NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 16.

16 Sept 24. The beginning of a Russian counteroffensive against Ukrainian troops who seized a swath of Russia’s Kursk region last month has turned the spotlight back on Kyiv and the objectives of its audacious invasion. The operation — which was the first major foreign incursion into Russian territory since the second world war — was always a gamble, said analysts. But with Ukraine’s forces in Kursk now on the back foot, the risks are growing, and the strategic rewards are still elusive. Ukrainian forces achieved a morale-boosting tactical victory when they seized roughly 1,200 sq km of Russian territory after their surprise attack on August 6. The operation helped to restore some faith in Ukraine’s offensive potential, changing the narrative of the war. But there has so far been little success for Ukraine in its aim of forcing Moscow to divert substantial forces away from the country’s east, where Kyiv’s exhausted troops are steadily losing ground. Russia has, if anything, stepped up the pressure within Ukraine, particularly around the important railway hub of Pokrovsk. The overall success of the Kursk invasion will now hinge on the costs Ukraine incurs in holding on to territory, potentially for months, according to analysts. And those costs will depend on the tactics Russian forces use to try to push the Ukrainian invaders out. Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said the outcome from Ukraine’s point of view depended on the relative resources committed by each side. “What’s important is not that Ukraine has diverted resources,” he said. “That’s OK — as long as Russia diverts more.” If Russia played the long game by committing only limited resources to Kursk, it could further stretch and grind down Ukrainian forces. Russia on Wednesday launched a counteroffensive in Kursk and claimed to have quickly retaken about 63 sq km from Ukrainian forces on the left flank of the area that Kyiv seized, though Deepstate, a military analysis outlet with links to Ukraine’s defence ministry, said Ukraine was still edging forwards in the north. The FT could not independently verify the reports. (Source: FT.com)

Sep 13.

On 12 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned the UK, US and wider NATO states that providing Ukraine with approval to conduct long-range strikes inside de jure Russian territory would mark a serious escalation of the war and mean Russia and NATO would be in direct conflict. Putin has made such statements numerous times before.

SIGNIFICANCE

* Putin’s statements come as UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer is in Washington DC where he is likely seeking authorisation by US President Joe Biden for Ukraine to use UK-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike inside Russia. The Guardian reported on 11 September that the UK has already decided to provide Ukraine with such permission; however, London is now waiting on final confirmation from Washington DC (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 September 2024).

* Moscow has also since revoked the accreditation of six British diplomats, whom the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claims are under suspicion of espionage and threatening Russia’s national security. It is highly likely that this is partially in response to the UK’s apparent decision.

FORECAST

Putin has frequently made similar threats in the past; we assess that, even if approval is granted for long-range strikes (which remains likely), it does not reflect a significant change in rhetoric or an escalation towards direct Russia-NATO conflict. Russian officials have maintained that NATO has already been a direct participant in the war for the past two years. Moscow has also already threatened military escalation before if Western nations were to cross so-called ‘red lines’. However, despite these lines being crossed multiple times before, we have not seen a significant direct escalation of the conflict.

We assess that Russia’s conventional military capability to respond to NATO remains very limited; any retaliation will likely be rhetorical or hybrid in nature. An intensification of hybrid operations across Europe, particularly against UK interests, remains a realistic possibility. Such hybrid operations can and have likely already involved: sabotage, assassinations, drone incursions, false-flag ‘provocations’, online disinformation campaigns, fomenting unrest and ethno-religious tensions, cyber attacks and military probing attacks in NATO airspace and waters. During particularly tense periods, the risk of confrontation between Russian and NATO aircraft and naval vessels will also increase. For example, in the Black Sea, a Russian Kh-22 missile hit a civilian grain ship in international waters on 12 September. This was particularly significant as the attack occurred in international waters (which is unprecedented). While further attacks against civilian shipping remain possible, confrontation with NATO military forces will likely remain isolated and not lead to wider direct conflict.

Moscow has also previously indicated that, if Western countries approve long-range strikes inside Russia, Moscow could, in turn, supply various groups around the world with weapons that could ‘target sensitive facilities’ belonging to those same Western countries. However, Moscow is already engaged in such action, again reflecting that Putin has threatened nothing new. Following the US’s approval of limited strikes into Belgorod oblast following Russia’s March Kharkiv offensive, Moscow almost certainly stepped up efforts to arm the Houthis in Yemen with missiles, only to pull out of the deal at the last minute in June following behind-closed-doors diplomacy with the US and Saudi Arabia. If the US approves long-range Storm Shadow missile strikes, Russia will likely reinvigorate efforts to arm Iranian proxies or other militant groups around the world that could target Western interests.

The UK is likely at high risk of targeted, hybrid retaliation since Moscow sees London as at the forefront of NATO’s efforts to support Ukraine. The UK has consistently been a leading nation in lobbying for greater military support for Ukraine; it was the first to commit to sending Western main battle tanks, the first to support the provision of F-16s and the first to supply long-range cruise missiles. The authorisation for Storm Shadow use inside Russia would be the latest example of the UK testing Russia’s so-called red lines.

Starmer responded to Putin’s latest warnings by stating that Russia started this conflict and that Ukraine has the right to defend itself, indicating that London’s position is unlikely to change. However, it remains unclear whether Washington DC’s stance will alter, given the Biden administration’s previous reluctance to allow long-range strikes over fears of escalation. While a statement later on 13 September remains possible, Bloomberg sources claim that a US decision on the matter is unlikely to be reached before the UN General Assembly’s annual debate on 24 September in New York.

Finally, our assessment that a nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely has not changed despite Russian statements that they are ‘reviewing’ their nuclear doctrine. As we have previously assessed, whenever Russia perceives itself to be on the back foot, it resorts to nuclear threats and rhetoric, including allegations of preparations for false flag attacks against nuclear power plants. While nuclear rhetoric will likely increase in the coming weeks, a major escalation or use of nuclear weapons remains highly unlikely.

Ukraine: Attack against civilian cargo vessel underscores threats to grain shipments in Black Sea. On 12 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that a Russian strategic bomber launched a Kh-22 missile against a civilian cargo vessel transporting Ukrainian grain to Turkey. The vessel was struck after it left Ukrainian waters and while it was reportedly located in Romania’s maritime economic zone. Since the start of the war, Russia has carried out numerous strikes against grain vessels. However, all these attacks occurred within Ukrainian territorial waters. As such, the latest attack is unprecedented given that it took place in international waters (according to international law, the surface waters of a country’s maritime economic zone are international waters). The attack coincided with heightened regional tensions related to the UK’s possible agreement to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles against Russian de jure territory. Additionally, on 10 September, the former Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu hinted that Russia would not refrain from attacks against vessels in the Black Sea following Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk oblast (Russia). Overall, we assess this incident underscores the persistent threat to civilian shipping in the Black Sea, a threat exacerbated by increasing regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

13 Sept 24. Russia has expelled six UK diplomats over spying claims, the country’s FSB security service said on Friday, ahead of talks between UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and US President Joe Biden on the war in Ukraine. Britain said the claims were “completely baseless” and that Russia had stripped the six British officials of their accreditation in early August as part of an escalating tit-for-tat diplomatic dispute. UK officials said the timing of the FSB announcement was clearly intended to put pressure on Starmer, who wants Ukraine to be able to use western-supplied long-range missiles against targets in Russia. The issue will be at the top of the agenda in White House talks between Biden and Starmer later on Friday, with the US still weighing the ramifications of what would be seen by Moscow as a major escalation of the war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday that if the west allowed Kyiv to use longer-range weapons against targets inside Russia then Nato would be “at war” with Moscow. (Source: FT.com)

Sep 12.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

KURSK: Russian forces have launched a counter-attack along the western flank of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk oblast; they have made some advances
STRIKES: Russian forces continue to launch long-range drone and missile attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure; there has been an uptick in the use of ballistic missiles against military targets close to the border
US: Ukraine was a key foreign policy topic during a debate between US presidential hopefuls Harris and Trump, though it remains unclear what a potential Trump administration’s Ukraine policy would look like
FORECAST: The UK has reportedly decided to allow Ukraine to use British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles against de jure Russian territory amid wider Western discussions about developing a strategy to end the war
BAKHMUT: North of Bakhmut, Russian forces are continuing to launch low-level attacks east of Siversk; geolocated footage from 8 and 10 September has confirmed marginal advances near the frontline town of Bilohorivka.
BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing to launch assaults around Chasiv Yar; they are likely attempting to make progress along the northern and southern flanks as grinding frontal assaults against the eastern section of the town continue. Geolocated footage published on 9 September indicates Russian advances in western Kalynivka, a small settlement located directly north-east of Chasiv Yar. Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 10 September that its forces have taken Hryhorivka, located almost three miles (4km) north of Chasiv Yar – though this remains unconfirmed at the time of writing.
BAKHMUT: Further south along the Toretsk axis, fighting remains intense and the battlefield is relatively dynamic amid Russian attacks and Ukrainian counter-attacks. Geolocated footage from 10 September indicates minor Ukrainian advances in the north-east of the town. However, Russian forces advanced along a major road towards the centre of the town on 11 September.
DONTESK: Russian forces continue to make gains to the south-east of Pokrovsk, despite Ukraine’s recent efforts to reinforce its defensive operations in the sector. Geolocated footage from 11 September shows Russian forces raising a flag in Lysivka, likely indicating that the settlement is now under Russian control. Geolocated footage published between 6 and 9 September shows Russian forces operating to the west of Mykhailivka (located to the south-east of Pokrovsk), which likely confirms that the settlement is also under Russian control. A Ukrainian military observer also acknowledged recent Russian advances to the north-east and east of Selydove and to the west of Novohrodivka (both located to the south-east of Pokrovsk). Selydove likely remains a contested settlement. However, further Russian advances here would likely increase pressure on Pokrovsk’s southern flank and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) running westwards.
DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian forces have made grinding gains toward Vuhledar, located to the south-west of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces recently reached Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 1, located around four miles (7km) to the north-east of Vuhledar. Additional footage from 10 September shows Russian advances in central and north-western Vodyane (located to the north-east of Vuhledar). The advances likely indicate that they have captured the settlement.
KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
KURSK: On 10 September, Russian forces launched a counter-attack (and made some advances) along the western flank of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk oblast. Geolocated footage from 10-11 September indicates movements of Russian armoured columns to the east and south-east of Korenovo; elements of Russian Airborne (VDV) forces rapidly advanced into the centre of the village of Snagost, located around eight miles (five miles) to the south of Korenevo. It remains unclear whether Russian forces now control the entire settlement.
KURSK: The scale of the Russian counter-attack remains unclear; geolocated footage confirms at least company-sized mechanised attacks, though some Russian sources have claimed that naval infantry and VDV ‘battalion tactical groups’ (BTGs) are taking part in the operation. Russian forces have notably not used BTGs since 2022, given the widely agreed failure of the concept during the initial full-scale invasion. Nevertheless, if the operation is led by relatively well-experienced naval infantry and VDV forces, and if these are well-supplied and reinforced, a Russian counter-attack will possibly aim to begin rolling back Ukraine’s western flank. However, the extent to which the Ukrainians have dug in around this area remains unclear, as does the status and number of Ukrainian reserves that could be committed to defensive operations. Nevertheless, the wider Kursk frontline remains contested and dynamic; geolocated footage published on 9 September indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in eastern Komarovka, located to the south-west of Korenevo.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continued to make gains in the Kupiansk sector amid ongoing efforts to push Ukrainian forces beyond the Oskil River. Over the past few days, Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian troops have expanded their control around Synkivka (located to the north-east of Kupiansk). Russian milbloggers have claimed that the settlement was under Russian control, with recent geolocated footage likely corroborating these claims. However, on 9 September, the governor of Kharkiv oblast, Oleh Synehubov, reported that Synkivka remains contested. Nevertheless, we assess that the settlement is likely under Russian control, with possible fighting ongoing in its outskirts. Geolocated footage from 11 September indicates recent Russian advances along a windbreak north of Pishchane (located to the south-east of Kupiansk). They also made confirmed marginal advances north of Stelmakhivka, which is also located to the south-east of Kupiansk. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 10 September shows recent Russian advances along a windbreak south-east of Makiivka, located to the north-west of Kreminna.
SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
STRIKES: On 10 September, Russia launched one Iskandr-M ballistic missile, one Kh-31P missile and 46 Shahed-136/131 drones against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces intercepted 38 drones; six other drones failed to reach their targets, likely as a result of Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures. The projectiles were intercepted over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
STRIKES: On 10 September, an OSINT source released a video showing an Iskandr-M ballistic missile striking a gathering of Ukrainian forces in Sumy oblast, near Bezdryk, a settlement located around 21 miles (33km) from the border. The attack took place on 4 September and possibly indicates Russia’s increasing willingness to use ballistic missiles against military targets such as equipment, troop concentrations and/or facilities near the frontline. Russian forces will possibly use recently supplied Iranian short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to conduct such attacks.
STRIKES: On 11 September, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 25 Shahed-136/131 drones, one Iskandr-M ballistic missile, two S-300 guided missiles and six Kh-31P missiles. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 20 drones; the remaining five drones failed to reach their targets, likely as a result of Ukrainian EW measures. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
STRIKES: Early on 12 September, Russian forces launched two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, one Kh-59/69 missile, two Kh-22/32 cruise missiles and 64 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 44 drones over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The attack targeted energy infrastructure, with the local authorities having reported damage to electricity and water supply infrastructure in the city of Konotop (Sumy).
STRIKES: On 10 September, the former Russian defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, stated that before Ukraine’s Kursk incursion, Russia refrained from strikes against energy infrastructure. However, Shoigu indicated that the Kursk incursion has prompted Russia to recommence such strikes. Nonetheless, Russia has systematically targeted energy infrastructure since the start of the war to degrade the country’s morale and overall socio-economic health risks; we also saw no clear shift in Russian striking patterns prior to the Kursk offensive. We assess that such infrastructure will remain a priority target ahead of the coming winter months, which are likely to be the most challenging for Ukraine to date.
STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 9-10 September, Ukraine launched a large-scale drone attack across Western Russia. Russia’s MoD stated that air defences intercepted 144 drones in total, including 72 drones over Bryansk oblast, eight over Belgorod oblast, seven over Kaluga oblast, 14 over Kursk oblast, four over Lipetsk oblast, 20 over Moscow oblast, one over Oryol oblast, 13 over Tula oblast and five over Voronezh oblast. The attack caused damage to residential buildings in Moscow. The attack led the Russian authorities to introduce restrictions for numerous flights operating from Moscow’s Domodedovo (DME), Sheremetyevo (SVO) and Vnukovo (VKO) airports.
STRIKES: On 10 September, the governor of Murmansk oblast (Russia), Andrey Chibis, reported that a Ukrainian drone struck the region, which is located around 1,200 miles (2,000 km) from the Ukrainian border. An online media outlet reported that drones were seen near Severomorsk, a port on the coast of the Barents Sea and the main base for Russia’s Northern Fleet (RNF). The attack took place while the RNF was conducting drills in the area. The Russian MoD did not comment on the incident. In August, a Ukrainian drone was reportedly intercepted near Olenya military airbase (Murmansk). Such attacks clearly underscore Kyiv’s expanding drone capabilities and willingness to target military entities located deep into Russian territory.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

US: Ukraine was a key foreign policy topic during a debate on 10 September between US presidential hopefuls Vice President Kamala Harris and the former president, Donald Trump. Trump refused to answer whether he believes a Ukrainian victory is in the best interests of the US. Rather, he insisted that it is in his country’s best interests for the war to finish, to ‘just get it done’ and negotiate a deal. Trump also reiterated his previous statements that he will end the war even before he hypothetically enters office, without providing further information as to how he intends to do so.
US: Meanwhile, Harris maintained her support for Ukraine, arguing that she believes Trump is only confident that he can end the war quickly because he would be willing to give up on supporting Kyiv. Harris emphasised that Ukraine remains an independent and free country because of the military support the US and its allies have provided. It therefore remains highly likely that a Harris administration would continue supporting Ukraine militarily in 2025. However, we assess that even under a Harris administration, international pressure to move towards a peace settlement would likely increase (see FORECAST below). Trump’s remarks, meanwhile, indicate that a second Trump administration would realistically push for a rapid end to the war. For further analysis on the possible Ukraine policy of a Trump administration, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 27 June 2024.
CHINA: US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell claimed on 10 September that China is providing Russia with ‘very substantial’ help to enhance its defence industry in exchange for top-secret Russian submarine and missile technology. Campbell stated that China is engaged in efforts to ‘sustain, build and diversify various elements of the Russian war machine’. According to Campbell, the alleged support to Russia is not dual-use technologies, which can be used for both military and civilian purposes. The US has previously criticised Beijing’s supply of such technologies, though it is unclear what this new support entails.
CHINA: While the official’s statements cannot be confirmed, they reflect (if true) growing defensive co-operation between China and Russia. The remarks indicate that Moscow is willing to offer sensitive military technology in exchange for materiel to help its war effort – as it has also likely done to procure North Korean munitions. That said, our assessment remains that China is unlikely to supply lethal aid for Russian forces to use in Ukraine in the foreseeable future due to credible fears of secondary sanctions and the impact these would have on the Chinese economy.
BUDGET: The IMF announced on 10 September that it has reached a staff-level preliminary agreement with Ukraine to provide Kyiv around USD 1.1 billion in financial assistance. The agreement is subject to approval from the IMF’s executive board, with the matter expected to be considered in the coming weeks. Notably, the IMF stated that the Ukrainian economy remained resilient in the first half of the year but acknowledged that its outlook remains ‘exceptionally uncertain’. According to the IMF, the war will entail fresh financing needs, which will in turn require large-scale support from Kyiv’s donors and determined policy efforts from the Ukrainian authorities.
BUDGET: The IMF assessed that an economic slowdown is expected in the second half of the year due to repeated Russian attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. It also cited the impact of the war on labour markets and investor confidence. The IMF forecast GDP growth at 3% for 2024, with inflation expected to rise to around 9% by the end of the year. The international financial agency emphasised that addressing the energy deficit ahead of the winter months is crucial, noting that this will require co-ordinated efforts – including with Kyiv’s international partners.

FORECAST

STRATEGY: On 11 September, The Guardian reported that, according to unnamed UK officials, the UK has decided to allow Ukraine to use British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles against de jure Russian territory. This remains unconfirmed by London. The final decision remains contingent on US approval, though this looks increasingly likely in the coming days and weeks amid domestic pressure and continued requests from Kyiv.

During a visit to Ukraine on 11 September with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that Washington DC is currently working on a plan to allow Ukraine to use Western long-range weapons against Russian territory. Notably, Blinken disclosed in an interview with British media on 10 September that the US has not ruled out allowing Ukraine to fire missiles deep into Russian territory, noting that when the US makes decisions it wants to ensure that these can advance what Ukraine is hoping to achieve. Russia has reportedly relocated 90% of its aircraft used to attack Ukraine to outside a 186-mile (300km) zone from the Ukrainian border. While this will limit Storm Shadow’s ability to target aircraft assets, given the missiles have a range of around 155 miles (250km), there are numerous other military targets within range lying across Russia’s border regions.

US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer are expected to discuss authorising at least some long-range Ukrainian strikes into Russia when they meet on 13 September at the White House in Washington DC (US). These developments mark a notable inflexion in the West’s stance, given that the US was previously reluctant to authorise such strikes due to concerns over escalation. Reports that Moscow has recently received several hundred Iranian ballistic missiles have likely prompted the UK and the US to reconsider their position, though as we have previously reported, London was already lobbying the US to approve such strikes for weeks.

However, according to Bloomberg sources, a decision on the matter is unlikely to be reached before the UN General Assembly’s annual high-level debate on 24 September in New York (US). Despite Moscow’s warnings that approval to strike inside Russia will prove escalatory, previous increases in Western support for Ukraine (such as the provision of main battle tanks, F-16s and Storm Shadow missiles) have resulted in only limited and contained Russian responses. We assess that, while UK-specific hybrid retaliation remains plausible, a major escalation of the war is unlikely.

Meanwhile, Western countries are seemingly intensifying strategic planning to consider wider war objectives as the conflict continues to grind on without an end in sight. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on 11 September, citing unspecified European diplomats, that Western officials want Ukraine to set more ‘realistic goals’ for 2025. Kyiv’s major war objective remains the full withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, including Crimea. Although the West still reportedly supports Ukraine’s aim of recapturing its territory, a more pragmatic approach to negotiations in 2025 will possibly aid Ukraine’s partners in maintaining domestic support for Ukraine. At the same time, the Biden administration has reportedly sent Congress a classified report outlining its strategy for the war in Ukraine. While details remain limited, such a document would likely provide a clearer vision as to how Washington DC (under a potential Kamala Harris administration) aims to assist Kyiv, as well as the extent of that support (rather than open-ended commitments without a clear strategy to end the fighting).

Separately, on 8 September, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke in favour of including Russia in a second peace summit amid German efforts to develop a peace plan. Scholz stated that he had agreed on this with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. While the German chancellor offered limited details on the matter, Italian media reported on 9 September that Scholz’ alleged peace plan includes potential territorial concessions to Russia. According to the outlet La Repubblica, which cited insiders in the German parliament, Scholz is working with some party members on an arrangement similar to the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements. These accords sought to end the war between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region. While the veracity of the report cannot be confirmed, Ukraine is highly unlikely to be willing to cede territory to Russia in the short-to-medium term. However, all conflicts must end with a form of settlement, and Germany’s potential plan means Berlin is the first major Western player to propose territorial concessions in a bid to end the war – something that a potential Donald Trump administration would also likely favour.

• Ukraine: UK’s reported decision to allow firing of long-range missiles is unlikely to cause escalation. On 11 September, the Guardian reported that, according to unnamed UK officials, the UK has decided to allow Ukraine to use British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles against de jure Russian territory. This remains unconfirmed by London, with the final decision remaining contingent on US approval. However, during a visit to Ukraine on 11 September with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, US State Secretary Antony Blinken stated that Washington DC is currently working on a plan to allow Ukraine to use Western long-range against Russian territory. These reports mark a notable inflexion in the West’s stance, given that the US has previously remained reluctant to authorise such strikes due to concerns over escalation. Recent reports that Moscow has recently received several hundred Iranian ballistic missiles have likely prompted the UK and US to reconsider its position. Despite Moscow’s warnings that approval to strike inside Russia will prove escalatory, previous increases in Western support for Ukraine have resulted in only limited, contained Russian responses. We assess that, while UK-specific hybrid retaliation remains plausible, a major escalation of the war is unlikely.
Sep 09.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that there has been a slight improvement in the operational situation in the Pokrovsk sector, though Russian forces continue to slowly advance
• STRIKES: Overnight on 6-7 September, Russia launched a large-scale drone attack on Ukraine involving 67 Shahed-136/131 drones; however, it is likely that Ukrainian advancements in electronic warfare capabilities are improving the interception rates of such drones
• MUNITIONS: Ukraine has disclosed that it is building underground weapons production facilities to ensure that its forces have weapons in case Western military aid is delayed
• FORECAST: Latvia and Romania, both NATO countries, reported that Russian drones violated their airspace during recent attacks on Ukraine; however, this is highly unlikely to trigger a Russia-NATO escalation
• BAKHMUT: The Ukrainian Azov Brigade confirmed on 6 September that its forces launched a counter-attack in Niu York (Donetsk oblast) and had retaken parts of the centre of the town. Geolocated footage from 7 September confirms the counter-attack in the north-western sector of the town, though the full extent of Russian control remains unclear. The Azov Brigade claims to have stabilised the frontline as a result of the counter-attack, though it remains likely that Ukrainian forces are still suffering from personnel shortages amid the relentless pressure from Russian forces. Meanwhile, to the east, geolocated footage published on 8 September confirms recent Russian advances in eastern Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). Russian forces are encroaching into the centre of the town from the east and south, though heavy street-to-street fighting is significantly slowing down the rate of Russia’s advance in the area.
• BAKHMUT: Further north, geolocated footage from 4 September indicates that Russian forces successfully advanced west of Klishchiivka (located south-east of Chasiv Yar, Donetsk oblast) up to the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal. While Russian sources have claimed further advances in the area since then, these remain unconfirmed. Nevertheless, the advance to the canal will likely increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending Chasiv Yar from the south. Russian forces are also intensifying attacks to the north-east of Chasiv Yar; the latest advances likely indicate attempts to encircle Chasiv Yar, given frontal assaults into the town’s eastern suburbs have so far proven largely ineffective.
• DONETSK: On 5 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that there has been a slight improvement in the operational situation in the Pokrovsk sector, amid a confirmed slowdown of the rate of Russian advances. Notably, however, Zelensky refrained from stating that the situation had stabilised. His statements came after Ukrainian Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said on the same day that Ukrainian forces had managed to halt Russian advances in the most critical direction of Pokrovsk over the past six days.
• DONTESK: Forbes reported on 6 September that Ukraine has committed some of its reserves to the Pokrovsk sector, where they are conducting small-scale counter-attacks. Notably, geolocated footage from 6 September indicates that Ukrainian forces regained positions in south-western Halytsynivka and western Mykhailivka, both located south-east of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast). Ukraine’s counter-attacks have likely been most effective in the area of Selydove (south-east of Pokrovsk), the outskirts of which likely remain contested. Capturing Selydove remains a priority for the Russians as part of their efforts to reach Pokrovsk to the north. Ukrainian counter-offensive operations have likely inflicted severe casualties on Russian forces in the sector, though it remains unclear if the slowdown from Russian forces is due to this pressure or in preparation for a renewed effort in the coming days.
• DONETSK: Nevertheless, Russian forces continued to make incremental gains in the Pokrovsk sector and west and south-west of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage from 7 September indicates recent Russian advances in central Hrodivka, east of Pokrovsk. Additional geolocated footage posted on 6 and 7 September shows that Russian forces recently made marginal advances in north-western and western Mykhailivka and south of the settlement. Meanwhile, an OSINT source reported on 9 September that Russian forces captured Vodyane, south-west of Donetsk city. Russian troops also made confirmed gains within northern Kransohorivka as of 6 September, indicating that Russian efforts to encircle a salient of Ukrainian troops south of Pokrovsk may be steadily succeeding in pushing the Ukrainians back.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage from 4 September indicates that Ukrainian forces retook some positions north-east of Lyptsi (located north of Kharkiv city, Kharkiv oblast). Notably, Ukraine’s Kharkiv Grouping of Forces reported on 5 September that Russia’s 7th Motorised Rifle Regiment currently fighting in the area is suffering from water shortages; some personnel are reportedly refusing to conduct some operations. While we cannot confirm this, such shortages would have a significant impact on morale. The Kharkiv Grouping of Forces nevertheless reported on 6 September that other Russian units in the area have increased their activity. Certain units are preparing to intensify offensive operations near Hlyboke, located 14 miles (23km) north of the Kharkiv city ring road.
• KURSK: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed on 6 September that Ukrainian forces now control over 500 square miles (1,300 sq km) in Russia’s Kursk oblast, including over 100 settlements, a month after the launch of the Kursk offensive. Nevertheless, much of the frontline in Kursk remains contested, with Russian forces retaking some positions in recent days amid increasing counter-attacks. Geolocated footage published on 5 and 6 September indicates that Russian forces have regained positions north-east of Zhuravli, located east of Korenevo, as well as other positions to the south-east of Korenevo. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are still consolidating their positions while disrupting Russian preparations for further counter-attacks. Geolocated footage from 7 and 8 September indicates Ukrainian strikes against a Russian pontoon bridge and a static bridge respectively across the Seym River south-west of Korenevo. This targeting of key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) will undermine the Russian defence and its ability to repel Ukrainian forces as Ukrainian forces likely focus on digging in and consolidating their positions.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past few days, Russian forces have made confirmed gains in the Kupiansk sector, likely indicating an uptick in offensive operations in the sector. Geolocated footage from 6 September shows Russian forces progressing within southern Synkivka, north-east of Kupiansk, indicating that the settlement is now under Russian control. Meanwhile, Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have made significant progress west and south of Pishchane and Stelmakhivka, both south-east of Kupiansk. While such claims have yet to be corroborated, they likely indicate an intensification of Russian offensive tempo in the sector.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Overnight on 6-7 September, Russia launched a large-scale drone attack on Ukraine involving 67 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine intercepted 58 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); six drones reportedly left Ukraine and flew towards Russia, Belarus and Russian-occupied Luhansk oblast. Three drones reportedly failed to reach their targets, likely due to active Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Rivne and Vinnytsia oblasts.
• STRIKES: Early on 8 September, Russia launched four Kh-59 missiles and 23 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces shot down one missile and 15 drones. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, two drones and the three remaining missiles failed to reach their targets due to active EW countermeasures. On 8 September, NATO countries Latvia and Romania reported that Russian drones violated their airspace during recent attacks on Ukraine. For further analysis of Russian airspace violations, please read FORECAST.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 8-9 September, Russia attacked Ukraine with three Kh-59/69 missiles and eight Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted two missiles and six drones. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that EW measures caused the last missile to miss its target. Air defences were active in the Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv and Sumy oblast. Ukrainian Kyiv oblast authorities claimed that this was the fifth long-range attack against the capital this month.
• STRIKES: Recently, Ukraine’s Air Force has frequently reported that Russian Shahed UAVs failed to reach their targets, likely indicating improvements in Ukraine’s anti-drone EW capabilities. On 7 September, a Ukrainian military analyst reported that Ukrainian EW systems are disabling Shahed-136/131 drones, causing the UAVs to change course and miss their targets. As a result, Ukraine’s use of EW will help conserve its limited number of air defence interceptors for more critical threats, such as missiles. This will reduce pressure on Ukraine’s air defence umbrella posed by large-scale Russian drone strikes.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine is also developing other anti-drone capabilities as part of its wider efforts to reduce pressure on its air defence systems. On 7 September, the Ukrainian drone production company Besomar reported that it developed an interceptor drone capable of engaging unspecified Russian drones. The interceptor is already reportedly being used by Ukrainian forces which also resort to first-person view (FPV) drones to shoot down attack drones. However, despite these efforts, we assess that Ukraine’s air defence capabilities will remain stretched, allowing Russia to carry out highly lethal strikes against the country’s critical infrastructure.
• STRIKES: On 6 September, Zelensky reassured Western partners that Ukrainian drone strikes solely target military objects on Russian territory. Zelensky emphasised that Ukrainian forces never target civilian infrastructure, in contrast to Russia. Zelensky’s comments, made during the Ambrosetti International Economic Forum in Italy, were aimed at reassuring Western partners regarding Ukraine’s long-range attacks on Russian de jure territory. Such statements are part of Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to persuade the West, and the US in particular, to lift restrictions on using Western munitions against Russian territory.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• MUNITIONS: On 6 September, President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed that Ukraine is building underground weapons production facilities to ensure that its forces have weapons in case Western-provided military aid is delayed. Zelensky offered little information on this development due to the sensitive nature of the matter. Nevertheless, Zelensky mentioned how Ukraine has developed its own new domestic drones and missiles. This could therefore suggest that such facilities are involved in the production of these capabilities and possibly other equipment. Zelensky’s comments reflect efforts to build Ukraine’s domestic military-industrial resilience to ensure the flow of key military equipment to offset delayed or reduced Western military support. The upcoming November US presidential election is a likely driver in such decision-making.
• ENERGY: Ukraine’s Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko assessed on 6 September that Ukraine will pass through the upcoming winter without major disturbances as long as Russia does not launch large-scale strikes that critically impact Ukrainian power infrastructure. Nevertheless, Halushchenko said it is challenging to predict how Russian strikes would affect the power system should they occur, which we assess is likely. Halushchenko disagreed with other assessments that Ukraine could see blackouts lasting up to 20 hours a day as a worst-case scenario, claiming that such statements are ‘conditional’.
• ENERGY: We assess that Halushchenko’s assertion is rather optimistic considering the extensive damage already inflicted on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure by Russian forces. Ultimately, Russia is highly likely to intensify strikes against Ukraine’s already-degraded energy infrastructure during the autumn and winter months, sustaining energy insecurity risks and operational disruption as well as the prospect of prolonged periods of electricity and heating blackouts.
• MISSILES: Reports emerged on 6 September that Iran has sent Russia over 200 ballistic missiles. According to a report from the British newspaper The Times, intelligence seen by Ukraine suggests that these are short-range Fath-360 missiles. The projectiles reportedly have a maximum range of around 74.6 miles (120km). Given their ballistic trajectory and high speed, these missiles will be difficult to intercept – though likely easier than the more advanced and longer-range Russian Iskandr-M missiles. Earlier on 9 September, the Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov did not outright deny reports that Moscow had received missiles from Iran. While the deliveries cannot yet be confirmed, if true, the development signals that Iranian-Russian defensive ties are burgeoning, with Iran showing its willingness to provide further capabilities for Russia to use against Ukraine. The influx of hundreds of missiles will also provide Moscow with the option to maintain a higher tempo of long-range strikes against Ukraine for longer this autumn and winter.
FORECAST
DRONES: On 8 September, Latvia and Romania, both NATO countries, reported that Russian drones violated their airspace during recent attacks on Ukraine. The Romanian Ministry of National Defence (MoND) confirmed that a drone entered its territory on 8 September as Russia targeted port infrastructure along the Danube River in Ukraine (approximately 400 metres from Romania’s Danube shore). Meanwhile, Latvian Defence Minister Andris Sprūds reported that a Russian drone had fallen near the town of Rezekne (Latgale region) on 7 September, having likely strayed from Belarus. Both countries confirmed no casualties or property damage.
This is the first known incident of a Russian military drone violating Latvian airspace since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, the incursion into Romania remains the latest in a growing number of such incidents since the full-scale invasion began, underscoring the persistent spillover risk posed to countries neighbouring Ukraine, particularly during high-intensity strikes. On 8 September, Latvian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis blamed ‘inaction’ for Russian drones being able to land in Ukraine and Latvia, insisting that projectiles should not be allowed to fall on NATO territory. Landsbergis stated that Latvia will support a ‘strong allied response’ without offering recommendations as to what that could be or any methods to stop conflict spillover in NATO countries.
Ukraine’s recently appointed foreign minister, Andriy Sybiha, implored allies on 8 September to make a collective decision to intercept Russian drones and missiles over Ukraine. The incidents in Latvia and Romania will likely maintain an ongoing debate over whether Ukraine’s partners, particularly among hawkish figures in states bordering Ukraine, should be empowered to shoot down Russian projectiles. However, a NATO policy change on the matter is highly unlikely in the immediate future. For further analysis of this ongoing debate, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 September 2024.
While notable, the latest incidents in Romania and Latvia are highly unlikely to trigger an escalation between Russia and NATO. We continue to assess that Moscow has no interest in deliberately undertaking actions that could lead to the triggering of the alliance’s Article 5 on collective defence. Accidental (or plausibly deniable) violations of NATO county’s airspace will likely drive the risk of temporary airspace closures, elevating the risk of short-term travel disruption for the duration of the conflict.
• Latvia-Romania: Russian drone incursions are highly unlikely to trigger Russia-NATO escalation. On 8 September, NATO countries Latvia and Romania reported that Russian drones violated their airspace during recent attacks on Ukraine. The Romanian Ministry of National Defence (MoND) confirmed that a drone entered its territory on 8 September as Russia targeted port infrastructure along the Danube River in Ukraine (approximately 400 metres from Romania’s Danube shore). Meanwhile, Latvian Defence Minister Andris Sprūds reported that a Russian drone had fallen near the town of Rezekne (Latgale region), having likely strayed from Belarus. Both countries confirmed no casualties or property damage. The incidents are highly unlikely to trigger an escalation between Russia and NATO. The incursion into Romania underscores the persistent spillover risk posed to countries neighbouring Ukraine – particularly during high-intensity strikes. We continue to assess that Moscow has no interest in deliberately undertaking actions that could lead to the triggering of the alliance’s Article 5 on collective defence. We assess that accidental (or plausibly deniable) violations of NATO county’s airspace will likely drive the risk of temporary airspace closures, elevating the risk of short-term travel disruption, for the duration of the conflict. (Source: Sibylline)

12 Sept 24. Roosevelt Group Heading to Indo-Pacific; No Change in U.S. Policy on Long-Range Weapons.
The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group is heading to the Indo-Pacific area of operations after completing its mission in U.S. Central Command, Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said today.
The United States still maintains the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in the region as well as destroyers, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, F-22 Raptor aircraft and more, Ryder said.
“As we have been since the beginning of the crisis in the Middle East, following Hamas’ vicious Oct. 7 attacks, we remain intensely focused on working with regional partners to de-escalate tensions and deter a wider regional conflict,” the general said. “The United States also remains very focused on securing a cease-fire as part of a hostage deal to bring all of the hostages home and to end the war in Gaza.”
On Ukraine, Ryder said U.S. policy on the use of long-range American weapons has not changed. “We’ve worked with the Ukrainians to ensure that they have the ability to conduct cross-border counterfire — defensive strikes — to defend their troops that are being attacked from across the border in Russia,” Ryder said. “We are very, very much focused … on ensuring that Ukraine has what it needs to be able to preserve its sovereignty and take back occupied territory. That’s going to continue to be our focus.”
The United States wants to see Ukraine win its conflict with Russia. President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of a sovereign country against all international laws and norms. As President Joe Biden has said, if Russia were to win its war on Ukraine, Putin would not stop with Ukraine.
“The bottom line is, we want to see Ukraine win in this conflict,” Ryder said. “When … Ukraine feels that it is time to go to the negotiating table, we want them to do so with as strong a hand as possible.”
Ryder noted that Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said last week in Ramstein Air Base, Germany, that there is no one system or weapon that will change the calculus in the Russian war of aggression. “There is no silver bullet that is going to enable Ukraine to succeed,” Ryder said. “It is about taking all of the capabilities that they have and employing them in a way that gets them closer to success and having that stronger hand at the negotiating table.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

12 Sept 24. Putin says West will be fighting directly with Russia if it lets Kyiv use long-range missiles.
• Summary
• Kyiv wants to hit Russia with U.S. long-range missiles
• Kremlin suspects U.S. will give Kyiv green light
• U.S. and UK are both weighing Ukrainian request
• Putin says move would change nature of the war
President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday that the West would be directly fighting with Russia if it allowed Ukraine to strike Russian territory with Western-made long-range missiles, a move he said would alter the nature and scope of the conflict.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has been pleading with Kyiv’s allies for months to let Ukraine fire Western missiles including long-range U.S. ATACMS and British Storm Shadows deep into Russian territory to limit Moscow’s ability to launch attacks.
In some of his most hawkish comments on the subject yet, Putin said such a move would drag the countries supplying Kyiv with long-range missiles directly into the war since satellite targeting data and the actual programming of the missiles’ flight paths would have to be done by NATO military personnel because Kyiv did not have the capabilities itself.
“So this is not a question of allowing the Ukrainian regime to strike Russia with these weapons or not. It is a question of deciding whether or not NATO countries are directly involved in a military conflict,” Putin told Russian state TV.
“If this decision is taken, it will mean nothing less than the direct involvement of NATO countries, the United States and European countries in the war in Ukraine. This will be their direct participation, and this, of course, will significantly change the very essence, the very nature of the conflict.”
Russia would be forced to take what Putin called “appropriate decisions” based on the new threats.
He did not spell out what those measures could be, but he has spoken in the past of the option of arming the West’s enemies with Russian weapons to strike Western targets abroad and in June spoke of deploying conventional missiles within striking distance of the United States and its European allies.
Russia, the world’s largest nuclear power, is also in the process of revising its nuclear doctrine – the circumstances in which Moscow would use nuclear weapons – and Putin is being pressed by an influential foreign policy hawk to change it to state Russia’s willingness to use nuclear arms against countries that “support NATO aggression in Ukraine.” (Source: Reuters)

12 Sept 24. Russia has started a significant counteroffensive to push back Ukrainian forces from its southern Kursk region, according to Russian and Ukrainian officials. The Russian defence ministry on Thursday said its forces had retaken 10 settlements in Kursk, or about 63 sq km of land, marking the first major drive by Moscow to recapture territories after Ukrainian troops stormed across the border in a surprise attack last month. The Russian counteroffensive on its soil comes as Moscow’s troops have been making steady gains in eastern Ukraine, approaching the logistical hub of Pokrovsk. On Thursday, a Russian missile also hit a foreign-flagged cargo ship in the Black Sea carrying wheat bound for Egypt shortly after it left Ukrainian waters, eroding trust in the safety of a key trade artery that is crucial both for global food supplies and Ukraine’s economy. Ukrainian forces have been seeking to consolidate the territorial gains made in Russia and carried out more drone strikes, including in the Moscow region, where two apartment buildings were hit this week. Russian authorities on Tuesday reported the first civilian casualty in the Moscow region from a drone attack since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in the spring of 2022. The Russian counteroffensive in Kursk has homed in on the left flank of the Ukrainian contingent in the area, from the settlement of Krasnooktyabrskoe down to the Russian-Ukrainian border towns of Snagost and Gordeevka. Russian forces have also captured at least 10 Ukrainian soldiers, according to drone footage shared on social media. “The [Ukrainians] have been squeezed on their western flank down to Snagost, and surprisingly easily. It seems the [Ukrainians] really didn’t have major forces there,” said a person close to the Russian military establishment. (Source: FT.com)

12 Sept 24. Ukraine rejects new hoard of low quality equipment in August.
August has seen Ukraine reject 37% of all equipment received in 2024. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence announced on 11 September 2024, that it had returned 230,000 non-compliant pieces of equipment to suppliers in August alone, bringing the total for 2024 to 1.8 m pieces of gear returned due to its low-quality.
The value of equipment returned in August was Hrv550m ($14.9m), with a total for $40m for the whole of 2024, with August accounting for 37.25% of returns for the year.
The excessive return of equipment is due to a change in amendments following Defense Ministry Order 375, according to Deputy Minister of Defense Yuriy Dzhyhyr. This change resulted in the relocation of the technical inspection of goods away from the suppliers premises.
Under the current order, inspection is conducted Joint Logistics Centers of the Logistics Forces Command. Dzhyhyr points out that while before there was a “chance of swapping out gear and clothing that had been technically inspected at the suppliers’ premises”, following the relocation of the technical inspection that chance is “greatly diminshed’.
Since the start of 2024, the Ministry of Defence’s Main Department of Quality Control has approved more than 16 m units of gear and clothing, valued at $321.3m.
Based on this information, the return rate for 2024, rejecting 1.8m pieces of gear from 17.8m pieces assessed would appear to be 10.11%.
(Source: army-technology.com)

11 Sept 24. Russia pushes back Ukrainian troops in some areas of Kursk, bloggers say. Russian forces have begun a significant counter offensive against Ukrainian troops who smashed their way into western Russia last month, and have taken some territory back, pro-Moscow war bloggers said.
Ukraine on Aug. 6 launched the biggest foreign attack on Russia since World War Two, bursting through the border into the region of Kursk with thousands of troops supported by swarms of drones and heavy weaponry, including Western made arms.
Yuri Podolyaka, an Ukrainian-born, pro-Russian military blogger, and two other influential bloggers – Rybar and the Two Majors – said that Russian forces had begun a significant counter-offensive in Kursk.
“In the Kursk region, the Russian Army launched counter-offensive actions on the western flank of the enemy’s wedge, reducing the Ukrainian zone of control near the state border,” the Two Majors blog said.
Podolyaka said that Russian forces had taken several villages on the west of the sliver of Russia that Ukraine carved out, pushing Ukrainian forces to the east of the Malaya Loknya River south of Snagost.
Reuters was unable to verify the battlefield reports due to reporting restrictions on both sides of the war. Russian defence ministry reports about the fighting gave little information. There was no immediate comment from Ukraine. (Source: Reuters)

10 Sept 24. Ukraine’s fire-dropping drones can find, shock Russian troops: experts. The Ukrainian military has begun utilizing first-person-view drones with a thermite spray capability over forested areas where Russian troops and equipment are hiding, a tactic that experts say can be a legitimate weapon of war, but only under strict circumstances.
On Sept. 2, footage emerged online showing what appeared to be a Ukrainian low-cost first-person-view drone, or FPV, carrying an incendiary burning mixture that it sprayed along a dense line of trees where Russian troops were suspected.
It was later reported by Ukrainian media outlet Militarnyi that the Ukrainian Mountain Infantry had received thermite munitions – which include a powdered mix of aluminum and iron oxide capable of burning at temperatures exceeding 2,200 degrees Celsius – that were mounted on drones and dropped on Russian positions.
Experts believe that the use of such weapons is two-fold, acting as both a cheap way to expose enemy locations and to cause fear among the invading troops.
“The primary use of these thermite FPV drones is as a defoliant to remove the tree and foliage cover that Russian troops and vehicles are using for concealment in tree lines; and secondarily likely intended as a psychological weapon due to the nature of the effects thermite would produce in contact with skin,” Justin Bronk, senior research fellow at the London-based Royal United Services Institute, said.
In addition, the high-temperatures of the blend can damage or destroy caches of equipment and ammunition in a single sortie, Federico Borsari, resident fellow at the U.S. Center for European Policy Analysis, noted.
“They can be employed for specific purposes for which explosive effects are not ideal, and be useful to burn abandoned vehicles, for instance, saving explosive warheads for missions requiring kinetic effects,” he said.
The two experts said FPVs are suitable drone variants to deliver the burning mixture at slow speed because of their low cost and precise maneuverability.
As incendiary weapons have become more common in the war, analysts have been flagging concerns over harm to civilians. For example, in 2023, Russia reportedly used thermite bombs in eastern Ukraine over residential neighborhoods, according to a video on social media that was picked up by the Youtube channel of The Telegraph newspaper.
Dangers in using thermite include the possibility of causing out-of-control fires that risk burning down civilian infrastructure and non-military targets.
The use of thermite munitions is not banned per say, but neither is it straightforward, experts say.
“It would be legitimate and legal to use them as defoliants to remove cover, and this holds unless they would a) hit civilians or b) there was a significant risk the subsequent fire would endanger civilians – contrast this with Russian use of thermite last year in an indiscriminate manner,” Matthew Savill, director of military science at RUSI, wrote in an email to Defense News.
Under the Geneva Conventions, deliberately targeting civilian areas with incendiary weapons constitutes a war crime, yet Moscow has paid little consideration to adhering to international norms during the course of the war.
Russian forces have used other fire-inducing weapons such as the 9M22S incendiary cluster rocket, used for the 122mm caliber Grad rocket artillery system, Bronk said.
Savill notes that throughout the war, Ukraine has largely been able to contrast its adherence to international conflict laws against Russian behavior, an important appearance he presumes Kyiv will strive to maintain.
“I would expect that however they choose to use thermite, they would want to keep that distinction,” he said. (Source: Defense News)

11 Sept 24. British Army denied training as priority given to Ukrainian forces. A landmark report by the National Audit Office has highlighted to cost to the UK military for the country’s support to Ukraine.
The military consequences of the UK’s ongoing military and financial support to Ukraine have been laid bare in a new report by the country’s National Audit Office (NAO), which outlines a startling training deficit for the British Army and an investment shortfall to replace donated equipment.
Whilst at its core a humanitarian crisis, the Russian invasion of Ukraine risks adding materially to existing global economic and supply challenges. We are likely heading into a period in which geopolitics will become a regular part of boardroom…
Contained in a landmark report into the UK military support for Ukraine, the NAO states the British Army saw an eight-fold decrease in training time requests being granted in 2023 compared to 2019, as apparent prioritisation sees the training of Ukrainian personnel moved to the fore.
Training of Ukrainian personnel is carried out under Operation Interflex, which had trained more than 42,000 Ukrainian personnel by July 2024.
“The [UK Ministry of Defence] acknowledges that Operation Interflex will constrain the [British] Army’s capacity to train its own soldiers on its training sites, with more than a quarter of the Army’s training estate being used,” the NAO report states.
“The Army says it will continue to deliver Interflex through 2024, working with international partners and the Army Reserve to mitigate the impact of supporting Ukraine on UK forces,” the report adds.
Images of Ukrainian personnel undergoing training, taken in 2022, were altered to protect their identity. Credit: Richard Thomas
The NAO report specifically links Operation Interflex and the British Army’s training shortfall, stating that providing training to Ukrainian recruits had “reduced the availability of training facilities for the British Army”.
British Army units which bid for time at UK training sites in 2023 had their bids rejected eight times more often than in 20193, because sites were not available, the report found.
An apparent flaw in UK training to Ukrainian forces was also identified as the war in Ukraine has evolved, with the NAO reporting that feedback from “tranche 4 trainees” suggesting that elements of the training “could be better aligned” to the conditions, and certain AFU training requests have not been met by the British Army.
“For instance, the MoD has only provided limited drone training due to UK military and civil aviation regulations but is exploring ways to mitigate this,” the NAO said.
The use of first-person-view (FPV) drones, fitted with rudimentary explosives, by both Ukraine and Russia as cost-effective loitering munitions has repeated the suggested lessons learned from earlier wars in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Middle East, with the proliferation of FPV platforms providing a near-constant threat on the battlefield.
UK donations to Ukraine: counting the cost
The NAO report also details the cost of UK equipment donations to Ukraine and the corresponding impact this is having on the country’s military inventories.
The NAO stated that to “address concerns” over the UK’s military readiness, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) had placed contracts worth almost £1bn ($1.3bn) to replenish equipment donated from UK stockpiles, and estimates the total cost of replacing donated equipment as £2.71bn.
“This reflects the cost of replacing old equipment with new, and in some cases more advanced technology. The MoD has also increased wider funding for UK military stockpiles by £2.51bn between 2022-23 and 2024-25 and committed in April 2024 to invest £10bn in munitions productions over the next decade,” the NAO said.
In addition to rapidly procuring equipment for Ukraine, the NAO said that the MoD donated equipment worth £171.5m from UK stockpiles. However, since mid-2023 the MoD had “sharply reduced its donations of equipment because it assessed that to continue would have imposed unacceptable risks to the UK’s military readiness”.
The MoD has also exempted all equipment procurement for Ukraine from regulations which normally provide additional oversight of non-competitive contracts.
Recent analysis by Army Technology exposed the true scale of UK military donations to Kyiv, potentially rising to beyond 1,000 vehicles, including main battle tanks, artillery, armoured reconnaissance, multiple launch rocket systems, and other protected mobility and logistics vehicles.
Tens of thousands of anti-tank and anti-air missiles have also been provided, as well as dozens of valuable Storm Shadow cruise missiles.
The UK has also committed to sustaining its support to Ukraine, despite an apparent £22bn black hole in public finances that is resulted in huge cuts to social and medical care.
Speaking to Army Technology, a UK MoD spokesperson said: “All UK forces have access to the relevant training required to be held at readiness to protect the UK and meet our NATO commitments.
“But we welcome the NAO’s report, which recognises that Ukrainian troops are better prepared to defend their country from Russia’s illegal invasion thanks to the UK providing training.
The spokesperson added that Operation Interflex had provided basic combat training to over 45,000 Ukrainian recruits, with UK Defence Secretary John Healey recently announcing an extension throughout 2025.
(Source: army-technology.com)

11 Sept 24. Ukraine Intercepts Rare Russian Spy Drones. Ukrainian forces have successfully intercepted multiple rare Russian Merlin-VR spy drones using affordable, anti-aircraft FPV drones.
The interception was confirmed by videos circulating on social media, which showed the downing of Merlin-VR and Supercam reconnaissance drones by the 38th Brigade of Ukraine.
The Merlin-VR, introduced by Russia in 2021, is capable of flying up to 16,000 feet and is designed for advanced reconnaissance in both automated and semi-automated modes. It is considered one of Russia’s more sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and its loss is notable. According to the open-source intelligence group Oryx, since February 2022, Russia has lost only two of its Merlin-VR drones, although actual losses could be higher as Oryx only tracks visually confirmed incidents.
The Merlin-VR drone, developed by Russia’s Scientific Research Institute of Modern Telecommunications Technologies (SRI STT), is said to feature a hybrid engine that offers reduced acoustic detectability. However, after Ukrainian forces shot down one of these drones in June 2022, no hybrid technology was found. Instead, it contained a conventional engine, alongside French-made thermal optics (Lynred PICO1024), an Israeli lens, and a Chinese starter-generator.
This interception highlights Ukraine’s innovative use of low-cost FPV (First-Person View) drones in neutralizing more advanced enemy systems. These adaptable drones have proven to be an effective tool for disrupting Russian reconnaissance operations.
Russia’s use of imported components in its military drones, including technology from France, Israel, and China, continues to raise questions about the true extent of its domestic defense capabilities.
(Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog)

11 Sept 24. Much of the military aid the UK has given to Ukraine has consisted of old equipment, such as army boots that otherwise would have had to be thrown away, according to a spending watchdog. Military gear that was “often due to be scrapped or replaced” was prioritised by the Ministry of Defence because it was believed to have “immediate military value” to Ukraine — but sending it to Kyiv also “reduced waste or costs relating to disposal”, the National Audit Office said on Wednesday. The ministry also used other “innovative ways of sourcing military equipment”, such as reverse-engineering replacement tracks for Soviet-era T72 tanks from samples at a tank museum in Dorset, the NAO noted. The findings come as some of Kyiv’s western allies tire of supporting Ukraine almost three years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion. The £7.8bn of military aid the UK has pledged or already sent to Kyiv make it the third-largest supplier of western support to Ukraine after the US at £56.5bn, and Germany at £16.2bn, the NAO said. The UK has pledged to continue providing £3bn a year of military aid. Other western allies have also given ageing equipment to Kyiv: in one recent US example, 10 donated vehicles ostensibly worth more than $7mn had a combined book value of zero. However, ageing military equipment cleared from British stockpiles was only a small portion of total UK aid sent to Ukraine, because it had a book value of just £171.5mn versus an estimated replacement cost of £2.7bn. Three-quarters of it also came during the first year of the invasion. The UK spent a further £2.4bn on procuring equipment, contributed £500mn to an international fund, and spent £830m on operational support, some channelled via Nato. (Source: FT.com)

10 Sep 24. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine’s drone range now allows for strikes deep into Russia. Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (HUR), announced on September 7 that Ukrainian-made drones now have a maximum range of 1,800 kilometers (1,118 miles). This milestone enables Ukraine to potentially strike deep into Russian territory, including airfields responsible for launching attacks on Ukrainian cities. Budanov highlighted how these drones, developed by HUR specialists, can target key Russian infrastructure supporting the war effort.
Though Budanov did not disclose specific drone models or confirm their involvement in previous strikes, the enhanced range suggests Ukrainian drones could now reach regions such as Russia’s Ural Mountains and military airfields far inside the country. Notably, Ukrainian drones have been linked to incidents near the Ural city of Yekaterinburg and at a Russian airfield in Chelyabinsk, though HUR did not claim responsibility.
The expanded drone range also covers airbases outside of Russia, including in Syria, where Ukrainian drones have reportedly struck Russian troops stationed at Kuweires airbase. However, the Olenya airfield in Murmansk, located in the Arctic Circle, lies beyond the stated 1,800-kilometer range, despite HUR claims of a TU-22M3 bomber strike there in July.
Despite Ukraine’s growing domestic capabilities, Kyiv continues to push for access to Western long-range weapons like the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which could offer faster and more precise strikes on Russian airfields.
Budanov emphasised the need for speed and firepower that drones lack, as drones are slower and easier to intercept. Western missile systems would offer little warning to Russia, providing Ukraine with a significant advantage in disabling Russian air threats.
Ukraine’s domestic drone advancements, coupled with its appeal for Western missile support, signify a continued effort to counter Russia’s aerial threat more effectively.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraines-drone-range-now-allows-for-strikes-deep-into-russia/?utm_campaign=C-UAS%20Hub%20General&utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8lp0KVog4Lr2cPPMgGSVkSz_-ByZAo_pecV9JBWpM7Oi0fow2WFV58rN7OTsAxF2tF_MNFYETrAn83Xr44DyN4OWf41mvyYAMxYBatvRBfwg2-m50&_hsmi=323952212&utm_content=323952212&utm_source=hs_email(Source: https://cuashub.com/)

09 Sept 24. Canada begins training Ukrainian F-16 pilots. Canada has begun Fighter Lead-In Training for Ukrainian F-16 pilots as part of a multinational effort.
The training programme, known as Fighter Lead-In Training (FLIT), will provide Ukrainian pilots with advanced skills necessary to operate F-16 jets. Credit: Christopher Chambers via Shutterstock.
Canada’s Minister of National Defence, Bill Blair, announced on 6 September 2024, that Ukrainian pilots have begun F-16 fighter training in Canada as part of a multinational effort to strengthen Ukraine’s air force capabilities in the ongoing conflict.
Canada’s participation in the training initiative is part of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), a coalition of more than 50 countries aimed at providing military assistance to Ukraine. Canada’s contribution includes $389m over five years, dedicated to F-16 pilot training.
The training programme, known as Fighter Lead-In Training (FLIT), will provide Ukrainian pilots with advanced skills necessary to operate F-16 jets. This training is seen as a key element in improving Ukraine’s air capabilities in its defence efforts against Russian forces.
In addition to the pilot training, Canada is offering logistical and technical support to Ukrainian air bases, including critical equipment required for maintaining the F-16 fleet. This assistance highlights Canada’s ongoing commitment to supporting Ukraine’s military infrastructure.
Canada has pledged further military donations to Ukraine, including 80,840 CRV-7 rocket motors and 1,300 warheads, to be delivered over the coming months. These donations follow previous shipments of military aid to Ukraine.
Canada will also contribute 970 surplus C6 machine guns and 10,500 9mm pistols, along with decommissioned chassis from M113s and Coyote LAVs, which can be repurposed for Ukraine’s needs. These are among several material donations from Canada to enhance Ukraine’s defence capabilities.
The announcement follows the country’s longstanding military support for Ukraine. Since February 2022, Canada has committed C$4.5bn ($3.3bn) in military aid, including tanks, combat vehicles, weapons, and winter supplies for Ukrainian forces, part of the C$19.5bn pledged by Canada to Ukraine since the conflict began.
As part of its broader support, Canada is also training Ukrainian personnel under Operation UNIFIER. This includes around 300 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members currently deployed across Europe to provide training and logistical support to Ukraine.
The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) has been actively involved in transporting military aid to Ukraine and has so far delivered more than 19 m pounds of supplies. The continued transport and training efforts reflect Canada’s enduring military partnership with Ukraine.
Beyond material support, the Canadian government has committed to strengthening Ukraine’s cyber capabilities and continues to invest in equipment and infrastructure to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty against external threats. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

09 Sept 24. Western intelligence warns Russia targetting aid to Ukraine.
A new joint advisory, including several global intelligence services, warned against malicious cyber activity waged by Russia’s GRU Unit 29155.
The US, together with the partner intelligence services, are issued a warning and technical advice on 5 September 2024, against Russian cyber attacks against Ukrainian military assistance. Credit: Dutch Ministry of Defence.
Western intelligence agencies have warned that Russian cyber attacks have been targetting allied military assistance to Ukraine.
The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency charged the actors with “espionage, sabotage and reputational harm” since at least 2020. However, the independent investigative researcher Bellingcat identified the unit’s malicious activity going back as far as Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Various sources link 29155 to, among other things, the poisoning of former GRU officer Sergei Skripal in 2018, an attempted coup in Montenegro and the assassination of a Bulgarian arms dealer.
Since 2022, however, the group’s overall aim seems to have been “to target and disrupt efforts to provide aid to Ukraine,” ruled the UK National Cyber Security Centre.
Now, it is the first time that the allied intelligence services confirmed that it was Unit 29155 specifically that was responsible for deploying the ‘Whispergate’ malware against multiple victims across Ukraine prior to Russia’s invasion in 2022.
Logistical vulnerability
“They are aimed at the logistics sector in countries that provide aid to Ukraine or play a role in it,” said Peter Reesink, director vice admiral in the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service.
While this advisory update points out the intentions behind Russian cyber operations, it may also point to the need to assess the enduring vulnerability of Western logistical processes in delivering Ukraine’s requirements; this has not been up to scratch.
Two months ago, Spain directly revealed details of the delivery route for its donation of Leopard 2A4 tanks bound for Ukraine.
The assistance made a near-week-long journey by sea through to Poland, before onward transit over the border. This package would bring Spain’s total number of Leopard 2A4s to Ukraine to 20 vehicles. The Spanish government stated that the “multi-modal transport” had “begun” in mid-July.
Western logistical practices are also vulnerable in other ways. The US Government Accountability Office lately found that the Department of Defense (DoD) was unable to track American-made systems pledged by third-party donors to Ukraine. This, their report said, was due to “inconsistent communication” between the DoD and the State Department.
“DoD officials are often unaware of [third-party transfers] authorised by [the] State [Dept] until they are identified upon entry to Ukraine, if at all.”
Clearly, there is a lack of coordination and standard processes in which coalition donors deliver their military assistance to Ukraine. Every bullet and shell are of crucial importance as the war enters a uncertain stage with Ukraine’s incursion inside Russia failing to disrupt Russian advances in the Donbas region, particularly around the city of Pokrovsk. (Source: army-technology.com)

10 Sept 24. Iranian transfers of Ballistic Missiles to Russia: UK, France and Germany joint statement.
Foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom gave a statement following Iran’s export and Russia’s procurement of Iranian ballistic missiles.
Statement by Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France and Germany:
The governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom strongly condemn Iran’s export and Russia’s procurement of Iranian ballistic missiles. This is a further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and will see Iranian missiles reaching European soil, increasing the suffering of the Ukrainian people. This act is an escalation by both Iran and Russia, and is a direct threat to European security.
The E3 has privately and publicly been clear that we would take new and significant measures against Iran if the transfers took place. We now have confirmation that Iran has made these transfers. We will be taking immediate steps to cancel bilateral air services agreements with Iran. In addition, we will pursue the designations of significant entities and individuals involved with Iran’s ballistic missile programme and the transfer of ballistic missiles and other weapons to Russia. We will also work towards imposing sanctions on Iran Air.
The E3 are closely coordinating our strong response to these transfers with our European and international partners. We call on Iran to immediately cease all support to Russia’s war against Ukraine and halt the development and transfers of its ballistic missiles. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

10 Sept 24. Biden administration sends Congress long-awaited Ukraine strategy report, sources say.
• Summary
• Congress has approved nearly $175bn in aid for Ukraine since Russia’s invasion
• Some Republicans criticize Biden for restricting Ukraine’s use of U.S. equipment
• Republican Senator Risch says Biden owes a strategy to Congress and the American people
U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration has sent Congress a classified report on its strategy for the war in Ukraine, three sources said on Monday, months after a June deadline mandated in a multibillion-dollar spending bill lawmakers passed in April.
A congressional aide said the long-awaited report had reached lawmakers on Monday and they had not yet had a chance to review it. Two other sources, requesting anonymity to discuss a classified matter, confirmed that it had been delivered. The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Congress has approved nearly $175bn of aid and military assistance for Ukraine and allied nations in the 2-1/2 years since Russia’s full-scale invasion.
After months of delay, the Republican-led House of Representatives passed a $95bn supplemental spending bill in April that included $61 bn in funding for Ukraine, as well as billions for Israel, civilians in conflict zones around the world and to “counter communist China” in the Indo-Pacific.
As part of that bill, Congress asked the Biden administration to submit a detailed strategy for Ukraine by early June.
Biden’s support for Ukraine is backed by Democrats and many Republicans in Congress. Some Republicans, however, have criticized his administration for restricting how Ukraine can use U.S. equipment, for example by refusing to supply weapons that could strike targets deep inside Russia.
Washington has restricted the weapons’ use because of limited supply of missiles, the lack of a rationale for using them given most Russian aircraft are out of range and for fear it would escalate the conflict.
Weeks after the deadline passed with no report, some members of Congress said they were frustrated and would consider blocking further funding.
In a statement emailed to Reuters in late August about the report, Senator Jim Risch, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he supported assisting Ukraine but did not do so blindly.
“Since the earliest days of (Russian President Vladimir) Putin’s war on Ukraine, we have asked the Biden-Harris Administration for a strategy on how the U.S. and our allies can help Ukraine win the war,” Risch said.
“When they did not respond to our requests, we mandated in law that a strategy be sent to Congress, but the deadline has passed with no response. President Biden and VP (Kamala) Harris owe a strategy not just to us, but to the American people, and their dereliction suggests they don’t have one or are afraid to share it.” (Source: Reuters)

09 Sept 24. Sweden ‘mentions’ Gripen in military aid package for Ukraine. The Swedish government has announced a substantial arms aid package for Ukraine, totaling 17 packages worth 4.6bn Swedish kronor, or approximately 400m euros. Interestingly, this package focuses on procuring new weaponry rather than transferring existing stockpiles.
Included in this aid are weapons, military equipment, and ammunition. There is also a mention of Gripen fighters, though none are currently being transferred. Notably, half of the total sum—2.3bn kronor or 200m euros—has been allocated to the Gripen program.
These funds are earmarked for procuring essential components of the JAS 39C/D Gripen, which are then repurposed for the new JAS 39E aircraft. The latest version of this aircraft is a substantial update, incorporating significant changes including adjustments to the wing dimensions.
By investing in these new components, several JAS 39C/D models will be preserved from dismantling and, should the Swedish government decide, “they might be transferred to Ukraine in the future,” it stated.
Despite discussions, the transfer of Gripen fighters has yet to occur due to concerns it might hinder receiving F-16 jets. The Swedish government remains committed to “creating conditions for a potential future delivery of JAS 39 Gripen fighters to Ukraine.”
Ukrainian sources suggest that allocating funds for the transfer of Gripen fighters is a strong indicator that it will eventually happen. However, all conditions surrounding this process involve not only the Swedish government’s approval but also permission from the United States, as the Swedish Gripen extensively uses American components.
In simpler terms, the Swedish government is taking cautious steps, possibly gearing up for the eventual transfer of aircraft.
Just a couple of months ago, BulgarianMilitary.com highlighted that Ukraine was considering acquiring Swedish JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets. However, Kyiv has since decided against this option. Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström noted, “It’s not just about acquiring new aircraft and training pilots. These are complex systems, and juggling two different systems simultaneously would be too difficult.”
Billström pointed out that Ukraine had an opportunity to acquire the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen but ultimately chose not to pursue it during negotiations. This decision was influenced by the availability and compatibility of F-16 fighters, which are widely used by NATO countries. The logistics of operating two distinct aviation systems made the F-16 a more practical choice for Kyiv. However, Billström emphasized that Sweden remains open to future discussions regarding Gripen deliveries.
It’s worth noting that the Swedish government had announced plans a year ago to train Ukrainian pilots and aviation personnel on the JAS 39 Gripen. Despite this, the plans were never fully realized.
(Source: News Now/https://bulgarianmilitary.com/)

10 Sept 24. Ukraine launches massive overnight drone attack on Russia. Ukraine launched a massive drone attack on central Russia overnight, with the Moscow authorities claiming to have intercepted 144 drones over the country, including 20 over Moscow.
One woman was killed in a Moscow suburb and several people were injured after a drone hit an apartment block, Russia’s defence ministry said.
Dozens of flights were suspended after Moscow’s main international airports were closed. (Source: FT.com)

09 Sept 24. Ukraine Develops New Combat Drone for Precision Bombing. A Ukrainian development team has developed a new combat drone designed to enhance the capabilities of the country’s defense forces. The unmanned aerial vehicle, named REX, was created by Armadrone in response to the operational needs and combat experience of Ukrainian military personnel, according to a Facebook post by the Brave Inventors platform.
The REX drone is engineered for a range of missions, including reconnaissance, surveillance, and the deployment of various types of munitions. It can also be used for targeting adjustments during strikes. The drone is capable of identifying, tracking, and eliminating targets, and then assessing the impact of the strike. Depending on the mission, the UAV can carry between two and eight munitions, with a total payload capacity of up to 10 kilograms.
One of the key advantages of the REX drone is its precision. “The high accuracy of the strike minimizes the risk of potential civilian casualties in temporarily occupied territories,” the Brave Inventors team highlighted.
The development of the drone was a collaborative effort between teams in Ukraine and Poland. The REX drone integrates cutting-edge Israeli technology and components exclusively manufactured in Ukraine’s allied nations, according to the developers.
The technical specifications of the REX drone include a range of up to 45 kilometers, a flight time of 1.5 hours, a takeoff weight of 16 kilograms, and a maximum speed of 35 meters per second. (Source: UAS VISION/ Defence Blog)

11 Sept 24. Ukrainian troops better prepared for war after training in the UK.
• The UK has provided £7.8bn of military support to Ukraine, including supplying a wide range of equipment and training tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops.
• Troops are being trained as part of Operation Interflex, with 89% of trainees in the fourth tranche of training stating that they felt better equipped to survive on the battlefield following its completion.
• British Army units which bid for time at the training sites in 2023 had their bids rejected eight times more often than in 2019, because sites were not available.
Nearly nine in ten Ukrainian troops trained by the British Army under ‘Operation Interflex’ said they felt better equipped to survive on the battlefield following the completion of training, according to a new National Audit Office (NAO) report.
Between January 2022 – when Russia began assembling troops near the Ukrainian border – and March 2025 – more than three years after Russia’s invasion – the UK committed £7.8bn1 of military support for Ukraine2.
The UK’s backing for Ukraine involves training Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) personnel on UK soil, with basic infantry training provided for new recruits and advanced leadership and instructor training for experienced and selected personnel. The main training programme is ‘Operation Interflex’, which surpassed its target to train 40,000 Ukrainian troops by July 2024, reaching 42,050 at this point.
The most recent tranche of Operation Interflex trainees (tranche 4) consisted of 9,000 Ukrainian troops, with 43% of this tranche having previous combat experience. Following the completion of training, 89% of tranche 4 trainees stated that they felt they were better equipped to survive on the battlefield. Some feedback from tranche 4 trainees suggested that elements of the training could be better aligned to the conditions in Ukraine, and certain AFU training requests have not been met by the British Army. For instance, the MoD has only provided limited drone training due to UK military and civil aviation regulations, but is exploring ways to mitigate this.
Providing training to Ukrainian recruits has reduced the availability of training facilities for the British Army. Army units which bid for time at the training sites in 2023 had their bids rejected eight times more often than in 20193, because sites were not available. The MoD acknowledges that Operation Interflex will constrain the Army’s capacity to train its own soldiers on its training sites, with more than a quarter of the Army’s training estate being used. The Army says it will continue to deliver Interflex through 2024, working with international partners and the Army Reserve to mitigate the impact of supporting Ukraine on UK forces.
To speed up some of its weapons4 procurement for Ukraine, the MoD has used non-competitive procurement5. As the conflict has continued the MoD’s Defence Equipment Support (DE&S), which carries out the procurement process, has sought to run competitive tendering exercises in cases where the Ukrainian demand for equipment has become more consistent and predictable.
In addition to rapidly procuring equipment for Ukraine, the MoD has donated equipment worth £171.5m from UK stockpiles. Since mid-2023, however, the MoD has sharply reduced its donations of equipment because it assessed that to continue would have imposed unacceptable risks to the UK’s military readiness.
To address concerns over the UK’s military readiness, MoD has placed contracts worth almost £1bn to replenish equipment donated from UK stockpiles and estimates the total cost of replacing donated equipment as £2.71bn. This reflects the cost of replacing old equipment with new, and in some cases more advanced technology. The MoD has also increased wider funding for UK military stockpiles by £2.51 bn between 2022-23 and 2024-25, and committed in April 2024 to invest £10 bn in munitions productions over the next decade.
Gareth Davies, head of the NAO said: “In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the UK sought to provide support quickly, through less structured management processes. As the war has progressed, the MoD has learnt lessons, establishing a more routine approach for the £7.8bn of military support it is providing.
“As the Ministry of Defence plans its future support for Ukraine, it must continue to balance the UK’s strategic interests with maintaining the UK’s own military capabilities. This includes making sure there are appropriate stocks of equipment and sufficient training provision for UK forces.”
Scope of the report
• This investigation was prepared in response to public and parliamentary interest in MoD’s support for Ukraine and the cost of providing this support. In it we set out the MoD’s approach to supporting the AFU and how it has developed as the war has continued, focusing on the extent and nature of the MoD’s military equipment supplies and the training provided to the AFU, and the financial implications. The report covers:
o An overview of the UK’s military support for Ukraine (Part One);
o Supplying Ukraine with military equipment (Part Two); and
o Training Ukrainian personnel (Part Three).
• This investigation does not seek to assess the strategic case for supporting Ukraine, or to evaluate the value for money or effectiveness of the equipment and training provided. Information on some aspects of MoD’s support for Ukraine is classified for reasons of national security and is not included in this report.
1. £7.8bn is the total UK funding committed to military support for Ukraine, between January 2022 and March 2025. The UK is also providing humanitarian and economic support.
2. The UK sought to be an early leader in providing support, with its efforts guided by wider UK foreign policy and part of an international response. According to German research organisation the Kiel Institute, the UK is the third largest provider of military assistance, behind the US and Germany.
3. 2019 is last available year for comparisons before the pandemic and the Ukraine war.
4. For examples of equipment supplied to Ukraine, please refer to figure 8 page 24.
5. The MoD exempted all such procurement for Ukraine from regulations which normally provide additional oversight of non-competitive contracts. (Source: NAO)

08 Sept 24. Canada Increases Military Aid to Ukraine with M113 and Coyote armored combat vehicles. At the 24th Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) meeting, held at Ramstein Air Base on September 6, 2024, and chaired by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, Canada significantly expanded its military support for Ukraine. Canadian Minister of National Defence, Bill Blair, made several key announcements, underlining Canada’s ongoing commitment to aiding Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. Blair confirmed that Canada will donate decommissioned military equipment, including the chassis of 29 M113 armored personnel carriers and 64 Coyote light armored vehicles (LAVs).
M113 and Coyote armored vehicles, previously part of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) inventory, have been retired from service and will be provided to Ukraine to be repurposed for operational use or as a source of spare parts for the Ukrainian military.
The Coyote is a light armored vehicle (LAV) used by the Canadian Army, primarily designed for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. It is based on the LAV-25 platform and serves a different purpose than traditional infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), focusing on intelligence gathering rather than direct combat. The Coyote is equipped with advanced sensors, including radar and long-range cameras, making it effective for battlefield observation and long-range patrols. Its design allows for high-speed maneuverability, enabling it to cover large areas quickly while providing critical intelligence to commanders in the field.
In terms of armament, the Coyote is outfitted with a 25mm M242 Bushmaster chain gun, which is effective against light armored targets and infantry. It also features two 7.62mm C6 machine guns, offering additional firepower. While its primary role is reconnaissance, these weapons provide the Coyote with a level of defensive capability, ensuring it can engage enemy forces if necessary. Though no longer a frontline vehicle in the Canadian Armed Forces, it remains a valuable asset for support and intelligence-gathering missions.
Further bolstering its support for Ukraine, Blair also announced a significant development in pilot training for Ukrainian forces. The Canadian government is taking over leadership of the fighter-lead-in-training (FLIT) component under the UDCG Air Force Capability Coalition (AFCC). Backed by a $389m investment over the next five years, this initiative will focus on advanced pilot training for Ukrainian personnel, including the operation of F-16 fighter jets. Ukrainian pilots have already arrived in Canada to begin the training program, which is seen as a critical step in building Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.
Canada will also supply critical equipment and infrastructure support to Ukrainian air bases and fleets as part of the training program. This marks a significant Canadian contribution to the AFCC, which aims to enhance Ukraine’s ability to defend its airspace against continued Russian aerial assaults.
In addition to training and armored vehicle support, Minister Blair announced the donation of 80,840 additional CRV-7 rocket motors and 1,300 warheads to Ukraine. This follows an earlier delivery of 2,160 rocket motors. The CRV-7s, once used by Canada’s CF-18 fighter jets, are set to be shipped to Poland and will soon reach Ukraine’s frontlines. These rocket motors provide enhanced firepower to Ukrainian forces in their ongoing efforts to repel Russian advances.
The military aid package also includes the donation of surplus small arms from the CAF’s inventory. Canada will provide Ukraine with 970 surplus C6 machine guns and 10,500 surplus 9mm pistols. These weapons are intended to enhance the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ ground capabilities, offering crucial support in the face of Russia’s ongoing invasion.
Blair emphasized that these donations represent Canada’s continued resolve to support Ukraine for as long as necessary. The announcements come as Ukraine faces intensified military operations, and the additional resources provided by Canada are expected to significantly bolster Ukraine’s defense capabilities.
As the UDCG (Ukraine Defense Contact Group) continues to coordinate international military aid, Canada’s contributions stand out as both a symbol of solidarity and a tangible boost to Ukraine’s ongoing war effort. The commitment of advanced training, air defense support, and vital equipment underscores Canada’s crucial role in the coalition supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and security. (Source: Google/https://armyrecognition.com/)

09 Sept 24. ‘Let Ukraine strike Russian air bases’, urges Estonian defence minister. Estonia’s Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur urged counterparts to lift restrictions on Ukraine targeting Russian airbases with donated equipment. Estonia urged defence ministers to let Ukraine strike Russian airbases on Russian sovereign territory, during a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group held on 6 September 2024, at Ramstein Air Base.
The meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group, held over the course of two days, convened key defence ministers to address the state of the battlefield, Ukraine’s evolving military requirements, and the ongoing flow of international aid.
Pevkur used the occasion to reinforce Estonia’s long-standing stance on Ukraine’s defence, underscoring the importance of swift action.
“Estonia’s position has been and remains very clear: we must give Ukraine everything it needs and quickly so that they can win the war and push the enemy out of their territory,” said Pevkur in a statement that left no room for ambiguity. He pointed to the devastating Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure and residential areas as evidence of Moscow’s desperation and disregard for civilian lives.
“Russia is also massively attacking critical infrastructure to leave people without heat and electricity for the winter,” he continued, highlighting the broader humanitarian impact of the war. “Ukrainians know where these strikes are coming from, but those points are currently out of their reach. Therefore, let Ukraine strike back at these air bases to eliminate the sources of attacks and save lives.”
Pevkur’s reference to Ukrainian military successes in Kursk signals a growing belief among some European nations that the country has the capability to push further into Russian-held territory. “The Ukrainian success in Kursk has shown that Russia cannot control what happens on its own territory,” he said, adding, “Russia is provoked by fear and weakness – when met with a show of strength, they will crumble.”
The remarks came as Pevkur met bilaterally with Ukraine’s Defence Minister, Rustem Umerov. The two ministers reviewed Estonia’s latest aid shipment to Ukraine and discussed the country’s immediate military needs. Pevkur outlined Estonia’s continued commitment, reaffirming his country’s pledge to contribute 0.25% of its GDP annually to Ukraine’s defence efforts—a contribution, he noted, that Estonia has already surpassed with its latest delivery of Mistral short-range air defence missile systems.
“We will continue our efforts, and as soon as we receive feedback from Ukraine on their needs that the Estonian defence industry can meet, we will immediately proceed with procurement to ensure that this aid reaches Ukraine’s defenders as quickly as possible,” Pevkur assured.
At a meeting of capability coalitions’ lead nations, Estonia was represented by Tuuli Duneton, Undersecretary for Defence Policy. Duneton co-chairs the IT Coalition steering group alongside Luxembourg, a project initiated at the September 2023 meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group.
The coalition, comprising 13 nations with Spain being the latest to join, is focused on bolstering Ukraine’s IT infrastructure, a critical component of modern warfare. “We have raised nearly €70m ($77m) in financial contributions and received €90m in material donations, amounting to a total of €160m in support,” Duneton revealed. The IT Coalition’s support is key to ensuring that Ukraine’s armed forces operate with secure, NATO-standard communications systems—an increasingly vital requirement as the war drags on.
“Several deliveries have already reached Ukraine and are in use on the battlefield,” Duneton confirmed, underscoring the coalition’s rapid mobilisation and tangible impact on Ukraine’s defence capabilities.
(Source: army-technology.com)

06 Sept 24. UK to extend training programme for Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel throughout 2025. The UK has trained more than 45,000 Ukrainian recruits since Putin began his illegal full-scale invasion in 2022.
Ukrainian recruits receive training under Operation Interflex
The UK will train further cohorts of Ukrainian men and women to become soldiers on British soil, as part of this new government’s commitment to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.
The training operation, which continues to evolve to incorporate lessons identified from Ukraine’s frontline, was due to come to an end this year but the scheme will now continue until at least the end of 2025.
The trainees will join the more than 45,000 Ukrainian personnel who have been trained under Operation Interflex since Russia’s illegal invasion in 2022.
The Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, announced the extension at a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) at the US Air Force base in Ramstein, Germany, which was also attended by President Zelenskyy and more than 50 other nations.
The extension highlights that the UK remains ironclad in its commitment to supporting Ukraine fight Russian aggression.
The Defence Secretary discussed the training programme with his Ukrainian counterpart, Rustem Umerov, in London earlier this week, the meeting also focused on how the UK will continue to ramp-up support over the coming months, confirming that £300 m worth of artillery ammunition will start to be delivered by the end of this year.
Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: “Operation Interflex has provided the brave men and women of Ukraine the vital skills they need to defend their nation in the face of Putin’s illegal invasion.
The extension of this training, which is vital for Ukraine’s defence, is another example of the UK’s ironclad commitment to Ukraine.
As I told our allies and partners today in Germany, the UK will continue to step up our support. We will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.”
Delivered in locations throughout the UK, the programme takes volunteer recruits who have joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine with little to no previous military experience and teaches them the skills required for frontline combat. The training allows Ukraine’s forces to accelerate their deployments, rebuild their forces, and scale-up their resistance as they continue to defend their nation against Russian invaders.
Over a minimum of five weeks, recruits will learn weapons handling, battlefield first aid, Law of Armed Conflict training, patrol tactics and receive rural environment training. With support from experienced British instructors, the brave men and women of Ukraine are supported as they become combat-ready soldiers.
This follows on from the UK announcing a £162m package of Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM) to Ukraine at the UDCG meeting today, highlighting our commitment to ramping up and speeding up deliveries of vital equipment to support Ukraine’s fight against Russia.
Following Russia’s barbaric attacks on Poltava and Lviv this week, the UK is ensuring that this support to the front line as fast as we can.
From artillery ammunition to drones, the UK, thanks to a pledge to provide £3bn of military support each year, will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine for as long as it takes.
Operation Interflex is an example of the UK working with international partners to support Ukraine, with a number of international partner forces now members of the programme, providing vital experience, training and insight into frontline combat. These countries include Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Australia and Romania.
The vital training offered by the UK armed forces extends far beyond just basic infantry training, over the last two and half years we have supported training on UK supplied equipment, teaching Ukrainian medics life-saving battlefield medicine and running a two week training course for Ukrainian military chaplains as they offer vital spiritual and pastoral support to those on the front-line.
Alongside training for the Ukrainian Army, British Royal Air Force instructors have been training Ukrainian pilots on their journey to learning to fly F16 fighter jets. Pilots received basic flying training, including aircraft handling and navigation, alongside English language training to assist their further instruction on F16s with other NATO countries.
This latest announcement will continue to support the development of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. From learning basic combat tactics, to being trained how to operate British Challenger II tanks and flying F16s, the UK is committed to teaching Ukrainian recruits’ vital skills that are making a difference on the battlefield. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

06 Sept 24. Zelenskiy calls on allies to lift restrictions on long-range strikes in Russia. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Friday urged military allies to ignore Moscow’s “red lines” and allow Kyiv to use long-range weapons for strikes on Russian territory.
“We need to have these long-range capabilities not only on the … territory of Ukraine but also on the Russian territory, so that Russia is motivated to seek peace,” he said at a meeting of the Ramstein group of some 50 nations which supply arms to Ukraine.
It was the first time that Zelenskiy joined the gathering of defence ministers at the U.S. air base Ramstein in western Germany.
(Source: Google/Reuters)

02 Sept 24. Netherlands send 28 Viking BVS10 amphibious vehicles to Ukraine. Netherlands is donating armoured amphibious all terrain vehicles Viking BSV10’s to Ukraine.
The Netherlands Ministry of Defence (Mod) announced on 31 August 2024, the donation of 28 an amphibious tracked vehicles to Ukraine.
The BVS10 Bandvagn Viking all-terrain vehicles were donated from Netherland stocks with the Marine Corp, and the Marine Corp have been involved in the training of Ukrainian personnel for both operational purposes and technical maintenance.
The announcement from the MoD was clear that while Ukraine adheres to international humanitarian law, the Vikings are to be used at the discretion of Ukraine. This is an uncommon declaration from the Netherlands MoD, one that likely reflects a position supportive of the Ukrainian counter-invasion into the Russian territory of Kursk, contrasting with the US reticence to allow its donated arms to be used against Russian targets on Russian sovereign land.
The Vikings serve in a number of combat roles, including command vehicle and mobile firs support, as well as troop transport and medical extraction.
The vehicle is armoured, providing protections from enemy fire, however, as the MoD states, the driver of the Viking suffered from a limited field of vision, and must communicate with the gunner to overcome this limitation. The MoD emphasised that this was an important aspect of training for the Ukrainian soldiers.
The Viking is a fully-amphibious armoured all-terrain vehicle consisting of two tracked vehicle units linked by a steering mechanism, that communicate via a two-way voice communications unit. The roof of the forward cabin is fitted with a ring mount for a 12.7mm Browning heavy machine gun or a 7.62 general-purpose machine gun. The front cabin accommodates a driver and three fully equipped soldiers. The rear cabin can hold up to eight soldiers. Alternatively, the rear cabin can carry a mortar section, a heavy machine gun section, or a fully-equipped anti-tank detachment with Milan anti-armour missiles and firing posts.
In June 2005, the Netherlands Defence Materiel Organisation awarded a contract to Land Systems Hägglunds for the delivery of 74 BvS10 all-terrain vehicles to the Royal Netherlands Marines. These vehicles were acquired in four different variants: troop carriers (46 vehicles), command vehicles (20), repair and recovery vehicles (four), and ambulances (four).
The BvS10 vehicles were intended to supplement the Bv206 vehicles that had been in service with the Marines since the early 1990s. Deliveries commenced in January 2006, and by 2008, the Netherlands had received 66 of these vehicles. As of 2020, the country possesses 73 Vikings and 88 Bv206s. Plans are underway to replace some of these vehicles with 124 new tracked vehicles, with deliveries expected to begin in 2027.
(Source: army-technology.com)

06 Sept 24. DE&S awards £300m artillery contract for Ukraine.
The International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) has just reached an important milestone, with eight countries joining the UK to provide over £1bn, as the UK Prime Minister announced the IFU’s largest support package at the NATO Summit with a £300 m contract to supply 152mm artillery shells for Ukraine’s Soviet-era guns.
DE&S’ Operations Directorate’s Rapid Procurement team, was pivotal in sourcing this equipment, with contracts signed and thousands of shells expected before the end of the year – providing a boost for Ukraine’s stockpiles.
Urgent work to accelerate the delivery of the UK’s military support for Ukraine was discussed between the Defence Secretary and his counterpart, Rustem Umerov, during a visit to London this week.
The Defence Secretary confirmed today the £300 m contract has now been signed and is expected to deliver thousands of shells before the end of the year – providing a significant boost for Ukraine’s stockpiles and aligning with the Government’s acceleration of military support deliveries.
Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Norway all confirmed their intent this summer to invest additional money in the Fund to purchase more drones to help on the frontline, as well as vital air defence capabilities to help shield Ukraine’s people and key infrastructure from relentless Russian bombardment.
Defence Secretary, John Healey, said: “UK military equipment continues to prove invaluable for Ukraine’s war effort. The ongoing defensive operation in Kursk underlines the crucial importance of continued support. And today’s milestone for the International Fund for Ukraine shows the value of working with our Allies to deliver that support.
“Our government is stepping up Britain’s support for Ukraine to fight Putin’s illegal invasion. We are speeding up deliveries of aid, with a much-needed ammunition package announced by the Prime Minister at NATO set to begin deliveries within months. We will continue to step up our support to help Ukraine achieve victory.”
In his first days as Defence Secretary, John Healey met President Zelenskyy and Minister Umerov in Ukraine, where he pledged to accelerate the delivery of the UK’s military support for Ukraine.
The artillery ammunition contract will deliver 120,000 newly-manufactured shells over the next 18 months and will stimulate industrial capacity in Europe and safeguard reliable supply chains that will continue to provide Ukraine with vital ammunition.
It follows previous packages of support from the IFU, which have delivered heavy-lift and reconnaissance drones, maritime drones, minefield-clearing capabilities, combat vehicle spares and air defence systems.
The IFU was first launched by Denmark and the UK in 2022 to provide a more efficient way for countries to pool resources to buy equipment and weapons to support Ukraine’s most urgent capability needs. The UK has donated £500m to the Fund to date.
With artillery having proved critical to Ukraine’s previous battlefield successes, this new investment will support them in further degrading Russia’s forces and preventing them from making significant breakthroughs.
Other contributors to the IFU include Australia, Iceland, New Zealand and Sweden. Further deliveries from the IFU’s other contracts will continue over the coming months. (Source: google/ADS)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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