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Military And Security Developments
Oct 03.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- DONETSK: Russian forces have captured the small but symbolically important town of Vuhledar, which had been a major Ukrainian defensive point since 2022
- STRIKES: Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted a record number of drone strikes in September, reflecting growing production capacity but also the importance of UAVs in tactical and strategic operations
- NATO: US President Joe Biden will reportedly possibly agree to advance the status of Ukraine’s bid to join NATO before he leaves office in January 2025, though membership remains a long-term prospect
- FORECAST: Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov confirmed that Ukraine plans to increase its domestic production of drones, long-range weapons and ballistic missiles in 2025; Ukraine is likely to enjoy a slight advantage in producing drones over Russia
- OFFENSIVES: On 1 October, Ukrainian First Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Havryliuk reported that Ukraine has reduced Russia’s artillery advantage from eight-to-one (as it stood in the winter of 2023-2024) to three-to-one (as it currently stands). In recent weeks, certain Russian sources have also drawn attention to growing artillery shell shortages for Russian forces. While we cannot confirm these claims, they possibly reflect the success of recent Ukrainian long-range drone attacks against major arms depots and their impact on Russian logistics. Consistent supplies of Western artillery ammunition, together with Ukraine’s steadily growing domestic production, are currently easing Ukraine’s artillery shortages. However, Russia retains a notable overall artillery advantage. For further analysis on Ukraine’s growing domestic production capabilities, see FORECAST below.
- BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 30 September confirms minor Russian advances along the E-40 highway that runs north-east of Chasiv Yar. However, several Russian sources have reported in recent days that Ukrainian forces are counter-attacking in the area and have recently reinforced their positions in the Chasiv Yar area. While we cannot confirm these reports, Russian advances around Chasiv Yar have proceeded at a much slower pace than those towards Pokrovsk in recent months.
- BAKHMUT: Further south along the Toretsk axis, Russian forces continue to make creeping gains in central Toretsk, though intense urban fighting continues to slow the rate of their advance. Geolocated footage from 30 September indicates further Russian advances along Maiakovskhovo Street in the town centre. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 30 September that its forces have taken Nelipivka, a small town to the south-west of Toretsk and due north of Niu York that sits along the Kryvyi Torets River. While Russian forces likely control at least the southern sectors of the town, it remains unconfirmed if they are now in control of the entire settlement.
- DONETSK: Russian forces have captured the symbolically significant town of Vuhledar, a key defensive stronghold for Ukrainian forces since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Geolocated footage posted on 30 September and 1 October showed Russian forces raising the Russian flag and operating in various parts of the town. Ukraine’s Khortysia Group of Forces confirmed on 2 October that permission had been granted for the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the town in order to preserve personnel and equipment. The 72nd Brigade had been defending Vulhedar; it remains unclear how many casualties the brigade took during its withdrawal. Various Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces suffered unspecified losses while withdrawing, though they did note that the exit route was not entirely cut off. Following the Ukrainian withdrawal from Vuhledar, it remains unclear whether Russian forces have the capacity to sustain their recent offensive momentum, of if they will focus on consolidating control of the town (which has largely been destroyed). One prominent Russian milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn to previously prepared defensive positions in Novoukrainka (located to the north-west of Vuhledar) and that this would be the next focus of Russian forces operating in the area. While the capture of Vuhledar will provide only limited support for Russian forces operating near Pokrovsk, it is possible that additional resources will be transferred to support the effort to capture Pokrovsk, which is a more important logistical node than Vuhledar. It nevertheless remains unclear how well-established Ukrainian fall-back positions and second-layer defences are in the area, though the Sukhi Yaly River to the north will provide a physical defence which Ukrainian forces will likely seek to leverage to slow further Russian advances from the south.
- DONETSK: Russian forces have continued to advance marginally in the direction of Pokrovsk in recent days, further expanding and consolidating the salient. Geolocated footage posted on 30 September and 2 October indicates that Russian forces have advanced east of Hrodivka (located to the east of Pokrovsk) and south of Tsukuryne (located to the south-east of Pokrovsk). Russian forces are currently attempting to encircle the settlement of Tsukuryne (located immediately to the west of Ukrainsk, which is under Russian control). Meanwhile, efforts continue to encircle Selydove, located to the north of Ukrainsk, which remains a key settlement for Russian forces to capture so as to set the conditions for an assault on Pokrovsk.
- DONETSK: Ukrainian milbloggers reported on 1 October that the Russian High Command has tasked elements of Russia’s 907th Reconnaissance Battalion and various Spetsnaz brigades to conduct spoiling and sabotage operations behind Ukrainian lines in the Donetsk sector. While we cannot confirm these claims, Russian forces reportedly recently succeeded in infiltrating unspecified Ukrainian rear areas in the Pokrovsk area, though it remains unclear how much disruption this operation caused to Ukraine’s command and control (C2) and logistics. On the morning of 30 September, Russian forces launched a mechanised assault in Vovchansk; it reportedly involved 17 MT-LB armoured infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and three tanks. Russian forces likely achieved only marginal advances in north-western areas of the Aggregate Plant in the town centre before Ukrainian forces stopped the attack. Ukrainian Spokesperson for the Kharkiv Group of Forces Vitaliy Sarantsev reported on 30 September that Ukrainian forces halted the attack using both first-person-view (FPV) drones and co-ordinated artillery strikes. While the attack failed to achieve a significant advance, it has likely confirmed that parts of the Aggregate Plant remain contested, and that Russian forces retain the capability to launch reinforced-company-sized mechanised assaults in the area.
- KURSK: On 30 September, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Northern Operational Command, Vadym Mysnyk, reported that Russian forces operating in Kursk oblast (Russia) have increased in number significantly; however, he claimed that they are unable to push the Ukrainians back. Mysnyk claimed that limited transport infrastructure and poor training have undermined these forces. This aligns with our assessment that Russian forces continue to rely mainly on less combat-effective internal troops, conscripts and FSB units, rather than large numbers of regular military units. Nevertheless, both sides have continued to launch attacks and counter-attacks across the Kursk salient (with both having made minor advances). The most notable battles are taking place along the western flank (near Korenevo) and the south-eastern flank (near Sudzha).
- OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have achieved further marginal advances along the Oskil-Kremmina axis in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 1 October indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Makiivka, located to the north-west of Kreminna; additional footage shows that Russian forces recently advanced north-west of Novovodyane, located to the south-west of Svatove.
- SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
- STRIKES: Overnight on 30 September-1 October, Russian forces launched 39 Shahed 136/131 drones at targets in Ukraine. Ukraine’s air force reported that 29 of the drones were intercepted over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. The locations of three additional drones were reportedly lost as a result of electronic warfare (EW) counter-measures. On 1-2 October, Russian forces launched another drone-only strike comprising 32 Shahed 136/131 drones. In all, 11 of the drones were intercepted over Kirovohrad, Odesa and Sumy oblasts; ten of the drones were reportedly lost as a result of EW counter-measures.
- STRIKES: Russian forces conducted a significantly larger drone attack involving 105 Shahed 136/131 drones overnight on 2-3 October. Ukraine’s air force reported that 78 of the drones were intercepted over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. In all, 23 of the drones were reportedly lost as a result of EW counter-measures.
- STRIKES: Research by an independent Russian news outlet and Forbes shows that Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted a record number of drone strikes in September. According to data released by the Russian MoD, 886 Ukrainian drones were intercepted over (internationally recognised) Russian territory in September. In turn, reports from Ukraine’s air force indicate that Russian forces fired 1,331 Shahed 136/131 drones at Ukrainian targets in September. The research almost certainly points to both sides’ growing domestic drone production capacity (see FORECAST for further analysis).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- NATO: US President Joe Biden will reportedly possibly agree to advance the status of Ukraine’s bid to join NATO before he leaves office in January 2025. An unnamed Western official cited by the Financial Times on 1 October claimed that there were ‘tentative’ signs of such a decision, though no further details were provided. Meanwhile, the former Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte assumed the position of NATO’s new secretary general on 1 October and stated that he will work with members of the alliance to bring Ukraine closer to joining the bloc. Rutte stated that he would ensure NATO states implement key decisions regarding Kyiv, including its ‘irreversible path to membership’.
- NATO: Outgoing NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg disclosed in an interview on 30 September that insisting Ukraine can only become a member when the war ends and if it regains full control of its territory will simply incentivise Russia to continue the conflict. Our assessment remains that Ukraine is highly unlikely to become a member of the military alliance in the foreseeable future. Additionally, a consensus on admitting Ukraine into NATO while Russia occupies parts of the country is highly unlikely to manifest; more cautious and/or Ukraine-sceptic states will almost certainly oppose such a prospect.
- ESTONIA: Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur disclosed on 2 October that his country is considering sending troops to western Ukraine for non-combat purposes. However, Tallinn is yet to make a final decision on the matter (the safety of Estonian personnel would first need to be ensured). Pevkur offered limited details as to how many Estonian troops could be deployed, though he did admit that Russia would regard a large contingent, such as a brigade-sized unit with military equipment, as a ‘very large target’.
- ESTONIA: Pevkur also stated that such a decision must be made in conjunction with fellow NATO member countries; this reduces the likelihood of such a deployment in the near term. In June, Stoltenberg announced that the military alliance has no plans to deploy forces to Ukraine. The transfer of Estonian troops (or wider NATO personnel) for non-combat tasks would likely allow Ukraine to redeploy additional personnel for frontline duties. However, consensus on the matter is unlikely in the near term given Russia would almost certainly perceive such a move as confirmation of its claims that it is fighting NATO in Ukraine, thereby elevating the risk of escalation. For further analysis, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 29 February 2024.
- LABOUR: Russian defence enterprises are looking to employ tens of thousands of new factory workers, further confirming chronic shortages across the Russian labour market. According to a BBC investigation published on 1 October, over 90,000 vacancies were posted on Russia’s largest job-hunting sites between mid-August and mid-September for defence industry positions alone. The salaries offered for the most in-demand skills were reportedly up to four times higher than the average wages in the regions where the vacancies were posted. Despite the lucrative incentives, the job advertisements garnered few views.
- LABOUR: While the report cannot be verified, we assess that it is credible in light of the mass exodus of Russians following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and ongoing demographic challenges. Although the exact number is unknown, estimates indicate that over 800,000 people have fled Russia. The large-scale departure of Russians has therefore left gaps in certain sectors, including high-skilled roles in the defence, IT and technology industries; these cannot be filled easily. Concurrently, Russia’s commitment to maintaining a highly attritional war will require manpower to ensure the production of defence equipment throughout the conflict.
- RECRUITMENT: In line with these continuing demographic challenges, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on 2 October that will exempt defendants and suspects from criminal liability if they join the army. Previously, only convicts or Russians under investigation had the option to sign a contract to fight in Ukraine. Independent Russian media outlets estimate that the authorities expect to send around 20,000 individuals to the frontline under the new bill. As such, the move will likely modestly replenish manpower without the government having to declare another round of mobilisation (at least in the near term), which would highly likely prove unpopular across Russian society.
FORECAST
PRODUCTION: Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov disclosed on 1 October that Ukraine plans to increase its domestic production of drones, long-range weapons and ballistic missiles in 2025. The defence minister emphasised that this is a priority for Ukraine, reflecting Kyiv’s desire to increase its domestic production of strike capabilities, as well as its efforts to reduce its reliance on Western aid. According to Umerov, Kyiv has already invested USD 4 bn in developing Ukraine’s domestic defence production industry; it reportedly plans to increase funding next year. On 1 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine produced 25 times more artillery and mortar ammunition in the first half of this year compared to the whole of 2022. With regard to drones, Zelensky claimed that Ukraine is able to produce around 4 m units annually. According to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine will produce roughly 1.5 m drones by the end of 2024. In contrast, President Putin announced on 19 September that Russia was increasing its drone production to nearly 1.4 m units this year (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 23 September 2024). This therefore suggests that Ukraine possesses a ‘drone advantage’ over Russia (at least in terms of units produced domestically in both countries). Certain unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and first-person-view (FPV) drones likely represent an area wherein Ukraine enjoys an advantage on (and over) the battlefield; Kyiv almost certainly intends to extend this advantage into the future. A US-based drone designer and manufacturer, AeroVironment, signed an agreement with an unspecified Ukrainian company on 1 October to localise its production of Switchblade 600 loitering munitions. The unit has a flight range of nearly 25 miles (40km) and a flight time of over 40 minutes; it has also been included in US assistance packages to Ukraine since 2022. As such, the development underscores interest among Western defence firms in producing weaponry inside Ukraine and/or establishing a presence therein; we assess this will further improve Ukraine’s resilience and self-sufficiency. Additionally, President Zelensky announced the successful testing of a new ballistic missile, though he offered limited specific details about the capability. Zelensky stated that Ukraine has managed to build a ‘de-facto new defence industry’ despite constant Russian attacks and the ongoing full-scale invasion. While his comments almost certainly reflect the growing innovation and production within Ukraine’s military-industrial base, Kyiv will highly likely require continued military aid from its international partners to sustain the war effort in the short-to-medium term. In addition, financial support and investment in Ukraine’s defence industry will likely remain crucial for developing its domestic military production line.
Sept 30.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- OSKIL-KREMINNA: Ukrainian forces repelled a sizeable mechanised assault from Russian forces which attempted to expand the Pishchane salient and reach the Oskil River
- AID: Ukraine’s allies are struggling to secure funding to provide military supplies for next year or are reluctant to increase financing to help Kyiv; Russia is set to further increase military spending
- CHINA: Western sources believe they have evidence that Chinese companies have covertly shipped weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine; if confirmed, this would increase the risk of US secondary sanctions on Beijing
- FORECAST: President Volodymyr Zelensky returned from the US this week, having presented his ‘victory plan’ to US President Joe Biden; however, he did not secure official authorisation for strikes inside Russian territory using Western weapons
- BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 26 September indicates that Russian forces advanced north-east of Chasiv Yar) into the western sections of the village of Kalynivka (both Donetsk oblast), further increasing pressure on Ukraine’s northern flank. Nevertheless, the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal that runs through the east of the town and the fortifications in and around the elevated town itself continues to provide Ukrainian forces with defensive advantages. These have have slowed Russian advances in recent months, particularly as Russian forces are prioritising the Pokrovsk and Toretsk offensives further south.
- BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 27 and 29 September indicates Russian advances in central Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) as Russian forces begin consolidating their positions in the eastern sectors of the town. Russian forces are advancing along Druzhby Street in the town centre, which runs north-west, next to the main thoroughfare that bisects the town. Progress remains slow as Russian forces resort to highly attritional, frontal infantry assaults in a highly defensible urban environment. However, extensive artillery strikes have essentially already destroyed the town.
- DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have continued to marginally advance during ongoing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage posted on 28 and 29 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced into southern Selydove, which is a key target for Russian forces to set the conditions for assaulting Pokrovsk to the north. Reports from both Russian and Ukrainian sources indicate that Russian forces are likely attempting to encircle Selydove rather than conduct more costly frontal assaults. That said, it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to close the cauldron to force a Ukrainian withdrawal in the coming weeks.
- DONETSK: Russian forces are also slowly closing on the key frontline town of Vuhledar; Ukrainian forces are continuing to defend the area despite increasingly unstable resupply routes. Geolocated footage posted on 28 September also indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Katerynika, located north-east of Vuhledar. Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces have continued to advance on both the western and eastern flanks of Vuhledar; while there is no geolocated footage to confirm this, Russian forces likely achieved marginal advances. One Russian milblogger noted on 29 September that the final push to seize Vuhledar may be slowed by the terrain on the outskirts of the town (it sits on a hill surrounded by a hill) but insisted that the offensive is proceeding rapidly.
- DONETSK: Ukraine’s 72nd Separate Mechanised Brigade charged with defending Vuhledar confirmed on 29 September that the brigade’s commander, Colonel Ivan Vinnik, had been transferred. Vinnik was appointed commander of the 72nd brigade in August 2022 and successfully oversaw the defence of the town against continued Russian efforts to capture it, albeit at varying levels of intensity. Although Vinnik was reportedly promoted, the timing of his transfer while the city is close to encirclement is possibly indicative of differences between himself and Ukraine’s political leadership; it is a realistic possibility that the Ukrainian leadership intends for the 72nd brigade to continue to hold the city, despite their precarious position and the possible high casualty rates this could incur. It remains unclear how well-prepared Ukrainian fallback defences are to the north-west of Vuhledar.
- KHARKIV: According to Ukraine’s Spokesperson for the Kharkiv Group of Forces Vitaliy Sarantsev, Russian forces are currently constructing tunnels and underground passages between buildings in Vovchansk in a bid to conceal troop movements. Sarantsev reported last week that Russian forces had broadly switched to the defensive in and around Vovchansk. Nevertheless, they are likely preparing for future offensive operations in the city, particularly after Ukrainian forces retook the Aggregate Plant in the centre of the city last week. Some Russian milblogger sources continue to claim that Ukrainian forces are not in complete control of the site, and while it remains likely that Russian forces have been pushed back, the area likely remains contested as Ukrainian forces conduct clearing operations.
- KURSK: On 15 September, the Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported that elements of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Spetsnaz units are currently fighting in Kursk oblast; however, command and control (C2) and insufficient training remain perennial issues undermining performance. Elements of the FSB’s ostensibly elite Alpha and Vympel groups are engaging in combat operations in Kursk. Moscow placed the FSB in charge of a ‘counter-terrorism’ operation in Kursk following the initial Ukrainian incursion. Despite the Alpha and Vympel groups’ role as elite counter-terrorism forces, FSB Spetsnaz forces likely do not have conventional military training and will not necessarily be well-positioned to engage in highly complex combined arms operations.
- KURSK: The deployment of FSB elements for combat operations reinforces our earlier assessment that Moscow has decided to continue relying upon internal, domestic security forces to contain the Kursk incursion, rather than redeploy regular military units from Ukraine. Meanwhile, on the ground over the last few days, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have continued attacking and counter-attacking across the Kursk axis; there have been few confirmed advances or changes to the frontline.
- OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 26 September shows that Ukrainian forces repelled a sizeable mechanised assault by Russian forces, which attempted to expand the Pishchane salient. The Russian forces reportedly attacked on 26 September with up to 50 armoured vehicles in the direction of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka, both located west of Pischane near the banks of the Oskil River, located around 10 miles (16km) south-east of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). The attack was a notably large assault, Ukrainian forces claim they inflicted significant casualties upon the attackers, including destroying three tanks and 11 armoured vehicles; however, this remains unconfirmed. While Ukraine repelled the attack, Russian forces have continued to make creeping progress in recent days across the wider Oskil-Kreminna axis: geolocated footage posted on 28 September indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south-east of Hlushkivka, located north of Kolisnykivka. This indicates that Russian forces have not abandoned efforts to expand their salient in the area and reach the Oskil River.
- SOUTHERN: Russian forces have advanced on the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region along the Mokri Yaly River valley; reinforcements in the area indicate possible preparations for further assaults. Geolocated footage from 26 September indicates recent Russian advances north of Staromaiorske, located around eight miles (13km) south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). This section of the frontline has remained relatively quiet in 2024, though Russian forces have stepped up attacks in recent weeks, likely as part of an overall effort to maintain pressure across Ukraine’s entire frontline.
- SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s Tavriisk Group of Forces spokesperson Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on 26 September that the situation on this section of the southern front could ‘escalate’ given intelligence which indicates that Russian forces are reinforcing positions of Velyka Novosilka. Specifically, assault groups in the area have reportedly received 25 light vehicles from the reserves, which could indicate preparations for a moderate uptick in the intensity of Russian assaults. Voloshyn reiterated his assessment on 28 September that Russian forces are concentrating forces near Pryiutne, located 10 miles (16km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka, for future assaults.
- STRIKES: Overnight on 27-28 September, Russian forces launched 73 Shahed-136/131 Shahed drones, two K-59/69 missiles and two Iskandr-M missiles at targets in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the two Kh-59/69 missiles and 66 drones were intercepted. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. A smaller-scale attack involving 22 Shahed-136/131 drones was conducted overnight on 28-29 September; 15 of the drones were intercepted over Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy and Vinnytsia oblasts; another five were reportedly lost as a result of electronic warfare (EW) measures.
- STRIKES: Russian forces launched 73 Shahed-136/131 drones, one Iskandr-M, one Kh-59/69 and one Kh-31P missile at Ukrainian targets overnight on 29-30 September. In total, Ukrainian assets intercepted 67 of the drones and the single Kh-59/69 missile over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. According to the head of the Kyiv Regional Military Administration, Serhiy Popko, all waves of drones targeting the capital were intercepted, resulting in no damage.
- STRIKES: On 26 September, Russian forces attacked a train station in the border town of Khutir-Mykhailivskyi (Sumy oblast) using first person view (FPV) drones. Khutir-Mykhailivskyi was, until this year, known as Druzhba, amid Ukrainian initiatives to re-name Ukrainian towns. The town and railyard are located just six miles (10km) from the international border with Ukraine. As such, the attack was almost certainly conducted by Russian forces operating along the frontline. Given this was a smaller FPV drone attack, we assess that the attack does not represent a shift toward Russia conducting large-scale, long-range strikes on Ukrainian rail infrastructure as a whole. Nevertheless, sporadic attacks against railway infrastructure in eastern Ukraine will continue in a bid to disrupt Ukrainian logistics.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- AID: Some of Ukraine’s allies are struggling to secure funding to provide military supplies for next year or are reluctant to increase financing to help Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on 27 September that Ukrainian officials are struggling to convince unspecified Western partners to fulfil their pledges to support Ukraine. According to the outlet, much of Ukraine’s military support is linked to a G7 deal to provide USD 50 bn in loans from the profits of frozen Russian central bank assets. However, even if an agreement is reached to use these funds, insiders familiar with the matter said this figure is not enough to support Ukraine’s war needs for another year.
- AID: Nevertheless, on 26 September, the US Department of Defense announced new aid for Ukraine worth USD 2.4 bn. It will provide Ukraine with additional air defence systems, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and components to support domestic Ukrainian production of such capabilities, as well as air-to-ground munitions. The support also aims to strengthen Ukraine’s defence industrial base, which is demonstrating its increasing ability to produce drones at scale, many of which are capable of orchestrating long-range attacks against targets inside Russian territory. For further updates on US military aid for Ukraine, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 26 September 2024.
- AID: Meanwhile, Russia reportedly plans to increase military spending to RUB 13.2trn (USD 142bn) in 2025; this amounts to roughly 6.2% of the country’s GDP. Reports expect defence and security spending to constitute around 40% of Russia’s total budget disbursement next year. According to Bloomberg, this is more than what the Russian government intends to spend on education, health care, social policies and the national economy combined. As such, this underscores how Russia will highly likely continue to prioritise bolstering defence at the expense of funding social spending. Although limited social spending is likely to dissatisfy elements of Russian society (particularly in less affluent regions), this is unlikely to translate into large-scale domestic unrest that could seriously challenge government stability. Instead, Russia will continue to outspend Ukraine on defence, ensuring the latter remains highly reliant upon Western funding for the foreseeable future.
- CHINA: A 27 September report from the British newspaper The Times cited unspecified Western officials who believe they have evidence that Chinese companies have covertly shipped weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine. According to a new report in possession of unnamed Western allies, an unnamed Chinese company sent a range of purpose-built military drones to Russia for testing at an unspecified point last year. An unnamed official familiar with the matter also corroborated a report from 25 September that Russia established a project in China to develop and produce long-range attack drones for use in Ukraine.
- CHINA: If true, these developments would mark a significant change in China’s unofficial support for Russia given Beijing has claimed neutrality throughout the conflict. However, we cannot confirm the reports. Also, it remains unclear whether Beijing is aware of the scale of any potential cross-border trade. It remains likely that the Chinese government does not intend to officially provide lethal aid to Russia for fear of secondary sanctions; however, unofficial support through private proxies or other methods is likely to continue at a lower level. Nevertheless, if further evidence of Chinese support for Russia’s war emerges, the risk of secondary US sanctions will increase.
- CHINA: On 27 September, Brazil and China held a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly aimed at rallying developing countries behind their initiative to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Some 17 countries attended the meeting, which Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Chief Advisor to the President of Brazil for Foreign Policy Celso Amorim chaired. In May, Brazil and China presented a joint proposal for peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, which (among other points) outlined three principles for de-escalation. These included neither side expanding the battlefield, no escalation of fighting and no ‘provocation’ by either party. The proposal failed to condemn Russia and did not demand that its forces leave Ukrainian territory. Much of the proposal was similar to China’s 12-point position paper on the ‘Ukraine crisis’ released in February 2023.
- CHINA: This development underscores Chinese efforts to promote steps it believes would help end the war. However, we assess that Ukraine is unlikely to perceive that these efforts are in its interests, especially given Beijing’s close ties to Moscow. Instead, Ukraine is likely to regard China’s promotion of its plans to end the war as an attempt to gain support from the wider international community, principally Global South countries, as opposed to a sincere show of support for Ukraine.
FORECAST
STRATEGY: On 28 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky returned from his visit to the US and provided a summary of his visit, during which he presented his ‘victory plan’ to US decision-makers. Zelensky stated that he held meetings with presidential candidate Vice President Kamala Harris, during which he said ‘all important points’ were raised. According to the Ukrainian president, their conversation lasted almost an hour.
Zelensky also commented on his meeting with former president Donald Trump, who is seeking re-election in November. The two met on 27 September in New York (US), with Trump stating after that they both want to see an end to the war and for a ‘fair deal’ to be made. Trump emphasised that an agreement must be fair and that he thinks this will happen at the ‘right time’. However, neither side shared details of what a potential deal would realistically look like.
The Ukrainian president stated in an interview on 28 September with Fox News that he received very ‘direct information’ from Trump that he will be on Ukraine’s side and offer support if he wins the election. However, Zelensky offered little details as to what this support would look like, specifically regarding the continuation of military and financial aid. Zelensky’s comments offer a cautious indication that Trump will possibly continue to support Ukraine if he assumes the presidency in January 2025. However, the certainty of continued US support to Ukraine under a second Trump administration will highly likely remain volatile. This is due to several factors including Ukraine scepticism among certain Republican officials and voters, as well as previous comments from Trump (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 September 2024).
Ukrainian presidential press secretary Serhiy Nykyforov stated on 28 September that US officials showed ‘enormous interest’ in Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’, contrary to media reports claiming scepticism with the strategy. However, it remains uncertain to what extent US President Joe Biden and his administration truly believe the strategy (which Zelensky presented to Biden on 27 September) can create conditions for a Ukrainian victory. Even so, Biden’s presidency will end in a matter of months, and it is unclear how a Trump or Harris administration would realistically work with Ukraine on realising the strategy. For further analysis on the ‘victory plan’, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 19 September 2024.
On 29 September, the head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, disclosed that Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’ will be presented to Ukrainians. However, some unspecified ‘sensitive’ elements of the strategy will be omitted to prevent Russia from obtaining details of the strategy. Yermak specified that the plan is necessary to create conditions to implement Zelensky’s so-called peace formula which seeks to promote an end to the war which would suit Ukraine’s terms. Our assessment remains that Russia is highly unlikely to agree to most points of Ukraine’s peace formula, including above all calls for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory.
Lastly, Zelensky’s visit to the US did not result in approval (at least in public) for long-range Ukrainian strikes using Western-provided weaponry against targets inside de jure Russian territory. We previously assessed that Kyiv could possibly be granted permission without official acknowledgement before the first attack is executed. British Foreign Secretary David Lammy has suggested that Ukraine may be granted permission before winter begins.
However, reports emerged on 26 September citing unspecified US officials that their intelligence agencies assess that Russia will likely retaliate ‘with greater force’ against the US and its partners if they grant such approval. They argue that the decision could precipitate increased arson attacks, sabotage targeting facilities in Europe and possibly ‘lethal attacks’ on US and European military bases. This largely aligns with our assessment and could possibly indicate why Washington DC is yet to publicly authorise a decision due to concerns over escalation with Russia. However, as we have assessed consistently over recent years, Russia’s hybrid destabilisation operations in Europe are already underway. Irrespective of any US decision on long-range strikes, Russian hybrid and grey-zone attacks across Europe are highly likely to continue, though the risk of direct Russia-NATO escalation will remain low.
- Ukraine: Rise in cyber operations will sustain espionage, disruption risks for critical infrastructure. On 27 September, international news outlets disclosed that Russian state-sponsored cyber attacks against Ukrainian organisations rose by 19% in H1 2024. While the intensity of these operations generally decreased compared to H2 2023, there was a significant increase in attacks against government organisations and critical national infrastructure (CNI). In March, the state-sponsored group ‘UAC-0002′ attempted to disrupt the power, heat and water facilities for approximately 20 organisations, underscoring the continued focus on destructive attacks against industrial control systems (ICS) within CNI. Additionally, the state-sponsored group ‘UAC-0184’ is targeting the Ukrainian military in an ongoing phishing campaign, highlighting the continuous development of new malicious operations. UAC-0184 uses popular messaging and dating applications to trick victims into downloading malicious payloads in a likely effort to collect sensitive information to bolster Russia’s military strategy. As Russia continues to supplement its kinetic action with cyber operations, we assess this will sustain security, espionage and disruption risks for firms operating within Ukraine’s CNI as the war persists. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Oct 24. AeroVironment Partners with Ukrainian Company to Produce Switchblade 600 Drones. The U.S. defense contractor AeroVironment has signed an agreement with a Ukrainian firm to begin local production of its Switchblade 600 loitering munitions, according to a report by Ukraine’s defense-focused website, Militarnyy. The Switchblade 600, a long-range, anti-armor variant of AeroVironment’s loitering munitions, will be produced in Ukraine under a phased plan. Initially, subsystem components will be sent from the U.S. for assembly, with a gradual localization of production as the program develops. AeroVironment’s Senior Vice President and General Manager of Loitering Munitions Systems, Brett Hush, explained that over time, more components will be manufactured in Ukraine, improving the system’s integration and capabilities. The agreement, however, is still pending approval from the U.S. government, a process that could take up to nine months. Specific production volumes have not been disclosed, but AeroVironment estimates several thousand Switchblade 600s will be produced annually once full-scale production begins. The Switchblade 600 is a tube-launched, portable loitering munition designed to engage armored targets. It has a range of 40 kilometers (24.9 miles) and carries a warhead similar to that of the Javelin anti-tank missile. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced during the same forum that the country is now capable of producing up to 4 m drones annually, with over 1.5 m production contracts already signed. Ukraine has also made significant strides in domestic artillery ammunition production, increasing output 25-fold during the first half of 2024 compared to the previous year. The enhanced production capabilities extend beyond drones. Ukraine has introduced the long-range “Palyanytsia” missile drone and other advanced systems that are already in use by its defense forces. Additionally, the development of marine drones, a new ballistic missile, and the Neptune missile system further strengthens Ukraine’s strategic defense capabilities as the conflict with Russia continues. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
03 Oct 24. Ukraine’s military says it struck Russian radar station with ATACMS missiles. The Ukrainian military said on Thursday it had used ATACMS ballistic missiles to strike a Russian radar station to reduce Moscow’s ability “to detect, track and intercept aerodynamic and ballistic targets”.
The military did not say when the strike had taken place or give the venue of the ‘Nebo-M’ radar station in its statement on the Telegram messaging app.
“The destruction of the Nebo-M radar will create a favourable ‘air corridor’ for the effective use of Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG cruise missiles,” it said.
The Ukrainian military said it believed Russia had 10 such operational systems left, each estimated to be worth more than $100m.
The United States sent long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine this spring and White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Ukraine had committed at the time to only using the weapons inside its own territory. Russian forces currently occupy about 18% of Ukraine’s territory.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has been pleading with allies for months to let Ukraine fire Western missiles, including long-range U.S. ATACMS and Britain’s Storm Shadow, deep into Russia.
After discussions with allies last month, and following a visit to the U.S. by Zelenskiy, Washington did not signal any change in its position on Kyiv’s use of the long-range weapons on Russian territory. (Source: Reuters)
04 Oct 24. Ukraine’s top commander orders defences bolstered in the east after Vuhledar falls.
- Top Ukrainian commander orders strengthened defences after key town falls
- Ukrainian president says preserving lives the priority
- Ukrainian forces on the defensive after 2-1/2 years of war
Ukraine’s armed forces commander General Oleksandr Syrskyi said on Thursday he had ordered defences to be strengthened in the eastern Donetsk region, a day after Kyiv forces announced they had withdrawn from the town of Vuhledar.
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy acknowledged the loss of Vuhledar, saying moving troops out and preserving lives was the critical issue.
The Russia-appointed governor of Donetsk region said both sides had recognised the strategic value of the town, adding that reconstruction efforts there would take time.
Russian troops are steadily inching forward in different sectors in eastern Ukraine despite Kyiv’s surprise incursion into Russia’s western Kursk region in August that Ukraine hoped would slow the advances.
Syrskyi said on social media he was working on “one of the hottest front sectors” with the 25th Sicheslav Airborne Brigade.
He gave no details on the location but the brigade operates in the Pokrovsk front, an area of intensified Russian assaults.
“While working in the brigade, I made a number of decisions aimed at strengthening stability and effectiveness of our defence,” Syrskyi said.
More than two-and-a-half years into the full-scale war, Ukrainian troops are on the defensive. The Ukrainian military announced on Wednesday it was pulling troops out of the coal-mining town Vuhledar, a hilltop bastion that had resisted intense attacks following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Ukraine’s eastern military command said on Wednesday it had ordered a pullback from Vuhledar to avoid being encircled by Russian troops and to “preserve personnel and military equipment”. Russia has widely used the tactic to secure control of other Ukrainian settlements.
“Lives (of soldiers) need to be saved because they are our people, they are citizens of Ukraine,” said Zelenskiy, addressing reporters alongside new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. “Therefore it is very right that they can retreat and save themselves.” (Source: Reuters)
02 Oct 24. The fall of a front-line town nestled atop a tactically significant hill is unlikely to change the course of Ukraine’s war against Russia. But the loss underscores Kyiv’s worsening position, in part the result of firm Western red lines, military officials and analysts said.
Vuhledar, a town Ukrainian forces fought tooth and nail to keep for two years, is the latest urban settlement to fall to the Russians. It follows a vicious summer campaign along the eastern front that saw Kyiv cede several thousand square kilometers (miles) of territory.
Ukraine’s military said they were withdrawing their troops from Vuhledar to “protect the military personnel and equipment” in a statement on Wednesday.
Vuhledar’s fall is a microcosm of Ukraine’s predicament in this chapter of the nearly three-year war. It reflects the U.S.’s refusal to grant Ukraine permission to strike targets deep inside Russian territory, preventing Kyiv from degrading Moscow’s capabilities. Meanwhile, Russia’s dominance of the skies allows it to develop and advance devastating aerial glide bombs for which Ukraine has no effective response, while a controversial mobilization drive has failed to produce a new class of Ukrainian fighters capable of holding the line.
The Ukrainians’ retreat from the town comes after a much-anticipated visit by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the U.S. last week. The Biden administration so far has refused Kyiv’s request to use Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, to strike Russian airfields and other key targets, and Zelenskyy’s “victory plan,” was dismissed by some as more of a wish list than a plan of action.
In the meantime, Russian fighter jets continued to drop aerial bombs on Vuhledar, which precipitated the retreat, soldiers there said.
“(The Russians’) main tactic was to encircle us from the flanks, and they did this constantly for six to seven months with constant aerial attacks — due to this tactic they managed to exhaust our resources, because we don’t have as much as they have,” said Arsenii Prylipka, the head of the press office of the 72nd Brigade, which had been defending Vuhledar since August 2022.
The fight for Vuhledar
After two years of failed attempts to capture Vuhledar, Russian forces switched tactics earlier this year. The town’s pre-war population of 14,000 dwindled to less than 100 during the heat of the fighting.
Russian soldiers began mounting sophisticated attacks from the north and southern flanks, powered by superior electronic warfare capabilities and an array of infantrymen on motorcycles, artillery fire, drones and aerial glide bombs. Moscow suffered heavy causalities.
Ukrainians have been pressuring the U.S. to relax restrictions on the use of Western weapons to strike targets deep inside Russia. Lawmakers said they expected a green light from the U.S. months ago, but it didn’t come: The Biden administration refused to waver on this red line.
It has meant that Russian command and control centers, logistics hubs and airfields from which Russian fighter jets carry deadly aerial glide bombs, are out of reach of Ukrainian forces.
Russia fires nearly 120 aerial bombs a day on average, about 3,000 a month. The bombs are Soviet-era weapons refitted with navigational technology.
“We cannot change the dynamics, and the Russians are pushing,” said Pavel Narozhnyi, founder of the non-profit Reactive Post, which sources spare parts for artillery.
Month after month of constant attacks eventually eroded Ukrainian defenses.
After two years of intense fighting, the 72nd Brigade — which never rotated out due to the intensity of the fight and the lack of a demobilization strategy from Ukrainian military leaders — withdrew from the patch of land many of their comrades died to defend.
Prylipka had said the brigade would stay until the very last moment when defending Vuhledar became impossible. That scenario unfolded this week.
“The Russians searched for weak spots in our defenses, a constant probe to find routes to penetrate the town and as they advanced they tried to destroy the entire town. All the time we are under fire,” said Prylipka.
Vuhledar served as a defensive stronghold, a fortress town atop a hill surrounded by open fields and near two major roads. From there, Ukrainian soldiers were able to observe approaching Russian forces at a distance. From that vantage point, it was easy to coordinate counter-attacks. That advantage now falls to Russian forces.
While tactically significant, Vuhledar isn’t a crucial logistics hub for Kyiv, and Russian forces already controlled most of the main roads through the town before capturing it, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War said. Ukraine’s access to other critical supply lines remains intact.
The road to Pokrovsk
The capture of Vuhledar is part of Moscow’s pursuit of the strategic logistics hub of Pokrovsk, just 30 kilometers (19 miles) north. Its fall would severely compromise Ukrainian defenses.
(Source: Defense News Early Bird/AP)
03 Oct 24. Ukraine Discovers Starlink on Downed Russian Shahed Drone.
Ukrainian Defense Forces destroyed a Russian Shahed-136 that was equipped with SpaceX’s Starlink satellite communication during a night attack on September 25, in which 28 of 32 drones were shot down.
Defense Express received the relevant photos from its own sources. They show a satellite dish with serial numbers on it. This should allow to investigate the supply channels of the Starlink terminal.
At the same time, the question of when the Russian Federation will begin to install Starlink on its long-range UAVs was objectively only a matter of time. Because before that, the enemy had already experimented with 4G modems with Ukrainian SIM cards.
And now we are talking about a very wide and powerful feedback channel with the drone, the possibility of transmitting information from it and changing the flight task at any distance. That is, the transformation of Shahed, first of all, into a reconnaissance tool.
Starlink may be needed by the enemy in order to transmit intelligence information, for example, collected by radio technical means about the positions of Ukrainian air defense. Or, in the case of equipping the drone with cameras – images. And thanks to Starlink, the Russian Federation can use Shahed as an extremely long-range barrage munition with the possibility of reconnaissance, due to an additional camera, and hitting even moving targets.
The choice of the Shahed platform for such purposes may be related to its capabilities in terms of a flight range of about 2,000 km and a fairly significant free volume in the middle of the fuselage. It may also be related to the “creativity” in Alabuz, where these drones are assembled .
We will remind that although Starlink does not work and is not sold in the Russian Federation, Russians purchase it through third countries. At the same time, the USA is trying to fight this problem , but the problem is far from being solved.
But apparently, Washington needs to speed up a little in this matter, because Shahed from Starlink is about unlimited range control of an attack UAV with a flight range of up to 2,000 km. Because taking into account the cooperation of the Russian Federation not only with other rogue countries, but also with terrorist groups, this is already a threat not only to Ukraine.
Andriy Yusov, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian GUR military intelligence agency, told Ukrainian media at the time that Russian use of Starlink was becoming “systemic.”
Starlink is owned and operated by entrepreneur Elon Musk‘s aerospace firm, SpaceX, and accounts for a huge percentage of active satellites. Musk has vehemently denied that Starlink is being sold to Russia.
SpaceX said earlier this year that it does not “do business of any kind with the Russian government or its military.”
“Starlink is not active in Russia, meaning service will not work in that country,” the company said in a statement. “SpaceX has never sold or marketed Starlink in Russia, nor has it shipped equipment to locations in Russia. If Russian stores are claiming to sell Starlink for service in that country, they are scamming their customers.”
“If SpaceX obtains knowledge that a Starlink terminal is being used by a sanctioned or unauthorized party, we investigate the claim and take actions to deactivate the terminal if confirmed,” the company added.
A Kremlin spokesperson said in February that Starlink is “not a certified system with us” and therefore “cannot be used officially in any way.”
But back in May, the then-assistant secretary of defense for space policy in the Pentagon, John Plumb, told Bloomberg that the U.S. was “heavily involved in working with the government of Ukraine and SpaceX to counter Russian illicit use of Starlink terminals.”
“At this time we have successfully countered Russian use,” Plumb added at the time. “But I am certain Russia will continue to try and find ways to exploit Starlink and other commercial communications systems.”
Russia’s use of Starlink will continue to be a problem, he said.
(Source: UAS VISION/Newsweek; Defense Express)
01 Oct 24. Russian troops reach centre of Ukrainian bastion Vuhledar.
Summary
- Vuhledar is near the junction of two main battle fronts
- Full control of town would help Russia’s troops advance
- Ukrainian troops are outgunned and outmanned in Vuhledar
Russian troops have reached the centre of Vuhledar, a bastion on strategic high ground in eastern Ukraine’s industrial Donbas region that had resisted Russian assaults since Moscow’s full-scale invasion, a regional Ukrainian official said on Tuesday.
Footage posted to social media showed Russian soldiers waving a flag from atop a bombed-out multi-storey building and unfurling another flag on a metal spire on a roof. Reuters determined the footage matched street patterns of Vuhledar.
Other images showed smoke rising over the ruins of the once small mining town, now a deserted and devastated battlefield where Ukrainian units had held off previous armoured Russian assaults through 2-1/2 years of war.
“The enemy is already nearly in the centre of the city,” Vadym Filashkin, governor of the Donetsk region that makes up part of the broader Donbas historical area, told Ukrainian TV, describing the situation as very difficult.
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the Ukrainian military did not comment on Tuesday on the situation in Vuhledar. It was unclear whether Russian forces controlled the whole town.
“Vuhledar… the city we all fought for, the city where soldiers from different units laid down their lives, the city where I met the war with a weapon in hand,” Stanislav Buniatov, a Ukrainian military blogger and a volunteer soldier said on the Telegram messaging app.
Combat footage by the popular war blog DeepState showed Russian forces throughout Vuhledar. Ukraine’s public broadcaster Suspilne quoted soldiers fighting there as saying they had not received an order to leave.
Kremlin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Monday that President Vladimir Putin “regularly receives direct information from the military” including on Vuhledar, but there was no official comment from Moscow that the town was taken.
Russian military bloggers, including a group of military analysts who ran the prominent Rybar Telegram channel, touted the capture of the city, which could speed up the advance of Russian forces in Donbas.
Vuhledar has strategic significance because of its high ground and its location near the junction of the two main fronts, in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russian forces reached the outskirts last week and have since intensified their push.
Earlier, Andriy Nazarenko, commander of a drone battalion of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, said they were outgunned and outmanned in Vuhledar.
“The situation in Vuhledar is very difficult, it is the hardest because assaults have been going on for more than six months and the enemy is constantly rotating its ranks with fresh, trained forces,” Nazarenko told Reuters.
Speaking from an undisclosed location during a Zoom interview, Nazarenko said his unit was doing everything possible to maintain “a window” for the infantry to be able to retreat from the town.
RUSSIA’S FAST ADVANCE
Since August, Moscow’s troops have advanced at their fastest rate for more than two years in eastern Ukraine, despite Ukrainian forces mounting a surprise incursion into Russia’s Kursk region.
Oleksandr Kovalenko, a Ukrainian military analyst, said that about 2,000 to 3,000 Russian troops were in the town, attacking from three different directions.
“We will not be able to hold on in Vuhledar in these conditions,” Kovalenko told Reuters, saying the decision to retreat from Vuhledar should be taken quickly.
Full control over Vuhledar would help Moscow’s troops to improve their logistics by using railways more actively, easing their further advance in the region and giving them positions on heights from which to fire artillery.
Filashkin, urging people to leave, said that about 350,000 people remained in government-held parts of the region, down from about 1.9 m before the war. Only 107 civilians remained in Vuhledar, which had a pre-war population of about 14,000, he said.
The Donetsk region, where Russian proxy forces launched a revolt in 2014, is one of four Ukrainian provinces that Moscow claimed to have annexed in late 2022. Moscow says capturing the rest of the province is one of its principal war aims.
Ukraine drove back Russian forces from the outskirts of Kyiv and recaptured territory in a counter-offensive in 2022. But another Ukrainian counter-offensive last year was a failure and Russian forces have mostly had the battlefield initiative since. (Source: Reuters)
02 Oct 24. China emerges a key supplier for Ukraine’s defence SME sector.
Ukraine’s burgeoning defence SME sector is having to contend with a range of difficulties as it looks to develop capabilities, amid the ongoing war against Russia.
Internal supply chain difficulties and European bureaucracy has emerged as a leading problem for Ukraine’s burgeoning defence small and medium enterprise (SME) sector, with some seeing China as a preferred provider of components and subsystems due to its more relaxed export regulations.
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Despite innovations, questions remain over the ability of Ukraine’s defence industrial base to produce components, subsystems, and platforms, at the scale needed. Global supply chains still reeling from the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, an economic downturn in the West, and a lack of production capacity as a result of the post-Cold War peace dividend.
None of the industry representatives that spoke with Army Technology were willing to be named due to security concerns.
A representative of a Ukrainian defence company said that it was easier to obtain components from markets in China, rather than the European Union (EU).
“It’s easier [to obtain components from China], the duration [to complete an order] is just two days,” said the representative, adding that processing orders from the EU could take weeks to complete, citing paperwork and bureaucracy.
A second representative from a Ukrainian SME operating in the defence space told Army Technology that all prototypes of its platforms currently undergoing testing were manufactured in China, although the official held the aspiration to move the process in-country.
China’s communist regime is also providing non-lethal military support to Russia, and is widely seen as backing Moscow in the conflict.
Developing an industry in the midst of war
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s defence industrial base is also having to contend with developing itself at the same time as the country battles with the necessities of battlefield reality, with manpower and recruitment at the forefront of problems requiring a solution.
Ukraine has already reduced the lower age limit for conscription and has recently implemented a new digital initiative intended to improve efficiency in conscription deferrals and personnel administration.
Such are the demographics of Ukraine, where the average age of military personnel fighting on the eastern front against Russia is well into the late-30s, elements of emergent generations are seeking to take the reigns as the next influential industrialists of the 21st Century.
One industry official, participating in a panel discussion which included senior representatives from western defence companies, said that he and his peers “did not need to listen” to “older” engineers, as the technologies of the future evolve and digitisation advances.
“[The engineers] that have been in [industry] for 20, 30, 40 years, we don’t need to listen to them. They had their time,” the Ukraine industry official said.
Another panelist, addressing delegates during IT Arena conference in Lviv, said that Ukraine’s own industrial base, once many hundreds of companies strong, had shrunk by more than half, while a brain drain prior to the outbreak of the Russia war in 2022 saw capable engineers and business leaders head overseas to Europe and the United States.
A Ukrainian SME official speaking with Army Technology concurred with this perspective, staying that “many people” who could provide invaluable expertise into Ukraine’s defence sector inevitably “move abroad”.
(Source: army-technology.com)
01 Oct 24. Russia is ready for long confrontation with US, senior diplomat says. Russia must prepare for a long confrontation with the United States and has sent repeated warnings to Washington over the crisis in relations, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was quoted as saying on Tuesday.
The 2-1/2-year-old Ukraine war has triggered the gravest confrontation between Russia and the West since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis – considered to be the closest the two Cold War superpowers came to intentional nuclear war.
The conflict is entering what Russian officials say is the most dangerous phase to date. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has been urging Kyiv’s allies for months to let Ukraine fire longer-range Western missiles deep into Russia to limit Moscow’s ability to launch attacks.
Ryabkov, who oversees arms control and relations with Washington, said Moscow had no illusions about relations, given the “bipartisan anti-Russian consensus” in the United States.
“We must prepare for a long-term confrontation with this country. We are ready for this in every sense,” Ryabkov was quoted as saying by state news agency RIA.
“We are sending all the warning signals to our opponent so that it does not underestimate our determination,” Ryabkov said.
President Vladimir Putin warned the West last week that Russia could use nuclear weapons if it was struck with conventional missiles, and that Moscow would consider any assault on it supported by a nuclear power to be a joint attack. (Source: Reuters)
30 Sept 24. EU opens defense innovation hub in Kyiv to boost industry outreach. The European Union officially opened its defense-innovation office in Kyiv earlier this month, as the bloc seeks to boost cooperation between the Ukrainian and European defense industries.
The office is part of Europe’s defense industrial strategy adopted in March, and one role will be connecting the bloc’s startups and innovators with Ukraine’s defense industry and armed forces, the European Commission said in a statement on Friday. The office also aims to strengthen Ukraine’s integration into the European defense-equipment market.
The office may help Ukrainian defense firms and startups gain access to EU funding as they develop military technology to help the country fight off Russia’s invasion, with financing one of the main hurdles to ramping up Ukraine’s weapon production. For EU defense firms and startups, the hub in Kyiv may help them tap into Ukraine’s battlefield experience and find partners in a country at the cutting edge of military drone development.
Ukraine has become a world leader in drone technology, with annual production capacity of up to 3 m drones, the country’s Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov said in a Sept. 20 post on Facebook, on the occasion of the innovation office opening.
European drone makers haven’t waited for the EU office to establish their footprint in Ukraine, with Latvia’s Atlas Aerospace setting up an R&D office in Kyiv last year and Germany’s Quantum Systems opening a factory and a development hub in the country in April.
Ukraine has more than 1,100 innovators in defense technology, including more than 500 working on unmanned aerial vehicles, more than 160 developers of robots, at least 150 firms working on AI applications and more than 110 on electronic-warfare tools, according to Brave1, a defense-tech collaboration platform set up by the Ukrainian government.
The country is holding a defense-tech investment summit in Kyiv later this week to court international investors, bringing together officials, military and manufacturers. The summit is probably one of the few such events to advertise the availability of “safe and fully equipped shelters” available across the city to ensure the well-being of attendees, as the Ukrainian capital continues to face a threat of Russian missile attacks.
The EU in December already opened an office in Kyiv for its research and innovation program Horizon Europe, which at that time had been funding more than 120 projects in Ukraine.
Separately, Denmark on Monday announced plans to set up a defense-industry hub in Kyiv, saying that will strengthen the opportunity for Danish companies to cooperate more directly with Ukraine’s defense firms. The hub is expected to be up and running before the end of the year, the Danish Defence Ministry said in a statement.
“The situation in Ukraine clearly shows that wars are not only won on the battlefield, but to a large extent also in industry,” Danish Minister for Industry and Business Morten Bødskov was quoted as saying in the statement. “With the new hub, we are laying the stepping stones for new development cooperation and increased trade, so that Denmark can continue to contribute to Ukraine’s fight for freedom.”
Meanwhile, Denmark placed an order with Rheinmetall for 16 of the company’s Skyranger 30 mobile air-defense turrets and ammunition for more than €100m ($112m). The turrets are scheduled for delivery in 2027 and 2028, with additional vehicle equipment for an 8-wheeled platform that will be used by the Danish armed forces, the company said in a statement on Monday.
The Skyranger turret with its 30mm revolver cannon and airburst munitions is “particularly suitable” to counter drones, according to Rheinmetall. The Danish order follows a first purchase by Austria, with Germany’s Bundeswehr also buying the system, the company said. For the Bundeswehr, the Skyranger will take the role previously filled by the Gepard air-defense systems, which had already been taken out of the Germany inventory before being sent to Ukraine. (Source: glstrade.com/Defense News)
27 Sept 24. Ukraine looks to digitise conscription to find qualitative edge. The launch of the Army+ and Reserve+ apps is intended to digitise personnel administration and recruitment. In a bid to find a qualitative edge against a Russian enemy that has quantitative superiority, Ukraine is digitising its army personnel record keeping for both full-time regulars and those listed in the reserve force, including, potentially, receiving conscription outcomes by mobile app.
Military aged males in Ukraine aged at least 25 years of age can be conscripted into service, unless they have a valid waiver, such as being a full-time student or having a medical disability.
The move by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) to digital record keeping and tracking is intended to remove the paper trail that has long plagued militaries around the world as they track the development and personnel and manage the influx of new recruits.
Teething problems were found after the initial launch of Army+, the MoD stated on 27 September, where “some service members” found that information about their service was not visible in the app.
At a press conference attending by Army Technology in the western city of Lviv, Kateryna Chernohorenko, Deputy Minister of Defence for Digital Development, Digital Transformation and Digitalization, told reporters on 27 September the Reserve+ app would incrementally take over the old paper-based conscription process.
Chernohorenko said that military age males currently had to make visits to conscription centres at periodic intervals in order to extend their service deferral, but through the Reserve+ app the process would be become more “automated”.
However, Chernohorenko said that the MoD needed “tech counterparts” in other ministries in order to fully implement the Reserve+ app.
“Naturally, this will take some time,” Chernohorenko suggested, stating that additional upgrades to Reserve+ will be issued in the first half of October.
It was also hoped that service contracts could be signed via the app, rather than going through the conscription process.
Online training made available through Army+ app
Another feature that will be available for Ukrainian military personnel through the Army+ app will be online training videos, with the inaugural course specific to uncrewed technologies and small drone operations on the battlefield.
Additional courses will be made available through the Army+ app, with suggestions able to be made by personnel in the months ahead.
The burgeoning digitisation of the military personnel management and recruitment process is also building large quantities of data, which is now being fed into a “dashboard”, known as Delta, from which real-time updates on recruitment, force numbers, and other administration, can be discerned.
The Delta dashboard has been developed according to Nato guidelines, Chernohorenko said.
It is thought that around one m Ukrainian personnel are currently serving in various branches of the military, reserve, paramilitary, and parapublic forces.
The bloody metrics of the Ukraine-Russia war
The huge number of military casualties on both sides that have resulted from the brutal combat following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has caused personnel issues for both sides as they look to replace battlefield losses.
While neither side is willing to disclose their own casualty figures, it is understood that more than 600,000 personnel on both sides have been killed and injured in combat.
Russia has sought to resolve its personnel problems through partial mobilisations of its civilian population, though this has generally eschewed affluent urban areas and instead focussed on smaller towns and villages.
Notoriously, prison convicts were also recruited into Russian military service on purported short-term contracts, such as with the notorious Wagner Group, and thrown into action on the battlefield. (Source: army-technology.com)
27 Sept 24. Will they, won’t they: Marles dodges media speculation about supplying M1A1 tanks to Ukraine. Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has dodged speculation regarding sending retiring M1A1 Abrams main battles tanks to Ukraine, after being questioned at a recent press conference in the United Kingdom.
The Minister for Defence, attending a media doorstop in London, said the federal government is considering all Australian Defence Force equipment but he could not go into particular capabilities about what will be sent to the country fighting Russian military forces.
“We are definitely looking at all the material that we have and all the material that is coming to its end of life within the Australian Defence Force about suitability for Ukraine and we’ve been doing that from the outset,” he said.
“There’s some platforms that work and some that, frankly, will not work in Ukraine. And having operated those platforms, whilst we understand Ukraine is a different context to the context in which Australia has operated those platforms, we are the experts in terms of how those platforms operate, and we do have a sense of what’s going to be useful for Ukraine and what is not.
“We are very mindful of platforms which are coming to their end of life within the Australian Defence Force, about their usefulness, their potential usefulness for Ukraine. I think that the other point to simply say is we are in an ongoing conversation with Ukraine about what capabilities we have, including those which are coming to the end of their life within our Defence Force.”
When questioned about possible discussions the Australian government has had with the US about handling and transferring ADF M1A1 main battle tanks to Ukraine, Minister Marles confirmed there was an ongoing dialogue.
“There are often real questions that need to be answered in terms of the handling of technology with the original supplier of the technology, which is often the United States,” he said.
“There will always be a conversation around that in terms of then on supplying that technology to Ukraine. And that does form part of how we consider the usefulness of assets which are coming to their end of life within the Australian Defence Force.
“In the general sense, we definitely do talk to the US about the platforms that we have. There is then, whatever platform we’re talking about, there’s a logistical exercise and actually getting it to Ukraine, but we’ve been able to meet those challenges in the past with the various platforms we’ve managed to get to Ukraine.”
The Deputy Prime Minister also confirmed ongoing discussions regarding the supply of 155mm artillery shells, which are in critical demand in Ukraine.
Minister Marles said, “155s (155mm shells) have definitely been on the agenda. We’ve done a lot of work in this space. We continue to talk to Ukraine about this. We’ve worked closely with France, for example, in relation to this as well in terms of supporting Ukraine. So we’ll continue to look at what options are available in terms of getting those kinds of munitions to Ukraine.” (Source: Defence Connect)
27 Sept 24. Ukraine conflict: US clears JSOW glide-bomb for F-16s. The United States is to send Raytheon RTX AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) glide-bombs to Ukraine for use aboard its recently delivered Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon combat aircraft. US President Joe Biden made the announcement on 26 September during a visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to the White House.
“To enhance Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities, I have decided to provide Ukraine with the Joint Standoff Weapon long-range munition,” President Biden said.
The baseline JSOW is a 1,000 lb-class glide-bomb with a maximum range of 116 km when released at high altitude and is already cleared for carriage on the F-16 of which Ukraine has received the first 10 of a pledged 79 jets (one was lost in late August). The GPS/INS (inertial navigation system) and terminal imaging infrared-guided JSOW is available in four different variants – JSOW-A, JSOW-A1, JSOW-C, and JSOW-C1 – though it is not clear from Biden’s announcement which is/are being transferred to Ukraine. For more information on the JSOW, please see AGM-154 Joint Stand‐Off Weapon (JSOW) and JSOW-ER. (Source: Janes)
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