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20 Jul 23. State Dept. Outlines AUKUS Trade Authorization Mechanism. The U.S. Department of State has posted a Fact Sheet outlining the AUKUS Trade Authorization Mechanism (ATAM). According to the Fact Sheet, the mechanism is designed to facilitate trade of U.S. defense articles and defense services between the United States, the UK, and Australia in support of AUKUS programs, for both Pillar I (providing Australia with a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability) and Pillar II (advanced capabilities). This is an interim measure to streamline defense trade of U.S. origin items while the Biden Administration pursues more comprehensive legislative changes. This approach was adopted to address concerns regarding how the speed and efficiency of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) processes would be inadequate for the expected increase in the volume of AUKUS-related defense trade. The implementation of the ATAM involves the following steps:
- Identify the scope of AUKUS programs. This will optimize operations and compliance, as both government and industry will have a clear understanding of which uses/programs are authorized under this Mechanism.
- Identify what technologies are not eligible under this Mechanism.
- Identify which communities in each country would be approved for access to the technology, which includes an obligation to record what is transferred and to secure and protect the technology. This will help reduce the likelihood of unauthorized diversion of sensitive defense technologies and, if necessary, help to investigate any potential diversion.
Next, the utilization of ATAM will proceed as follows:
- The exporter must check proposed transfers under AUKUS against these three basic and transparent criteria (programs, technologies, and authorized communities) that Defense and State would develop, and review with partners.
- Transfers beyond the UK or Australia, or transfer to a non-AUKUS program or a community not eligible to receive it, would require standard non-ATAM authorization.
- Based on legislation, the U.S. government would need to notify shipments under this authorization exceeding $100m at least 15 days prior to the shipment. Existing systems will be utilized to conduct congressional notification.
The ATAM will allow DCS transfers of some items typically transferred only under FMS. According to the Fact Sheet, ATAM offers an immediate solution to expedite and secure defense transfers of U.S. defense items for AUKUS projects, leveraging existing authorities (ITAR § 126.4 of the ITAR) to allow seamless and speedy defense trade. (Source: glstrade.com)
20 Jul 23. UK sanctions Wagner Group leaders and front companies responsible for violence and instability across Africa. 13 new UK sanctions announced targeting individuals and businesses linked to the actions of Wagner Group in Africa.
• New UK sanctions target 13 individuals and businesses linked to the actions of the Russian Wagner Group, including executions and torture in Mali and the Central African Republic and threats to peace and security in Sudan
• This includes three designations for the mercenary group’s top officials in Mali and CAR, including the ‘right hand man’ of Yevgeny Prigozhin, who have deliberately targeted civilians in their operations
• A further five businesses and individuals involved in threatening peace and stability in Sudan, including through disinformation campaigns and providing military equipment, have been targeted.
The UK government has today (Thursday 20 July) announced a wave of sanctions against individuals and businesses involved with the Wagner Group in Mali, Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan. These measures will limit their financial freedom by preventing UK citizens, companies and banks from dealing with them, alongside freezing any assets held in the UK and travel bans.
The Russian mercenary Wagner Group has operated in Mali, CAR and Sudan for several years, aggressively pursuing Russian foreign policy interests in the region and providing military support to counter-terrorism operations which have seen hundreds of civilians killed. The UK has already sanctioned the Wagner Group, its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, and several of his key commanders who have participated in Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.
The head of the Wagner Group in Mali, Ivan Aleksandrovitch Maslov, is one of those targeted today. Wagner mercenaries, alongside Malian forces, massacred at least 500 people in Moura in March 2022, including summary executions as well as rape and torture.
The head of the Wagner Group in CAR, Vitalii Viktorovitch Perfilev, and the Wagner Group’s head of operations in the country, Konstantin Aleksandrovitch Pikalov, are sanctioned for deliberately targeting civilians.
Pikalov, known as the Wagner Group founder and CEO Yevgeny Prigozhin’s “right hand man”, is the operational head of Wagner in CAR. Pikalov is responsible for the Wagner Group’s torture and targeted killings of civilians.
Wagner Group has also provided weapons and military equipment to Sudan. Three businesses, which act as fronts for the Wagner Group and operate in the country, have been included in the new measures, due to the continued risk they pose to peace and stability. These include M-Invest, and its subsidiary Meroe Gold. These build on recent sanctions against companies funding the conflict.
Andrew Mitchell, Minister for Development and Africa, said:
The Wagner Group is committing atrocities in Ukraine, as well as acting with impunity in countries like Mali, Central African Republic and Sudan. Wherever Wagner operates, it has a catastrophic effect on communities, worsens existing conflicts and damages the reputations of countries that host them.
These sanctions expose despicable individuals who have commissioned violations of international humanitarian law, holding them to account for the severe harm they are inflicting on innocent civilians for financial gain.
The UK announced a package of sanctions linked to Sudan last week, targeting six companies providing funding and military equipment to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Through diplomatic engagement and aid programmes, the UK continues to support local, national and international efforts to promote long-term prosperity and stability in Mali, CAR and Sudan.
The UK remains deeply concerned by the destabilising role Wagner plays in this region. Wagner mercenaries operating in Africa have long been reported as being responsible for multiple breaches of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, including numerous reports of indiscriminate killings of unarmed civilians. The group’s presence in Africa is self-serving as demonstrated by their grip on the security and economic environments as well as their continued exploitation of natural resources.
The individuals and businesses sanctioned today are:
Mali
• Ivan Aleksandrovitch Maslov, the head of the Wagner Group’s operations in Mali, who oversaw the group’s involvement in the Moura Massacre and has been involved in the commission of violations of international humanitarian law, in particular, the deliberate targeting of civilians.
Central African Republic
• Alexander Alexandrovich Ivanov, the Wagner Group’s unofficial spokesperson in CAR, for his association with the Group which has committed violations of international humanitarian law, deliberately targeting civilians.
• Aleksandr Grigorievitch Maloletko, a military instructor for the Wagner Group and a close associate of Yevgeny Prigozhin, for his association with the Group which has committed violations of international humanitarian law.
• Dimitri Sytii, an individual associated with the Wagner Group in CAR which has violated international humanitarian law, deliberately targeting civilians.
• Konstantin Aleksandrovitch Pikalov, a close advisor of Yevgeny Prigozhin, for his involvement in the commission of violations of international humanitarian law in CAR, in particular the deliberate targeting of civilians.
• Mining company Lobaye Invest Sarlu for involvement in activities which threaten the peace, stability and security of the CAR, including through acts that undermine efforts to resolve armed conflicts, such as funding the training of CAR army recruits by Russian mercenaries.
• Sewa Security Services, a CAR-based security company (and subsidiary of Lobaye Invest Sarlu) for its involvement in activities which undermine or threaten the peace, stability and security of the CAR, including by providing support for and/or promoting the actions of the Wagner Group in CAR.
• Vitalii Viktorovitch Perfilev, the head of Wagner Group operations in CAR, for violating international humanitarian law by deliberately targeting civilians.
Sudan
• Andrei Sergeevich Mandel, Director General of M-Invest which in itself is responsible for action which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan.
• M-Invest, a company serving as a front for the Wagner Group, for threatening the peace and security of Sudan. M-invest has previously advised the Sudanese government on disinformation campaigns to discredit pro-civilian government protestors.
• Meroe Gold, a mining subsidiary of M-Invest, for threatening the peace, stability and security of Sudan. Meroe Gold has imported equipment to Sudan including weapons, helicopters and military trucks.
• Mikhail Potepkin, Regional Director of M-Invest and Director of Meroe Gold, for threatening the peace and stability in Sudan. Potepkin is associated with the Wagner Group. He worked to ensure planes hired by Meroe Gold could continue operate domestically and internationally whilst being undetected by commercial aviation radars.
• Al-Solag Mining, for threatening the peace, stability and security of Sudan by its association with Meroe Gold (and for its attempts to avoid existing Western sanctions and Sudanese regulations).
• (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
19 Jul 23. Togo: Terrorist attack underscores rising threat of jihadist expansion, elevating risks to staff. On 17 July, unidentified militants ambushed a military convoy in Sankortchagou (Savanes region), killing at least 12 security personnel. Though no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it was likely carried out by Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). JNIM primarily operates in Mali and Burkina Faso, however, continued instability has enabled militants to conduct cross-border attacks into Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 12 May 2022). While still highly uncommon, further cross-border attacks are likely and there is a realistic possibility these will increase in frequency as conditions deteriorate in Mali and Burkina Faso, underscoring risks to the safety of staff in border regions. A heightened security posture will likely be adopted throughout Savanes over the coming weeks, increasing disruptions to movement. Jihadists’ continued targeting of military personnel in border regions will likely sustain heightened risks to businesses and NGOs using government convoys as protection and around checkpoints. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jul 23. Hong Kong: Appointment of former senior intelligence officer will sustain national security concerns. On 18 July, Dong Jingwei was appointed as director of Hong Kong’s Office for Safeguarding National Security, replacing Zheng Yanxiong. Dong is a former vice-minister for China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), its national intelligence and counter-intelligence agency, underscoring Beijing and Hong Kong’s growing emphasis on national security (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 6 July 2023). Much remains unknown about Dong’s career, however, he previously urged Chinese intelligence officers to ramp up their counter-espionage efforts in 2021. As such, he will likely sustain China’s current anti-espionage campaign and the pervasiveness of Hong Kong’s National Security Law (NSL), further aligning Hong Kong’s national security policies with China. Dong’s background and expected governance style will also sustain foreign investors’ worries over the expanding role of national security in political affairs, driving uncertainty. Similarly, the elevation of national security concerns, especially concerning alleged foreign interference, will sustain tensions with the US and other regional geopolitical competitors. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jul 23. North Korea: US soldier incident likely to give Pyongyang leverage in future political engagements. On 18 July, Travis King, a serving US soldier, was detained in North Korea after he wilfully crossed the border in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). King was reportedly being put on a flight to the US after facing disciplinary action for assault. He left the airport and joined a civilian tour of the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom in the DMZ. The incident occurred during a period of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Earlier on 19 July, North Korea fired two suspected short-range ballistic missiles into waters near Japan likely in response to the port visit by a US nuclear ballistic missile submarine to South Korea (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 18 July 2023). It is possible that Pyongyang will use King’s detention as leverage in pushing for political dialogue and negotiation with Washington DC, which will plausibly provide a way to manage tension escalation in the medium to long term. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jul 23. Russian Armed Forces to Get More Fifth-Generation Fighter Jets — Prime Minister. Russia plans to increase the deliveries of fifth-generation fighter aircraft to its armed forces, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin said.
“It is planned to increase the deliveries of fifth-generation fighter aircraft,” the head of the Russian government told a coordination council on meeting the needs of the Russian armed forces on Tuesday.
He said that one of the council’s priorities is to ensure that the state procurement order is being implemented in time.
“For example, late next month aircraft makers handed over another batch of new Su-35S aircraft to the defense ministry. More aircraft are already being manufactured,” he added.
Moreover, the premier added that Uralvagonzavod had already delivered its scheduled batch of T-90M Proryv and T-72BZM tanks.
“The enterprise has gained a considerable momentum over the past year, more than tripling its production output in the reported period. The armored vehicles that they manufacture is particularly required for fulfilling the tasks of the special military operation,” he said.
Su-57 (Felon by NATO classification) is a fifth-generation Russian multi-functional fighter jet designed to destroy all kinds of air, ground-based and surfaced targets. The aircraft has a supersonic cruising speed, intra-fuselage weapons, radio-absorbing equipment (a “stealth” technology) as well as the newest onboard equipment. The intellectualization of Su-57 systems allows them to take on part of the pilots’ functions, including pilotage and preparation for the use of weapons. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/TASS)
19 Jul 23. Uralvagonzavod Delivers New Batch of T-90M, T-72B3M Main Battle Tanks to Russian Troops. The Uralvagonzavod defense manufacturer (part of the state tech corporation Rostec) delivered a new batch of advanced T-90M Proryv (Breakthrough) and upgraded T-72B3M main battle tanks to Russian troops, the Industry and Trade Ministry announced on Tuesday.
“Defense enterprises timely meet the needs of our Armed Forces for advanced and reliable hardware. This work is controlled by the Russian Government’s Coordination Council. Enterprises have gained a good pace. In particular, Uralvagonzavod has boosted output more than threefold over the past year and has now delivered the next batch of T-90M Proryv and upgraded T-72B3M tanks to Russian troops. This armor is especially in demand in fulfilling objectives in the zone of the special military operation,” the statement reads.
Uralvagonzavod qualitatively and timely fulfils the tasks set by the state in providing the army with reliable military hardware, Uralvagonzavod CEO Alexander Potapov said.
“This is proven by invariably good assessments of Uralvagonzavod’s armor given by the military participating in the special military operation,” the chief executive said.
The upgraded T-72B3M tank features new protection that considerably enhances its survivability and the efficiency of employing this armor both in a combined arms battle and in a combat environment with the massive use of anti-tank weapons.
The upgraded T-72B3 tank is also outfitted with a new fire control system that features an automatic process of preparations for fire and considerably raises fire accuracy. The tank is equipped with a 1,000 hp high-power engine.
The T-72B3M is an upgraded version of the T-72B3 tank that has received a new sight system with a digital display and a rear view video camera. The tank’s armor has been reinforced with Relikt reactive armor side plates. The tank has also received a new 125mm cannon with the enhanced barrel life, a new R-168-25U-2 Akveduk ultra-short-wave radio station, new fire-fighting equipment and a Sosna-U multi-channel gunner sight.
The T-90M Proryv is the most advanced armored vehicle in the family of T-90 main battle tanks and most of all fit for modern warfare thanks to its all-round armor protection, top-notch all-weather highly automated fire control and enhanced survivability.
The tank has received a fundamentally new turret differing from the serial-produced combat module and a more powerful 1,130 hp engine. The Proryv is outfitted with a 125mm tank cannon that can fire new powerful munitions and also missiles capable of wiping out enemy tanks from a range of 5 km.
The new multichannel sight enables the tank to employ its armaments at any time of the day or night. In addition, the option of exchanging data with other combat vehicles in real time has been one of the upgraded tank’s major advantages. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/TASS)
19 Jul 23. Bangladesh: Anti-government protests will sustain threat of violence ahead of 2024 polls. On 18 July, tens of thousands of people took part in nationwide anti-government marches organised by the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The BNP is calling for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign so the general election, scheduled for January 2024, can be held under a neutral caretaker government. The BNP claimed that rallies in at least 17 locations were attacked by supporters of the ruling Awami League (AL), including in the capital Dhaka and Lakshmipur district (Chittagong division) where one BNP activist was allegedly killed, with hundreds reportedly injured. The BNP also accused the police of opening fire on protestors. The upcoming polls come amid heightened tensions after the AL was accused of undermining the last two general elections, with the US among others calling for a free and fair ballot. Regular protests and political rallies are highly likely in the coming months, driving the risk of unrest nationwide. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jul 23. Ammunition and electronic systems dominate SA’s 2022 defence exports. Ammunition and electronic systems accounted for the majority of South African defence exports last year, according to the latest National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) annual report, with big items like armoured vehicles making up a relatively small percentage.
For the calendar year 2022, South Africa exported R4.679bn worth of military hardware and munitions, up from R3.353bn in 2021. At approximately R420 m, armoured vehicles made up only a small portion of South African arms exports, with armoured vehicles being sold to Congo (1), Ghana (6), Guinea (2), North Macedonia (2), Mali (2), Niger (8), Senegal (16), Togo (3), UAE (1), Unites States (4), and Zambia (2), according to the NCACC.
Similarly, modest amounts of “large calibre artillery” worth R113 m was sold to Djibouti (4), Egypt (3), France (10), Switzerland (4), Uganda (8) and the United States (4).
Ammunition accounted for the largest single component of South Africa’s 2022 arms exports, amounting to R1.628 bn. Some of the larger customers for “round/shell” items included Australia (R382m for 8 203 items); Germany (R119m for 9 816 items); India (R315m for 316 135 items); Qatar (R181m for 49 201 items); and the UAE (R420m for 42 800 items). Other ammunition customers included Bangladesh, the Philippines, Rwanda, Spain, and Turkey.
Similarly, bombs and rockets made up R946m worth of arms exports in 2022, with Germany, for example, acquiring 18 420 bombs (most likely mortar bombs) worth R575m, and the Philippines acquiring 189 921 bombs for R204 m. Qatar bought over 2 000 rockets for R1.7m and the UAE bought 399 907 bombs for R126m. Other customers included Saudi Arabia and Zambia, buying 8 961 and 380 bombs respectively.
After bombs, rockets and artillery rounds, electronic equipment accounted for the second largest portion of defence exports, amounting to R1.3bn in 2022. Some of the larger exports included communications equipment to India (R55m) and Mali (R39m); measuring equipment to the United Kingdom (R32m); countermeasures equipment to Germany (R79 m); and observation equipment to Turkey (76 items for R1.047bn) and the UAE (32m).
R15m worth of ‘alerting and warning systems’ were sold to China, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, and Sweden. Total communication, measuring, and electronic warfare exports amounted to R147m last year, while imaging, observation and countermeasures equipment came to R1.191bn. Sales of software and technology, including electronic warfare and countermeasures equipment, came to R8m in 2022.
Other notable sales in 2022 included R210m worth of light weapons. Bangladesh was the biggest recipient of light weapons, receiving 1 000 worth R79m. Other customers included Brazil, Denmark, France, Malaysia, Korea, Peru, Singapore, the UAE and United States, but these were for between 1 and 72 items.
The only aircraft being listed as exported last year was a single helicopter worth R12m to Ghana, while Malaysia received 66 missiles (possible Ingwes for its armoured vehicle turrets supplied by Denel) worth R79m.
The NCACC report also lists R599m worth of dual use exports in 2022. However, when all dual use exports are tallied up, they only come to R386m, not R599m as stated in the report.
Dal use exports for 2022 included R70m worth of armour (17 000 units) sold to Angola, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, France, Portugal, Romania, Singapore and the UAE. Communications equipment worth R136m was sold to over a dozen countries. Information security technology worth R56m was exported to eight nations.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) worth R299m were sold ten nations, including 36 to Benin (for R29m); nine to Brazil (R11m); seven to the DRC (R3.4m); ten to Cote d’Ivoire (R8m); five to Mali (R5.6m); nine to Mozambique (R2.8m); 82 to Nigeria (R70m); nine to Saudi Arabia (R5 m); two to the United States (R162m); and ten to Zambia (R1.8m).
With regard to imports, in 2022 South Africa imported 40 ‘large calibre artillery’ weapons from France (R25 m); two from Switzerland (R5.4m), and 80 artillery weapons from the United Arab Emirates (R113m). Seventy-eight light weapons were imported from the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Turkey, the UAE and United States. Over a million rounds of ammunition were received from China, Norway and the UAE. Small amounts of countermeasures equipment, imaging equipment, warning and communication equipment were received from the UK, Australia, Belgium, and Sweden. Imports, according to the NCACC, amounted to R301m in 2022.
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
18 Jul 23. India-Argentina Sign Agreements To Strengthen Cooperation In Defence. Argentina’s Defence Minister Jorge Taiana held a bilateral meeting with his counterpart Rajnath Singh on Tuesday and announced the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between both countries and the signing of a Specific Agreement on Academic Cooperation for peacekeeping.
Taiana also invited Minister Singh to the II Latin American Conference of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (ALCONU) that will take place in Argentina on 12 September.
In a press statement, Argentina’s Defence Minister said, “We are here to perfect and deepen the agreements we have and sign some others. One of them is a Memorandum of Understanding that is richer in content and concrete possibilities than the one currently in force.”
“I think we have a concrete opportunity in the field of Defense, where we can give a quality leap in cooperation between the two countries,” he added.
The head of the portfolio added that the world is rapidly changing, but nevertheless, Latin America has some characteristics that make the region stand out — the first is the absence of weapons of mass destruction and the non-existence of conflicts between states; the second is the enormous variety of natural resources; and the third is the existence in some countries of significant development in strategic areas with high potential for cooperation and the establishment of joint ventures.
During the meeting, the officials discussed issues related to defence cooperation and exchange in areas of training and training of officers and cadets. They also analysed the global geopolitical situation and Argentina’s minister highlighted the importance that the country attaches to the vision of a bicontinental country and its projection towards the South Atlantic and Antarctica.
Another point of the meeting was the Malvinas Question, where Minister Taiana thanked India for its support in the United Nations Decolonization Committee.
Earlier, on Tuesday, Jorge Taiana, who arrived in India the day before, laid a wreath at the National War Memorial in the national capital on Tuesday and paid homage to the fallen heroes. During his visit, Argentina’s Defence Minister is also scheduled to visit Bengaluru.
The Argentine Defence Minister visited BrahMos Aerospace and is scheduled to interact with leading think tanks in Delhi. He will also travel to Bengaluru and visit the Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) facilities and separately interact with the defence start-ups in an event organised by Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX), read India’s Defence Ministry press release. (Source: Google/https://www.businessworld.in/ANI)
18 Jul 23. Cameroon: Shootings in Bamenda underscore persistent threat of attacks in separatist regions. On 17 July, the Cameroonian defence ministry confirmed that unidentified gunmen killed at least ten civilians on 15 July in an attack at the Nacho Junction, a busy intersection in Bamenda (Northwest region). The Ambazonia Governing Council, the largest of the Anglophone separatist groups in Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions, has denied responsibility. However, given the fragmented nature of the movement and its often-demonstrated willingness to harm civilians, the attack was likely conducted by Anglophone separatists. Separatists frequently target security personnel wherever they are present (regardless of the tactical or military utility), including in higher-density civilian areas, elevating risks to bystanders and convoys accompanied by security details. As such, businesses and NGOs travelling with a security detail will continue to face elevated threats of ambush throughout Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest throughout 2023. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jul 23. Kenya: Debt-reduction reforms to secure additional IMF funding will likely sustain unrest risks. On 17 July, the IMF’s Executive Board completed its fifth Extended Fund Facility and Extended Credit Facility review for Kenya, approving USD 1bn in funding and immediately disbursing USD 415.4m. The IMF also approved a 20-month arrangement of USD 551.4m to support climate resilience efforts. The approval comes after the government enacted reforms, including the 2023 Finance Act, to support its goal of reducing debt from 5.7% to 4.1% of GDP in FY2023/2024. The IMF also extended the deadline for meeting its conditions from 38 to 48 months. The funding will support the government’s capacity to address its external public debt and boost its foreign exchange reserves, improving Kenya’s economic outlook in the medium-to-long term. However, the enactment of further debt-reduction reforms to secure additional disbursements will likely act as flashpoints for protests, sustaining domestic unrest risks in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jul 23. RoK-US: Renewed commitment on extended deterrence will sustain regional tensions. On 18 July, South Korean and US government officials held their first Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting. This is a bilateral initiative that was established in April to improve consultation on nuclear matters, including deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea. The meeting occurred amid the first port visit by a US nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to South Korea since the 1980s, underscoring both countries’ bolstered commitment to extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. A trilateral meeting involving Japan will be held on 20 July in Karuizawa (Japan), highlighting growing trilateral security co-operation and policy co-ordination. North Korea will almost certainly perceive these developments as a threat; it will likely retaliate via military provocations, though these are unlikely to pose direct threats to regional businesses and assets. The SSBN’s deployment will also likely sustain regional tensions with China, diminishing prospects for a substantial improvement in diplomatic relations with Beijing. However, targeted boycotts against US or South Korean brands remain unlikely in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jul 23. El Salvador-Colombia: Arrest of Colombian nationals will likely strain relations, security co-operation. On 17 July, the Salvadoran authorities arrested over 100 Colombian nationals over their alleged involvement in an illicit microfinance scheme tied to drug trafficking. The attorney general claimed that from 2021, over USD 20m linked to drug trafficking was sent to Colombia under the scheme. The mass arrest operation is part of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele’s broad anti-gang crackdown, which has seen around 70,000 suspects jailed since March 2022. The measures have faced international criticism despite Bukele’s high domestic approval ratings. The Colombian foreign ministry stated that it is in talks with Salvadoran officials, but did not add further details. There is a realistic possibility that the incident will exacerbate existing tensions between the two countries. This will likely impact co-operation in combatting transnational organised criminal groups in Central America. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jul 23. Iran: Direct confrontation is unlikely amid US deployment; vessel seizure attempts will likely persist. On 17 July, the Pentagon confirmed that the US will send additional F-35 and F-16 fighter jets and a warship to the Strait of Hormuz to augment its assets patrolling the area. This follows attempts by Iran to seize two oil tankers last week (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 22 May 2023). While the additional assets will mitigate the risk of Iranian hijackings in the coming weeks, their deployment will not deter Iran from attempting future such seizures. The threat of vessel seizures will likely be sustained through 2023, elevating detention risks for US-linked crews and vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, the deployment will likely prompt greater posturing from Iran. While direct confrontation remains highly unlikely, the development reflects the likely continued stagnation of informal nuclear talks, sustaining the likelihood of Iran pursuing its nuclear ambitions in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jul 23. Israel-Morocco: Israeli African Union membership will possibly be at risk vis-à-vis Western Sahara. On 17 July, Israel confirmed that it had agreed to recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara following negotiations in early June. The announcement will likely improve prospects for bilateral relations and trade ties between the two countries and the resumption of the regional Negev Summit. However, Israel’s policies in the West Bank combined with unfavourable Moroccan public opinion will likely continue to challenge bilateral diplomatic relations. There is a realistic possibility that small-scale demonstrations against improving ties with Israel will take place in the Rabat (Morocco) in the coming weeks. Furthermore, Israel’s announcement is likely to further alienate Algeria, a key member of the African Union (AU), reducing Israel’s prospects of becoming a member. This is likely to create further challenges for Israel’s diplomatic and economic efforts to facilitate access to new markets across Africa. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jul 23. US-Israel: Visits by Israeli officials will likely ease bilateral tensions, raise domestic instability risks. On 17 July, US President Joe Biden invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to undertake an official visit to the US, the first such invitation since Netanyahu re-entered office in December 2022. The announcement came before the scheduled visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog on 18 July. Biden signalled in March that he would avoid meeting Netanyahu due to the Israeli government’s recent hardline policies, including its activities in the West Bank and judicial reforms. The invitation is therefore likely to decrease bilateral tensions between the US and Israel. However, these visits will likely raise contentious domestic political issues; several Democratic caucus members will likely publicly condemn the Israeli government’s conservative policies, which will possibly undermine Biden’s ostensible show of support. Protests are also highly likely to occur in major US urban centres during the visits. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jul 23. US-China: Restrictions on new investment in Chinese tech in 2024 will likely increase regulatory risks. According to reports on 17 July, the Biden administration plans to finalise an executive order by the end of August which restricts investments in Chinese technology. Specifically, it reportedly plans to focus on barring new investments in cutting-edge technologies. This is likely to include artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing and semiconductors. Notably, the proposal will reportedly be less restrictive than initial reports suggested in early May. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen also stated it would be ‘narrowly targeted’. The order is likely to come into effect in 2024. Regulatory risks for US firms with interests in China are likely to increase in the short-to-medium term, especially firms focused on technology and new investment. China will possibly impose retaliatory restrictions on investment in US projects. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 23. DOD Increases Military Presence Near Oman. The Defense Department today announced an increased presence in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility, including an additional Navy destroyer along with fighter jets.
“In response to a number of recent, alarming events in the Strait of Hormuz, the secretary of defense has ordered the deployment of the of the destroyer USS Thomas Hudner, F-35 fighters and F-16 fighters to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility to defend U.S. interests and safeguard freedom of navigation in the region,” said Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh during a briefing.
Earlier this month, Singh said, the Iranian navy attempted to illegally seize two merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman.
“One attempt included an Iranian navy ship firing upon the merchant vessel,” Singh said. “In light of this continued threat and in coordination with our partners and allies, the department is increasing our presence and ability to monitor the strait and surrounding waters.”
According to a news report from U.S. Central Command, on July 5, U.S. forces already in Centcom’s area of responsibility participated in preventing two commercial tanker ships from being seized by the Iranian military in international waters near the coast of Oman.
One of those ships, the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker TRF Moss, was approached by an Iranian naval vessel, but that naval vessel departed after the arrival of the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul.
Later that same day, the Bahamian-flagged oil tanker Richmond Voyager was also approached by an Iranian naval vessel. That Iranian naval vessel got within one mile of the tanker and fired on it using small arms and crew-served weapons. As happened with the TRF Moss, the Iranian vessel departed when the USS McFaul arrived on the scene.
According to Centcom, Iran has attacked or seized about 20 merchant vessels since 2021.
“We call upon Iran to immediately cease these destabilizing actions that threaten the free flow of commerce through this strategic waterway, of which the world depends on for more than 1/5 of the world’s oil supply,” Singh said.
Singh also said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen. Mark A. Milley tomorrow will host a virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group from the Pentagon.
“They will join ministers of defense and chiefs of defense from nearly 50 nations from around the world to discuss Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and continue close coordination to provide Ukraine with the security assistance they need to protect their people and defend their country,” she said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
17 Jul 23. Iran: Resumption of morality police patrols will increase security, detention risks in the near term. On 16 July, Iranian authorities confirmed that Morality Police patrols were again operational across the country to enforce the mandatory hijab law. This comes after their suspension following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022 while in police custody, which sparked large-scale protests over the past 10 months (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 12 October 2022). The re-deployment of police officers mandated to survey dress code violations also follows increased digital surveillance, as well as an uptick in targeting recreational and commercial businesses, with closures reported in Tehran, Islamshahr, Eshtehard and Parand. Renewed morality police patrols will result in a further uptick of enforcement efforts likely to increase security and arbitrary detention risks, particularly for female nationals and dual-nationals. The new enforcement campaign also has a realistic possibility of triggering an uptick in protest activity in the coming days, elevating security and bystander risks in close proximity to gatherings. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 23. Sudan: Talks resume, but prospects for successful ceasefire remain low. On 15 July, representatives from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) arrived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to resume negotiations with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group. The development follows a flurry of statements from both sides claiming a willingness to engage in ceasefires provided key terms are met. However, it appears likely that these statements are motivated primarily by an effort to secure international goodwill amidst rising calls from regional states for a peaceful resolution to the conflict with numerous summits launched in recent weeks. Fighting continued in Khartoum over the weekend, and the RSF remains unlikely to concede military demands to leave the city. While an explicit demand to withdraw from Khartoum was dropped, demands to stop attacks on civilians would likely necessitate an RSF withdrawal from Khartoum due to their heavy presence in residential areas. As such, while further ceasefire agreements are possible in the coming weeks, these are unlikely to hold. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 23. Senegal: Sonko candidacy raises risks of domestic unrest, sustains risks to staff, assets. On 16 July, the opposition PASTEF party nominated Ousmane Sonko as their candidate for the 2024 Presidential Election. On 5 June, Sonko was sentenced to two years in prison on ‘youth corruption’ charges, triggering protests which killed at least 16 people. The conviction makes him ineligible for the presidency, though Sonko is yet to be taken into custody and efforts to overturn the conviction are ongoing. Protests over Sonko’s candidacy and eligibility will almost certainly continue, with developments in his appeals and campaign likely triggering demonstrations in the coming weeks. Protesters will likely gather near Sonko’s Keur Gorgui residence in the capital Dakar, and in Ziguinchor and Saint Louis. There is a realistic possibility of violent clashes between protesters and security forces, including the erection of informal roadblocks and localised looting, elevating risks to bystanders and assets in affected areas. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 23. South Africa: Heightened security posture will likely increase disruption to transit of goods. On 14 July, authorities deployed the South African National Defence Force across Limpopo, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and Free State provinces, to support the police in their response to ongoing attacks on trucks. Since 8 July, unidentified assailants have set fire to at least 21 trucks carrying goods across the country (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 12 July 2023). There is some speculation that the attacks mark the second anniversary of the July 2021 spate of unrest and are related to concerns that former president Jacob Zuma will be made to serve the remainder of his prison sentence. The heightened security posture will likely reduce the risk of attacks and sustained supply chain disruption over the near term. However, security force checkpoints along major transit routes, particularly along the N3 road to the Port of Durban, will increase disruption and delays to the transit of the goods. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 23. US-Mexico: Mexico records over 500 migrant interceptions in two days, as security forces enhance measures to prevent northward migration. Mexican officials confirmed on 16 July, that over 500 irregular migrants had been detained in the previous two days in the state of Veracruz. Police disclosed that the various migrant groups were being transported inside tractor-trailers, adding that the majority of them were from Cuba and Central American states. The operations are early signs that security forces are cracking down on migrant smuggling groups, following the lifting of the US’s Covid-era migrant reception rules in May, leading to a large uptick in northward migration. This will likely lead human smuggling groups to diversify their routes of operation as well as force some migrant groups to form caravans. At least one caravan, mostly made up of Venezuelan migrants was created on 15 July in Chiapas state. Caravans are regularly targeted by smuggling groups which kidnap migrants for ransom. The uptick in the security force crackdown will likely lead to further regulatory scrutiny of firms employing migrants, in particular those located in the north of the country. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 23. Somalia: Al-Shabaab attack underscores heightened risks to bystanders at venues attended by government officials. L][On 14 July, an al-Shabaab suicide bomber killed Abdikarim Ahmed Afar Sheegle, the former deputy mayor of Marka (Lower Shabelle region), in the capital Mogadishu’s Hodan district, in the vicinity of the Ministry of Defence. The incident comes amidst a broader al-Shabaab campaign to bolster its influence in southern Somalia and disrupt the organisation of a planned offensive in that region. While the recent attack does not indicate an escalation in the security risk environment, it does underscore al-Shabaab’s intent to target officials associated with southern Somalia. As such, areas where officials, as well as military personnel, frequent will continue to be targeted, particularly in Mogadishu, and major towns in southern Somalia, heightening risks to bystanders within their vicinity. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 23. Singapore: Scandals embroiling senior politicians unlikely to induce government instability. On 14 July, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau – Singapore’s independent anti-graft body – confirmed the arrest of Transport Minister S. Iswaran in a corruption probe involving Ong Beng Seng, a property tycoon. Iswaran, currently on bail, is the most senior official of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) to be embroiled in a corruption investigation for several decades. Separately, two PAP lawmakers, including Speaker of Parliament Tan Chuan-Jin, resigned on 17 July over what the party has described as ‘inappropriate relationships’. Although the recent scandals will represent a crisis and embarrassment for the PAP, they are unlikely to significantly undermine the stability of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s government, which lacks credible opposition. Similarly, given Singapore’s robust anti-graft mechanism, Iswaran’s case is unlikely to cause lasting damage to the city-state’s reputation as a clean and pro-business investment destination. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jul 23. US sending F-16 fighter jets to protect ships from Iranian seizures. The U.S. is beefing up its use of fighter jets around the strategic Strait of Hormuz to protect ships from Iranian seizures, a senior defense official said Friday, adding that the U.S. is increasingly concerned about the growing ties between Iran, Russia and Syria across the Middle East.
Speaking to Pentagon reporters, the official said the U.S. will send F-16 fighter jets to the Gulf region this weekend to augment the A-10 attack aircraft that have been patrolling there for more than a week. The move comes after Iran tried to seize two oil tankers near the strait last week, opening fire on one of them.
The defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to provide details of military operations in the region, said the F-16s will give air cover to the ships moving through the waterway and increase the military’s visibility in the area, as a deterrent to Iran.
The U.S. Navy said in both instances the Iranian naval vessels backed off when the USS McFaul, a guided-missile destroyer, arrived on the scene.
In addition, the defense official told reporters the U.S. is considering a number of military options to address increasing Russian aggression in the skies over Syria, which complicated efforts to strike an Islamic State group leader last weekend. The official declined to detail the options, but said the U.S. will not cede any territory and will continue to fly in the western part of the country on anti-Islamic State missions.
The Russian military activity, which has increased in frequency and aggression since March, stems from growing cooperation and coordination between Moscow, Tehran and the Syrian government to try to pressure the U.S. to leave Syria, the official said.
The official said Russia is beholden to Iran for its support in the war in Ukraine, and Tehran wants the U.S. out of Syria so it can more easily move lethal aid to Lebanese Hezbollah and threaten Israel. The U.S. has seen more cooperation, collaboration, planning and intelligence sharing, largely between mid-level Russian and Iranian Quds force leaders in Syria, to pressure the U.S. to remove troops from Syria, the official added.
There are about 900 U.S. forces in the country, and others move in and out to conduct missions targeting Islamic State group militants.
The U.S. does not believe Russian aircraft plan to drop bombs on U.S. troops or shoot down manned aircraft. But there are concerns that Russian pilots will knock a Reaper drone out of the sky and that Moscow believes that type of action would not get a strong U.S. military response, the official said.
As an example, in March, a Russian warplane poured jet fuel on a U.S. surveillance drone and then struck its propeller, forcing the U.S. military to ditch the MQ-9 Reaper into the Black Sea. The incident spiked tensions between the two countries and triggered a call between their defense chiefs, but led to no direct military response.
Last week, Rear Adm. Oleg Gurinov, head of the Russian Reconciliation Center for Syria, said the Russian and Syrian militaries have been doing joint training. In comments carried by Syrian state media, he said Moscow is concerned about drone flights by the U.S.-led coalition over northern Syria, calling them “systematic violations of protocols” designed to avoid clashes between the two militaries.
U.S. and Russian military commanders routinely communicate over a deconfliction phone line that has been in place for several years to avoid unintended clashes in Syria, where both sides have troops on the ground and in the air.
There are often many calls a day, and at times result in angry threats as commanders argue over an ongoing operation, said the U.S. official. Describing a conversation, the official said the Russians will often declare an area of space a restricted operating zone and say they are doing military exercises there.
The U.S. sees no exercises, and tells Russia that American forces are on a counterterror mission against the Islamic State group and plan to fly in that area. The Russians then say they can’t guarantee U.S. aircraft safety if they go there. And once the mission begins, and the aircraft move into the zone, “it sometimes gets very heated,” said the official, as both sides loudly protest and reject the other’s assertions.
The most recent incident was Friday morning, when a Russia aircraft flew repeatedly over the at-Tanf garrison in eastern Syria, where U.S. forces are training Syrian allies and monitoring Islamic State militant activity. The official said the Russian An-30 aircraft was collecting intelligence on the base. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Military Times)
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