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07 Nov 24. Australian RSL calls for urgent development of major local defence industry capacity. The Defence and National Security Committee of the Returned & Services League of Australia (RSL) has launched a new report, calling on Australia to urgently develop a locally based major defence industry.
The paper, prepared for the RSL’s Defence and National Security Committee, titled Building a Sustainable Sovereign Industrial Defence Capability, is calling on successive Commonwealth governments to have greater ambition for the Australian Defence industry.
As part of this, the paper highlighted the urgency for Australia to develop one or more large Tier 1 national security and defence and advanced manufacturing primes.
The RSL Defence and National Security Committee is chaired by Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Peter Leahy AC and the paper’s lead author is Vice Admiral (Ret’d) Peter Jones AO DSC RAN.
RSL National president Greg Melick said the Australian government had embarked on a major reorientation of Defence policy, Australian Defence Force capabilities and Defence industry policy settings.
Melick said, “The RSL believes that the new policy settings could be further strengthened to better enable Australia’s ability to defend itself in any sustained conflict, through the creation of one or more Australian Tier 1 national security and advanced manufacturing prime system integrators, or Australian defence prime.”
A central highlight was the comparison between Sweden and Australia, where Sweden, with a significantly smaller population and economy when compared to Australia, has developed a global prime in Saab that is delivering capability generally quicker and cheaper to that nation’s defence force.
“Our paper contends that the absence of even one Australian defence prime has led to poor project outcomes, particularly in the naval sector. It has also resulted in billions of dollars needlessly going offshore at the expense of Australian jobs and national resilience,” Melick said.
As part of this call to arms, the RSL has called on increased bipartisan support to help support the development of Australian defence primes, stressing the timing amid ongoing changes in the nation’s defence industrial base and the policy and regulatory frameworks that underpin the Defence Industry Development Strategy and the government’s related initiatives.
Melick said, “Australia needs to return to a position where it does have its own national defence primes so that it can have a truly robust capability that can deliver capability to the ADF in a steady, cost-effective way with managed schedule and cost risks. This should be an expectation of every Australian taxpayer. It is something that other G-20 economies take as a given.”
(Source: Defence Connect)
06 Nov 24. The Houthis are winning in the Red Sea – rest of the world on the back foot. Who is winning the battle for the Red Sea? If I were taking bets right now, I’d have some of my money on the Houthis, for they seem to be retaining the initiative. That’s based on current results, and one cannot really imagine they will be able to continue preventing over 60 per cent of all shipping from using the waterway dividing Africa from Asia.
This month it is one year since the first drone or missile was fired at a merchant ship sailing innocently through the now infamous Bab al-Mandab Strait. That’s the narrow point at the lower end of the Red Sea after which it becomes the Gulf of Aden. This is conveniently close to the Yemen coast from where the Houthis are able to fire off Iranian-supplied missiles and drones almost at will.
Who are these Houthis?
Who are these Houthis? The Houthi movement is a Zaydi Shia Islamist militant organisation enjoying the backing of Iran, which by force of arms has wrested control over a large part of Yemen, including the capital of Sanaa and most of the coast facing the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
In recent years the Houthi movement successfully held off attempts of overthrowing it by the combined military forces of neighbouring Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Despite the Houthis having occupancy of the capital and control over much of the economically productive regions, the movement lacks international recognition and the government it overturned remains, at least on paper, the recognised legal authority of Yemen.
Among the weapons used against merchant shipping are waterborne drones – smallish semi-submerged motorised vessels loaded with high explosives and used to target ships sailing even some distance from the Yemen coast. Such craft have been used in the Black Sea with devastating effect by the Ukrainians, effectively chasing what remains of the Russian Black Sea fleet to the far corners of that enclosed sea.
Off the Yemeni coast over a hundred ship attacks have been recorded in the past 12 months, with two vessels sunk and four seafarers killed. Some of the vessels were set on fire. Another two were highjacked and taken to Yemeni anchorages with their crews detained on board.
Cape of Good Hope
The result of this year-long naval activity, ostensibly targeting ships with an Israeli interest although making no guarantee that other shipping remains safe, is that the majority of vessels that ordinarily would travel via the Red Sea and Suez Canal, have been forced to sail the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.
That requires another ten to 14 days of sailing time, with commensurate added expense, for which someone has to pay! At a guess it isn’t the shipping companies, who as in the days of the Covid-19 pandemic, are suddenly anticipating strong and rewarding year-end results. Increased tariffs are once again bearing surprising fruit.
As just one example, Maersk is reporting a 41% increase in revenue and that’s in spite of having to re-route all of its Asia-Europe-Asia ships south via the Cape of Good Hope. And that means increased bunker consumption and overall operating costs.
Suez Canal
Between 10 and 12 per cent of total global trade by volume goes – or went – through the Suez Canal, which automatically includes the Red Sea. By way of interest, 22 per cent of the canal traffic is made up of container ships. Car carriers also number around the 20 per cent mark while oil products including crude oil vessels account for another 25 per cent. That’s around two thirds of the total shipping that would ordinarily use the shorter route.
Most of those vessels are now avoiding the Red Sea and the Suez Canal is suffering.
It’s important to highlight containers, cars and oil products, because the ships that carry these commodities are among those that now lead the way in diverting around the Cape.
The big loser in all this is probably Egypt, the owner of the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal Authority (SCA), effectively the Egyptian Government, has seen revenue plummet and no solution in sight. Other ships are still using the canal, which is physically unaffected, but the numbers are seriously down.
According to Egyptian reports, the SCA has lost an estimated $6 bn in revenue since the Red Sea crisis began. Foreign Minister Badr Abdelaty revealed this last week following his meeting with the Secretary-General of International Maritime Organization (IMO), Arsenio Dominguez.
US Navy
When the Houthis fired their first missiles and drones towards Israel in October 2023, US Navy ships played an early and decisive role in assisting Israeli defences. In addition, the US and its allies quickly formed a coalition of naval forces to provide a naval presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to intercept missiles as they were fired from Yemeni positions.
The naval ships were soon heavily involved in assisting merchant ships that were being targeted by Houthis around the Bab al-Mandab Strait and later in the Gulf of Aden. Details of the size and identity of the naval forces haven’t always been forthcoming but at one stage it was quite significant.
Aircraft too came into the equation, involving missions over Houthi-held Yemeni territory which were aimed at reducing the Houthi’s ability to target passing ships or to target Israel. Though claiming to be successful, a number of ships risking the journey through the Red Sea or even those operating in the Gulf of Aden en route to nearby Djibouti, continue to come under Houthi attack.
In January this year President Joe Biden said the air and naval strikes against Houthi launch and storage facilities would continue to protect the free flow of international commerce. Regardless of this, the attacks on international shipping have continued through the year.
Israel and Gaza
According to the Houthis these attacks will continue until Israel abandons its invasion of Gaza (and that now includes Israel having to abandon raids into parts of southern Lebanon).
There are conflicting reports suggesting the interest of the international naval forces is starting to wane over what happens in southern Red Sea. While no such announcements or intentions have been made, it will only add to the concerns of those whose ships continue using the shorter route.
Of course, it could be that any reduction of the naval forces may simply be in proportion to the decreasing number of ships running the gauntlet of missiles and drones.
On the other hand many see the ‘allied’ response as being defensive and not sufficiently offensive towards the Houthis as the latter continue firing off their missiles and directing their drones. That’s despite the US and UK air forces in the region having undertaken numerous raids across Yemen in an effort to degrade the Houthi ability of continuing their attacks.
The latter remains a difficult task. The Houthi’s don’t require sophisticated launch pads or airfields for their drones or even some missiles. They don’t require expensive or noticeable equipment or facilities to handle the launches. Supplies of missiles and drones can be easily stored or transported without drawing much attention.
How long will this go on before once again the Red Sea and Suez Canal can be considered safe shorter routes on the long journey between South-East Asia and Europe or the eastern seaboard of North America? It’s anybody’s guess at the moment. There no end in sight in Gaza, and no reason to think the Houthis will abandon their support for their compatriots in Hamas or Hezbollah.
Will US and European nations continue providing naval cover for commercial shipping wanting to sail the length of the Red Sea? It seems maybe not. The EU’s mission Aspides commander indicated recently that Aspides lacks the ships and resources necessary to respond.
Which is surprising considering the extent to which most of those same European nations have continued their support of the EU NAVFOR naval forces guarding against piracy and smuggling in the wider Middle East area.
Shipping companies meanwhile have accepted that the diversion of their ships around the Cape will have to continue well into 2025.
German frigate
But it’s not only merchant ships that are avoiding the gauntlet. A German Navy frigate, no less, has been instructed to divert.
What was a surprise this past week concerns the German Navy frigate, FGS Baden-Württemberg (F222), returning from the far-off Pacific, which will not risk the crossing of the Red Sea and is instead taking the longer route around South Africa.
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius issued instructions for the frigate and the fleet auxiliary Frankfurt-am-Main to avoid the shorter and much cheaper route into the Mediterranean because the ship lacks suitable long-range defences.
Nor were there any suitable escorts to accompany the German ships through the dangerous waters.
This is the same ship that in September helped tweak the Chinese whiskers by sailing provocatively through the Taiwan Strait! Minister Pistorius was again the person to make that announcement on 14 September 2024.
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
05 Nov 24. Chad: Threat of withdrawal from regional task force reflects increasing pressure on security forces. On 4 November, President Mahamat Idriss Deby threatened to withdraw Chadian troops from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional counter-insurgency task force operating in the Lake Chad region. Jihadist groups including Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are highly active in the Lake Chad area, which spans northern Cameroon, western Chad, eastern Niger and Nigeria. Deby’s announcement comes after jihadist militants killed over 40 soldiers during an attack in Lac province on 27-28 October and reflects broader concerns regarding the task force’s capacity to address cross-border militant activity. Even so, Chad is unlikely to withdraw from the MNJTF in the short term due to a lack of suitable alternatives. Rather, we assess that Chad will likely leverage these threats to increase its influence within the MNJTF in the coming months, particularly regarding unit co-operation and intelligence sharing. Deby’s statement also possibly reflects efforts to increase access to military aid, given Chad’s status as a regional ally to France and the US. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Nov 24. North Korea fires multiple short-range missiles, condemns military drills.
- Summary
- Missiles fired hours before U.S presidential election
- Follows ICBM test, Putin meeting North Korean Foreign Minister
- Kim Yo Jong condemns US, Japan, South Korea military drills
North Korea fired at least seven short-range ballistic missiles on Tuesday off its east coast, Japan’s defence minister said, soon after Pyongyang condemned military drills by its rivals and just hours before the U.S. election.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s sister condemned the drills involving the United States, Japan and South Korea, in a report published on state media KCNA. At least seven missiles flew to an altitude of 100 km (62 miles) and covered a range of 400 km before falling outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone into the ocean, Japan’s Defence Minister Gen Nakatani said. (Source: Reuters)
04 Nov 24. SANDF needs to be reformed. Defence Minister Angie Motshekga as a matter of urgency needs to secure additional funding to match the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF’s) mandate, fix governance and supply chain management issues, and commission a new Defence Review in order to reform the armed forces.
This is according to Rise Mzansi’s leader Songezo Zibi. Speaking to defenceWeb, he said Motshekga likely needs to secure support for an overhaul of the SANDF’s leadership. “The poor governance outcomes reflect the leadership, yet the generals do not endure the same scrutiny and pressure as heads of department elsewhere.”
Zibi believes a new Defence Review is needed, with clarity of mandate, and then long-term funding as well as a focus on personnel renewal, as “our infantry ranks are too old for their rank and battlefield roles.” In addition, the SANDF needs to update and refurbish existing systems while planning for new acquisitions in the medium term, and establish a cyber warfare capability.
Getting the SANDF back on the right track also includes looking at foreign missions. “We must review our national expectation of the defence force as a diplomatic instrument and reduce commitments if we cannot meet them. That also means we need to reassess our diplomatic priorities,” Zibi said.
One commitment that needs to be re-examined is South Africa’s contribution to the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC).
“Since we do not have adequate resources for our armed forces on this mission, we must bring them home or we are going to get our people hurt,” Zibi maintains. “I also do not think we ever had a plan for when and how we must pull out of this mission. It has become a permanent mission, which was never supposed to be the case.” He believes more South African soldiers will continue to die in the Democratic Republic of Congo until the mission is adequately resourced.
As for the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), the mission was “necessary but again we have no resources. Perhaps a different strategy more aligned to the resources allocated is necessary.”
Although the SANDF’s leadership cannot really refuse a policy instruction within the constitution and therefore cannot refuse additional commitments, “they can, however, speak up a bit more when the opportunity arises – such as when they appear in parliament,” Zibi said.
As a lack of funding is a major issue, one solution is to shrink the SANDF to a border guard in line with its current funding, but Zibi believes this is a risky option. “We need a proper defence force” and “a bigger budget just to survive at this point,” he maintains.
Zibi has pledged to work closely with other members of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) to ensure that “the little resources the armed forces get, are put to good and efficient use. The oversight and working together are urgent because in the armed forces, failure at any level can cost lives.”
Zibi went on to say the underfunding of the SANDF betrays the mandate given to the SANDF. “We need to be bold and increase funding drastically, and do that on the back of a strategic review. I am just not comfortable with the long process of white and green papers. This should be accelerated because I do not think we have the luxury of time. If we do not drastically increase funding, then let us narrow the mandate similarly and live with the consequences. But I do not think we can afford to live with those consequences.”
As for the defence industry, Zibi believes it is extremely important both as a strategic lever for South Africa’s own operational needs as well as technological and industrial advancement. “It is also a potentially lucrative export industry, but that must be supported by a more pragmatic approach to geopolitics.”
“I do not think it is possible to build a world class defence industry when the country’s armed forces aren’t able to secure what gets produced here. A successful military industrial complex needs a proper defence force with a clear mandate,” he concluded. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
01 Nov 24. China-Vietnam: Diplomatic dispute highlights growing maritime tensions in South China Sea. Earlier on 1 November, China’s foreign ministry warned Vietnam not to carry out ‘illegal activities’ in waters under ‘Chinese jurisdiction’. This comes after Vietnam’s foreign ministry on 31 October condemned China’s ‘serious violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty’ and urged Beijing to ‘immediately release the fishermen and fishing vessels that were illegally detained’. Details of how many were detained and when the detentions took place were not mentioned. On 29 September, officers from China’s Maritime Safety Administration reportedly boarded a Vietnamese fishing vessel and hit crew members with metal rods near the disputed Paracel Islands. The islands in the South China Sea are claimed by both China and Vietnam but are administered by China. This latest diplomatic exchange highlights elevated maritime tensions in the South China Sea; both sides have reportedly continued to build up infrastructure on disputed islands. Despite this, we assess that a military escalation remains highly unlikely. China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner and Beijing seeks to maintain working relations to counterbalance US influence in the region. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Nov 24. Russia: Heightened reliance on oil export revenues will exacerbate risks of oil price volatility. On 3 November, OPEC+ countries agreed to delay plans to expand oil output until the end of the year. The move aims to boost oil prices, which have remained weak despite Middle East tensions due to reduced demand from China. This decision benefits Russia, whose reliance on oil exports has deepened since the war in Ukraine began. Western sanctions have reduced Russia’s exports, making oil revenues an even larger share of the state budget and helping to fund escalating war costs. According to Russia’s draft 2025 budget, military spending will reach 30% of the total budget, the highest since the Cold War. We assess that declining oil prices will likely severely impact available liquidity in the National Wealth Fund (NWF); its liquid assets have been critical in covering the budget deficit. Although the government plans to raise taxes to boost revenue, it is likely to remain heavily dependent on oil income, making Russia’s economy vulnerable to oil price fluctuations amid rising war spending. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Nov 24. Congo (DRC): Sustained conflict will likely continue at least until agreement is validated by ministers. On 3 November, the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group attacked Kamandi Gîte (North Kivu province) and surrounding communities, capturing the town earlier in November following clashes with pro-DRC government militia forces (Wazalendo). These developments further enhance M23’s influence over the key N2 highway between the regional capital Goma and the large northern city of Butembo (both North Kivu province). This will limit the authorities’ capacity to reinforce military positions in the north of the province, increasing the risk of further M23 advances while driving displacement and pressure on already strained aid resources. The advancements come amid alleged progress in talks between the DRC and Rwanda in Angola; security and military experts from both states have reportedly agreed upon draft documents for securing a peace agreement. While such an agreement will possibly result in a reduction in conflict, fighting will likely continue over the coming weeks. We assess that this will sustain security risks to local staff and NGOs in North Kivu, including in the proximity of large urban centres. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Nov 24. China-Myanmar: Burmese junta leader will likely seek military, financial support during China visit. Earlier on 4 November, Myanmar’s state media confirmed that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing will travel to China for a week-long visit from 6 November. This will be his first visit to China since the military coup that brought him to power in 2021. He is set to attend a regional summit, meet members of China’s business community (including defence companies) and hold talks with Chinese Premier Li Qiang. Last week, the junta dispatched a business delegation and former military intelligence officials to China. This visit comes amid a worsening security outlook in Myanmar with the junta increasingly ceding territory to ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). In October, a grenade was thrown at the Chinese Consulate-General in Mandalay (Mandalay region). We assess that China will likely continue its military support for the junta despite concerns over the latter’s capabilities. We assess that a collapse of the junta’s rule would plausibly impact China’s investments in Myanmar (including in oil and gas) and increase instability at the border. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Nov 24. Bolivia: Attack on military barracks underscores government stability risks. On 1 November, supporters of former president Evo Morales took over 200 soldiers hostage during an attack on a military barracks near Chapare (Cochabamba department). The authorities stated that the assailants also stole weapons and munitions from the military installation. The attack comes in response to attempts by President Luis Arce to disperse numerous roadblocks erected by Morales’ supporters nationwide. Also on 1 November, Morales began a hunger strike which he will reportedly carry out until Arce engages in a dialogue. Since 13 October, Morales’ supporters have erected roadblocks and clashed with police in protest of an ongoing investigation into Morales over allegations of sexual abuse of a minor. At least 91 police officers have sustained injuries since 13 October. In the coming days and weeks, roadblocks will sustain domestic unrest, supply chain and bystander safety risks. Additionally, we assess that the attack on the military installation and the hunger strike highlight escalating government stability risks in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
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