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19 Jan 23. Sink or swim for AUKUS agreement as US senators speak out.
The AUKUS agreement to bring nuclear-powered submarines to Australian shores is pulling the nation between two very different short and long-term strategic goals, according to an Australian strategic defence expert.
The three-party security pact between Australia, the UK, and the US is currently walking a tightrope between upgrading the Australian military capability and the immediate operational goal to get nuclear submarines as soon as possible, said John Blaxland, professor of international security and intelligence studies at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
The trilateral security partnership was announced by US President Joe Biden, then-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison in September 2021. Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles recently travelled to the United States for an AUKUS Defence Ministers meeting in December last year.
The agreement surfaced earlier this month with information that US Democratic Senator Jack Reed and Republican Senator James Inhofe have advised US President Joe Biden against plans to sell or transfer Virginia Class submarines to Australia ahead of the US Navy requirements.
AUKUS will need to be reconsidered “to avoid stressing the US submarine industrial base to the breaking point” and “turning into a zero-sum game for scarce, highly advanced (technology)”, wrote the two senators in the December 21 letter published by US website Breaking Defence on 5 January.
“There are some harsh realities. The US nuclear submarine baseline is at capacity and it’s not unreasonable for them to safeguard their own interests,” Professor Blaxland said.
“There’s an understandable nervousness of Australia to pick up the economic baton and not be an economic liability, as opposed to a net asset.
“(For example) the Australian Collins Class submarine was remarkably successful, but it took decades to get right and that was with conventional (diesel-electric) propulsion, not the far more complicated nuclear option.
“The US is taking a risk here and Australia needs to show it’s serious, not just with intent but a fair amount of money. This is a warning that there needs to be an energised response in Australia.”
The agreement is fast approaching the end of its 18-month preliminary planning phase and initial consultation is scheduled to end in March this year.
Beyond submarines, the long-term features of the agreement also include Australia acquiring long-range strike capabilities with Tomahawk cruise missiles to be fielded from Hobart Class destroyers, joint air-to-surface standoff missiles and long-range anti-ship missiles, collaboration on hypersonic missiles, precision strike guided missiles for land forces and accelerating $1bn for a sovereign guided weapons manufacturing enterprise.
“AUKUS is more than submarine propulsion, it’s about resilience, hypersonic, AI and an advanced defence industry in Australia. To potentially be a bigger player in that space and our ability to contribute to the US and coalition resources,” Professor Blaxland said.
“In the past, we have had stop-and-start defence investments and we have had support from government for defence-related industries.
“It seems now that we have reasonable bipartisan support for a significant investment in muscling up the Australian defence industry in support of a more self-reliant defence position.”
Professor Blaxland said as China’s economic power continues to grow and tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue deteriorating, Australia’s defence capability could influence the region.
“AUKUS is more than just Taiwan, it has a bigger picture. Taiwan is the touchstone of China asserting expansionist behaviour into the Indian Ocean, South Pacific and South-East Asia,” he said.
“If Australia wants to have a deterrent effect on Chinese behaviour or contribute to a coalition deterrent effect, it will need bolstered capabilities.
“Countries right across Timor, New Guinea and Solomon Islands are doing their own calculations for their national interests and if Australia does not have something substantial to offer, then they will look elsewhere.
“That substantial offering would include robust military capabilities that have range, endurance and survivability.” (Source: Defence Connect)
19 Jan 23. North Korea passes new defense budget. North Korea’s rubber-stamp parliament has passed a budget that sustains a high level of defense spending, despite the country’s economic troubles as leader Kim Jong Un pushes for an aggressive expansion of his nuclear arsenal.
State media reports indicated Kim didn’t attend the Supreme People’s Assembly’s two-day session that ended Wednesday. Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency didn’t mention any comments by assembly members toward the United States or South Korea in Thursday’s report on the meetings.
The assembly convened weeks after Kim called for an “exponential increase” of nuclear warheads, mass production of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons targeting “enemy” South Korea and the development of more advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles designed to reach the U.S. mainland.
His statements during a major political conference in December underscored an intensifying nuclear standoff with the United States and its allies in Asia after he pushed North Korea’s weapons tests to a record pace in 2022.
The North fired more than 70 missiles last year, including multiple ICBM launches, and conducted a series of tests it described as simulated nuclear attacks on South Korean and American targets.
Analysts say Kim’s aggressive arms expansion and escalatory nuclear doctrine are aimed at forcing the United States to accept the idea of North Korea as a nuclear power and to gain leverage in negotiations for economic and security concessions.
KCNA said the assembly’s members projected overall state spending would increase by 1.7% this year but made no mention of the actual size of the budget.
The assembly’s members devoted 15.9% of this year’s national budget to defense spending, the same proportion as last year, to support efforts on “further bolstering up the war deterrence both in quality and quantity” and “defending the dignity and security of the country and the people,” KCNA said.
It’s difficult to gauge how much money North Korea would be spending on its military capabilities, considering the poor quality of the limited statistics it discloses.
According to the U.S. State Department’s 2021 “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers” report, North Korea possibly spent around $4bn on defense in 2019, which would have amounted to 26% of its estimated gross domestic product, the highest proportion among 170 countries it reviewed.
Experts say North Korea’s weapons development is driven by a Soviet-style party-military complex where the ruling party leadership surrounding Kim exercises full control over defense industries and faces scant constraints in concentrating national resources on arms capacities.
KCNA’s report on the assembly meetings hinted that North Korea was struggling to revive a moribund economy battered by mismanagement, U.S.-led sanctions over Kim’s nuclear ambitions, and COVID-19-related border closures.
Finance Minister Ko Jong Bom lamented unspecified shortcomings in raising tax revenues from state companies. He urged economic workers to strengthen their “ideological resolve” and put broader national interests ahead of the interests of their own units, KCNA said.
Ko said this year’s budget should be “implemented without fail” to financially support efforts to bolster the country’s defense capabilities and economy. He said 45% of this year’s budget would be spent on a huge umbrella category covering efforts for “developing the economy and improving the people’s standard of living.”
North Korean officials have described 2023 as a crucial year for accomplishing Kim’s economic goals set under a five-year development plan that goes through 2025.
The pandemic, which significantly slowed progress, forced North Korea to shield its poor health care system with strict border controls that reduced trade with China — its main ally and economic lifeline — and decimated domestic industrial production that heavily relies on imported materials.
During the December political conference, ruling party members identified key economic projects for 2023, highlighted by construction and agricultural activities, which are less dependent on trade.
The assembly’s members also passed a new law aimed at protecting the “cultured” dialect specific to the capital Pyongyang region, apparently a move to stem South Korean and foreign cultural influences.
They also discussed strengthening the surveillance activities of the Central Public Prosecutors Office to establish a “revolutionary law-abiding spirit,” reflecting the determination of Kim’s government to exert control of the people in the face of deepening economic challenges.
Kim last appeared at the assembly in September, when he declared his country would never abandon the nuclear weapons he clearly sees as his strongest guarantee of survival. The assembly passed legislation authorizing preemptive nuclear attacks in a broad range of scenarios where it may perceive its leadership as under threat, including conventional clashes or conflicts that wouldn’t necessarily amount to war.
Alarmed by the growing North Korean nuclear threat, South Korea and Japan are scrambling to strengthen their defenses in line with their alliances with the United States.
In an interview with The Associated Press last week, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said his government was discussing with the Biden administration joint military planning potentially involving U.S. nuclear assets.
The allies plan to hold a tabletop exercise next month to sharpen their responses if North Korea uses a nuclear weapon. Yoon’s government has also said it would urge Washington to deploy strategic military assets near the Korean Peninsula more often.
In December, Japan made a major break from its strictly self-defense-only post-World War II principle, adopting a new national security strategy that includes the goals of acquiring preemptive strike capabilities and cruise missiles to counter growing threats from North Korea, China and Russia.
(Source: Defense News)
19 Jan 23. Royal Navy takes command of key Middle East security force.
The UK has taken charge of a key naval force tackling terrorism and drugs smuggling across the Middle East.
The Royal Navy has taken up the reins of Combined Task Force 150; tasking international warships and aircraft to patrol the Indian Ocean and waters of the Middle East to deter terrorism and illicit activities which support it, such as drugs smuggling. This is the eleventh time the Royal Navy have taken command of the Task Force.
The force has proven to be particularly successful in the fight against the illegal drugs trade. Since July 2022, and under the recent command of the Royal Saudi Naval Force, there have been six busts: capturing more than eleven tonnes of hashish, three tonnes of heroin, two tonnes of methamphetamines and three tonnes of opium – taking over £150m drugs off the streets.
One of those seizures – totalling nearly £15.5m of illegal narcotics – was carried out by Royal Navy frigate HMS Montrose in October. She’s now been replaced in the region by her sister ship HMS Lancaster which has been on patrol in the Strait of Hormuz with the US Navy.
The Royal Navy’s Captain Jim Bryon took charge from the Royal Saudi Naval Force at the group’s HQ in Bahrain.
Capt Byron said his predecessor, Rear Admiral Abdullah Al-Mutairi had achieved “huge success” in his six months in charge.
“Commanding Combined Task Force 150 is a huge privilege and I am delighted to have been welcomed so warmly to Bahrain to work once again with our Combined Maritime Force partners.
“The work these 38 nations do – ready and stronger together – is a clear demonstration of what can be achieved when like-minded nations come together for the common good.”
“Through persistent military presence, we will do all we can to maintain maritime security across the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman, ensuring the legitimate use of the global maritime commons and disrupting the illicit activity of terrorist organisations and narcotics traffickers.”
He continued: “My Royal Navy staff, supported by personnel from both the Royal Navy of New Zealand and the Italian Marina Militare, will work tirelessly to keep a watchful eye over the region”.
The Chief of Joint Operations at the Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood, Lieutenant General Charlie Stickland, highlighted the United Kingdom’s long history of contributing to regional security in the Middle East, working with allies and partners.
“Taking Command of CTF150 for the eleventh time demonstrates our continued commitment to supporting maritime security in the region. During the UK’s Command, CTF150 will bring together our partners to collectively respond to malign smuggling activity and promote the international rules based order to deter the illicit use of the seas.”
CTF 150 is one of several task groups operated by the Combined Maritime Forces, the world’s largest international naval partnership, with more than 30 nations providing security for merchant shipping by conducting, supporting counter-piracy, counter-terrorism and maritime security patrols.
They cover the Red Sea, the Gulf, the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the wider Indian Ocean and include three of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints – the Suez Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz.
Disruption to the regular flow of traffic would impact not just the UK – which benefits from regular supplies of liquid natural gas from the Gulf – but the global economy. (Source: Royal Navy)
19 Jan 23. Senegal: Decision to proceed to trial opposition leader raises the likelihood of protests in major cities. On 17 January, an investigating judge into rape allegations against opposition leader Ousmane Sonko announced that they had referred the matter to Senegal’s criminal chamber for trial. Sonko’s legal team has stated its intention to appeal this decision. A trial could threaten Sonko’s capacity to contest the 2024 election. As such, if an appeal is unsuccessful and the matter proceeds to trial, supporters will claim that the decision was politically motivated and accuse President Macky Sall of manipulating the courts. Further developments and trial decisions will act as flashpoints for protests in major cities including Dakar, Thies and Ziguinchor. Such protests would likely target government buildings and potentially French businesses due to allegations that Sall is propped up by France, driving some instances of looting against street-level French assets. Protesters are likely to erect roadblocks during demonstrations, causing transport disruption, while possible clashes with police will elevate bystander risks. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jan 23. Israel-Palestinian Territories: Court ruling will increase prospects of competing protests; violent clashes a real possibility. On 18 January, Israel’s Supreme Court ruled the Shas party leader, Aryeh Deri, unfit to serve as a minister. The verdict stems from Deri’s multiple criminal convictions, including tax and bribery offences, with a suspended prison sentence pending until 2025. Hundreds of pro-Deri supporters gathered outside of his private residence yesterday in Jerusalem to denounce the suspension. Equally, the head of the conservative United Torah Judaism (UTJ) party added that the UTJ would back any procedure to reinstate Deri. Recent developments elevate the likelihood of clashes between pro- and anti-government supporters in the coming days, particularly during planned large-scale rallies scheduled to take place on 21 January in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa and Be’er Sheva to denounce government reforms (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 16 January 2023). Gatherings will likely take place in major squares and near road junctions, with likely clashes and confrontations with law enforcement elevating bystander safety risks. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jan 23. New Zealand: Prime minister’s surprise resignation will drive moderate government instability. On 19 January, Jacinda Ardern announced that she would step down as the leader of the ruling Labour Party and prime minister by 7 February, stating that she no longer has ‘enough in the tank’ to lead ahead of the next general election in October. Ardern’s unexpected resignation triggers a leadership contest in the Labour Party, with a vote by Labour MPs to be held on 22 January. Although Ardern’s responses to major crises, such as the Christchurch shootings and the Covid-19 pandemic, had been widely praised, her and Labour’s approval ratings among the electorate have fallen in recent months, partly due to rising inflation. Ardern’s resignation and the process to elect her successor will drive government instability over the coming weeks. The new Labour prime minister will face mounting challenges to secure a victory in the October poll. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jan 23. Russia: Reliance on some European markets set to continue, despite wider trade pivot to Asia. On 18 January, the Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS) published data regarding Russia’s international trade in 2022. The data shows a distinct pivot of Russian trade towards Asia, with trade with China and Turkey increasing by 28% and 84% respectively last year. This increase in trade made the two states Russia’s top trading partners in 2022. The data also confirms that Germany and the Netherlands are among Russia’s top five trading countries, though notably trade with Germany decreased by 23% compared to the previous year. The decrease in trade with the Netherlands was more a modest 0.1%. While the data shows Russian efforts to shift towards Asian markets following its invasion of Ukraine, the Netherlands data in particular indicates a continued reliance on some European markets, which is likely to continue in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jan 23. Kuwait: Renewed inter-governmental tensions increase the likelihood of cabinet resignation. On 16 January, the Kuwaiti Parliament’s Financial and Economic Affairs Committee voted against the withdrawal of several draft economics bills. This development underpins a wider ongoing dispute between Kuwait’s parliament and government. At the centre of disputes is a proposed bill which would result in the Kuwaiti government purchasing citizen loans and implementing a monthly repayment system. The cabinet remains divided over the long-term cost of the proposal, with ministers stressing that it would be detrimental to public reserves. Failure to resolve the political stalemate will likely result in the resignation of Kuwait’s cabinet in the coming days, representing the sixth since the beginning of 2020. This will entrench obstacles towards economic reforms, undermining investor outlook and Kuwait’s economic diversification efforts. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jan 23. Bangladesh: Upcoming opposition rallies will likely see significant turnout; risk of clashes is high. An alliance of opposition parties led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) plans to hold protests across all districts of Bangladesh as well as outside the National Press Club in the capital Dhaka at 1130 hrs (local time), on 25 January. Protests have been on the rise in Bangladesh since last month. Yesterday, 16 January, traffic movement was significantly disrupted in Dhaka by anti-government rallies by the BNP, counter rallies by the ruling Awami League (AL) party and protests by garment workers. The BNP is demanding that a caretaker government be installed before general elections in December, a demand the AL calls unconstitutional. The AL also re-elected for the tenth time Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina as the party chief despite opposition campaigns demanding Hasina’s resignation. Significant domestic political tensions increase the risk of clashes between political parties, and between BNP supporters and security forces, elevating physical threat levels for bystanders. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jan 23. Ecuador: Workers’ unions call for national mobilisation; increasing risk of domestic unrest. On 16 January, the United Workers’ Front (FUT) called for nationwide protests on 19 January over the alleged mismanagement of the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS). Among the demands of the union is the disbursement of around USD 24 bn owed to the country’s social security service. Separate union officials also suggested the protest would be used to reject several government policies as well as call for the creation of a commission with social security experts to draw up reform proposals. Protests by labour and indigenous groups are common in Ecuador and regularly lead to roadblocks, which heavily impact transport and logistics. The ongoing friction between the unions and the government will raise the risk of domestic unrest in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jan 23. Uzbekistan: Tashkent mayor’s dismissal likely attempt to mitigate unrest amid winter gas shortages. On 16 January, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced he had sacked Tashkent mayor Jahongir Arikhodjayev. The president had remained a strong supporter of Arikhodjayev, despite repeated scandals and accusations of corruption against the mayor. The announcement comes during the harshest winter in 15 years, which has caused acute gas shortages for residents throughout the country. Mirziyoyev also dismissed numerous other officials, ostensibly due to corruption and mismanagement of the energy crisis. Arikhodjayev had been a strong advocate of foreign direct investment in Tashkent. His dismissal is unlikely to undermine Mirzyoyev’s commitment to economic liberalisation, though it will likely complicate existing contracts – particularly those connected to the Tashkent City project, which Arikhodjayev spearheaded. The president’s actions are more likely an attempt to mitigate growing public anger at the gas shortages and mitigate the threat of unrest. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jan 23. Colombia: 30 soldiers detained by farmers in Meta, sustaining risk of attacks against security forces. On 16 January, a group of around 300 farmers detained 30 soldiers in Vista Hermosa (Meta department). The farmers opposed the military operation aimed at eradicating illegal crops in the region of Alto Cano, and suggested the military personnel should not have entered the area due to the recently announced ceasefire against dissident guerrilla groups. The detention of soldiers attempting to eradicate illegal crops is common. In 2022, officials reported several similar cases in Meta and Cauca departments. Dissident FARC guerrilla fronts are known to operate in the area, and these were included in the ceasefire proposed by President Gustavo Petro’s government on 31 December 2022. The incident highlights the sustained risk of further attacks targeting security forces in the region. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jan 23. Iraq: Renewed fissures exacerbate KRG instability; risk of civil unrest in urban areas will persist. On 16 January, the Kurdistan Democratic Party urged members of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to return to ministerial meetings after the party quit Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) sessions on 15 January. Following years of relative harmony between the KRG’s main parties, recent tensions tied to the government’s decision to delay elections by another year in October 2022, have been further exacerbated by fissures between Baghdad and the KRG, which have re-ignited internal debates over equitable budgetary allocations. Parliamentary meetings will represent flashpoints for civil unrest, sustaining security risks near government buildings in Erbil and Suleimaniyah, as residents express frustration over the government’s failure to address enduring socio-economic issues. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jan 23. Pakistan: Dissolving Punjab and KP assemblies will drive political instability. On 14 January, the Punjab assembly was disbanded automatically as the governor refused to respond to the Chief Minister’s (CM) order to dissolve the provincial legislature. Similarly, the current CM of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province has said he will send a notice to dissolve the KP assembly on 17 January. The governor in KP has indicated that he would not act on the advice of the CM, implying that an automatic dissolution like in the case of Punjab is likely. Both dissolutions are at the behest of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) president Imran Khan, who wants to exert pressure on the Shehbaz Sharif government for early general elections. Though the dissolution does not directly impact the federal government, the President of Pakistan who also belongs to the PTI may ask for a vote of confidence to be taken against the Sharif government. Uncertainty regarding political stability will likely impact investor confidence as well as ongoing government- IMF negotiations, raising socio-economic health risks. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jan 23. DRC: ADF attack underlines regional recruitment drive; elevates threats against symbolic targets. On 15 January, the IS-aligned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) detonated an IED in a Pentecostal church in Kasindi (North Kivu region), killing at least 17 people. While historically the ADF – a Ugandan Islamist group – has primarily recruited from Uganda and the North Kivu region, authorities have arrested a Kenyan national in connection with the incident. This underlines the group’s increasing regional recruitment amid reports that the ADF is in communications with IS in Iraq and Syria to position itself more fully as a proponent of global jihadism. This will elevate the likelihood of more symbolically motivated attacks in North Kivu, driving attack risks to bystanders around churches and kidnap risks against international NGO staff, particularly in rural areas and smaller urban centres. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jan 23. Colombia: Four people killed in Cartagena amid turf war; risk to bystanders remains elevated. On 14 January, four people were killed in targeted homicides in Cartagena (Bolivar department), in the neighbourhoods of San Pedro Martir, Ciudad Jardin, El Campestre and Nuevo Chile. The victims reportedly had several judicial priors for drug trafficking, manufacturing or possessing narcotics. According to security force officials, the targeted homicides follow an escalation in conflicts between criminal groups in the city due to internal ruptures in local gangs as well as the encroachment by crime groups into the area. In 2022, the city recorded 360 homicides, of which more than 70% were contract killings. The recent attacks indicate a continuation of the trend, sustaining the elevated risk of attacks in the city which may impact bystanders. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jan 23. Peru: Government extends state of emergency in protest-hit areas of Lima, Puno and Cusco. On 14 January, the Peruvian government extended a state of emergency order for 30 days in the capital city of Lima, as well as the southern regions of Puno and Cusco. The emergency measures grant police special powers to detain citizens and limit the right to assembly. In Puno, the restrictions include a 10-day curfew. At least 47 people have died in violent clashes between protesters and security forces since early December, following the detention of former president Pedro Castillo. In a march in Lima on 14 January, protesters demanded President Dina Boluarte step down, and that Castillo be released. Protests are likely to continue in the near term sustaining the risk of domestic unrest in the country. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jan 23. Israel-Palestinian Territories: Protests likely to continue this week; limited business disruptions are expected. Around 80,000 people gathered in Tel Aviv’s Habima Square on 14 January, to rally against the heavily criticised reform of the judiciary system led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s new government (see Sibylline Alert – 12 January 2023). The largely peaceful protest was attended by high-level political opposition figures, including former Defence Minister Benny Gantz and former Justice Minister Tzipi Livni. Smaller-scale rallies took place in other cities including Jerusalem and Haifa. Additional protests are expected in the coming days – including on 21 January in Tel Aviv – as the reform plans will be discussed in the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. Given that large-scale rallies are more likely to take place on Saturday evenings, operational and travel disruptions for businesses will be limited. In addition to Habima Square, likely gatherings in additional locations near busy traffic junctions near Kaplan Street and the Ayalon Highway have a realistic possibility of increasing the likelihood of confrontations with law enforcement elevating bystander risks.
16 Jan 23. Iraq: Government tolerance of US military presence sustains risk of retaliatory attacks on military assets . On 15 January, Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani confirmed that there is no definitive date for the withdrawal of US troops during an interview with The Wall Street Journal. Al-Sudani defended the presence of foreign troops in Iraq, employing a more tolerant attitude towards foreign intervention than previous leaders of Shia parties. Despite Washington announcing the complete withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in July 2021, approximately 2,500 non-combat US troops remain in advisory roles. The comments prompted backlash from Tehran-backed militia, including the Fatah Alliance and Kataeb Hizballah, who have claimed responsibility for attacks against military bases and personnel in recent years. Despite al-Sudani’s seemingly lenient approach towards foreign intervention, the risk of attacks on US-affiliated assets has not diminished. Moreover, the government’s perceived tolerance will increase the likelihood of retaliatory attacks by Sunni extremist groups, such as IS, targeting military checkpoints and government buildings. (Source: Sibylline)
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