We celebrated one of them last Monday . And I’d like to think the Ukrainians were demonstrating the same to the rest of the world, right now.” (Source: US DoD)

 

07 Jul 22.  Germany refuses to ‘plunder its own military’ for the sake of Ukraine.

Pressure on Olaf Scholz to provide armoured vehicles, as German MPs prepare to set an example by limiting their own use of hot water

Germany has said it doesn’t want to “plunder its own military” as it refuses to send armoured vehicles to Ukraine.

Berlin has rejected a request to deliver around 200 Fuchs armoured personnel carriers to Kyiv, citing a need to preserve the country’s own security interests.

“We support Ukraine with everything that is possible and responsible. But we have to ensure Germany’s ability to defend itself,” Christine Lambrecht, the German defence minister, told the German Press Agency on Thursday.

“It is therefore irresponsible to plunder the Bundeswehr (German military), especially in these times, and even to ignore the military advice of the General Inspector.”

Ms Lambrecht said her decision was made pursuant to military advice.

General Inspector Eberhard Zorn – Germany’s highest-ranking soldier – has previously said the military did not have enough leeway to let Ukraine have the vehicles, although it is unclear exactly how many the German military have in stock.

It comes as German MPs are set to limit their consumption of hot water in anticipation of an energy shortage over the winter months.

Members of the German parliament are expected to set an example to the public as electricity prices soar to record highs and households are encouraged to save as much heat and power as possible.

The move will see all 1,800 instant boilers that provide warm water for bathroom sinks in Berlin’s parliament buildings switched off, according to a report in Der Tagesspiegel. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

07 Jul 22.  Russia-Ukraine war: Russia fails to take territory for first time since war began.

Russia has not made any territorial gains in Ukraine for the first time in 133 days, according to its own assessments, hinting at an “operational pause” for its battle-stricken forces to recuperate.

Before this, Moscow’s defence ministry had claimed territorial gains in its daily update every day since its invasion of Ukraine on February 24.

The Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, said this indicated an “operational pause” in order to prepare for a large-scale offensive after capturing much of the eastern Luhansk region.

“Russian forces will likely confine themselves to relatively small-scale offensive actions as they attempt to set conditions for more significant offensive operations and rebuild the combat power needed to attempt those more ambitious undertakings,” ISW added.

Analysts have suggested this is part of Russia’s attempts to steel itself for a protracted war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is also passing a law to give it more control over business and workers to put the Russian economy on a stronger war footing. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

06 Jul 22. European Command Group Strives to Get Ukrainians What They Need. No one doubts Ukraine’s courage in combatting the Russian invasion of their country, but courage alone can only go so far.   Ukrainian service members need effective military capabilities at the right moments to defend their people.  That is the mission of the International Donor Coordination Cell at U.S. European Command.  The cell coordinates the efforts of donor nations from around the world to get Ukraine the military capabilities it needs.

U.S. European Command hosts the cell, and it was cobbled together quickly, as the mismatched furniture and computer cables taped to the floor attest. In the early days of the Russian invasion, separate British and American teams were essentially doing the same mission. Officials combined the teams, and while British and American service members predominate, there are representatives from many countries in the secure facility. These include Ukrainian officers.

The cell mission is evolving. When Russia first threatened Ukraine, it was a “push” system — meaning donor nations were pushing anti-armor and anti-air systems like the Javelin and Stinger missiles and small arms ammunition into the country as quickly as possible. That has evolved into a “pull” system, where Ukraine is able to ask for military capabilities it needs to fight the Russian threat. The fight in Donbas today is fundamentally different than the fight that occurred around Kyiv in March and April. U.S. officials have said repeatedly that Ukraine’s successful effort to drive the Russians away from Kyiv requires the anti-armor and anti-air systems. The fighting in the Donbas is an artillery struggle, and that requires far different systems.

Putting together the capabilities is another challenge the cell is surmounting. Donor countries may offer models of the same system, but the versions may be different. They may get a barrel from one donor country, match it with a chassis from another, and the ammunition from a third. A fourth or fifth donor country may provide the transportation for the system. The idea is to get a working system into the hands of the Ukrainian military as quickly as possible.

There are other hurdles that must be surmounted that don’t immediately come to mind. The system dials, manuals and maintenance specifications must be translated from various languages to Ukrainian.

There are many nodes in the transportation system and many modes of transport. There are obviously many different routes used. That’s as specific as any member of the cell will get.

There is a limit to the Soviet-era weapons and ammunition that Ukrainian soldiers are using, and the military is transitioning to newer, NATO-compatible weapons systems. This involves training, and the cell is coordinating the training efforts in the West for Ukrainian soldiers. A cell official said the Ukrainian service members “are keen” on the training and want to finish it as soon as possible. “They don’t even want to take tea breaks,” the cell official said. “They want to finish the training and get back into the fight.” (Source: US DoD)

 

05 Jul 22. Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine. The United States has committed approximately $7.6bn in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration, including approximately $6.9bn since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked invasion on February 24.

On July 1, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced $820m in additional security assistance for Ukraine. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $50m, as well as $770m in Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds.

The PDA authorization is the fourteenth drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.

United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:

• Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
• Over 6,500 Javelin anti-armor systems;
• Over 20,000 other anti-armor systems;
• Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• 126 155mm Howitzers and up to 410,000 155mm artillery rounds;
• 36,000 105mm artillery rounds;
• 126 Tactical Vehicles to tow 155mm Howitzers;
• 19 Tactical Vehicles to recover equipment;
• Eight High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition;
• Two National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
• 20 Mi-17 helicopters;
• Hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles;
• 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
• Over 10,000 grenade launchers and small arms;
• Over 59,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition;
• 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets;
• 121 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Laser-guided rocket systems;
• Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;
• 26 counter-artillery radars;
• Four counter-mortar radars;
• Four air surveillance radars;
• Two harpoon coastal defense systems;
• 18 coastal and riverine patrol boats;
• M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions;
• C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing;
• Tactical secure communications systems;
• Thousands of night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders;
• Commercial satellite imagery services;
• Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear;
• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;
• Medical supplies to include first aid kits;
• Electronic jamming equipment;
• Field equipment and spare parts;
• Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.

The United States also continues to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself. (Source: US DoD)

 

04 Jul 22. Ukraine used rare howitzer as part of mission to retake Snake Island. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence had ordered the weapon to be destroyed to avoid the Russian Army seizing it following Russia’s invasion. Ukrainian forces reportedly used a rare truck-mounted self-propelled howitzer against Russian forces on Snake Island. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, the 2S22 weapon – only one is known to exist – was used to help liberate the Black Sea island from Russian forces. The ministry also quoted General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as paying “huge gratitude to the designers and manufacturers” of the weapon.

General Zaluzhnyi added that the “Ukrainian Bohdana self-propelled howitzer… played an important role in the liberation of the island” before showing his “appreciation to foreign partners for the provided munitions”.

Due to the weapon’s range, it is believed there is only a small area of Ukraine the self-propelled howitzer could have been fired from – an area close to the coast near Snake Island, according to geo-location Twitter account @GeoConfirmed.

That area, however, is swampland near the Romanian border, so Ukrainian forces may have needed to bring the weapon in by boat or possibly landing craft. The firing of the weapon highlights the lengths Ukrainian forces have gone to retake Snake Island from Russian control.

After the island fell into Moscow’s hands, Ukraine’s armed forces have bombed it with aircraft, fired missiles at it from drones, destroyed ships and a helicopter bringing supplies to the island and, now, managed to hit it with heavy artillery.

Earlier this week, it was confirmed that Russian forces had withdrawn from Snake Island.

Moscow claimed it pulled back its forces as a “goodwill gesture” that demonstrated that “the Russian Federation wasn’t hampering the United Nations’ efforts to establish a humanitarian corridor for taking agricultural products from the territory of Ukraine”.

The 2S22 Bohdana, also known as Bogdan or Bogdana, was developed by Kharkiv Tractor Plant (KhTZ) – a tractor manufacturing company in Ukraine. The weapon only successfully completed preliminary firing tests in January this year, with the Ukrainian armed forces testing the weapon in Odessa Oblast. (Source: Forces.net)

 

04 Jul 22. Vladimir Putin has ordered his top generals to carry on their advance towards western parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk province after the Russian army captured the country’s far eastern Luhansk region at the weekend. The Russian president was speaking at the Kremlin on Monday as Ukrainian forces retreated from Lysychansk, the last city in the Luhansk region that was under Kyiv’s control. A week earlier, Ukrainian forces had pulled out of Severodonetsk, a nearby city across the Siversky Donets river following months of fierce battles. The seizure marks the first time Russia has conquered an entire Ukrainian province since starting a full-scale invasion of its neighbour in February. Moscow, along with its proxy separatist forces, has controlled large parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions that form Donbas since it fomented a breakaway conflict soon after it annexed Crimea in 2014. The battles will now shift to large cities Ukraine still controls in the Donetsk region to the west of Lysychansk — namely Bakhmut, Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. “The units that took part in active hostilities and achieved success, victories in the Luhansk direction, of course, should rest, increase their combat capabilities,” Putin was quoted in a Kremlin statement. “And other military formations . . . must carry out their tasks according to a previously approved plan, according to a single plan.” Putin has justified the invasion of Ukraine as an operation to “liberate” the two internationally unrecognised “republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk, which Kyiv and its western backers say are puppets of Moscow. After failing to capture Ukraine’s capital city Kyiv, Russia’s army has focused on gaining more ground in Donbas through heavy artillery bombardments. Ukraine has meanwhile retaken some territory in southern coastal regions north of Crimea, notably around Kherson. It is a provincial capital of the southern Kherson region which — along with Zaporizhia to the east — Russian forces have not yet fully conquered. Recommended War in Ukraine: free to read Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in maps — latest updates Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s administration on Monday defended the retreat from Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, saying that the preservation of troops that faced encirclement was vital to future operations. “The defence of the Lysychansk-Severodonetsk agglomeration has been a successful military operation,” Oleksiy Arestovych, an adviser in Zelenskyy’s office, said in a Telegram post. He described the battles in Lysychansk and Severodonetsk as successful in bogging down Russia’s invading army and inflicting high costs until more western weaponry needed for a Ukrainian counter-offensive is supplied. Ukrainian officials say more than 34,000 Russian troops have perished in the war and that thousands of military vehicles and equipment including planes and helicopters have been destroyed. Zelenskyy has said the attritional battles over Donbas are claiming the lives of 100 to 200 Ukrainian troops each day in recent weeks. Ukrainian and Russian military claims could not be independently verified. Ukrainian forces had succeeded in achieving set-out objectives by holding out in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk longer than expected, Arestovych insisted. “The main tasks were: to pin down the main enemy forces; inflict losses on them; buy time for the supply of western weapons and improve the second line of defence; to create conditions for our offensive operations in other sectors of the front,” he said. Outgunned and outnumbered by Russia’s army, Ukrainian forces needed to be “cunning and manoeuvrable” to win a protracted war, he added. (Source: FT.com)

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Ukraine Conflict – July 11th.

Military and security developments
08 Jul 22.
• The Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed on 7 July that Russian forces in the Donbas are now pausing to allow troops to rest and regain their combat effectiveness. This aligns with our previous assessment and largely explains the relative lack of any significant military developments over the past week following the capture of Lysychansk.
• It should be noted, however, that armed hostilities have not stopped, and that the operational pause is not a ceasefire. Russian forces have continued low-level offensive operations along most axes, with some modest gains. Russian forces along the Luhansk-Donetsk border have now reached the eastern outskirts of the village of Spirne, 12km southeast of Siversk – a key target for Russian forces in the area. Fighting also continues around Verkhnokamyanka, along the main road connecting Lysychansk with Siversk.
• The Ukrainian General Staff this morning, 8 July, confirmed Russian forces are also advancing south of Bakhmut in the direction of Veselaya Dolyna, a village just 5km southeast of Bakhmut. Therefore, despite the operational pause, Russian forces are still pushing back the Ukrainians at certain points in order to set conditions for future assaults against Bakhmut and Slovyansk to the north. These operations include instances such as Russia’s missile strike on Kramatorsk yesterday, a city just south of Slovyansk, illustrating the mounting pressure that will be placed upon the area in the coming weeks.
• On 7 July, Ukrainian General Staff stated that over 70% of Russian projectiles, both guided and unguided, miss their target due to a combination of inaccuracy and Ukrainian air defence systems. This reinforces our own assessment that the risk of civilian collateral damage during Russian strikes has increased as stocks of precision weapons dwindle. Kyiv has emphasised the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defences, but the inaccuracy of older missile systems and “dumb bombs” likely account for the large majority of such misses – as illustrated by the recent Kremenchuk shopping centre strike. According to the General Staff, Russian forces have carried out 6,443 “operational-tactical sorties” since the beginning of the invasion, as well as 626 long-range strikes involving Iskandr and Kalibr ballistic and cruise missiles.
• The Belarusian government has once again extended military drills currently taking place along the southern border with Ukraine until at least 16 July. The drills are designed to ensure Ukrainian forces continue to screen the northern border and keep pressure up. However, as previously assessed they are highly unlikely to indicate any planned ground invasion or direct intervention in Ukraine in the coming months. See Sibylline Situation Update Brief for more analysis.
Political developments
• Today, 8 July, US and Western allies gathered at G20 talks in Indonesia. The high-profile meeting, which includes the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as well as his Western counterparts, comes shortly after the host, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, visited both Moscow and Kyiv last week. He reportedly delivered a message from President Zelensky to President Putin, though he did not specify what the note included. Prospects for any diplomatic breakthrough at the summit on key issues, including grain shipments, remain very low, with Lavrov stating that he would not “go running” after Washington for discussions, blaming the US for severing ties with Russia. Lavrov furthermore stated that there was “nothing” to discuss with the West, indicating the extent to which basic diplomatic communication remains difficult to non-existent, particularly in the case of US- and UK-Russian relation.
FORECAST
On 7 July Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the war might drag on until “the last Ukrainian is left standing”, warning that Russia has not yet “seriously started in Ukraine”. The statement is the latest indicator that Moscow has not abandoned its maximalist war goals in Ukraine, and that readiness to fight a much more protracted war if necessary is highly likely to remain Kremlin policy. Shortly after the statement, Kremlin spokesman Dimitry Peskov claimed that only a small portion of Russia’s potential has been used in Ukraine thus far. While this ignores the fact that the Russian Armed Forces have undeniably expended significant portions of their pre-war combat power, Peskov’s statement also likely alludes to the fact that Moscow has not issued general mobilisation. He is therefore likely reminding domestic and international audiences that Moscow still has options available to escalate its commitment to the war in the coming months.
Putin’s statement is highly significant as Nikolai Patrushev, the hawkish Secretary of the Russian Security Council, reiterated at a conference on 5 July that the original war goals of a complete “denazification and demilitarisation” of Ukraine will be achieved, and that Ukraine will be forced to adopt neutral status thereafter. This reinforces our assessment that if and when the remainder of Donetsk oblast is conquered, a termination of military operations thereafter remains unlikely, and that the Kremlin would more likely continue the war in order to achieve wider political objectives, including the conquest of the so-called Novorossiya region.
This assessment is furthermore supported by the current stance of the Kyiv government, which makes a ceasefire and peace agreement highly unlikely in the next three months. Following Putin’s statement yesterday, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that “Ukrainians are not ready to give away their land,” and urged the West to continue providing military support to Ukraine. This stance is unlikely to change in the coming months, and as such a termination of Russian military operations if and when Donetsk oblast falls is unlikely to serve the Kremlin’s interests. However, Russia’s ability to continue fighting will ultimately be determined by the military situation. As previously assessed, it remains to be seen whether Russian forces are able to translate the recent tactical victories in Luhansk oblast into wider operational and strategic ones that would facilitate a continuation and expansion of the war in the coming months.
05 Jul 22.
• Yesterday, 4 July, the Russian Ministry of Defence declared that Russian and separatist forces had taken full control of Luhansk oblast following the fall of Lysychansk over the weekend. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu furthermore claimed Russian forces had taken the villages of Bilhorivka and Zolotarivka on the administrative border with Donetsk oblast, which Ukrainian officials appeared to corroborate following reports that the Russians were fortifying their positions around Bilhorivka. However, Luhansk oblast regional head Serhiy Haidai this morning claimed that Ukrainian forces have in fact repelled Russian assaults against Bilhorivka, claiming that Russian forces have now left the frontline settlement. This remains unconfirmed at present, but if true would undermine President Vladimir Putin’s claim to have consolidated control over the entire Luhansk oblast.
• Nevertheless, the Ukrainian General Staff did confirm in its morning briefing today that Russian forces have continued pushing west past the Luhansk border, reporting “partially successful” Russian assaults against the village of Spirne, just west of the T-1302 highway. It should be noted for clarity that Ukrainian General Staff reports yesterday of a Russian river crossing across the Siverskyi Donets appear to have referred to crossings between Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, which are now far behind the frontline. As such, these crossings are unlikely to have a significant impact on current offensive or defensive operations given that the front has moved some 15km to the west.
• Further south along the Bakhmut line, Russian forces have continued assaults and reconnaissance-in-force probing attacks along the frontline east of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian General Staff yesterday, 4 July, confirmed that the Russians took the town of Klynove, which sits just east of the M-03 highway and just 10km southeast of Bakhmut itself, indicating that Russian forces are continuing to make incremental progress towards the town. However, it remains to be seen whether an operational pause following the fall of Lysychansk will impact operations on this axis, with further progress likely to remain slow in the coming weeks.
• Russian forces have also continued offensive operations northwest of Slovyansk. The Ukrainian General Staff have reported partially successful Russian assaults around the village of Mazanivka, about 20km northwest of Slovyansk, though Ukrainian forces have simultaneously repulsed attacks further east around the more strategically important village of Doyna. Dolyna lies directly on the M-03 highway, the main road connecting Izyum to Slovyansk.
• On the southern axis, Russian forces have continued operations to shore-up their tactical positions along the Kherson-Mykolaiv border region, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting numerous Russian attacks on settlements including Ivanivka, Potemkyne and Myrne, some 45km south of Kryvhi Rih. Intense artillery bombardments have continued along this axis, likely in an attempt to stall Ukrainian counterattacks and assist ground forces in reclaiming lost positions Ukraine had taken during last month’s limited counteroffensive in the area. However, much of the border zone remains heavily contested, and progress on either side remains incremental.
• Nevertheless, Ukrainian resistance behind the frontline remains ongoing in both Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblast. The Ukrainian Resistance Centre reported that earlier this week Ukrainian partisans had blown up a railway bridge between Melitopol and Tokmak, in Zaporizhzhia oblast. This is just the latest reported partisan activity, with the Centre also claiming that a Russian armoured train transporting ammunition to the front “accidentally” derailed between Yakymivka and Melitopol on 2 July, implying partisan involvement. The Russian military is far more reliant upon railways than other European countries, party explained by its geographic size. But such reliance has its disadvantages, as operating beyond railheads will place considerable strain on Russian logistics, as repeated Russian failures have testified throughout this war. This is despite the fact that the Russians have dedicated material-technical support brigades designed to support their combined arms armies in the field. As such, reliance upon railways means that partisan activity targeting railheads and rail infrastructure will continue to be an effective way of undermining Russian operations across the southern axis.
• On 4 July, the head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence’s Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian intelligence sees no serious threat of Belarusian troops crossing the border into Ukraine in the near future. Similarly, the State Border Guard Service stated on 4 July that they have identified no significant change on the border situation with Belarus (and Transnistria), stating that there are no signs of preparations for an offensive grouping in the region. This aligns with our own assessment provided last week as to the very low likelihood of Belarus being brought directly into the war (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 30 June).
Political developments
• President Zelensky said that talks with Turkey and the United Nations regarding grain exports are ongoing. The announcement follows yesterday’s reports that Turkey has detained a Russian vessel off its Black Sea coast following Kyiv’s claims that it was carrying stolen grain. Meanwhile, investigative reports also claim that contrary to Turkish claims that it does not buy Ukrainian grain from the occupied territories, satellite imagery appears to suggest otherwise. As such, the issue will remain highly contentious as Ankara has not yet announced the next steps regarding the halted Russian vessel. Meanwhile, Zelensky also stressed the need for a third nation to provide guarantees for the security of the ships, a request that remains difficult to meet given that the West is reluctant to come into a direct military confrontation with Russia and trigger and even larger escalation. However, further discussions are reportedly expected to be held in the short term in Turkey, which is likely to continue playing a key mediating role on the issue.
• Yesterday, Ukraine unveiled its funding needs, indicating that the country requires between USD 60 – 65 bn this year – a figure far greater than its partners have so far been able to promise – with the ultimate price tag for rebuilding estimated at USD 750 bn. The reconstruction plan would extend over the next decade, with the most immediate phase being rebuilding of critical infrastructure. However, with the Russian offensive now set to focus on capturing Donetsk after taking Luhansk, the war is bound to extend for several more months at the very least, ultimately driving up the costs of reconstruction the longer the war goes on. More importantly, with a realistic possibility that Russia will cut gas supplies to Europe even further, the threat of rising inflation will remain elevated through the remainder of 2022. Subsequently, depressed socio-economic conditions on the continent will undermine the ability of most countries to continue financially contributing to Ukraine’s reconstruction.
• Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, reiterated at a conference today, 5 July, that the original war goals of a complete “denazification and demilitarisation” of Ukraine will be achieved, despite the provision of Western weapons. Patrushev remains one of the most influential members of the hawk faction in the Kremlin who likely remains in favour of expanding the war effort to achieve the Kremlin’s original extensive goals.
• For more strategic analysis and escalation outcomes to the current conflict in Ukraine, see our Scenario Planning and Projections report.
FORECAST
Following the capture of Lysychansk over the weekend, President Vladimir Putin held a televised meeting with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu on 4 July, where he congratulated Russian and separatist forces for “liberating” the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR). Putin also notably stated that the “Central” and “Southern” grouping of troops that took part in the operation, under the command of Alexander Lapin and Sergey Surovikin respectively, should rest in order to restore their combat effectiveness. This is a clear indication that the Kremlin has agreed to an operational pause for Russian and LNR troops in the area, which is highly likely to be necessary given the intensity of fighting in recent weeks. The move is also likely designed to serve domestic goals that present Putin as concerned for the welfare of the troops amid widespread reports of poor conditions at the front.
However, influential pro-war hawk and former DNR commander Igor Strelkov (real name Girkin) heavily criticised the costs of the Russian victory in Luhansk oblast yesterday on Telegram. Reiterating his previous criticisms of the Kremlin’s strategy, Strelkov argued that despite the tactical victory in Lysychansk, Russian forces have failed to achieve the goals of the “second stage of the special military operation”, namely the destruction of significant portions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and conquest of the entire Donbas. He furthermore argued that the tactical victory in Lysychansk has been achieved at such high cost that Russian and separatist forces are now exhausted, and that Ukrainian forces have been able to achieve personnel and equipment superiority along other fronts, which are now vulnerable to Ukrainian counteroffensives. While Strelkov and other hardliners have been consistently calling for general mobilisation in order to offset Ukraine’s growing capability and manpower advantages, his analysis of the military realities on the ground align more closely with our own and wider Western assessments of the relatively poor performance of Russian forces.
As previously predicted earlier during the Battle for the Donbas (see Ukraine Daily Update – 30-05-22), the conquest of Luhansk oblast has been achieved at such cost in terms of manpower, equipment and morale – and thus overall combat effectiveness – that it now remains unclear whether Russian forces will able to translate this tactical victory into a wider operational and strategic one. Strelkov has argued that it was a serious mistake to accept battle on the Ukrainians’ terms; it also remains our assessment that Kyiv’s “defend every square inch” strategy has effectively slowed the Russian advance and enabled Ukrainian forces to inflict significant casualties on Russian forces. This has ultimately necessitated the operational pause seemingly ordered by Putin, and it remains to be seen when and where the Russians will be able to regain the initiative given the attritional nature of the war.
• Over the weekend Russian forces secured Lysychansk, the last city in Luhansk oblast that had remained under Ukrainian control. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on 2 July that their forces had successfully withdrawn from the city to limit losses, as we had previously anticipated. However, Russian forces have likely been conducting clearing operations through 3-4 July to clear remnant Ukrainian forces that remain behind the frontline. Russian sources have this morning, 4 July, reported that an unspecified number of Ukrainian troops remain trapped south of Lysychansk. They have also reported that a ceasefire has been declared as of this morning around the pocket, indicating that negotiations for surrender may be taking place or have already been agreed upon. However, this remains unconfirmed. Nevertheless, the Russian Ministry of Defence did confirm on 3 July that their forces were still fighting in Lysychansk, though it remains likely that they will quickly clear the city in the coming hours and days.
• Following the Ukrainian fighting withdrawal from Lysychansk, Russian forces on 2-3 July pushed further west and have now reportedly taken control of the Luhansk oblast administrative borders, seemingly completing the Russian conquest of the oblast. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russian forces on 2 July captured Maloryazantseve and Novodruzhesk, both on the outskirts of Lysychansk, as well as the villages of Bilhorivka and Zolotarivka further west, which sit along the Luhansk-Donetsk border. Geolocated footage published on 3 July showed Russian forces walking inside these villages, indicating that Russian forces may have entered the villages uncontested following a wider Ukrainian withdrawal to the west. Both of these villages sit on two roads leading west towards Siversk, which is likely to remain the next target for Russian forces. For further analysis and our assessment of the unfolding military situation on this axis, see the Forecast below.
• Elsewhere along the frontline, the Russians are continuing to launch offensive operations against targets at either end of the M-03 highway, that connects Slovyansk in the northwest to Bakhmut in the southeast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed this morning that Russian forces have launched renewed assaults southeast of Izyum along the M-03 highway. Russian forces are currently attempting to assert control over the heavily fought-over village of Bohorodychne, which sits northwest of Slovyansk. East of Bakhmut, Russian forces have furthermore continued to apply pressure on the Ukrainian defence, pushing them further west in places, though progress remains slow and incremental.
• Elsewhere, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused Ukrainian forces on 3 July of striking the Russian city of Belgorod with three Tochka-U ballistic missiles and targeting the city of Kursk with an explosives-laden drone. The Ukrainians have not yet commented on the attacks; however, Moscow alleges it killed three people and struck residential buildings in the cities. In related developments, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka claimed on 3 July that Belarusian air defences intercepted Ukrainian missiles that had attempted to strike military facilities inside Belarus, without providing any evidence. The former accusations inside Kursk and Belgorod oblasts remain more credible given previous Ukrainian Tochka-U attacks in the regions, but it remains unlikely that Ukraine would seek to open hostilities with Belarus directly at this time. For further analysis and trigger points for a potential ground invasion from Belarus, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 30 June.
05 Jul 22 Cyber Update
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Pro-Russian cyber threat actors have continued to engage in malicious activities during this monitoring period. The cyber attacks launched against the Norwegian government and Ukraine’s largest private energy firm DTEK present the most significant incidents during this monitoring period. With Western countries not indicating that they plan on stopping their retaliatory activities against the Russian government over its invasion of Ukraine, there is a heightened risk that further cyber attacks will be launched against these countries in the coming weeks. Despite this, this activity will likely remain rudimentary and low-level cyber attacks – such as DDoS – and cause limited operational disruptions to the targeted organisations, such as government agencies or those in the energy, transportation, or telecommunications sectors.
• Elsewhere, Pro-Ukraine hackers’ data leak and disruptive cyber operations have maintained pace during this monitoring period. While Anonymous’ declaration of “cyber war” against the pro-Russian group Killnet will likely further heighten the two sides’ tit-for-tat cyber conflict, the groups’ limited technical capabilities will lower the level of disruption caused to Western organisations’ operations by their retaliatory cyber activities. Nevertheless, the persistent targeting of Western countries’ critical infrastructure will heighten the risk of sporadic and short-term disruptions occurring in the coming weeks.
Russia-linked operations maintain pace; Pro-Moscow groups will continue launching disruptive cyber attacks against countries that engage in retaliatory activity against the Russian government
• On 1 July, industry reports claimed that the allegedly pro-Russian hacktivist group XakNet hacked Ukraine’s largest private energy firm DTEK. It currently remains unclear what type or how information has been compromised by this campaign. This incident follows Russian military forces’ shelling of the DTEK-owned thermal power plant in Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine. Moreover, this cyber attack also coincides with DTEK’s owner Rinat Akhmetov’s 27 June filing of a lawsuit against the Russian government for the financial damages he incurred as a result of Moscow’s shelling of DTEK’s properties. This incident further exemplifies the trend identified in Microsoft’s April 2022 report, which found that pro-Moscow hacking groups engaging in a wide range of cyber attacks to closely match and support Moscow’s conventional military activity in Ukraine (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 28 April 2022).
• On 30 June, Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection (SSSCIP) claimed that Ukrainian government and private sector organisations had been subjected to 796 cyber attacks since Russia’s invasion on 24 February. Of these attacks, the most impacted entities were those in government, defence, telecoms, and energy sectors. While these cyber intrusions have served several different purposes, most of the attacks (242 incidents) were aimed at exfiltrating sensitive information. These findings further confirm Microsoft’s report in April that Russian state-linked threat actors have launched more than 237 cyber operations against Ukraine aimed at a wide range of activities, including destructive and intelligence-gathering operations (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 28 April 2022).
• On 29 June, the National Security Authority (NSM) accused pro-Russian criminal groups of targeting public and private sector organisations in a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack over the past 24 hours. While the NSM Director, Sofie Nystrøm, told local media that “no sensitive information was taken” during the attack, the Labour Inspection Authority reportedly was among the affected institutions. The attack follows closely an ongoing DDoS campaign against Lithuania by the pro-Russian hacktivist gang Killnet (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 28 June 2022). Oslo, along with other Nordic governments, offered full support for Sweden and Finland’s applications to join NATO. Tensions between Oslo and Moscow have also risen amid a dispute over the blockade of Russian coal shipments transiting via Norway. The strong similarities between the campaigns against Lithuania and Norway suggest that it is highly possible that the same group was behind both attacks.
Pro-Kyiv hackers continue data leak operations; Tit-for-tat conflict with pro-Moscow groups will heighten the threat posed to critical sector organisations
• On 3-4 July, a Twitter account allegedly representing the Anonymous hacktivist collective claimed that the group hacked the Russian Space Research Institute and plans to leak its sensitive information online “soon”. The current lack of information over what type of information was allegedly accessed during this campaign makes it difficult to assess the veracity of Anonymous’ claim and its potential impact on the Russian Space Research Institutes’ operations. Anonymous claimed that this cyber attack was in response to the pro-Russian hacktivist group Killnet’s targeting of the Norwegian and Lithuanian governments with Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks in late June and early July. This is the latest retaliatory cyber operation against Killnet by Anonymous since the group alleged on 30 June to have hacked the Russian architectural and engineering service firm ASP-Proekt for similar reasons.
• On 29 June, a separate Twitter account purporting to be linked to Anonymous claimed that the collective – in concert with the IT Army of Ukraine – hacked the Russian Federation’s LTE router and took down 88 sites. This user did not provide any further details on this campaign, including which sites were impacted and/or which tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) they allegedly used to engage in this malicious activity. If officially confirmed, this incident would be indicative of the Russian government’s 20 June disclosure that “Russian information infrastructure” is increasingly being targeted by several cyber threat actors, such as the US, Ukraine, and EU member states (see Sibylline Weekly Ukraine Cyber Update – 28 June 2022).
FORECAST
Publicly-disclosed pro-Russian cyber attacks maintained pace during this monitoring period, with the DDoS attacks against the Norwegian government indicative of pro-Moscow hacking groups’ continued targeting of countries that engage in retaliatory activities against the Russian government. Despite these groups’ persistent targeting of the EU and NATO member states – such as Italy, Lithuania, Norway, and Romania – their cyber activities have consistently been low-level cyber attacks, such as DDoS. Indeed, the DDoS activity that targeted Norwegian government agencies’ websites caused short-term and limited disruptions and has largely been resolved as of the time of writing. This trend is indicative of cyber security firm Cloudfare’s findings that nearly 98 percent of network-layer DDoS attacks in Q4 2021 lasted under an hour. While further such disruptive cyber attacks are highly likely to be launched in the coming weeks, Moscow’s apparent lack of time, funding, and resources will likely limit both the success and sophistication of these cyber attacks. Organisations are advised to consult the “Quick Guide” checklists provided by Western governments’ cyber security agencies – such as the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) – to minimise their exposure to Russia-linked threats.
Meanwhile, pro-Ukraine hacking groups have continued to engage in data leaking and disruptive cyber operations to express their political grievances over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The most notable development during this previous monitoring period has been Anonymous’ declaration of cyber war against the pro-Russian hacktivist group Killnet over its targeting of the Norwegian and Lithuanian governments’ infrastructure with DDoS activity. Given that neither group has physical assets that can be targeted, this tit-for-tat cyber conflict will likely result in retaliatory cyber attacks being launched against countries and organisations being supported by these groups, such as Western countries’ critical infrastructure. Despite this threat, neither side has shown the technical capability to launch cyber attacks that are more sophisticated than DDoS or data leak operations. As such, the overall disruption and impact of these attacks are expected to be limited. Nevertheless, these two groups’ persistent targeting of critical infrastructure operators – in sectors such as energy, telecommunications, or transportation – could cause short-term and sporadic business disruptions to organisations dependent on these services.
Political developments
• A two-day Ukraine Recovery Conference kicked off in Lugano, Switzerland today, 4 July. During the event, a comprehensive plan for rebuilding Ukraine is expected to be announced, with over 40 countries and more than 20 international organisations reportedly invited to partake in the conference. The plan includes a blueprint for investment into infrastructure, as well as climate and digital spheres, with the European Commission (EC) expected to present a plan on coordinating donations, which are largely anticipated to come from the European Union. However, given the immense scale of the project and finances required, the meeting in Lugano marks only the first such conference on the topic, with further reportedly planned for November.
• The reconstruction plans are also inevitably set to come under the close scrutiny of various member states, many of which are increasingly more concerned about adding debt amid a difficult economic situation and rising inflation in Europe. Moreover, concerns and demands regarding aid being linked to anti-corruption and democratic reforms will also likely be increasingly demanded by countries traditionally more sceptical about advancing Ukraine’s EU membership prospects. Concrete progress on these issues, however, will inevitably remain stalled in the short term given that the war is still ongoing. As such, it is bound to remain a sticking point during negotiations. The scale of rebuilding efforts will also ultimately depend on the length of the war, with the cost already estimated at USD 1 trillion, should it extend until the end of the year.
• On 3 July, Turkish authorities confirmed that they had detained a Russian vessel carrying grain from Ukraine, which Kyiv reported was stolen as it accuses Russian forces of widespread looting. Turkish authorities are expected to announce how they will deal with the detained ship, which was reportedly loaded in the occupied Ukrainian port of Berdyansk. The development will inevitably drive tensions between Russia and Turkey, with the latter previously more reluctant to intervene in these matters for the fear of angering Moscow. As such, diplomatic tensions between Moscow and Ankara will remain elevated, especially should Turkey refuse to release the vessel, which could subsequently result in Moscow retaliating by curtailing trade and energy links with Turkey.
• Late last week the Russian government submitted a draft amendment to a number of federal laws which would introduce “special measures in the economic sphere” to support the war effort in Ukraine. The amendment looks set to prevent all Russian companies, irrespective of ownership, from refusing to supply or support the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine as well as “counter-terrorist operations” when called upon. In this respect, the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on 3 July that numerous directors of Russian military repair firms are not accepting new Russian equipment for repair as the federal government has not paid them for previous work. The amendments would thus force companies to supply goods, perform work, and provide services for the special military operation, while also allowing the alteration of existing worker contracts to force them to work during weekends and holidays. This is the latest indication that the Kremlin is covertly mobilising not only manpower but also the economy to support the war in Ukraine. While Western-owned firms are comparatively unlikely to be providing critical military services to the Russian military, the new amendments, which are highly likely to pass, present profound reputational, legal, and sanctions risks for any firm called upon to directly support the war effort. In this respect, this is another step toward Russia enforcing a de facto wartime economy, which will reinforce the enduring risks for Western firms still operating inside Russia.
• For more strategic analysis and escalation outcomes to the current conflict in Ukraine, see our Scenario Planning and Projections report.
FORECAST
The fall of Lysychansk is set to provide Moscow with its most significant victory since the fall of Mariupol, and will allow President Vladimir Putin this week to declare that the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) has been fully “liberated”. However, this is only one-half of the Donbas region, with Russian forces now set for another gruelling and attritional fight for the remainder of neighbouring Donetsk oblast. Russian forces are now set to focus on pushing towards Siversk and Bakhmut from the east, with the ultimate aim of encroaching on the heavily fortified cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk along the M-03 (E40) highway. This will likely take many months of attritional fighting to accomplish, if Russian forces are able to accomplish it at all. All indicators nevertheless point to the Kremlin preparing to fight a longer war for at least several more months to achieve the conquest of the entire Donbas region.
It remains unclear at this stage where precisely the Ukrainians will establish a new defensive line following the withdrawal from Lysychansk, though the ‘Bakhmut line’ remains the most likely. As previously assessed, this line would have various advantages for the defending Ukrainians, including a string of almost unbroken villages running between Siversk-Soledar-Bakhmut which can be (and likely already have been) fortified. In addition, the Bakhmutka River stands at the back of the line guarding the T-0513 highway, which in turn will provide stronger ground lines of communication to resupply and reinforce Ukrainian forces on the frontline.
The ‘Bakhmut line’ could thus provide a two-phased defence which would serve the overall Ukrainian strategy of slowing the Russian advance while inflicting heavy casualties. The Ukrainians could first establish defensive positions east of the riverbank, utilising the defensive advantages of the villages and fortified towns of Siversk and Soledar. After slowing the Russian advance here, the Ukrainians could then proceed with the option of withdrawing across the river to take up secondary defensive positions along the western bank of the Bakhmutka, utilising the natural defences of the (albeit small) river and the slightly elevated position of the western bank.
However, the Ukrainian General Staff this morning, 4 July, confirmed that Russian forces had “forced” the Siverskyi Donets River, but did not specify where and in what force. Where specifically the Russians have succeeded in fording the river will likely determine whether the Russians will be in a position to unbalance this ‘Bakhmut line’ by threatening to flank from the north. There are a small number of possible fording points along the Siverskyi Donets, but if they have done so west of Siversk, this could seriously threaten the overall Bakhmut defence. One potential crossing point could be around Yampil, northwest of Siversk, or around Raihorodok, northeast of Slovyansk. The former would pose the most serious threat to Ukrainian forces as this would provide Russian forces with the opportunity to flank the Bakhmut line along the western bank of the Bakhmutka River, enabling a pincer movement against Siversk. The latter point around Raihorodok would support an offensive towards Slovyansk, around which Russian forces have struggled to build momentum over the last two months. It ultimately remains unconfirmed where the Russians have forded the river and in what strength, but developments here could determine how far Russian forces will push the Ukrainians and where the latter will establish a new defensive line. (Source: Sibylline)

07 Jul 22. Germany refuses to ‘plunder its own military’ for the sake of Ukraine.
Pressure on Olaf Scholz to provide armoured vehicles, as German MPs prepare to set an example by limiting their own use of hot water
Germany has said it doesn’t want to “plunder its own military” as it refuses to send armoured vehicles to Ukraine.
Berlin has rejected a request to deliver around 200 Fuchs armoured personnel carriers to Kyiv, citing a need to preserve the country’s own security interests.
“We support Ukraine with everything that is possible and responsible. But we have to ensure Germany’s ability to defend itself,” Christine Lambrecht, the German defence minister, told the German Press Agency on Thursday.
“It is therefore irresponsible to plunder the Bundeswehr (German military), especially in these times, and even to ignore the military advice of the General Inspector.”
Ms Lambrecht said her decision was made pursuant to military advice.
General Inspector Eberhard Zorn – Germany’s highest-ranking soldier – has previously said the military did not have enough leeway to let Ukraine have the vehicles, although it is unclear exactly how many the German military have in stock.
It comes as German MPs are set to limit their consumption of hot water in anticipation of an energy shortage over the winter months.
Members of the German parliament are expected to set an example to the public as electricity prices soar to record highs and households are encouraged to save as much heat and power as possible.
The move will see all 1,800 instant boilers that provide warm water for bathroom sinks in Berlin’s parliament buildings switched off, according to a report in Der Tagesspiegel. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

07 Jul 22. Russia-Ukraine war: Russia fails to take territory for first time since war began.
Russia has not made any territorial gains in Ukraine for the first time in 133 days, according to its own assessments, hinting at an “operational pause” for its battle-stricken forces to recuperate.
Before this, Moscow’s defence ministry had claimed territorial gains in its daily update every day since its invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
The Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, said this indicated an “operational pause” in order to prepare for a large-scale offensive after capturing much of the eastern Luhansk region.
“Russian forces will likely confine themselves to relatively small-scale offensive actions as they attempt to set conditions for more significant offensive operations and rebuild the combat power needed to attempt those more ambitious undertakings,” ISW added.
Analysts have suggested this is part of Russia’s attempts to steel itself for a protracted war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is also passing a law to give it more control over business and workers to put the Russian economy on a stronger war footing. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

06 Jul 22. European Command Group Strives to Get Ukrainians What They Need. No one doubts Ukraine’s courage in combatting the Russian invasion of their country, but courage alone can only go so far. Ukrainian service members need effective military capabilities at the right moments to defend their people. That is the mission of the International Donor Coordination Cell at U.S. European Command. The cell coordinates the efforts of donor nations from around the world to get Ukraine the military capabilities it needs.
U.S. European Command hosts the cell, and it was cobbled together quickly, as the mismatched furniture and computer cables taped to the floor attest. In the early days of the Russian invasion, separate British and American teams were essentially doing the same mission. Officials combined the teams, and while British and American service members predominate, there are representatives from many countries in the secure facility. These include Ukrainian officers.
The cell mission is evolving. When Russia first threatened Ukraine, it was a “push” system — meaning donor nations were pushing anti-armor and anti-air systems like the Javelin and Stinger missiles and small arms ammunition into the country as quickly as possible. That has evolved into a “pull” system, where Ukraine is able to ask for military capabilities it needs to fight the Russian threat. The fight in Donbas today is fundamentally different than the fight that occurred around Kyiv in March and April. U.S. officials have said repeatedly that Ukraine’s successful effort to drive the Russians away from Kyiv requires the anti-armor and anti-air systems. The fighting in the Donbas is an artillery struggle, and that requires far different systems.
Putting together the capabilities is another challenge the cell is surmounting. Donor countries may offer models of the same system, but the versions may be different. They may get a barrel from one donor country, match it with a chassis from another, and the ammunition from a third. A fourth or fifth donor country may provide the transportation for the system. The idea is to get a working system into the hands of the Ukrainian military as quickly as possible.
There are other hurdles that must be surmounted that don’t immediately come to mind. The system dials, manuals and maintenance specifications must be translated from various languages to Ukrainian.
There are many nodes in the transportation system and many modes of transport. There are obviously many different routes used. That’s as specific as any member of the cell will get.
There is a limit to the Soviet-era weapons and ammunition that Ukrainian soldiers are using, and the military is transitioning to newer, NATO-compatible weapons systems. This involves training, and the cell is coordinating the training efforts in the West for Ukrainian soldiers. A cell official said the Ukrainian service members “are keen” on the training and want to finish it as soon as possible. “They don’t even want to take tea breaks,” the cell official said. “They want to finish the training and get back into the fight.” (Source: US DoD)

05 Jul 22. Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine. The United States has committed approximately $7.6bn in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration, including approximately $6.9bn since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked invasion on February 24.
On July 1, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced $820m in additional security assistance for Ukraine. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $50m, as well as $770m in Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds.
The PDA authorization is the fourteenth drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.
United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:
• Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
• Over 6,500 Javelin anti-armor systems;
• Over 20,000 other anti-armor systems;
• Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• 126 155mm Howitzers and up to 410,000 155mm artillery rounds;
• 36,000 105mm artillery rounds;
• 126 Tactical Vehicles to tow 155mm Howitzers;
• 19 Tactical Vehicles to recover equipment;
• Eight High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition;
• Two National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
• 20 Mi-17 helicopters;
• Hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles;
• 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
• Over 10,000 grenade launchers and small arms;
• Over 59,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition;
• 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets;
• 121 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Laser-guided rocket systems;
• Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;
• 26 counter-artillery radars;
• Four counter-mortar radars;
• Four air surveillance radars;
• Two harpoon coastal defense systems;
• 18 coastal and riverine patrol boats;
• M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions;
• C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing;
• Tactical secure communications systems;
• Thousands of night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders;
• Commercial satellite imagery services;
• Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear;
• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;
• Medical supplies to include first aid kits;
• Electronic jamming equipment;
• Field equipment and spare parts;
• Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.
The United States also continues to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself. (Source: US DoD)

04 Jul 22. Ukraine used rare howitzer as part of mission to retake Snake Island. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence had ordered the weapon to be destroyed to avoid the Russian Army seizing it following Russia’s invasion. Ukrainian forces reportedly used a rare truck-mounted self-propelled howitzer against Russian forces on Snake Island.
According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, the 2S22 weapon – only one is known to exist – was used to help liberate the Black Sea island from Russian forces. The ministry also quoted General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as paying “huge gratitude to the designers and manufacturers” of the weapon.
General Zaluzhnyi added that the “Ukrainian Bohdana self-propelled howitzer… played an important role in the liberation of the island” before showing his “appreciation to foreign partners for the provided munitions”.
Due to the weapon’s range, it is believed there is only a small area of Ukraine the self-propelled howitzer could have been fired from – an area close to the coast near Snake Island, according to geo-location Twitter account @GeoConfirmed.
That area, however, is swampland near the Romanian border, so Ukrainian forces may have needed to bring the weapon in by boat or possibly landing craft. The firing of the weapon highlights the lengths Ukrainian forces have gone to retake Snake Island from Russian control.
After the island fell into Moscow’s hands, Ukraine’s armed forces have bombed it with aircraft, fired missiles at it from drones, destroyed ships and a helicopter bringing supplies to the island and, now, managed to hit it with heavy artillery.
Earlier this week, it was confirmed that Russian forces had withdrawn from Snake Island.
Moscow claimed it pulled back its forces as a “goodwill gesture” that demonstrated that “the Russian Federation wasn’t hampering the United Nations’ efforts to establish a humanitarian corridor for taking agricultural products from the territory of Ukraine”.
The 2S22 Bohdana, also known as Bogdan or Bogdana, was developed by Kharkiv Tractor Plant (KhTZ) – a tractor manufacturing company in Ukraine. The weapon only successfully completed preliminary firing tests in January this year, with the Ukrainian armed forces testing the weapon in Odessa Oblast. (Source: Forces.net)

04 Jul 22. Vladimir Putin has ordered his top generals to carry on their advance towards western parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk province after the Russian army captured the country’s far eastern Luhansk region at the weekend. The Russian president was speaking at the Kremlin on Monday as Ukrainian forces retreated from Lysychansk, the last city in the Luhansk region that was under Kyiv’s control. A week earlier, Ukrainian forces had pulled out of Severodonetsk, a nearby city across the Siversky Donets river following months of fierce battles. The seizure marks the first time Russia has conquered an entire Ukrainian province since starting a full-scale invasion of its neighbour in February. Moscow, along with its proxy separatist forces, has controlled large parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions that form Donbas since it fomented a breakaway conflict soon after it annexed Crimea in 2014. The battles will now shift to large cities Ukraine still controls in the Donetsk region to the west of Lysychansk — namely Bakhmut, Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. “The units that took part in active hostilities and achieved success, victories in the Luhansk direction, of course, should rest, increase their combat capabilities,” Putin was quoted in a Kremlin statement. “And other military formations . . . must carry out their tasks according to a previously approved plan, according to a single plan.” Putin has justified the invasion of Ukraine as an operation to “liberate” the two internationally unrecognised “republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk, which Kyiv and its western backers say are puppets of Moscow. After failing to capture Ukraine’s capital city Kyiv, Russia’s army has focused on gaining more ground in Donbas through heavy artillery bombardments. Ukraine has meanwhile retaken some territory in southern coastal regions north of Crimea, notably around Kherson. It is a provincial capital of the southern Kherson region which — along with Zaporizhia to the east — Russian forces have not yet fully conquered. Recommended War in Ukraine: free to read Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in maps — latest updates Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s administration on Monday defended the retreat from Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, saying that the preservation of troops that faced encirclement was vital to future operations. “The defence of the Lysychansk-Severodonetsk agglomeration has been a successful military operation,” Oleksiy Arestovych, an adviser in Zelenskyy’s office, said in a Telegram post. He described the battles in Lysychansk and Severodonetsk as successful in bogging down Russia’s invading army and inflicting high costs until more western weaponry needed for a Ukrainian counter-offensive is supplied. Ukrainian officials say more than 34,000 Russian troops have perished in the war and that thousands of military vehicles and equipment including planes and helicopters have been destroyed. Zelenskyy has said the attritional battles over Donbas are claiming the lives of 100 to 200 Ukrainian troops each day in recent weeks. Ukrainian and Russian military claims could not be independently verified. Ukrainian forces had succeeded in achieving set-out objectives by holding out in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk longer than expected, Arestovych insisted. “The main tasks were: to pin down the main enemy forces; inflict losses on them; buy time for the supply of western weapons and improve the second line of defence; to create conditions for our offensive operations in other sectors of the front,” he said. Outgunned and outnumbered by Russia’s army, Ukrainian forces needed to be “cunning and manoeuvrable” to win a protracted war, he added. (Source: FT.com)
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