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03 May 24. RoK: Intelligence agencies warn of North Korean terror threat overseas. Earlier on 3 May, South Korea’s spy agency, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), stated that North Korea was plotting ‘terrorist’ attacks targeting South Korean diplomatic staff or citizens. It said that North Korea may seek ‘retaliation’ for a recent wave of defections by elite North Koreans to South Korea. On 2 May, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised its terrorism alert level from ‘attention’ to ‘alert’ for embassies in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and consulates in Vladivostok (Primorsky Krai, Russia) and Shenyang (Liaoning province, China). The ministry uses a four-tier terrorism alert scale: ‘concern’, ‘caution’, ‘alert’, and ‘serious’. ‘Alert’ means that there is a ‘strong possibility of terrorism’. It went on to state that this was in accordance with information delivered by its ‘intelligence agencies about North Korea’s attempted harm to [South Korean] diplomatic staff’. NIS claimed Pyongyang had ‘dispatched agents to these countries to expand surveillance of the South Korean embassies’. Pyongyang has diplomatic relations with all five countries involved, making them higher-risk locations for South Korean assets. Scrutiny of security risks to South Korean diplomatic personnel and assets in these countries will likely be elevated over the coming weeks as a result. (Source: Sibylline)
03 May 24. Russian Forces Begin Operations in Niger Base Hosting U.S. Troops. In Niger, United States and Russian troops are operating in close proximity at Airbase 101, adjacent to Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, the capital of Niger. According to a senior U.S. defense official who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity, Russian forces are utilizing a separate hangar at the base and are not interacting directly with U.S. troops. This setup occurs amidst increasing military and diplomatic rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, particularly influenced by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
The presence of Russian troops at the base has become a significant point of contention following a coup in Niger in July 2023, which led to the establishment of a military junta. This shift in power has prompted the U.S. and its allies to reassess their military footprint in Africa, with recent troop withdrawals from Chad and discussions about reducing their presence in Niger. The U.S. has also expressed concerns about potential security gaps that could be exploited by Islamic militants in the Sahel region, should U.S. intelligence and military capabilities be reduced.
Furthermore, discussions have been strained between U.S. officials and Nigerien authorities. In a recent meeting, U.S. officials voiced concerns over the expected Russian military presence and other security issues, including potential dealings between Niger and Iran regarding uranium. The U.S. clearly communicated that it could not maintain a base jointly with Russian forces, a stance that was poorly received by the Nigerien officials.
As the situation continues to evolve, the U.S. is planning a professional and responsible withdrawal from Niger, with U.S. troops likely returning to the U.S. Africa Command’s home bases in Germany. The Russian military’s involvement in Niger includes not only the personnel stationed at Airbase 101 but also the reported deployment of additional military equipment and trainers, further solidifying Russia’s growing influence in the region. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
03 May 24. Austin Lauds Strong Ties Between Key Allies in Indo-Pacific. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III underscored today the United States’ commitment to deepening ties with key allies throughout the Indo-Pacific after meeting with his counterparts from Australia, Japan and the Philippines.
The meeting, which Austin hosted at the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii, marks a key milestone as the four nations work to enhance interoperability among their forces.
“Just last year in Singapore, the defense ministers from Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States met together for the first time,” Austin said during a press conference following the talks. “Today’s meeting — the second of its kind — built on that momentum and it helped advance a vision that our four democracies share for a free and open Indo-Pacific.”
In describing that momentum, Austin highlighted last month’s Maritime Cooperative Activity in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone last month — the second multilateral cooperative of its kind over the past year alone.
“Activities like this don’t just strengthen our interoperability, they also build bonds among our forces,” he said. “And they underscore our shared commitment to international law in the South China Sea.”
These discussions come at a critical time for defense cooperation throughout the region, a defense official said earlier this week in previewing the talks.
We’ve gathered here because we share a vision for peace, stability and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.”
The official noted China’s recent harassment of Philippine vessels operating in the South China Sea.
“Japan and Australia have been some of our most vocal and staunchest allies in speaking up about the completely unacceptable nature of this behavior,” the official said, adding that the Philippines have also highlighted China’s concerning behavior throughout the region.
“How we, as allies, not only operate together, but how we think about addressing the really worrisome operational behavior and coercion that we see taking place in a number of places across the region, is obviously a topic that we’re going to focus on together,” the official said.
During their meeting today, the four leaders discussed the current security landscape across the region, and discussed new initiatives extend more security and stability to the Indo-Pacific.
Those efforts include more maritime exercises and activities between the four countries and pursuing coordinated security assistance for the Philippines.
“We’ve gathered here because we share a vision for peace, stability and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” Austin said. “We’ve charted an ambitious course to advance that vision together, and that’s why today’s meetings were so important.
The meeting capped a series of meetings between Austin and his counterparts while in Hawaii to preside over the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command change of command ceremony later this week.
Earlier today, Austin met bilaterally with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles.
The meeting follows Australia’s announcement last week of its new national defense strategy which commits to a 20% increase in defense spending over the next decade.
Austin also met with Japanese Defense Minister Kihara Minoru. The meeting follows Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s official state visit to the U.S. last month where the two countries announced significant strides in strengthening defense cooperation.
Following the bilateral meetings with his counterparts, Austin convened the 13th trilateral defense ministers’ meeting among the U.S., Australia and Japan.
The three leaders focused on a range of regional topics and how the three countries can further expand initiatives aimed at peace and security throughout the Indo-Pacific.
They also discussed cooperation on science and technology and signed a new trilateral agreement outlining cooperation on research, development, test and evaluation for new capabilities.
The agreement encourages standardization and interoperability on defense technology and aims to make the countries’ already strong ties on science and technology more efficient and cost effective.
On Friday, Austin will preside over the Indo-Pacom change of command ceremony.
During the ceremony, Austin is expected to recognize outgoing Indo-Pacom commander Navy Adm. John Aquilino’s efforts that were instrumental in strengthening U.S. partnerships throughout the region.
Additionally, the secretary will have an opportunity to meet with the leaders of the Freely Associated States, which include the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau. (Source: U.S. DoD)
01 May 24. Japan, the United States and Australia are in the final phases of preparation to sign a document on a deal to promote joint research and development in the defense field at Thursday’s trilateral defense ministers meeting in Hawaii, a senior U.S. Defense Department official told The Yomiuri Shimbun and other media on Tuesday. The official also said the command-and-control system of U.S. forces in Japan will be reevaluated, with a goal of completing the review by March 2025. Japanese Defense Minister Minoru Kihara, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles will be in Hawaii to attend the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s change of command ceremony. The three are expected to agree on a deal and sign an agreement before the ceremony. The document will include agreements on the standardization of equipment and advanced information-sharing on research, development and testing. The official said the deal would enhance the interoperability of equipment and make cooperation more efficient and cost-effective.In January, Japan agreed with Australia to conduct joint research on autonomous underwater vehicles, while working with the United States to analyze technologies to counter hypersonic weapons being developed by China and Russia. Trilaterally, the countries are conducting research on unmanned aerial vehicles linked to fighter jets. The upcoming deal is expected to expand current bilateral cooperation efforts in advanced technologies to a trilateral framework.
The official also said the reevaluation of command and control structures between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces in Japan is expected to be an agenda item at Thursday’s Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting. The official said the U.S. side was intensively studying what would be the best way to organize the U.S. forces in Japan and what it will be necessary to equip them with. The official said the U.S. side would hasten the reevaluation so that it can be realized in time for Japan’s establishment at the end of fiscal 2024 of the SDF Joint Operations Command that would strengthen the integrated operations of its ground, maritime and air forces.
Read more at: https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2024-05-01/japan-us-australia-defense-deal-13721946.html?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru
(Source – Stars and Stripes(Source: Defense News Early Bird/https://www.stripes.com/)
02 May 24. Uzbekistan’s balance of budgets and borders. Key drivers behind Uzbekistan’s heightened defence spending include the imperative to modernise its armed forces and combat domestic terrorism.
Uzbekistan is taking steps to fortify its defence capabilities, signalling a departure from its historically peaceful stance.
The nation, nestled in Central Asia, faces mounting security challenges from neighbouring countries and also internal threats, prompting an increase in defence spending.
According to GlobalData’s “Uzbekistan Defense Market 2023-2028″ report, Uzbekistan’s defence budget is set to rise steadily, reflecting its commitment to modernise its armed forces and tackle emerging security threats head-on.
The upward trajectory of Uzbekistan’s defence expenditure is evident, with the budget for its armed forces witnessing a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 2.2% from 2019 to 2023, reaching $2.67bn. This growth comes as the nation also deals with economic constraints and geopolitical complexities.
Key drivers behind Uzbekistan’s heightened defence spending include the imperative to modernise its armed forces and combat domestic terrorism. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s administration has prioritised military modernisation, aiming to upgrade outdated equipment and ensure combat readiness. Recent initiatives, such as integrating technologies like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), exemplify this.
However, navigating Uzbekistan’s defence market poses challenges for foreign investors, chief among them being corruption and budget limitations. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Uzbekistan low, reflecting systemic challenges in ensuring fair competition and transparency in business dealings. Despite legislative reforms and anti-corruption efforts, entrenched corruption hinders investment and erodes investor confidence.
Budget constraints further complicate the investment landscape. Uzbekistan’s defence budget is projected to reach $3.03bn by 2028, growing at a CAGR of 2.6%. Efficient resource allocation becomes imperative in this context, necessitating careful consideration for prospective investors.
Amidst these challenges, the military rotorcraft sector emerges as a beacon of opportunity in Uzbekistan’s defence market. With an anticipated expenditure of $404.4m between 2023 and 2028, investment in attack helicopters holds promise. Additionally, sectors like EO/IR Systems and military unmanned aerial vehicles present attractive investment avenues, with expected expenditures of $19.4m and $9.9m, respectively, over the same period.
Recent contracts, such as Uzbekistan’s agreement with Russia to acquire MI-35M helicopters, are examples of the nation’s commitment to modernising its defence capabilities. These investments symbolise Uzbekistan’s intent to adapt to evolving security dynamics and enhance its military in the face of regional uncertainties.
While Uzbekistan’s defence landscape presents challenges, it also offers opportunities for foreign investors, particularly in high-growth sectors like military rotorcraft. Addressing systemic issues such as corruption and budget limitations will be crucial in unlocking the market’s full potential and fostering sustainable growth in the years to come.
01 May 24. New Zealand Says No Quick Membership of AUKUS Tech Pact. New Zealand’s foreign minister on Wednesday ruled out Wellington quickly joining a landmark defense technology pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States but lampooned critics as “out of date.”
In a speech sketching how the underpinnings of New Zealand’s independent-minded foreign policy have “seismically shifted,” Winston Peters said it would be “irresponsible” of the government not to explore deeper defense cooperation with allies.
New Zealand’s possible participation in the AUKUS grouping’s efforts to develop advanced military technology — particularly in areas like artificial intelligence, undersea drones, and hypersonic missiles — has roiled the country’s politics.
Center-left former prime minister Helen Clark is among those who have argued that participation in AUKUS would threaten New Zealand’s sovereignty and risk damaging relations with major trade partner China.
Peters on Wednesday said those arguments were “outdated,” saying: “The world has changed, and so must we.”
Citing once-neutral Sweden and Finland’s decision to join NATO, Peters said the strategic environment that once delivered for New Zealand’s interests was no more.
“These foundations, which underpinned New Zealand’s foreign, trade and economic policies in decades past, have seismically shifted in the first quarter of the 21st century,” he said, according to the text of the speech.
“The Pacific region’s strategic environment is not benign, far from it. Remorseless pressure is being exerted across it as beachheads are sought and influence peddled.”
Peters said that as a result, New Zealand should consider taking part in AUKUS when the time comes.
“It would be utterly irresponsible for any government of any stripe to not consider whether collaborating with like-minded partners on advances in technology is in our national interest,” he said.
“Here New Zealand needs to ask hard questions of itself. As we seek a more secure region and world, are we doing our share?”
“New Zealand’s long history of parsimony when it comes to defence cannot hold if we wish to continue garnering respect from, and influence on, others,” he said.
Peters said it was not yet clear that New Zealand would be invited to participate in AUKUS’s so-called pillar two, which focuses on defense technology, even after two years of preliminary talks.
Washington, London, and Canberra have also been in talks with Japan and South Korea, which are in favor of participating and appear further along in the process.
“We must also carefully examine what utilities, if any, we might offer, or be expected to offer pillar two partners, in return. That will take time,” Peters said.
“At that future point we will need to carefully weigh up the economic and security benefits and costs of any decision about whether participating in pillar two is in the national interest.
“The government is a long way from this point of being able to make such a decision.” (Source: Google/https://www.thedefensepost.com/)
01 May 24. Australia, United Kingdom and United States announce plans to remove export controls. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have proposed changes to national exemptions to remove export controls between AUKUS partners, in a major development of the international partnership.
The new export licence-free environment is expected to enable defence industry across all three countries to work more seamlessly, while strengthening collaboration and making it easier to develop advanced scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities.
For the first time, the proposed changes would remove the requirement for approximately 900 export permits, valued at $5 bn per year, which would otherwise be required under current export controls from Australia to the US and the UK. In addition, the requirement would be removed for approximately 200 permits, valued at over $129 m per year, required for defence exports from the UK to Australia.
The changes would enable licence-free trade for over 70 per cent of defence exports subject to International Traffic in Arms Regulations from the United States to Australia, as well as enable licence-free trade for over 80 per cent of defence trade subject to Export Administration Regulations from the United States to Australia.
Public consultation is now open on the Defence Trade Legislation Amendment Regulations 2024 (DTL Amendment Regulations), which includes amendments to the Defence Trade Controls Regulation 2013 and Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958, and will run until 31 May 2024. Stakeholders across industry, higher education and research sectors, as well as those from the UK and the US, are invited to provide feedback on the draft arrangements.
The UK has also released their open general export licence amendments, alongside the US’ amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations for simultaneous consultation.
Submissions on the DTL Amendment Regulations can be made at: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-trade-controls-amendment-act-2024
Further information on the DTL Amendment Regulations can be accessed at: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-trade-controls-amendment-act-2024
In April this year, the United States Department of Commerce announced the creation of a licence-free dual use “export environment” with Australia and the United Kingdom, expecting to save industry up to US$2bn.
The exemption covers dual-use technologies, with the AUKUS governments expecting the new licence-free environment to drive scientific, technological, and industrial cooperation.
It follows a decision earlier in the year to exempt Australia and the United Kingdom from US export control licensing requirements for military end use items.
The announcement is expected to save US industry up to US$2 bn and is the latest relaxation of Defence trade rules under the tripartite agreement.
In March, Australia introduced similar changes as part of the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024, which established an exemption for Australia’s AUKUS partners from domestic export control requirements. The amendment will come into effect in September.
Further changes to US trade regulation are also projected to be introduced. The United States government is expected to exempt Australia and the United Kingdom from some controls under the US’ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), with ITAR opening for public consultation. The Australian government has welcomed the moves from the three partner nations to drive trade. (Source: Defence Connect)
01 May 24. Lebanon’s military stagnates amid economic turmoil, Hezbollah influence. The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah has exchanged near-daily strikes with Israeli forces near the border region for almost seven months in the wake of Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza.
And while Lebanon’s national military is working closely with a United Nations-led force to deescalate tension and improve border security, economic and political factors are hindering these efforts, analysts have told Defense News.
The Lebanese Armed Forces, or LAF, is struggling to fulfill its mission due to Hezbollah’s “position in national politics, the spillover effects of the Syrian and Gazan conflicts, the severe and prolonged economic depression and an ongoing governance crisis,” according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank.
Formed in 1982, Hezbollah is an Iran-backed armed group and also a Shiite political party in Lebanon. The U.S. considers the organization a terrorist group.
In the years leading up to Lebanon’s 1975-1990 civil war and throughout the conflict, the presence of militant groups affiliated with sectarian parties grew. The sectarian leaders themselves preferred to create their own armed groups instead of empowering a government institution with the mandate to defend the whole country, according to Dina Arakji, a defense analyst with the Middle East Institute think tank.
In October 2019, Lebanon was plunged into a severe financial crisis, stemming from decades of corruption and mismanagement by a political class that has ruled the country since the end of the civil war. The state of the economy was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the deadly Port of Beirut explosion in August 2020, per the World Bank.
The government has predominantly allocated its defense budget to salaries and benefits over the last two decades, limiting procurement programs. The situation is worsened by the absence of a political will to empower the military, Arakji told Defense News.
Hassan Jouni, a former Lebanese Armed Forces brigadier general who now works in academia, agreed.
“There is no accordance neither in politics, nor in strategy. We lack a national view,” Jouni told Defense News.
While the military does have governmental support, Jouni added, some perceive it as weak and unable to defend the country’s borders, “especially people in south Lebanon, who have firsthand experience with the Israeli threat.”
Foreign aid
Since the 2019 economic collapse, foreign security assistance to the LAF has largely focused on supporting and sustaining existing capabilities, including providing the force with spare parts for its equipment, Arakji noted.
Until recently made up of approximately 80,000 troops, the military likely lost about 7,000 personnel due to early retirement and a failure to adjust salaries following the economic crash, according to Jouni. To avoid mass resignation, the military allowed personnel to work other jobs, such as driving for ride-hailing services.
“When I was commander of the Staff College, the yearly budget used to be around $160,000 for approximately 100, between trainers and students. After the collapse, it went down to $10,000,″ Jouni said.
In current U.S. dollars, Lebanon went from a $2bn defense budget in 2019 to a $432m fund in 2020, after the economy crashed, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a Swedish think tank. Its 2023 defense budget dropped to $241m.
“The LAF remains dependent on foreign support to replace and modernise its ageing equipment. Lebanon has no significant domestic defence industry,” the IISS think tank wrote in a February report analyzing militaries around the world.
Amid its financial troubles, the military lacks advanced air defense systems that would defend against the increased proliferation of drones and missiles in modern warfare. However, “the LAF has some capabilities that Hezbollah does not, and most of those are derived from the fact that the LAF is a conventional military, whereas Hezbollah remains fundamentally an asymmetric paramilitary force,” said Aram Nerguizian, a Middle East military expert at the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank.
He noted the military fields the A-29 Super Tucano plane and the MD-530F+ helicopter for light attack capabilities and to fulfill intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Both aircraft types can deploy U.S.-supplied weapons systems that let the force launch precision strikes against soft, high-value targets.
He pointed to the military’s drone fleet, which includes the Boeing Insitu ScanEagle provided by the United States. The force has also significantly expanded its artillery inventory with the M109A5 self-propelled howitzer.
In addition, some LAF units, such as the special forces, have counterterror and warfare experience, and they receive training abroad. Indeed, Lebanon’s armed forces are one of the most operationally capable among Arab militaries, Nerguizian said. As an example, he cited the military’s response to the threat of the Islamic State group along the border with Syria from 2014 to 2017.
“The U.S. military looks at the LAF as the only case of a national military in the Middle East decisively defeating and ejecting ISIS,” he told Defense News.
The United States is a major financial contributor to Lebanon’s security. Since 2006, the U.S. has provided more than $5.5 bn in total foreign assistance to Lebanon, according to the U.S. State Department, with more than $3bn meant to boost the military and security as well as counter Hezbollah’s influence.
“The Lebanese security environment is not organized the way you would have it in Jordan or Egypt in terms of the bilateral relationships. For example, there is no explicit U.S.-Lebanon state-to-state military relationship. It’s a U.S.-LAF military-to-military relationship,” Nerguizian said.
Together with Qatar, the U.S. also helps pay the salaries of security personnel.
America’s support signals its confidence the Lebanese military is “an innovative and adaptable partner in a complicated region” Nerguizian said. But this commitment remains subject to periodical review, and is vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of U.S. politics.
Still, there are other sources of foreign aid, Jouni noted: NATO members, such as the U.K., support Lebanese special units; Italy trains Lebanese forces on military combat techniques; and Canada provides winter weather training and the necessary equipment for such conditions.
The British, American, Italian and Canadian embassies in Lebanon did not respond to requests for comment. The Lebanese Army also did not respond to Defense News’ inquiries.
However, Kai Zimmermann, a military official with the German Embassy in Beirut, told Defense News the country has supported the LAF as part of the Enable and Enhance Initiative started in 2017, with a focus on rebuilding the military infrastructure in the port of Beirut as well as strengthening the Lebanese Navy’s training activities and ability to deploy vessels at sea.
Twofold threat
For Jouni, the LAF faces two challenges: defending itself against Israel and countering the threat of terrorism.
“When we talk about [the] Israeli threat, we talk about the implementation of the Resolution 1701,″ the former officer said, referring to the U.N.’s call to end the 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel.
It also encouraged the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese troops along the southern border with Israel, although the military contingent there currently numbers about 5,000, according to Abdallah Bou Habib, Lebanon’s foreign minister, who spoke to the Lebanese daily newspaper L’Orient-Le Jour.
Indeed, there’s support among the partners of Lebanon and Israel for “an expanded and consolidated LAF deployment” along the U.N.-drawn border demarcation line, Nerguizian said, adding that this is also preferable to the Israel Defense Forces and would benefit the region, within a larger international framework.
One of the LAF’s missions is to fully implement that U.N. resolution, preferably “in a nonconfrontational way,” Jouni said; others include neutralizing the threat of militias and resistance groups as well as uniting a divided population. Failure to achieve these aims could lead to further conflict, Jouni said, and the force can only reach its goals with “a military and defense strategy, backed by a political vision.”
“There are events happening in the Middle East that are relatively routine and predictable,” Nerguizian said.
“Then you have once-in-a-generation, but potentially dramatic, changes,” he added, citing Hamas’ attack on Israel in early October, and before that the formation of Hezbollah, “which ultimately led to a tectonic change.”
According to the expert, Lebanon’s military proactively understood the scale of potential change to come, more so than any other Lebanese institution or faction.
However, “the only missing element is the national political willpower to commit the LAF to its national security duties,” Nerguizian said. Without this, Lebanon risks remaining unprepared for these rare but significant events. (Source: Defense News)
01 May 24. South Korea: Seoul’s possible plans to join AUKUS pact will drive regional tensions. Earlier on 1 May, South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik stated that Seoul is in talks over joining the Pillar Two component of AUKUS, a security pact between Australia, the UK and the US. Pillar One concerns Australia’s purchase of nuclear-powered submarines from the UK and the US, in which Seoul does not intend to participate. Pillar Two focuses on developing and sharing advanced military technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonic weapons and electronic warfare (EW). On 1 May, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles stated that Seoul possesses ‘deeply impressive technology’ and that ‘as Pillar Two develops, there will be opportunities in the future’. In recent months, Japan and New Zealand have also explored the possibility of joining Pillar Two. However, strict US licensing restrictions on military technology transfers will likely delay any imminent AUKUS expansion. China has criticised AUKUS for destabilising the region and ‘constituting serious nuclear proliferation risks’. We assess that South Korea’s possible plans to join AUKUS will likely worsen its ties with China and North Korea, raising regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
01 May 24. RoK discusses joining part of AUKUS pact with US, UK and Australia. South Korea has held talks about joining part of the AUKUS defence deal between the U.S., Britain and Australia, Defence Minister Shin Won-sik said on Wednesday, only weeks after the pact said it would consider including Japan.
Formed in 2021, AUKUS is a two-stage security pact to counteract China’s growing power in the Asia Pacific region.
While a first stage to give Australia nuclear submarine technology is limited to the core trio, they have raised the possibility of other countries joining a second stage, or “Pillar 2”, that aims to share other military technology.
South Korea could contribute to that second stage with its defence, science and technological capabilities, Shin said at a news conference after a meeting between Australia and South Korea’s foreign and defence ministers in Melbourne.
“During today’s meeting we also discussed the possibility of partnering with AUKUS Pillar 2,” he said.
“We support AUKUS Pillar 2 activities and we do welcome that members are considering Korea as an AUKUS Pillar 2 partner.”
South Korea, with its close ties to the U.S. and world-leading defence industry, has long been speculated as a potential Pillar 2 partner along with Canada, New Zealand and Japan.
Less than a month ago the AUKUS partners announced they were considering working with Japan on specific Pillar 2 defence projects and would hold talks over its involvement this year.
“Korea is a country with deeply impressive technology where we do have shared values,” said Defence Minister Richard Marles.
“As AUKUS Pillar 2 develops there will be opportunities in the future, and we’re seeing that play out in relation to Japan as well.”
China, a vocal critic of the pact, said in April that adding new members would destabilise the region.
Expanding the pact faces hurdles from strict U.S. restrictions on sharing technology, which Canberra and London worry could bog down the deal for all if new members are added too quickly.
The U.S. State Department on Tuesday unveiled a plan to relax those restrictions and make it easier to transfer military gear and sensitive technology to Britain and Australia. (Source: Reuters)
30 Apr 24. Australia, Poland pledge closer ties for military, defence industry cooperation. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles has pledged to maintain the close and personal relationship between Australia and Poland.
Minister Marles recently visited Warsaw in Poland and also parts of Ukraine to witness first-hand the impacts of the Ukraine-Russia war in Eastern Europe.
He met with Polish Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz to discuss both country’s commitment to the global rules-based order, supporting Ukraine against Russia’s full-scale invasion, support of Ukraine’s self-defence, and deepening of defence cooperation and defence industry.
“There is something very personal about the relationship between Australia and Poland. There is a very significant Polish diaspora in Australia, a very large Polish community,” he said.
“As we talk about ways in which we can engage together more strategically in the future, this conversation is happening on a very strong foundation of trust, a very strong foundation of personal links.
“What we saw happen over two years ago with the Russian invasion of Ukraine simply cannot be allowed to stand. The idea of a large country seeking to impose itself on a smaller neighbour – not by reference to international law, but simply by reference to power and might – simply cannot be allowed to stand at this moment in time.
“It is an affront to the global rules‑based order. What we understand is that Australia’s national interest is deeply engaged in the maintenance of the global rules-based order around the world. In the Indo-Pacific of course, but also here in Eastern Europe.
“That is why we are so concerned by what’s happened in Ukraine, why we are so determined to play our part in supporting Ukraine so that they are able to resolve this conflict on their terms.
“When we look to the way in which Poland has provided leadership, we are very inspired by that and deeply grateful for it. And we look at Poland as a country with who we have strategic alignment now, but with whom we share values. Both democracies with a deep history and connection to democracy.”
Minister Marles emphasised agreements between Australia and Poland in defence cooperation, defence industry, and usage of similar military equipment such as the F-35 fighter aircraft.
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence of Poland, Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz said the two countries can work together and share a common history.
“Australia is a tried and tested friend of Poland, it is a great economic partner but also a partner in defence and military.
“Australia cooperates very closely and works together with NATO – with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – it is our partner and our friend.
“We work together in many different places and many different fields, on many different continents. We have economic and military ties.
“When it comes to military cooperation, we plan to negotiate and hopefully sign an agreement in the field of defence between Poland and Australia.
“We intend to support each other and to monitor the situation in Europe with particular attention to the situation in Ukraine. We intend to continue to support Ukraine.
“Australian soldiers have been present in Poland supporting us in protecting the deliveries for Ukraine. We appreciate this very much and as the country that neighbours Ukraine, we really, really value your support.
“We are aware of the geopolitical situation in the Pacific, we appreciate the role Australia plays in the global security together with the United States. And considering this, we appreciate your involvement in Europe even more and I would like to thank you for supplying your planes, the E-7A planes in protecting the airspace in Poland. The Australian mission has concluded and we hope it will take place in the future as well.” (Source: Defence Connect)
30 Apr 24. Moldova: Trial of pro-Russia regional leader will likely elevate unrest, destabilisation risks. Russian-state media reported on 29 April that legal proceedings against the pro-Moscow leader of Moldova’s Gagauzia region, Evgenia Guțul, will begin on 30 April in the capital Chișinău. Guțul was elected to lead the pro-Moscow region in May 2023 as a candidate from the pro-Russia Șor party. Guțul is accused of illegally financing the now-banned party using funds from Russia in 2019-2022, among other offences. She could face up to seven years in prison or a fine if found guilty, as well as a ban on holding government positions. We assess that the trial against Guțul will almost certainly further strain tensions between pro-West officials in Chișinău and pro-Moscow officials in Gagauzia, which will possibly provide Moscow with the grounds to stir up further separatist and anti-government sentiment. Domestic unrest risks will also likely be elevated in Chișinău and Gagauzia (particularly in the regional capital Comrat) in the coming days and weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Apr 24. Haiti: Further attacks, government instability are almost certain as council selects interim president. Later on 29 April, Haiti’s transition council will select an interim president to manage the country until elections are held. The leader of the G9 gang coalition, Jimmy Chérizier, stated that armed attacks will increase if his demands are not met. Chérizier and other members of the Viv Ansanm coalition of criminal groups have demanded amnesties and political representation in the government. Haiti continues to face an acute humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by gangs’ efforts to seize aid shipments. In the short term, further attacks are highly likely in the capital Port-au-Prince, elevating bystander safety and operational risks for humanitarian workers and journalists. In addition, food, energy and water security risks will remain significantly elevated in the medium term. In the long term, we assess that an acute internal conflict is increasingly likely to take hold as armed gangs reject the transition council’s authority. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Apr 24. Russian Wagner Mercenaries Pursue Warlord Joseph Kony in Central African Republic. Russian mercenaries associated with the Wagner Group have intensified efforts to capture one of the world’s most elusive fugitives, Joseph Kony, the notorious leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). According to multiple sources, including a Rolling Stone report, a recent operation in the Central African Republic nearly succeeded in apprehending Kony, who has evaded international efforts to capture him for over two decades.
In early April, in a remote area of the Central African Republic, Wagner mercenaries engaged in a significant gunfight near a village named Yemen, where Kony was believed to be hiding. The operation followed the surrender of 14 defectors from Kony’s LRA at the end of March to Wagner-affiliated Chadian fighters posing as Central African Republic government forces. This action led to a severe skirmish in Yemen, reportedly resulting in casualties among both the local population and Wagner’s forces.
Kony, indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity, has been a ghostly figure in the African bush, orchestrating a campaign of terror that includes abduction, mutilation, and forced recruitment of children into his militant group. Despite various international efforts, including a high-profile U.S. military operation named Observant Compass, Kony has remained at large, moving frequently across borders and evading capture.
Wagner’s pursuit represents a significant shift in the dynamics of international military operations in Africa. The Russian mercenary group, led until last year by Yevgeny Prigozhin, has been increasingly active on the continent, providing direct military support to several African regimes in exchange for access to natural resources and strategic footholds.
The implications of Wagner potentially capturing Kony are profound, challenging the efficacy of Western-led military interventions in Africa. This comes at a time when U.S. and European influence on the continent is perceived to be waning, as evidenced by recent coups in Mali and Niger that have disrupted long standing military partnerships. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
30 Apr 24. China-Philippines: Scarborough Shoal clash will sustain regional tensions around contested waters. On 30 April, two Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels fired water cannons at two Philippine vessels near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. The CCG hit the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessel BRP Datu Bankaw and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel BRP Bagacay. The two vessels continued their maritime patrol to provide support to Filipino fishermen in the area, according to Manila. Beijing claimed that the vessels were expelled from the area. The incident reflects the ongoing disputes over maritime boundaries in the South China Sea, where China asserts extensive claims that conflict with the Philippines’ delineation of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A 2012 stand-off over the shoal sparked large-scale protests in the Philippines. China installed a 380-meter-long barrier in September 2023, restricting access to the shoal and driving further tensions; the barrier has reportedly since been re-installed. The latest action follows a pattern of assertive manoeuvres by China in the region, including other incidents in which the CCG used water cannons against Philippine vessels engaged in resupply missions. The latest incident also comes amid joint military drills between the Philippines and the US, which prompted criticism from China. We assess that regional tensions will likely remain elevated; further clashes around contested features are therefore possible. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Apr 24. Georgia: Government’s anti-West rhetoric will exacerbate polarisation, anti-government sentiment. On 29 April, thousands of protesters demonstrated in the capital Tbilisi against a Russian-style foreign agent bill that is undergoing a second parliamentary hearing. A pro-government rally co-ordinated by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party took place at the same time. GD likely bussed in supporters to increase the turnout at the pro-government event, during which oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and long-time leader of GD, accused the EU and the US of seeking to undermine Georgia’s stability by financing NGOs to interfere in the country’s affairs. Ivanishvili implied that the West wants to repeat a ‘Ukrainian scenario’ by dragging Georgia into its confrontation with Russia. Ivanishvili’s statements are highly notable as they mark an escalation in GD’s anti-West rhetoric; they are likely aimed at justifying the foreign agent law by claiming that it seeks to obstruct Western interference – aligning with similar Russian narratives. We assess that GD’s growing anti-West stance will exacerbate polarisation and anti-government sentiment among pro-EU supporters, elevating unrest risks in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Apr 24. Kenya-Somalia: Disrupted counter-insurgency operations will sustain elevated attack risks. On 29 April, suspected al-Shabaab fighters killed five people in an IED attack in the town of Elwak (Mandera county, Kenya) that borders Somalia. The attack comes after an al-Shabaab roadside IED killed six telecom workers in Garasbaley district on the outskirts of Mogadishu (Somalia) on 28 April. The attacks underline the deterioration in counter-insurgency operations following political infighting over constitutional reforms. We assess that persistent political tensions will sustain this increased threat of al-Shabaab attacks in the short term, with the likely use of roadside IEDs elevating risks during overland movement. With Kenyan troops scheduled to remain in Somalia until at least the end of 2024, the threat of cross-border attacks into Kenya will persist. Deteriorating counter-insurgency capabilities will also drive the risk of more complex attacks in which IEDs are used in tandem with small arms, including against hotels and government buildings in Mogadishu. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Apr 24. Russia: Law enforcement will likely remain primary target of Islamist attacks in North Caucasus. Earlier on 29 April, the Internal Affairs Ministry of Russia’s Karachay-Cherkessia Republic (North Caucasus) reported a shootout between the security forces and suspected militants in the village of Mara-Ayagy. According to the authorities, two law enforcement officers were killed and another four were injured, while five attackers were shot dead. This marks the second attack on law enforcement in a week in the region; two police personnel were killed on 22 April in the town of Karachaevsk. Russia’s Investigative Committee said the perpetrators of the attack on 28 April had participated in the previous assault. Authorities often report attacks on law enforcement personnel in the North Caucasus. As such, the latest incident aligns with our assessment that Islamist threats in the volatile region are most likely to manifest as low-level attacks against security forces, rather than against civilians (see Sibylline Special Report – 23 April 2024). (Source: Sibylline)
29 Apr 24. Georgia: Strong EU sentiment will sustain elevated unrest, driving travel, disruption risks. On 28 April, around 20,000 protesters rallied in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, against the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party’s re-introduction of the Russian-style foreign agent bill. Anti-riot police forces were deployed around the parliament to impede protesters from approaching the building, which was placed on yellow security alert. On 29 April, protests will likely continue during the bill’s second hearing. Youth activist groups played an important role in the latest rally, reflecting the increasing engagement of younger generations in ongoing demonstrations against the bill, which have persisted for the past two weeks. In 2023, mass protests forced the parliament to withdraw the bill. However, this time, the GD-led government has extended the timeframe for adoption of the legislation until mid-May, expecting the demonstrations to lose momentum. We assess that, despite GD’s strategy, strong EU and anti-government sentiment will sustain elevated protest risks in the coming weeks. This, in turn, will increase travel and supply chain disruption risks, particularly in Tbilisi. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Apr 24. Iraq: Attack on gas field underscores risks to security, electricity, potential for business disruption. On 27 April, an unidentified group carried out a drone attack targeting the Khor Mor gas field in the Sulaymaniyah governorate (Kurdistan Regional Government, KRG) killing four Yemeni contractor employees. The attack targeted the storage facilities of Pearl Petroleum Company, one of the biggest private oil investors in Iraq. On 29 April, Dana Gas (operating under Pearl Petroleum) announced that it had temporarily suspended production from Khor Mor. The attack was launched from the area between Diyala and Saladin governorates. As such, coordinated search and stop operations by Iraq and the KRG in the area are likely in the coming week, elevating bystander and mobility disruption risks. Furthermore, the Khor Mor gas field provides nearly 67% of the region’s electricity supply. As such, there is a realistic possibility of electricity disruption in the KRG in the coming days, increasing risks of business disruption, particularly for the manufacturing industry. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Apr 24. China urges Japan to take a U-turn on its militarisation drive. China has criticised Japan’s military expansion and newly published Diplomatic Bluebook, dismissing the view that China is a strategic threat.
for the Ministry of National Defense (MND), Senior Colonel Wu Qian, urged Japan to ‘wake up from the old dream of militarism at an early date’ according to a release from the MND on 25 April 2024.
The release took issue with Japan’s characterisation of China in the 2024 Diplomatic Bluebook, one that identifies China as an unprecedented, and the greatest, strategic challenge to Japan.
“Japanese remarks are purely false narratives, and we are firmly opposed to that,” remarked Wu.
Japan’s 2024 Diplomatic Bluebook, published by the Foreign Ministry on 16 April, says China’s military build up is “unprecedented and represents the greatest strategic challenge to ensuring the peace and security”, but also speaks of a desire to build a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” with China.
China and Japan have both made significant investments in their military capabilities in recent years.
For its part, Japan has doubled its commitment for defence spending, raising a long standing cap of no more than 1% of GDP for its military, so that it will spend 2% on its forces. Under the new spending commitments, Japan will have the third largest military in the world within four years.
In 2024 the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that China’s 2023 military spending was $296bn (2.1trn yuan). The budget that has risen for the 29th consecutive year, rising 6% over 2022, although this represents a change in the size of GDP, as the share of spending as a percentage of GDP has remained 1.7% for each year.
China’s MND took issue with recent reports of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida criticising the an accelerated Chinese nuclear arsenal development, in remarks that identified China’s expansion of this capability as a concern to global and regional stability.
The MND spokesperson noted that China’s national defence policy is defensive in nature, and that its nuclear defence strategy is one of defence, rooted in a policy of no first use for nuclear weapons, at any time, under any circumstance.
The statements from Wu come on the same day of the announcement of a joint military exercise between China and Bangladesh, and follow on a range of comments from the MND critical of the AUKUS partnership’s role in the Indo-Pacific, and of a US-Japan-Philippines joint statement that cited China’s “dangerous and aggressive” behaviour in the seas around China.
The joint training between China and Bangladesh, named ‘Golden Friendship’ will be the first raining between the two militaries.
Bangladesh and the US completed Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) on 22 April 2024, the 30th year of the annual exercise.
(Source: army-technology.com)
26 Apr 24. Colombia’s internal defence growth fight amid corruption. Rising border disputes, terrorism, and internal conflicts propel Colombia towards a defence market expansion despite corruption challenges and a limited budget.
According to the latest report by GlobalData, Colombia is facing increasing security threats from armed militias, border disputes, and internal unrest, which has resulted in a rise in defence expenditure, reaching $18bn by 2029.
GlobalData’s latest report states that Colombia confronts escalating security threats from armed militias, border disputes, and internal unrest, triggering a surge in defence spending to $18bn by 2029.
However, corruption scandals and constrained budgets hinder foreign investment, posing challenges to sustained growth.
Colombia stands at a juncture as it grapples with persistent security threats from various fronts. Armed militias, border disputes with Venezuela, and internal conflicts persistently undermine national stability. In response, Colombia’s defence market is poised to undergo growth, reaching an estimated $18bn by 2029, according to GlobalData’s Colombia Defense Market 2024-2029 report.
The report highlights a 7% Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) in defence expenditure, indicating the nation’s resolve to fortify its security apparatus amidst mounting challenges. Despite signing a peace accord in 2017, factions within groups like FARC and the expanding influence of ELN continue to pose security threats. This necessitates a proactive approach to bolster defence capabilities and ensure national sovereignty.
Key statistics from the report reveal increases in defence spending over the forecast period. From $8.9bn allocated in 2020, Colombia’s defence expenditure is projected to soar to $13.7bn by 2024, marking an 11.2% CAGR during 2020–2024. Moreover, acquisition expenditure, crucial for modernising military capabilities, is anticipated to witness a 14.5% CAGR, reaching $12.2bn by 2029.
However, amid the surge in demand for military equipment, Colombia’s defence market faces challenges. Recent revelations of high-level corruption within the armed forces have shaken public trust and deterred foreign investment. Allegations of collaboration with criminal groups and mismanagement of funds emphasise the urgent need for transparency and accountability in defence procurement processes.
Furthermore, despite growing, Colombia’s defence budget remains relatively modest compared to global standards. With acquisition expenditure representing an average of 5.7% of the total defence budget during the historic period, the market struggles to attract foreign arms suppliers. Despite forecasts indicating an increase of 7% over the forecast period, the slow growth trajectory poses obstacles to procuring high-tech defence equipment at scale.
In 2022, US-based Sikorsky reached an agreement with the Corporación de la Industria Aeronáutica de Colombia (CIAC) to supply spare parts for Colombia’s Black Hawk helicopter fleet. Additionally, Sikorsky and CIAC have collaborated on managing the Black Hawk Flight Simulator Center in Colombia.
Two Black Hawk army helicopters are seen flying over Colombia airspace. Source: Alejo Bernal/Shutterstock.
Nevertheless, specific sectors within Colombia’s defence market exhibit promising growth prospects. Naval vessels, military fixed-wing aircraft, and military land vehicles emerge as key investment areas. Notably, the military land vehicles market is expected to grow at a CAGR of 12.7% between 2023 and 2028, becoming the third-largest contributor to Colombia’s defence market.
As Colombia navigates these challenges, the government remains committed to modernising its defence capabilities. Plans to acquire frigates, logistic support vessels, and transport aircraft show the nation’s determination to enhance its security infrastructure. However, addressing corruption and increasing defence spending transparency will be imperative to attracting foreign investment and ensuring sustainable growth in the defence market.
Colombia’s defence market is poised for transformation amid escalating security threats and ambitious modernisation plans. Overcoming internal obstacles and fostering greater transparency will be vital to realising the nation’s defence objectives and securing long-term regional stability. (Source: army-technology.com)
27 Apr 24. Update: air strikes against Daesh. The RAF are continuing to take the fight to Daesh in Iraq and Syria.
A Royal Air Force Typhoon departs on a mission supporting Operation Shader in support of the Counter-Daesh operations in Iraq and Syria. Crown Copyright.
Summary
- Sunday 21 April 2024 – RAF Typhoons struck a rocket launcher in northwest Iraq.
Detail
On the evening of Sunday 21 April, a pair of Royal Air Force Typhoon FGR4s, flying as part of the long-standing global coalition, conducted a routine patrol over Syria and Iraq as part of Operation Shader. Rockets were observed being launched in northwest Iraq against coalition forces. Acting rapidly in defence against this attack, our aircraft successfully employed a single Paveway IV, precision guided bomb to destroy the rocket launcher system. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
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