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18 Dec 24. US alarmed Russia close to accepting nuclear-armed North Korea.
- Summary
- Russian foreign minister said “denuclearising” North Korea was a closed issue
- North Korea’s UN envoy says nuclear war in Northeast Asia a matter of time
- South Korea’s UN envoy warns Pyongyang might try to grab attention during US presidential transition
The United States voiced alarm at the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday that Russia was close to accepting a nuclear-armed North Korea, as Moscow and Pyongyang defended their growing cooperation.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in September that Moscow viewed the notion of “denuclearising” North Korea as a closed issue, as it understood Pyongyang’s logic of relying on nuclear weapons as the foundation of its defence.
“Alarmingly, we assess that Russia may be close to accepting North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program, reversing Moscow’s decades-long commitment to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula,” said U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield.
“We believe that Moscow will become more reluctant not only to criticize Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons, but also further obstruct passage of sanctions or resolutions condemning North Korea’s destabilizing behavior,” she said. (Source: Reuters)
18 Dec 24. Report: Despite Corruption Problems, China Progresses Toward Modernization.
The Defense Department today released the annual “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” report, a congressionally mandated annual report that offers insight into the capabilities, strategies and goals of China and its military.
Of note in this year’s report is a rise in corruption within the People’s Liberation Army, China’s efforts to curtail that corruption, and how that corruption might affect the PRC’s ambitions.
“I think the of the anti-corruption hunt is reflective of a serious concern that this is having serious problems,” said Ely Ratner, assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, while speaking today at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “I think there are questions about the overall effect on the PLA and the whole way in which corruption reverberates through the entire system and what that means.”
The corruption touches every service in the PLA, the report notes, and Xi Jinping, China’s president, has made rooting out corruption in the military a focus of his tenure since taking office.
Last year, corruption-related investigations resulted in the removal of at least 15 high-ranking military officers and defense industry executives from their posts, including the PRC Defense Minister Li Shangfu.
“I think if you just look at the language that China’s senior leaders use to describe the intensity of the anti-corruption campaign and why it’s so vital, that gives you a good sense of how they see it,” said Michael Chase, deputy assistant secretary of defense for China, Taiwan and Mongolia.
Based on who was removed and from what parts of the PLA, Chase said, the corruption could relate to such things as major military construction projects as well as research development and acquisition programs.
“Therefore, may be a different kind of impact on the PLA’s ability to meet the capabilities development milestones that Xi Jinping has set out for them,” he said. “It certainly has to shake the leadership’s confidence in the political reliability of the PLA, and again, in its sort of overall ability to deliver what they’ve been tasked to deliver.”
According to the report, the PRC’s public defense budget increased in inflation-adjusted prices to $220 billion for 2023 and allows the PLA to focus on modernizing its weapons and equipment, recruitment and retaining personnel, and enhancing the military’s strategic capacities.
” reflects investments in a range of capabilities that are focused on Taiwan contingencies, on the East or South China Seas — operations relatively close to the PRC borders,” Chase said. “It also reflects investments in power projection capabilities, the kinds of things that we note in the report about the PLA Navy trying to improve its ability to operate out beyond the first island chain. And it reflects the longer-term ambition to really become a global military with capabilities that can, from the PRC’s point of view, defend their interest worldwide.”
Chase said there are also investments in nuclear expansion and modernization as well as space and counter-space capabilities.
The report details China’s build-up of nuclear weapons. The U.S. Defense Department estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads as of mid-2024 and estimates the PRC will have more than 1,000 by 2030.
“We also talk in the report about not just the expansion in numbers, but also the increase in quality,” Chase said. “We talk about the growing technological sophistication the increasing diversity of China’s nuclear arsenal.”
In earlier reports, decades ago, similar reports detailed China’s small and outdated nuclear weapons capabilities. That has changed.
” we’ve seen over time is that they’ve expanded to a nuclear triad, with the PLA Navy having ballistic missile submarines, conducting deterrence patrols, as we cover in the report, and that the PLA Air Force has also regained a nuclear deterrence and strike mission with the addition of nuclear-capable bombers,” Chase said.
There is also an increase in diversity and capabilities such as precision strike capable missiles with lower yield nuclear warheads, for instance.
“That gives the PRC a wider range of options in terms of the kinds of nuclear deterrence operations they would conduct, as well as … kind of having more rungs on the escalation ladder in terms of how they could conduct nuclear operations,” Chase said.
The report also highlights struggles with deficiencies in China’s military. One area that is true involves the readiness and capabilities of commanders. A term “the five incapables,” used by the PLA, describes areas where Chinese military officers might improve, including the ability to evaluate situations, understand the intent of higher authorities, make operational decisions, deploy forces and manage unexpected situations.
“I think from the PRC perspective, some of this derives from their lack of combat experience,” he said. “From the PRC point of view, it means that the experience that they do have is coming from the overseas operations, from the exercises that they conduct at home — not from any sort of real-world experience with combat operations.”
Other areas where the PLA might not be where it needs to be, the report concludes, include conducting urban warfare and long-distance logistics.
Ties between the PRC and allies, including Russia, are also included in the report. Included there is China’s support to Russia for its ongoing war in Ukraine and in military cooperation and exercises.
“We continue to see them conduct the maritime exercises … the PRC to participate in other Russian exercises, and the joint bomber patrols to take place with some regularity,” Chase said. “They will add some new elements to these over time. But a lot of the time, I think also trying to kind of maximize the political signaling value, to showcase more and deeper military cooperation.”
Chase said that as Russia has become more dependent on the PRC, China will want more from it.
“The PRC … is probably going to want to exert more leverage, to kind of extract greater cooperation from Russia in areas where Russia historically has been more reluctant,” he said. “In the Arctic, for example, would be one example where that might take place.”
Ratner said the PRC’s relationship with Russia is not the only one to be watching. The PRC has relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran and Iranian proxy groups as well.
The PRC’s support to Russia’s war in Ukraine, Ratner said, “is just one of the ways in which the PRC’s, anti-Western, anti-American orientation has been destabilizing, not only in Europe but in other theaters throughout the world.”
The PRC is active in the Middle East as well, he said, where the PRC continues to support Iran and its proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.
“The Houthis have built a supply chain into the PRC for drones and missiles that they are using to attack international shipping,” he said. “These are not just one-off transactions. This is really systemic in terms of how the Houthis are acquiring the capabilities they need.”
He also said there is a “bargain” between the Houthis and the PRC, where if the Houthis don’t attack PRC shipping, Beijing will continue to provide diplomatic and political support to the Houthis.
“That is just an extraordinarily destabilizing set of activities,” he said. “I think that the Russia piece is important, but we ought to not leave out the Middle East piece as well.”
The PRC has made public its goals for modernization of the PLA. The PLA has made uneven progress toward its 2027 capability milestone for modernization, which the report said could make the PLA a more credible military tool for the Chinese Communist Party’s Taiwan unification efforts. The year 2035 has also been touted as when the PLA plans to complete its modernization efforts, while 2049 remains a target to become a “world-class military.”
18 Dec 24. China has increased its arsenal of operational nuclear warheads to 600 from 500 in just a year, as the People’s Liberation Army continues a rapid expansion of its forces, according to the US defence department. In its annual “China Military Power Report”, the Pentagon said the PLA had expanded its arsenal by 20 per cent in the 12 months from mid-2023 and was on track to have 1,000 operational warheads by 2030. The Pentagon has in recent years warned that the US will soon face two nuclear peers as China’s arsenal grows closer in size to the US and Russia. China has not denied increasing the size of its nuclear forces but dismisses US concern about the issue, saying Washington uses it as a pretext for its pursuit of “absolute strategic predominance”. The Pentagon report estimated that China would continue to increase its nuclear forces until at least 2035. But it did not repeat its 2022 projection that the PLA was on track to have 1,500 warheads by the middle of the next decade, a figure that would nearly match the number deployed by the US and Russia. Chinese soldiers during a decontamination drill © CFOTO/NurPhoto/Reuters A US defence official said the Pentagon was being cautious with its latest forecast. “The further out we go . . . the more challenging it is to have a projection that you can have great confidence in, because there are so many variables that could cause them to adjust either what they think is necessary or what they’re able to do,” he said. The report said the PLA Rocket Force, which manages most of China’s nuclear arsenal, was developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles that would significantly improve its nuclear-capable forces. The report, which is mandated by Congress, comes as president-elect Donald Trump prepares to take office in January. Defence experts are waiting to see what approach he will take on China and Taiwan. US officials believe President Xi Jinping has ordered the Chinese military to develop the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, the centennial of the PLA’s founding. The defence official stressed the Pentagon did not believe an attack on Taiwan was “imminent or inevitable” and said the US had “deterrence today that’s real and strong”. The report said the PLA had made “uneven progress” towards its modernisation goal for 2027. The report said the PLA was experiencing a new “wave” of corruption in its senior ranks that “may have disrupted” progress towards the 2027 milestone. “It may have shaken Beijing’s confidence in high-ranking PLA officials,” it concluded. The Chinese defence ministry last month said Miao Hua, one of the top five military officers who command the PLA, had been placed under investigation for “serious violations of discipline”. The Financial Times reported last month that some US officials believe Chinese defence minister Dong Jun is also under investigation. The US official said he could not confirm or deny if Dong was being probed. Beijing has dismissed the claim. Dong’s two predecessors — Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu — have both been placed under investigation for corruption. The Pentagon official said that in the second half of 2023 alone China removed at least 15 high-level military officials and defence industry executives, including the head of the PLA Rocket Force. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said in August that Beijing’s nuclear strategy focused on self-defence, that it always kept its nuclear capabilities at the “minimum level required by national security”. (Source: FT.com)
18 Dec 24. Iran: Military control of oil industry will drive further sanctions, energy security risks. Earlier on 18 December, various media outlets published the findings of several unnamed Western officials and Iranian trading sources which claim that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has increased its control of Iranian oil exports from around 20% (around three years ago) to over 50%. Iran has increasingly utilised a covert network of oil tankers to bypass international sanctions and to fund proxy groups such as the Yemen-based Houthis, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). The recent disruption to IRGC supply chains and financial investments in Syria has threatened its capacity to support LH; this will likely increase the IRGC’s reliance on oil revenues to support its proxies, driving further IRGC consolidation over oil exports. This will likely prompt Western countries to impose further sanctions on businesses operating in the sector, as well as secondary sanctions on Chinese firms processing oil payments. This comes amid increasing US reluctance to issue sanctions waivers to key Iranian energy importers, such as Iraq. We assess this will raise financial and compliance risks; it will also deter international engagement with Iran’s legitimate markets due to the broad application of the sanctions. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Dec 24. Kazakhstan: Russia’s waning economic footprint will facilitate nuclear co-operation with China, West. On 17 December, Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s nuclear resources company, announced that the Russian state-owned nuclear company Rosatom is selling its stakes in two uranium deposits to Chinese companies. The decision follows Kazatomprom’s earlier warnings about growing secondary sanctions risks associated with Rosatom. While Rosatom retains stakes in other deposits, including the Budennovskoye deposit – one of the world’s largest – the sales likely highlight Moscow’s waning economic influence in Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector (to China’s advantage). Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer, accounting for 20% of global primary uranium production in 2023. However, it lacks its own uranium processing capacity. Nonetheless, during a referendum in October, the country overwhelmingly voted in favour of the development of the civilian nuclear sector, paving the way for international co-operation for establishing domestic nuclear processing capabilities. Ultimately, we assess that Russia’s diminishing economic influence will create opportunities for Chinese and (possibly) Western entities to invest in the country’s nuclear sector, thereby improving Astana’s long-term socio-economic outlook. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Dec 24. India-China: Further border talks highlight intent to stabilise relations; trade tensions will persist. Earlier on 18 December, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks on their countries’ ongoing border dispute. This is the first such high-level meeting since 2019. Bilateral relations between India and China deteriorated following deadly border clashes that broke out in Ladakh in 2020. However, in October, the two sides reached a substantive agreement on patrols in disputed areas, signalling a potential thaw in relations. The latest meeting highlights both sides’ intent to ease border tensions further and to reduce the risk of another flare-up. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman stated that Beijing would seek to stabilise bilateral relations ‘at an early date’. Nonetheless, we assess that economic and geopolitical rivalry will likely limit the extent of bilateral co-operation. On 17 December, reports emerged that India plans to impose a tax of up to 25% on steel imports to curb cheap imports from China. While improved economic ties are likely due to the easing tensions, India will likely proceed with caution given its pre-existing reliance on China economically. Additionally, we assess that geopolitical competition for influence in South Asia will almost certainly persist. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Dec 24. 80% plus of SA defence industry production exported Parliament oversight committee hears. South African manufactured Springbuck armoured personnel carriers in Somalia. Confirmation of the limited uptake of local defence industry products and services by the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) was provided to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) at its final meeting of the year. An AMD (SA Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industries Association) presentation had it more than 80% of the output of the South African defence industry (SADI) is exported. This, according to Executive Chair Sandile Ndlovu, who is also Executive Director and Chief Executive of SAAMDEC (SA Aerospace, Maritime, and Defence Export Council), makes the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) “crucial as both a regulator and enabler” a Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) report has it. Ndlovu, again according to the PMG report, expressed concern over a lack of NCACC meetings since April impacting on exports and “creating uncertainty” in the SADI. He is reported as telling the JSCD: “South Africa’s defence industry is unique on the African continent, possessing capabilities across all warfare domains: air, maritime, land, cyber, and space. It can produce at various levels of complexity, providing South Africa with strategic independence and enabling it to dictate its own policies without external influence”.
By way of illustration, Ndlovu’s presentation states: “The defence sector comprises about 600 manufacturers, predominantly privately owned, employing around 20 000 individuals directly. For every direct job created in this sector, there is a multiplier effect resulting in six additional jobs in supporting industries”. He further highlighted significant foreign investment from companies based in Europe, contributing to local job creation and tax revenue.
“South Africa has established an industry capability that would take decades to replicate if lost” Ndlovu’s presentation reads with a caution against losing this capability due to insufficient support or changes in operational practices. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
16 Dec 24. Centcom Strikes ISIS, New Carrier Group Enters Region. U.S. Central Command forces conducted precision air strikes today targeting ISIS camps and operatives in Syria, the Defense Department has announced.
“Battle damage assessments are ongoing no indications of civilian casualties,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters during a morning briefing.
Ryder added that those initial assessments indicate approximately one dozen ISIS fighters were killed in the strikes.
When questioned as to whether there is any concern within the Pentagon that the Dec. 8 downfall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria could ostensibly lead to ISIS making attempts to free its detained fighters from prison camps in the region, Ryder said that DOD is working with the Syrian Democratic Forces to ensure the situation doesn’t deteriorate.
” presents a significant security concern in the sense that, were ISIS able to affect some type of breakout of any detention facility, that would be a significant setback and something that would be very concerning,” Ryder said.
” why we continue to work very closely with the SDF to ensure that those detainees can continue to be held, working with the international community to attempt to repatriate many of those detainees; that is something that we’ll continue to communicate very closely with the SDF to ensure,” he added.
When questioned in regard to the United States’ military presence in the vicinity of the ISIS detention facilities, Ryder said the U.S. provides an “outer layer” of security in that region, and that the primary focus remains on “supporting the defeat ISIS mission more proactively in terms of disrupting and degrading any potential external operations.”
In other Centcom developments, Ryder announced that the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group entered its area of responsibility on Saturday.
The group, which was deployed to ensure stability and security in the region, “consists of the flagship USS Harry S. Truman; Carrier Air Wing 1, with nine embarked aviation squadrons; Destroyer Squadron 28; the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg; and two Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers: USS Stout and USS Jason Dunham,” Ryder explained.
The Harry S. Truman CSG arrived in the region following recent operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Its deployment to the Centcom AOR follows recent deployments to the same region by the USS Abraham Lincoln CSG and the USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG before it. (Source: U.S. DoD)
16 Dec 24. Libya: Risk of further armed group clashes will persist, sustaining risk of operational disruption. On 15 December, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) declared force majeure at the Zawiya oil refinery, suspending operations after several storage tanks caught fire during heavy clashes between local armed groups on the perimeter of the refinery. At least one person was killed in the clashes and ten others were injured. While the fires are now contained, the operations at the key oil refinery will likely remain suspended for the next 48 to 72 hours at least. However, this is unlikely to significantly impact local fuel supplies to the capital Tripoli and the surrounding area as the Brega Oil distribution tanks were not damaged. Nevertheless, the clashes underscore the persistently fragile security environment in western Libya, particularly in and around Zawiya; sporadic clashes between local militias are highly common. We assess that this will sustain ongoing operational disruption risks for businesses in the region (including the capital Tripoli) which are not limited to the oil industry. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Dec 24. Liberia: Further opposition-led protests in Monrovia are likely over deadlock in legislature. Earlier on 17 December, activists affiliated with the ‘Citizens Nonstop, Capitol Lockdown’ movement held a protest outside the Capitol Building in the capital Monrovia to call for the impeachment of President Joseph Boakai. The security forces adopted a heightened posture around the Capital Building, erecting additional checkpoints that resulted in localised movement disruption. The development comes amid calls for protests by the opposition Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC) led by the former president George Weah due to increasing tensions within the legislature related to an impasse over whether a majority exists to remove speaker Jonathan Koffa. As Boakai’s Unity party lacks a majority in the House of Representatives or Senate and is dependent on ad hoc alliances, tensions within the parliament will likely persist, sustaining policy stagnation risks and undercutting the government’s capacity to address governance failures and economic challenges. This will sustain the threat of domestic unrest and further protests in Monrovia in 2025, driving sporadic movement disruption and bystander risks. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Dec 24. North Macedonia: IS-linked arrests underscore elevated Islamist terrorist activity, related threats. On 16 December, the authorities arrested four individuals over their alleged ties to Islamic State (IS), as well as other terrorism-related activity. One individual is suspected of leading a terrorist cell in North Macedonia with the intent of executing an attack against civilian targets. He is accused of recruiting members and spreading propaganda via the messaging service Telegram. France recently arrested the CEO of Telegram for allegedly permitting organised crime and terrorist activity on the service. Since then, Telegram has been more co-operative in providing evidence to the authorities, which will likely moderately enhance European intelligence capabilities. The arrests highlight the elevated terrorist activity across Europe (and in North Macedonia specifically) fuelled by the Middle East crisis and the resurgence of terrorist groups such as IS. In August, a foiled terror plot in Austria involved an individual with North Macedonian roots. We assess that a small-scale terror attack is possible in Europe in the coming weeks and months, especially amid the current holiday season. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Dec 24. Iraq: Kurdistan power-sharing consensus is unlikely in short term, driving domestic unrest risks. Earlier on 17 December, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) held a meeting in Erbil (Erbil governorate) to discuss the formation of a new Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This is the second meeting since the elections in October, in which the KDP retained a plurality of seats in the regional parliament. Discussions are unlikely to lead to a consensus in the short term, with the KRG highly likely to remain divided between two de-facto administrations – the KDP in Erbil and the PUK in Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate) – with each controlling its own security forces. This will likely sustain attack risks posed by Islamic State (IS) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) against military and government personnel and facilities, driving bystander security risks for proximate business personnel and assets. Political and economic uncertainty will likely persist through Q1 2025, driving domestic unrest risks and elevating the threat of sporadic clashes between the authorities and protesters. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Dec 24. Syria: Collapse of ceasefire talks will increase scope of armed conflict in northern areas. On 16 December, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced that the US-brokered ceasefire talks with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in Manbij and Kobani (both Aleppo governorate) had failed. A temporary ceasefire had been agreed between the two groups last week, in which the SDF withdrew from Manbij and control was passed to the SNA. We assess that the SNA will likely continue to advance east towards the Euphrates River and resume efforts to capture the strategic Tishrin dam and the nearby Qere Qozak bridge. Both crossings connect Manbij to the river’s west bank and will be necessary to supply further advances towards Kobani and Raqqa (Raqqa governorate). Although SDF forces are now overstretched, we assess it is unlikely that Kurdish forces will conduct a tactical retreat from Kobani due to its strategic position along the Turkish border, elevating the risk of a wider armed conflict in the coming days and increased instability in northern Syria. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Dec 24. Israeli Airstrikes in Syria’s Tartus Spark Massive Explosions, Triggering 3.0-Magnitude Seismic Event. Israeli airstrikes targeted military sites in Syria’s coastal Tartus region, marking the most significant strikes in the area in over a decade. According to reports from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) and other sources, the attacks struck air defense units and missile depots, causing massive explosions and widespread secondary detonations. Footage shared on social media showed a large fireball and thick smoke rising from the strike sites. The explosion was so powerful that it reportedly registered as a 3.0-magnitude seismic event on nearby sensors. Observers reported ongoing blasts as munitions stored at the facilities continued to detonate. The Tartus region, home to Syria’s main naval base and a critical hub for the Assad regime and its allies, has been a frequent target of Israeli operations. Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes in Syria over the years, primarily aiming to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from gaining a foothold and transferring advanced weapons to the Lebanese militia. While SOHR provided much of the reporting, the group’s reliability has been questioned in the past due to its limited ability to verify details independently. However, video evidence and reports from multiple sources confirm the significant impact of the strikes. The scale of Monday’s attack appears to reflect intensified efforts to destroy remaining Assad-era military stockpiles following the regime’s recent collapse. Syrian state media has not issued an official response, and the full extent of the damage or casualties remains unclear. Israel has not officially commented on the attack. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
13 Dec 24. Myanmar-Bangladesh: Security risks will highly likely remain elevated at border in coming months. On 12 December, Bangladesh’s army announced that it increased border patrols with Myanmar to ‘prevent any law and order situation’ from spreading to Bangladesh. This comes after the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organisation (EAO) in Myanmar claimed that it captured the last junta base on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border in Maungdaw township (Rakhine state) on 10 December. The AA now seemingly controls the 168-mile (270km) border between the two countries as well as around 80% of Rakhine state. Bangladesh’s border security measures are seemingly aimed at preventing an influx of Rohingya Muslims fleeing Myanmar, a concern of the interim government. The Bangladeshi authorities have suspended boat travel between Teknaf (Chittagong division) and Saint Martin Island off the Bangladeshi coast in light of the security situation. The latest developments also represent a setback for Myanmar’s military junta, which has ceded territory to various EAOs in recent months. We assess that security risks will highly likely remain elevated in Rakhine state as the AA looks to expand control in Ann, Gwa and Taungup townships. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Dec 24. South Korea: Protest, policy risks will likely remain heightened during president’s impeachment trial. On 14 December, South Korea’s National Assembly (unicameral legislature) passed a motion to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol by 204 to 85 votes following his short-lived declaration of martial law earlier this month (see Sibylline Alert – 4 December 2024). Yoon was suspended from office. Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who is now acting president, has pledged policy continuity and ordered the military to maintain a ‘watertight readiness posture’ to deter any provocations by North Korea. The Constitutional Court has 180 days to decide whether to confirm Yoon’s impeachment or restore his powers; the first preparatory hearing will commence on 27 December. If Yoon’s impeachment is confirmed, an election must take place within 60 days. He also faces criminal investigations. Earlier on 16 December, Han Dong-hoon, leader of Yoon’s People Power Party (PPP), resigned amid a political backlash after he, along with at least 11 other PPP lawmakers, supported the impeachment motion. We assess that domestic unrest risks will likely remain elevated over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Dec 24. Philippines-China: Chinese embassy safety advisories likely underscore latent bilateral tensions. On 15 December, the Chinese embassy in the Philippines advised that the security situation in parts of the Philippines is unstable. It added that there have been several armed robberies, drug-facilitated thefts and currency exchange scams involving Chinese citizens. This follows a prior advisory on 5 December, which warned of ‘prominent’ public security risks and reminded Chinese tourists to ‘pay attention to travel safety’. In recent years, there have been high-profile crimes against Chinese nationals, including the kidnapping and murder of two Chinese nationals in June and the 2023 kidnapping of six Chinese nationals in the capital Manila. While crime is a concern for travellers to the Philippines, we assess that China’s successive safety advisories are likely in part an attempt to leverage security concerns to exert indirect pressure on the Philippines in the context of their South China Sea dispute by fostering an image that may deter Chinese tourists from travelling. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Dec 24. Kyrgyzstan: Prime minister’s resignation does not underscore increasing government instability. Earlier on 16 December, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov dismissed now-former prime minister (PM) Akylbek Japarov (unrelated), the country’s longest-serving PM. The presidential office issued a statement explaining that this was due to former PM Japarov’s transfer to an unknown position and that the president had appointed First Deputy PM Adylbek Kasymaliyev as PM. The reasons for Japarov’s dismissal remain unclear. A media outlet stated that it came after a recent corruption scandal involving senior tax officials, though it remains unclear whether both events are connected. The PM’s dismissal is possibly part of President Sadyr Japarov’s continued efforts to consolidate his authoritarian rule. Since his election in 2021, President Japarov has systematically sought to expand his presidential powers while systematically repressing the opposition, leading to a severe deterioration of the country’s governance standards. For instance, in November, authorities detained several opposition figures over coup allegations. We assess that the PM’s dismissal does not underscore growing government stability risks in Kyrgyzstan. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Dec 24. SANDF rotation 32 leaves for DR Congo. The command element of 9 SA Infantry (SAI) Battalion, which left for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) this week, is the leader group of the thirty second SA National Defence Force (SANDF) deployment to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission under Operation Mistral.
The group, along with a Tactical Intelligence Unit (TIU) from the SA Army Intelligence Formation, boarded an Ethiopian Airlines charter flight from Bloemfontein’s Bram Fischer International Airport (BFIA) bound for the DRC. The contingent will be followed by the remainder of the 32nd South African commitment to MONUSCO (UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC).
They are set to take up duties in the mission’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), activated in March 2013. Staffed by Malawian, South African and Tanzanian military personnel, it is the only UN peacekeeping unit given an offensive mandate as part of its protection of civilians duty.
All involved were declared mission ready following pre-deployment training and validation at the Joint Mobilisation and Demobilisation Centre (JMDC) at the De Brug training area outside the Free State capital. The pre-deployment phase was to ensure the next South African MONUSCO rotation met set UN requirements in, among others, command and control, protection of civilians and provision of humanitarian assistance.
Cape Town-based 9 SAI will fly the South African flag in the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade, replacing Eastern Cape, Mthatha-based, sister unit 14 SAI.
Major General Godfrey Thulare, SANDF Joint Operations Division Headquarters General Officer Commanding (GOC) was on hand to bid the soldiers farewell with best wishes for the work ahead.
Reporting on the departure, Major SS Kekana of Joint Operations added a personal farewell when he bid those leaving home soil “tsela tshweu” – good luck.
The rotation of the South African commitment to MONUSCO comes ahead of a 19 December UN Security Council (SC) briefing where ending the 14-year-old mission will be on the agenda. Although the UN was supposed to withdraw from the DRC this year, the UN said the meeting later this month is also expected to renew MONUSCO’s mandate, which is set to expire on 20 December.
“A key issue for Council members in December will be MONUSCO’s mandate renewal. Unlike the past two years, the Congolese government is no longer pushing for the mission to leave. After MONUSCO’s withdrawal from South Kivu, Council members also feel that the conditions are not yet favourable for the mission to draw down in North Kivu and Ituri, the two remaining provinces where the mission continues to operate. A possible option for Council members is to renew the mission’s mandate for another year while also considering strengthening MONUSCO’s capacity to support the development of DRC’s national institutions and its capacity to protect civilians,” the UN Security Council Report noted this month.
The security situation in eastern DRC remains fragile, with the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group further expanding its presence in North Kivu province, the Report said. It added that Council members agreed the solution to the long-standing issue in the DRC is political, and they continue to support regional efforts.
“Council members also agree on the need to address the root causes of the crisis in eastern DRC. Some members have repeatedly expressed concerns about the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the proliferation of weapons, which help to fuel the conflict in the region.”
South Africa also has troops in the DRC serving with the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). Its Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier General Julius Gambosi, this week visited troops from all three Troop Contributing Counties (Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania) stationed at Goma and Sake.
“Your efforts and sacrifices do not go unnoticed,” he remarked. “You stand as the first line of defence, far from your families, ensuring the safety, and well-being of others. For this, we owe you an immense debt of gratitude.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
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