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18 Aug 23. Europe/Africa Air Force Chief Cites Lessons From War in Ukraine.
The U.S. Air Forces Europe and Africa are learning lessons from the Russian invasion of neighboring Ukraine to develop strategies, capabilities and tactics needed to better defend the NATO nations, Air Force Gen. James B. Hecker told the Defense Writers’ Group today.
Hecker, speaking from his headquarters at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, also discussed the situation in Africa.
Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has given NATO leaders a view into President Vladimir Putin’s military machine. “It has given us the opportunity to take a look and learn some lessons from what’s going on in the last year and a half,” Hecker told reporters. “I think, by far, the largest lesson that we’ve learned is that neither side was able to get air superiority. I think we all thought that Russia would get it within a couple of days, and we’d be looking at a 10-day war.”
Ukrainian counter-air capabilities were up to the task. The general said Ukrainians shot down at least 75 Russian aircraft before the Russians changed tactics. Many were knocked down by shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft weapons, he said. Russian forces charged to the suburbs of Ukraine’s capital of Kyiv before the Ukrainian military pushed them back.
Had the Russians gained air superiority, it may have been a totally different picture. “But since they weren’t able to do that, we end up with a fight that we have today … we haven’t seen one like this probably since World War I,” the general said.
The war devolved to an artillery duel with the Russian military indiscriminately firing into civilian areas of Ukraine.
“What we’ve seen out of the Russian side, is they have gone to solely using one-way they get very cheaply from Iran, or they use cruise missiles off of their bombers that they launch from thousands of miles away,” he said.
Both Ukraine and Russia have significant, integrated air and missile defense systems. These surface-to-air missiles prevented either side from establishing air superiority.
“My No. 1 priority—and throughout NATO—on the air side is to counter the anti-access, area-denial mission,” he said. “We’ve been putting a lot of effort on improving our skills and working with all of the allies to do that.”
The general said his second priority is countering how Russia fights when it can’t get air superiority. The Ukrainians have been very good at knocking down the one-way UAVs and cruise missiles, and NATO nations need to improve their capabilities, as well, he said.
“My third priority is information sharing,” Hecker said. “It’s amazing what you can do if you share information amongst your allies—and how much better and capable you make each other really at zero cost. It’s just a policy change, but an important one.”
He said the Air Force also needs to invest in and exercise the agile combat employment capability. ACE, as it is called, is about dispersing aircraft and high-value equipment to safeguard deterrence. “As weapons get a lot more accurate, they can just hit every single aircraft even if it’s dispersed ,” Hecker said. “What we have to do now is disperse our aircraft amongst different airfields and potentially even on highways.”
He said his final priority is command and control, which is complicated by the ACE concept. “How are we going to command and control all these units, especially if they’re taking off and landing at other airfields using the ACE concept?” he asked. “How are we going to make that happen?”
Operating in the face of cyberattacks also complicate this situation.
Hecker also has responsibility for Air Force support in Africa where the situation in Niger is front and center in that theater. Nigerien Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani, a former chief of the country’s Presidential Guard, seized power from Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26. The Defense Department has paused military training in Niger and has also paused some additional security cooperation efforts as officials continue to monitor events on the ground.
The United States has roughly 1,000 personnel in the country. “If our civilian leaders decide that they want us out there, then obviously we have we’ve been doing planning for that, and we’ll be ready to get us out there,” Hecker said. “We hope that it’s been a permissive environment.”
Taking troops and capabilities from the nation would have an effect on counterterrorism operations in and around the Lake Chad region. “But we will obviously look for some other allies that are in that we could maybe partner up with and then move our assets there,” he said.
The general stressed that no decision has been made, and plans are just a prudent precaution. “What we hope for is that we have a peaceful diplomatic solution to this, and we don’t have to move,” he said.
(Source: U.S. DoD)
19 Aug 23. China helping to arm Russia with helicopters, drones and metals.
Russian firms have received tens of thousands of Chinese shipments since the war in Ukraine began.
China is helping to arm Russia with helicopters, drones, optical sights and crucial metals used by the defence industry, a Telegraph investigation has found.
Russian firms – including sanctioned companies – involved in the production of missile launchers, armoured vehicles, and strategic bombers, have received tens of thousands of shipments from China since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began through the first quarter of this year.
It comes as China, which insists it remains neutral, is attempting to position itself as a key peace-broker in talks aimed at ending the conflict.
Trade between China and Russia is set to surpass $200 billion this year, a new record high, even as Chinese exports to other countries have fallen significantly.
Exports of goods with potential military uses rose by more than three times in the year which ended this June, compared to the one prior, according to analysis from the Observatory of Economic Complexity, a trade data visualiser.
Dual-use goods
Such goods are classified as dual-use, meaning they also have civilian purposes, allowing China to skirt international sanctions and claim that it conducts only legal trade with Russia. China’s support appears to be helping Russia weather sanctions, calling into question the effectiveness of a crucial part of the West’s campaign against Moscow aimed at crippling Russia’s economy.
One Chinese company sent 1,000 drones to Russia in the two months before the war, according to figures compiled by Molfar Global, an open source research organisation. That firm, Shantou Honghu Plastics, describes itself as a wholesaler of children’s toys on its website and social media profiles.
The drones were sent to a Russian firm called Samson, which similarly describes itself as a wholesaler of games and toys and appears to be a shell company, stating only 10,000 rubles in capital to its name, according to a public company registry.
Then, four days after war broke out in Ukraine, Chinese company Hems999 supplied two helicopters. Another Chinese firm, Tianjin Huarong Aviation, has transferred four Airbus helicopters to Russia since the war began.
All were received by Russian firm Ural Helicopter, whose primary customer is the Russian National Guard, deployed to Ukraine and led by Viktor Zolotov, a longtime bodyguard to Putin.
Chinese firms have also sent optical sights to more than 50 Russian companies from the start of 2022 through the first quarter of this year. Imports of these products nearly doubled to $2.5 million last year, compared to the one prior.
Yiwu Wojie Optics Instrument accounted for the majority of optical sights – about 2,500 – furnished to Russian firm CEK, which has previously supplied such goods and night vision equipment to the Russian internal affairs ministry, according to data pulled by Molfar from 52wmb, a Chinese trade data aggregator.
Invoices state such equipment is for “hunting,” though the devices could be fitted to military weapons, and offer enhanced vision for military operations.
Russian imports of raw materials soar
Chinese exports of turbojets and radar missile navigation systems have also been sent via India and Costa Rica before being re-exported to Russia, according to Molfar research, in an apparent effort to evade sanctions.
According to the trade data, Russia’s imports of raw materials and components vital for the manufacture of armaments have soared.
China exported $18 million of titanium alloy products to Russia in 2022, nearly double the year prior.
Lightweight and heat-resistant titanium alloys are a key material used to manufacture military aircraft and weapons.
Titanium plates and rods were shipped from China to NPP Start, a developer of air-defence missile launchers which is part of Russia’s Rostec defence conglomerate.
Titanium products have also been sent to S7 Technics, which performs aircraft maintenance and repair, and has done work for an organisation that oversees the air transport of Putin and other Kremlin officials.
S7 is also working to make aircraft spare parts so that Russian airlines can keep their fleets operational after sanctions cut off supplies of Western-made components for Airbus and Boeing planes.
Chinese companies also sent deliveries of magnesium alloys to Tupolev, which builds and helps maintain long-range bombers like the Tu-95 and Tu-160M, which have been used to launch cruise missile attacks on Ukraine.
(Source: Daily Telegraph)
18 Aug 23. Japan, South Korea, U.S. Strengthen Trilateral Cooperation. The trilateral ties among Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States will make the world safer and the three countries stronger, President Joe Biden said at the conclusion of talks at Camp David, Maryland today.
The United States has decades of solid relations with both South Korea and Japan bilaterally – both nations are treaty allies of the United States. But forging a trilateral relationship has long proved difficult, as there have been roadblocks to relations between South Korea and Japan.
Biden praised the political courage of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio for their efforts to work together. He said the Republic of Korea and Japan are capable and indispensable allies, and that America’s commitment to both countries is ironclad.
“Strengthening the ties between our democracies has long been a priority for me, dating back to when I was vice president of the United States,” Biden said at the start of the meeting. “That’s because our countries are stronger and the world is safer … as we stand together. And I know this is a belief we all three share.”
All three leaders believe this to be an inflection point in history, Biden said. “We’re called to lead in new ways to work together to stand together,” he said. “And today, I’m proud to say our nations are answering that call.”
The three nations agreed to elevate defense collaboration. This includes launching annual multidomain military exercises to bring trilateral defense cooperation to unprecedented levels, the president said.
The nations will also speed up information sharing on North Korea’s missile launches and cyber activities which will strengthen ballistic missile defense cooperation.
“Critically, we’ve all committed to swiftly consult with each other in response to threats to any one of our countries from whatever source that occurs,” Biden said. “That means we’ll have a hotline to share information and coordinate our responses whenever there is a crisis in the region or affecting any one of our countries.”
The three nations reaffirmed their commitments to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and address economic coercion. Biden said. “We’re going to continue to counter threats from including cryptocurrency money laundering to the tune of billions of dollars, and potential arms transfer in support of Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine,” he said. “Together, we’re going to stand up for international law, freedom of navigation and a peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea.”
President Yoon noted that Camp David has been the site of many historic meetings over the years. “From this moment on, Camp David, will be remembered as a historic place where the Republic of Korea, the United States and Japan, proclaimed that we will bolster the rules-based international order and play key roles to enhance regional security and prosperity based on our shared values of freedom, human rights and rule of law,” he said through a translator. “The stronger coordination between Korea, the U.S. and Japan requires more robust institutional foundations. Moreover, challenges that threaten regional security must be addressed by us building a stronger commitment to working together.”
Kishida said the international community is at a turning point in history. “In order to allow the potential of our trilateral strategic collaboration to bloom and to blossom, I wish to take this moment to raise the security coordination between Japan, ROK and the U.S. to new heights,” he said.
In a written statement, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III called the meeting historic. “Today’s summit reaffirmed that cooperation among our three countries delivers security and prosperity for our people, the Indo-Pacific region and the world,” he said. “We are working more closely than ever with the ROK and Japan in support of a common vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
19 Aug 23. Camp David pact eases Japan-South Korea tensions US president unveils trilateral agreement that includes joint military exercises and intelligence sharing. The leaders of Japan and South Korea on Friday put decades of frequently acrimonious relations behind them, signing on to a trilateral pact with the US that will deepen military and intelligence co-operation between the three allies. The agreement, formally reached at President Joe Biden’s retreat at Camp David outside Washington, sets up annual summits between US, Korean and Japanese foreign and defence officials; establishes joint military exercises; and creates new lines of communication on threats posed by North Korea and China. At a joint news conference, Biden said the countries had “made history” with their first trilateral summit and praised his counterparts for their “political courage” — a nod to the tensions between Tokyo and Seoul that have festered since Japan’s wartime aggression more than 80 years ago. In addition to securing a long-sought thaw in relations between the US’s most important allies in east Asia, Biden also secured unity in deterring China, saying the leaders had “reaffirmed our shared commitment to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and addressing economic coercion”. Yoon Suk Yeol, the South Korean president, said Camp David would be remembered as a historic place where the three countries had launched a “new chapter in our trilateral co-operation”. Fumio Kishida, Japanese prime minister, was equally fulsome, noting the summit came at a time when the international order was “in crisis” and had been “shaken to its foundations” by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korean missile launches, and tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea.
The summit was the first gathering of foreign leaders at Camp David since 2015 and marked the end of a year-long effort by Biden aides to persuade Tokyo and Seoul to move beyond bitter tensions over Japan’s wartime behaviour and co-operate more closely in areas including military exercises, cyber security and intelligence sharing. The US has bilateral defence treaties with Tokyo and Seoul, but has for decades struggled to convince its two allies to work more closely on regional security arrangements. Yoon and Kishida agreed to the summit amid growing regional concern about China’s rapid military modernisation. Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser, insisted the arrangement was not aimed at any single rival, but other US officials said the pact was unlikely to have been agreed without heightened concerns about China and North Korea. “China’s entire strategy is based on the premise that America and its number one and number two ally in the region can’t get together and get on the same page. That’s fundamentally going to be different,” Rahm Emanuel, the US ambassador to Japan, said this week. Patricia Kim, an Asia expert at the Brookings Institution, said the “striking progress” on bilateral and trilateral co-operation would not have been possible without the rising threat posed by Beijing and Pyongyang. Kim said that “a heightened sense of insecurity” around China and North Korea was coupled with “renewed fears” of a disintegrating international security environment triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. She also credited “incredible political will in all three capitals — particularly in Seoul”. Michael Green, a former top White House Asia official who heads the US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, said the summit was Biden’s “most important power play in Asia” since the 2021 Aukus deal to help Australia obtain nuclear-powered submarines. Recommended Stephen Roach The old approach to US-China relations no longer works “From an historical perspective, it is arguably much bigger than Aukus because nobody doubted that the US, UK and Australia could work together,” Green said. “There was doubt . . . about whether Japan and Korea could align strategically.” While the three countries have hailed the agreement as historic, one of the critical questions is whether their future leaders will continue in the same direction. Officials in Asia are particularly concerned about what will happen to US policy towards alliances if Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025. US officials have stressed that they are trying to create institutional structures that will be hard to unwind. Event details and information FTWeekend Festival(Source: FT.com)
18 Aug 23. South Africa: Opposition coalition unlikely to secure majority in 2024 polls, raising policy risk in next administration. On 17 August, seven opposition parties, including South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), signed the Multi-Party Charter coalition agreement. The coalition agreement comes amid increasing threats to the ruling African National Congress’ (ANC) 57.5% National Assembly majority in the 2024 polls. The ANC’s popularity has continued to decline over the past three election cycles and unprecedented energy security challenges and high levels of unemployment will likely render the 2024 elections the most competitive to date. However, South Africa’s third largest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) will not join the opposition coalition, significantly reducing the likelihood the coalition will secure a majority. As the charter rules out the possibility of a coalition with the ANC, this will force a coalition with the EFF if the ANC is unable to secure a majority, raising policy risk and the threat of more interventionist economic policy during the next administration. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Unverified shooting at airport reflects volatile security environment at border. On 18 August, Armenia’s National Security Service (NSS) claimed that an unidentified individual fired three shots at the Syunik Airport (TBA) in Kapan, near the south-eastern border with Azerbaijan. According to the NSS, the individual travelled to the airport in an Azerbaijani-registered vehicle. The incident has not been independently verified, but it reportedly occurred just hours after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited the airport on 17 August. As such, it will further fuel tensions with Azerbaijan. The NSS called on Azerbaijani authorities to investigate the incident; Baku has not yet commented. The incident also comes after gunfire was reported on 15 August in a bordering area where an EU civilian monitoring mission was operating. The latest developments underscore an increasingly volatile security environment at the Armenia-Azerbaijan borders. Ultimately, further similar incidents will lower the short-term prospects of signing a peace treaty. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 23. Russia-Turkey: Escalation risks heightened in short term despite ship’s successful transit from Ukrainian Black Sea port. On 18 August, the first vessel to use Ukraine’s ‘humanitarian corridor’ in the Black Sea crossed Turkey’s Bosphorus Strait. The Hong Kong-flagged Joseph Schulte container ship left Odesa earlier this week after having been trapped in the Ukrainian port since 23 February 2022 – the day before the full-scale invasion. Meanwhile, Ankara warned Moscow on 17 August to avoid further escalation after the Russian navy fired warning shots and boarded a Turkish-owned cargo vessel sailing under the flag of Palau on 13 August in the Black Sea. The container ship’s successful voyage underscores the viability of shipping lanes that hug the Ukrainian, Romanian and Bulgarian coastlines, minimising the likelihood (and ability) of Russian vessels intercepting them. However, Russian threats against civilian vessels will remain credible in Ukrainian and international waters in the key shipping lanes in the north-western Black Sea, elevating the risk of miscalculation and escalation (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 23. Pakistan elevates defence posture to counter regional challenges.
Geopolitical tensions prompt Pakistan’s modernisation efforts across naval, air force, and army domains while navigating internal and external complexities. As geopolitical uncertainties escalate, Pakistan strategically bolsters its defence capabilities across land, air, and sea.
Drawing insights from GlobalData’s “Pakistan Defense Market 2023-2028” report, Pakistan’s defence landscape transformed with a renewed focus on naval, air force, and army modernisation.
The nation’s commitment to fortifying its position is underscored by a growing defence budget and strategic partnerships as it grapples with regional challenges and navigates a complex global environment.
The commitment to enhancing its defence capabilities comes to the forefront as the nation undertakes a comprehensive modernisation drive across its naval, air force, and army domains. Fuelled by escalating geopolitical tensions, Pakistan’s multi-domain approach reflects its resolve to safeguard sovereignty and security while addressing internal and external challenges.
Defensive transformation amidst geopolitical uncertainties
GlobalData’s “Pakistan Defense Market 2023-2028” report highlights the South-Asian countries resolute efforts to modernise its armed forces in response to mounting regional challenges. With its defence budget projected to reach $10bn by 2028, Pakistan’s increased investment underscores its determination to counter evolving threats.
This strategic realignment encompasses advanced naval vessels, combat aircraft, missile systems, and submarines, aligning with the country’s vision for a robust defence infrastructure.
Regional complexities shape defence strategy
The enduring Indo-Pak tensions and territorial disputes catalyse Pakistan’s defensive measures. The intricacies surrounding Kashmir and Siachen Glacier disputes continue influencing the security priorities. As the nation navigates through these complexities, the defence strategy underscores the importance of a robust and technologically advanced defence posture.
Balancing defence and economic realities in Pakistan
Despite economic challenges and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, Pakistan allocates resources to defence and economic growth. The delicate equilibrium between security imperatives and socioeconomic needs underscores their determination to uphold regional stability while fostering domestic development.
Pakistan’s Naval, Air Force, and Army modernisation
Pakistan’s ambitious modernisation spans its naval, air force, and army domains, reflecting a holistic approach to national security. Collaborations with foreign partners, technological advancements, and indigenous development projects reinforce the South Asian countries drive to build a formidable and self-reliant defence apparatus.
Strategic partnerships and international dynamics
China’s role as a key defence partner enhances Pakistan’s capacity-building initiatives. Collaborative projects, joint ventures, and technology sharing are pivotal components of Pakistan’s strategy to strengthen its indigenous capabilities and maintain a credible deterrent against regional threats.
Navigating a complex geopolitical landscape
As Pakistan charts its course in a dynamic geopolitical landscape, its commitment to modernisation underscores its determination to secure its interests and maintain regional stability. The convergence of naval, air force, and army modernisation initiatives showcases the multifaceted approach to security, reflecting its evolving stance in the global arena.
Amid geopolitical challenges, Pakistan’s defence efforts transcend mere numbers, encompassing a robust strategy to bolster naval, air force, and army capabilities.
The nation’s pursuit of comprehensive modernisation underscores its commitment to maintaining regional equilibrium while addressing internal and external complexities. As Pakistan forges ahead, its multi-domain approach highlights its position as a steadfast player in the ever-changing global security theatre. (Source: army-technology.com)
18 Aug 23. Mission PEGASE 2023. On June 25, departing from Istres Air Base, 19 aircraft deployed for the PÉGASE 23 mission. The group, comprising 10 Rafale, five A330 MRTT Phénix and four A400M Atlas, begin its deployment with a stopover with the French base in the United Arab Emirates (FFEAU). The group then split in two to reach Singapore and Malaysia simultaneously, in less than 30 hours. By reaching this area of the world, 11,000 km from France, the PÉGASE 23 mission fulfilled its projection objective in the time allowed.
This first stage of the mission demonstrated France’s ability to ensure the sovereignty and protection of its territories in the Indo-Pacific through rapid intervention from France.
On June 28, 72 hours after leaving France, PÉGASE 23 landed on the island of Guam, 18,000 km from its starting point for the second phase of the mission. For four weeks, the airmen took part in one of the large-scale American exercises bringing together partners from the region and many allies, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and United Kingdom.
The objective was threefold: to share know-how, to strengthen interoperability and the operational preparation of French forces. In parallel, an A330 MRTT Phénix and an A400M Atlas deployed for the benefit of the Armed Forces stationed in New Caledonia (FANC) and French Polynesia (FAPF).
From the American Andersen air base in Guam, the fighter crews took part in various training sessions with the US Air Force F-35 fighters deployed there for the occasion. Combat pilots and navigators could thus practice visual combat, penetration into enemy territory or even zone defense, in order to reinforce air-to-air detection, identification, classification and commitment.
The crews of the A330 MRTT Phénix tankers reinforced their operational skills in patrol flights with other tanker aircraft.
Finally, the A400M Atlas crews practiced patrolling, dropping packages or even search and rescue at sea (SAMAR – Aero-Maritime Rescue). The exercise was extended in real-world conditions when an A400M successfully took part 9in a rescue mission off Guam. After spotting a vessel in distress in less than twenty minutes at night, then maintaining visual and radio contact for five hours, our airmen actively contributed to the rescue of all the eleven people making up the crew.
The third and final phase of PÉGASE 23 began on July 24. The deployment again separated to be able to reach three distinct geographical points:
— New Caledonia, where two Rafales, accompanied by an MRTT, presented the PÉGASE 23 system to the President of the Republic during his trip to Nouméa. The aircraft then flew to Indonesia and then to the United Arab Emirates before landing in France on August 2.
— Indonesia, where a device remained until July 28 before joining Djibouti then France on July 30.
— South Korea from July 24 to 26, and then Japan until July 29. The third detachment then flew to Indonesia before flying the final stage of the PÉGASE 23 mission in Qatar.
Through exercises, joint flights, static displays, visits by authorities, round tables, these various stopovers made it possible to consolidate partnerships with host nations and the interoperability of forces before returning to France on 3 August.
PEGASE 2023 key figures:
— 40 days of deployment.
— Rafale: 170 sorties (500 flight hours).
— A330 MRTT Phénix: 80 sorties (500 flight hours).
— A400M Atlas: 80 sorties (440 flight hours).
(Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com)
(Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ French Armed Forces Ministry)
18 Aug 23. China’s Defense Minister Promises to Boost Cooperation with Russian Ally Belarus. Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu on Thursday visited Belarus and said his country would increase military cooperation with Russia’s neighbor and ally, where Moscow is deploying tactical nuclear weapons.
Shangfu met with strongman President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk and said “the purpose of my visit to Belarus is precisely the implementation of important agreements at the level of heads of state and the further strengthening of bilateral military cooperation.”
Neither side gave details of what the cooperation will entail, but the two countries have agreed to hold joint military exercises next year.
Li visited Russia just before going to Belarus.
Russian troops that were deployed in Belarus were part of Russia’s invading force in Ukraine and Russian troops and weapons remain there.
Belarusian forces have not taken part in the Ukraine war and Lukashenko on Thursday said China’s military assistance would not be directed against third countries. Lukashenko has previously said Belarus has taken delivery of Russian nuclear weapons and on Thursday he said they could only be used by Belarus if the country was under threat.
“Nuclear weapons, which are in Belarus, will not be used if there is no aggression against us,” Lukashenko said, adding that Belarus would not enter into hostilities against Ukraine as long as its border was not violated.
China claims to be neutral in the conflict in Ukraine but accuses the United States and its allies of provoking Russia and maintains strong economic, diplomatic and trade ties with Moscow.
Belarusian analyst Valery Karbalevich said the visit of the Chinese defense minister is “an important signal not only to the EU and the U.S., but also to Ukraine.”
“With this visit, China marks the scope of its military interests and shows that it is interested in building up ties with Minsk and Moscow, including military cooperation, despite the dissatisfaction of Western countries,” he told The Associated Press. “This is also a signal to Ukraine that the prolongation of the war can force China to take one side.” (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Voice of America News)
17 Aug 23. US slams North Korea for using repression to build nuclear weapons.
The United States slammed North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the United Nations on Thursday for using “repression and cruelty” and totalitarian rule to unlawfully develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
“We cannot have peace without human rights,” U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, told the Security Council, which met to publicly for the first time since 2017 to discuss human rights abuses in North Korea.
“Kim Jong Un’s repressive, totalitarian control of society – and the systemic, widespread denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms – ensures the regime can expend inordinate public resources developing its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs, without public objection,” she said.
North Korea (DPRK) has repeatedly rejected accusations of abuses and blames sanctions for a dire humanitarian situation. Since 2006 it has been under U.N. sanctions over its ballistic missiles and nuclear programs, but there are aid exemptions.
China said it opposed the public meeting of the 15-member council on abuses in North Korea, but it did not attempt to block it on Thursday. China failed four times between 2014 and 2017 to stop public meetings on the issue.
“The council should play a constructive role in resuming talk and easing tensions,” China’s Deputy U.N. Ambassador Geng Shuang told the meeting, which was requested by the United States, Albania and Japan.
“Pushing the council to consider the human rights situation in the DPRK will not only not help to ease, but escalate the situation. It is irresponsible, unconstructive and an abuse of the council’s power,” he said.
‘BLOOD AND SWEAT’
Kim on Monday called for an increase in missile production to be ready for war, while a South Korean lawmaker warned on Thursday that Pyongyang may launch an intercontinental ballistic missile to protest a U.S., Japan, South Korea summit.
U.N. human rights chief Volker Turk said that there had been decades of chronic human rights violations in North Korea, and that many “stem directly from, or support, the increasing militarization of the DPRK.”
He cited widespread forced labor used to “support the military apparatus of the State and its ability to build weapons.”
North Korea did not address the meeting. But on Wednesday it lashed out at human rights in the United States, saying that U.S. soldier Travis King had sought refuge in North Korea from racism and abuse at home and in the U.S. military.
“No country has a perfect human rights record. We all have our flaws. But in open societies, people can protest and drive progress forward,” Thomas-Greenfield the council on Thursday.
Ilhyeok Kim fled North Korea when he was 17. Now in his late 20s, he told the Security Council that he had been forced to do unpaid labor from a young age, planting and harvesting crops.
“The government turns our blood and sweat into luxurious life for the leadership and missiles that blast our hard work into sky,” Kim said.
“The money spent on just one missile could feed us for three months, but the government doesn’t care and is only concerned with maintaining their power, developong nuclear weapons and creating propaganda to justify their actions,” he said. (Source: Reuters)
17 Aug 23. North Korea prepares for military actions in protest of U.S. three-nation summit -South Korea. North Korea may launch an intercontinental ballistic missile or take other military action to protest a summit of the United States, South Korea and Japan, a South Korean lawmaker said on Thursday, citing the country’s intelligence agency.
U.S. President Joe Biden will meet at Camp David in Maryland on Friday with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, hoping to tighten ties between Seoul and Tokyo amid nuclear threats from North Korea and at a time when China’s regional influence is growing.
North Korea (DPRK) has criticised the deepening military co-operation of the three countries as part of a dangerous prelude to the creation of an “Asian version of NATO”.
The reclusive state could also attempt another spy satellite launch at the end of August or early September after its first such effort failed in May, Yoo Sang-bum, a member of the South Korean parliament, told reporters.
There was a chance North Korea would launch the satellite to celebrate its founding anniversary on Sept. 9, Yoo said after a meeting with the chief of the National Intelligence Service.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has set a priority of conducting a launch in the second half of this year, Yoo said.
When asked about the South Korean warning, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said she didn’t have “anything specific on that.”
“We know to expect the unexpected from the DPRK. So we’re prepared for the unexpected,” she told reporters.
North Korea and Russia agreed on broad defence co-operation when the Russian defence minister met Kim last month and watched a military parade with him in the capital, Pyongyang, Yoo quoted South Korean intelligence as saying.
“The National Intelligence Service is anticipating that Russia and North Korea will speed up their defence cooperation and is closely tracing movements” to spot any possible Russian transfer of nuclear missile technology to the North, Yoo said.
Thomas-Greenfied said the visit by the Russian defence minister was a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions by showing “support for their weapons programs and that clearly was what we saw with his presence there.”
Russian officials appear to have visited North Korea this month to discuss details of military co-operation and South Korea spotted signs of military supplies being shipped out of Pyongyang on a Russian plane on Aug. 8, Yoo said.
Washington has criticised North Korea for providing weapons to Russia for its war in Ukraine.
SANCTIONS
On Wednesday, the United States imposed sanctions on three entities it accused of being tied to arms deals between the two countries.
Pyongyang and Moscow have denied arms transactions.
South Korea’s foreign ministry welcomed the latest U.S. measures, saying it would also review imposing further sanctions on the North aimed at curbing its illicit weapons development and arms trade.
“Any U.N. member state should immediately halt military co-operation with North Korea, including illicit arms transactions, that threatens the peace and stability of the international community,” the ministry spokesperson told a briefing.
(Source: Reuters)
17 Aug 23. China’s ambitious defence modernisation sets course for dominance. China’s drive to boost its military prowess reflects its comprehensive modernisation blueprint. China’s relentless pursuit of global dominance is mirrored in its grand defence modernisation plan spanning 2023-2028. With a concerted focus on its navy, air force, and army, China aims to solidify its status as a military powerhouse, driven by evolving security landscapes and regional influence. GlobalData’s recent report, “China Defense Market 2023-2028,” delves into the intricate details of this multifaceted strategy that underpins China’s quest for technological supremacy and territorial ascendancy.
Strategic modernisation drives defence expenditure surge
China’s defence expenditure leaps forward, propelled by a multifaceted strategic vision. President Xi Jinping’s two-stage plan aims to position China as a global leader in terms of national strength and international influence. This ambitious blueprint, bolstered by a decade of robust economic growth, is the cornerstone of China’s defence industry expansion.
Modernisation unveiled: Navy, Air Force, and Army powerhouses
China’s modernisation journey traverses the navy, air force, and army, each increasing its capabilities.
China’s maritime strategy unfolds in three phases, culminating in a blue water navy beyond the second island chain. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is powering into its third phase, enhancing anti-access and area denial capabilities while procuring advanced destroyers, submarines, and missiles.
The skies are the limit for China’s air force, with advancements in fifth-generation aircraft, UAVs, and early warning systems. The indigenously developed J-20 Mighty Dragon stealth fighter and ongoing FC-31 Gyrfalcon programme spotlight China’s aeronautical aspirations.
Ground forces are reinforced through advanced tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, missile systems, and support capabilities, establishing a formidable land-sea-air deterrent.
Navigating geopolitical challenges and alliances
China’s defence modernisation path navigates intricate geopolitical waters. Escalating military expenditures stem from border tensions with India and South China Sea territorial disputes. China’s expanding influence via the Belt and Road Initiative draws international scrutiny, fostering strategic alliances to counterbalance its growing presence.
Digital ramparts: Bolstering cybersecurity and technological resilience
China’s cyber defence is fortified as the Strategic Support Force (SSF) reinforces space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. Safeguarding critical infrastructure and sensitive information is paramount in China’s drive to ensure technological resilience.
Forward march toward a transformed future
China’s all-encompassing defence modernisation strategy charts a course towards global influence and national security. As the nation’s navy, air force, and army surge ahead, the global geopolitical landscape is poised for a paradigm shift, reverberating with the resounding impact of China’s transformative military advancements. (Source: naval-technology.com)
17 Aug 23. Russian Wartime Defense Spending Balloons. In June, after months of speculation, Kyiv launched its much-awaited counter-offensive against the Russian military, aiming to break the impasse that settled over the conflict through the winter and spring months. To date, however, and despite the large amount of military hardware delivered to the country, Ukraine has only re-captured marginal amounts of territory, underscoring the grueling challenge of dislodging Russian forces along the front in the east and south.
Absent a breakthrough by either side on the frontlines, the core question for the longevity of the conflict is how long the combatants can maintain operations, as neither side will seek serious resolution through diplomatic channels if it feels as if it still has an advantage or opportunity on the battlefield. Enthused with its position in the war, Moscow is confident enough to play hardball with recent international efforts to pursue peace talks. Even as it courts friends throughout Africa, Moscow panned an African-led peace proposal and skipped the recent talks in Riyadh geared toward the same purpose. The message from the Kremlin is clear: peace talks must run through Moscow.
Though Russia badly misread Ukraine’s willingness to defend itself at the outset of the war, and the West’s willingness to help it do so, Moscow at this stage believes it can outlast the Western support, ramping up defense spending dramatically to rush equipment and men to the frontlines. Earlier in August, Reuters reported that, over the first six months of this year, Russia spent RUB5.59 trillion on defense, already higher than the approved level. By year-end, that figure could balloon to RUB9.7 trillion (roughly $100 billion), nearly double the original plan for 2023.
Defense spending growth has enabled the industrial sector, in particular, to remain resilient in the face of Western sanctions. President Vladimir Putin highlighted over the summer that many Russian companies without previous exposure to the defense sector have begun producing military products. Rostec official Vladimir Artyakov, meanwhile, has recently boasted to media that combat aircraft production, at least for certain platforms, has doubled, while claiming that armored vehicle production has increased “four times over the year.”
But under the surface, the macroeconomic context has changed dramatically since Russia launched its invasion, raising questions about the sustainability of the defense budget. On the eve of the war, Brent crude traded over $90 per barrel, buoyed by global business and travel reopenings following COVID-19 restrictions. Within weeks of the invasion, the price per barrel rocketed north of $120, a boon for oil exporters like Russia. As much as two-thirds of annual Russian exports are energy-related products.
Russia still entered recession in 2022, with its economy contracting 2.1 percent, according to International Monetary Fund estimates. It is set for a partial, paltry recovery of 0.7 percent this year, and the picture does not look much prettier in the fund’s forward expectations. Nor are energy markets offering much reprieve. By January, natural gas prices had lost their “war premium,” on lower demand in Europe. Oil, meanwhile, has largely traded range-bound between $70 and $90 per barrel this year. Budget receipts are therefore tumbling, even as the Russian government ramps up its expenditures, resulting in a rising deficit.
The lights are still on, but this is a story of stagnation. President Putin commented in June that the goal of increasing defense capabilities “should not harm” the economy; Moscow runs a real risk of doing just that as it continues to run large deficits to maintain the war project.
Russia typically spends around 15-16 percent of its budget on defense – according to the published figures, anyway – but, at RUB9.7 trillion, the defense budget this year is accounting for well over a third of public outlays. As a share of economic output, the budget hovered between 2.6 and 3.8 percent of GDP through the 2010s. It is now over 6 percent of GDP.
In peacetime conditions, this level of defense spending would be quite unsustainable. Speaking in October 2020, then-head of the Accounts Chamber, Alexei Kudrin, assessed that defense spending around the level of 2.8-2.9 percent of Russian GDP was ideal. As finance minister years prior, he had been critical of spending above 3 percent of GDP on the military, teeing up a standoff with President Dmitry Medvedev that ultimately led to Kudrin’s ouster from the position.
The original 2023 Russian government budget, crafted as it was well after the war had already begun, priced-in cuts to defense spending in 2024 and 2025, perhaps on rosy assumptions of where the war would be by the end of 2023. Particularly in light of the recent Reuters report, these cuts have presumably been pushed out into the future, but nevertheless imply that Moscow is aware it cannot spend at these levels forever, even given rising tension with NATO and a pressing need to rearm its battered military.
It is true that Moscow prioritizes stability above all else and has the tools to keep defense expenditures afloat even as energy markets normalize, leading to higher baseline spending habits than in the West, for example. But Russia is not immune to the defense burden on its economy, even if its tolerance is higher, and moreover cannot indefinitely afford to throw rubles away in Ukraine when its primary security concern is really deterring NATO.
(Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Forecast International)
17 Aug 23. RoK Police Raid Arms Procurement Agency Over Suspected Corruption in Aegis Destroyer Project. Police on Thursday raided the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), as part of their investigation into allegations of possible corruption in the process of selecting Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. as the preferred bidder for an indigenous Aegis-equipped destroyer development project in 2020.
The Korean National Police Agency sent investigators to the DAPA headquarters at the Gwacheon Government Complex, just south of Seoul, in the morning to search the DAPA department in charge of the Korea Destroyer Next Generation (KDDX) project to build the next-generation 6,000 ton-class destroyer.
They reportedly seized the KDDX-related bidding documents based on suspicions that a high-ranking DAPA official changed the bidding-related regulation in favor of Hyundai Heavy.
At that time, Hyundai Heavy beat rival bidder Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. by a margin of just 0.056 points. Police suspect that the DAPA official deleted a regulation that specifies penalty points for bidders involved in security breach incidents. Hyundai Heavy was once involved in a KDDX secret leak case involving a former Navy officer.
The DAPA had denied the suspicion saying the concerned bidding regulation was not deleted. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Yonhap News Agency)
16 Aug 23. UK urges all parties to build on truce-like conditions in Yemen and pave the way for a UN-led Yemeni-Yemeni peace process: UK statement at the Security Council.
Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward at the UN Security Council meeting on Yemen.
Thank you, President, and I would like to start by thanking Special Envoy Grundberg, Director Worsornu and Ms Amat Al-Salam for their briefings.
I would also like to join others in condemning the murder of WFP staff member Moayad Hameidi, and echo briefers’ condolences to his family and his friends.
I also want to join others in congratulating the United Nations, the Dutch Salvage company, SMIT, and all who were involved in the successful transfer of oil from the SAFER tanker to the Yemen. The successful completion of this operation demonstrates what can be achieved when all actors work together in the interests of Yemen and its people.
Taking encouragement from the achievement, the UK urges all parties to work together to build on the truce-like conditions in Yemen and pave the way for a UN-led Yemeni-Yemeni peace process. In particular, it is essential that the Presidential Leadership Council remain united towards one common goal: a lasting and inclusive peace for the Yemeni people. An inclusive peace process under UN auspices is the only pathway to end permanently this war.
Madam President, Houthi attacks and continued threats to prevent oil exports from Government controlled areas are severely impacting Yemen’s economy. These attacks on the economy are attacks on the livelihoods and services for some of the most vulnerable people in Yemen. And we urge the Houthis to stop these attacks.
The UK welcomes the recent deposit of $250m from Saudi Arabia, as the first tranche of a generous $1.2bn pledge of economic support.
As Director Worsornu said, the Government of Yemen will remain dependent on external financing to provide basic services and pay public salaries until the Houthis stop their economic warfare and the Government can generate its own revenues.
Colleagues, in spite of the relative peace in Yemen over the last 18 months, the humanitarian situation remains dire. We continue to see impediments to the free movement of female aid workers to deliver assistance to women in need; to independent monitoring and assessment missions; and to the fair selection of humanitarian service providers. The humanitarian response is already severely underfunded. These impediments pose additional, and entirely avoidable, burdens on the humanitarian effort and ultimately on the Yemeni people. We urge the Houthis to lift restrictions and allow unfettered access of humanitarian aid.
Finally, President, the UK reiterates its call for the unconditional release of all Baha’i’s detained by the Houthis. Thank you. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
16 Aug 23. Russia: Investigation shortcomings, water, energy insecurity possible instability trigger in Dagestan. On 14 August, an explosion at a petrol station on a highway in Makhachkala, the capital of the Russian region of Dagestan, killed 35 people and injured over 100. On 15 August, authorities claimed that the illegal storage of agrochemicals products could be a potential cause of the explosion, among others being considered. The incident occurred amid rising regional discontent over water supply and power issues. On 13 August, hundreds of residents of a settlement near Makhachkala blocked a federal highway leading to the capital to protest against water shortages that have occurred throughout most of the summer. On 9 August, similar protests took place against recurrent power supply disruptions. Any shortcomings in the investigation and failures by local authorities to address water and power supply issues could realistically represent a trigger for an escalation of unrest in Dagestan in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Escalation risks remain high despite civilian border monitoring missions. On 15 August, the EU’s civilian monitoring mission in Armenia confirmed that there had been gunfire in the area of one of its patrols along the border with Azerbaijan. The mission initially denied the incident took place, but later issued a corrected statement and disclosed that none of its personnel were harmed. Armenia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that Azerbaijani forces targeted the observers with gunfire on 15 August near the village of Verin Shorzha, approximately less than four miles (6km) from the border. Baku dismissed the accusations as disinformation. Armenia-Azerbaijan tensions have been steadily rising in recent weeks despite international efforts to broker peace. The incident underscores that civilian missions operating in border areas may be insufficient to ensure security and prevent escalations. The strategic communication failure and confusion also risk undermining trust and the legitimacy of the EU mission. Further bouts of cross-border gunfire will consequently likely impede efforts for a peace settlement. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 23. Colombia: Police warns of possible ELN bombings in Bogota, sustaining elevated risk of attack. On 15 August, Colombia’s National Police issued an early warning alert, concerning potential attacks by the ELN guerrilla against security forces and government officials in the capital Bogotá. The alert indicated that members of the ELN’s Eastern War Front, which is largely based in Venezuela, were allegedly mobilising to the capital. Authorities added that these attacks would be retaliation for recent operations against drug traffickers in the area. The announcement comes amidst ongoing peace talks between the government and top ELN leaders in Caracas (14 August). The Eastern War Front has previously derailed peace talks with the government, staging a high-profile bombing in Bogota and increasing the kidnapping of security forces around the Venezuelan-Colombian border. While the ELN leadership in turn has attempted to bring the Eastern War Front into the negotiations, it is unclear how much the leadership structure is able to control fronts on the ground. The risk of attacks in Bogota will likely remain elevated in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 23. Haiti: UN, rights groups propose robust use of force to combat gangs amid rights groups’ concerns. On 15 August, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for a ‘robust use of force’ by a multinational police deployment with military assets to restore order and disarm gangs in Haiti. His comments followed Haiti’s repeated request for international aid to combat criminals overrunning the capital Port-au-Prince. These also followed Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) warnings of widespread rape and killings by gangs, however, the group stressed that safeguards should be in place if external forces deploy. According to a 14 August HRW report, most Haitians support foreign assistance, however, there remains a general concern regarding population protection during a possible intervention after past peacekeeping abuses. Kenya and several other smaller Caribbean nations have signalled their willingness to participate in a peacekeeping mission, however, the likelihood of an immediate decrease in the security risk environment if an intervention is approved remains low. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 23. Libya: Heightened security volatility will likely persist despite Tripoli militia agreement, ceasefire. On 15 August, the Special Deterrence Forces (RADA) and the 444th Brigade reached an initial agreement, halting the ongoing fighting in Tripoli which caused the death of 27 individuals and wounded 106 others. Government of National Unity sources have confirmed that, as part of the mediated deal, RADA has handed over the 444th commander to the Stabilization Support Apparatus (SSA). The SSA will retain him in custody until an old case with the Public Prosecutor’s Office is settled. Tensions were sparked by RADA’s arrest of Mahmoud Hamza, commander of the 444th Brigade at the Mitiga International Airport (MJI) (see Sibylline Alert – 15 August 2023). Confrontations highlight militia territorial and authority competition, as well as the continued volatility of the security environment in Tripoli, despite months of relative stability. The fragility of the recent agreement, amidst currently elevated tensions, will sustain the threat of a resumption of violence in Tripoli in the coming weeks, underscoring a heightened operational risk environment for business staff and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 23. Iraq: Closer security cooperation with the US against IS elevates domestic unrest risks. On 14 August, Iraq formally approved agreements reached during the 7 August joint security cooperation dialogue with the US. As part of the agreements, it will establish a joint high committee with the US-led Global Coalition Against Daesh/Islamic State (IS) and join the international database for lost and stolen weapons. The moves represent the Iraqi government’s readiness to engage in further security cooperation, especially concerning IS, likely bolstering its counter-insurgency capabilities. However, challenges limiting or slowing the process are likely due to US-Iran tensions and Iran-affiliated militias and parties in Iraq. Furthermore, improving relations with the US will likely drive anti-government sentiment and demonstrations against Western, and particularly US, intervention in Iraq. There is an increased likelihood of organised protests led by the Sadrist Movement and Iran-backed organisations in urban centres, particularly in Baghdad, over the coming months, elevating bystander risks. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. New Zealand lays out ‘understand, partner and act’ defence roadmap. New Zealand has outlined its key priorities for the future of defence and national security in a newly released Defence Policy Strategy Statement 2023.
The New Zealand government published the defence roadmap alongside a Future Force Design Principles 2023 and the National Security Strategy, Secure Together – Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki, earlier this month.
The Defence Policy Strategy Statement indicates there are four key interests to be promoted and protected, such as a secure, sovereign New Zealand; a stable and resilient region; collective security through a strong network of partners; and a strong, effective international rules-based system. The statement also details plans for NZ Defence to act proactively to deliver three objectives of promoting and protecting NZ defence interests, contributing globally to collective security efforts, and responding to events in New Zealand, the region, and globally where required. It details two critical threats to NZ of strategic competition and impacts of climate change.
“The world today is contending with a range of complex and disruptive security challenges,” Prime Minister and Minister for National Security and Intelligence Chris Hipkins said.
“In recent years, our country has experienced terrorist attacks, growing disinformation, and cyber attacks on critical national infrastructure.
“The domestic and international security environment has changed and our preparedness needs to change too; to be clear-eyed on risks and to put in place the right capabilities to be effective.
“The earlier we act, the more secure New Zealand will be for our children and grandchildren.
“As we scan the international horizon, we need to keep our eyes wide open to the emerging issues and threats to New Zealand and our interests.
“These emerging threats do not require an entirely new foreign policy response. Our independent position, coupled with targeted investments and strengthened ties with partners and allies, puts us in a strong position to face the future.
“These plans represent an important step in how we are protecting our national security and advancing our national interests in a more contested and more difficult world.”
The Defence Policy Strategy Statement confirms that NZ’s relationship with China is significant and essential cooperation will continue, however, the PRC’s “assertive pursuit of its strategic objectives” is a major driver towards strategic competition among states in the region.
“Beijing continues to invest heavily in growing and modernising its military and is increasingly able to project military and paramilitary force beyond its immediate region, including across the wider Indo-Pacific,” the document said.
“The wider Indo-Pacific is now the central global theatre for strategic competition. Indo-Pacific states are rapidly investing in their military and security capabilities in response to the range of security challenges they are facing.
“Intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific is increasing the potential for confrontation and means conflict could occur, potentially with little warning.
“Potential triggers include increasing tensions relating to Taiwan, maritime tensions and competing claims in the South and East China Seas, and ongoing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, exacerbated by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs.
“Even without deliberate intent, tactical miscalculation could lead to conflict with consequences that could spread across the region, including into the Pacific.
“Heightened competition and tensions in disputed areas of the Indo-Pacific pose potentially significant impacts for New Zealand’s interests.
“Over recent years, the Pacific has become increasingly significant as a theatre for strategic competition. The Chinese government in particular has sought to grow its political, economic, and security influence in the Pacific at the expense of more traditional partners such as New Zealand and Australia.”
The document identified key climate effects such as rising temperatures, melting ice, sea level rise, ocean acidification, intensifying cyclones, changing rainfall patterns, and increasing wildfires. Environmental impacts of concern included coral bleaching, shifting fish stocks and marine life, coastal erosion, decline in agricultural productivity, decline in freshwater resources, declining efficiency of natural carbon sinks, biodiversity loss, and wildfire.
Other factors putting pressure on international security included the COVID-19 pandemic, state and non-state competition for natural resources, technological advances, disinformation, terrorism and violent extremism, and trans-national organised crime.
Key international partnerships outlined in the Defence Policy Strategy Statement include its only formal defence ally of Australia, crucial defence partner the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Canada as part of the Five Eyes partnership, ASEAN, Five Power Defence Arrangements, and Pacific Partnership members.
To achieve its defence policy objectives, the document outlines a strategy of “Understand, Partner and Act” by increased strategic awareness, collective security approaches, and maintaining a credible combat-capable deployable force for humanitarian assistance and combat.
(Source: Defence Connect)
15 Aug 23. Chinese Defense Chief to Attend Security Meeting In Russia, Visit Belarus. Chinese State Councilor and Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu is scheduled to visit Russia, attend an international security conference in Moscow and visit Belarus this week, a move experts said on Monday will contribute to peace and stability, help resolve contradictions in the Ukraine crisis and boost China’s military cooperation with the two countries.
At the invitation of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin, Li will visit Russia, attend the 11th Moscow Conference on International Security in 2023 and visit Belarus from Monday to Saturday, Senior Colonel Wu Qian, a spokesperson at China’s Ministry of National Defense, said in a press release on Monday.
During his visit in Russia, Li will deliver a speech at the Moscow Conference on International Security and meet with Russian and other countries’ defense leaders and in Belarus, Li will meet and hold talks with leaders of the Belarusian government and its military and visit Belarusian military units, Wu said.
The security conference is scheduled to be held on Tuesday, at which heads and representatives of defense agencies, international organizations, and the expert and political science communities will have the opportunity to exchange views on strengthening constructive cooperation in the new realities, said Shoigu in a statement published on the website of the Russian Defense Ministry.
China, Russia and Belarus are expected to deepen military cooperation in a move that is conducive to safeguarding regional peace and stability in Europe and Asia-Pacific, Song Zhongping, a Chinese military expert and TV commentator, told the Global Times on Monday.
The three countries have similar views in many key global affairs, including opposing the US-led Western hegemony and advocating a multipolar world and multilateralism, Song said.
China can also promote peace talks for the Ukraine crisis with Russia and Belarus, Song said.
Western media has been hyping China-Russia military cooperation as a “threat,” with the latest event being China and Russia’s third joint naval patrol that allegedly reached international waters near Alaska in late July and early August.
Experts commented that the joint patrol marks a positive force that helps safeguard regional stability and security of strategic routes in the Asia-Pacific region at the time when the US is enhancing combat readiness and rallying allies and partners in the region to change defense policies and expand militaries, which have escalated regional tensions.
China, Russia and Belarus can deepen military cooperation in terms of joint military exercises, anti-terrorism and defense technologies, Song said. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Global Times)
15 Aug 23. Brazil Will Invest BRL 53bn In Strategic Technologies That Guarantee National Sovereignty.
In a ceremony held this Friday (11th) in Rio de Janeiro, the President of the Republic, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, launched the new Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). During the event, which was attended by the Minister of Defense, José Mucio Monteiro, the Federal Government detailed the initiative, which provides for investments of R$ 53bn ($11.3bn–Ed.) in the Defense area, one of the nine contemplated in the program. Through the initiative, a total of R$ 1.7trn will be invested in all states.
Resources earmarked for Defense will be used to equip the country with state-of-the-art technologies and increase national defense capacity, in addition to strengthening the Defense Industrial Base (BID), generating more jobs and income. Currently, the sector represents around 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and generates 2.9m direct and indirect jobs. The PAC’s Defense axis covers strategic projects for the Armed Forces, such as naval, land, air equipment and integrating systems.
Check below the strategic programs contemplated in the Defense axis of the new PAC:
Navy Nuclear Program (PMN) – Construction of the Embedded Nuclear Plant (PNE) of the Conventionally Armed Submarine with Nuclear Propulsion (SCPN). As intermediate objectives, the Laboratory of Nucleoelectric Generation – LABGENE, which is the prototype on land of the PNE, and the infrastructure of the Fuel Cycle will be developed and obtained.
Submarine Development Program (PROSUB) – Construction in the country of the first Conventionally Armed Submarine with Nuclear Propulsion (SCPN). In addition, the Program contributes to the improvement and innovation of the Submarine Force of the Brazilian Navy (MB), with the construction of four Conventional Diesel-Electric Propulsion Submarines. It is also planned to continue work on the Itaguaí Naval Complex (RJ)
Program for the Development of Patrol Vessels (PRONAPA) – Construction of patrol vessels, which will be developed and built nationally, for use in naval inspection actions and inspection of inland waters, the territorial sea, the Contiguous Zone and the Economic Zone Exclusive (ZEE).
Tamandaré Class Frigates Project – To promote the renewal of the Fleet with the construction of four modern ships of high technological complexity in the country. The frigates will be versatile escorts of significant combat power, capable of countering multiple threats and intended for the protection of maritime traffic, being able to carry out defense missions, close or far, from the Brazilian coast.
Armored Force Strategic Program – Obtain armored vehicles on wheels and tracks, in addition to their component subsystems, such as weapons and communications systems, contributing to the transformation of Motorized Infantry into Mechanized (Inf Mec), in the modernization of Mechanized Cavalry (Cav Mec) and Armored Infantry and Cavalry (Bld).
ASTROS Strategic Program – Contribute to the organization of the Brazilian Army’s missile and rocket artillery (EB), enabling the Land Force to be equipped with a long-range and high-precision strategic fire support system, capable of using guided rockets and missiles cruise tactics at a range of 300 km, which will contribute to strengthening Brazil’s dissuasive capacity.
Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON) – Equip the Army with the necessary means to monitor and control the Brazilian land border strip, with the support of sensors, processors and actuators, among other technological means.
Army Aviation Program – Keep the Army’s aviation up-to-date, in view of the modern means and existing forms of combat, contributing to extra-regional deterrence; for expanding the projection of the EB on the international scene; for sustainable development and social peace.
Air Force FX-2 – Re-equip the fleet of military combat aircraft to protect the national territory and maintain the sovereignty of Brazilian airspace. The initiative foresees the acquisition/production of multi-purpose fighter aircraft (F-39 Gripen NG), in order to expand the FAB’s capacity in fulfilling the tasks of Aerospace Control, Interdiction, Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Force Protection, among others. The project also includes the peripherals needed to support and use equipment with state-of-the-art combat capability.
KC-390 – Develop and acquire multi-mission transport aircraft, freighter type, to carry out logistical air transport missions (troops and cargo) in national and/or global territory, refueling, aeromedical evacuation and in-flight firefighting, as well as adequacy of air base infrastructure to support and operate such equipment.
KC-X – Acquisition of aircraft for in-flight refueling missions, logistical air transport (cargo and passengers), humanitarian actions and aeromedical evacuation, national or international. They are the largest ever operated by the FAB, with a high capacity to transport cargo and travel long distances.
Transport and Refueling – Conversion of FAB A330-200 transport aircraft for in-flight refueling, with preparation for aeromedical evacuation, in addition to materials, equipment and services.
HX-BR – Acquisition of medium-sized helicopters intended for combat support and interdiction tasks, as well as for training missions, which can also be used in humanitarian, national and civic-social integration actions. In addition, the project provides for the acquisition of specific weapons for helicopters, integration systems, logistical support, flight simulators and technology transfer in the area of rotary-wing aircraft.
TH-X – Acquisition of light helicopters for instruction at the FAB, and instruction and operation in maritime environments at the MB. The equipment will replace and standardize the FAB and MB light helicopter fleets, providing increased interoperability and job effectiveness.
(Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Brazil Ministry of Defense)
15 Aug 23. Australia and Japan Deepen Defence Ties. Australia and Japan are strengthening our defence ties with the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) coming into effect. This military agreement provides the legal framework for greater defence cooperation between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF).
It is the first visiting forces agreement Japan has struck with any country outside the United States.
When it comes to practical outcomes, this agreement will see more training and exercises between the two countries, including:
–Japanese F-35s will deploy to Australia, to RAAF Base Tindal for the first time at the end of August
–Exercise Bushido Guardian, where Australian F-35s will be deployed to Japan for the first time in early September
–Australia will participate in Exercise Yama Sakura as a full participant for the first time with more than 150 personnel travelling to Japan in December.
The RAAF will streamline more effective force cooperation, and enable each country to increase the sophistication and regularity of training, exercises and other cooperative activities.
Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon Richard Marles MP, said: “The Reciprocal Access Agreement will deepen the relationship between our respective defence forces, supporting closer cooperation and strengthening the capabilities of both the ADF and the JSDF.
“Both Australia and Japan recognise the increasing complexity of our security environment and the need to grow our partnership to support a stable and prosperous region.”
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, said: “Australia and Japan share an aspiration for a stable, peaceful and prosperous region, and this bilateral Reciprocal Access Agreement will help us deepen our defence cooperation.
“The security and defence relationship between Australia and Japan is critical to both nations, and is underpinned by our Special Strategic Partnership.” (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Australian Department of Defence)
15 Aug 23. Signal: two years on from the Taliban takeover, regime recognition? Recent talks between the US and Afghanistan indicate a gradual trend of international legitimisation of the Taliban government.
Two years ago to the day, Taliban soldiers swept through Kabul, capturing Afghanistan’s capital city in the culmination of an insurgency against the US-backed government which began in 2001.
More than 170,000 casualties and $2.3trn expenditure later, it marked the end of the War in Afghanistan with an outright victory for the Taliban.
On July 30 and 31, representatives from the US and Taliban met for the first time since the takeover. In Doha, officials discussed narcotics restrictions, economic challenges, and steps towards the recognition of the Taliban government, Al Jazeera reported.
Increased relations between Kabul and Washington mark a significant U-turn in US diplomatic policy towards what President Biden called a “God-forsaken place” entrenched in “terrorism”.
While previous US-Afghanistan talks had lacked progress, the US State Department’s engagement with the Taliban has been criticised as legitimising a regime branded as “the least peaceful country in the world” by security and peace think tank Vision of Humanity.
Humanitarian crisis, economic woes
Despite initially promising to uphold women’s rights and press freedom, the Taliban regime has persecuted minority groups and violently suppressed protests amid a slew of disappearances, arrests, torture and extrajudicial executions.
“A year ago, the Taliban made public commitments to protect and promote human rights,” said Yamini Mishra, Regional Director at Amnesty International. “Yet the speed with which they are dismantling 20 years of human rights gains is staggering. Any hopes of change have quickly evaporated as the Taliban seek to govern through violent repression with full impunity.”
As of July 2023, five million Afghans had fled the country and over three million had been internally displaced, according to the UN’s refugee agency. Malnutrition has soared, the economy has plummeted and hundreds of thousands of jobs have been lost. Afghanistan’s crisis is now at a critical level, with 15.3 million people – over 1/3 of the Afghan population – facing acute food insecurity.
This dire humanitarian situation has been compounded by reluctance among foreign companies to invest into Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
GlobalData’s ‘Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment into Asia-Pacific 2022’ report reveals that overseas company investment into the North and Central Asia sub-region is already the lowest across the Asia-Pacific region.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Afghanistan itself has declined sharply due to both the Covid-19 pandemic and the Taliban’s takeover. FDI flows into Afghanistan have plummeted from $119m in 2018 to $21m in 2021, according to UNCTAD’S World Investment Report.
The US defence industry’s gravy train
During its 20-year presence in Afghanistan, the US invested trillions of dollars’ worth of military aid on reconstruction projects and strengthening the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) against Taliban insurgency.
US defence contractors saw profits skyrocket, enlisted without reserve to supply drones, fuel, trucks, planes, helicopters, ships, weapons and munitions – on top of support services from catering and construction to IT and logistics.
Defence stocks outperformed the stock market overall by nearly 60%. Revenue injections enabled the “Big Five” – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamic, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman – to consolidate the industry through acquisitions of second tier manufacturers, including Hughes Aircraft and McDonnell Douglas, and to spend over $2.4bn lobbying US Congress since 2001.
The legacy of such extreme spending is not limited to financial gain among defence companies. Many of the US-manufactured and US-supplied guns, rockets and drones left behind in Afghanistan are now in the Taliban’s possession.
“These weapons are potentially in the service of crushing human rights,” said Aref Dostyar, Afghanistan’s former consul general in Los Angeles. Particularly symbolic were images of the Taliban parading through the streets of Kabul, Kandahar and Herat atop some of the 23,825 armoured Humvees the US left behind.
International engagement with the Taliban regime
Such scenes are undeniably humiliating for the US State Department, but are unlikely to be a predominant factor driving officials back to the Taliban-chaired negotiating table.
No country has formally recognised the Taliban since its return to power. But precedent for any such recognition, slight or significant, will be set by the US government – which is displaying increasing willingness to negotiate, as per the talks in Qatar’s capital at the end of July. Formal recognition is some way off, but legitimisation of the Taliban regime has laid the foundations for Afghanistan’s reintegration efforts.
Central Asian states have been at the forefront of these efforts regarding regional trade and security. Aside from proposals for a trans-Afghan railway line, Kazakhstan welcomed a Taliban delegation to a business forum on August 3. The two nations signed deals to supply grain and flour to Afghanistan worth $200m.
The stance of more influential states has been more indicative of the global trend in regime recognition. While Europe, the UN and USA have stipulated that recognition is conditional on compliance with human rights, Russia and China have engaged diplomatically with Kabul without explicit declarations of recognition.
Beijing has eyes for Afghanistan’s vast reserves of critical rare earth minerals. Chinese companies have invested in Afghanistan’s lithium sector, and have begin drilling for oil in the Amu Darya basin following a governmental deal in January 2023.
According to thinktank Brookings Institution, the likeliest outcome is for the US to engage in extended negotiations with the Taliban, using “recognition as a carrot to urge the Taliban to undertake certain fundamental reforms”.
Perhaps 20 unsuccessful years of deploying the stick in Afghanistan has left the US government with little choice – but efforts to discursively placate Taliban-US relations must take care not to legitimise a regime responsible for unprecedented human suffering. (Source: airforce-technology.com)
15 Aug 23. Libya: Arrest of militia commander in Tripoli will sustain likelihood of violent clashes in near term. Late on 14 August, the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, which is linked to the Special Deterrence Forces (RADA) militia in the capital Tripoli, detained Mahmoud Hamza, the commander of the rival 444th Brigade. The arrest took place at Mitiga International Airport (MJI) in Tripoli before Hamza could board a plane to Misrata (Misrata district). The arrest sparked overnight violent clashes near the Tripoli Medical Center and the Ain Zara area of the capital; confrontations are reportedly ongoing. As a precautionary measure, some commercial flights have been diverted from MIJ to Misrata International Airport (MRA), with air travel disruption likely to persist throughout the day. The Ambulance Emergency Service has also declared a state of high alert and evacuated several residents in southern Tripoli due to the fighting. A volatile security environment will likely persist in the coming hours and days, sustaining heightened bystander and security risks for business assets and staff in Tripoli. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. Niger: Jihadist attack points to persistent risks in western regions; further attacks are highly likely. On 14 August, likely al-Qaeda- or IS-aligned jihadists killed six soldiers and sustained ten losses in an ambush against a military convoy near Sanam (Tillaberi region). The attack follows a similar ambush on 9 August, when gunmen killed at least five soldiers near Bourkou-Bourkou (Tillaberi). In the coming days, the National Guard will likely adopt a heightened security posture in Tillaberi and erect additional checkpoints, disrupting overland transport. There is a realistic possibility that these checkpoints will be targeted by jihadist groups. Nevertheless, heightened tensions with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has assembled a standby force to intervene in Niger following the coup on 26 July, will likely restrict available military resources to combat jihadist activity (see Sibylline Alert – 11 August 2023). As such, further attacks are highly likely, sustaining heightened operational risks, particularly for mining firms and NGOs throughout Tillaberi. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. Nigeria: Helicopter downing reflects likely persistence of bandit activity through 2023. On 14 August, armed gunmen, known locally as bandits, brought down a Nigerian Air Force (NAF) helicopter with small-arms fire near Chukuba village in Shiroro local government area (LGA, Niger state). The helicopter was responding to an ambush by bandits along the Zungeru-Tegina highway (Niger) which late on 13 August, and in which 23 soldiers were killed. The helicopter was transporting 11 dead bodies and seven injured individuals when it was downed. While the destruction of a military helicopter is unusual, bandits shot down an NAF fighter jet with small-arms fire in July 2021. The latest incident is broadly consistent with the prolonged kinetic conflict, and reflects the significant difficulty in nullifying the capabilities of disparate bandit groups (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 19 August 2022). Fighting will likely persist through 2023, sustaining related risks in rural communities and during overland transit, and elevating the likelihood of kidnap. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. Ethiopia: Further airstrikes, clashes will sustain elevated bystander safety risks in Amhara. On 13 August, a suspected Ethiopian government airstrike hit the town square of Finote Selam (Amhara region), killing 26 people. The suspected airstrike follows an escalation in heavy fighting between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and the Fano militia, an Amhara ethno-nationalist group, which prompted the authorities to impose a state of emergency. Since the fighting intensified, there have been reports of airstrikes on other towns in the region, as well as the extra-judicial killing of civilians in the city of Gondar and the town of Shewa Robit (Amhara region). While federal forces have successfully regained control of Fano-captured districts, the Fano will likely be able to utilise heightened ethnic tensions with Tigray and the perceived government repression of Amharans to mobilise support. As such, further airstrikes and clashes are highly likely, sustaining heightened risks to staff and assets across Amhara and disrupting the operations of businesses and NGOs. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. Latvia: Resignation of centrist prime minister elevates government instability risks. On 14 August, Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš announced his resignation to his centre-right New Unity Party, inviting the party to propose a new candidate. He cited the unwillingness of the co-governing United List and National Alliance party to enact a ministerial reshuffle as the reason for his resignation. Kariņš played an important role in the country’s strong stance regarding the war in Ukraine and refused to co-operate with the pro-Kremlin minority in Latvia. With the next general election due in 2026, a new coalition will have to form in the context of a politically divided landscape. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that the country’s pro-Ukrainian stance will change, regardless of the composition of the next coalition. The recent pan-Baltic effort to speed up its decoupling from Russian energy infrastructure and decreasing inflation makes it highly likely that the next government will follow these efforts and continue to be a vocal opponent of the war in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. Russia: Proposal for dual-use radio frequencies underscores tightening grip over information space. On 15 August, the Russian media outlet Kommersant reported that Russia’s draft 2030 strategy for developing the Russian telecom industry proposes that civilian radio operators and law enforcement agencies should share radio frequencies. Accordingly, the initiative outlined by the Ministry of Digital Development will grant law enforcement agencies control over radio frequencies. As such, the security services will have the power to appoint radio frequency operators and to shut down radio frequencies in a state of emergency. Similarly, the ministry proposed establishing a single state-controlled operator of 5G networks in June. Such a measure would also allow state security services to restrict the use of these networks. With the dual use of radio frequencies likely to be implemented, radio stations will be increasingly vulnerable to state censorship. Both initiatives highlight the Kremlin’s broader efforts to restrict the population’s access to information amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. Bolivia: Clashes between ruling party factions in Sucre highlight political instability risks. On 15 August, supporters of Bolivian President Luis Arce and the former president Evo Morales clashed at a labour federation meeting in Sucre (Chuquisaca department). Numerous injuries were reported. Pro-Arce supporters allegedly attempted to convert the regular labour meeting into a congress to elect new leaders, a move which pro-Morales figures rejected. Both Arce and Morales are members of the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, though the movement has fractured in recent years as Morales has distanced himself from controversial policies espoused by Arce. Morales has also recently accused the government of plotting against him, even warning of a possible assassination attempt. The lack of unity inside the party will sustain an elevated risk of political instability in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. Ecuador: Further politically motivated attacks are highly likely after assassination of party organiser. On 14 August, a local director for the former president Rafael Correa’s Revolucion Ciudadana (CR) party was killed outside his home in the town of San Mateo (Esmeraldas province). The murder occurred less than one week before the general election on 20 August and follows the high-profile assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio on 9 August. Correa’s movement blamed government ineptness for the growing rise in violent crime. Ecuador has experienced a spike in murders and overall criminality since 2021. This recent spate of violence suggests that criminal groups are attempting to influence political candidates to secure concessions surrounding security measures and the targeting of narcotics routes. Further politically motivated attacks are highly likely ahead of the election, which is taking place amid a state of emergency that was declared on 9 August. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. Yemen: Televised Houthi threat against Saudi Arabia reflects stalled talks, raised likelihood of attacks. On 14 August, Houthi Supreme Leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi threatened to attack Saudi Arabia’s NEOM in a televised address; this comes amid stalled negotiations with Riyadh. While negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Iran-backed Houthis showed progress in April with a prisoner release deal, they stalled on 23 July over civil servant salaries. The threat also follows the recent deployment of US forces to southern Yemen and a visit by the US special envoy for Yemen to the Gulf on 14 August; al-Houthi claims these factors threaten to protract the conflict. Rising tensions among the Houthis over the limited progress of talks, as well as concerns that Saudi Arabia is currently bolstering its position, will increase the likelihood of attacks targeting Saudi-affiliated military assets in Yemen in the coming weeks. However, regardless of the threat, an escalation triggering cross-border attacks targeting critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia remains unlikely in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 23. North Korea’s Kim, Russia’s Putin exchange letters, vow stronger ties. North Korea leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin exchanged letters on Tuesday pledging to develop their ties into what Kim called a “long-standing strategic relationship,” Pyongyang’s state media KCNA said. The letters mark the 78th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan’s 1910-45 colonial rule, which is also celebrated as a national holiday in South Korea.
In his letter to Putin, Kim said the two countries’ friendship was forged in World War II with victory over Japan and is now “fully demonstrating their invincibility and might in the struggle to smash the imperialists’ arbitrary practices and hegemony,” KCNA said.
“I am firmly convinced that the friendship and solidarity … will be further developed into a long-standing strategic relationship in conformity with the demand of the new era,” Kim was quoted as saying in the letter.
“The two countries will always emerge victorious, strongly supporting and cooperating with each other in the course of achieving their common goal and cause.”
The United States has accused North Korea of providing weapons to Russia for its war in Ukraine, including artillery shells, shoulder-fired rockets and missiles. Pyongyang and Moscow have denied any arms transactions.
Last month, Russia’s defence minister stood shoulder to shoulder with Kim as they reviewed his newest nuclear-capable missiles and attack drones at a military parade in Pyongyang.
Putin, in his message to Kim, also vowed to bolster bilateral ties.
“I am sure that we will strengthen the bilateral cooperation in all fields for the two peoples’ well-being and the firm stability and security of the Korean peninsula and the whole of Northeast Asia,” Putin said, according to KCNA.
The leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan are set to discuss security cooperation over North Korea, Ukraine and other issues at a trilateral summit on Aug. 18 at Camp David. (Source: Reuters)
14 Aug 23. Australia, Japan trade F-35 deployments in reciprocal access deal. Australia and Japan will trade F-35 Joint Strike Fighter deployments later this year as part of a new Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement.
Australian F-35s will be deployed to Japan for the first time in early September during Exercise Bushido Guardian, while Japanese F-35s will deploy to RAAF Base Tindal in Australia for the first time at the end of August.
The military agreement strengthens defence ties and provides the legal framework for greater defence cooperation between the Australian Defence Force and Japan Self-Defense Forces.
“The Reciprocal Access Agreement will deepen the relationship between our respective defence forces, supporting closer cooperation and strengthening the capabilities of both the ADF and the JSDF,” according to Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles.
“Both Australia and Japan recognise the increasing complexity of our security environment and the need to grow our partnership to support a stable and prosperous region.”
Japan operates the 302nd Tactical Fighter Squadron and 301st TFS, as part of the JASDF’s 3rd Air Wing at Misawa Air Base. The JASDF has 147 F-35 aircraft with 105 “A” and 42 “B” variants.
Australia will also participate in Exercise Yama Sakura as a full participant for the first time with more than 150 personnel travelling to Japan in December.
Minister for Foreign Affairs Senator Penny Wong said the RAA will streamline more effective force cooperation and enable each country to increase the sophistication and regularity of training, exercises, and other cooperative activities.
“Australia and Japan share an aspiration for a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region, and this bilateral Reciprocal Access Agreement will help us deepen our defence cooperation,” she said.
“The security and defence relationship between Australia and Japan is critical to both nations and is underpinned by our Special Strategic Partnership.” (Source: Defence Connect)
14 Aug 23. Is Morocco Israel’s next defence Eldorado? On 17 July, Israel officially recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara. This recognition is another sign of the growing ties between the two countries.
Indeed, in December 2020, at the end of COVID-19 outbreak and just before Joe Biden took office, the Trump administration pulled off a historic coup: the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel on the one hand, and the Arab countries of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco on the other. In exchange for the normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel, Morocco also managed to wrest recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara from Washington.
Since then, Morocco and Israel have engaged in an impressive succession of contracts, notably for the supply of arms. While the North African kingdom is in the midst of modernizing its armed forces, particularly in view of tensions with its Algerian neighbour, Israel finds itself with a highly competitive defence industry in many market segments, such as heavy armour, drones and cyber.
Morocco’s military needs and the proactivity of Israeli arms manufacturers
To demonstrate their respective confidence in this partnership, the two countries also signed a framework agreement in November 2021 to provide guiding principles for cooperation between intelligence services, increased links between the two nations’ industry players, arms procurement and joint military exercises.
Arms sales have since taken off, with industrial exchanges and sales. Moroccan F-16s will be fitted with Israeli technologies, while two Israeli UAVs from BlueBird Aero Systems will be built under license. However, Morocco has been using Israeli UAVs, discreetly, for years, with the purchase from France in 2014 of three second-hand Harfang UAVs for $48m, built by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) in cooperation with then EADS. Contracts were signed with the blessing, and assistance, of both states, including visits by the Israeli ministers of industry, foreign affairs and defence, and the organization of two Morocco-Israel economic forums, one in each country.
Since then, contracts have continued to flow in, including anti-missile and anti-drones systems, various types of UAVs and UGVs, cyber security software and more. In 2021 Morocco ordered Harop loitering munitions, and four Gulfstream G550s for electronic warfare; in 2022 it ordered Barak MX missile defence systems for $500m, Elta radars, Skylock anti-drone systems, 150 Wander-B and ThunderB UAVs from BlueBird, and in 2023 ordered 200 Merkava tanks and possibly rocket launchers.
While the relationship between the two countries dates back to the creation of Israel, the rapprochement in the light of the Abraham Accords has given a real boost to trade relations and industrial partnerships. In fact, the Kingdom could welcome a growing number of Israeli companies and factories to its soil, as the latter could benefit from lower labour costs, while Morocco’s relative stability has long attracted European industry players such as Airbus and Safran.
Israel and Morocco are now looking to enhance their relationship, while seeking to mutually benefit from each country’s strengths. For example, IAI has signed a MoU with the International University of Rabat to establish a joint centre of excellence focusing on aeronautics and artificial intelligence research. Elbit Systems, according to Israel’s liaison office in Rabat, is looking to open two sites in Morocco to get better access to the African market.
On top of that, the geographic and climate context which the two militaries operate are relatively similar in both countries, with deserts dotted with more fertile land. Thus, one of the reasons why Israel was unable to export its excellent Merkava tank series was their weight: in the desert, there are no rivers or bridges to cross, so Israeli tanks are known to be particularly well armoured, and therefore, heavy.
On the cyber front, cooperation between the two countries has been thrown into the spotlight by the scandal surrounding Pegasus, the spyware developed by Israel’s NSO. Indeed, secret services of both countries have had relations for decades with Moroccan intelligence being keen to emulate the Israeli Mossad. Although more discreet, sales of Israeli surveillance software and hardware seem to be on the increase.
The impact of increased arms sales between Israel and Morocco
The easing of relations between Morocco and Israel has, however, rekindled rifts with neighbouring Algeria. The two countries have a stormy history, as they clashed in the Sand War, with Algiers supporting the Polisario Front in its current war with Morocco, and the two countries having severed their diplomatic ties. The fact that Rabat has access to first-class weapons is of particular concern to the military junta in Algeria. Morocco’s frenzy of military purchases could generate major new arms contracts for Algeria, which, if it was to procure its equipment mainly from Russia, could continue now to strengthen its military cooperation with China.
Morocco, on the other hand, seems more inclined to acquire Western equipment, whether from Israel or the USA, although contracts also exist with Beijing, with reports of Wing Loong drones operating in the Kingdom’s skies.
Last but not least, the dynamism of commercial and industrial relations between the two countries in the context of arms contracts is further proof, if it was needed, of the worldwide interest in Israeli defence products. With a hefty national investment, helped by US Foreign Military Financing, Israel’s defence industrial base quickly became structured around the need for innovative, effective products, with export seen as a crucial priority.
The current context of increased international tensions and open conflicts – such as those in Nagorno-Karabakh – is sadly serving as a showcase for the effectiveness of the weapons produced in the country. Morocco did notice this, as have other nations.
Written by ADIT – The Bulletin and republished with permission. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
14 Aug 23. Pakistan: Latest BLA attack in Gwadar underlines persistent terrorism threat to China-linked projects. On 13 August, militants belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) attacked a convoy of Chinese engineers in the south-western city of Gwadar (Balochistan province). The convoy, transporting 23 Chinese personnel, came under heavy gunfire while en route to the Gwadar Port, a Chinese-financed project, and an integral part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). While no Chinese nationals were harmed, the Pakistani military killed two militants and injured three others. As a separatist militant group, the BLA has a history of targeting Chinese interests and personnel in Pakistan, underlining the security risks for entities linked to China (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 27 April 2022). With the Pakistani government already facing mounting pressure from Beijing due to the deteriorating security environment in Balochistan surrounding CPEC projects, this incident will further undermine foreign investors’ confidence. The Pakistani military will likely conduct counter-terrorism operations in the coming days, increasing disruption and bystander risks around foreign-funded projects in Gwadar. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. Niger: Diplomatic engagement unlikely to resolve regional tensions; intervention remains likely. On 13 August, a Nigerian delegation of Islamic scholars that met with junta leader General Abdourahamane Tchiani, announced the junta was open to negotiations with Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The junta had previously refused to permit the arrival of an ECOWAS delegation, prompting the body to activate a standby force (see Sibylline Alert – 11 August 2023). However, the junta has also stressed that it intends to charge deposed President Mohamed Bazoum with high treason, threatening it will kill Bazoum if there is an intervention. While diplomatic engagement will likely delay further ECOWAS action, these efforts are unlikely to restore civilian rule in Niger, sustaining the risk of intervention and underscoring persistent risks to business staff and assets. In preparation for potential intervention, the junta will almost certainly adopt a heightened security posture in the capital Niamey in the coming days, likely restricting movement and access to Niger’s road network, hampering evacuation efforts and disrupting supply chain continuity in affected areas. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. Mali: Security environment will highly likely deteriorate following MINUSMA’s withdrawal. On 13 August, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) announced the acceleration of its planned withdrawal from the northern village of Ber (Tombouctou region). The announcement comes amid increasing tensions between the Malian government and Tuareg rebel groups (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 8 June 2023). On 12 August, the Tuareg-led coalition the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), accused Malian forces of attacking its forces near Ber, while the Malian army accused the group of killing six soldiers. Fighting in Ber substantially undermines existing ceasefire agreements, elevating the risk of conflict escalation and the risks to staff and assets in surrounding areas, including Timbuktu city. The UN’s accelerated withdrawal from Ber will compound this trend by reducing deterrence for CMA operations. A broader MINUSMA withdrawal will also reduce oversight for military operations against Tuareg communities, increasing the likelihood of Tuareg alliances with the JNIM jihadist group, further undermining northern Mali’s security environment. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. South Africa: Zuma’s release likely to increase ANC divisions, elevate risks to government stability. On 11 August, President Cyril Ramaphosa approved a court remission allowing former president Jacob Zuma to avoid returning to jail to serve the remainder of his 15-month sentence. While the government announced that this was part of a broader measure to reduce prison overcrowding by releasing non-violent offenders, it will likely be viewed as effort to mitigate unrest from Zuma supporters. While Zuma is unlikely to return to politics, he retains a loyal following within the ruling Africa National Congress (ANC). As such, there is a realistic possibility that his return to society as a public figure will embolden his supporters, intensifying fracturing within the party. Furthermore, President Ramaphosa’s decision is likely to exacerbate public anger over lack of accountability and corruption within the ANC. Such allegations will further undermine electoral prospects ahead of the 2024 general elections, increasing risks of political deadlock and government instability during the next administration. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. North Korea: Calls to increase defence capabilities will sustain inter-Korean, regional tensions. On 14 August, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un called for a ‘drastic boost’ in missile production to secure ‘overwhelming military power’ and war-readiness following recent visits to defence factories. His visits are the latest in a series of inspections of defence manufacturers. The visits are likely seeking to bolster military modernisation efforts amid improving US-South Korea military relations, which Pyongyang perceives as highly threatening. Kim’s statement followed the announcement that US and South Korean forces will conduct the ‘largest scale ever’ Ulchi Freedom Guardian joint exercise on 21-31 August, which will focus on countering Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear threats. Tensions will most likely rise during the event with Pyongyang likely responding with military activity to protest and highlight its disapproval. While the exercises and tit-for-tat actions will increase the risk of temporary disruption to the aviation and maritime industries operating near the Korean peninsula, other businesses will remain largely unaffected. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. Malaysia: Medium-term political stability risks will increase despite status quo state election results=. On 12 August, local elections resulted in the alliance made up of Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN) holding on to three state assemblies (Negeri Sembilan, Penang and Selangor), while Perikatan Nasional (PN) held on to Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu. Notably, PN significantly increased its control in the three states while making inroads in the remaining three. PN leader Muhyiddin Yassin claimed the results indicated a ‘rejection’ of the unity government. The polls have been viewed as a referendum on the government led by PH’s Anwar Ibrahim, which came into power last November. While avoiding losing a state gives Anwar some breathing room, BN’s poor performance has prompted growing calls for internal changes. If BN leader Ahmad Zahid Hamidi is replaced, new leadership may decide BN is not benefitting from being the junior partner to long-time rivals PH and leave the alliance. Such an eventuality would significantly destabilise the government and drive policy uncertainty in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. Russia-Turkmenistan: Russian-led ‘gas union’ will likely undermine Turkmenistan’s regional exports. On 12 August, Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement expressing concerns over Russia’s plans to establish a gas union with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Within the gas union, first presented in November 2022, Astana and Tashkent would import Russian gas for domestic consumption. Due to their own undeveloped energy infrastructure, these countries have been unable to produce gas from large domestic reserves to satisfy growing domestic needs. Turkmenistan has been supplying these countries with gas in recent years, but it has not been able to provide technological assistance to maintain and modernise gas infrastructure. Notably, in January 2023, Ashgabat suspended gas supplies to Uzbekistan due to reported technical issues. Given Russia’s ability to supply gas and manage energy infrastructure, Moscow’s gas union likely appears more attractive to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. With Moscow increasingly aiming to supply Central Asian markets to partially offset losses from the European markets, the union will pose a moderate threat to Turkmenistan’s gas exports. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. Argentina: Far-right presidential candidate’s win in primary election increases risk of pro-government protests, unrest. On 13 August, far-right presidential candidate Javier Milei secured an unexpected first-place finish in the country’s primary elections, securing 30.5% of the vote. The populist economist outpaced both the main conservative opposition bloc (28%) and the ruling left-wing Peronist coalition (27%). The primary elections are widely seen as a litmus test for voter support, in large part because the vote is mandatory. Milei’s rise reflects deep public discontent with traditional parties amid spiralling inflation, hovering at 116%, and increasing poverty. With Milei gaining momentum, the government and left-wing groups will likely ramp up efforts to mobilise their electoral base and traditional allies, including powerful labour groups. This will likely lead to large-scale mobilisations in major cities, particularly in the capital Buenos Aires, ahead of the country’s presidential ballot on 22 October. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. Colombia: IED attack targeting senator’s escort underscores sustained threats from militant groups. On 13 August, two soldiers were injured in an IED attack while they were part of an advance escort for a senator, Juan Felipe Lemos, in the Anori municipality (Antioquia department). The attack occurred before Lemos, from the centrist Partido de la U party, was due to arrive for campaign events. Authorities blamed the bombing on FARC dissidents active in the area. The incident occurred after a soldier was recently kidnapped on the road connecting the municipalities of Caloto and Santander de Quilichao (Cauca department), with the Dagoberto Ramos FARC dissident front claiming responsibility for that incident. IED attacks targeting security forces are common in rural areas of Antioquia, where dissident guerrilla and paramilitary forces are present. Further attacks against election candidates and officials are likely in the medium term.(Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. Iran: Shrine attack underscores security volatility ahead of anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death. Late on 13 August, a shooting incident at the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz (Far province) killed one and wounded eight others. Iranian authorities have arrested four individuals, but no group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the Shia Muslim pilgrimage site. A similar attack also took place on the Shah Cheragh Shrine in October 2022 (see Sibylline Alert – 26 October 2022) and was later claimed by the Islamic State. A heightened security posture across Shia religious sites in Iran is likely in the near term, including the stationing of armed guards and erection of roadblocks. The incident further underscores the continued volatility of the security environment in the country. There is a realistic possibility of the government attributing the attack to Sunni extremists in order to further justify security measures to repress demonstrations ahead of the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death. This will heighten the likelihood of unrest and clashes in cities with sizeable Sunni populations, amid sustained anti-government sentiment.(Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. US-Iran: Potential deal to unfreeze Iranian funds will not reduce sanctions, compliance risks for firms. On 11 August, White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby informed reporters that the release of any frozen Iranian funds could only be used for non-military means, such as for food, medicine, or medical equipment. The pending deal, if approved, would release funds currently frozen in South Korea to Qatar, where Iran could then access the assets. In exchange, five American citizens currently held prisoner by the Iranian government would be placed under house arrest in Tehran. Republican members of Congress have sharply criticised the potential deal, alleging that the funds are tantamount to a ransom, and could allow the Iranian government to divert existing state funds toward its nuclear programme or destabilising military activities. The release of assets is not considered ‘sanctions relief’; therefore, it is highly likely that sanctions risks will remain elevated, and enduring limitations for trade will be sustained.(Source: Sibylline)
14 Aug 23. North Korea’s Kim orders making more missiles ahead of S. Korea, US drills. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has called for an increase in missile production to help secure “overwhelming military power” and be ready for war, state media KCNA said on Monday, as South Korea and the United States gear up for annual military drills.
Kim gave the order as he visited key munitions factories that produce tactical missiles, missile launch platforms, armoured vehicles and artillery shells on Friday and Saturday.
His field inspection was the latest in a string of visits to arms factories, where he ordered mass production of weapons, and came days before South Korea and the U.S. are to begin annual military drills, which Pyongyang sees as a rehearsal for war.
Kim noted an “important goal to dramatically increase” missile production capacity to meet the needs of the expanded and strengthened frontline military units, KCNA said.
“The qualitative levels of war preparations depend on the development of the munitions industry, and the factory has a tremendous responsibility in accelerating our military’s war preparations,” he was quoted as saying.
At other plants, Kim inspected and drove a new utility combat armoured vehicle, and praised recent progress in modernising production lines for large-caliber multiple rocket launcher rounds, KCNA said.
There was a “very urgent need” to “exponentially increase” the production of such rockets to strengthen frontline artillery units, he said.
“Our army must thoroughly secure overwhelming military power and solid readiness to handle any war at any time, so that the enemy does not dare to use force, and would be annihilated if it does,” Kim said.
South Korea and the United States said on Monday that they would stage the Ulchi Freedom Guardian summer exercises on Aug. 21-31 to improve their ability to respond to North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile threats.
North Korea has denounced the allies’ military drills as a rehearsal for nuclear war.
This year’s drills will be held on the “largest scale ever”, mobilising tens of thousands of troops from both sides, as well as some member states of the U.N. Command, for about 30 field training programmes, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
“The exercises are an essential element in maintaining robust combined defence posture in case of emergency – absolutely necessary to respond to the growing military threat from North Korea,” JCS spokesman Col. Lee Sung-jun told a briefing.
The United States has accused North Korea of providing weapons to Russia for its war in Ukraine, including artillery shells, shoulder-fired rockets and missiles.
North Korea and Russia have denied any arms transactions.
The leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan are also set to discuss security cooperation over North Korea, Ukraine and other issues when they gather for a trilateral summit on Aug. 18 at Camp David.
KCNA separately said on Monday that Kim visited “typhoon-hit areas” after tropical storm Khanun swept over the Korean peninsula last week, flooding farmlands. (Source: Reuters)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
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