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Military And Security Developments
Nov 28.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OFFENSIVES: The Economist has estimated that around 60,000-100,000 Ukrainian service personnel have died so far since the full-scale Russian invasion; this comes as the US calls on Kyiv to lower its draft age
• STRIKES: Russia launched its largest single drone attack against Ukraine this week, alongside another high-intensity missile strike targeting energy infrastructure across the country
• AID: The Biden administration reportedly does not have enough time left to disburse all the authorised funds to Ukraine before its term ends; this comes amid uncertainty over Trump’s policy
• FORECAST: US President-elect Donald Trump announced that he has nominated retired General Keith Kellogg to serve as a special Ukrainian peace envoy; Kellogg has proposed a strategy to begin negotiations in 2025
• OFFENSIVES: On 26 November, The Economist estimated that around 60,000-100,000 Ukrainian service personnel have died so far since the full-scale Russian invasion. This estimate is garnered from various open sources, and cannot be confirmed. It is also estimated that as many as 400,000 additional Ukrainian service personnel have sustained severe injuries, leaving them unable to fight. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) estimated earlier this month that up to 200,000 Russian soldiers had died over the same period. While Russian casualties are significantly higher, Russia retains a distinct demographic and personnel advantage over Ukraine, and is therefore able to absorb such losses more easily. For further analysis on Ukrainian personnel shortages, see CONSCRIPTION below.
• BAKHMUT: On 25 November, Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Anastasiya Bobovnikova appraised the situation for Russian forces along the Siversk axis, stating that high casualty rates are severely affecting Russian morale. According to Bobovnikova, Russian forces in the area have suffered around 15,000 losses, though she did not specify over what timeframe. She also claimed that Russian forces have been operating damaged military equipment for around a month, which ultimately reflects the vehicle and equipment losses sustained in this sector. We cannot confirm Bobovikova’s assessment, though Russian forces have suffered numerous setbacks around Siversk over the last two years.
• BAKHMUT: It also remains likely that a poor command culture has resulted in officers chronically misreporting the situation on the ground around Siversk, which has triggered severe backlash among Russian pro-war commentators in recent weeks. This poor command culture and possible discipline issues have likely contributed to the recent removal of the Southern Military District (SMD) commander, Colonel General Gennady Anashkin, which the Kremlin confirmed on 26 November. Anashkin, who had overseen operations around Siversk, has now been replaced by the acting commander of the Eastern Military District (EMD), Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik.
• BAKHMUT: Further to the south-west around Chasiv Yar, Bobovikova assessed on 25 November that the situation around the town remains particularly ‘dangerous’ as Russian forces have started to concentrate a significant number of troops and are experimenting with new tactics. While she did not provide further details of the troop build-up, she claimed that Russian forces are deploying a variety of novel tactics in a bid to break through Ukraine’s defences. Despite this, Russian forces have made no confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar in recent days, though the rate of attacks towards the refectory factory in central Chasiv Yar and efforts to cross the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal remains high.
• BAKHMUT: Further south still, around Toretsk, geolocated footage published on 25 November indicates Russian advances in the south-western sector of the town. Meanwhile, footage from 26 November indicates that Ukrainian forces have also regained some limited positions in central Toretsk, underlining the contested nature of the urban fighting taking place in the town’s centre.
• DONETSK: Russia has made limited gains in the Pokrovsk sector over the past few days. Geolocated footage from 27 November shows recent marginal Russian advances to the west of Krutyi Yar and in western Petrivka, which are located to the south-east and south of Pokrovsk, respectively. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian troops recently captured Zhovte (located to the south of Pokrovsk) and are progressing along the railway line to the north of the settlement. Russian forces have also likely captured Lysychne after making confirmed gains in the north of the settlement as of 25 November.
• DONETSK: Russian forces have continued to progress in the Kurakhove sector, which remains the priority for Russian offensive operations along the Donetsk frontline. Geolocated footage from 27 November shows recent Russian advances into western Berestky (located to the north of Kurakhove and on the northern shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir). A Ukrainian military observer assessed that Russian forces control around 60% of Kurakhove and are conducting frontal assaults against Ukrainian positions in the city. Russian troops also made confirmed advances to the north-west of Dalne 9 (located to the south of Kurakhove).
• KHARKIV: On 25 and 26 November, Russian forces conducted small attacks in an attempt to penetrate the international border at two points to the north-east and north-west of Kharkiv city, respectively. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Yevheniy Romanov stated on 26 November that Ukrainian forces had successfully repelled these ‘sabotage and reconnaissance’ groups, noting that such probing attacks across the border remain common.
• KURSK: Geolocated footage published on 26 November indicates marginal Russian advances to the north-west of Sudzha that were made during a platoon-sized mechanised assault. Russian forces advanced to the east of the village of Nizhny Klin, located around ten miles (16km) to the north-west of Sudzha, though the overall rate of Russian advances remains fairly slow across the Kursk salient.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In recent days, Ukrainian forces have regained positions in Kupiansk and to the west of Kreminna amid continued Russian offensives along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline. On 26 November, an OSINT group with ties to the Ukrainian military reported that Ukrainian forces had succeeded in dislodging Russian troops from the city of Kupiansk. While we cannot confirm this, we recently reported that Russian troops had entered the south-eastern outskirts of the city.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 27 November, Head of the Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Oleh Syniehubov reported that Russian forces are attempting to cross to the right bank of the Oskil River during the hours of darkness. Syniehubov noted that such attempts have been unsuccessful due to active Ukrainian defensive measures. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the sector reported that Russia’s operational objective is to cross the river. He explained that Ukrainian counter-attacks are obstructing Russian mechanised assaults, forcing the Russian command to rely on dismounted assaults, which are much more attritional. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 25 November shows that Ukrainian forces have regained lost positions to the north-east of Torske and west of Kreminna.
• SOUTHERN: The rate of Russian advances towards Velyka Novosilka has decreased in recent days; this is likely due to Russian forces beginning preparations for assaults (either into the town from the east, or to the north as part of an encirclement manoeuvre). Reports from 27 November indicate that Russian forces deployed an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) into eastern Velyka Novosilka; other Russian sources claim their forces have now also entered the town itself. While we cannot confirm this, the deployment of UGVs would likely form part of Russian reconnaissance operations to assess Ukrainian defences. Nevertheless, pressure continues to mount from the south and the east. Geolocated footage from 26 November indicates recent Russian advances to the south-east of Novodarivka, located around ten miles (16km) to the south-west of Velyka Novosilka.
• SOUTHERN: Along the Dnieper River and the borders of Kherson oblast, Russian forces are likely concentrating additional forces to deter Ukrainian amphibious landings amid intensifying fighting over islands in the Dnieper River delta. The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Tavriisk Group of Forces, Vladyslav Voloshyn, reported on 27 November that Russian forces are concentrating on the Kinburn and Tendrivska Spits – two peninsulas that jut out of mainland Kherson oblast into the Dniprovska Gulf opposite mainland Mykolaiv oblast. These peninsulas remain important bases for Russian forces from where they can launch missiles, artillery and drone attacks into south-western Ukraine – including along the coastline towards Odesa oblast. Voloshyn assesses that Russia is fortifying these areas to prevent Ukraine from conducting amphibious landings (Ukrainian special forces have done so in the past).
• STRIKES: On 26 November, Russia launched the largest number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in a single attack to date. The attack comprised 188 UAVs, including Shahed-136/131 drones and unidentified variants; Russia also launched four Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Ukrainian forces reported the interception of all four missiles and 76 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. In all, 95 drones were reportedly lost, possibly due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures; five UAVs flew on to Belarus. Falling debris caused damage to residential buildings and critical infrastructure in Kyiv oblast. The authorities in Ternopil oblast reported damage to energy infrastructure, which apparently caused blackouts. Separately, the Ukrainian authorities reported that two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles targeted civilian and energy infrastructure in Odesa during daylight hours on 25 November and that Ukrainian air defences intercepted one of the missiles. The authorities in Sumy oblast reported that one unidentified missile hit civilian infrastructure in Sumy city.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 26-27 November, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 89 Shahed-136/131 drones and other unknown UAVs. Ukrainian air defences shot down 36 UAVs over Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. In all, 48 UAVs were reportedly lost, possibly due to EW measures; five drones flew on to Belarus and Russia. Falling drone debris damaged a residential building in the capital Kyiv. Separately, Russia attacked Odesa on 26 November with one Iskandr-M ballistic missile.
• STRIKES: On 28 November, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike involving 188 projectiles. It launched 91 missiles, including three S-300 missiles, 57 Kh-101 missiles, 28 sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles (typically used as decoy projectiles) and three Kh-59/69 missiles. In all, 97 Shahed-136/131 drones and other unknown UAVs were also launched. Ukraine enjoyed a relatively high interception rate, shooting down 70 Kh-101 and Kalibr missiles, all Kh-59/69 missiles and 35 UAVs. In all, 62 UAVs were reportedly lost, possibly due to EW measures.
• STRIKES: Ukrainian Energy Minister German Galushchenko reported that the 28 November strike severely damaged the country’s energy grid, causing widespread blackouts, including precautionary energy shutdowns implemented by various energy operators. Andriy Yermak, the head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, stated that Russia has stockpiled long-range projectiles to intensify strikes against critical infrastructure in the coming months. We previously reported on Moscow’s stockpiling efforts, providing an estimate of the quantities of Russian missiles as of 20 November (Sibylline Ukraine Update – 25 November 2024).
• STRIKES: The latest attack comes 11 days after a high-intensity strike involving 120 missiles and 90 drones on 17 November. The timing of both strikes contrasts with previous months when large-scale missile barrages were rare. As such, this likely supports our assessment that Russia will significantly step up the frequency of such strikes over the winter months, particularly against critical infrastructure ahead of the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump. Given that Trump will likely pressure Ukraine to begin peace talks, Moscow will use the coming months as a window of opportunity to maximise destruction in Ukraine, particularly vis-à-vis critical energy infrastructure.
• STRIKES: Russia’s strike campaign will also possibly include the use of experimental missiles, such as the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which was launched for the first time overnight on 20–21 November. Notably, on 28 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his threats that Russia could use Oreshnik missiles against unspecified ‘decision-making centres’ in Kyiv. Putin further stated that a ‘massive use’ of Oreshnik missiles would have the impact of a nuclear strike. However, it remains unlikely that Russia has the capability to scale up the production of Oreshnik missiles to conduct large-scale attacks with such projectiles – and, as we have previously assessed, the effectiveness of the Oreshnik’s non-nuclear warhead remains very limited. Putin’s statements are almost certainly part of the Kremlin’s ongoing strategy to instil fear in Ukraine and its Western allies, signalling Russia’s capability and willingness to escalate the conflict. Such threats are aimed at undermining Western support for the continuation of the war and will likely be used by Moscow as leverage in future peace negotiations.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its air defences intercepted 39 Ukrainian UAVs over Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Orel, Rostov and Voronezh oblasts (all Russia), as well as Russian-occupied Crimea. On 27 November, Ukrainian forces conducted combined strikes against Sevastopol (Russian-occupied Crimea). The attack involved Ukrainian Neptun anti-ship missiles, modified S-200 missiles, unspecified ballistic missiles, UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles and 40 drones. Russian sources claimed that the attack targeted the Nakhimov Higher Naval School in Sevastopol and the nearby Belbek Airfield.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• AID: US President Joe Biden’s administration reportedly does not have enough time left to disburse all the authorised funds to Ukraine before its term ends. The WSJ reported on 27 November that the administration still has over USD 6.5 billion remaining in approved drawdown authority aid which it has not provided to Ukraine. The authority allows the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide weapons and equipment to Kyiv from its own stocks. However, the Pentagon has reportedly reached the limit of the assistance it can send Ukraine each month without undermining its own military capabilities.
• AID: The Pentagon is aiming to transfer up to USD 750 million worth of weapons per month from its stocks to Ukraine for the remainder of the Biden administration’s term. Given the closing window, the incoming Trump administration will likely inherit a substantial sum of authorised funds which have not yet reached Kyiv. While it is unclear what the President-elect intends to do with the remaining money, his administration will possibly withhold any weapons transfers to push Ukraine to enter negotiations. Alternatively, reluctance from Moscow to engage in talks to end the war would possibly prompt the US to dispatch further assistance to Kyiv (see FORECAST below).
• AID: Meanwhile, despite the transfer issues, Biden is preparing a new USD 725 million arms package for Ukraine. The package, details of which were reported on 27 November, will possibly comprise a variety of anti-tank weapons, including land mines, drones, Stinger missiles and ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). The assistance is also expected to include cluster munitions, though the contents and size of the package will possibly change in the coming days. While we cannot confirm the report, it underscores the Biden administration’s efforts to ramp up transfers of key equipment before Trump’s inauguration on 20 January 2025.
• AID: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed on 27 November that key commitments pledged at a NATO summit in July are yet to be implemented fully. Zelensky specified that these include air defences and other forms of military support. According to the Ukrainian president, failure to provide promised support on time significantly affects the motivation and morale of the Ukrainian people. Besides this, it will also undermine Ukrainian military planning and resource allocation, thus impacting operations and efforts to strengthen air defences. However, such issues are likely to persist throughout the course of the conflict, despite repeated efforts to streamline aid transfer procedures.
• CONSCRIPTION: Reports emerged on 27 November that the Biden administration is urging Ukraine to lower its draft age from 25 to 18 to offset its growing personnel shortages. According to an unspecified senior official, Ukraine is not mobilising or training enough soldiers to offset battlefield losses or to match Russia’s growing military. Lowering the age would provide Ukraine with much-needed recruits; however, making the necessary legal changes would likely take several months and would be a highly unpopular political decision.
• CONSCRIPTION: At present, it remains our assessment that personnel shortages will remain the single most important issue undermining Ukrainian capabilities over the next 12 months, even more so than (some) weapons shortages. As such, difficult decisions will possibly need to be made in the coming months if Kyiv wants to convince its Western backers that it can continue fighting – this will possibly lead to debates around lowering the age to 21 rather than 18. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 8 February 2024.
• DEPLOYMENTS: The French news outlet Le Monde claimed on 25 November that France and the UK are holding discussions about dispatching troops and private defence companies to Ukraine. According to the outlet, discussions on the matter were revived among Ukraine’s European allies following Trump’s victory in the US presidential election. However, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy subsequently stated that London is not considering sending troops to Ukraine ‘at this time’. Such a deployment is highly unlikely in the near term. However, a ‘coalition of the willing’ led by more hawkish states (such as the UK, Poland and Nordic countries) remains possible in the medium-to-long term (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 29 February 2024).
FORECAST
US: President-elect Donald Trump announced on 27 November that he has nominated retired General Keith Kellogg to serve as a special Ukrainian peace envoy. Kellogg previously served as a national security adviser to the former vice-president Mike Pence during Trump’s first presidency.
While it is unclear how much influence Kellogg’s proposed position would have in ending the war, and although Trump has yet to commit publicly to a strategy to end the war, Kellogg has nevertheless indicated what his own preferred approach to peace negotiations would likely be. In a research paper published by the pro-Trump America First Policy Institute in April, Kellogg advocated for a formal US policy to seek both a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement to end the war. The paper proposed that Washington DC would continue to arm Kyiv so Russian forces cannot advance further, as well as to deter any renewed aggression after a ceasefire or peace agreement is reached.
Kellogg suggested that future US military assistance would be conditional on Ukrainian participation in peace talks with Russia, and that if Russia refused to enter talks, the US would ramp up support for Ukraine. The prospect of withholding or ramping up aid would possibly provide leverage to push both Ukraine and Russia to enter politically unpopular talks, though it is unlikely that this would happen immediately. The paper also proposed denying Ukraine NATO membership for an ‘extended period’ in exchange for a comprehensive peace deal with security guarantees. This arrangement would aim to convince Russia to join peace talks, while appealing to the Russian narrative that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was in response to NATO expansion. For further analysis on Kellogg’s proposed plan, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 27 June 2024.
Meanwhile, Trump’s proposed national security adviser, Mike Waltz, has reportedly been considering several proposals for ending the war – including one from Kellogg. According to insiders familiar with the matter cited by CNN on 27 November, Trump officials will likely push for a ceasefire early to freeze the conflict temporarily while both sides negotiate. However, Ukraine would likely oppose an immediate freezing of the frontlines given concerns that Russia would exploit a pause in hostilities to regroup and launch a renewed attack against Ukraine at a later date, particularly if negotiations stall or are completely abandoned. The Kremlin has meanwhile repeatedly stated that it opposes any ceasefire or freezing of the conflict – almost certainly due to the fact that it is advancing on the battlefield and has not achieved most of its war objectives.
Another scenario being considered is one in which Russia is allowed to retain the Ukrainian lands it currently holds in exchange for Ukraine receiving NATO membership. However, this proposal seems unlikely to be popular among Republicans close to Trump and would likely be met with resistance from other members of the military alliance. Fundamentally, however, Russia would be highly unlikely to agree to such a deal, given NATO expansion was one of Moscow’s principal reasons for invading Ukraine.
Nevertheless, another proposal that the incoming Trump administration has reviewed is from Richard Grenell, Trump’s former ambassador to Germany. For further analysis on Grenell’s suggestion regarding the creation of autonomous regions in Ukraine. Ultimately, it is likely too early to determine what the Trump administration’s strategy for ending the war will be. It will possibly contain various elements of different plans or change depending on battlefield developments.
Executive summary
• In our most likely three-month scenario, Russia will continue to make further tactical gains but without a major breakthrough that definitively alters the strategic balance in Moscow’s favour.
• In our most likely 12-month scenario, there is a realistic possibility that the war will continue as a semi-stable attritional conflict that protracts through 2025. While growing international pressure to enter talks could see some progress in early 2025, the enforcement of a stable ceasefire (not to mention a strategic settlement) will remain unlikely, particularly if Moscow judges that it can withstand any potential coercive attempts by the US to force its hand to end the war before it achieves its goals.
• The victory of US President-elect Donald Trump has increased the likelihood of peace negotiations in 2025, though the prospect of a quick (and stable) end to the war still remains unlikely in the next three months. Nevertheless, Trump’s approach to peace negotiations will likely have a significant impact on the trajectory of the conflict and the various scenarios which could unfold in 2025. However, in the short term, the rate of Russian advances over the winter will remain the most significant factor.
• Russia and Ukraine significantly expanded their strike packages this month, with US authorisation of long-range ATACMS and Storm Shadow attacks inside Russia triggering Russia’s launch of an experimental intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) against Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Despite Russian threats and revisions to its nuclear doctrine in a bid to deter further support to Ukraine, we assess that a nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely; that said, further tests of nuclear-capable systems are a realistic possibility.
• Other key triggers, warnings and indicators to watch for in December include: announcements from the incoming Trump administration’s team as to their preferred strategy to end the war, further nuclear sabre rattling from Moscow in a bid to reinvigorate the credibility of its nuclear threats and deter Western support for Ukraine ahead of Trump’s inauguration and an uptick in long-range strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
Nov 27.
• Europe-North America: Zero-day vulnerabilities pose elevated espionage risks to firms. On 26 November, the cyber security company ESET reported that two zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-9680 and CVE-2024-49039) had been exploited by the Russia-aligned group, ‘RomCom’, since at least October. This attack primarily targeted victims in Europe and the US. The campaign directs users to a fake, malicious website whereby the vulnerabilities can be exploited to execute arbitrary code without user interaction, leading to the installation of a backdoor onto victims’ devices. Vulnerable browsers include versions of Firefox, Thunderbird and the Tor Browser. While it is unclear how RomCom directs users to the fake website, the campaign highlights the elevated phishing risks from state-aligned actors. Both vulnerabilities have had patches released, underscoring the importance of strict patch management policies to prevent unnecessary infections. We assess that RomCom’s increasing sophistication and development of stealthy capabilities underscore heightened exploitation risks to individuals in Europe and the US in the medium-to-long term.
Nov 26.
• Russia: Co-ordinated sanctions against oil tanker fleet will enhance enforcement of oil price cap. On 25 November, the UK imposed sanctions on 30 oil tankers from Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, raising the total number of UK-sanctioned tankers to 73. Similarly, Bloomberg reported earlier on 26 November that the EU is discussing its 15th sanctions package which includes a proposal to impose restrictions on 45 additional Russian shadow fleet oil tankers. These likely restrictive measures would ban the tankers from accessing European ports and services. Russia has been using an expanding fleet of ageing oil tankers to circumvent the price cap. Approximately 80% of Russia’s seaborne oil exports are estimated to be transported via its shadow fleet, which consists of approximately 600 vessels. These developments underscore a co-ordinated effort by G7 countries to strengthen enforcement of the price cap on Russian seaborne oil exports. However, we assess that Russia will likely retain enough shadow fleet vessels to maintain a significant volume of seaborne exports that circumvent the price cap.
Nov 25.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
• KURSK: Ukraine believes Moscow has ordered its troops to retake Kursk oblast before the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump in January; Ukraine has already lost around 40% of the territory it had originally seized in August
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have accelerated their advances, seeking to exploit and create vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian frontline amid reports of preparations for future offensive operations to take Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast)
• STRIKES: President Putin confirmed that Russia launched an experimental intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) missile, the Oreshnik, at Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast); the capability of its conventional warhead remains unclear
• FORECAST: US President-elect Donald Trump is reportedly considering appointing his former director of National Intelligence to be a special envoy for the Russia-Ukraine war; however, it remains unclear if such a role will be created and what influence it will have
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 22 November indicates Russian advances along the eastern bank of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal south of Chasiv Yar, though little confirmed progress has been made within the town itself. A Russian military commentator with connections to the Kremlin claimed on 23 November that Russian forces now control 30% of Chasiv Yar, but this cannot be confirmed.
• BAKHMUT: Further south in Toretsk, Russian forces continue to grind forward in the city centre, making advances along several major roads. Russian sources claimed on 21 November that Russian forces now control 50% of the town, but this cannot be confirmed.
• DONETSK: Although there have been no recent confirmed advances in the Kurakhove direction in recent days, it remains one of the most intense areas of fighting. On 22 November, the Ukrainian General Staff, quoted by Reuters, acknowledged the increasingly critical situation of Ukrainian defensive positions in the Kurakhove sector and noted that Russian forces have been advancing 0.124 to 0.186 miles (200m to 300m) a day. The Ukranian General Staff also stated that Russian forces have broken through some unspecified areas in the Kurakhove sector. On the same day, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its forces had captured the eastern Ukrainian village of Dalne, which is located directly south of Kurakhove. Earlier this month, we had assessed that the settlement was likely fully under Russian control. Its capture will increase the pressure on Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the pocket to the north and north-east of Vuhledar. It will also facilitate advances towards Kurakhove from the south along the C051104 highway.
• DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces continued to advance at a fast rate in the Vuhledar sector, located due south of Kurakhove. A Ukrainian military observer reported on 24 November that Russian troops have seized Illinka Katerynivka, Yelizavetivka and likely Romanivka (all north-east of Vuhledar along the C051104 highway). Geolocated footage from 24 November shows that Russian forces advanced to central Trudove (north of Vuhledar).
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: President Volodymyr Zelensky assessed on 23 November that the Kremlin has given orders for its forces to retake Kursk oblast before the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump. This aligns with our previous assessment, with the goal almost certainly aimed at improving Russia’s negotiating position and undermining Ukraine’s if and when peace talks begin in 2025. Sources within the Ukrainian General Staff, cited by Suspilne on 22 November, also reported that Russia has now concentrated around 60,000 troops in Kursk oblast which they assess will attempt to push Ukrainian forces out of the region. Earlier estimates put the total number of Russian and North Korean forces amassed in Kursk oblast at 50,000. If accurate, this latest assessment would reflect continued Russian efforts to prepare for the anticipated counter-offensive.
• KURSK: Reuters cited a senior Ukrainian military official on 24 November in a report assertin that Ukraine has lost 40% of the territory it has initially captured in Kursk oblast when it launched its offensive in August. While it remains unclear if the Russian full-scale counter-offensive is underway, Russian forces continue to make steady advances in a bid to push the Ukrainians across the international border. Geolocated footage from 21-24 November indicates Russian advances along the northern section of the Kursk salient, specifically near Darino, Zeleny Shlyakh and Malaya Loknya, all south-east of Korenevo and north-west of Sudzha.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past few days, Russia continued to advance along the Oskil-Kreminna line, though at a slower pace. Geolocated footage from 24 November shows recent Russian advances south of Lozova (south-east of Kupiansk). Russian troops also made confirmed marginal advances into eastern Kopanky (west of Svatove).
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have stepped up the rate of assaults across the southern axis along the border of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and are advancing at a notable rate. Ukraine’s spokesperson for the Southern Group of Forces, Vladyslav Voloshyn, stated on 24 November that Russian forces are preparing for an attempt to break through along the southern axis and will likely concentrate around Velyka Novosilka.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces are likely attempting to encircle Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast); as such, they are currently pushing from both the south-west and east. Geolocated footage from 24 November indicates Russian forces have reached the eastern outskirts of Rozdolne, a village located five miles (8km) north-east of Velyka Novosilka. These latest advances are likely exploiting vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defences, exposing the city to future assaults from the north where defences are likely less well prepared. Such attacks have also exposed the T-05-18 highway to Russian fire control, which remains a key ground line of communication (GLOC) for Ukrainian forces along the southern axis. If Russian forces can continue pushing to Velyka Novosilka’s north, cutting off this GLOC could realistically allow Russian forces to bypass the highly fortified Mokri Yaly River valley which has defending Velyka Novosilka from the south since 2023 and close a cauldron around the city in an attempt to trigger a Ukrainian withdrawal. However, whether this will be successful, or whether the Russians will prioritise resources further north to attempt to take Pokrovsk, remains unclear.
• SOUTHERN: The Economist reported on 24 November that Ukrainian intelligence believes Russian forces are preparing for a ‘bold’ large-scale offensive towards Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast); however, many Ukrainian officers assess Russia is not yet ready to launch such an operation. In preparation for the expected Russian attack, Ukrainian forces are building layers of new fortifications around Zaporizhzhia city, including minefields and fixed concrete fortifications, in a bid to slow and potential Russian breakthrough. Russia has formally annexed the entire Zaporizhzhia oblast, which includes Zaporizhzhia city (home to over 700,000 before the invasion and a major industrial centre). It remains highly likely that Moscow still intends to take the city, whether via military means or through a peace settlement in 2025.
• SOUTHERN: Ukrainian intelligence maintains that tens of thousands of Russian personnel had begun massing on the southern front earlier this year in preparation for an offensive towards Zaporizhzhia, which was prevented by Ukraine’s own Kursk offensive in August. As such, we assess that the timeline for a major offensive to take Zaporizhzhia city will likely be tied (at least in part) to the success or failure of Russia’s offensives in Kursk oblast. Kursk will likely remain the strategic priority for Moscow in the coming months; if Russian forces successfully liberate the region, tens of thousands of troops could realistically redeploy to Zaporizhzhia oblast to take part in an offensive in early 2025.
• STRIKES: On 21 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that Russia had launched an experimental intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) missile, the Oreshnik, overnight on 20-21 November. Initial reports had claimed it was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which was incorrect. The Oreshnik missile targeted Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) with a non-nuclear payload, which Putin claimed hit a military-industrial complex. However, Ukrainian sources claimed that the damage was minimal. The German media outlet Bild reported that the projectile did not carry any explosive warhead. Putin notably stated that serial production of the weapon will now begin, and claimed that Russia would announce any launch of such missiles in advance to the Ukrainian people likely as part of an ongoing psychological warfare campaign. The missile is a nuclear-capable weapon; its recent use is clearly part of Moscow’s nuclear threats in response to Ukraine’s recent use of ATACMS and UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles against Russia (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 21 November 2024).
• STRIKES: The Oreshnik is likely an experimental version of the RS-26 Rubezh-class intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). As such, the missile has a range of 1,550-1,860 miles (2,500-3,000km), potentially extending to 3,100 miles (5,000km). Russian sources have explained that the missile can be equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), meaning it contains multiple warheads each with separate guidance units capable of hitting different targets. The use of such MIRV warheads would pose a significant challenge to Ukrainian air defences, though it remains likely that the missile’s warheads hit the same target in Dnipro, raising questions about the viability of the weapon’s conventional warheads. Nevertheless, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied Putin’s claims that the missile cannot be intercepted, asserting that Ukrainian experts are currently analysing the missile’s wreckage and collaborating with allies to develop measures to counter the projectile.
• STRIKES: On 22 November, Russia launched 114 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including Shahed-136/131 and unidentified drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 64 UAVs. 41 were reportedly lost, possibly due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: On 24 November, Russia launched 73 UAVs, including Shahed-136/131 and unidentified drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted 50 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. 19 Drones were lost due to EW measures. On 25 November, Ukraine’s Air Force reported that Russia had also launched an unspecified number of Kh-59/69 missiles.
• STRIKES: On 24 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that over the past week, Russia launched approximately 800 glide bombs, 460 drones and more than 20 missiles. The reported number of projectiles underscores the intensification of Russian strikes, which coincides with a significant increase in offensive activity along the frontline. Russia’s ability to sustain a high tempo of strikes is partly due to Moscow’s efforts to ramp up domestic missile production in addition to supplies of missiles and drones from Iran and North Korea. On 21 November, a Ukrainian news outlet, RBC-Ukraine, reported that Russia’s missile production increased from 115–130 strategic missiles per month in 2023 to 170 such missiles per month. Russia can reportedly produce 70 Iskandr-M ballistic missiles monthly and its stock of such missiles stands at to 350 units. As of 20 November, Russia reportedly possesses 220 Kh-101 missiles, 390 Kalibr cruise missiles (which it extensively uses as decoys) 230 Kh-22 missiles, 70 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles and 45 North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles.
• STRIKES: Earlier on 25 November, Russia launched a large-scale drone attack involving 145 drones, including Shahed-136/131s and unknown types. Ukraine’s Air Force reportedly intercepted 71 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Despite these interceptions, drones struck the city centre of Nikopol (Dnipropetrovsk oblast).
• STRIKES: Overnight on 23–24 November, a Ukrainian strike reportedly hit a Russian S-400 air defence radar system in an unspecified location in Russia’s Kursk oblast. Russian milbloggers alleged that Ukraine used US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), though this remains unconfirmed. Kursk oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov reported that Russian air defences intercepted 24 drones and two missiles. Such attacks likely aim to weaken Russia’s air defence coverage in a bid to facilitate further Ukrainian long-range strikes and undermine Russia’s ability to launch attacks. A Russian online opposition media outlet also reported that, overnight on 23-24 November, a Ukrainian drone attack targeted Russia’s Krasnodar Krai, where Ukrainian UAVs crashed eight miles (13km) from the Russian military Khanskaya Air Base in Adygea Republic.
• STRIKES: On 24 November, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Ukraine will likely use Western-provided missiles to target Russia’s Rostov oblast. The region hosts important troop deployment centres and military bases and is the headquarters of the Southern Military District. Such attacks would likely disrupt Russian military logistics and troop deployments from Rostov oblast, complicating its ability to resupply and reinforce positions across the frontlines.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• RECRUITMENT: Reports on 24 November claimed that Russia has recruited hundreds of Yemeni mercenaries to fight in Ukraine, likely reflecting growing Russian-Houthi ties. According to unnamed recruits from Yemen who spoke to the British outlet the Financial Times (FT), they were promised employment with high salaries and Russian citizenship. However, the individuals were then forcibly enlisted into the Russian army and sent to fight in Ukraine (a similar practice with which Russian authorities have coerced other foreigners to fight; those affected include individuals from Central Asia, Nepal, Cuba and various sub-Saharan African countries).
• RECRUITMENT: While we cannot confirm the reports, they are highly likely credible and align with a broader trend of Russia relying on (and often coercing) foreign fighters to bolster manpower. This pattern is likely to continue as it allows Russia to replenish its troop numbers without having to declare another round of mobilisation which would highly likely cause domestic social upset. It also likely reflects growing co-operation between Moscow and the Houthis. We previously assessed that the provision of P-800 Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles to the group was increasingly likely (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 18 November 2024).
• ROMANIA: On 24 November, a Russia-sympathetic independent candidate won the first round of Romania’s presidential election. Călin Georgescu gained just under 23% of the votes cast, with two pro-West candidates (Elene Lasconi and Marcel Ciolacu) almost tied at around 19% each. Georgescu, who is critical of the EU and NATO, has previously claimed that the ‘imperialist’ military-industrial complex is responsible for the war in Ukraine.
• ROMANIA: Romania has been a strong ally of Ukraine throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion; the former has provided military support and the two signed a ten-year security agreement in July. The second round of the Romanian presidential election will take place on 8 December; we assess that there is a realistic possibility Georgescu will win. In this case, his victory will highly likely undermine Romanian support for Ukraine, including the continued provision of military support given the president enjoys significant power over foreign policy and security matters.
• BORDERS: Polish farmers ended their blockade of the Medyka-Shehyni border crossing with Ukraine on 24 November. The farmers began their protest, which concerned a trade deal between the EU and the South Common Market (MERCOSUR) bloc and agricultural tax rates, on 23 November. Polish Agriculture Minister Czesław Siekierski met with participants on 24 November. Farmers are expected to submit their demands by 26 November, with Siekierski to provide a response by 10 December. Polish farmers have staged several protests at border crossings with Ukraine since November 2023.
• BORDERS: We assess that renewed blockades of Polish-Ukrainian border points are possible in the coming weeks, driving supply chain risks. The possibility of such action will likely increase if farmers deem Poland’s resolution to be unsatisfactory. Depending on the scale, moderate operational disruption is likely, though humanitarian aid and military supplies to Ukraine are unlikely to be impeded. It is also possible that the protests will moderately undermine socio-economic health conditions in Ukraine.
US: US President-elect Donald Trump is reportedly considering appointing Richard Grenell, his former director of National Intelligence, to be a special envoy concerning the war in Ukraine. According to a Reuters report from 22 November which cited four unspecified insiders, there is currently no special envoy dedicated solely to resolving the conflict, though Trump is considering creating such a position. Grenell previously served as the US ambassador to Germany as well as a special presidential envoy for Serbia and Kosovo peace negotiations, meaning that he has notable diplomatic experience in Europe. However, if the role is created, it is not guaranteed that Grenell would be selected, nor that he would accept.
In July, Grenell advocated for a peace deal that would allow Ukraine to preserve its territory but enable the creation of ‘autonomous’ regions, a possible reference to a proposed ‘Minsk III’ peace process. Details on the matter remain limited, though it is highly likely that the regions in question would be in eastern Ukraine (specifically Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). Previous Minsk I and II peace accords failed to prevent a second Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and it remains highly unlikely that a Minsk III process, which Kyiv has strongly rejected, would prevent further Russian aggression in Ukraine. Grenell has also argued against Ukraine joining NATO in the near term, though this reflects an unspoken consensus across the West. While it is ultimately uncertain whether a special envoy role will be created and how much influence it would have, US peace proposals would almost certainly require significant concessions from both sides, which both Moscow and Kyiv could readily refuse. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 November 2024.
Notably, Trump’s nominee for national security adviser, Mike Waltz, called on 24 November for a ‘responsible end’ to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Waltz’s remarks were largely centred on concerns over the escalation of the conflict following the decision of outgoing President Joe Biden to authorise long-range strikes inside Russia using US-supplied ATACMS missiles (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 18 November 2024).
Waltz stated that Washington DC needs to restore deterrence and peace and to ‘get ahead of this escalation ladder’ rather than respond to it. As we have previously assessed, this indicates that the Trump administration will likely reverse the long-range strike authorisation and prioritise seeking an end to the war in 2025 rather than continuing open-ended military assistance to Kyiv. Nevertheless, it is also possible that such comments are designed to criticise long-range strike authorisation and appeal to audiences who believe that the decision will escalate regional tensions further. It does not necessarily confirm any potential policy decisions by the incoming Trump administration. Nevertheless, the New York Times (NYT) reported on 21 November that unspecified intelligence and Pentagon officials are sceptical that Ukraine will manage to reclaim territory that Russia has seized over the past months.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 23 November that he expects to receive proposals for Trump’s peace plan in January 2025. Zelensky has called on Trump to share his ideas on how to bring an end to the war, which the latter has claimed he could end in 24 hours. However, the visions of Trump and Zelensky on resolving the conflict likely differ on several key issues, such as territorial concessions, the continued supply of US military equipment and Ukrainian NATO ambitions.
• Russia: Payment disruption abroad will likely persist in coming weeks following US sanctions. Reports emerged on 23 November that banks in several countries have stopped servicing cards using the Chinese payment system UnionPay issued by Russia’s Gazprombank. Affected countries include Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Kazakhstan, Turkey and the UAE. Gazprombank cards are also said to not work in China, with cardholders unable to withdraw money from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s ATMs. It comes after the US issued new sanctions against Russia’s Gazprombank on 21 November; the financial institution subsequently warned its clients abroad of potential payment issues with UnionPay cards. We assess that the punitive measures are almost certainly intended to further limit Russia’s ability to evade sanctions. Payment problems with Gazprombank-issued UnionPay cards in other countries, including those to which Russian citizens often travel, are likely in the coming days and weeks due to concerns over secondary sanctions risks. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Nov 24. Russia lost more than 2,030 troops in the past 24 hours, reaching a record daily high, according to Ukraine’s military. Over 300 weapons and military equipment were also destroyed, the General Staff of the Armed Forces added in its daily statement. The figure could not be independently verified and battlefield losses are notoriously difficult to estimate. It surpasses the 1,950 Russian losses recorded By Ukraine on November 12. It comes as Russia continues its assault on Ukraine’s east, launching more than 100 attacks in the key strategic hubs of Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. Moscow has also stepped up its aerial attacks in response to Ukraine’s use of Western long-range missiles to hit targets inside Russia. Ukraine said it shot down 88 out of 132 Russian drones launched overnight. On Thursday, Moscow carried out what was described as a “massive” attack on Ukraine’s power grid, causing blackouts across the country. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
28 Nov 24. Russia launched a “massive” missile and drone attack against Ukraine overnight, targeting energy infrastructure across the country, Kyiv’s energy minister said. A nationwide air raid alert was issued after Russia launched seven Tu-95 strategic bombers, the Ukrainian air force said. Explosions were heard in several cities, including in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Lutsk, and Rivne. Local officials also said there were strikes in Sumy, Lviv, and Vinnytsia. Emergency power outages were introduced in Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro, and Donetsk as a result of the strikes, energy provider DTEK said. Volodymyr Zelensky’s chief of staff said the attack showed Russia was “continuing their tactics of terror”. It follows a warning by the United Nations that Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure may make this winter the “harshest since the start of the war”. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
28 Nov 24. Ukraine Sends Shahed Drones Back to Russia and Belarus Using Spoofing Technology. Ukraine is using advanced electronic warfare systems to intercept and alter the satellite coordinates of Russian Shahed strike drones, redirecting them back into Russian and Belarusian territory, Le Monde reported on November 26. A source close to Ukrainian military intelligence revealed
“This is the result of our ‘spoofing’—intercepting satellite coordinates.”
On the morning of Tuesday, November 26, Russia unleashed a record-breaking 188 Shahed drones, accompanied by 4 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, in the largest drone assault recorded in the 1,000 days since the war began, according to Ukraine’s Air Force.
The 192 air targets were launched from Russia’s Voronezh, Oryol, Kursk, and Krasnodar regions.
Ukrainian air defense forces managed to shoot down 76 drones using fighter jets, helicopters, mobile air defense batteries, and surface-to-air missiles, supplemented by electronic jamming.
An additional 95 drones were diverted using spoofing tactics that manipulate the satellite coordinates guiding the drones and missiles through Ukrainian airspace.
Between November 24 and 26, a record-breaking 43 Shahed drones were sent to Belarus from Ukraine. Ukraine has been actively and successfully developing electronic warfare (EW) systems to counter enemy drones, which helps preserve its limited air defense systems and missiles. They disable drones by forcing them to change course and crash after running out of fuel, according to a report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24MEDIA)
28 Nov 24. Vladimir Putin has threatened to deploy Russia’s new hypersonic ballistic missile against “decision-making centres in Kyiv”, as his forces used cluster munitions to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure on Thursday. The Russian president said such a strike with the highly destructive Oreshnik missile would be in response to Ukraine using western long-range missiles to hit targets within Russia. “At present, the ministry of defence and the general staff are selecting targets to hit on Ukrainian territory. These could be military facilities, defence and industrial enterprises, or decision-making centres in Kyiv,” Putin said on Thursday during a meeting in Kazakhstan. He added that the Oreshnik missile Moscow first deployed last week in a strike on Dnipro could destroy even highly protected underground sites and that Russia had commenced its serial production. “The temperature of the striking elements reaches 4,000 degrees,” Putin said. “Everything at the epicentre of the blast disintegrates into fractions and elementary particles. Essentially, it turns to dust.” The threat comes just days after Ukraine closed its parliament on Friday due to a reported missile threat. Ukraine’s parliament building is located in Kyiv’s now heavily guarded government quarter, along with its cabinet offices, the presidential administration and the national bank. Earlier on Thursday, 11 Ukrainian regions reported damage to energy facilities, with power being cut for several hours as temperatures in Ukraine dropped below zero. Kyiv residents also experienced blackouts on Thursday. “Again, the energy industry is under massive enemy attack,” said energy minister Herman Halushchenko, urging people to seek shelter as air raid sirens wailed in Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that “about 100 attack drones, more than 90 missiles of various types” had targeted the country’s energy facilities. He said Russia’s use of cluster munitions was reported in several Ukrainian regions. “The use of these cluster elements significantly complicates the work of our rescuers and power engineers in mitigating the damage, marking yet another vile escalation in Russia’s terrorist tactics,” Zelenskyy said. (Source: FT.com)
28 Nov 24. Russia has used cluster munitions and other highly destructive bombs to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, prompting emergency shutdowns across the country on Thursday. “Again, the energy industry is under massive enemy attack,” said energy minister Herman Halushchenko, urging people to seek shelter as air raid sirens wailed in Kyiv. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that “about 100 attack drones, more than 90 missiles of various types” had targeted Ukraine’s energy facilities. He said Russia’s use of cluster munitions was reported in several Ukrainian regions. “The use of these cluster elements significantly complicates the work of our rescuers and power engineers in mitigating the damage, marking yet another vile escalation in Russia’s terrorist tactics,” Zelenskyy said. (Source: FT.com)
27 Nov 24. The US has pressed Ukraine to lower its military recruitment age to 18 to address a severe shortage of manpower that has weakened its position on the battlefield and led to the fastest Russian gains in two years. A senior US administration official on Wednesday said Kyiv needed to drop the minimum conscription age from 25 to help withstand Russia’s offensive. “The simple truth is that Ukraine is not currently mobilising or training enough soldiers to replace their battlefield losses while keeping pace with Russia’s growing military,” the senior official said. Washington’s request comes as Joe Biden’s administration is rushing to deploy $7bn in security assistance to Kyiv before president-elect Donald Trump takes office in January. Ukraine should “look hard at the ages of individuals that they are willing to recruit, balancing the need to invest in future generations with the current requirements of the battlefield”, the senior US official said. Ukraine has said it needs 160,000 soldiers to fill out its ranks, which the US sees as “on the low end”, the official said. But Ukraine has been unwilling to conscript under-25s, with Ukrainian officials worried about the demographic challenges the country faces. “Let there be no speculation — our state is not preparing to lower the mobilisation age,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told parliament last week. While the Biden administration has eventually approved many of Kyiv’s requests for weapons and given permission to use them inside Russia, officials believe this will not be enough to have a decisive impact. US national security adviser Jake Sullivan last week said: “Our view has been that there’s not one weapon system that makes a difference in this battle. It’s about manpower, and Ukraine needs to do more, in our view, to firm up its lines in terms of the number of forces it has on the front lines.” US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby on Wednesday said Washington was “ready to ramp up our training capacity if they take appropriate steps to fill out their ranks”. The fighting in Kursk and along Ukraine’s south-eastern front in the Donetsk region has escalated in recent weeks, as the warring sides look to strengthen their positions and seize the initiative on the battlefield before Trump takes office. (Source: FT.com)
27 Nov 24. South Koreans oppose arms for Ukraine as envoy visits.
• Summary
• South Koreans opposed to military aid for Ukraine
• Media say Ukrainian envoy in Seoul to request arms aid
• Seoul says its response depends on actions of Pyongyang, Moscow
South Koreans remain widely opposed to directly supplying arms to Ukraine, recent polls show, despite renewed international requests from Kyiv and allied capitals after North Korean troops were reported to be helping Russia.
Ukraine has asked Seoul for a range of weapons and Seoul has said it could consider such aid, depending on future steps by Russia and North Korea.
A Ukrainian delegation led by Defence Minister Rustem Umerov met South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol on Wednesday, Yoon’s office said, amid media reports that the visit aimed to seek arms support.
“No to the South Korean government planning arms supply to Ukraine,” read a banner held by a small group of protesters gathered outside Yoon’s office in the capital.
Both sides agreed to keep up sharing of information on North Korea’s dispatch of troops to Russia as well as the exchange of technology and weapons between the two, Yoon’s office said in a statement.
The delegation also met Seoul’s national security advisor Shin Won-sik and defence minister Kim Yong-hyun and discussed cooperation between Seoul and Kyiv.
Ukraine planned to send Seoul a detailed request for arms support including artillery and an air defence system, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in an October interview with South Korean broadcaster KBS.
A Western diplomat told Reuters that discussions behind the scenes focused on air defence systems designed to shoot down aircraft and missiles, but this month’s U.S. presidential election win by Donald Trump cast uncertainty over the talks.
Yoon, already battling with record low approval ratings over domestic scandals, faces wide opposition from the South Korean public to the idea of arming Ukraine, surveys have shown.
Most South Koreans viewed growing military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow as a threat, a Gallup Korea poll showed in October, but 82% opposed sending military aid, including arms.
“To the South Korean government, there will be fewer benefits for continuing to support (military aid) when there is little domestic support and the relationship with the next U.S government could deteriorate,” said Yang Uk, an analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
Yoon’s low approval ratings, along with little public backing for supply of weapons, are burdens sapping his mandate on foreign policy, he added.
The public, largely not sensitive to the seriousness of the war in Ukraine, is likely to focus on the downside in the event of the South’s direct involvement, Yang said.
Unlike neighbouring Japan, which has also avoided directly arming Kyiv, South Korea is one of the world’s largest weapons exporters and has inked large, lucrative defence deals with Ukraine’s neighbours.
South Korea has provided demining vehicles, body armour, and other non-lethal aid for Ukraine and has not ruled out supply of weapons to Kyiv, especially after Seoul and Washington reported the dispatch of thousands of North Korean troops to Russia.
At home, the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) has criticised the government for not ruling out provision of weapons aid and urged it to seek parliamentary approval for such decisions.
The DP has a majority in parliament after a landslide victory in an April election, but experts say the president can bypass the body to supply lethal weapons to another country.
In an interview with Russia’s TASS news agency, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko said ties between Seoul and Moscow would be “completely destroyed” if South Korea supplied arms to Ukraine.
Russia should first ask itself what it provides to North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang’s dispatch of troops and how it is threatening the security of South Korea, a senior South Korean foreign ministry official told a background briefing on Wednesday, when asked about the comments.
Seoul’s response depends on the actions of Russia and North Korea, the official added, speaking on condition of anonymity.
The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. (Source: Reuters)
26 Nov 24. Key European defense chiefs want Ukraine aid group to remain active. Top defense officials from Europe’s biggest military spenders want the international Ukraine Defense Contact Group to continue working after Donald Trump assumes the U.S. presidency, which many analysts here believe will not be as favorable to Kyiv as the Biden White House.
The 50-plus nation forum, also known as the Ramstein Group, has been hosted by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, representing Ukraine’s most powerful ally in the defense against Russia’s invasion. Its regular meetings at the air base in Germany, or sometimes via teleconference, have been instrumental in drumming up new rounds of military aid and financial contributions to the war-torn nation.
Keeping the group going is a priority for top defense leaders from Germany, France, the U.K, Poland and Italy, who met in Berlin on Monday to take stock of Europe’s defense strategy as Trump ascends to the White House once again
“The five of us want to stick to the UDCG format, keep supporting it and lobby for its continued existence,” German Defense Secretary Boris Pistorius told reporters.
Pistorius noted that Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, who dialed into the meeting remotely, had made the request.
Another goal of the five-nation group is to focus on building Ukraine’s defense industry, as the local production of weapons would cut down fielding times, Pistorius said. Special emphasis will be on providing Ukraine with artificial intelligence-enabled drones as well as munitions, especially artillery rounds, he added.
The ministers stressed the importance of maintaining military support for Ukraine, while at the same time ramping up their own defense spending.
Meanwhile, France in the coming weeks will provide Ukraine with Mistral air defense missiles and other weapon systems, including equipment it’s supplying together with Italy, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu told reporters in Berlin.
The aid will be funded using interest income from frozen Russian assets, an innovative solution that will please French and European taxpayers, according to the French minister.
The country has been training an entire brigade in the east of France, which includes equipping the force of more than 2,000 soldiers with VAB armored personnel carriers, AMX 10 RC infantry fighting vehicles and Caesar 155mm artillery.
Lecornu said the work of training the brigade is complementary to what France is doing in Poland, noting that Umerov had asked for continued support in training troops.
The French defense minister said he expects to make quick progress on the European Long-Range Strike Approach, the proposal to develop a land-based long-range cruise missile.
France, Germany, Italy and Poland signed on for ELSA in July, with the U.K. and Sweden joining later this year. The project touches on Europe’s capability to provide security for the continent, not only against threats from the east but also the Middle East, Lecornu said.
Pan-European missile maker MBDA has proposed a truck-mounted version of its naval cruise missile as a short-term option for the ELSA project.
Leaders from the United States and Germany agreed at the NATO summit in Washington this summer to station U.S. medium-range and long-range missiles in Germany to deter Russia, under what Pistorius labeled an “interim” solution until the ELSA project yields results.
As is the case with most trans-Atlantic security projects, there’s no telling if the incoming Trump administration plans to follow through on the missile commitment.
Either way, Pistorius told reporters there is no fallback plan.
“There are no indications that the decision would change,” he said, adding, “If that were to happen, we’d have to think anew about alternative interim solutions.” (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)
27 Nov 24. Nordic and Baltic leaders discuss security after two fibre optic cables severed. Poland is pushing Nordic and Baltic states to patrol their waters jointly against any Russian sabotage attempts, following the suspicious severing of two data cables last week. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on Wednesday he was seeking to convince Baltic Sea countries that they share “the same sense of threat when it comes to Russia” to set up a “navy policing” force that would mirror Nato’s Baltic air patrols. His comments came as he arrived in Sweden for a summit of Nordic and Baltic leaders who were set to discuss the security challenges stemming from two incidents last week in which two fibre optic cables connecting Germany and Finland, as well as Sweden and Lithuania, were severed within 24 hours. Yi Peng 3, a Chinese bulk carrier, is being investigated by Swedish authorities after it passed close to both cables around the time they were cut more than a week ago. The ship is now voluntarily moored in international waters between Denmark and Sweden, with naval vessels from both countries as well as Germany, and occasionally Russia, monitoring the area. Europe is on heightened alert for potential sabotage of crucial infrastructure after a series of events including damaged gas pipelines, data cables, parcel bombs and arson attacks across the continent. Intelligence officials have focused their suspicion on Russia for many of the incidents. But for the second time in just over a year, a Chinese vessel is suspected of damaging infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, sparking intense diplomatic efforts with Beijing. Germany’s defence minister Boris Pistorius has not explicitly blamed Russia, but he linked the cable damage to the kind of “hybrid” warfare that the Kremlin has sponsored to attack western allies of Ukraine. On Wednesday Tusk also called on European partners to “wake up” and act more decisively against Russia without waiting for Washington to make decisions first. “We are unable to predict how American policy will evolve in the coming months — of course we must cultivate relations with the United States, but Europe must become independent. The era of fear and uncertainty towards Russia must end,” he said. EU allies have expressed concern that Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January will lead to less US involvement in European security and add pressure on Nato allies to spend more on defence or be left at Russia’s mercy. Tusk’s pro-EU coalition government plans to make security and defence the core of its six-month rotating presidency of the bloc which starts in January. Recommended The Big Read Can Europe defend itself without America? If Europe stands united, then “Russia is a technological, financial and economic dwarf in relation to Europe,” Tusk said. “If Europe is divided, Russia is a threat to each individual state.” The Polish foreign ministry has recently warned that it could expel more Russian diplomats after accusing some of them of plotting arson attacks in Poland. Last month Warsaw ordered the closure of the Russian consulate in the Western city of Poznań. Polish investigators have also linked Russia to the recent discovery of parcel bombs in Germany and the UK, which could have been delivered onwards by courier companies to the US. (Source: FT.com)
27 Nov 24. Ukraine Delivers Over 1 million Drones in a Year Exceeding Target. Ukraine surpassed the President’s directive to deliver one m drones to the frontlines in a year, reported Deputy Prime Minister for Innovations Mykhailo Fedorov on November 26.
“The state’s main task is to provide the Armed Forces with everything they need. If they need drones, we provide drones. If they need new technologies, we launch Brave1 and built the Tech Command,” Fedorov said.
Fedorov highlighted that Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to work cohesively and achieve ambitious objectives. Collaborative efforts between the Ministry of Digital Transformation, the Ministry of Defense, the State Special Communications Service, the President’s Office, the Ministry of Strategic Industries, and the General Staff are all aligned toward the singular objective of safeguarding the nation. State institutions aim to expand drone deployment into other areas of technological warfare.
“Unity has been Ukraine’s greatest asset since February 24, 2022, and it will remain so. Our mission is to work together for victory, each in our own role,” Fedorov concluded.
Earlier, The Ukrainian company Buntar Aerospace unveiled the Buntar-1, a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) reconnaissance drone designed for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24MEDIA)
26 Nov 24. Cuashub.com said today that Russian tactics shift to daytime drone strikes. Russian forces are increasingly employing new drone deployment strategies in their ongoing attacks against Ukraine, with recent operations including daytime strikes following an extensive campaign of regular night-time offensives.
Ukraine’s Air Force reported on November 25 that Russian forces launched 145 drones in a large-scale operation beginning the previous evening. While 71 of these drones were intercepted by Ukrainian air defences, another 71 disappeared from radar, likely due to Russian electronic warfare systems.
This shift in tactics complicates air defence operations, which have so far relied on the predictability of nighttime Shahed drone strikes.
“On the night of 24–25 November (since 18:30 on 24 November), the occupiers deployed Shahed attack drones and other unidentified types of drones to attack Ukraine from Orel, Kursk, Millerovo and Primorsko-Akhtarsk in the Russian Federation and temporarily occupied territories in Crimea,” the Air Force said.
In an apparent tactical shift, Russian forces deployed drones not only at night but also during the day, breaking from established patterns. The Air Force warned that this evolution in Russian drone tactics may require changes in both defensive operations and reporting practices.
Previously, Ukrainian forces had adapted to regular nocturnal Shahed drone strikes. Despite these challenges, Ukrainian air defence systems successfully intercepted drones in numerous regions, including Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts.
“Another 71 drones disappeared from radar, likely because of Russian electronic warfare systems; one drone crossed into Belarusian airspace,” the Air Force added.
The attacks also involved glide bombs, Kh-59/69 air-to-surface missiles, and various other unmanned systems. This escalation highlights Russia’s continued efforts to target critical infrastructure and military positions while refining its drone warfare strategy.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/russian-tactics-shift-to-daytime-drone-strikes/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
27 Nov 24. Cuashub.com said today that Russia launches drone assault of unprecedented scale. Russia conducted its largest drone assault on Ukraine since the war began, deploying 192 aerial targets, including 188 drones, in an overnight operation targeting critical infrastructure beginning November 25. Ukraine’s Air Force reported 76 drones were shot down while 95 others were disrupted by electronic warfare but not intercepted. Five drones were tracked entering Belarusian airspace.
Key targets and impact
The western Ternopil region suffered the most severe consequences, with extensive damage to its power grid leaving 70 percent of the area without electricity. The attack disrupted water and heating supplies, and local officials warned that restoration efforts could take a significant time.
“The consequences are bad because the facility was significantly affected and this will have an impact on the power supply of the entire region for a long time,” said Vyacheslav Nehoda, Ternopil’s governor.
The capital, Kyiv, was also targeted, but air defense systems successfully intercepted more than ten drones, limiting damage. Falling debris in the Kyiv region caused property damage but no casualties.
The scale of the drone deployment signals a Russian to finally overwhelm Ukrainian air defences. Using low-cost “Shahed” kamikaze drones and other, unidentified UAS, Russia launched an assault of unprecedented scale on Ukraine’s defenses, combining these with Iskander-M ballistic missile strikes launched from the Voronezh and Kursk regions.
“The enemy launched a record number of Shahed attack UAVs and unidentified drones,” the Air Force reported on Telegram. The drones’ diverse approaches and coordinated waves strained Ukraine’s interception capabilities.
Ukraine’s counter-UAS defenses
Ukraine’s response included a multi-layered defense involving aviation, anti-aircraft missiles and electronic warfare. Despite these efforts, significant portions of the attacking drones evaded capture or interception. This indicates both the growing sophistication of Russia’s UAS tactics and the challenges faced by Ukraine’s counter-UAS systems.
Russia’s intensified use of UAVs coincides with its renewed offensives in Ukraine’s eastern territories, underscoring a strategy to pressure Ukraine on multiple fronts. The attacks also demonstrate the critical need for Ukraine to enhance its counter-drone capabilities to protect civilian infrastructure amid escalating threats.
Ukraine’s Air Force noted that active countermeasures by electronic warfare systems were partially effective, but called for further innovations to address the increasing scale and complexity of drone attacks. (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
26 Nov 24. Ukrainian Uncrewed Aerial Mothership Launches Kamikaze Drones. Ukraine’s domestically developed Dovbush T10 drone has taken on a new role acting as a mothership for first-person view (FPV) kamikaze quadcopters. In this configuration, the T10 also serves as a key signal relay node between the highly maneuverable one-way-attackers and their operators. Beskrestnov (sometimes referred to by the pseudonyms Serhii Flash or Flesh; his first name can also be found written as Serhiy) is a Ukrainian servicemember who has been cited as an expert in “radio technologies” and other military electronics. He regularly posts about new uncrewed aerial systems, electronic warfare, and other battlefield developments.
Ukrainian “Dovbush” UAV carrying and releasing two FPV drones during tests.
According to Beskrestnov, the T10 mothership can carry up to six FPVs at a time. The footage he shared online shows picture-in-picture views as the kamikaze drones are released while their launch platform continues on separately. A single pickup truck looks to be the test target for both kamikaze drones.
Interestingly, the clips also show that the drones are held in place upside down under the T10’s wings via their small bomb-shaped payloads and that they flip over when they are released.
I find the way the FPV is attached to the wing amusing. The bomb acts as an adapter between the mothership and the FPV-Kamikaze. And the FPV itself hangs upside down
In his Telegram post, Beskrestnov did not provide more details about the T10 mothership’s capabilities, including its range and endurance and how far the FPVs can reach after launch.
The T10 first emerged in late 2022 configured as a surveillance and reconnaissance platform with an unspecified sensor package and a reported range of just under 22 miles (35 kilometers). The drone can also be employed as a one-way-attacker with a nearly 26-and-a-half-pound (12-kilogram) warhead. In its baseline configuration, the design reportedly costs around $12,000.
The T10’s primary mode of launch appears to be via a rack installed on the top of a pickup truck, which gets it up to a suitable speed to fly off on its own. How it might be recovered after a mission is unclear. The design reportedly features a navigation package that can fall back in some way on inertial navigation system (INS) guidance if its GPS signal is jammed, something that is a major threat on the battlefield in Ukraine.
At its most basic level, the T10 mothership offers a way to maximize the reach of typically short-range FPV drones by releasing them at the edge of its own combat radius. The FPVs also gain extra loiter time, which they could spend on identifying and/or maneuvering to their targets, or even waving off an initial attack run and coming back from a different, unexpected vector.
Putting the signal relay on the mothership orbiting above also puts that node closer to where the FPVs are actually operating, making it easier to maintain connectivity. The graphic below offers a good visual depiction of the overall benefits of this combination.
The T10 mothership is not the first such combination to emerge on the battlefield in Ukraine, with the Russians also employing larger drones as aerial launch platforms and signal relay nodes for FPVs.
Russian forces started using Pchelka drone carrier in Ukraine. The UAV is capable of carrying and dropping FPV drones from the air. Moreover, it also serves as a signal repeater, increasing the range of use of drones.
The Drone-type “ mother” was used, which serves as a repeater for the control and video signal for up to 40 km distance and also a carries multiple FPV drones.
While Ukraine’s T10-based drone mothership may not be the first such design to emerge in the conflict there, it is more evidence of the value this kind of combination offers already. (Source: UAS VISION/yahoo!news)
25 Nov 24. Russian propagandists criticize Putin’s ‘super missile.’ New satellite images have surfaced showing the aftermath of a missile strike on the Pivdenmash aerospace plant in Dnipro, Ukraine, following an attack by Russia’s latest missile, referred to by President Vladimir Putin as “Oreshnik.” Contrary to Russian media claims, the images show that the aerospace plant sustained only minor damage, sparking frustration among Russian propagandists who had previously touted the complete destruction of the facility.
The satellite photographs, published after the November 2024 strike, reveal that much of the missile’s payload failed to reach its intended target. Instead, several missiles impacted nearby civilian areas, causing damage to residential homes, garages, and other private structures. The Pivdenmash plant itself, a significant site for Ukraine’s aerospace industry, appeared largely intact despite the strike.
The Kremlin-connected Romanov Light Telegram channel addressed the situation, stating, “Satellite images of Pivdenmash have appeared, showing the site after the ‘Oreshnik’ strike. The workshops are still there, nothing has been ‘reduced to dust.’ However, it seems that the residential area above was hit.” This comment reflects growing dissatisfaction among some Russian military commentators about the effectiveness of the strike.
Ilya Tumanov, a prominent figure in military circles and known from the fighterbomber Telegram channel, also expressed his disappointment: “The agonizing wait for proper satellite images is over. What has been shown to the world is some blurry nonsense, with no craters or workshops reduced to rubble and dust.” His remarks highlighted the unfulfilled expectations of destruction that Russian officials had claimed.
The decision to use the advanced “Oreshnik” missile, which has been described by Putin as a new super weapon, is facing criticism. Analysts argue that Putin’s emotional decision to deploy such a highly classified missile for a test strike has inadvertently handed Western experts an opportunity to study its components and technology. This represents the first confirmed use of this missile class in an active combat scenario globally.
Despite the missile being largely reduced to fragments after impact, Ukrainian military officials have confirmed that experts from Ukraine, together with international specialists, now have direct access to these remnants. According to Ukrainian officials, even fragmented pieces are valuable for studying the missile’s technology, materials, and potential innovations. The analysis of these components will be conducted in cooperation with Western partners, further enhancing the understanding of Russia’s latest weapons.
The missile strike and its aftermath illustrate the complexities of deploying new technology in warfare, particularly when high-profile systems are used in environments where they may fail to achieve their intended results. For Ukraine, the access to these missile components provides a rare opportunity to gain insights into one of Russia’s latest advanced weapon systems. (Source: Google/https://defence-blog.com/)
25 Nov 24. Ukrainian ATACMS Strike Reportedly Destroys Russian S-400 System in Kursk. Ukrainian forces have reportedly launched a precision strike using U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles on an S-400 air-defense system in Russia’s Kursk region. According to a statement from the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), the attack, carried out over the weekend, destroyed a 92N6E radar station, two missile launchers, and other components of the S-400 system, which was undergoing maintenance at the time. The strike also reportedly killed five officers from the 1490th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, part of Russia’s 6th Army, as well as three technicians from Almaz-Antey JSC, the state corporation responsible for the system’s development.
Images shared by Ukrainian sources, showing scorched areas and multiple impact points, suggest the use of at least two ATACMS missiles. These are precision-guided ballistic missiles with a range of up to 190 miles, recently greenlit for use against targets inside Russian territory by the U.S. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
23 Nov 24. Ukrainian Army’s Artillery Enhanced with Germany’s Donation of 4 Additional PzH 2000 Howitzers. The PzH 2000 is renowned for its advanced design and formidable battlefield performance. Its primary armament is the Rheinmetall 155mm L52 artillery gun, compatible with standard NATO 155mm ammunition. The system can engage targets at a range of up to 30 km using standard rounds, with extended ranges achievable when employing assisted projectiles.
The howitzer’s rate of fire is another standout feature, capable of firing three rounds in nine seconds and sustaining a rate of 8–10 rounds per minute. This rapid-fire capability allows it to deliver overwhelming firepower in critical moments. Mobility is ensured by an MTU 881 Ka-500 engine, which generates 1,000 PS (986 hp) and allows the vehicle to reach speeds of up to 67 km/h (41 mph).
The PzH 2000 boasts armor designed to withstand 14.5mm machine-gun fire and shell splinters, with additional roof armor to protect against mortar rounds. The system is operated by a five-person crew, including the commander, driver, gunner, and two loaders.
Since its deployment in Ukraine in mid-2022, the PzH 2000 has proven to be a game-changer on the battlefield. Ukrainian artillery units have effectively utilized these howitzers to counter Russian military advances and destroy fortified positions. The system’s precision, combined with its rapid-fire capability, has been highly effective in disrupting enemy operations.
Ukrainian soldiers have praised the PzH 2000 for its accuracy and versatility, highlighting its significant impact in both defensive and offensive operations. Its advanced targeting systems have enabled operators to engage high-value targets with minimal collateral damage.
However, the intense pace of combat in Ukraine has placed additional stress on the PzH 2000 units. The howitzer is designed to fire up to 100 rounds per day, a limit that Ukrainian forces frequently exceed in their operations. This high rate of fire has accelerated wear and tear on the systems, necessitating frequent maintenance. Repairs have been facilitated through specialized maintenance hubs established in neighboring countries, underscoring the need for logistical support to sustain these advanced systems.
Despite these challenges, the German PzH 2000 howitzer has solidified its reputation as a critical asset for Ukraine’s artillery forces. Its mobility, firepower, and advanced targeting make it a formidable tool against Russian forces. Germany’s ongoing commitment, as evidenced by the latest delivery, underscores the strategic importance of the PzH 2000 in Ukraine’s continuing struggle for sovereignty.
Germany’s delivery of an additional four PzH 2000 howitzers highlights its unwavering commitment to supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression. Since the beginning of the war, Germany has been a pivotal ally, providing a broad range of military equipment essential for Ukraine’s resilience and combat effectiveness.
This support has included advanced air defense systems like the IRIS-T SLM, Gepard anti-aircraft tanks, and Patriot air defense missile systems to counter aerial threats. Additionally, Germany has supplied Leopard 2 main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles like the Marder, and various forms of artillery, including the PzH 2000 and precision-guided munitions. These contributions have played a crucial role in bolstering Ukraine’s ability to defend its territory and reclaim key areas under occupation.
The ongoing provision of advanced weaponry, spare parts, and logistical support reflects not only Germany’s military commitment but also its solidarity with Ukraine in the face of a protracted conflict. As Ukraine continues its fight for sovereignty, the continued support from Germany and other allied nations will be instrumental in sustaining its defense capabilities and securing a just and lasting resolution. (Source: Google/https://armyrecognition.com/)
26 Nov 24. A North Korean general was injured and several officers sent by Pyongyang to Russia’s Kursk region were killed last week when Ukraine launched British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles at a Russian command centre, according to a Ukrainian official. The official said the strike, which hit the town of Marino, was one of “several” that have targeted the North Koreans in Kursk region over the past week, also using other weapons. Ukrainian forces were actively searching for more positions where the North Koreans were present, noting that they had been spread out, he added. The identity of the general was not disclosed. Ukrainian intelligence said that North Korea had sent Colonel General Kim Jong Bok to oversee the “Storm Corps” special forces units deployed in Russia. It is unclear whether he was in Marino during the attack. The Wall Street Journal, citing western officials, first reported that a North Korean general had been injured. US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said last month that the North Korean troops who enter the fray would be “fair game and fair targets” for Ukrainian forces. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), citing information from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service and echoing Ukrainian intelligence officials interviewed by the Financial Times, said last week that the North Korean troops were likely training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne units “in preparation for combat in Kursk” region. Deep State, a Ukrainian war tracking group closely tied to the defence ministry, shows all three brigades located in Kursk region and part of the its eponymous regional capital. After capturing some 1,100 sq km of Russian territory in August, Ukraine currently controls just over half of that, according to military officials and Deep State’s calculations. Thousands of North Korean soldiers have now been deployed from staging grounds to Russia’s second line, freeing up more of Moscow’s own 50,000-strong force for combat with the Ukrainian troops, according to senior officials in Kyiv. (Source: FT.com)
22 Nov 24. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian drone units responsible for 80 percent of Russian losses. Ukraine’s drone units now account for at least 80 percent of Russian frontline losses, according to a report by The New York Times. Ukraine’s drone units have become a cornerstone of its military strategy, as ammunition supplies dwindle and the Ukrainian army grapples with troop shortages, drones have increasingly filled the gap, becoming essential in the fight against Russia. Ukrainian commanders note that the reduced availability of US-made HIMARS missile systems has further driven the dependence on drones. HIMARS, which have a range of about 50 miles and are used to strike targets behind enemy lines, have become increasingly scarce on the battlefield.
“HIMARS — I barely hear them at all anymore. They’re almost non-existent,” said Sgt. Maj. Dmytro, a 33-year-old drone operator and company leader. “If we had more munitions, it could compensate for the lack of people.”
Russia targets drone teams
Ukraine’s small drone teams, often operating in groups of just a few soldiers, have become high-priority targets for Russian forces. Sgt. Maj. Vasyl, a drone pilot, explained that Russia uses large glide bomb munitions, typically deployed against buildings or defensive positions, to attack Ukrainian drone teams.
“If they detect a drone operator, everything is thrown at us,” he said.
Ukraine’s frontline drone units use FPV drones for reconnaissance and direct attacks. These drones are often packed with explosives and flown into Russian positions or armoured vehicles. Ukraine has rapidly expanded its drone production capabilities during the war, producing advanced models as well as cost-effective designs for frontline use. In October, Ukraine exceeded its annual goal of manufacturing one m FPV drones according to comments made by Lieutenant General Ivan Havryliuk, Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine to Ukrainian media. The heavy use of drones has become a defining feature of the war in Ukraine, fueling an arms race between the two sides as both seek to accelerate development of C-UAS solutions. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-drone-units-responsible-for-80-percent-of-russian-losses/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
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