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16 Dec 22. Jordan: Domestic Unrest.
EVENT
On 15 December, the US embassy in Amman restricted US government personnel from personal and official travel to the southern Jordanian governorates of Karak, Tafilah, Ma’an and Aqaba until further notice. The warning comes amid ongoing protests and strike action nationwide, mainly driven by truck and bus drivers, in response to high fuel prices.
SIGNIFICANCE
- A senior police officer was killed and at least two others were wounded during protests in the southern city of Al-Husseiniya, yesterday, 15 December (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 16 December 2022). Additional protests and violent clashes were also reported in Zarqa, Irbid and in the capital Amman. The domestic unrest uptick over the past 48 hours has triggered the deployment of additional security forces and armoured vehicles in southern cities like Ma’an.
- Yesterday’s shooting incident follows a series of protests and industrial action across southern Jordan (see Sibylline Analytical Update – 15 December 2022). The Bus Owners’ Association and the Transport Services and Taxi Owners’ Union reached an agreement with the government earlier this week. However, officials have highlighted that the implementation of measures like subsidies is limited by the IMF-backed structural economic reform plan, restricting the likelihood of short-term measures to address socio-economic grievances.
- According to local news outlets, netizens have experienced connectivity issues in accessing Twitter and TikTok since the early hours of today, 16 December. Authorities have also temporarily suspended access to Tiktok citing ‘user misuse’ and ‘failure to deal with content inciting violence’, at the time of writing. Jordanians have largely used TikTok and Facebook to share updates and document protests over the past week. Local reports have further shared an overall slowdown of internet services across the country.
FORECAST
Protests and linked labour actions are expected to continue in the coming days, with a heightened security posture by Jordanian security forces and law enforcement likely to elevate the potential for violent clashes and confrontations. The likelihood of hotspots being locking-down and large-scale deployments have a realistic probability of shifting protest activity more towards the outskirts of urban centres. Hotspot areas cities in southern Jordan, particularly Ma’an and Aqaba. Bouts of unrest in Amman also remain likely, though a major violent escalation remains less likely than in other large urban centres across Jordan.
Business staff and assets will be exposed to heightened security and bystander risks, particularly in the south, due to the possibility of additional live fire exchanges. Road blockages and other disruptive actions, including stone-throwing, along highways and overland routes, remain likely. This will sustain physical security risks for logistics firms, as well as disrupt and delay road freight supply chains.
Government involvement in restricting online access is likely to represent an additional driver for currently heightened anti-government sentiment in the coming days. It further highlights an increased risk of state oversight and media access restrictions for in-country non-governmental organisations, members of the media and activists. However, beyond firms relying on social media e-commerce, disruptions are less likely to significantly impact private-sector business operations. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Dec 22. Peru: Protests Update.
EVENT
Anti-government protests have continued to escalate since the former president, Pedro Castillo, was removed from office on 7 December. To date, at least 15 deaths and 400 injuries have been reported. Most protests have occurred in southern areas, though several cities have also experienced an uptick in incidents of domestic unrest. The government declared a curfew on 15 December in parts of Apurimac, Arequipa, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, Ica, La Libertad and Puno departments. The authorities previously expanded a state of emergency order, granting the police special powers to dissolve protests. The order also limits public assembly freedoms.
SIGNIFICANCE
- Castillo was removed as president on 7 December following an impeachment motion passed by Congress. The motion was passed hours after Castillo attempted to dissolve Congress. The legislature later swore in Dina Boluarte, the former vice president, to replace Castillo. A judicial panel on 15 December ordered Castillo to serve an 18-month pre-trial detention period, citing an investigation into criminal and graft charges.
- As of 15 December, Boluarte has twice revised the timeline for presidential elections. Government officials recently suggested presidential elections could take place as early as December 2023. Opposition lawmakers have signalled they will not impede early elections.
- Protesters have repeatedly targeted critical infrastructure and highways. Protesters besieged Andahuaylas Airport (ANS) and Rodríguez Ballón International Airport (AQP), severely disrupting flight operations. The police eventually dispersed the demonstrators. Officials at MMG’s Las Bambas copper mine also reported disruption due to roadblocks.
- S&P Global confirmed on 12 December that it cut Peru’s sovereign outlook from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’, citing risks to the country’s creditworthiness due to the ongoing political standstill and disagreements between the executive and legislative branches of government.
FORECAST
Sibylline has revised its base case scenario. Protests and related disruption are likely to continue through December and into early January 2023. Demonstrations are planned for 17-18 December in several large cities, including the capital Lima. Protesters have targeted government facilities in arson attacks and acts of vandalism. There is a high risk to personnel and assets in the vicinity of such unrest. The current state of emergency allows the security forces to crack down on protests. If examples of excessive police force are filmed and posted on social media, further demonstrations are possible before, during and after the December holidays.
As of 15 December, the police reported that roadblocks were impeding traffic along 59 highways across Peru. Further roadblocks are expected from 16 to 19 December. Roadblocks are common in southern areas of Peru, where protesters regularly target traffic heading towards key infrastructure. Further transport and operational disruption is likely in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Dec 22. Burkina Faso: Wagner deployment remains unconfirmed but threatens to exacerbate jihadist expansion. On 15 December, Ghanaian president Nana Akufo-Addo alleged that the military government in Burkina Faso had reached an agreement with Russian private military contractors, Wagner Group, for the deployment of soldiers in exchange for a mine in southern Burkina Faso. Akufo-Addo’s claims could not be verified, no other state has indicated it has knowledge of an agreement or the deployment of Wagner personnel in Burkina Faso. However, the overthrow of the former military government in September was in part driven by disputes within the Burkinabe military about seeking Russian assistance against jihadists and on 9 December, the Burkinabe prime minister visited Moscow. As such, it remains likely that even if an agreement has not been reached, negotiations about a possible Wagner deployment are ongoing. If this results in the deployment of Wagner personnel to Burkina Faso, it will disrupt French and European security agreements raising the threat of further jihadist expansion towards coastal West African states. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Dec 22. Iran asking Russia to sell military ships, help build new designs: Israeli sources. According to multiple Israeli defense sources, officials from Iran have traveled to Russia to discuss the potential for naval cooperation – including building new ships.
In addition to its nuclear and long-range ballistic missiles program, Iran has for years been working to build up its navy, with the goal of being able to project power in its surrounding bodies of water. Now, Israeli defense sources warn, Tehran is looking to lean on its increased ties with Russia to add new ships to its fleet.
However, experts warn that internal politics between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the domestic navy may complicate any effort between Tehran and Moscow to work together on naval capabilities.
According to multiple Israeli defense sources, officials from Iran have traveled to Russia to discuss the potential for naval cooperation. They carried with them two requests, Israeli sources say: first, to buy some existing Russian warships, and then to ask the Russians to design more bespoke naval capabilities that fit with Iran’s operational requirements. (Russia already has some ship designs built for export, including the Grigorovich-class, classified as a “general purpose” surface combat vessel.)
It is highly unlikely Iran would build these ships themselves, given resource constraints. Instead, whatever comes from the agreement would be built in Russia. It is expected that both the new designs and the existing ones would be outfitted with versions of Iran’s homemade cruise missiles.
“The Iranians hoped that China [would] help them to build a navy but the Chinese were not in a hurry to share their maritime technologies,” Eliezer Marom, former commander of the Israeli navy, told Breaking Defense. “The war in Ukraine opened a new option to acquire the needed combat vessels from Russia.”
It’s not the first tie between Russia and Iran on the sea, as the Russian navy has been instrumental in helping Iran ship oil to Syria. According to a report from the US Naval Institute, in October the Iranian-flagged oil tanker Samah entered the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. “After a few miles, the 900-foot-long ship stopped reporting its position and destination. Evidence suggests the ship sailed to Syria, escorted by two Russian Navy ships, including a destroyer,” the report states.
Iran’s maritime aspirations became clear some years ago when its officials for the first time pointed to the plan to establish a naval station in Syria, to be able to support Hezbollah on a regular basis without having to rely on air or land convoys through Syria, Iraq, or Turkey. The plan included the opening of another naval station in Yemen, through which Iran will be able to pose a threat at the Red Sea’s entrance and potentially impede ship traffic heading towards the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Eilat. (As a bonus, Israeli sources believe that such a station would also help Iran with intelligence gathering.)
Those two naval stations were not officially established, but in recent years the Iranian navel plan became even more ambitious — to potentially include expanding beyond its territorial waters.
According to Iranian Navy Commander Rear Adm. Shahram Irani, Iranian naval units are now present in the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean as well as the Pacific Ocean, and are safeguarding merchant containers and oil tankers owned or leased by the Islamic Republic during their missions in international waters.
Iran is also building relations with Venezuela, with Israeli intelligence concluding that the latter may allow Iranian naval forces to use its ports in the future — giving Iran a naval base to operate out of in the Americas.
Israeli naval expert Shaul Chorev told Breaking Defense that the plan to create an Iranian naval presence in the western hemisphere is largely an effort to “poke a finger in the west’s eye.”
Chorev, a former deputy chief of the Israeli Navy, also served from 2007 to 2015 as the head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission. He noted that the Iranian plan to expand the presence of their navy became clear when they participated in an exercise with the Russian fleet and two of their ships arrived at St. Petersburg this February.
“The new defense relations with Russia may help” Iran build up its navy, Chorev said. “The Iranian IRCG are operating small vessels that are used to attack mostly civil ships in the region. The current effort is to build a real capable navy.”
Complicating Factors
One major question about any naval buildup, however, is who gets what. The IRGC acts as effectively an independent military, with few ties between its operations or acquisitions and that of Iran’s regular navy. And their different mission sets require different capabilities.
A good example to that came in May, when the IRGC navy expanded its fleet with three new military ships, including a patrol combat boat bearing the name of Qasem Soleimani, who was killed in a 2020 US airstrike. The Soleimani patrol combat warship is a multi-hulled vessel that can carry helicopters and can unload strike speedboats and vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) drones.
Israeli sources said that the IRGC naval force is being built to enable the performance of “terror attacks” using fast boats as launching pads for other weapon systems like armed drones. According to Iran international website, operated from London by opponents of the Iranian regime, the IRGC Navy also received the Shahid Rouhi and Shahid Dara high-speed and missile-launching assault boats.
While the IRGC needs small fast vessels for commando operations, the Iranian navy needs big combat vessels, said Marom, the former Israeli navy commander. He also noted that Iran has a huge fleet of oil tankers and new combat ships for Iran’s navy would likely be aimed to protect this vast export operation.
“Iran is surrounded by seas and that forces them to have a meaningful navy. This is also connected to their aspiration to become a major force in the Gulf and Middle east. They operate in Lebanon and Syria which are located on the shores of the Mediterranean and in Yemen located on the shores of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. To be present in these seas the Iranians need a strong navy,” Marom said.
Marom pointed to the fact in the 1970s, the US began work on building four destroyers of the Kidd class that were to be transferred to Iran under the Shah of Iran. The transfer was canceled after he was overthrown in the Iranian Revolution on 11 February 1979. The same needs then apply to Iran now, Marom said.
Another point of tension is prioritization within Iran from a strategic sense. Raz Zimmet, an expert on Iran from the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) told Breaking Defense that Teheran will have to reassess its priorities and take budgets from its two main military programs — the nuclear and long-range ballistic missiles — if it wants to get serious about shipbuilding.
“Building a capable navy involves huge sums and Teheran will have to make some major decisions,” Zimmet said.
Of course, despite the best effort of American-led sanctions, Iran seems to be doing ok financially thanks to its oil exports. According to an analysis from CEIC, Iranian exports were reported at 762.779 barrels per day in Dec. 2021, a number that is up from the previous year. That number, Israeli sources say, has only increased in the last year.
As to Russia: while its industrial base has taken a major hit due to sanctions from the war, Israeli sources believe the draw of Iranian funds will be a welcome infusion of cash, and that should be enough to make the Iranian boats a priority.
Until the recent growth in relations with Russia, China was seen as the source for building an Iranian naval force.
In 2014 the heads of the Iranian Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) met for the first time to discuss operational cooperation. But ultimately nothing major came of that relationship, with China apparently reluctant to share much technology with Tehran.
Now, the geopolitical map has shifted and Iran and Russia are finding it mutually beneficial to work together. The supply of armed UAVs to the Russian forces stuck in Ukraine and the plan of Iran to purchase Russian SU-35 fighter aircraft made the two countries “defense partners,” in a way that Israeli sources did not see developing as quickly as it has.
(Source: Defense News Early Bird/Breaking Defense.com)
16 Dec 22. Secretary of Defense Austin Statement on Japan’s Release of its New Strategy Documents (National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program). We welcome the release of Japan’s updated strategy documents – the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program – which reflect Japan’s staunch commitment to upholding the international rules-based order and a free and open Indo-Pacific. There is important alignment between Japan’s newly released National Defense Strategy and the vision and priorities outlined in the U.S. National Defense Strategy, both of which underpin continuing bilateral efforts to modernize the Alliance, bolster integrated deterrence, and address evolving regional and global security challenges through cooperation with likeminded allies and partners.
We support Japan’s decision to acquire new capabilities that strengthen regional deterrence, including counterstrike capabilities. We also endorse Japan’s decision to increase substantially its defense spending and reach two percent of GDP in 2027, and to improve the jointness and interoperability of its Self-Defense Forces through the creation of a permanent joint operational headquarters. The Alliance remains the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, and the United States is committed to working with Japan in support of the goals enshrined in both countries’ strategies. (Source: US DoD)
15 Dec 22. Iran: Arabian Gulf maritime security will remain volatile amid unrest, sustaining business disruption. On 14 December, the Kayhan newspaper, which is closely linked to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, put forward the possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz to oil tankers and commercial vessels from Western countries. The comments come amid increased international pressure after a US-drafted resolution removed Iran from the UN Commission on the Status of Women. While the implementation of a partial Iranian blockade is more likely than the complete closure of the waterway, any such action will increase energy insecurity for Western states seeking to diversify hydrocarbon supplies away from Russia (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 10 June 2022). In addition, such a move will likely exacerbate already heightened diplomatic tensions with the US, and will likely result in further sanctions against Iran. Ongoing anti-government protests in Iran and febrile geopolitical tensions will sustain maritime risks in the near term for key Arabian Gulf shipping lanes amid a volatile security environment. Low-level Iranian and/or proxy attacks against vessels remain possible. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Dec 22. Mexico: Alternative electoral reform plan will raise political instability risks. On 14 December, the Senate approved an electoral reform plan put forward by President Lopez Obrador. The move comes one week after lawmakers rejected an expanded version of the reform, citing its potential to undermine the country’s electoral body (INE). Among the endorsed amendments are fresh curbs on the power of the INE to block candidates, as well as changes to campaign donations. The opposition claims that the bill degrades the country’s democratic institutions, while the government claims that the main purpose of the reforms is to reduce the influence of economic interests in politics. The bill’s approval is likely to increase political instability and will possibly lead to domestic unrest in major urban centres through early 2023. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Dec 22. Peru: Expanded state of emergency order will sustain transport disruption risks. The government expanded a state of emergency order on 14 December, granting the police special powers to dissolve protests. The order also limits public assembly freedoms. In addition, the authorities suggested that they would bring forward national elections to December 2023, shifting from a previous declaration which stipulated that elections would be held by mid-2024. The protests began on 7 December following the impeachment of former president Pedro Castillo. At least eight demonstrators have died due to clashes with the police. The gatherings have repeatedly targeted key infrastructure and major mining roads. Among the affected mining operations is MMG’s Las Bambas mine, which supplies around 2 percent of global copper supplies. Protests are likely to continue in southern areas, and may lead to further roadblocks. This will sustain the risk of transport disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Dec 22. Colombia: Planned strike ordered by ELN in Choco province will increase likelihood of armed attacks. On 14 December, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that ELN guerrillas will carry out an armed strike in Choco department on 15 December. Armed strikes are common in areas controlled by guerrilla groups, which force businesses and transport services to cease operations for a set period of time. The government – which is currently in peace talks with the ELN – has asked the group to halt the strike. In the latest round of peace talks, the parties agreed on terms related to humanitarian aid deliveries, the use of anti-personnel mines and the recruitment of minors. Personnel and assets in areas of Choco controlled by the guerrillas face heightened risks during the armed strike. It is unclear if the armed strike will severely impact the ongoing negotiations. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Dec 22. UK commits further £13m to the Lebanese Army. The joint border project has reinforced the authority of the Lebanese state along its land border with Syria where Four Land Border Regiments are deployed. The British Ambassador to Lebanon, Hamish Cowell, announced a £13m commitment to support the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) resilience from 2022 till 2025 in a Memorandum of Understanding signed with LAF Commander in Chief General Joseph Aoun.
Ambassador Cowell, with the US Ambassador, Dorothy Shea, and the Canadian Ambassador, Stephanie McCollum, met General Aoun during the High Level Steering Committee to discuss security on the Lebanese-Syrian border.
The joint border project has reinforced the authority of the Lebanese state along its land border with Syria where Four Land Border Regiments have been deployed from the North in Arida to the south in Jebel Al Sheikh.
Following the meeting, Ambassador Cowell said: “This MOU demonstrates our commitment to continuing our support to and cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces. Since 2009, the UK has committed over £87m allowing the LAF to optimise its capabilities, develop and modernise. We are proud of our contribution to building the LAF’s reputation as a respected, professional armed forces able to defend Lebanon and provide security along its border with Syria.
It was a privilege to meet the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Joseph Aoun, and attend my first High Level Steering Committee. The Lebanese Armed Forces play a pivotal role in safeguarding Lebanon and its people. I am hugely impressed by the courage that the men and women of the Lebanese Armed Forces show.”(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
14 Dec 22. Pakistan: Imminent military operations will raise tensions with Afghanistan; border clashes are likely. Pakistan will likely launch military operations in Afghanistan’s border areas within the next 24 hours. This is due to several recent incidents, including an attack against the Pakistani embassy in Kabul (Afghanistan) and deadly clashes involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The exact details of the operations are unclear. However, Afghanistan’s Taliban government will possibly respond with cross-border attacks, raising bystander risks. The Chaman border crossing, which is vital for cross-border trade, will possibly also close. Pakistani military operations will likely continue throughout the winter, as this is typically when militants decrease their activity and remain in hideouts. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Dec 22. Brazil: Protests following confirmation of electoral results maintain risk of domestic unrest. Supporters of President Jair Bolsonaro attempted to enter the Federal Police headquarters in Brasilia on 12 December, amid protests over the electoral certification of president-elect Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Security was also reinforced in several areas of the capital – including the Southern Hotel Sector in Brasilia, where Lula da Silva was staying – following protests in several areas. No casualties were reported following the protests. However, the Supreme Court later issued a temporary arrest warrant for pro-Bolsonaro indigenous leader, Jose Acacio Serere Xavante, citing anti-democratic acts. After the 30 October presidential election, Bolsonaro supporters blocked roads in protest, while others camped out in front of army barracks calling for a military coup. Sporadic protests are expected to continue in the country in the lead-up to and following the inauguration of Lula da Silva in Brasilia on 1 January. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Dec 22. Colombia: First round of peace talks between government and ELN end; threat of armed groups remains elevated. On 12 December, representatives of the Colombian government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla concluded the first round of peace talks in Caracas. Mexico will hold the next round of talks in January 2023. In a joint statement, the negotiating parties said they had reached four points of agreement, including an emergency plan for the Colombian provinces of Choco and Valle del Cauca, without giving further details. Colombia’s Defence Minister also acknowledged a drop in ELN operations since the talks began. Talks between the ELN and the government were cancelled in 2019 when a dissident ELN front bombed a police academy in Bogota. Dissident groups – especially the ones on the Venezuelan border – are still capable of contravening agreements made by the ELN’s negotiating party, sustaining the risk of armed attacks and kidnapping impacting personnel and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Dec 22. Peru: Protests in support of ousted president continue, as S&P cuts sovereign outlook to ‘negative.’ Protesters in support of ousted president Pedro Castillo clashed with police in several areas of the country on 12 December, increasing the overall death toll from two to seven. The largest demonstrations occurred in the departments of Apurimac and Arequipa. In Arequipa in particular, protesters invaded the Alfredo R. Ballon Int. Airport (IATA: AQP) leading to flight suspensions. Other minor incidents of arson and vandalism were also reported in Lima. The continued spate of unrest comes as S&P Global said it had cut Peru’s sovereign outlook from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’ citing risks to the country’s creditworthiness from the ongoing political standstill and disagreements between the executive and legislative branches of government. Further protests are expected in the near term, in particular around southern areas which have historically supported Castillo. This will increase risks to personnel and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Dec 22. UK signs Plan for Defence Cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Defence Secretary meets Saudi Arabian counterpart to discuss defence cooperation. The Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP, met His Royal Highness Prince Khalid bin Salman, the Minister for Defence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in London today (13 December 2022). The Defence Ministers reflected on the strength of the historic UK-Saudi defence partnership of over half a century, based on a shared commitment to peace, stability, and the strengthening of mutual and regional security.
The Defence Secretary and His Royal Highness welcomed the signing of a Plan for Defence Cooperation which will enhance bilateral defence and security cooperation to address shared security challenges, including through regular dialogue and consultation, education and training, and capability-building. It reaffirms the UK’s enduring commitment to working with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on promoting regional security and stability.
Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said: “It is a pleasure to sign this Plan for Defence Cooperation, bringing us even closer to one of our most important partners. It is a key milestone between our two nations, as we look to enhance our defence partnership further in support of mutual and regional security.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
12 Dec 22. S. Africa: President Faces Challenges.
Key Points
- Although the National Assembly is unlikely to vote to impeach President Cyril Ramaphosa, the investigation into his fitness for office is likely to weaken his re-election bid at the African National Congress (ANC) party’s elective conference on 16-20 December.
- Ramaphosa’s key challenger, Zweli Mkhize, has also been linked to a corruption scandal. In the unlikely event that Ramaphosa loses the leadership contest, the commitment to South Africa’s anti-corruption clampdown will therefore possibly decrease under Mkhize’s leadership.
- If Ramaphosa survives the elective conference, the charges against him will sustain internal party divisions, undermining investor confidence.
Context
On 30 November, an independent panel appointed to investigate President Ramaphosa’s fitness for office concluded that it had found evidence that the president had violated his oath of office and possibly engaged in serious misconduct. The statement comes amid queries over the alleged theft of USD 4 m from Ramaphosa’s Phala Phala farm in 2020. On 5 December, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC ruled that MPs should reject the adoption of the panel report, though this ruling was not unanimous. The National Assembly will vote on the report on 13 December.
Forecast
The National Assembly is unlikely to vote to impeach Ramaphosa
Ramaphosa’s political future depends on the outcome of the National Assembly’s vote. A vote in favour of the report would likely result in the launch of impeachment proceedings. Although the NEC rejected the adoption of the panel report, the vote was not unanimous. This reflects significant divisions within the ANC, particularly from the Radical Economic Transformation (RET) faction which remains aligned with the former president Jacob Zuma. Such divisions threaten to undermine the ANC’s majority within the National Assembly, where it holds 230 seats out of 400.
Regardless of this divide, a successful impeachment is highly unlikely. ANC members who ignore the NEC’s ruling that party members should reject the report’s findings risk their political futures, especially as the vote is taking place in an open ballot. Furthermore, in the event a majority of the national assembly votes in favour of the report, an impeachment vote needs to receive a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly to succeed, a feat which the opposition is highly unlikely to achieve.
The panel report will increase concerns about a successful challenge to Ramaphosa’s bid for party leadership at the elective conference
Regardless of our assessment, the scandal will herald challenges to Ramaphosa’s re-election bid at the ANC’s elective conference on 16-20 December. On 22 November, Ramaphosa won a clear majority of branch nominations, securing 2,037. His main rival, the former health minister Zweli Mkhize, won 916 votes. However, the scandal has damaged Ramaphosa’s credibility and will likely encourage members of the RET, prominent members of which have held talks with Mkhize, to bolster their efforts to secure the party leadership for Mkhize.
Mkhize’s involvement in a corruption scandal involving the awarding of a USD 10m Covid-19 communication contract indicates that commitment levels to South Africa’s anti-corruption clampdown will possibly decrease under his leadership. In line with RET objectives, a Mkhize presidency would possibly prompt a rollback of corruption investigations and prosecutions, hindering progress towards transparency-enhancing reforms. This would significantly undermine efforts to restore confidence in the South African market, impacting projections for economic recovery, the value of the South African Rand (ZAR) and international investment.
Despite the boost to Mkhize’s election prospects, Ramaphosa remains the favourite to secure the party’s leadership. Statements from the NEC and other ANC bodies indicate that Ramaphosa maintains significant influence over the party’s machinery, regardless of the scandal. Ramaphosa’s popularity ranks above that of the ANC party itself, indicating that his removal would undermine the chances of the party being re-elected in future polls.
Panel report will deepen divides within the ANC and undermine investor confidence
If Ramaphosa secures victory in the leadership contest, the panel report will remain a source of internal division between his supporters and those of former president Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa has called on the constitutional court to review the panel’s findings. This process will likely increase scrutiny over the issue and possibly drive further legal investigations in the coming months. Any such developments will act as potential internal flashpoints within the ANC.
The allegations will also increase internal opposition to party rules which dictate that individuals accused of corruption should step down from key posts. This will exacerbate infighting and possibly further undermine the credibility of the ANC. There is a realistic possibility that any such divisions will disrupt the passing of policy and undermine government efficiency. This will hinder progress to fulfil repeated pledges to reform state utilities such as the electricity utility Eskom. In addition, Ramphosa’s opponents, particularly the Economic Freedom Fighters party, will likely use the allegations and investigations to mobilise anti-government protests. Unless Ramaphosa is able to overcome these challenges and accelerate reforms, such conditions will likely undermine investor sentiment and dampen growth prospects. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Dec 22. The warming US-Philippine alliance. There are signs that the bilateral US-Philippine military relationship may be rejuvenated following years of stagnation, after a series of high-level meetings between American and Filipino representatives.
The relationship soured over recent years, prompting concerns in the West that the Philippines may abandon the US alliance system.
Designated by the US as a major non-NATO ally, a title shared by a select cadre of US allies including Australia and Japan, the relationship chilled over recent years following improved relations between the Duterte-led Filipino government and China.
In 2019, the Chinese government lauded the increasingly cordial relationship between China and the Philippines, noting that: “Xi Jinping pointed out that China-Philippines relations have achieved the ‘trilogy’ of turnaround, consolidation and elevation over the past three years, and entered a new stage of development.”
The warming relations between the Philippines and Chinese governments came shortly following a war of words between former President Rodrigo Duterte and Washington, with President Duterte calling President Barack Obama the “son of a whore”.
Michael Beltran, writing in the Lowy Institute’s The Interpreter this week detailed how the incoming government of President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr and Washington have sought to rebuild bilateral relation.
In November, Vice President Kamala Harris visited the Philippines to reassert the US’ continued support for the country.
“In front of the gathered navy and fisherfolk, she reaffirmed the unwavering support of the United States in the face of Beijing’s ‘intimidation’ and ‘coercion’ in the territorial row,” Beltran wrote.
“The White House touted the ‘ironclad’ relationship between the two countries as exhibited by the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allows American troops to operate in a number of Philippine military facilities.”
According to Beltran, the US increased their expenditure on the EDCA and sent three core signals to the region.
“First, it was a direct statement to China by the Biden administration about maritime territories – arguably the most direct, alongside frequent US Navy operations within the South China Sea,” he continued.
“Second, it allowed Harris to splash the cash to back up a range of US promises. And third, with Marcos new to the role, it reminded the Philippines of US dominance in shaping the region’s geopolitical narrative.”
The Vice President’s visit comes as the new Philippine government has sought to re-pivot its defence strategy following years of hedging under former President Duterte.
In October, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III and Senior Undersecretary Jose Faustino Jr, officer in charge of the Philippine Department of National Defense, met in Hawaii to oversee joint military planning between both countries.
According to media reports, it is expected that the United States and the Philippines will increase their number of joint military exercises to 500.
At the meeting, Faustino explicitly reiterated the country’s ongoing commitment to the US alliance system.
“Our two countries are working together to reach a common understanding of the importance of our defence alliances and what it means to recognise each other as equal partners in advancing our respective countries’ interests and in promoting peace and prosperity in the region,” Faustino said.
Not only did the meeting highlight their ongoing commitment to the alliance, but also paved a course for deeper military relationships between the two nations.
“Our meeting highlighted the importance of the bilateral defense relations between the Philippines and the US, and we were able to discuss forward-looking, practical and valuable ways on how to empower our partnership through improving defence cooperation across various lines of efforts,” he continued.
“As well as increasing interoperability and information sharing between our two-armed forces with the end view of further enhancing the credibility of our alliance.”
Not only are the two nations now expected to increase the number of military exercises, but their scale too.
According to media reports, the annual Balikatan wargames will surge to include some 16,000 US personnel. The last Balikatan exercise was held in April this year, with some 9,000 military representatives from the United States and Armed Forces of the Philippines taking part in the wargame.
(Source: Defence Connect)
12 Dec 22. Afghanistan: Hotel Attack.
EVENT
Around 1430 local time today (12 December), an explosion followed by gunfire occurred at the Longan Hotel, which is popular with Chinese nationals, in the Shahr-e Naw neighbourhood of Kabul. The Taliban government said its security forces killed at least three attackers; two foreigners, reportedly Chinese, were among the 18 people injured.
SIGNIFICANCE
- The attack occurred a day after China’s ambassador to Afghanistan Wang Yu called on Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stankzai to ensure security for Chinese diplomatic and business personnel and their assets. The targeted area was also cordoned off the night before, indicating possible intelligence of an imminent attack.
- Despite an increase in Chinese nationals in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover in 2021, this is the first time they have come under direct attack in Kabul. The Taliban government has been pushing to deepen economic ties with China, as evidenced by recent negotiations with Beijing to open the Wakhan Corridor to boost bilateral trade.
- While no group has thus far claimed responsibility for the attack, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) is the most likely perpetrator. If the ISIS-K link is proven, the attack indicates a growing trend of the group targeting the personnel and/or assets of those foreign countries engaging with the Taliban government.
- ISIS-K had targeted the Russian embassy earlier this year when Moscow and Kabul were discussing an agreement on Russian gasoline and commodity supplies to Afghanistan. The group also attacked the Pakistani embassy after the visit of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar to Afghanistan, where she held talks with the Taliban government on trade and security.
FORECAST
The relatively affluent Shahr-e Naw neighbourhood in Kabul is a central district that houses office buildings, a shopping mall, medical centres and several popular hotels. A heavy security presence will remain in the area as the Taliban government investigates the incident. This will sustain minor transport disruption in the upcoming days. There may also likely be a permanent stationing of extra security personnel near the targeted area.
The emerging trend of ISIS-K’s targeting points to an elevated threat of attacks against the personnel and assets of those foreign countries that are currently actively engaging with the Taliban government. Such a threat also extends to countries which have shown an interest in cooperating with the Taliban despite the latter’s lack of international recognition. These include India, Qatar and Iran, in addition to Russia, China and Pakistan. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Dec 22. Japan’s Kishida walks tightrope to redemption with planned defence splurge. Boosting military spending may be Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s best hope of reviving his sinking popularity, but there is a catch, analysts say: paying for it with unpopular new taxes could undermine an already wobbly premiership.
About two-thirds of Japanese voters back a government plan for the country’s biggest military build-up since World War Two, arming it with missiles that can strike targets in neighbouring China or North Korea.
That is more than double Kishida’s approval rating, which has plummeted amid revelations about his ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) ties to the controversial Unification Church and the resignation of three scandal-tainted ministers.
The problem with the crowd-pleasing defence policy is that Kishida’s administration has been unclear about how it will pay for the estimated $320 bn splurge over the next five years. The increase would push defence spending to 2% of the country’s gross domestic product, or about a tenth of current public spending.
His government has said cost cutting won’t cover it, and with growing unease about how financial markets will react to signs of profligacy, Kishida is turning to tax increases that few voters appear to want and many LDP lawmakers oppose.
“From his perspective, he is engaged in a delicate balancing act,” said Koichi Nakano, a professor of political science at Sophia University in Tokyo. “If I had to bet, then I would probably bet against him (Kishida) surviving the entire calendar year next year.”
Kishida, who leads one of the LDP’s smaller factions, needs public support to keep the fractious group in line so he can govern Japan while navigating a slowing global economy, inflation and geopolitical tensions with the country’s nuclear-armed neighbours.
Although there are no signs of leadership challenges, analysts say digital minister Taro Kono, who stood against Kishida in last year’s leadership run-off, and former foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi could be successors.
FUNDING OPTIONS
Missile tests and other aggressive acts by China and North Korea have solidified public support for a stronger Japanese military.
Yet only 20% of respondents to an October poll published by the Yomiuri newspaper, Japan’s biggest daily, favoured tax increases to pay for increased defence spending, compared with 40% who backed government borrowing.
In a survey by Fuji Television last month, 66% of people said they opposed higher taxes to pay for a bigger military.
Kishida’s advisers, however, have prodded him to embrace tax increases.
A panel of experts the premier established to guide him on defence last month urged “broad tax measures” to pay for the spending alongside financial prudence from the world’s most indebted large industrial nation.
The report even made vague reference to the turmoil unleashed on financial markets when former British Prime Minister Liz Truss announced unfunded tax cuts in September that were hastily withdrawn and led to her resignation.
RARE REBUKE
Kishida’s experts seem to be winning his ear, even though many in his own party disagree.
At a news conference on Saturday, Kishida, who needs an extra $30 bn a year for his defence plan once money from other reserves runs out, said Japan would pay for any spending shortfall with tax revenue rather than government bonds, which would expand national debt that is already more than twice the size of the economy.
On Monday, however, Kyodo News reported that the government would issue about 1.6trn yen ($11.61bn) in construction bonds for Defence Force facilities.
Kishida also pledged that tax increases would not squeeze peoples’ incomes, earning him a rare public rebuke from one of his own cabinet ministers for suggesting that businesses would have to cover the cost.
“I can’t comprehend why the Prime Minister would make remarks that will discourage wage increases,” economic security minister, Sanae Takaichi wrote on Twitter. Takaichi stood against him in the LDP leadership race in 2021.
Many in Kishida’s party are opposed to tax increases, including 70% of the LDP committee that has formulated much of Kishida’s defence plan, according to Masahisa Sato, an upper house lawmaker and former deputy defence minister, who is one of the LDP’s most vocal proponents of a stronger military.
Among those opposed, “some are just against it, but others want more time to discuss a funding plan,” he said, a course both he and Takaichi advocate.
For now it seems Kishida’s best policy may be silence, even if that just puts off awkward questions, analysts say.
“To head off any manoeuvring within the LDP that threatens his administration, Kishida will have to pander to the whims of lawmakers,” said Tomoaki Iwai, professor emeritus at Nihon University, who predicted the defence plan may not bolster Kishida’s popularity at all. ($1 = 136.5600 yen) (Source: Reuters)
13 Dec 22. Japan eyes $11.6bn in construction bonds for military facilities -Kyodo
Summary.
- Japan to double annual military outlay to equivalent of 2% GDP
- Saddled with huge debt, Tokyo struggles to pull together funding
- Debt issue eyed on top of spending cut, tax hike, non-tax income
Japan’s government, which has publicly said it does not want to issue new debt, wants to use construction bonds for developing Self-Defense Force facilities as part of efforts to boost defence spending, Kyodo news agency reported on Tuesday.
The government will earmark about 1.6trn yen ($11.61bn) for construction spending by the fiscal year that ends in March 2028, Kyodo said, citing an unnamed person involved with the process.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had said as recently as Saturday that issuing debt to pay for military spending was “impossible as a responsible option for the future”.
Finance Minister Shunichi Suzuki said he was aware of the media report, adding that no decision has been made.
“We are in the middle of a decision-making process. At this moment, the government has not reached a conclusion,” he said. “In developing defence capabilities stably for the future, it’s difficult to consider government bonds as stable funding sources.”
Kishida has told his government to earmark 43trn yen for defence over the next five years; that would double annual defence spending to the equivalent of about 2% of Japan’s gross domestic product. But the industrial world’s most indebted government is struggling to scrape together funding sources.
Japan is saddled with public debt that is more than twice the size of its economy. Boosting defence capabilities has emerged as an urgent matter amid uncertainty over China, North Korea and Russia.
Given the government’s tattered public finances, Japanese officials have publicly shrugged off the possibility of fresh government debt issuance, while pledging to streamline spending, raise taxes and tap non-tax revenue.
However, some ruling party lawmakers have called for issuing construction bonds to pay for portions of the larger defence budget.
On Monday, Sanae Takaichi, a cabinet minister, voiced opposition to any hasty decision on tax increases. ($1 = 137.7700 yen) (Source: Reuters)
12 Dec 22. US-Syria: Long-term US regional engagement remains unclear despite recent counter-IS operation. US special forces killed two Islamic State (IS) operatives on 11 December during a raid in north-eastern Syria. The operation comes after targeted air strikes in October killed three central IS figures involved in recruitment and attack plotting. These events underscore Washington DC’s short-term commitment to carrying out counter-terror operations. However, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Kurdish forces in northern Iraq and Syria have become increasingly concerned about long-term US engagement amid an uptick in Turkish aerial attacks in the region. It is unclear what direction long-term US foreign policy will pursue after the 2024 presidential election. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Dec 22. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Retaliatory attacks are unlikely despite increased tensions after rocket strikes. On 11 December, six people were killed and 17 others were injured after rockets were fired into Chaman district (Baluchistan province, Pakistan) from Afghanistan. The incident occurred nine days after Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) attacked Pakistan’s ambassador in the capital Kabul on 2 December. Islamabad also blames Afghanistan’s Taliban government for failing to curb a surge in Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) activity in Pakistan. However, it is unlikely that the 11 December incident will lead to retaliatory attacks by Pakistan’s armed forces. Protests made through formal government channels are more likely. However, the attack will significantly contribute to deteriorating bilateral tensions, which will largely focus on disputed border issues. Physical security threats for personnel involved in cross-border transit activity will remain high in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Dec 22. Peru: Military control of key infrastructure and roads will possibly lead to decreased transport disruption. On 13 December, Peru’s defence ministry announced that the military will take control of critical infrastructure and key roads across the country. The measure aims to protect airports and hydroelectric plants, among other crucial strategic facilities, from protests sparked by the impeachment of Pedro Castillo. The government will reportedly prioritise road networks across the country. Protesters have targeted roads and two airports since early December, which has led to transport and operational disruption. At least seven people have been killed in recent clashes in several parts of the country. Further protests are likely, though the risk of transport disruption will possibly decrease in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Dec 22. Israel: Knesset speaker election will facilitate government formation; civil unrest risks will persist. On 13 December, the Knesset elected Yariv Levin, a Likud party member and close ally of Prime Minister-designate Benjamin Netanyahu, as the new parliament speaker. In total, 64 out of 120 Knesset members (MKs) voted in favour of Levin. The new speaker is likely to call for votes on four pieces of legislation, including the expansion of the authority of the national security minister, the revision of provisions for MKs serving a suspended sentence, additional regulations for opposing MKs to leave parliamentary factions and control of the West Bank portfolio by an independent minister. These legislative issues represent demands by Netanyahu’s coalition partners. Once they are resolved, the government’s formation is likely to be finalised. Civil unrest risks stemming from protests by both pro-Netanyahu and anti-Netanyahu supporters will be sustained in cities such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Dec 22. Egypt-Yemen: Maritime insecurity will persist amid volatility, sustaining short-term threat of attacks. On 13 December, Egypt assumed command of the 34-nation Red Sea Combined Task Force (CTF) 153 stationed in Bahrain. The CTF aims to combat smuggling and illegal activities. This has triggered threats from the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. These threats will increase if military operations encroach on Yemen’s territorial waters. The Houthi’s defence minister, Mohammad Nasser al-Atifi, stated that these waters include the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden. These waterways are also part of the CTF’s area of operations. Amid the ongoing conflict in Yemen, several commercial attacks against vessels by the Houthis have taken place in recent weeks. Additional attacks against commercial vessels remain a realistic possibility and will exacerbate the instability of Red Sea maritime shipping lanes. Risks of incidental and collateral damage to personnel and assets are consequently elevated. Heightened regional tensions will sustain the likelihood of maritime tit-for-tat hostilities by Iran in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
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