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18 Jul 24. Russia, China Vying for Influence in Southern Hemisphere With U.S.. Russian warships have been making port visits to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, and 22 nations in the U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility have signed on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the commander of Southcom told attendees of the Aspen Security Forum.
Army Gen. Laura J. Richardson said the nations that have signed on to the Chinese initiative don’t see the investments the U.S. has been making in their countries.
“All they see are the Chinese cranes,” she said. “These projects are in the billions of dollars. … They are big-time projects.”
Richardson said it would be OK with her if those investments were for doing good in the hemisphere. “But it makes me a little suspicious when it’s in the critical infrastructure.”
Critical infrastructure, she said, includes deep-water ports, cybersecurity, energy and space.
“I worry about the dual use nature of that. These are state-owned enterprises by a communist government. I worry about the flipping of that to a military application,” Richardson said, referring to China.
Southcom’s No. 1 teammate working in the various countries in the region are U.S. ambassadors, but some nations are without a U.S. ambassador because many have not been confirmed in a timely manner, leaving, she said.
“We have an absolute connective tissue with all of our U.S. ambassadors in the region.”
Besides U.S. ambassadors, others that Southcom partners with to increase U.S. influence in the region include the Commerce Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, NASA, the Inter-American Development Bank, the American Chambers of Commerce, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and human rights and nongovernmental organizations, the general said.
“I really believe that economic security and national security go hand in hand here in this hemisphere, and we have got to work both of them together very, very quickly,” she said.
Regarding the Russian port visits, Richardson said U.S. vessels have been shadowing those vessels to ensure the safety and security of the United States.
Also, the Russians continue to make high-level government visits to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua with their foreign affairs minister and the head of the Russian legislative body, she said, adding that the U.S. could be doing more in its own government exchanges. (Source: U.S. DoD)
18 Jul 24. DOD Developing Regional Sustainment Framework in Indo-Pacific. In coordination with Indo-Pacific allies, the U.S. military is launching a regional sustainment framework to begin development of a global network of regionally aligned maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities, DOD officials said yesterday.
Christopher J. Lowman, the assistant secretary of defense for sustainment, and Lisa P. Smith, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for product support, announced the framework during a Pentagon briefing.
The guiding principle is to place sustainment capabilities close to where they are needed, Lowman said. This is all about repairing damaged or non-mission capable equipment back into service. The idea is focused on enhancing the military capabilities of the joint force and also “enhancing the capabilities of regional partners and strengthening those regional partnerships through the regional sustainment framework,” Lowman said.
DOD is working with five different Indo-Pacific nations on fielding these regional sustainment centers. The regional partners must have the overall capability to repair U.S. joint force equipment, and that of similarly equipped allied and partner armed forces, he said.
These sustainment centers would be close to the need. In the Indo-Pacific this would eliminate the need to ship equipment from the Philippines, for example, to the United States for repair or refurbishment.
All this would strengthen U.S. relationships with regional allies, Lowman said. It would also increase readiness of deployed American forces. A further effect is to enhance military readiness through collaboration with the U.S. industrial base. “Ultimately this will deter aggression,” the assistant secretary said. “We do believe, by implementing multiple options for a theater commander to use in terms of redirecting unserviceable flows to repair capabilities creates higher level of uncertainty within adversaries’ planning cycles and thereby enhancing deterrence and the deterrence value.”
Indo-Pacom is the focus this year. U.S. European Command will be the focus in 2025 and U.S. Southern Command in 2026. U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command will follow, he said.
Smith said the framework is needed in response “to changing global threats to augment the traditional model of sustainment.”
The framework supports U.S. National Defense Strategy priorities and objectives “by strategically engaging with our allies and partners to bring critical weapons system maintenance, repair and overhaul capability and capacity closer to the forward deployed point of need.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
18 Jul 24. India updates defence procurement rules. India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has launched updated defence procurement rules, aimed at providing further support for localised private-sector research, development, and manufacturing.
The updated Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP 2020) was issued by the MoD in mid-July. The MoD made no formal announcement about the update, but the new rules introduce several new mechanisms and requirements for companies bidding to supply defence equipment to the Indian military.
The updated rules provide additional support for spiral development programmes, introduce additional guidelines for offset-related technology transfers and the procurement of raw materials, outline new methodologies to evaluate intellectual property (IP), and institute a host of other measures to support new and small defence businesses.
The concept of a ‘spiral development model’ was introduced by the DAP 2020 on the policy’s launch in late September 2020.
The newly updated version of the policy provides greater detail about this model, which is to be operated and financially supported by India’s Innovation in Defence Excellence (iDEX) and Technology Development Fund (TDF), MoD schemes to support private-sector research and development.
This new model outlines three stages of spiral development for procurements valued at less than INR2.5 billion (USD29.9 m), with varying levels of compliance with user requirements. The model is intended to enable suppliers to secure what the MoD terms as “minimum pilot order quantities”, based on end-user requirements, for field evaluations.
The new ‘guidelines for the acquisition of technology’ apply to offset-related technology transfers from foreign suppliers to state-owned defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). (Source: Janes)
17 Jul 24. ISIS Reconstituting as Attacks Surge in Syria and Iraq, 6 Dead in Oman in Latest Attack. The 9th IAD is partnered with U.S. Army 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division. The 2nd BCT, 82nd Abn. Div. is deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, to enable their Iraqi security forces partners through the advise and assist mission, contributing planning, intelligence collection and analysis, force protection, and precision fires to achieve the military defeat of ISIS.
The United States military has reported a resurgence of ISIS activity in Syria and Iraq, with the number of attacks by the group on track to double from the previous year. According to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), ISIS has already claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in the first six months of 2024. This resurgence is seen as an attempt by the group to reconstitute its forces following several years of diminished capability.
CENTCOM noted that between January and June 2024, joint operations with Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) resulted in 196 missions, leading to the deaths of 44 ISIS operatives and the arrest of 166 more. This increased activity follows a year where ISIS was behind 121 attacks in the region, indicating a significant escalation in their operations.
In a related incident, ISIS claimed responsibility for a deadly attack in Oman. Gunmen attacked a Shiite mosque in Muscat, killing six people and injuring nearly 30 others. This marks the first time ISIS has claimed responsibility for an attack in Oman, a country known for its stability and sectarian harmony. The attackers were eventually killed by Omani security forces after a protracted gunfight. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
18 Jul 24. Taiwan says committed to strengthening defence after Trump comments. Flags of Taiwan and U.S. are placed for a meeting between U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce speaks and with Su Chia-chyuan, President of the Legislative Yuan in Taipei, Taiwan.
Taiwan is committed to boosting its defences and working with the United States, the foreign ministry said on Thursday, days after Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump was quoted as saying Taiwan should pay to be defended.
The United States is Chinese-claimed Taiwan’s most important international backer and arms supplier, despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, and Washington is bound by law to provide the means for the island’s defence.
Taiwan’s government has made defence modernisation a priority, including developing its own submarines, and has said many times the island’s security rests in its own hands. The budgeted defence spending for this year amounts to 2.5% of its gross domestic product, a historic high.
Speaking to reporters in Taipei, Kuoyu Chiao, deputy head of the North America department at Taiwan’s foreign ministry, said Taiwan and the United States share the universal values of democracy, freedom, and human rights, and have a mutually beneficial economic relationship.
“Therefore, Taiwan has long enjoyed cross-party and cross-government support in the United States,” he said, declining to comment directly on Trump’s remarks.
“In the future, we will continue to work together with the United States and like-minded countries to strengthen our national defence capabilities and jointly maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” Chiao added.
A top national security adviser to Trump said on Wednesday that Taiwan needs to boost its defence spending significantly in the face of potential Chinese aggression.
Late Wednesday, Taiwan’s ruling party said Trump’s comments regarding the island were nothing more than a hope that Taiwan would show the same determination to protect its own security as Japan, South Korea and the European Union.
“China is the biggest threat to the United States; this is the consensus of the Democratic and Republican parties,” Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party Secretary-General Lin Yu-chang said in a statement. “Now is the best era of Taiwan-U.S. relations.”
Unlike Japan and South Korea, Taiwan and the United States have no formal defence agreement, a previous treaty being terminated in 1979 when Washington switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing.
Taiwan has a backlog worth some $19 bn of arms deliveries from the United States, which U.S. officials and politicians have repeatedly pledged to speed up.
Beijing has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control. President Lai Ching-te, who says only the Taiwanese people can decide their future, has repeatedly offered talks but been rebuffed.
U.S. President Joe Biden has upset the Chinese government with comments that appeared to suggest that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if it were attacked, a deviation from a long-held U.S. position of “strategic ambiguity”. (Source: Reuters)
17 Jul 24. Pakistan: Security risks remain high in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province following two militant attacks. On 15 July, suicide bombers rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into the perimeter wall of an army cantonment in Bannu (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) after security forces foiled their attempt to infiltrate the building. The blast killed at least eight soldiers. In a press release on 16 July, the military stated it carried out a retaliatory operation and killed all ten assailants involved in the assault. Hafiz Gul Bahadur, an Afghanistan-based faction of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack. Separately, on 16 July, gunmen killed five civilians at a health facility in Dera Ismail Khan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). No group has yet claimed responsibility for this attack. The attacks came after the government launched the counter-insurgency Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in June. We assess that the operation is unlikely to prevent Afghanistan-based groups from mounting attacks across the porous border with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Elevated security and bystander risks will highly likely persist in western Pakistan in the medium term as militant groups remain intent on and capable of mounting attacks there. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 24. Iran-US: Opening of diplomatic channel is unlikely to prompt new nuclear deal, raising tensions. On 16 July, Iran’s acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani announced that Iran was open to resuming negotiations on mutual participation in a nuclear deal after the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. This comes after Bagheri’s announcement on 11 July that indirect talks are already ongoing between Iran and the US via Oman. In the short term, it is highly unlikely that the US will engage in direct negotiations with Iran over its nuclear capabilities, especially given Iran’s role in funding Hamas and Lebanese Hizballah in ongoing conflicts with Israel. Additionally, with former president Donald Trump currently favourite to win the US presidential election, prospects for negotiations are likely to decrease further. Consequently, Iran will likely continue developing its nuclear programme, worsening relations with the West, elevating the risk of further sanctions on businesses and individuals operating in Iran, and leading to further diplomatic isolation impacting domestic economic development. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 24. US-Iran: Risk of Iran-backed attack remains low despite intelligence reports. According to reports on 16 July, US intelligence agencies had been previously tracking a potential Iranian assassination plot against former president Donald Trump before the assassination attempt on 13 July. Reports allege that Thomas Matthew Crooks (the identified shooter) had no connection to the Iranian plot. Iranian officials claim these allegations of a plot to assassinate Trump are ‘unsubstantiated and malicious’. For years, the US intelligence community has expressed concerns about a retaliatory attack targeting Trump in response to his order in January 2020 to kill Iranian military commander Qasem Soleimani. Reports indicate that the threat of such retaliatory attacks against Trump and his officials has increased in recent months. We assess, however, that in the short-to-medium term, the threat of an Iran-backed assassination plot against Trump remains low. That said, US-Iran regional tensions will likely increase substantially if Trump is elected in November. In this case, Iranian proxies would possibly intensify efforts to attack US military bases and assets in the Middle East, threatening US trade interests. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jul 24. Myanmar: Attempted strike on capital airport highlights pressure on junta, attack risks. On 17 July, international media reported that militants fired one or two rockets at Naypyidaw International Airport (NYT) on the morning of 16 July. Security sources reported that the attack caused no injuries or significant damage. This followed local news reports featuring claims from the Mountain Knights Civilian Defense Force (MKCDF) – a People’s Defence Force (PDF) linked to the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) – stating a rocket attack on 16 July on the Air Force base within the airport killed 16 and destroyed three planes. Local news outlets sympathetic to resistance groups do not always verify potentially exaggerated claims. In April, PDFs claimed to have carried out a drone attack on the airport (used by commercial and military aircraft) and the military headquarters in the capital Naypyidaw. The junta claims it shot down the attack drones. We assess that while armed resistance groups likely do not possess the capacity to launch sustained operations against Nyapyidaw and its significant fortifications, it will still be at risk of occasional attacks as resistance groups look to stretch the junta’s forces and sustain pressure. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jul 24. Iraq: Attack on US airbase underscores risks of elevated security postures, resumed hostilities. On 17 July, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) faction Harakat Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya (HAAA) announced that it had resumed attacks on US forces in Iraq after launching the 16 July drone attack on the US-Coalition Ain Al-Asad Airbase (al-Anbar governorate). The attack comes after the US designated HAAA a terrorist organisation on 18 June and follows months of relative calm due to the IRI’s de facto truce with US military assets since early February. Given HAAA’s statement, we assess that further IRI attacks on US assets are likely. This will elevate the collateral risks to staff and assets in the vicinity of US military facilities. The US will likely respond to further attacks through targeted airstrikes, increasing the possibility of a resumption of tit-for-tat engagement between the US and IRI, delaying US withdrawal from Iraq and sustaining the risks of country-wide escalation. An increased Iraqi security posture is highly likely around military assets, elevating the likelihood of arbitrary stop-and-search operations and temporary detentions, impacting staff. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 24. DA wants a new defence review and for SANDF to withdraw from DRC. In light of the severe underfunding of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and its consequent impact on equipment and capabilities, and the changing nature of warfare, the Democratic Alliance has called for a new defence review, and for the withdrawal of soldiers from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Chris Hattingh, Democratic Alliance representative for Defence & Military Veterans, made these remarks during the defence budget vote debate in Parliament on Monday 15 July. He started off by reminding Parliamentary representatives that the defence budget has once again decreased, from R52.5 bn to R51.8 bn, continuing a downward trend that has seen a 1.3% year on year decrease, or 5.69% decrease in real terms considering inflation.
“Over time the departmental budget has declined to such an extent that the estimated shortfall has now reached R50bn per annum. The diminishing budget does not enable the defence force to comply with its constitutional mandate to be a disciplined military force that defends and protects the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people.”
He pointed out that in July 2023 the Department of Defence informed National Treasury that there is insufficient funding for the compensation of employees, that critical posts are being left vacant, and that the Department of Defence is unable to execute its core mandate amidst increasing operational requirements. There is also limited funding for the Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan (SCAMP), that the deterioration of SANDF facilities, infrastructure and capabilities continues, that the Department of Defence is unable to modernise and secure legacy defence ICT systems, and is unable to maintain critical stock levels – including fuel, ammunition, medical supplies as well as pharmaceuticals.
“The national treasury reported in June that the Department of Defence was responsible for 78% of all government departments’ late payments of suppliers over 30 days, amounting to R1.407bn. These late payments have severe consequences for suppliers, some struggling to survive, and others having their credit ratings downgraded,” Hattingh stated.
He reminded Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga that the 1998 Defence Review set the defence personnel budget at 40% of the total budget with 30% for operating costs and 30% for capital costs (a 40:30:30 ratio). However, by 2011 personnel spending climbed to 55% and it has now escalated to 66%, “which is unsustainable.”
He warned that the lack of adequate funding resulted in a lack of proper maintenance and regular upgrading and replacement of obsolete equipment, “and this has seriously impacted on the SANDF’s ability to fulfil its mandate.”
New defence review needed
“Armscor has identified a bloated South African military and the resistance to strategic modernisation as one of its key risk factors. The Department’s response to address these issues by a re-evaluation of the Defence Review 2015 will prove to be totally inadequate and a critical waste of money and time. To re-evaluate the Defence Review 2015, the basis for what resulted in the SANDF is today, is unthinkable. You can’t use the framework that collapsed the system to repair the system,” Hattingh said.
“We have lost our air and maritime capabilities, and the DRC, where our forces are now being confronted with new technology, is evident that the Defence Review 2015, conceived and born in the heyday of state capture, is not only outdated but totally inadequate,” Hattingh said, emphasising that the world has moved on and conventional warfare will never be the same, with electronic warfare, drone warfare and new technology reshaping the battlefield. This new face of warfare has also reached the SANDF, where soldiers in the DRC are exposed to precision guided mortars, amongst others.
“What is required now is a new and fresh defence review to guide the SANDF to be a lean, potent and agile SANDF that South Africa needs.”
External deployments
With regard to international military deployments, Hattingh noted that the Department of Defence faces a mandate to deploy 2 900 SANDF members into the DRC with the Southern African Development Community mission (SAMIDRC) at an approximate cost of R2.4bn, while the SADC mission in Mozambique is costing R850m this financial year.
However, “only R2.6bn has been allocated over the MTEF [three-year Medium Term Expenditure Framework] period for peace support operations. However, last week, Treasury’s allocation of R2.1 bn for operation Thiba [in the DRC] and R750m for Operation Vikela in Mozambique – collectively R400m less than the projected cost – will certainly ease the financial pressure on the SANDF. However, the escalation of the DRC conflict will certainly demand more funding,” Hattingh prophesised.
“Now let me address the elephant in the room,” he told Parliament. “The SANDF deployment in the DRC is certainly not an SADC peacekeeping mission. Neighbouring countries like Angola and Zambia, part of SADC, do not participate in this SADC mission although they share long borders with the DRC. The conflict between the DRC and various rebel groups including M23 has escalated into an undeclared war involving the FARDC – that’s the army of the DRC – the Wazalendo coalition of rebel groups, the FDLR, the Burundi National Defence Force, and SADC force on the one side, where we have rebel groups joining South Africa and other groups against the M23 rebel group’s coalition and the Rwanda Defence Force. This is not peacekeeping.
“Recently, the conflict has seen the deployment of precision guided mortars and GPS jamming, limiting flights between Goma, Beni and Butembo, further restricting support for members in the DRC. The cold reality of the south African DRC deployment is that our soldiers lack the required levels of logistical, tactical and medical support; lack adequate training for high tech warfare, and lack discipline.
“There is inadequate funding, no threat to south Africa from the regional conflict in the eastern DRC. Therefore, Honourable House Chair and Minister, our soldiers should come home immediately. And perhaps, Honourable Minister, the Honourable Minister should tell the President in words that he understands, ‘Honourable President, whether you like it or not, our soldiers must come home,” Hattingh concluded. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
17 Jul 24. Rise Mzansi rejects meagre defence budget. Rise Mzansi is yet another of South Africa’s political parties that has condemned and rejected the latest defence budget as wholly inadequate and a risk to those in uniform.
Rise Mzansi National Leader, Songezo Zibi, speaking during the debate on the defence and military veterans budget in Parliament on 15 July, said that he rejected the R51 bn allocation as “wholly inadequate for the mandate the armed forces are expected to fulfil… You do not need to be a military expert to see that the SANDF’s facilities and vehicles have fallen into disrepair.”
Zibi said the problem with underfunding the armed forces is that it is always a deadly decision. “People will die from all of this, and I believe they already do.”
This year alone, nine South African National Defence Force (SANDF) members have died while on Southern African Development Community and United Nations peace missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, including five in combat against M23 rebels, with the majority succumbing to mortar attacks.
Zibi went on to state that “our armed forces have a significant mandate that involves border protection, regional support for the SAPS [South African Police Service], peacekeeping and so on. Just in the period between 2012 and now, we have in real terms cut the defence budget by over 50%. We spend 0.7% of GDP on defence, far from the global average of 2.2% of GDP. And it shows. There is no universe where you take the knife to the lifeblood of the defence forces and you retain its competence and strength.
“At 40-years-old, the average age of infantry level personnel is too high. The men and women who are expected to fight the actual on the ground battles are too old. These soldiers should not, on average, be older than 25.
“In 2020 your predecessor gave the average ages for the different rank groups as rifleman (34), lance corporal (44), corporal (46), sergeant (48), staff sergeant (51), warrant officer – class one (53), warrant officer – class two (55), second lieutenant (33), lieutenant (36), captain (41), major (46) and lieutenant colonel (50).
“We are putting ourselves at a distinct disadvantage if we continue down this path. Perhaps it is the stain of the Arms Deal. Perhaps it is our history that makes us so reluctant to want a well-equipped, professional army we can be proud of. But we must decide whether we want defence force or not. We cannot be half-committed to this, pretending that we have a defence force that can defend the country when we do not.
“I want to suggest to this House that if we to reduce the spending on the armed forces, then let us do so consciously by reducing its mandate too. Doing the opposite amounts to criminal negligence,” Zibi told parliament.
“The people that work in the armed forces are workers with rights. They are entitled to the best safety mechanisms and conditions we can afford. When we give them a stretched mandate without resources, we are deliberately putting their lives in danger, and that is
unconscionable,” he continued.
“South Africa has many needs including people who cannot put food on the table. But we must make some decisions – and one of these is to decide whether or not we want a defence force. If we do, let us fund it properly, or we reduce its mandate, or we just shut it down.
“But I know this: we will one day regret the decision to defund the armed forces to the extent we have. We will need an army one day and realise we have none left – and there will be no quick fixes,” Zibi concluded. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
17 Jul 24. MK Party refuses to support defence budget allocation. Underfunding of the South African Department of Defence (DoD) has turned the defence force into a ‘drill squad with no capacity’ and an extended budget is needed to rebuild the military, the uMkhonto weSize (MK) party maintains.
The party’s Muzi Ntshingila, speaking during freshly appointed defence minister Angie Motshekga’s maiden budget vote in Parliament on 15 July, said that a chronic shortfall of funding has reduced the DoD to “a drill squad with no capacity to ensure human security, to facilitate peace, development, and human rights” and appealed for “an extended budget for maintenance and replacement of the DoD’s ageing fleet, to modernise its defence, maritime and air force fleets and equipment, and also to fund research and development”.
He said the reduction of the defence budget to less than 2% of GDP as is common in most countries was “unpatriotic and counterrevolutionary,” and a misalignment between realistic requirements and the budget has led to inefficiencies. “There’s an urgent need for more realistic budget planning to ensure effective utilisations of allocated funds,” Ntshingila added.
Speaking of the R51bn budget allocation for defence, Ntshingila stated that, “Umkhonto we Wizwe party does not support this vote.”
He reminded members that the budget vote “implicates the work of four ministries: the Home Affairs portfolio which is responsible for border management and immigration; the Police Ministry which is tasked with crime intelligence function, and the intelligence portfolio in the Presidency. “It is disturbing to observe the disintegration of the defence budget by the departments of Intelligence, Police, and Home Affairs instead of developing one budget for national security,” he said.
“The budget and the work of this Department is compromised by its shared mandate with the aforesaid ministries. Thus, it has progressively failed to fight security breaches such as the illegal invasion of South African borders by illegal immigrants, zama zamas and criminals. The SANDF border capacity is in shambles and many foreign nationals enter our ports of entry with little difficulty. This has led to social dislocation in our country.
“We are appealing for an extended budget for maintenance and replacement of the DoD’s ageing fleet, to modernise its defence, maritime and air force fleets and equipment, and also to fund research and development for advanced military health services.”
Ntshingila was clear that peace and national security is central to development, with the South African National Defence Force playing an important role in South Africa’s democracy. “This does mean that we must pay lip service to the Department’s gradual decline as demonstrated by the demise of Denel. It is also very concerning that the current soldier life concept is outdated. We need a rejuvenated strategy that allows for a younger more deployable force coupled with an exit mechanism for ageing personnel.”
He highlighted the non-availability of funds for aircraft and naval vessel maintenance as an area of critical concern. “Increasing funding to modernise the DoD fleet, artillery, and vessels are necessary to maintain our combat readiness. The reduced targets for flying and sea hours reflect operational limitations due to inadequate maintenance and funding, impacting the readiness and effectiveness of our forces.
“Despite the allocations for border safeguarding technology, funds have been misallocated and underutilised, compromising border security. The delayed evaluation of the 2015 Defence Review has stalled critical reforms needed for modernisation of our defence strategy.”
Ntshingila touched on the plight of former armed liberation fighters as an indication the Department of Military Veterans “has reached rock bottom” due to numerous issues such as notable vacancies, fraud allegations, unspent funds, and problems with the military veterans’ database. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
16 Jul 24. Brown Meets With Key Leaders in Philippines. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., today discussed ongoing efforts to further strengthen the longtime U.S.-Philippine alliance as he met with key leaders in Manila, Philippines.
Brown took part in a series of engagements with Philippine National Security Advisor Eduardo M. Ano, Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Jr., and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. during his first visit to the Philippines as chairman.
The leaders discussed bilateral security assistance and the importance of maritime domain awareness. They also shared their assessment of the regional security environment and the importance of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, according to a summary of the meetings.
“The U.S.-Philippines Alliance has upheld peace and security in the Indo-Pacific for more than 70 years with a shared vision of transparency, the rule of law, respect for sovereignty, and the peaceful resolution of disputes,” the summary reads.
Brown also visited a U.S. rotational access site designated as part of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The sites are designed to strengthen combined training, exercises and interoperability between the two countries.
In a reflection of both countries’ commitment to deepening ties, the U.S. and the Philippines added four new rotational sites in 2023 as part of an expansion of the EDCA, which was first signed in 2014. That brings the total to nine sites under the agreement. Brown, who first visited the Philippines in 1987 as a junior officer, said he has watched the partnership grow over the past nearly 40 years and further accelerate in more recent years.
“I do see that the relationship is gaining momentum,” Brown said yesterday ahead of the visit. He added that Philippine relationships with other regional allies are also growing.
“I think it’s a positive trajectory,” he said.
Brown’s visit to the Philippines was the first stop on a multiday visit to the Indo-Pacific where he will build upon U.S. investments in partnerships throughout the region.
It is his second visit to the Indo-Pacific region since taking office.
Robust partnerships with key regional allies remain central to the United States’ approach to advancing the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific amid increased competition with China, the United States’ pacing challenge, and threats posed by North Korea.
These partnerships are accelerating throughout the region. The U.S. has made significant strides in deepening U.S.-South Korean security cooperation and extended deterrence. It is outlined under the April 2023 Washington Declaration, which marks the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-South Korean alliance and recommits to developing an ever-stronger mutual defense relationship.
The U.S. has also led efforts to deepen trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea grounded in a commitment to advance a shared vision of peace and prosperity, as outlined during the August 2023 summit among President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol at Camp David.
NATO has also expanded its partnership with key allies in the Indo-Pacific. The transatlantic alliance hosted high-level meetings with key partners in the region, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea at this year’s NATO summit in Washington.
Later this week, the chairman will travel to Japan to meet with senior government officials and military leaders for discussions on regional deterrence and security cooperation. Brown will also meet with U.S. service members stationed at Yokota Air Base. (Source: U.S. DoD)
16 Jul 24. Putrajaya lays out naval spending plans for 13th Malaysia Plan. Malaysia’s Deputy Defence Minister Adly Zahari has given further details on what the country would procure in its 13th plan, which covers the period spanning 2026–30.
Details on these naval procurements were provided during a parliamentary session on 11 July, the official Hansard for which was released on 15 July.
Putrajaya outlines funding for its major national programmes in five-year periods known as ‘Malaysia Plans’.
Adly had previously disclosed in a November 2023 parliamentary address that the 13th Malaysia Plan would see the country acquiring a new hydrographic vessel and three so-called multirole support ships (MRSSs), which are essentially landing platform dock (LPD)-like vessels.
In the session on 11 July, Adly further disclosed that the government would also now allocate funding for a third batch of Littoral Mission Ship (LMS) vessels, four anti-submarine warfare (ASW)-capable helicopters, and six unmanned aerial vehicles.
In June 2024 Malaysia signed for three Ada (MILGEM)-class-derived corvettes with Turkish shipbuilder STM to fulfil requirements under Putrajaya’s LMS Batch 2 programme.
Under this contract, STM will build all three 99.5 m corvettes in Türkiye, with all three vessels scheduled for delivery to the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) within 3.5 years from its signing.
Adly made no mention on whether the Batch 3 ships would be procured from the same shipbuilder but indicated that it will also comprise three vessels, similar to what was procured in Batch 2. Malaysia’s first batch of LMS vessels were procured from China and four hulls were acquired in this tranche. (Source: Janes)
16 Jul 24. Brazil: Major security operation in Rio de Janeiro will increase attack, bystander safety risks. On 15 July, the security forces launched a major operation in ten ‘favelas’ (low-income) in the west of Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro state). The ongoing operation has involved at least 2,000 security personnel from the military and civilian police forces. It aims to stop ongoing violence between drug trafficking gangs and militias. The security forces have detained at least 20 people, though opposing factions have yet to clash openly. The impacted neighbourhoods include Cidade de Deus, Gardenia Azul and Rio das Pedras. Reports indicate that around 18% of Rio de Janeiro is under the control of armed groups; the Comando Vermelho gang controls 52% of this area, while armed militias control 39%. The operation will likely significantly elevate bystander safety risks for the duration, especially since civilian casualties are common during security force operations in Brazil. Furthermore, if gang leaders or police personnel are killed in the operation, the risk of violent attacks will highly likely escalate as criminals and police carry out revenge killings. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jul 24. Congo (DRC): Clashes will heighten risks to NGO staff, elevate risks of truce breakdown. On 15 July, fighting between the M23 rebel group and armed groups allied with the Kinshasa-Congolese armed forces broke out in the town of Bweremana (North Kivu province), around 9.3 miles (15km) from the provincial capital Goma. Fighting began on 12 July in the villages of Mpati and Nyange (also North Kivu province), around 43 miles (70km) northwest of Goma. The fighting comes amid a humanitarian truce ongoing since 5 July which is set to expire on 19 July (see Situation Update Brief – 15 July 2024). Clashes and mortar shelling, which have so far killed four civilians, will sustain a heightened risk environment for humanitarian workers engaged in aid distribution. Moreover, the clashes raise the risk of a broader breakdown in the truce, driving wider violence across North Kivu. This will elevate the exposure of NGO staff and returning displaced persons to conflict and collateral risks at very short notice, possibly impeding access to overland routes, disrupting aid delivery and the evacuation of NGO staff. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jul 24. Oman: Augmented security posture in capital is highly likely after shooting near Shia mosque. On 15 July, an unidentified number of gunmen, possibly a sole perpetrator, shot and killed at least four people and injured several others, including Pakistani expats, near the Imam Ali Shia mosque in the capital Muscat. Investigations are ongoing and the Omani authorities have not yet released details of the incident. Small-arms attacks are highly unusual within Oman. The symbolic nature of the attack, targeting a Shia mosque on the eve of Ashura day (16 July), indicates there is a realistic possibility that the preparator is a member or an affiliate of a Sunni jihadist group. However, the incident is highly unlikely to prompt a broader escalation of sectarian tensions in Oman. We also assess that the Omani authorities will likely conduct major search and stop operations this week in the Al-Wadi Al-Kabir area in the capital and significantly augment its posture near Shia mosques and Western embassies. The authorities will also likely set up new checkpoints along major roads inside the capital, moderately elevating travel delays this week. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Jul 24. Japan reemerges as an Asia-Pacific military power.
By 2027 Japan plans to take “primary responsibility” for national defence against overseas invasions and is seeking to expand its stand-off strike capabilities.
After decades of externally imposed and subsequently internally adopted peaceful isolationism, Japan is waking up to a series of new challenges in the western Asia-Pacific , a region that China is seeking to claim for its own in an emergent multi-polar global order.
Detailing key defence priorities in its new Defence White Paper, published on 12 July 2024, Japan includes the nuclear threat posed by North Korea and ongoing concerns around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and, in a region-specific matter, its occupation of the Kuril Islands chain in the northwestern Pacific.
The new defence paper reaffirmed Tokyo’s commitment to defence spending, stating that Japan would take “necessary measures” to ensure the budget for “fundamental reinforcement of defence capabilities and complementary initiatives” reaches 2% of FY2022 GDP levels by FY2027. At this level, funding was calculated to be approximately Y11trn ($69.6bn) by 2027.
GlobalData forecasts from 2023 indicate that Japan’s total defence expenditure was anticipated to value $85.9bn in 2028, owing to the need to “adequately finance its own national defence capabilities”.
In addition, Japan scrapped its long-standing 1% GDP ceiling for annual defence spending and has publicly stated its desire to hit the 2% benchmark over the next decade. Current estimates put Japan’s defence spending at around 1.6% of GDP.
Between 2024-2028, Japan’s defence spending was forecast to increase from $70.3bn to $85.9bn over the period, as it embarks on a wide-ranging recapitalisation of its military, including the development and addition of new naval platforms and stand-off attack munitions, according to GlobalData analysis.
Detailing the potential threats posed by China and Russia, the White Paper revealed that in FY2023, Japan’s Air Self-Defence Force fighters were forced to scramble 669 times to intercept encroaching aircraft, the vast majority of them conducted by China (479 instances) and Russia (174 instances).
Japan’s defence build-up programme
Initiated in 2022, Japan’s Defence Build-up Programme (DBP) is a multi-year process intended to provide the country with the required capabilities determined necessary to defend its own interests, in areas such as space, cyber, electromagnetic domains, and greater integration of military services.
Included in this was the target that by 2027 Japan would be able to take “primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation”, as well as the ability to “disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining support of its ally and others”.
This commitment to independent self-defence capability was reiterated in the 2024 White Paper, which points to a shifting Japanese relationship with the US, still declared a cornerstone of its defence policy, but now increasingly spoken of in terms of military partners rather than acting as a client state to host the immense US military forces deployed in Japan.
“While the presence of the US Forces in Japan (USFJ) functions as a deterrence, it is necessary to make efforts that are appropriate for the actual situation of each area to mitigate the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of local residents,” the White Paper stated.
“The realignment of the USFJ is a crucial initiative to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, while further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-US Alliance.”
The US maintains more than 50,000 military personnel in Japan, where it has had a military presence since the end of WWII, with Japan hosting large air force and naval bases, such as Yokosuka, which is home to the US Navy’s 7th Fleet.
Other elements including the ability to utilise stand-off weapons, originally set at being introduced in the 2030s, have been brought forward, as threats continue to proliferate.
The White Paper stated that total expenditure needed to achieve the level of defence buildup sought by the DBP for five years from FY2023 to FY2027 amounts to approximately ¥43trn.
Tokyo speeds up Tomahawk acquisition
Among Japan’s military acquisition efforts is a focus on stand-off strike capabilities, such as its Tomahawk cruise missile programme.
The Defence White Paper restated the intention to speed up its acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missile as well as the deployment of the upgraded ground-launched Type-12 anti-ship missile, bringing forward the timelines for both programmes from FY2026 to FY2025.
In a programmatic outline of future platforms and capabilities, the defence paper stated that Japan “will fundamentally reinforce its stand-off defence capabilities to respond from outside the threat zone, including anti-aircraft missiles, against naval vessels and landing forces that invade Japan, including its remote islands”.
Included in this was the “deployment on Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surfaced-launched variants)” as well as the “acquisition of US-made Tomahawks”, which was to be accelerated by one year, starting in FY2025, to “promptly secure sufficient capabilities”.
Aegis System Equipped Vessels
Elsewhere, and in a bid to “strengthen the integrated air and missile defence capabilities”, Japan’s Ministry of Defence will start construction of the Aegis System Equipped Vessels, an anticipated class of two large surface warships able to conduct ballistic and potentially hypersonic missile defence operations.
In the White Paper’s forward, Japan Minister for Defence Kihara Minoru stated that the start of construction of the Aegis System Equipped Vessels would be “expedited” in order to enable Japan to “defence [itself] from increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile and other threats”.
Potentially linked to this is a joint Japan-US programme to develop a “Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) guided missile to counter Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs)”, the White Paper stated, as well as the ongoing procurement of SM-3 Block IIA, SM-6, PAC-3MSE missiles.
GlobalData’s Global Missiles & Missile Defense Systems Market Forecast 2023-2033 report reveals that Japan is expected to spend approximately $8.9bn to procure various types of missiles, including the procurement of interceptor-category missiles such as the AIM-120C-7, RIM-161D SM-3 Block-2, RIM-66 Standard, RIM-116 RAM Block 2, and RIM-174 Standard ERAM, all of which will be procured from the US.
As part of this effort, Japan has earmarked $1bn for the development of the GPI munition.
Japan to promote uncrewed systems, improve military logistics
Additional capabilities that Japan is seeking to integrate into its forces structure include uncrewed assest that are able to operate for extended periods, including the development of uncrewed amphibious vehicles that can “land on any shore of islands and perform tasks such as transporting supplies from the sea to the vicinity of troops”.
Further, Japan will establish a new formation to improve deployment capabilities in its southwest region, under the tentatively named Self-Defense Forces Maritime Transport Group, as a joint force, along with the acquisition of “manoeuvre support vessels and transport helicopters”.
(Source: army-technology.com)
15 Jul 24. Somalia: Attack points to elevated risks facing civilian installations frequented by government staff. On 14 July, al-Shabaab militants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the Bondhere district of the capital Mogadishu, killing at least five people. The attack targeted a cafe near the presidential palace during a showing of the EURO 2024 final. The attack comes after numerous al-Shabaab militants unsuccessfully attempted to break out of Mogadishu Central Prison on 13 July, which resulted in at least eight casualties. These incidents highlight al-Shabaab’s ongoing efforts to augment its presence in Mogadishu and to disrupt counter-insurgency operations. In the coming weeks, al-Shabaab militants will almost certainly continue to try to carry out attacks in Mogadishu and other major cities, targeting both military and civilian installations. Hotels and restaurants frequented by government personnel will face particularly elevated targeting risks, sustaining the significant threat to staff and assets (including in the Bondhere area). We assess there is a realistic possibility that militants will target gatherings associated with major sporting events, further driving threats to staff around the upcoming Paris 2024 Olympic Games. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Jul 24. Myanmar: Temporary ceasefire in northern Shan state highlights China’s influence. On 14 July, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), two ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) based in northern Shan state, announced a four-day ceasefire until 18 July regarding their operation to take control of Lashio (Shan). The accompanying statements highlight that this decision was taken in co-operation with China so as not to overlap with the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Conflict in northern Shan has intensified since a Chinese-mediated ceasefire broke down in late June. The junta is struggling to withstand the EAOs’ attempts to take its north-eastern regional command headquarters. It is reportedly awaiting further weapons supplies from Beijing following a visit to China by the junta’s second-most senior figure, Vice-Senior General Soe Win. The development highlights the level of influence Beijing has on the situation in Myanmar, specifically through its links to most of the key players.. Despite the ceasefire, we assess that fighting will likely continue in other parts of the country and in northern Shan in the coming week. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Jul 24. North Korea threatened Saturday to boost its nuclear fighting capability and make the United States and South Korea pay “an unimaginably harsh price” as it slammed its rivals’ new defense guidelines that it says reveal an intention to invade the North.
On Thursday, U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol authorized the signing of joint nuclear deterrence guidelines as part of efforts to enhance their capabilities to cope with North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal. The guidelines were adopted a year after the two countries established a consultation body to bolster information-sharing on nuclear operations and discuss how to integrate U.S. nuclear weapons and South Korean conventional weapons in contingencies.
In a statement carried by state media, North Korea’s Defense Ministry said the U.S.-South Korea guidelines betrayed “their sinister intention to step up their preparations for a nuclear war against” North Korea.
The statement said its enemies’ escalating nuclear threats urgently require North Korea to further improve its nuclear deterrent readiness and add unspecified “important elements to the composition of the deterrent.” It said the U.S. and South Korea will “pay an unimaginably harsh price” if they fail to stop provocative acts.
South Korea’s Defense Ministry on Sunday called North Korea’s statement “sophistry,” saying the guidelines would not have been needed if there were no North Korean nuclear threats. The South Korean Defense Ministry warned in a statement that any attempt by North Korea to use nuclear weapons will invite an overwhelming response by the South Korean-U.S. alliance and result in the end of the North’s government.
Details of the U.S.-South Korean guidelines weren’t available, but experts say they are largely about how the two countries would integrate U.S. nuclear weapons and South Korean conventional weapons to respond to various potential contingencies caused by North Korean attacks and provocations. Experts say the U.S. and South Korea are expected to map out detailed concept and operation plans based on the guidelines and review them via bilateral military exercises.
The guidelines are the first of their kind between the allies. The U.S. has repeatedly promised to use all its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to protect South Korea if it is attacked by North Korea, but many experts in South Korea believe the U.S. lacks plans on how it would implement its extended deterrence to its ally. South Korea has no nuclear weapons.
North Korea has argued it was forced to pursue nuclear weapons to deal with U.S.-led nuclear threats. American and South Korean officials have steadfastly said they have no intention of attacking North Korea.
Concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program have grown in recent years as the North performed a slew of provocative missile tests and openly threatened to use nuclear weapons preemptively in potential conflicts with its adversaries. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/AP)
15 Jul 24. Cudgels taken up in defence funding debate. Battle lines are seemingly drawn ahead of the 2024 fight for defence funding, with National Treasury (NT) on one hand warning the powers that be in the seventh administration’s defence ministry to be wary of overspending, particularly when it comes to cost of employees (CoE), and a Parliamentary defence oversight committee wanting “proper funding” for the SA National Defence Force (SANDF).
With Parliament set to be officially opened on Thursday (18 July, Mandela Day) already staffed oversight committees – including the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) – met to hear and discuss departmental budgets. Minister Angie Motshekga will have her turn later today (Monday, 15 July) when the defence budget is tabled for the National Assembly (NA) sitting in the Good Hope Chambers of the Parliamentary precinct.
Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana, following up on a letter to Motshekga’s predecessor Thandi Modise, points out to Motshekga her Department of Defence (DoD) has “in recent years, overspent its budget for CoE, leading to the accumulation of irregular expenditure of R10.1 bn”. Government’s keeper of the purse strings further informs the former basic education minister “unauthorised expenditure of R2.9 bn” was incurred in 2022/23 with “a potential unauthorised expenditure of R3.5 bn in 2023/24”.
“These figures indicate that the department’s pressure on compensation of employees is unsustainable, as it is displacing funding for other departmental expenditures. This situation also poses a fiscal risk to the broader public finances,” Godongwana’s letter informs his Cabinet colleague, adding NT was asked to “condone” DoD accumulated irregular expenditure emanating from CoE overspend.
The finance minister maintains a long-term solution is essential and notes two measures to be attended to by “authorities including the department’s accounting officer” (Acting Secretary for Defence, Thobekile Gamede). One reads: “The DoD must take part in the spending review of its cost drivers one of which is compensation of employees’ budget, which will be conducted by the NT” and the other stating SANDF personnel eligible for retirement “must take part in the government-wide early retirement without penalisation of pension benefits”.
On the opposite side of the fence is the PCDMV under the chairmanship of Dakota Legoete which wants “proper funding” for the SANDF as a matter of “utmost urgency”. The PCDMV met for the first time last Friday to consider and adopt budget vote reports on the DoD, Department of Military Veterans (DMV) and associated entities including Armscor and the Castle Control Board (CCB).
On the thorny and long-standing issue of defence funding, Legoete’s committee – a Parliamentary Communication Services statement has it – expressed “deep concern” about the SANDF deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as part of SAMIDRC (Southern African Development Community Mission in DRC) which “remains unfunded”.
Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana, in his 12 July letter to Motshekga, said he has authorised the use of funds from the National Revenue Fund to defray expenditure to the amount of R2.1 bn for the South African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo through Operation Thiba. “A report on the amounts so authorised will be submitted to Parliament and the Auditor-General and the expenditure will be included in the next adjustments.”
“Furthermore, I have approved the inclusion of the expenditure in the 2024 Adjustment Appropriation Bill in terms of section 30(2)(d) of the PFMA to the amount of R750m for the South African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) through Operation Vikela,” Godongwana continued.
“The report of the committee indicates that the challenges of limited funding and lack of logistical support continue to put the lives of members of the SANDF at risk,” the PCDMV sated. “The committee has identified several critical areas that need immediate attention and that effective collaboration is essential to address funding and operational requirements. This includes not only proposals for engagement between the DoD and NT, but also engagements within Parliament between the committee and other committees that include the Joint Standing Committee on Finance (JSCF),” the statement reads in part.
The PCDMV noted the CoE irregular expenditure, and “will further engage on employee costs during the Seventh Parliament”. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
12 Jul 24. Defense Official Says U.S.-Philippines Alliance Is Making Remarkable Progress.
The U.S.-Philippines alliance is a key to stability and progress in the Indo-Pacific, and it’s on track to build on the progress made over the past three years, said Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, yesterday.
Ratner told the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ South China Sea Conference that the progress in the alliance has been historic, and he sees it as “truly transformative and decisive, as emblematic of broader strategic changes across the Indo-Pacific.”
He credited the presidents of the U.S. and the Philippines for the advances in the closeness of the alliance and discussed what this cooperation will look like in the future.
It hasn’t been easy, Ratner said. One of the first trips Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III made when he took over his position in 2021 was to the Philippines. He met with then-President Rodrigo Duterte in the nation’s capital, Manila. The alliance was on shaky ground at the time, Ratner said.
“I’ll never forget that engagement, which marked a key turning point at a critical time in the alliance,” the assistant secretary said. “In the wake of that meeting, we saw a renewed commitment to the alliance on both sides.”
Since then, the alliance has gotten closer, and it has picked up considerable momentum under the leadership of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.
President Joe Biden has met with Marcos on several occasions, just as Austin has met with his defense counterparts on numerous occasions.
Key to the engagement is the fact, as Austin said to Marcos during their last Pentagon meeting, “that our two countries are more than allies. We’re family.”
“We have elevated the U.S.-Philippines alliance to stand among our most vital defense partnerships in the world,” Ratner said. “We have raised the profile of alliance engagements. We have stood shoulder to shoulder with Manila in the midst of a changing security environment.”
Part of this is the agreement for U.S. rotational presence in the Philippines, Ratner said. The two nations have also taken major steps to increase interoperability, and the U.S. military is working closely with the Philippines’ armed forces on force modernization. “And we have pursued new opportunities together with the Philippines to cooperate multilaterally with like-minded partners across the Indo-Pacific in support of a shared vision for a free and open region,” he said.
Part of this vision is the United States standing with the Philippines as the nation defends its lawful rights in the South China Sea, Ratner said. China is challenging the Philippines’ lawful right to the Second Thomas Shoal, a “low-tide elevation beyond any lawful territorial sea, on the Philippines’ continental shelf, and well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone,” Ratner said.
China’s claim on the Shoal “has no more credibility today than it did when the arbitral tribunal issued its unanimous ruling in 2016,” he said. “And the kind of revisionism and coercion we’ve seen there from is both destabilizing and dangerous.”
This aggressive Chinese behavior stands in sharp contrast to the remarkable leadership by President Marcos to protect and defend the rights of the Philippines under international law, Ratner said.
“All the while, the United States has acted in support of the Philippines and made clear that our alliance commitments are ironclad and that all nations should be able to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows,” Ratner said.
The assistant secretary said last year was transformative for U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, with U.S. force posture being “more mobile, distributed, resilient and lethal.”
The U.S.-Philippines agreement to expand U.S. rotational access to four new strategic sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement was a highlight of the year. “We’re committed to continuing to invest in infrastructure improvements at all nine EDCA sites to strengthen combined training, exercises and interoperability between our forces, as well as to support humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts,” he said.
This has laid the groundwork for more. “The United States and the Philippines are discussing the conclusion of a General Security of Military Information Agreement … that will strengthen and expand our information sharing,” Ratner said. “We are also working together on a security sector assistance roadmap to help prioritize shared investments in the modernization of Philippine forces.”
The Philippines is also taking an active role in a growing community of “minilateral” cooperation across the region. “This is not a single coalition or institution, and it’s certainly not like any other arrangement in any other region,” he said. “Instead, it’s unique to the opportunities and challenges of the Indo-Pacific – comprised of like-minded countries who share a vision for what the region can and should look like.”
The Philippines is working alongside Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and other nations of the region in these exercises.
These like-minded nations are moving toward greater interoperability and cooperation, Ratner said. They are granting reciprocal access. They are also engaging in more complicated and complex regional exercises. “The new convergence in the Indo-Pacific won’t always start with or include the United States, nor should it,” Ratner said.
The U.S-Philippines alliance is healthy and poised for more achievements to come, Ratner said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
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