NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Oct 20.

Oct 18.

• Ukraine: Presidential comments are highly unlikely to indicate plans to acquire nuclear weapons. On 17 October, Ukrainian President Zelensky reported that, in September, he told US presidential candidate Donald Trump that Ukraine either needs to be part of NATO or to pursue nuclear capabilities to ensure its long-term security. Later that day, however, Zelensky backtracked on his remarks, reassuring that Ukraine is not seeking nuclear capabilities. While Ukraine theoretically retains the potential to acquire a nuclear weapon, we assess that Ukraine is highly unlikely to pursue such a programme in the short term, given its Western partners’ non-negotiable opposition to nuclear proliferation. Zelensky’s contradictory comments likely reflect Ukraine’s attempts to consider all options to ensure the country’s long-term security against Russian aggression. Nevertheless, NATO membership will remain Ukraine’s priority. The first element of Zelensky’s victory plan, presented on 16 October to Ukrainian lawmakers, relates to an ‘unconditional’ invitation to join NATO in the near term. As such, the comments concerning nuclear weapons could realistically form part of an effort to encourage NATO allies to extend an invitation to Ukraine, which nevertheless remains unlikely in the short term. Irrespectively, we assess that Zelensky’s comments will likely trigger regional tensions with its Western partners and Russia and could realistically increase the risk of Russian strikes against Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure in the coming months.

Oct 17.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• KURSK: A Russian official has claimed that Russian forces have now retaken around half of the territory that Ukraine originally occupied when it began its Kursk offensive in August
• NORTH KOREA: Ukrainian intelligence claims that North Korean personnel are preparing to deploy in support of Russian combat operations and industrial production, though this is unconfirmed
• AID: US President Joe Biden announced new military aid to Ukraine worth USD 425m, while Australia has committed to sending 49 Abrams tanks to Ukraine
• FORECAST: On 16 October, President Zelensky presented the details of his ‘victory plan’ to Ukrainian lawmakers
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have advanced north of Verkhnokamyanske (located to the east of Siversk), expanding their salient towards Siversk. They have claimed various other advances in the area over the last two weeks, though it remains unclear whether they have also advanced to the north-east of Siversk.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have continued to make grinding advances in central Toretsk. Geolocated footage from 15-16 October confirms Russian advances in the town centre as well as in western Druzhba, a satellite settlement located to the east of Toretsk. Notably, Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Anastasiya Bobovnikova reported on 15 October that Russian artillery and aircraft have destroyed all buildings in Toretsk that Ukrainian forces could have used as defensive positions – reflecting the sheer scale of the devastation and Russia’s efforts to deny Ukrainian forces any and all defensive advantages in urban environments. Nevertheless, Russian forces will likely have to expend their personnel and equipment to grind forwards in what will remain a highly attritional battle for the remnants of Toretsk. Meanwhile, geolocated footage published on 14 October also indicates Russian forces advanced to the west of Niu York (located to the south-west of Toretsk).
• DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces have continued to make creeping advances in the Pokrovsk sector; however, they are increasingly unlikely to capture the key settlement of Pokrovsk before the muddy season sets in. On 16 October, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces captured Krasny Yar, a settlement located 6.2 miles (10km) to the south-east of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage from 1 October shows Russian forces raising a flag at the settlement’s House of Culture, likely confirming their control of the area. A Russian milblogger noted that the deterioration of the weather has slowed down Russian operations in the area. As such, we assess that the arrival of the muddy season in the coming weeks will highly likely undermine Russian efforts to capture Pokrovsk in the short term, though this will not (by itself) prevent further Russian advances. Russian forces have conducted numerous winter offensive operations throughout the war, even amid unfavourable ground and weather conditions.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, on 16 October, Russia’s MoD claimed that its forces captured Maksymilianivka, a settlement located 5.2 miles (8.5km) to the south-east of Kurakhove (west of Donetsk city). Although such claims remain visually unconfirmed, they underscore that Kurakhove is a key objective of Russian operations west of Donetsk city, with slow progress increasing pressure on the defending Ukrainian forces.
• KHARKIV: Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) claimed on 16 October that its forces cleared a forested area of 400 hectares to the north of Lyptsi (located to the north of Kharkiv city), reportedly inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces. The GUR claims to have ‘destroyed’ three unspecified Russian motorised rifle battalions during the operation. However, we cannot confirm this (or the claimed Ukrainian advance) at present.
• KURSK: Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander Apty Alaudinov claimed on 14 October that Russian forces have now retaken around half of the territory that Ukraine originally occupied when it began its Kursk oblast (Russia) offensive in August. While we cannot confirm this claim, it remains likely that Russian forces have indeed recaptured around 50% of the territory which Ukraine at least temporarily advanced across in August. Alaudinov, who has presented himself as the unofficial spokesperson of Russian forces in Kursk, subsequently stated on 15 October that the operational goal of Russian forces in Kursk is to ‘lure’ Ukrainian forces into an encirclement and destroy the forces caught therein.
• KURSK: Ukrainian and Russian sources have also reported that the muddy season (rasputitsa, also known as bezdorizhzhia in Ukrainian) has begun to set in across Kursk. This will reduce ground quality for wheeled vehicles on both sides, undermining mechanised assaults.
• KURSK: Despite the weather, Russian forces have continued to make slow advances along the western and eastern flanks of Ukraine’s Kursk salient, though the full extent of Ukraine’s control of these areas remains unclear. Geolocated footage from 15 October confirms Russian advances to the south-east of Sudzha, while footage from 15-16 October also indicates Russian advances to the east of Lyubimovka (located to the south-east of Koronevo) along the western flank of the salient. Russian sources have also claimed over the last week that their forces have pushed Ukrainian forces from the vast majority of the Glushovosky salient (located due west of Ukraine’s main Kursk salient to the north of the international border and to the south of the Seym River). While we cannot confirm this, it remains likely that Ukrainian forces have lost the majority of the positions they once held in this area; they likely only retain smaller positions along the international border.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have made confirmed gains along the Oskil-Kreminna line and are likely to attempt to maintain a high operational tempo in the sector in the coming days and weeks. On 16 October, Russia’s MoD claimed that its forces captured Nevske to the north-west of Kreminna, which geolocated footage from 16 October seemingly confirms. A Ukrainian military observer also confirmed the capture of the settlement by Russian troops, who are, according to him, attempting to advance west across the Zherebets River towards Novolyubivka and south in the direction of Novosadove, both located to the west of Kreminna. He also assessed that the Russian command is preparing to intensify operations in the Kreminna sector, but lacks the necessary reserves to sustain protracted offensive operations. According to the observer, the Russian command is forming assault companies with 10-12 armoured vehicles, likely to launch mechanised assaults in the sector. Yet once again, increasingly muddy conditions will undermine these efforts in the coming weeks. Further north, footage from 15 October also shows Russian advances into south-eastern Kolisnykivka (located to the south-east of Kupiansk).
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have launched a number of attacks along the southern axis in recent days, but have not yet made any notable confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked towards Mala Tokmachka, located roughly six miles (10km) to the south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast) on 15-16 October. Despite claims of advances, these developments remain unconfirmed. On 15 October, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces fighting in the area, Vladyslav Voloshyn, reported that Russian forces are conducting regular missile and drone strikes in the area, but have not accumulated sufficient forces for large-scale offensive operations on this axis. This aligns with our ongoing assessment that Russian assaults along the southern axis will likely remain relatively limited in contrast to the higher-priority Russian offensive operations in Donetsk.
• STRIKES: On 15 October, Russia attacked Ukraine with seven S-300/400 missiles, two Kh-59 missiles and 17 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine intercepted 12 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. As a result of Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW), four UAVs failed to reach their targets.
• STRIKES: On 16 October, Ukrainian forces intercepted 68 of the 136 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia; EW measures disabled an additional 60 UAVs. An S-300/400 missile and a Kh-59 missile were reportedly not intercepted. Ukrainian air defences were active in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Ternopil and Zhytomyr oblasts.
• STRIKES: Early on 17 October, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with one Kh-59 missile and 56 Shahed-136/131 drones; Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down 22 drones and disabled 27 others via EW measures. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Ternopil and Zhytomyr oblasts. The Ukrainian authorities reported that the remaining drones damaged unspecified infrastructure facilities along the frontline.
• STRIKES: On 16 October, CNN published an article investigating a Ukrainian drone unit conducting long-range UAV strikes against Russian territory.  The unit commanders explained that the unit has been focusing its strike efforts on ammunition depots. A strike launched in late September allegedly targeted a storage facility housing recently supplied Iranian ballistic missiles. Destroying Russian storage facilities, particularly those housing Russian ammunition, such as artillery rounds, glide bombs and missiles, has been a key element of Ukraine’s strategy, as we have previously assessed. Such attacks aim to disrupt Russian military logistics and ultimately slow down Russian offensive operations.
• STRIKES: The article also reported on the tactics used to enhance the lethality of Ukrainian strikes. These tactics heavily rely on decoy drones (which represent up to 30% of drone strikes) to saturate Russian air defences and subsequently create opportunities for successful strikes. Assessing the success of a drone strike is reportedly verified through ground intelligence, Russian reporting via Telegram and satellite imagery.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NORTH KOREA: On 16 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky criticised China, Iran and North Korea for supporting Russia in waging war against Ukraine. Zelensky accused Beijing of refraining from taking ‘truly serious’ and ‘effective’ steps to stop Russian aggression and denounced Russo-Chinese co-operation, as well as Iranian support for Russia. Elsewhere, Zelensky insisted that North Korea is participating in the war against Ukraine on Russia’s side.
• NORTH KOREA: The Ukrainian president cited unspecified domestic Ukrainian intelligence that proves that North Korea is transferring not only weapons to Russia, but also workers for Russian factories and possibly troops. According to Zelensky, these workers are filling the gaps left by Russian citizens who were sent to fight in Ukraine. Meanwhile, an unnamed Western diplomat claimed on 15 October that Pyongyang has sent around 10,000 North Korean soldiers to Russia, though the exact type of these soldiers is unknown.
• NORTH KOREA: Ukrainian outlets, including Suspilne, also reported on 15 October that Russia’s 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade is forming a 3,000-strong ‘battalion’ staffed by North Korean troops. While the size of such a force would be closer to a brigade than a battalion, it remains unclear whether this is actually taking place. Ukrainian intelligence also alleged that 18 North Korean soldiers have already deserted positions in Kursk. It therefore remains unclear if North Korean troops are already deploying to frontline positions, with the New York Times reporting on 16 October that unnamed US military and intelligence officials have expressed ‘some scepticism’ that large numbers of North Korean personnel are fighting in Ukraine. We cannot confirm the intelligence Ukraine claims to have in its possession.
• NORTH KOREA: Nevertheless, the transfer of several thousand North Korean military personnel and/or labourers to Russia would highly likely offset growing shortages. Additional human resources will likely allow the Kremlin to avoid declaring another round of partial mobilisation, which would mitigate against the risk of societal backlash and a further exodus of Russians. The Kremlin has consistently shown its reluctance to issue further mobilisation orders. Ultimately, North Korean manpower would allow the Russian government to further insulate the (ethnic) Russian population from the ongoing war, especially those from affluent urban areas home to the country’s elites (particularly the capital Moscow and St. Petersburg).
• AID: On 15 October, US President Joe Biden announced new military aid to Ukraine worth USD 425 m. According to a statement from the White House, it includes additional air defence capabilities, air-to-ground munitions, armoured vehicles and unspecified critical munitions. The notice also mentioned that the US will provide Kyiv with additional capabilities in the coming months, which is highly likely in anticipation of Biden leaving office in January 2025. These include hundreds of air defence interceptors, dozens of tactical air defence systems, artillery systems and ‘significant quantities’ of ammunition, as well as other materiel. Zelensky claimed that the new assistance includes unspecified ‘long-range weapons’; he did not mention if there were any operational restrictions (though we assess their use against targets inside Russia is most likely prohibited).
• AID: Meanwhile, Australia will donate 49 US-produced Abrams M1A1 tanks to Ukraine. According to Australian Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy, these tanks will deliver more firepower and mobility to Ukrainian forces. According to media reports, a small number will require refurbishments before being delivered to Europe; they could also be sent to Ukraine and used for spare parts or other roles. As such, exact timelines for their transfer remain uncertain. However, as Ukraine already has these tanks in its arsenal, integrating them onto the battlefield is unlikely to delay using them effectively, though they are among the most complex systems operated by Ukrainian forces.

FORECAST

STRATEGY: On 16 October, President Zelensky presented the details of his ‘victory plan’ to Ukrainian lawmakers. The framework consists of five points comprising geopolitical, military, economic and security-related provisions; it also contains classified annexes, mostly relating to defence and deterrence, meaning that elements of the strategy remain unknown.

The first element of the plan relates to Ukraine receiving an ‘unconditional’ invitation to join NATO in the near term. According to Zelensky, an invitation to join the military alliance would possibly serve as a signal to Russia that its efforts to prevent Ukraine from joining the bloc have failed. However, the US ambassador to NATO, Julianne Smith, disclosed on 16 October that the bloc does not plan to invite Ukraine to become a member in the immediate future. Similarly, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated earlier on 17 October that Ukraine will join the alliance in the future, but disclosed that allies are currently focused on efforts to build a bridge towards membership. As such, the remarks confirm our ongoing assessment that Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO in the foreseeable future, meaning the first element of the plan is unlikely to be realised.

The second point of the plan relates to defence and the steps towards strengthening Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression. Zelensky specified that there is a clear list of weapons needed to sustain Ukraine’s armed forces. He emphasised the importance of ensuring that the war is brought back to Russian territory. He also noted that one key element is the ‘successful continuation’ of operations in ‘defined areas’ of Russian territory to prevent Russia establishing buffer zones in Ukraine – likely referring to Kursk. Zelensky also called for expanding Ukraine’s missile and drone use, as well as investment to increase the domestic production of these weapons.

As part of the second point, the plan emphasises strengthening Ukraine’s air defence systems to protect against Russian strikes, as well as joint efforts with countries neighbouring Ukraine to shoot down Russian projectiles. In addition, Zelensky reissued calls for partners to lift restrictions on the use of long-range weapons on all Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine, as well as de jure Russian land. Zelensky named military infrastructure as targets for such strikes while demanding the provision of suitable long-range capabilities such as missiles and drones. Firstly, NATO is highly unlikely to allow countries bordering Ukraine (principally Poland and Romania) to shoot down Russian missiles and drones over Ukraine in the coming months due to concerns of escalation. Approval (at least that which is granted publicly) on long-range strikes against military targets inside de jure Russian territory also remains uncertain despite ongoing debates about the matter.

The third point of the plan relates to deterrence and containing future acts of Russian aggression, though it is arguably the most uncertain part of the entire strategy. This point refers to deterring Russian aggression through a ‘non-nuclear strategic deterrence package deployed on Ukrainian soil’. While it remains unclear what exactly this means, it likely refers to some form of genuine (and permanent) strategic long-range attack capability that would threaten Russia’s interior.

Meanwhile, the fourth provision relates to harnessing Ukraine’s economic potential, such as tapping into its rich natural resources, as well as doubling down on sanctions against Russia. Zelensky reportedly discussed with the US and selected partners (including the EU) the possibility of an agreement to protect critical resources available in Ukraine, as well as joint investment. This point highly likely aims to assist in reviving foreign investment in Ukraine to aid with the country’s post-war recovery. It also includes a secret annex that is only to be shared with designated allies.

The fifth and final point relates to security in the post-war period; Zelensky stated that, if partners agree, certain US military contingents stationed in Europe could be replaced with Ukrainian units that have battlefield experience. This is almost certainly an attempt to appeal to Western policy makers (in particular those in the US) by emphasising the need to share the burden of military deployments to Europe; Zelensky’s proposal possibly intends to allow the US to pivot its forces away from Europe towards the Indo-Pacific.

Zelensky stated that his victory plan can be implemented by the end of 2025, but only with the help of Ukraine’s partners. According to Zelensky, if allies begin following the strategy, there is a possibility that the war will end ‘no later than next year’. However, such comments assume that Russia would be willing, or forced, to enter negotiations if the plan is implemented. We continue to see no genuine indication that Russia is prepared to negotiate with Ukraine in the short term, especially now that its forces are making advances on the battlefield. Moscow is unlikely to agree to genuine negotiations in the near term when it is making gains in Ukraine and believes its attritional strategy to outlast Western support for Ukraine is beginning to bear fruit.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi disclosed on 16 October that the UK is devising its own proposals for the victory plan and its implementation. While limited details were provided, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine’s allies will be willing to commit to several provisions of this strategy (as mentioned above), which will limit the prospect of it being successfully implemented. At the same time, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz disclosed on 16 October that he is willing to talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin about a ‘just peace’ in Ukraine, if asked. The timing is notable given Zelensky’s efforts to promote his victory plan, with Scholz’ comments possibly indicating his willingness to accelerate peace negotiations.

Meanwhile, polling continues to indicate that the majority of Ukrainians still consider the expulsion of Russian troops from the entirety of Ukraine and the restoration of its territorial integrity as the definition of a victory. According to polling from late September by the Razumkov Centre, 37.8% of respondents consider this to reflect a Ukrainian victory. Meanwhile, 17.5% consider destroying the Russian army and upheaval in Russia to be a victory. The third-largest share of respondents (16.6%) described victory as the removal of Russian troops to behind the lines of February 2024 (meaning parts of Donetsk and Luhansk remain occupied, as well as Crimea). Just over 8% stated that they would regard an end to the war that sees Russia retaining control over the territories it has annexed in the full-scale invasion as a Ukrainian victory.

Such polling underscores that any scenario in which Russia retains control over Ukrainian territory remains deeply unpopular among Ukrainian society. For Zelensky to entertain serious concessions in order to end the war, a significant shift in public sentiment would likely be needed, as would a referendum to provide Kyiv with a political mandate to end the war. While Zelensky could proceed to conclude the war in 2025 (or after) without public input, the controversy of such a peace settlement would seriously undermine his political position.

Amid growing discussions regarding how the war could end, the White House has rescheduled a meeting of Ukraine’s allies. The same meeting was cancelled earlier this month and scheduled for November, though a concrete date remains unknown. The meeting, convened as the Ukraine Defence Contract Group (Ramstein format), will be held virtually and at the ‘leader-level’. Leaders are expected to co-ordinate with international partners on additional assistance for Ukraine. Meanwhile, the next meeting of the Ukraine-NATO council is taking place today (17 October); likely key topics include the current situation on the battlefield, as well as Ukraine’s most pressing military needs.

Oct 16.

• Ukraine: Threat from Russian hybrid operations will remain very high for foreseeable future. On 15 October, Ukraine’s National Police announced an investigation into a wave of bomb threat messages sent to various state institutions, businesses and media outlets. Approximately 2,000 messages were sent on 14 October, most originating from Russian IP addresses. All were false and are highly likely part of Russian destabilisation operations orchestrated by Russian intelligence services. Meanwhile, earlier on 16 October, media reports indicated that Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has been recruiting Ukrainian teenagers to set fire to military vehicles in exchange for financial compensation. These incidents underscore the heightened risk of Russian hybrid threats in Ukraine, which also include mis- and dis-information campaigns and cyber operations. Alongside Russia’s long-range strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, these efforts aim to erode morale, particularly as the situation along the frontline remains critical. We assess that the risk of Russian destabilisation operations against Ukraine will remain high for the foreseeable future.

Oct 14.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS (click on each to navigate below):

• KURSK: Russian forces launched a large counter-attack across the Kursk axis; they have succeeded in pushing Ukrainian forces back in a number of places amid an intensification of offensive operations
• NORTH KOREA: Unspecified South Korean and Ukrainian officials have claimed that North Korean soldiers are assisting Russian troops and could potentially deploy to Ukraine to fight by the end of 2024
• NEGOTIATIONS: Ukraine reiterated its view that the war with Russia will end ‘no later than next year’ amid growing speculation that the former is considering compromises to bring about an end to the war
• FORECAST: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that he is prepared to interfere with aid to Ukraine in support of presidential hopeful Donald Trump if he is elected as the next US president
• OFFENSIVES: The Washington Post cited claims from Ukrainian soldiers operating on the Donetsk frontlines on 12 October that Russian forces have been utilising illicitly obtained Starlink terminals to improve tactical coordination on the battlefield. A Ukrainian commander of a drone platoon fighting near Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) claimed that Ukrainian forces have identified a sharp uptick in Starlink terminals among Russian positions in September, resulting in a decrease in interceptions of Russian radio transmissions.
• OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian military personnel interviewed by the Washington Post maintained that Russia’s seizure of Vuhledar (Donetsk oblast) earlier this month was partially due to Russian forces’ increased use of Starlink, which is improving battlefield communication and co-ordination and the accuracy of Russian artillery fire.  As we have previously reported, there is little SpaceX (the company that runs the Starlink satellite network) can do to prevent Russian forces from using Starlink terminals once they reach the battlefield. It will remain extremely difficult for SpaceX to determine which Starlink terminals in a given region of the frontline are being operated by which side. As such, if SpaceX cuts coverage to Russian forces in the Donbas, it will also risk cutting off frontline Ukrainian units operating in their vicinity; this would seriously undermine command and control efforts.
• BAKHMUT: Ukrainian officials confirmed on 10 and 11 October that Russian forces are now in control of between 50% and 60% of the frontline city of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), which remains one of Moscow’s priority operational objectives in Ukraine. Russian advances into the centre of the town have nevertheless been slow and highly costly. Ukrainian forces are conducting sporadic, localised counter-attacks in certain areas; geolocated footage published on 9-10 October indicates that they managed to retake some marginal positions in the centre of Toretsk, as well as positions to the south of Toretsk (north-east of Neplivka).
• DONETSK: Over the past few days, Ukrainian forces have regained lost positions in the Pokrovsk sector, specifically near Selydove, likely in a bid to disrupt Russian efforts to encircle the settlement. According to an OSINT group with links to Ukraine, overnight on 12-13 October, Ukrainian forces regained limited positions near the town of Novohrodivka, also located south-east of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage from 13 October shows that Ukrainian forces recaptured positions north of Selydove (south-east of Pokrovsk). Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces captured Mykhailivka, a settlement just east of Selydove and south of Pokrovsk. While the Russian MoD’s statements have yet to be confirmed, they underscore ongoing efforts to capture Selydove, which would be crucial for its efforts to set conditions to advance north to capture the logistics hub at Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian operations continued progressing west and south-west of Donetsk City towards Kurakhove, a direction where some of the heaviest fighting has been taking place in recent days. Geolocated footage from 13 October shows recent Russian advances towards south-eastern Katerynivka, south-west of Donetsk City. On 14 October, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that the situation along the Kurakhove front (west of Donetsk City) remains critical.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Russian forces launched a large counter-attack across the Kursk axis on 10 October, and have seemingly succeeded in pushing Ukrainian forces back across a range of places amid an intensification of offensive operations. Geolocated footage from 10 October indicates that Russian forces succeeded in advancing into Kremyanoye (located around six miles (10km) east of Korenevo) and have also moved south-east along the main highway between Korenevo and Suzhda, reaching the northern outskirts of a village called Zeleny Shlyakh. Russian sources also reported that their forces succeeded in enveloping Ukrainian positions around Lyubimovka, located seven miles (12km) south-east of Korenevo. It remains unclear at present whether Russian forces have retaken the town or have enveloped Ukrainian positions there. Nevertheless, Russian forces likely advanced towards Olgovka, likely taking the village of Matveevka, located around 2.5 miles (4km) east of Korenevo, as of 13 October. Russian sources claimed on 11 October that Russian forces have now retaken nearly two dozen settlements in Kursk oblast, though we cannot confirm this
• KURSK: These developments, confirmed by geolocated footage, indicate that Russian forces are steadily pushing the Ukrainians back along their western flank, though President Volodymyr Zelensky maintained on 13 October that Ukrainian forces are holding their positions in Kursk. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported in a film published on 10 October that Russian forces have redeployed around 50,000 troops from other operational areas to Kursk oblast since August. While the tempo of Russia’s offensive counter-attacks has stepped up over the last few days, it remains unlikely that the Russian High Command will want to redeploy significant forces from other high-priority frontlines in the Donbas to accelerate the recapture of Kursk oblast. It nevertheless remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to push Ukrainian forces back further before poor ground conditions caused by the Autumn rains begin limiting opportunities for manoeuvre operations.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past few days, Russian troops made confirmed gains in the Kupiansk sector. As of 11 October, Russian forces made confirmed gains south of Stepova Novoselivka (south-east of Kupyansk). Geolocated footage from 10 October also shows recent advances in northern Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).
• SOUTHERN: As we previously assessed, Russian forces began localised offensive operations along the southern axis this week, making some limited gains; these advances are unlikely to indicate a new, large-scale offensive priority. Both Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on 12-13 October that Russian forces succeeded in breaking through Ukrainian defences near the village of Levadne, located around 12 miles (20km) south-east of Velyka Novosilka. Reports confirm that Russian forces have reached the south-eastern outskirts of the settlement, but it remains unclear if they have taken the village and made further gains in the area. Further to the west, geolocated footage from 11 October indicates marginal Russian advances north-west of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
• STRIKES: On 11 October, Russia launched one Iskandr-M ballistic missile, one Kh-31P missile and 66 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted 29 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 31 drones reportedly failed to reach their targets due to active Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: On 12 October, Russia attacked Ukraine with an unspecified number of unidentified missiles and 28 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 24 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: On 13 October, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, two Kh-59 missiles and 68 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 31 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv and Poltava oblasts. According to Ukraine’s Air Force, 36 drones were lost in various oblasts, likely due to active EW measures. Russia did not launch any Shahed drones overnight on 13-14 October, which is the first time it has not done so since late August. Since then, Russia has been conducting daily drone attacks, including very large-scale UAV attacks.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, a Ukrainian drone strike launched on 12 October reportedly struck an oil storage facility in Rovenky, in Russia-occupied Luhansk oblast. A similar attack targeted a key oil terminal in occupied Crimea last week. Ukraine has, over the past few months, intensified attacks against oil infrastructure in Russian border regions and also within Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. Such attacks aim to disrupt the fuel supplies to Russian frontline troops and create logistical hurdles for Russian military operations.
• STRIKES: On 14 October, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that a Russian Tu-134 military aircraft was set on fire at a military airfield in Russia’s Orenburg oblast. According to the GUR, such aircraft are typically used to transport high-ranking Russian military officials. In May, Ukrainian forces claimed responsibility for a drone attack against a Voronezh-M long-range early warning radar system located in Orenburg oblast. The strike underscored Ukraine’s ability to conduct a long-range attack in a region located more than 621 miles (1,000km) from its borders. As such, though the GUR did not claim responsibility for the latest incident, we assess that it was likely the result of a Ukrainian long-range attack or a sabotage operation.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NORTH KOREA: Unspecified South Korean and Ukrainian officials have claimed that North Korean soldiers are assisting Russian troops. A Bloomberg report on 11 October cited an unnamed Ukrainian military intelligence official who claimed that ‘several thousand’ North Korean infantry soldiers are training in Russia and could possibly be deployed to the battlefield in Ukraine by the end of this year. The official said Ukraine has not observed anything to suggest North Korean units are fighting yet, but explained that North Korean officers are already in Russia-occupied Ukraine to study the battlefield and how Russian forces operate.
• NORTH KOREA: While we cannot confirm the report, it is highly likely credible given the growing military co-operation between North Korea and Russia. The deployment of North Korean troops to aid Russian soldiers would likely eventually ease manpower constraints for Russia in the coming months. While it is unclear what North Korea would receive in exchange for its offering of personnel, we assess that it could possibly stand to gain battlefield knowledge, as well as technology transfers and technological insights from Russia. For further analysis.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his view on 11 October that the war with Russia will end ‘no later than next year’.  Zelensky made the remarks while meeting German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, adding that he would present Scholz with a plan that sets out how Ukraine can win the war. The Ukrainian president offered limited details but added that the plan aims to force Russia to peace and ensure against renewed aggression in the future. Nonetheless, our assessment remains that the war is likely to protract into 2025 .
• NEGOTIATIONS: Meanwhile, the German media outlet Der Spiegel reported that the Ukrainian government is holding ‘serious discussions’ about abandoning its stated aim of fully restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity. According to an unspecified source close to the Ukrainian government, an agreement to end the war without some concessions would be impossible. The official noted that factors pushing Ukraine to consider territorial concessions include Russian advances in the east and the outcome of the US presidential election. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry on 10 October categorically refuted foreign media reports claiming that Ukraine is ready to make territorial concessions. We cannot confirm the veracity of the latest report, but it reflects that pressure is mounting for Ukraine to consider negotiations, including the possibility of ceding land to Russia, despite deep societal opposition to such an outcome.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Separately, presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak disclosed on 14 October that Ukraine’s victory plan includes a request for greater Western-provided long-range strike capabilities and permission to use them against military targets inside Russia. Podolyak stated that this authorisation could alter Russia’s calculus in the war by increasing domestic pressure and weakening Russian frontline resources. However, such permission alone is unlikely to change the trajectory of the war in Ukraine’s favour significantly. For further analysis on why Ukraine’s Western partners have not yet (at least publicly) granted such authorisation, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 30 September 2024.
• TROOPS: Reports emerged on 10 October claiming that the UK is considering sending troops to western Ukraine to train soldiers. According to unspecified sources familiar with the matter, the potential plan envisions instructors providing intensive basic training to new recruits before they are deployed to the front. This would reportedly solve some logistical issues which arise from sending Ukrainian troops to the UK for training, saving money. Meanwhile, British soldiers would reportedly learn battlefield skills and have the ability to test newly developed weapons.
• TROOPS: Although insiders say training would take place in ‘secluded’ locations removed from the frontline, Ukraine is an active warzone and regions that have seen fewer strikes cannot be considered completely risk-free. Training zones manned by Western troops would likely be a high-value target given Russia would use their presence to validate its claims that Kyiv’s Western partners (principally NATO members) are participants in the war. As such, the threat of long-range strikes or other sabotage operations against Western training missions in Ukraine would likely remain high if such deployments took place.

FORECAST

AID: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has stated he is prepared to interfere with aid to Ukraine in support of presidential hopeful Donald Trump if he is elected as the next US president. Politico reported on 14 October that Orbán, who retains friendly relations with Russia, has devised a plan that would let Trump possibly evade a USD 50 bn loan that the EU, G7 countries and the US have already agreed on to support Ukraine.

According to the report, this would allow Trump to assure Republican voters that he will not give Kyiv any further funding if elected in November. The Hungarian authorities reportedly claim that they will not approve changes to rules permitting the US to take a substantial role in the loan until after the US presidential vote. European leaders are in favour of extending the sanctions rollover period to at least 36 months, as the US had requested; however, Orbán is refusing to support this measure. All 27 EU Member States must be in agreement to approve any changes to the regulation of sanctions.

Europe will still likely go ahead with the loan even if the US does not participate in it substantially; however, failure to extend the duration of the sanctions will cost the EU, including Hungary, financially, according to an unnamed EU diplomat. Nevertheless, sources familiar with the matter said that the US is considering participating in the loan, even at a significantly lower amount. This will likely mean that Washington DC will contribute USD 5 bn. Moreover, the non-participation of the US could realistically push Japan to withdraw from the agreement. Ultimately, the reports underscore Hungary’s sustained efforts to interfere with support for Ukraine and the growing alignment between Orbán and Trump.

Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden will travel to Germany on 18 October to meet with Scholz after his trip was postponed due to a domestic natural disaster. Biden’s itinerary has been shortened and will no longer include a visit to the US military base in Ramstein (Rhineland-Palatinate state, Germany), where Ukraine’s allies traditionally gather for meetings on military support for Kyiv. Biden was originally set to convene a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (also known as the Ramstein format) on 12 October; Zelensky was also due to present his victory plan then. It remains uncertain if such a meeting will take place in the near term.

Despite this setback, Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov disclosed on 13 October that state visits to France, Germany, Italy and the UK resulted in pledges of further investment in Ukraine’s industrial-defence complex. London promised additional long-range weapons, artillery systems and robotic systems, while Paris discussed the possibility of opening a training centre for drone operators in France. Scholz announced on 11 October that his country, alongside Belgium, Denmark and Norway, will allocate another EUR 1.4 bn (USD 1.5 bn) in military aid to Ukraine this year. This is set to include additional IRIS-T and Skynex air defence systems, Gepard tanks with anti-aircraft gun systems, self-propelled howitzers and other capabilities.

The German opposition leader stated on 13 October that, following federal elections in September 2025, he would supply Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles, which Scholz has so far refused to do. That said, Friedrich Merz, the leader of the opposition conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, caveated that their provision would be subject to certain conditions. Firstly, according to Merz, Berlin would appeal to Moscow to cease attacking Ukrainian civilian targets, but, if this does not stop, Ukraine should be free to use delivered weapons without restrictions. According to polling from Politico, the centre-right CDU/CSU alliance is leading with 31% as of 11 October and is likely to win the 2025 federal election. As such, it is possible that a change to Berlin’s stance on providing long-range Taurus missiles could realistically change next year should Scholz fail to secure another mandate. Nevertheless, German public opinion on Ukraine conducting long-range strikes using Western weaponry against targets inside Russia is split; 42% of Germans agree with such strikes while 43% are against them.

Lastly, the Kremlin said on 13 October that Russia has not received a proposal from Germany for a telephone call between Scholz and President Vladimir Putin. Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov claimed that Putin remains open to contact. Conversely, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated on 11 October that Putin is no longer prepared to speak to Scholz. According to German media reports earlier this month, Scholz is hoping to speak to Putin for the first time in almost two years. However, we assess that, even if the two leaders eventually speak, the dialogue is unlikely to significantly influence Kremlin decision-making concerning the war in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)

18 Oct 24. France Sends First Domestically-Made Kamikaze Drones to Ukraine. On Wednesday, October 16, French Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu announced the first delivery of French-made kamikaze drones to Ukraine in the coming weeks.

Lecornu detailed that the aerial drones for transfer were manufactured by Delair, have successfully passed all performance tests, and will be soon adopted by both the French and Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The video from the defense minister shows one of these drones in action, visually similar to the DX-11 unmanned aerial system.

These will be the first attack UAVs of French production; the French army itself admits that its domestic industries are yet to catch up with modern drone technologies.

Therefore, it should not be surprising that as of now, the French military considers kamikaze drones to be just a “complement to the CAESAR artillery gun,” a quote by minister Lecornu.

Given that the French view the role of kamikaze drones in modern warfare as supplementary, the capabilities of these systems are in accordance with this vision. To put it simply, they are not quite impressive at all.

For example, there were earlier reports that France was making its kamikaze UAVs based on Delair’s UX11 mapping drone. The reference is an aerial vehicle mere 1.1 meters in wingspan, the total weight is 1.5 kilograms. Making an effective attack drone with a proper firepower would require a radical redesign; there’s no information yet if any such adjustments have been made.

Another basis for a kamikaze drone is the Delair DT46, an aircraft with a takeoff weight of 25 kg, 5 kilograms of payload capacity. One more model worth mentioning here is the DT26 reconnaissance UAV with a launch weight 17 kg and operational range 30–50 km.

Another fact speaking volumes of French approach to drone development is that despite the increased interest in kamikaze drones production announced by Paris officials in April 2024, the current defense plans of France provide for procurement of only 1,800 kamikaze drones for its armed forces by 2030.

Meanwhile, Ukraine aims to produce 1 m FPV drones by the end of 2024.

(Source: UAS VISION/Defense Express)

17 Oct 24. Australia confirms 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks will be gifted to Ukraine. An Australian Army M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank from the 1st Armoured Regiment drives through the Cultana Training Area, South Australia, during Exercise Rhino Run 24. Photo: CPL Johnny Huang

Australia has announced the gifting of 49 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks to Ukraine as part of the latest military assistance package worth around $245m.

The new equipment is expected to bolster the Armed Forces of Ukraine in its fight against Russian military forces, as well as add to the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s firepower and mobility and complement partners’ support for Ukraine’s armoured brigades.

The announcement brings the total value of Australia’s military assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to over $1.3bn and overall support to more than $1.5bn.

Australian Minister for Defence Industry and Capability Delivery Pat Conroy MP will be at the NATO Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Brussels and will be confirming this news directly with his Ukrainian counterpart.

“We stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine in their fight against Russia’s illegal invasion,” Minister Conroy said.

“These tanks will deliver more firepower and mobility to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and complement the support provided by our partners for Ukraine.

“As we face a challenging geostrategic environment, it is important that we continue to work together with our partners around the world to deter aggression and coercion and protect the global rules-based order.”

The M1A1 Abrams tanks have been an important capability for the Australian Army, providing substantial defence against enemy fire and improvised explosive devices. As they have done for Australia, the Abrams tanks will see both the capability and resistance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine further bolstered.

As was announced in January 2022, the Australian Army M1A1 Abrams are to be replaced by the M1A2 fleet. To support the transition, the Australian Army will retain a small number of M1A1 Abrams tanks to assist the introduction of the new M1A2 fleet.

The Australian Defence Force also continues to make significant contributions to multinational efforts to train Ukrainian military personnel under Operation Kudu.

The Australian government will continue to work with the government of Ukraine and its international partners to deliver meaningful support for Ukraine to end the conflict on its terms.

“Australia’s support for Ukraine has not wavered since Russia’s illegal invasion, and Australia will continue standing with Ukraine,” Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles said.

“This is the latest support package which the Albanese government has announced, taking our overall commitment support to Ukraine to more than $1.5bn.”

Ukrainian ambassador to Australia and New Zealand Vasyl Myroshnychenko has thanked the Australian government and public for their continued support.

“The government of Ukraine expresses its strongest gratitude to the government of the Commonwealth of Australia – and the Australian people – for the allocation of 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks for Ukraine’s military defence,” he said.

“I take this opportunity to specifically thank the Prime Minister Anthony Albanese MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles MP, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Senator Penny Wong and the Minister for Defence Industries Pat Conroy MP for their commitment to Ukraine’s cause. Your leadership has significantly contributed to Ukraine’s security and future.

“This support package is very timely, very substantial and very fit for purpose. Combat assaults by the Russian Federation on Ukraine and Ukrainians have increased by some 20 per cent in the last three months to their highest level in 2024. Only this week, the Russian aggressor conducted an air strike on Ukrainian cities and towns involving nearly 140 drones and missiles.

“The tanks provided by Australia, one of the largest allocations of tanks by any ally, are likely to be used by tank brigades and mechanised infantry brigades of the ground forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) who are engaged along a 1,400-long kilometre front – or the distance between Sydney and Adelaide. Some of the soldiers in these and other units have been trained by Australian soldiers based in Great Britain.

“Ukraine’s capacity to both defend itself and to bring the war to a just conclusion is, in part, reliant on receiving adequate and continuous support from those nations, including Australia, who also believe in democracy, the integrity of national borders, and the international rules-based order.

“We look forward to working closely with the Australian government to execute the expeditious and effective transfer of the tanks to the battlefield in Ukraine. Everything that can be done to swiftly execute this process should be done as there are literally lives at stake.” (Source: Defence Connect)

11 Oct 24. Lithuania to Supply Thousands of GA-10-FPV-AI Drones to Ukraine. The Lithuanian government has announced that it will provide thousands of locally manufactured GA-10-FPV-AI first-person view (FPV) drones to the Ukrainian and Lithuanian armed forces as part of a major investment in a low-cost capability that transforms modern combat.

The Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense announced a $1m contract with the Vilnius-based drone company Granta Autonomy, founded in 2015, for its new GA-10-FPV-AI quadcopter platform.

“The new unmanned aerial vehicles are part of a broader defense procurement initiative worth €8 m involving several other Lithuanian drone manufacturers,” Lithuanian authorities stated in a press release.

A total of 2,300 drones will be delivered to the Lithuanian army, and 5,000 units will be provided to Ukraine, sourced from selected Lithuanian companies, with the first deliveries expected to arrive in the war-torn country by the end of this month.

The drones feature a quadcopter frame with vertical takeoff and landing capabilities and the ability to carry a maximum payload of 3 kilograms, according to the company.

In August, the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense announced that combat drones produced by five Lithuanian companies had successfully passed tests conducted by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to simulate a frontline environment and would be selected for deployment to troops. According to local news outlet LRT, an initial batch of drones had previously failed such a test.

The GA-10-FPV-AI is claimed to be capable of operating autonomously in GPS-denied environments, customizable for different video transmission frequencies and camera types.

Lithuania has taken note of these developments, announcing this summer that its armed forces are undergoing specialized training to learn how to operate FPVs, along with plans to equip all military branches with these drones.(Source: UAS VISION/Army Recognition)

17 Oct 24. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that he has intelligence reports that 10,000 North Korean soldiers are preparing to enter the war on the side of Russia against Ukraine. “We know that there are 10,000 soldiers of North Korea, that they are preparing to send, fight against us,” he told reporters in Brussels, adding that they were “land forces, other tactical personnel”. “This is the first step to a world war.” Zelenskyy said that some North Korean officers had already arrived in occupied Ukraine, in an apparent reference to trainers who are helping the Russian armed forces use missiles provided by Pyongyang. “Because of the gap in mobilisation, because of lots of Russian losses, and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is afraid of mobilisation very much . . . that is why he is trying to involve other participants in this war.” Military analysts and Nato officials have cast doubt on the accuracy of reports that North Korean troops are involved in combat in eastern Ukraine. Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte said on Wednesday that the defence alliance had no “definitive” information on this matter. The White House said on Tuesday it could not independently confirm the reports of North Korean troops fighting on behalf of Russia but “those reports are concerning to us”, according to National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby. (Source: FT.com)

16 Oct 24. Russia says it captures two villages in eastern Ukraine, Kyiv says it repelled attacks. Russian forces captured two villages in eastern Ukraine – Krasnyi Yar in Donetsk region and Nevske in Luhansk region, Russian state-run news agency TASS cited the Russian Defence Ministry as saying on Wednesday. The Ukrainian military said it had repelled Russian attacks near Krasnyi Yar on the Pokrovsk front over the past day and that Russian forces had attempted to break through Ukraine’s defences around Nevske on the Lyman front, according to a morning readout it posted on the Telegram messaging app. (Source: Reuters)

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