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12 Dec 24. Ethiopia-Somalia: Agreement provides route to economic growth; major hurdles persist. On 11 December, the presidents of Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to a joint declaration in Turkey, in the capital Ankara, to resolve their disputes over the Somaliland region and to begin talks to reach a maritime access deal. Talks are due to begin by February, to be concluded within four months. If successful, the agreement would likely drive greater security co-operation to secure overland routes and drive regional economic growth over the long term. However, the breakthrough came the same day that clashes erupted in Jubaland state between the Somali National Army (SNA) and Jubaland regional forces. There is a realistic possibility the agreement reflects a short-term Somalian effort to mitigate Ethiopia’s capacity to exacerbate an ongoing national security issue. As such, we assess it is unclear if Somalia will be genuinely willing to grant Ethiopia port access and talks will possibly be subject to delays. This will sustain the risk of future spikes in tensions, threatening security cooperation against al-Shabaab and driving possible Ethiopian support for regional forces in dispute with Mogadishu. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Dec 24. Niger: Cross-border Islamic State attacks highlight increasing threats to staff, mining assets. On 10 December, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) militants attacked the village of Chatoumane (Tillabéri region). Local media reports indicate that the attack was one of the most fatal ISGS incursions to date and resulted in at least 90 military and 50 civilian casualties. Subsequently, on 11 December, ISGS militants attacked a village adjacent to the Samira Hill gold mine (Tillabéri region) and destroyed numerous buildings in co-ordinated arson attacks. The attacks highlight the increasing activity and capacity of ISGS in the Burkina Faso-Mali-Niger tri-border area. In the short term, the security forces will likely adopt an augmented posture in the Téra department (Tillabéri region) and erect additional roadblocks, disrupting overland movement and increasing staff exposure to petty corruption. However, broader constraints on security force capacity will likely limit the junta’s ability to conduct successful counter-terrorism operations in the long term. Consequently, we assess that ISGS is highly likely to continue escalating attacks on civilian population centres, increasing threats to staff and assets in the Tillabéri region. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Dec 24. Afghanistan: Minister’s assassination underscores continued security challenges for the Taliban. On 11 December, a suicide bombing targeted the Ministry of Refugees in the capital Kabul, killing the acting minister for refugees, Khalil Haqqani, along with six others. According to Islamic State’s news media agency ‘Amaq’, Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) has since claimed responsibility for the attack. The incident marks the most high-profile assassination of a government figure since the Taliban took power. Khalil Haqqani was a prominent member of the influential Haqqani Network faction of the Taliban and the uncle of the current interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The attack follows multiple bomb attacks in the country in recent years, many of which have been claimed by IS-K, the Taliban’s main rival, highlighting the persistent security challenges facing the Taliban from the group. While the Taliban’s reported recent crackdown has somewhat undermined IS-K’s operational capabilities, we assess that IS-K will likely continue to mount opposition and pose significant security challenges for the Taliban government. There is a realistic possibility of further attacks targeting Taliban government officials, including in Kabul. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Dec 24. Sudan: RSF advances will compound risks facing civilian areas, raise risk of violence in South Sudan. Between 9 and 10 December, barrel bombs and shelling killed at least 127 people in the town of Kabkabiya (North Darfur). The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has increased its use of airstrikes amid the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) continued territorial advances. The RSF seized control of the towns of Bout (Blue Nile state) and Jouda (White Nile state) between 8 and 10 December. The UN has expressed concern over the mass exodus of refugees who have crossed into South Sudan since the RSF seized Jouda. This will elevate the risk of weapons proliferation and strain humanitarian resources in South Sudan, exacerbating the risk of violence targeting NGO workers, particularly in Renk (Upper Nile state, South Sudan). We assess that the risk of inter-communal violence will also increase. Further RSF advances will intensify the risks of looting and targeted violence against aid workers during paramilitary raids, while also resulting in an uptick in indiscriminate SAF airstrikes on civilian populations, elevating physical security risks for NGO staff therein. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Dec 24. Somalia: Further clashes between SNA, Jubaland forces are likely, driving substantial security risks. Earlier on 11 December, fighting broke out between Somali National Army (SNA) troops and Jubaland regional forces around 12 miles (20km) from Ras Kamboni (Jubaland state) near the border with Kenya. Casualty figures have not been released and both sides dispute who initiated the clashes. Jubaland officials claim their forces were attacked with a combined drone and small-arms assault, while the Somali defence ministry claimed Jubaland forces attacked SNA troops who were attempting to occupy bases from withdrawing African Union (AU) forces. The clashes come amid escalating tensions between Mogadishu and the Jubaland authorities over the allegedly illegitimate re-election of the regional president, Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 11 December 2024). With the SNA bolstering its presence throughout Jubaland, we assess there is a realistic possibility of further clashes in the coming weeks, particularly around military bases and checkpoints occupied by the SNA, escalating bystander risks (especially in rural areas). A determined attempt to remove Madobe forcibly is currently unlikely, though if Jubaland follows Puntland state by declaring independence, the risk of clashes in major regional cities such as Kismayo and Bu’ale will increase. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Dec 24. South Korea: Building political pressure on embattled president will drive government stability risks. Earlier on 11 December, the police raided the office of President Yoon Suk-yeol amid an investigation into his short-lived declaration of martial law last week (see Sibylline Alert – 4 December 2024). The head of the anti-corruption body stated that the office would arrest Yoon ‘if the situation allows’. North Korean state media has accused Yoon of ‘imposing a dictatorship on the people’, the first public acknowledgement of the incident from Pyongyang; no major military activity from Pyongyang has been monitored since the incident. In recent days, protests in the capital Seoul demanding Yoon’s removal have continued. Labour groups have also carried out industrial action, though unionised railway workers will return to work following a tentative wage agreement. Yoon’s People Power Party (PPP) has called for him to resign in early 2025 before a snap election. The opposition Democratic Party (DP) has called for a second impeachment vote on 14 December after a previous vote did not secure enough support in the National Assembly (due to a PPP boycott). However, the likelihood of an impeachment vote passing has likely risen as the PPP comes under public pressure. If the vote passes, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo will replace Yoon in an acting capacity and the Constitutional Court will decide on whether to confirm the impeachment. Given recent developments, we assess that government stability and policy risks will highly likely remain elevated in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Dec 24. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has published the IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2024, which offers a sobering perspective on the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of global armed conflict in the period from July 1 2023 to June 30 2024. Its findings portray a world where inter-state conflict is once again on the rise with the Middle East at the heart of global insecurity. The rivalries between Western allies and its protagonists have returned to geopolitics with a vengeance, with Russia particularly keen to flex its muscles in areas around the world. Established conflict resolution mechanism has been quietly undermined while international humanitarian law has become increasingly under attack and non-state armed groups or NSAGs have emerged as political and geopolitical actors.
The IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2024 finds that:
Fatalities from violent events have risen by 37% year over year, with an increase in the Middle East and North Africa of over 315%. Over 200,000 have been killed globally, leading to a surge in intensity and the human cost of armed conflict.
The overall ratio of fatalities per event has also increased by approximately 17%, highlighting the growing intensity and lethality of armed violence.
The year is defined by the continuation of the Russia/Ukraine war, the break-up of the conflict in Gaza and the escalation of the long-standing Israel-Iran rivalry. Conflict in Sudan has also marked the reporting period due to its human impact.
Other findings include:
The resurgence of inter-state conflict: While most active armed conflicts have remained internal (with or without third party interventions), the reporting period has been defined by the continuation of the Russia/Ukraine war, the break-up of the conflict in Gaza and the escalation of the long-standing Israel-Iran rivalry from a low-intensity proxy confrontation into a direct conflict that threatens to engulf the entire region.
Middle East emerges at the forefront of global insecurity dynamics: The unprecedented attack by Hamas against Israel on October 7 2023 drastically altered the dynamics in the MENA region. After being largely sidelined for the past decade, the Israel-Palestinian territories conflict has returned to the forefront of Middle Eastern politics and security concerns. Hamas’ ties to the Iran-led Axis of Resistance (which includes non-state armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen) and Israel’s aggressive military response in Gaza, risk escalating into a full-scale regional war between Israel and Iran. Following the October 7 attack and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza, tensions have intensified, with the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon reactivating and, on April 13, 2024, leading to the first direct military clash between Iran and Israel since the founding of the Islamic Republic. Iraq, Syria, and Yemen have also been drawn into the hostilities. Given the unwavering support from the US and Western Europe for Israel, what started as a regional crisis has now effectively become an international one.
Competition between Western powers and revisionist powers has intensified: During the reporting period, non-Western powers have become increasingly assertive on the global stage, exacerbating conflict dynamics worldwide. Russia’s destabilising impact on global security is a prime example. Beyond its ongoing war on Ukraine in violation of international law, Russia has remained active in crucial theatres in the MENA region.
Growing geopolitical fragmentation undermines legitimacy and effectiveness of established conflict resolution mechanisms: The UN Security Council has struggled to fulfil its primary role of maintaining global peace and security due to internal divisions fuelled by geopolitical fragmentation. The inability of the international system and Western powers like the US to secure ceasefires in conflicts such as those in Gaza and Sudan, or mediate domestic and international conflicts, including those in Ukraine, Ethiopia-Somalia, DRC-Rwanda and Venezuela has been a feature of the reporting period. Meanwhile, emerging geopolitical powers, such as the Gulf countries, China, Brazil, and Turkey, have also failed to demonstrate greater effectiveness in their mediation efforts.
International humanitarian law increasingly under attack: The wars in Sudan and Gaza have been marked by violations of international humanitarian law by all involved parties. In both conflict theatres, state and non-state armed actors (NSAGs) have shown a blatant disregard for civilian lives, leading to alarming levels of forced displacement (including 90% of Gazans and 7.7 m internally displaced Sudanese). These violations include the use of lethal violence in proximity or against civilians, blocking humanitarian aid deliveries, reportedly using food insecurity as a weapon of war, and—particularly in Gaza—the widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure in urban areas.
The continued rise of NSAGs as political and geopolitical actors: During the reporting period, these groups have further solidified their roles as political actors and governance providers in numerous fragile or conflict-affected countries worldwide. According to the ICRC, 455 armed groups of humanitarian concern were active globally as of July 2024, with approximately 210m people living under their full or contested control. Moreover, the major role played by NSAGs such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in MENA conflict dynamics has highlighted their growing geopolitical and geo-economic clout and these groups’ ability and willingness to engage with and/or challenge geopolitical state-players in pursuit of their strategic objectives.
The increasingly pressing need to unpack (and address) the climate/conflict nexus: the accelerating climate crisis continues to disproportionately affect fragile countries, which are especially vulnerable to its impacts. This exacerbates the underlying causes of conflict, leading to forced displacement and instability across borders. The growing competition for scarce and inter-state natural resources, such as water and land, is becoming a significant driver of both internal conflicts, with NSAGs notably leveraging control over these resources as a weapon of war and a means of gaining political power. In turn, armed violence and conflict weaken states’ capacities to adapt to climate change and build resilience. Moreover, conflicts often hinder climate mitigation efforts, as seen in the narco-deforestation in Latin America and the pollution from illegal mining in many regions of the world.
Outlook for war in Ukraine: While Donald Trump’s re-election, and Ukrainian setbacks on the battlefield, have revived speculation of a ceasefire, neither Moscow nor Kyiv currently appears willing to consider this. The prospects for a final end to the war look more remote still. The two sides remain far apart on any possible peace terms while a durable settlement would require a host of wider political, legal, economic and security questions to be resolved, including the potential for reparation payments to Ukraine, the future of frozen Russian assets, accountability for war crimes, the return of Ukrainian citizens deported to Russia and the structure of future security guarantees.
11 Dec 24. MP assured South African State Security Agency on top of terrorism threats. Concerns expressed by an MKP (uMkhonto we Sizwe Party) Member of Parliament (MP) as regards South Africa being a logistic hub for terrorist organisations were assuaged by Minister in The Presidency, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, in the final round of Parliamentary questions for the year.
Nhlamu Ndhlela, a National Assembly (NA) MKP whip, was informed in a written reply government employs a co-ordinated response to countering and preventing terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations, domestically and regionally”.
According to her the State Security Agency (SSA) prioritises “comprehensive investigative efforts” to determine whether allegations South Africa is being used by terrorist organisations to move equipment. These efforts are not confined to South Africa and include “robust and ongoing collaboration and engagement with regional counterparts”. This approach sees a high-level focus on gathering intelligence to identify direct or indirect links between terrorist entities active in South Africa and the southern African region.
Where credible links are identified, joint investigative initiatives with regional partners are undertaken with the primary objective of assessing and mitigating potential risks and threats to national and regional security.
“Concurrently,” her response has it, “systematic follow-up investigations are being conducted to critically evaluate the veracity of assertions made in both media and research reports, many of which currently lack substantiated evidence”.
“These efforts underscore the SSA’s commitment to rigorous evidence-based approaches in addressing concerns and protecting regional stability and national security.”
The SSA, according to Ntshavheni, has “a central role in directing the domestic law enforcement response to the country’s identified terrorism and terrorism financing risks”.
The focus on detection, investigation and countering/disrupting terrorism and terrorism financing risks and threats, “is the operational embodiment of South Africa’s recently revised National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NCTS) and the National Counter the Financing of Terrorism Strategy (NCFTS)”.
“Through these frameworks, the SSA is consolidating and reinforcing South Africa’s counter terrorism architecture, ensuring implementation of robust measures to mitigate, neutralise and disrupt any terrorist related activities with direct or indirect links to South Africa. This co-ordinated response is pivotal to strengthening national security and demonstrating the SSA’s and all relevant security cluster departments unwavering commitment to countering and preventing terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, domestically and regionally.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
11 Dec 24. Israel Conducts Major Strikes in Syria, Targeting Air & Naval Assets. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have carried out an extensive military operation in Syria, striking over 350 targets across the country and dismantling significant military assets. This comes in the wake of the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime on Sunday after a rapid offensive by Syrian rebel forces. Israeli officials said the strikes aimed to prevent advanced weaponry from falling into the hands of extremist groups amid the chaos. As part of the multi-pronged operation, Israeli naval missile ships destroyed the remnants of Syria’s naval fleet late Monday night. The strikes focused on the ports of Latakia and Al-Bayda, where 15 naval vessels, including Osa-class missile boats, were stationed. Verified images from Latakia show sunken vessels, with missile launchers from destroyed boats still visible above the water. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
11 Dec 24. Russian Warships Leave Syrian Naval Base Following Assad’s Overthrow, Satellite Imagery Reveals. Satellite imagery has revealed that Russian naval vessels stationed at the Tartous naval base on Syria’s Mediterranean coast have vacated the facility following the overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad by rebel forces. Images captured by Planet Labs and BlackSky show significant changes in Russia’s naval deployments in Tartous. On December 1, multiple Russian warships, including surface combatants and a submarine, were docked at the Tartous base. However, by December 3, those vessels had disappeared. Imagery taken on December 9 by Planet Labs indicated that at least three ships from Russia’s Mediterranean fleet had relocated, anchoring approximately 13 kilometers (eight miles) northwest of Tartous. Among the identified vessels were two guided missile frigates and an oiler. The remaining ships could not be immediately located in the latest available imagery. Additional images captured on December 7 and December 9 by BlackSky provide further insight into the fleet’s movements. According to BlackSky’s intelligence, six warships initially stationed at Tartous returned briefly last Thursday but departed again by Monday. Russia, a staunch ally of Assad throughout the Syrian civil war, maintained its Tartous naval base as a critical outpost in the Eastern Mediterranean, solidifying its influence in the region. The base served as a logistical hub for Russia’s operations in Syria and provided access for its Mediterranean fleet. While the ships remain offshore, it remains unclear whether Russia is repositioning its forces temporarily or planning a longer-term strategy. Given the rapidly evolving security environment in Syria following Assad’s ouster, Moscow may be reassessing its naval deployments to safeguard its fleet and maintain operational flexibility. The Tartous base is Russia’s only naval facility outside its borders and a key element of its regional influence. Its use by Russian forces dates back to the Cold War era, and it has been expanded and modernized in recent years. While the warships’ current location suggests a temporary repositioning, the lack of official statements from Russian authorities adds to the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Tartous base. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
10 Dec 24. Austin Says Regional Alliances Strengthen Indo-Pacific Security. The U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger, said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, who met today with Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani in Tokyo.
“We share a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, and I’m proud of how much we’ve accomplished over the past four years,” Austin said.
Those accomplishments, he said, include improvements to force posture, defense industrial agreements and upgrades to command and control.
“We’ve worked more closely than ever with our partners across this in support of stability, deterrence and peace,” the secretary said.
Japan and the U.S. have made historic progress with Australia, the Philippines, South Korea and other partners. “We’re committed to building on that progress,” he said.
“We’re clear-eyed about the challenges to peace and stability in this region and worldwide, and that includes coercive behavior by in the East China Sea and South China Sea and elsewhere in the region,” he said, adding that other threats are from Russia and North Korea.
“We’re meeting these challenges with confidence and resolve and we remain committed to advancing our historic trilateral cooperation with the Republic of Korea,” he said.
“Let me be clear, America’s extended deterrence commitment to Japan and the Republic of Korea is ironclad,” he said.
Austin also met Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba today and they said they share a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Earlier in the day, Austin arrived at Yokohama North Dock for a classified briefing with U.S. Army officials about the Army’s initiatives in Japan, as well as engagements with soldiers from U.S. Army Japan and the Army’s 5th Composite Watercraft Company.
“The 5th Composite Watercraft Company was activated in February — making good on another important announcement following the 2023 U.S.-Japan 2+2 meeting. This is also the first time that an Army composite watercraft company has been deployed outside the United States,” said a senior defense official.
Also earlier in the day, Austin visited Yokota Air Base, where he met with Air Force Lt. Gen. Stephen F. Jost, the new commander of U.S. Forces Japan.
Jost provided the secretary with updates on a wide range of defense activities across the alliance, as well as ongoing efforts to upgrade U.S. Forces Japan to a Joint Force Headquarters, according to a senior defense official.
The United States is helping to upgrade alliance command and control by continuing to refine requirements to reconstitute U.S. Forces Japan into a joint force headquarters, the official said.
These requirements include upgrades to personnel, resourcing and facilities to enable expanded missions and responsibilities. “We are in a good position to implement these requirements in the months ahead, ensuring that the JFHQ is in a strong position to operate effectively with Japan and that the alliance can respond in peacetime and contingencies,” the official said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
10 Dec 24. Readout of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Daniel Shapiro’s Visit to Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar. Pentagon Spokesman Tom Crosson provided the following readout: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Daniel Shapiro traveled to Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar from December 4-9 to consult with regional partners and reinforce U.S. commitment to regional security and stability. DASD Shapiro began his trip in Jordan where he met with senior Jordanian defense officials to reaffirm the strength of the U.S.-Jordan strategic partnership throughout 75 years of diplomatic relations. During his visit, DASD Shapiro highlighted the United States’ unwavering support of Jordan as a valued partner in promoting security and stability in the Middle East region. In Bahrain, DASD Shapiro attended the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Manama Dialogue and participated in a panel discussion, “Defence Challenges in a Complex World” alongside counterparts from Brazil, Canada, and Hungary. On the margins, DASD Shapiro met with a range of allies and partners, including senior officials from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Czechia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. During these engagements, DASD Shapiro discussed regional security concerns, including the situation in Syria, efforts to implement the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah, U.S. and partner efforts to address Houthi destabilizing activities in the Red Sea and to secure a ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza, and opportunities to build on security integration in support of a more resilient and secure region. He also met with senior Bahraini government officials, including Crown Prince and Prime Minister HRH Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, National Security Advisor HRH Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, and Bahrain Defense Force Commander-in-Chief Field Marshall Sheikh Khalifa Al Khalifa. In these discussions, DASD Shapiro reviewed key bilateral defense issues, and conveyed U.S. appreciation for Bahrain’s generous hosting of USNAVCENT and participation in a range of U.S.-led regional security initiatives, including Operation PROSPERITY GUARDIAN. He further congratulated Bahrain on the United Kingdom’s intent to accede to the September 2023 Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA), announced during the Manama Dialogue, which constitutes an opportunity to further expand the region’s multilateral security architecture in support of resilience. DASD Shapiro concluded his trip in Qatar, where he visited U.S. and coalition forces at Al Udeid Air Base and met with Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces Lieutenant General Jassim Mohammed Ahmed Al Mannai and Chief of the International Military Cooperation Authority, Brigadier General Abdulaziz Al Sulaiti. During these engagements, DASD Shapiro conveyed appreciation for Qatar’s hosting of U.S. and coalition forces and reviewed key bilateral defense issues, including foreign military sales and joint interoperability. He also exchanged views on regional security issues, including Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and ongoing efforts to deliver a ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza. (Source: U.S. DoD)
10 Dec 24. China-Taiwan: Taiwan continues to monitor elevated Chinese military activity. Earlier on 10 December, Taiwanese General Hsieh Jih-sheng gave a press conference at the Ministry of National Defense (MND) regarding increased Chinese naval activity observed near Taiwan since 9 December. He stated that the activity did not constitute ‘military exercises’ but rather combat preparedness manoeuvres forming two strategic ‘walls’: one extending between the first and second island chains in the West Pacific and another within Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). While explaining the discrepancy in reported vessel numbers (21 detected by Taiwan around the island compared with around 90 reported by international media), Hsieh stated that the larger figure likely includes observations of Chinese vessels by Japan and other neighbouring countries across a broader area. No live fire drills have been monitored. China has not publicly announced or recognised any manoeuvres. However, we assess there is a realistic possibility that current military activities could still intensify, particularly as the reserved airspace zones set up by China off its eastern and south-eastern coast run until 11 December. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Dec 24. DOD’s Mission to Defeat ISIS Remains Ongoing in Syria. The Defense Department’s mission to defeat ISIS remains ongoing in Syria, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said today. She said the U.S. Central Command will continue to work to prevent the militant group from reestablishing a foothold in the country following the overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime over the weekend.
“Centcom, together with allies and partners in the region, will continue to carry out operations to degrade ISIS capabilities, even during this dynamic period in Syria,” Singh said.
On Saturday, U.S. forces conducted precision airstrikes in central Syria against known ISIS camps and operatives. As part of the operation, U.S. Air Force fighter and bomber aircraft struck more than 75 targets.
“There should be no doubt — we will not allow ISIS to reconstitute and take advantage of the current situation in Syria,” Centcom Commander Army Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla said in a statement following the strikes. “All organizations in Syria should know that we will hold them accountable if they partner with or support ISIS in any way.”
Singh emphasized that the U.S. mission in Syria is “to counter ISIS and to support our local partners on the ground, the Syrian Democratic Forces, to ensure that ISIS can never reestablish a safe haven there.”
The rapid overthrow of the Assad regime at the hands of Syrian rebel forces on Saturday introduces “historic opportunity for the long-suffering people of Syria” while at the same time introducing a “moment of risk and uncertainty” for the region, Singh said.
“The Assad regime brutalized, tortured and killed hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrians and now, at long last, the Assad regime has fallen,” she said. “That is a fundamental act of justice.”
She said the U.S. “will continue to work with our partners and with our stakeholders in Syria to help them seize the opportunity and to manage the risk.”
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke by phone with Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler on Saturday to discuss the developments in Syria.
During the call, Austin emphasized that the U.S. is watching closely the various Syrian opposition groups’ statements and actions in the wake of Assad’s overthrow.
Both leaders agreed that the opposition groups must take steps to protect civilians, including ethnic and religious minorities, and follow international humanitarian norms, according to a summary of the discussion provided by Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder.
“Secretary Austin and Minister Guler both reaffirmed the importance of close coordination between the United States and Turkey to prevent further escalation of an already volatile situation, as well as to avoid any risk to U.S. forces and partners, and the Defeat-ISIS Mission,” the summary reads. (Source: U.S. DoD)
09 Dec 24. China-Taiwan: Authorities prepare for highly likely large-scale Chinese military exercises. Earlier on 9 December, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) initiated ‘combat preparedness drills’ and raised its alert level to ‘high’ after detecting nearly 90 Chinese naval and coast guard vessels in the waters near Taiwan. Vessels from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), specifically its eastern, northern and southern theatre commands, were monitored. Also on 9 December, China issued Notice to Air Mission (NOTAM) bulletins for seven reserved airspace zones of its eastern and south-eastern coast until 11 December. This measure is commonly used to ensure safety during military drills, suggesting that China is preparing for such activities in the area. In May and October, China conducted large-scale drills (dubbed Joint-Sword 2024A-B; see Sibylline Alert – 14 October 2024) in response to perceived provocations by Taiwan, though the current preparations point to upcoming drills that will possibly diverge in shape and form from drills earlier this year. Beijing would likely cite recent stopovers by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te in Hawaii (US) and the US territory of Guam during his Pacific tour as a catalyst for further drills. Chinese war games are likely to last several hours, at least. We assess that temporary disruption to aircraft and/or maritime activity is conceivable depending on the nature of the possible drills (such as whether they include live-fire exercises, which were absent from previous drills this year). (Source: Sibylline)
09 Dec 24. Burkina Faso: New government will moderately increase operational disruption risks. On 6 December, interim President Ibrahim Traoré dismissed Prime Minister Appolinaire Kyelem de Tambèla and dissolved the government; he also dismissed high-profile figures such as the former defence minister Kassoum Coulibaly and the former union leader Bassolma Bazié. Traoré subsequently appointed Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouedraogo as prime minister, who has in turn appointed a new cabinet. The reappointments likely reflect Traore’s efforts to neutralise possible challenges to his leadership, reflecting sustained government stability risks. Bazie’s dismissal will possibly trigger an uptick in union-led, anti-government protest activity, though a repressive response from the security forces will moderate the risk of sustained unrest. More broadly, the dissolution likely forms part of an effort to delay the transition to civilian rule further, sustaining governance risks. As power remains almost exclusively concentrated within the executive, policy risks remain low. Even so, as the new government will likely bring in new ministerial staff, we assess that staffing changes will possibly disrupt established working relationships between businesses and government personnel in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Dec 24. South Korea: Unrest, policy risks remain elevated following failed impeachment of president. Earlier on 9 December, South Korea’s justice ministry announced that President Yoon Suk-yeol was prohibited from leaving the country. Yoon is the subject of an investigation over his brief declaration of ‘emergency martial law’ last week. An impeachment motion on 7 December did not pass in the National Assembly (unicameral assembly), as most lawmakers from Yoon’s People Power Party (PPP) boycotted the vote. However, PPP leader Han Dong-hoon stated that Yoon will be ‘excluded from his duties, including foreign policy’ until he resigns and that Prime Minister Han Duck-soo will manage state affairs in the meantime. However, there is continual uncertainty surrounding Yoon’s authority; he remains commander-in-chief of the army, while the opposition Democratic Party (DP) claims that this a ‘blatant constitutional violation’. The DP has called for another impeachment vote on 14 December and every Saturday until he steps down. In recent days, tens of thousands of people have participated in peaceful protests in the capital Seoul calling for Yoon’s resignation (there have also been smaller pro-Yoon demonstrations). We assess that the risk of protests will almost certainly remain elevated in the coming days. Gatherings will likely be focused around the National Assembly building in Seoul on weekday evenings and weekends. The ongoing political uncertainty will almost certainly drive policy stagnation in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Dec 24. UK joins US-Bahrain agreement to build security across the Middle East. The UK will join the US-Bahrain Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement as it works with partners to build long-term security and stability across the Middle East
- Today the UK has announced it will join the US-Bahrain Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement
- This move signals the UK’s continued efforts to work with key partners to build long-term security and stability across the Middle East
- Minister Falconer set to sign the agreement during his visit to the region
Today, the UK has announced its intention to join the US-Bahrain Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) which aims to build long-term security and stability across the Middle East. This demonstrates the UK’s commitment to working with key defence partners Bahrain and the US to cooperate more closely with them and allies to foster regional stability and prosperity.
The UK’s Minister for the Middle East will travel to the region tomorrow, to attend the Manama Dialogue, where Bahrain, US and UK will sign and celebrate the UK joining the C-SIPA agreement. He will also deliver a speech addressed to foreign, defence and intelligence Ministers from across the region and world to discuss the most pressing regional security issues.
The UK’s membership of C-SIPA will bolster its strong security and economic cooperation with Bahrain. Bahrain hosts the UK’s naval facilities in the Gulf and has supported operations which support freedom of navigation and commercial trade through the Red Sea. The first UK Bahrain Strategic Investment Partnership agreed in 2023 has already provided over £1bn investment in UK.
The UK has a special relationship with the US built on a foundation of deep security, military and intelligence links, as well as unique cultural and people to people bonds. Joining C-SIPA is a natural extension of this, and the UK will continue to be a reliable partner standing with the US and Bahrain to support greater stability and prosperity in the Middle East.
The Minister for Middle East and North Africa, Hamish Falconer said:
The Middle East is subject to instability and the risks of escalation and miscalculation are high. It is more important than ever for the UK to join efforts to build long-term regional security in the region, alongside key partners Bahrain and US.
C-SIPA is a joint commitment to be at the forefront of global efforts to promote the rule of law and contribute to regional stability and prosperity.
I am delighted that the UK have announced its decision to join and look forward to furthering our security cooperation with Bahrain and the US.
Minister Falconer will also attend the Doha Forum in Qatar to collaborate with key partners on tackling challenges facing our world, from security to technology and development.
Following this, the Prime Minister will travel to the Gulf next week, where he will be discussing defence and security partnerships and cooperation on regional stability. The UK is proud to work with Gulf countries who have been vital partners in calling for peace, delivering humanitarian aid and working to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East.
(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
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