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02 Mar 23. Only one of SA Navy’s four frigates operational; no submarines serviceable. The majority of the South African Navy’s primary combat vessels are not operational, with the frigate SAS Mendi’s seaworthiness prioritised for Armed Forces Day and Exercise Mosi II.
This is according to an Armscor presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) on 15 February, which detailed the maintenance status of the SA Navy’s frigates and submarines.
The presentation explained that the frigate SAS Amatola is currently in a Docking and Essential Defect (DED) period, but work was temporarily suspended to prioritise the SAS Mendi, which was required for Armed Forces Day operations. The Mendi took part in AFD and Exercise Mosi II off the coast of Richards Bay along with the hydrographic survey vessel SAS Protea, and the first new inshore patrol vessel, SAS King Sekhukhune I.
Work on the SAS Amatola will resume in March, with a current estimated completion date of three months after receipt of outstanding spares and subject to the completion of repairs on the SAS Spioenkop. The latter is currently undergoing “ad-hoc maintenance and repairs of the hull and structure.” Completion of this work is dependent on the SA Navy providing customer furnished spares (CFS) – maintenance will be completed within one month from the receipt of spares.
The fourth and final frigate, SAS Isandlwana, is currently undergoing ad-hoc maintenance and repairs of the mast and flight decks. Armscor stated that the masts will be completed within six months. “This is part of the continuous refurbishment activities to keep the sub-systems serviceable, as the vessel will be in a perpetual maintenance phase.”
With regard to the submarines, the SAS Mantatisi is currently undergoing Docking and Essential Defect (DED) maintenance, which is due to be completed in March subject to successful approvals of all post-maintenance trials.
The SAS Queen Modjadji is currently undergoing preservation and pre-refit planning activities, in preparation for a refit. The procurement process for services is currently underway, with a requirement received from the Navy on 6 February 2023. Armscor estimates the contracting process will take approximately 140 days.
Funding to complete the refit of the SAS Charlotte Maxeke is available and the submarine is currently “in refit process” with Armscor providing project management. “Armscor Dockyard is currently going through a procurement process to contract a local supplier for support services. Bids are currently being evaluated and contracting will be completed within the next month.”
The latest defence budget vote, released in February, showed that the Maritime Defence component of the SANDF is getting R4.9bn for the 2023/24 financial year, as well as in 2024/25, and R5.2bn in 2025/26. Of the R4.9bn allocated for 2023/24, just R1.45bn is going towards Maritime Combat Capability, with the remaining on logistics support, human resources, base support etc. but the majority of funds (R2.3bn) is allocated to salaries.
The defence budget allocation states that the SA Navy will defend and protect South Africa and its maritime zone by providing three frigates, one combat support vessel (the SAS Drakensberg), two offshore patrol vessels, and three inshore patrol vessels per year as well as two submarines a year. The Navy will conduct four coastal patrols and spend 8 000 hours at sea a year.
Budget cuts mean there is no funding for mid-life upgrades/refits of the SA Navy’s three submarines and four frigates. These vessels will have to wait until at least 2033/35 before sufficient funding becomes available for this.
Due to limited funding, only one of four frigates (SAS Amatola) was partially refitted in 2014/15 and one of three submarines (SAS Manthatisi) was refitted in 2013/14. Funding for refitment of the remaining three frigates – SAS Isandlwana, SAS Spioenkop and SAS Mendi and for submarine SAS Queen Modjadji I – has not been available since this work became due, according to the Department of Defence (DoD).
According to the DoD, the average cost estimate for a frigate refit is R687m with a submarine refit costing R660m.
Pending the conduct of the outstanding refits, the SA Navy is currently focused on prioritising essential maintenance and repair of the frigates Spioenkop and Mendi, the combat support vessel SAS Drakensberg and submarine Manthatisi to ensure operational availability.
In August 2021, the Department of Defence told the PCDMV that for the 2021/22 financial year, the SA Navy’s vessel refit as well as maintenance and repair full cost requirement of R1.470bn was only 53.4% funded, with R786m allocated.
Defence minister Thandi Modise, in response to a question on SANDF maintenance backlogs from the Economic Freedom Fighters, stated in a recent parliamentary reply that, “within the SA Navy environment, the frigates and submarines of the SA Navy are being maintained in accordance with the available budget. Maintenance contracts to enhance maintenance on these vessels are extended as and when funding becomes available. There is currently a delay in availability of the logistic supply vessel of the SA Navy as a result of unavailability of spares and non-performance by the appointed maintenance contractor. These delays have been addressed and mitigating steps have been implemented.”
02 Mar 23. Sudan: Military will likely delay peace process until immunity is guaranteed, sustaining protests. On 1 March, a leading member of the civilian coalition which recently signed a framework political agreement with the military junta accused the military of hindering the peace process. Sudanese political parties have been engaged in talks to finalise a civilian-led government over a two-year transition (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 7 December 2022). However, contentious issues, including possible military immunity for past repression, remain unresolved. On 28 February, the police forces killed one protester when they used live ammunition to disperse a pro-democracy demonstration in the East Nile suburb of the capital Khartoum. It is highly likely that the military will continue to delay the process until it has secured the guarantees for long-term immunity. While negotiations continue, resistance committees are likely to sustain protests in major urban centres including Khartoum and Port Sudan, disrupting supply chains and presenting an elevated physical security risk for bystanders. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Mar 23. US increases military support for Somalia against al-Shabab. The United States is increasing its military assistance to Somalia as the country sees success in battling what the U.S. calls “the largest and most deadly al-Qaida network in the world.”
Sixty-one tons of weapons and ammunition arrived Tuesday in Mogadishu, the U.S. said in a statement of support for a historic Somalia-led military offensive against al-Shabab extremists that has recaptured dozens of communities since August.
In a separate joint statement with other leading security partners Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Britain, the U.S. said they will support Somalia’s efforts to manage weapons and ammunition that could allow the United Nations Security Council to lift its arms embargo on the country.
“A very productive meeting,” Somalia’s national security adviser, Hussein Sheikh-Ali, tweeted after the Washington gathering.
The government of Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared “total war” last year on the thousands of al-Shabab militants who for more than a decade have controlled parts of the country and carried out devastating attacks while exploiting clan divisions and extorting ms of dollars a year in their quest to impose an Islamic state.
The current offensive was sparked in part by local communities and militias driven to the brink by al-Shabab’s harsh taxation policies amid the country’s worst drought on record. Somalia’s government quickly lent support. Now neighbors Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti have agreed to a joint “search and destroy” military campaign.
Somalia is recovering from decades of conflict, and the federal government is eager to shed the country’s history as a failed state and attract investment. Under the current president, the government is cracking down on al-Shabab’s financial network and encouraging religious authorities to reject the extremist group’s propaganda — even enlisting a former deputy al-Shabab leader as Somalia’s current minister for religious affairs.
The U.S. has an estimated 450 military personnel in Somalia after President Joe Biden reversed his predecessor Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw American forces. The U.S. supports Somali forces and a multinational African Union force with drone strikes, intelligence and training.
The increased support for the Somalia-led offensive comes as the AU force is set to withdraw from the country and hand over security responsibilities to Somalia by the end of 2024. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)
28 Feb 23. BlackSky details building of China’s secret naval base in Cambodia. BlackSky geospatial satellite imagery intelligence discovers construction to accommodate aircraft carriers at suspect base in Cambodia.
The construction of a secret naval staging facility for Chinese military vessels off the coast of Cambodia was detailed at the DGI London conference on 28 February by geospatial intelligence company BlackSky.
This will be only the second staging facility China has outside of its territory and poses a challenge to Cambodia’s neighbours in the region. In addition, such a facility would allow China further power projection in any future crisis over Taiwan.
On 22 February Radio Free Asia published satellite imagery describing the scale of development that had occurred at the port of Ream from 1 July 2022 until 28 January 2023, outlining new construction and massive land clearance. Radio Free Asia also detailed the construction of two new piers, highlighting that “they seem to be temporary ones to ferry in construction materials and equipment and not naval piers for warships”.
However, analysts familiar with the site contradict this claim, stating that there has been further construction to extend one of these piers in recent months. The capability provided by this pier is in excess of the specifications needed for ferrying construction materials, and instead meets requirements to service China’s warships.
Satellite imagery from BlackSky shows the pier extending into waters deep enough to service aircraft carriers, with columns deployed to a length sufficient to moor these vessels.
Reports began to emerge last year that China was leasing a pier on the island of Ream off the coast of Sihanoukville, but the allegations were firmly denied by Phnom Penh, which responded by saying granting access to the base would be in volition of Cambodia’s constitution.
In July 2022 the Wall Street Journal published the account of US officials who had seen an early draft of a deal between Cambodia and China that would allow China to use the base for thirty years, storing weapons, posting military personnel and berthing warships.
BlackSky’s geospatial intelligence
BlackSky’s network of 14 satellites captured the scene as a part of its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, which provide users with the capability to automatically task satellites based on all-source intelligence cues.
“We started monitoring this facility, at first at a low frequency, maybe once a week, once every couple of weeks. Then as we started to understand the pace of activity at this facility was picking up, we picked up the rate we were doing collection and analytics,” said BlackSky CEO Brian O’Toole, speaking at the conference.
“And then that started getting us some interesting insights relating to the pace of construction and ultimately to start to deliver information about how fast this is moving along and potentially when this facility is going to come online.”
The BlackSky satellite constellation has been engineered to provide ISR capabilities with end users operating any device, serving as an intelligence provider to deployed troops in active environments. Using mobile technology, frontline operators can request and receive detailed satellite imagery within an hour of the requisition, well ahead of an industry standard that can see individual tickets take several days to complete.
The same system was tasked with monitoring the movements of vessels around Ream, revealing a flurry of activity through the port in recent months.
BlackSky’s tip-and-cue enabling functions allow a user to set a specific ‘tip’ – for example the arrival or departure of a ship from a location – to ‘cue’ the collection of satellite imagery in the area. The size of the constellation allows the simultaneous capturing of images across the portion of the world monitored through BlackSky’s constellation inclined orbit. (Source: naval-technology.com)
28 Feb 23. Malaysia proposes strong budget increase with eye on military procurement. Malaysia has proposed a 2023 defence budget of MYR17.74bn (USD3.97bn), a nominal 10% increase over the original 2022 allocation of MYR16.14bn. The expenditure – announced on 24 February – comprises MYR11.4 bn for operations and MYR6.3 bn for development expenses, including procurement. These represent year-on-year increases of 3% and 26%, respectively. Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia’s prime minister and finance minister, indicated in his budget speech that the strong increase in development expenditure is intended to bolster the readiness of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF). He said “around MYR4.1bn” of the budget has been allocated to maintenance and acquisitions but provided no details.
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) budget documents show that 71% of operations expenses will be spent on salaries, with most of the remainder allocated to services and supplies.
From the development expenditure, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) receive 28% and 27%, respectively, while the Malaysian Army has been allocated 16%. All are strong increases.
28 Feb 23. Israel-Palestinian Territories: Shooting of dual US-Israeli citizen underscores volatile security environment; will increase duty of care concerns for businesses. On 27 February, an American-Israeli dual national was killed during a shooting attack targeting vehicles on a highway near the West Bank city of Jericho. The incident comes amid rising violence in the West Bank in recent days, driven by heightened ethno-religious tensions between Israeli settlers and Palestinians (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 27 February 2023). Despite Israel’s heightened security posture, sporadic attacks and incidents of ‘vigilante violence’ will almost certainly persist in the coming weeks. Business staff and assets will remain exposed to elevated physical security risks in the West Bank, Jerusalem, mixed Israeli-Palestinian neighbourhoods and major Israeli cities, such as Tel Aviv. Likely targets of car-ramming, shooting and stabbing attacks will include Israeli checkpoints and security force positions, major roads and junctions, and religious sites. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Feb 23. Nigeria: Likelihood of run-off poll increasing, driving threat of violence. On 27 February, opposition parties, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Labour Party (LP), walked out of the venue where election results are being announced. The parties have claimed that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) colluded with the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) prompting calls for a re-run. INEC has rejected the allegations and any legal challenge is unlikely to succeed. Regardless, despite the current lead of APC’s Bola Tinubu there remains a strong possibility the election will proceed to a second round. Tinubu came in a close second in Lagos, his stronghold, and the PDP is expected to perform well in parts of the north where results are yet to be announced. A run-off, to be organised within 21 days likely between the APC and PDP, would increase the risk of violence between rival activists, and likely prompt backlash from supporters of LP’s Peter Obi. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 23. Nigeria: Widespread incidents of intimidation and allegations of fraud raise risk of domestic unrest. Voting in Nigeria’s general election continued on 26 February after incidents of violence and technical issues prevented voting on 25 February. The results are likely to be announced within the next five days amid slow counting and repeated disruption. While all the leading parties have claimed that the counting process has been subject to irregularities, the opposition Labour Party has declared that it is being subject to a targeted campaign to deny its vote share. Labour agents claim they were specifically targeted by men pretending to be election officials, who stormed a collation centre in Lagos on 26 February. With early results indicating Labour has not performed as well as polling suggested, the likelihood is increasing that the party will organise protests in the post-election period, particularly in southern cities, including Lagos. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 23. Cameroon: IED detonation underlines elevated threat of attacks in vicinity of security assets. On 25 February, the separatist militia group, Ambazonia Governing Council, detonated IEDs injuring 19 people during a race in the town of Buea in the Southwest region. The Ambazonia Governing Council has claimed that the attack targeted the elite security force that provided cover for athletes during the race. Despite efforts towards a fledging peace process, the conflict between the Cameroon government and Anglophone separatist groups will likely continue through 2023 (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 23 January). The incident underlines the elevated threat the conflict poses to civilians, with separatists willing to target security officers wherever they are present regardless of tactical or military utility. As such, businesses and NGOs travelling with a security detail are likely to face elevated threats of attacks, in the Northwest and Southwest regions. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 23. India: Political tensions between BJP and AAP will sustain the risk of domestic unrest. On 26 February, India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) arrested Deputy Chief Minister of New Delhi Manish Sisodia over his alleged involvement in a liquor excise policy dispute. Sisodia belongs to the Aam Adami Party (AAP), a rival of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The AAP have blamed the BJP for wrongfully accusing Sisodia. His arrest has already sparked small-to-medium scale protests in the national capital as well as Bengaluru, Bhopal, Chandigarh, and Gandhinagar among other cities. The highest risk lies in the capital where Delhi police have deployed several officers outside the CBI office. There is a reasonable threat of clashes between AAP and police personnel, as well as AAP and BJP supporters outside local BJP offices. Protests will likely extend into the coming days with local BJP offices remaining high-risk areas. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 23. Georgia: EU statement on foreign agent law underscores risks for Georgia’s EU candidacy. On 24 February, an EU spokesperson made a statement underlining the risks that the proposed Georgian ‘foreign agent’ law poses for the operations of civil society organisations and media companies. The statement mentioned that as part of the EU 12 priorities, media freedom and the involvement of civil society organisations are crucial to the EU accession process. Aligning with Russia’s own foreign agent law, the proposed law is now supported by the ruling party and will require a comprehensive financial review of entities that receive more than 20% of their revenue from a foreign entity. Although President Salome Zurabishvili refused to sign the bill, the majority party has enough seats to pass the law. In addition to posing governance and financial risks to media companies and NGOs, the law will undermine Georgia’s efforts to integrate closer to the EU.
27 Feb 23. Ecuador: Influential indigenous group breaks talks with government, increasing risk of domestic unrest. On 24 February, Ecuador’s indigenous umbrella group CONAIE ended talks with President Guillermo Lasso’s government, calling for his resignation over corruption allegations. The organisation claims that the government has not complied with agreements reached following the 2022 spate of civil unrest. The government, in turn, has stated that it reached numerous binding agreements with CONAIE, including a temporary moratorium on oil exploration in the Amazon and the suspension of new mining concessions in the ancestral territory. CONAIE’s move comes after prosecutors raided offices at state oil company Petroecuador and a presidential office on 10 February as part of an investigation into the alleged graft. The rupture of negotiations between CONAIE and the government is likely to increase the risk of domestic unrest in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 23. Mexico: Army detachment kills 5 in Nuevo Laredo, elevating risk of domestic unrest. On 25 February, five people including a US citizen were killed by the Mexican Army while travelling in Nuevo Laredo (Tamaulipas), where the military is deployed to combat drug cartels. The Human Rights Committee of Nuevo Laredo has called for a thorough investigation into the incident and for the authorities to take action. The Ministry of National Defence (Sedena) is carrying out an investigation but has not released further details. Incidents of force abuse are common in high-risk areas, including those being contested by narcotics cartels that operate near the US border. However, the incident has sparked outrage in the local community and is being widely covered by domestic media outlets. This will elevate the risk of domestic unrest in the area and urban centres in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 23. South Korea: Minerals, rare earth scheme likely to improve supply chain, economic security amid growing US-China competition. On 27 February, South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) unveiled plans to reduce the country’s reliance on Chinese minerals and rare earths from 80% to 50% by 2030 in an effort to ensure supply chain stability amid growing US-China competition in the semiconductors industry. MOTIE identified 33 minerals as ‘key’, with 10 of them labelled as ‘strategic’, including lithium and nickel. Seoul will also diversify its import sources by enhancing relations with 30 resource-rich countries, which will minimise its dependence on China and consequently minimise supply chain and policy risks. Seoul will also establish an early warning system to foresee future supply risks, increase its stockpiles from 54 to 100 days, and create a ‘swift release scheme’ to support domestic industries in case of market and supply chain shocks. MOTIE also vowed to bolster the US-led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) framework which will further align its economic and security policies and interests with the US. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 23. Indonesia: Spike in domestic unrest highlights lack of security force control in Papua region. On 24 February, Indonesian authorities deployed more than 200 security personnel, to the town of Wamena (Jayawijaya regency) in the restive Papua region following a riot that led to 10 deaths and more than 20 injuries. The unrest was triggered by rumours of a child kidnapping, leading to a group of residents surrounding and throwing rocks at the Wamena Police Station where the alleged assailant was being held. Police then opened fire on the crowd leading to several casualties. According to the police, the situation is now ‘under control’ although security is likely to remain high. The incident highlights the lack of trust the local Papuan population has in the Indonesian authorities. It also underscores the lack of effective law and order exercised in the contested region, following the kidnapping of a New Zealand pilot with negotiations over his release continuing. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 23. Defence Strategic Review must tackle Australia’s drone vulnerability. Opinion: One of the most striking aspects of the Ukraine war has been the impact of drones. Global audiences have been enthralled by YouTube videos of Russian tanks reduced to flaming wrecks, victims of Ukrainian drones armed with anti-tank grenades or homemade bombs, writes Oleg Vornik, CEO of DroneShield.
Ukraine has also experienced the effects of drone warfare. Its electrical grid has been repeatedly smashed (or interdicted) by waves of cheap Iranian-made drones launched by Russia.
These events in Eastern Europe, while half a world away from the Pacific, provides a glimpse of the threats Australia will likely face in the future.
The upcoming Defence Strategic Review will address how Australia will meet the challenges of a changing political and technological security environment. Much attention will be devoted to crucial systems and capabilities including submarines, aircraft, precision-guided missiles, and even unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV), such as the Loyal Wingman program.
But as the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated, there are two aspects to drone warfare for which we must be prepared.
What gets most attention are the drones themselves: how far and fast they can fly, and the size of their payload. Equally important is how to destroy or limit enemy use of them.
Warning signs were evident back in 2020, when Azerbaijan used Israeli and Turkish-made drones to decimate Armenian tanks and artillery during the Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Both Ukraine and Russia are discovering how difficult it is for their infantry, armor and artillery to function and manoeuvre under the gaze of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Russia’s relentless attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure have also shown how cheap drones can replace missiles and manned bombers for strategic bombardment. Even if air defences manage to shoot down some UAS, enough can get through to cause massive damage.
Although Russian and Iranian drones are not a big threat to Australia, Chinese drones are.
There is ample evidence Beijing has both the intention and means to wage drone warfare. For example, UAS will certainly be a key component of any Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
China has already offered a taste of this. Its military and civilian drone fleet buzzed Taiwanese territory in late 2022. Chinese media has also suggested that kamikaze drones could be used to destroy Taiwanese artillery or even assassinate top leaders in a decapitation strike.
To accomplish these missions, the People’s Liberation Army has amassed an array of big and small drones. These include the Wing Loong-3, a missile armed strike UCAV, similar to the MQ-1 Predator, except it reportedly has an intercontinental range of 10,000 kilometres — sufficient to reach Australia.
The high-altitude, turbojet-propelled WZ-7 “Soaring Dragon” reconnaissance UAS — China’s counterpart to the US RQ-4 Global Hawk — may have a range of 7,000 kilometres, which can cover much of the Pacific.
What is remarkable about the Ukraine war is that big, expensive drones have not been the star players. Instead, it has been the little UAS with a camera that spots enemy troops moving, and calls down an accurate artillery barrage.
This points to a significant Chinese advantage. Chinese manufacturers produce 80 per cent of the world’s commercial drones, according to some estimates. This gives China an immense reservoir of small unmanned aircraft that can be modified for military purposes.
For Australia, the threat is immediate. China is paying close attention to the strategic and tactical lessons of the Ukraine conflict. Beijing may well decide drones are an ideal weapon for striking Australian bases and infrastructure. At the very least, it’s a way to disrupt or deter tactical operations by ground troops and ships.
It’s true a Chinese drone offensive against the Australian mainland would face geographical and technical challenges. But given the rapid and continuous improvements in UAS range, payload and accuracy, history suggests these obstacles will be overcome.
Defending against larger strike and reconnaissance drones can be accomplished by traditional kinetic means: guns, air defense missiles, and even lasers.
But the Ukraine war suggests future wars will be dominated by vast numbers of small UAS. These operate in coordinated swarms that overwhelm a target and can be operated by a lone infantryman or insurgent.
The laws of economics and logistics suggest relying on kinetic counter-drone weapons to stop these small intruders is neither affordable nor effective. A counter-UAS (C-UAS) system that runs out of ammunition will quickly be an expensive launcher with an empty magazine or another opportune target.
The challenge for Australia becomes not just finding methods to mitigate the drone threat, but also making these countermeasures practical and affordable. Radio-frequency (RF) countermeasures have emerged as a means to disrupt the command signals between drones and their operators.
The counter-drone strategy Australia chooses will set a precedent for how we will cope in the face of their use against us. Drones are already prominent, and effective modern formations, large and small, are using them for reconnaissance, strike and logistic support.
As it stands, ADF personnel at various levels have expressed concerns over drone security, and their limitations in taking them down in domestic air space.
As we look ahead to the Defence Strategic Review, it’s crucial we not only focus on traditional means for protecting the nation, but also recognise the urgent need to detect and limit the malicious use of drones on home soil. (Source: Defence Connect)
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