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12 Oct 22. Yemen: Failure to meet ceasefire renewal deadline is likely to reinstate the pre-truce security environment, sustaining operational and physical risks for businesses. Following the non-renewal of a ceasefire agreement on 2 October, negotiations have continued between the warring parties in Yemen, with tomorrow, 14 October, now slated to be the official deadline for the Houthis to accept the conditions of the truce. Today, 13 October, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister stated that efforts to secure an agreement are still in place, with a technical delegation reportedly arriving in Sana’a. However, further failures to reach a negotiated agreement will likely prompt a return to a pre-ceasefire status quo, including the elevated likelihood of a renewed cross-border escalation. Business assets and personnel in Saudi Arabia, as well as the UAE, are expected to face a renewed threat of drone and missile strikes. Firms based in Saudi Arabia’s southern provinces and linked to critical infrastructure will continue to face greater exposure to physical and operational risks in the coming days and weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Oct 22. Mali: New constitution likely undermines peace agreement, exacerbating jihadist conflict. On 12 October, state broadcasters publicised details of the draft Malian constitution over which a referendum is scheduled in March 2023. While strengthening the power of the presidency, the text also rules out the possibility of Malian federalism. This condition may be used to stymie progress on pledges to enact “regionalisation”, a key condition of the 2015 Algiers peace agreement between the Malian government and northern Tuareg rebel groups, which focused on providing northern communities with greater autonomy. As “regionalisation” is highly unpopular in the more populous south, it is likely that the referendum text will pass. This may increase strains between the Malian government and Taureg armed groups. While it is unlikely that such strains would lead to a complete breakdown of the peace agreement, it may weaken local support for pro-government Tuareg groups, likely increasing the recruitment potential of both al-Qaeda and IS-aligned jihadist groups. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Oct 22. Update: air strikes against Daesh. The RAF are continuing to take the fight to Daesh in Iraq and Syria.
Summary
- Monday 10 October – a Reaper engaged a Daesh terrorist in northern Syria.
Detail
Royal Air Force aircraft have continued to conduct armed reconnaissance patrols against Daesh terrorists. On Monday 10 October, a Reaper remotely piloted aircraft, armed with Hellfire missiles, tracked and, when it was safe to do so without posing a risk to civilians, successfully engaged one such terrorist who was on a motorcycle in northern Syria, near Hamman At Turkumen.
Previous updates
- Iraqi security forces identified a number of Daesh terrorists attempting to re-establish a presence in an area to the north of Tikrit. A Royal Air Force Reaper remotely piloted aircraft joined coalition aircraft in supporting the Iraqi operation by tracking the group on Tuesday 14 June, and at an appropriate opportunity, when the terrorists were exposed in the open away from any civilians, conducted a successful attack alongside the other coalition aircraft; the RAF Reaper employed Hellfire missiles. The group was reported to be destroyed as a result of this Iraqi-led operation, and the terrorists eliminated before they could mount an active threat to the Iraqi people.
- Royal Air Force aircraft have continued to fly missions over Iraq and Syria in support of the global coalition against the Daesh terrorist movement. On Tuesday 14 December 2021, hostile drone activity was detected around the At Tanf coalition base in Syria. A pair of Typhoon FGR4s from Royal Air Force Akrotiri were conducting one of their regular patrols over Syria and Iraq as part of the global coalition against Daesh, and were tasked to investigate. On arrival in the At Tanf area, the pilots were able to identify a small hostile drone, and despite the diminutive size of the target, succeeded in conducting an air to air engagement with an ASRAAM (Advanced Short Range Air to Air Missile) which eliminated the threat it posed to coalition forces. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
12 Oct 22. Iran: Protests.
Key Takeaways:
- While protests are pressuring the Iranian leadership, the movement is unlikely to pose a major threat to overall political stability in the near term. However, further demonstrations are likely to persist in the weeks ahead, with the possible deployment of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces significantly exacerbating physical security risks.
- The Iranian government will likely respond to further escalations in domestic unrest levels by intensifying external attacks by the IRGC or proxy networks in the region. As per our previous reporting, Tehran will utilise the perceived threat from Kurdish separatists’ or other regional conflicts as a distraction from addressing internal developments.
- It is unlikely that Iran’s protest movement will result in the collapse of negotiations to renew the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, there is a realistic probability that increased external pressure on Western governments from lobbyists and civil society groups will sustain delays in nuclear talks and jeopardise Iran’s re-entrance into the global market.
Context
Anti-government protests are now in their fourth consecutive week across Iran. Initial bouts of civil unrest started in Iran’s Kurdistan region in Divandareh, Saqqez and Dehglan on 18 September in response to the death of Mahsa Amini while in the custody of Morality Police officers for violating national hijab laws. Subsequently, on 22 September, Iranian authorities warned of widespread pro-government counter-protests, with loyalists gathering in Iran’s north-western Hamadan city over recent weeks (see Sibylline Alert – 23 September 2022).
Since 18 September, protest activity has continued, sustained by rising levels of government dissent primarily amongst Iran’s female population. In Tehran’s Islamic Azad and al-Zahra Universities, female students painted their hands red and gathered to chant ‘death to the dictator’ while burning their mandatory hijabs. Similarly, teenage girls have launched demonstrations at schools, with videos circulating of schoolgirls chanting in defiance at a member of the IRGC’s paramilitary branch. The security forces’ response has been heavy-handed, with IRGC senior leader, Ali Fadavi, noting that the average age of detained protesters is 15. Moreover, the forced disappearance and death of 16-year-old student and activist, Nika Shakarami, on 30 September has further fuelled protest activity in recent days.
The Iranian government’s response has prompted international backlash as human rights organisations call upon Western governments to condemn civil liberty violations and the suppression of women’s rights. Several countries, including France and the Netherlands, have urged nationals to leave amid an increase in arbitrary detentions and disappearances, including the arrest of nine foreign individuals during recent protests (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 10 October 2022).
Protest activity will persist in the weeks ahead; enhanced security response will mitigate government stability risks
Protesters and anti-government groups, including the Neighbourhood Youth of Tehran, have demonstrated the ability to coordinate despite significant telecommunications restrictions, including limited internet access. Furthermore, workers in the southern port city of Assaluyeh have been demonstrating in support of the protests, highlighting a broadening base of the anti-government movement within critical sectors of the Iranian economy. On 10 October, at least 1,000 workers at the Bushehr, Damavand and Hengam petrochemical plants went on strike, setting up roadblocks and chanting slogans such as ‘death to the dictator’. While strikes in Iran’s oil industry are not uncommon, the industrial action will likely prompt a strengthening of Iran’s security posture near critical infrastructure. This elevates operational risks for businesses active directly or indirectly in Iran. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility of additional sectors organising industrial action in the coming days and weeks.
Additionally, on 8 October, protesters reportedly killed a member of the IRGC Ground Forces 22nd Beyt ol Moghaddas Operational Division in Sanandaj, a primary protest hotspot. State media claimed that the guardsman was killed in an attempt to disperse protesters while another official was injured in the incident. Previously, when IRGC Ground Forces were deployed during anti-government protests in 2019, in the Mahshahr and Khuzestan provinces, this resulted in hundreds of deaths. The reported involvement of IRGC Ground Forces signals a worsening security environment and elevates the likelihood of lethal force being used to curb protests in the coming days and weeks. At the time of writing, the Oslo-based Iran Human Rights has reported that at least 185 individuals have been killed, including 19 children.
The conciliatory tone adopted by hard-line figures such as Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei on 10 October, after calling for ‘dialogue’ with the Iranian population, highlights latent concerns over the destabilising domestic impact of this persistent wave of protests. This marks a significant shift from earlier statements whereby he called for ‘decisive actions without leniency’ against these ‘riots’. However, while protests appear to be placing notable pressure on Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, demonstrated by his rare public acknowledgement of internal dissent, the movement is ultimately unlikely to pose a major challenge to political stability overall in the near term.
Iranian government will continue to launch external attacks as a distraction from internal dissent
Since the outbreak of protests in Iran, there has been a significant uptick in the number of IRGC-launched missiles and drones against ‘terrorist’ targets in the northern Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), framed as a new phase of their military operation in the region (see Sibylline Alert – 29 September 2022). This aligns with established IRGC tactics, whereby the Iranian government will aim to distract from rising internal dissent by intensifying attacks on perceived external threats.
Tehran’s leadership has maintained that Kurdish separatists based in northern Iraq, primarily the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) are driving bouts of domestic unrest and seek to destabilise Tehran’s government. While state-based Iranian outlets reported that the IRGC has paused aerial and ground assaults on the IKR in the past 48 hours, there is a realistic probability that attacks resume if the Iranian government feel legitimately threatened by internal protest activity.
In this scenario, this will probably prompt an uptick in activity amongst Iran’s proxy networks, increasing regional security risks. Iran’s Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed that Iran’s protest movement was ‘engineered’ by Israel and the US to destabilise the regime. Such statements could potentially embolden groups such as Palestine’s Hamas and Lebanon’s Hizballah. Already, tensions between Hamas and Israel have escalated in recent months, exacerbated by the group’s plan to counter Israel’s coastal blockade in the Mediterranean.
Additionally, despite the ratification of a deal between Israel and Lebanon on the demarcation of their maritime border as of 11 October, there is a realistic probability that Hizballah will attempt to spoil the agreement if tensions with Israel worsen in the coming months. Such conflicts will sustain cross-border security threats, extending to the maritime sphere and critical infrastructure, specifically the Karish gas field.
Any significant deterioration in the security environment near Iran’s south-eastern borders, due to perceived government instability or weakened security forces, will increase the likelihood of Sunni militant groups carrying out opportunistic attacks near porous border areas. Already, the Sunni Islamist group Jaish ul-Adl claimed responsibility for an assault on a police station near Zahedan, the capital of the Sistan and Balochistan province on 2 October. In response, the Pakistani Federal Investigation Agency confirmed that Iranian authorities closed the Taftan crossing, preventing all overland trade and human transportation, as well as extending internet closures and blackouts to bordering towns. However, overall, we assess that the current spill-over effects on neighbouring Pakistan and Afghanistan are minimal, with any form of protest over recent having been relatively short-lived or peaceful.
Business Implications and Forecast
Iran’s use of state repression and heavy-handed security responses towards civil unrest is well established, as observed during the anti-government protests in 2019. This indicates that Iranian security forces will expand their use of lethal force in response to increasing protests, particularly in Kurdish strongholds. This would likely include a wider deployment of IRGC Ground Forces, resulting in greater fatalities and extensive arrests. The Iranian government will continue to enforce protracted internet blackouts and enhanced state surveillance to stifle civic activism, disrupting communications and posing a credible threat to businesses operating in-country.
In the short term, a further escalation will sustain the elevated detention risk faced by European and Iranian dual nationals, intensified by a warning from Iran’s Foreign Minister Nasser Kaanani on 10 October, urging foreign visitors to ‘respect’ the Islamic Republic’s laws. There is a realistic possibility that additional countries will issue travel warnings or alert levels for citizens in the coming days, prompting possible embassy closures or the re-call of ambassadors. Moreover, Iran-based businesses and personnel aligned with countries which have publicly condemned Iran’s response to protests will be more vulnerable to detention or surveillance by authorities. Such risks are likely to be further exacerbated ahead and after the EU foreign ministers meeting on sanctions on 17 October.
Growing international condemnation of Iran and the subsequent implementation of sanctions on Tehran-linked entities will likely complicate market access to Iran and elevate and operational risks for businesses. Entities in the pharmaceutical and biochemical sectors will likely evade economic penalties from sanctions due to the nature of the industry, however, the expansion of Iran’s misinformation campaigns and state-backed violence heightens regulatory and security risks for firms and personnel based in-country.
Western governments will continue to pursue the renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, greater scrutiny of crackdowns by international human rights organisations and government lobbyists will jeopardise the lifting of economic sanctions and inflame geopolitical tensions. While the protest movement in Iran is unlikely to result in the entire collapse of nuclear negotiations, recent developments will complicate the resolution of some key sticking points, including the removal of the IRGC’s terrorist designation. Moreover, inflamed tensions between the US and Iran threaten to delay the ratification of any deal before the US mid-term elections in November, compromising US President Joe Biden’s policy of deterrence. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Oct 22. China: Rare Protest. On 13 October, a protest took place on Sitong Bridge overpass in Haidian district, Beijing, which included banners featuring anti-government slogans, three days before the start of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
SIGNIFICANCE
- According to photos and videos released on social media, the protest criticised the government’s zero-Covid policy and President Xi Jinping. Two hand-written banners in Chinese were seen hanging from Sitong Bridge. One read “No to Covid tests, yes to food. No to lockdowns, yes to freedom. No to lies, yes to dignity. No to cultural revolution, yes to reform. No to great leader, yes to vote. Do not be a slave, be a citizen”. The other read “Go on strike, remove the dictator and traitor to the nation Xi Jinping”. An individual with a loudspeaker chanting the same slogans was also present. Photos and videos released on social media showed the presence of smoke and fire, with some netizens initially speculating it was an act of self-immolation, possibly by a protester. A closer observation of available imagery and videos appears to suggest that objects, including cardboard boxes, were set alight. However, this remains unconfirmed. Available media also shows firemen and police officers quickly extinguished the fire.
- Sitong Bridge is located in the vicinity of several prestigious universities, including Peking University and Tsinghua University. The location of the protest (see the map below) is relatively distant from the centre of the city, Tiananmen Square, and the Great Hall of the People, where the CCP congress will take place. Such protests in China, especially in Beijing and amid heightened security and surveillance measures, are extremely rare. With the congress just days away, the protest will be perceived as a major embarrassment for the CCP and its General Secretary Xi Jinping, who is expected to secure a convention-defying third term at the important political gathering.
- The CCP leadership will therefore treat this protest seriously and ensure that it is an isolated incident that does not inspire further political protests elsewhere. Indeed, the incident have been comprehensively censored on China’s digital sphere, with discussion and images of the protest swiftly removed from social media platforms. Searches of the related keywords, such as ‘Sitong Bridge’ and ‘Haidian’ and ‘protest’, have already been blocked on Chinese social media platforms. This response is in addition to the already heightened surveillance and information control measures that the authorities have put in place ahead of the congress (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 7 October 2022).
FORECAST
The rare protest highlights the notable discontent among some quarters of the Chinese population amid the serious impact on their lives and livelihoods as a result of the government’s persistence with the zero-Covid strategy. Top party leaders will perceive this protest as a real threat to social stability; the government will likely further strengthen and expand security and surveillance measures, especially in and around Beijing. Highly visible police patrols may be expanded to a wider area of the city, together with more enhanced security checks (of ID cards and luggage) on public transport networks. In particular, Haidian district will likely experience a significantly higher security presence through the end of next week. These security measures will cause short-term disruptions to travel and logistics in central Beijing, which may affect business operations.
The protest’s proximity to leading universities could prompt fears and speculation of future protests by students, which have historically been an important (and active) force in China’s political movements. Students at Peking University have already protested against Covid-19 lockdown measures in May 2022. Therefore, university campuses will likely be subject to tighter access restrictions, with officials citing Covid-19 control measures. Higher cyber surveillance and information controls, including a temporary suspension of virtual private network (VPN) access on campus, are also possible. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Oct 22. Haiti: NGOs and local activist groups protests over possible limited military intervention, however, risk of armed conflict remains unchanged. Numerous residents staged protests in Port-au-Prince on 10 October, a day after the UN indicated that it may back a limited military intervention in the country to lift the gang-led fuel blockade. The protests were supported by several NGOs, which suggested that any intervention would escalate gang violence. The government had previously called for a partial military intervention, citing local gangs, blocked fuel distribution and a resurgence of cholera. Details on the composition of a possible international force are scarce, but regardless of the approach, the risk of armed conflict remains elevated. Despite the government’s bet on intervention as a tool for re-stabilising the country, any long-term change in the current situation is unlikely given that the roots of the crisis lie in the strong links between the political officials and the gangs operating in the country. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Oct 22. North Korea: Escalatory Activity.
Key Takeaways:
- North Korea has intensified missile launches in the last six weeks, likely to bolster its political signalling to South Korea and Japan, as well as the US. The latter, for their part, have resumed and continued conducting joint military exercises unabated by the North’s threats. Therefore, the missile launches act as a method to protest the perceived growing aggressiveness of its regional competitors and as deterrence against the continuation of such activities.
- Escalating tit-for-tat military actions will continue to shape regional security for the medium term at least, as the prospects of diplomatic compromises and North Korean denuclearisation appear increasingly unlikely. However, armed conflict is not in any party’s interest, and remains unlikely.
- However, North Korea’s missile launches and possible nuclear tests will have minimal impact on regional businesses. Despite North and South Korea, Japan and the US upping the ante in Northeast Asia, businesses are highly unlikely to suffer from direct physical threats or major operational disruptions. At most, occasional minor transport and logistical disruptions are probable in the short-to-medium term.
Context
North Korea has conducted a record number of missile launches throughout 2022, including the resumption of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches following a self-imposed moratorium in 2018. The resumption of such activities has heightened regional tensions amid an increase in diplomatic complexities and military sabre-rattling following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
North Korean leadership likely perceives the shift in the international order from a US-centric unipolar order to a multipolar order as a driver of rising external threats. For example, recent political leadership changes in neighbouring South Korea have been followed by a resumption of bilateral, as well as trilateral, military exercises with the US and Japan.
Tit-for-tat military posturing, whether in the form of missile launches, naval or aircraft exercises, will likely continue for the foreseeable future and shape Northeast Asia’s security order. More concerningly, the resumption and increase of such military activities have heightened fears of a possible North Korean nuclear underground test in the coming weeks. A nuclear test, which would be the first since 2017, would be highly destabilising for regional security, and will most likely be met by additional foreign economic and financial sanctions, as well as an elevated military presence by regional powers and possibly the West.
Changes in North Korea’s nuclear posture unlikely to deter regional or Western military presence, but will elevate threat of security crises
Since April, North Korea’s nuclear rhetoric has grown more assertive, increasingly alluding to nuclear strikes against its enemies, especially South Korea (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 29 April 2022). Kim Jong-un’s rejection of new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s proposal to denuclearise in exchange for economic aid upped the ante, worsening the already slim prospect of diplomatic compromises. Consequently, regional tensions have gradually risen, with China and Russia siding with North Korea to counter the influence of the US and its allies (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 27 May 2022), accompanied by the resumption of higher-than-usual missile testing and military activities.
Additionally, Kim Jong-un’s calls, on 25 April, to “annihilate the enemy” and to protect “fundamental interests” with nuclear weapons paved the way for gradual changes in North Korean nuclear deterrence policy. This stance was intensified on 8 September, when North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly passed legislation that granted the use of nuclear first strikes for self-defence, signalling a shift away from responsive second strikes (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 9 September 2022).
Shortly after, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that North Korea had also readied the No.3 Punggye-ri nuclear test tunnel and estimated that a nuclear test could occur between 16 October – 7 November, at the earliest. Regional Western allies have not been deterred by North Korea’s nuclear rhetoric. A resumption of major trilateral exercises involving South Korea, US, and Japanese forces has been announced and European military presence in the Asia Pacific region has also increased (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 29 September 2022). As such, additional bellicose activities are expected to shape the regional security environment for the foreseeable future, including an elevated naval and aerial presence by South Korea, Japan, US, and allied forces. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Oct 22. Australia confirms major cost blowouts, government touts reforms. The Albanese government has proposed reforms to address “significant and systemic issues” relating to major Defence capability projects.
According to new data from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) and advice from Defence, major issues have been identified in a number of key Defence capability projects. The projects are valued at a combined $69bn.
At least 28 projects are behind schedule by a cumulative 97 years and at least 18 projects are over budget, with variations totalling at least $6.5bn.
Notable projects of concern include:
- $44bn Hunter Class Frigate program — construction delayed by four years and expected cost is $15 bn higher than initially anticipated.
- $1.4bn C-27J Spartan Battlefield Airlifters — delivered four-and-a-half years behind schedule and unable to be deployed into battlefields.
- $3.7bn Offshore Patrol Vessel project — running one year behind schedule.
- $356m Evolved Cape Class patrol boats — running nearly a year behind schedule.
- $970m Battlefield Command System — three years behind schedule.
- Defence SATCOM projects worth $906m — running between two and four years behind schedule.
According to the Albanese government, these “significant and systemic issues” are the result of mismanagement from the former Morrison government.
“Money was being flushed down the toilet while the former government regaled in how much they were spending on defence,” Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles said.
“We face the most challenging strategic circumstances since the Second World War — this, along with the serious pressures facing the economy mean we need to be more responsible about how we manage critical projects, particularly as we reach record spending within Defence as a per cent of GDP.
“It’s not as though we can go onto the battlefield and overwhelm our adversary by waving a copy of the budget papers in their face.”
To address these issues, the government has pledged to:
- establish an independent projects and portfolio management office within Defence;
- require monthly reports on projects of concern and projects of interest to the Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Industry;
- establish formal processes and “early warning” criteria for placing projects on the projects of concern and projects of interest lists;
- foster a culture in Defence of raising attention to emerging problems and encouraging and enabling early response;
- provide troubled projects with extra resources and skills; and
- convene regular ministerial summits to discuss remediation plans.
Deputy Prime Minister Marles has also committed to “prudent management of the defence budget” to ensure timely delivery of key next-generation capability, including the nuclear-powered submarine fleet promised under AUKUS.
“In doing so, we are building a potent and capable Defence Force which will keep our country safe in the future,” he said. (Source: Defence Connect)
05 Oct 22. Russia’s Pacific Fleet receives newest nuclear-powered submarines. The Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet has received two submarines in one day at the Rybachiy naval base in Kamchatka Krai, Russia.
The Project 885M Severodvinsk (Yasen)-class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine (SSGN) Novosibirsk and Project 955A Dolgorukiy (Borey)-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Knyaz Oleg both arrived at the naval base on 26 September 2022, having departed the Northern Fleet region around 23 August.
Knyaz Oleg joins two other Project 955s in the Pacific Fleet, Alexander Nevskiy and Vladimir Monomakh , which were commissioned in December 2013 and December 2014, respectively, while Novosibirisk is the first of its class for the fleet. Both submarines have had a long wait to be sent to their new homebase, having been commissioned on 21 December 2021.
Novosibirisk remained at Severodvinsk in the White Sea until this transfer, while Knyaz Oleg (Source: Janes)
10 Oct 22. North Korea: Escalating rhetoric, military activities mostly symbolic gestures, risk of conflict unaffected. Following the launch of two ballistic missiles on 9 October, North Korean media stated on 10 October that they represented nuclear strike drills against South Korea, representing a sharp escalation in rhetoric and deterrence from Pyongyang. However, the launch, the seventh since 25 September, is unlikely to be a provocation for conflict but, rather, an escalation in deterrence against South Korea, Japan, and the US, among others, amid an increase in joint military exercises and patrolling activities (see Sibylline Alert – 4 October 2022). Despite the increase in such bellicose activities, Pyongyang is unlikely to willingly attack its neighbours, but the risk of military accidents will continue. The risk of war will remain low. Security risks to regional businesses will remain low, but the likelihood of snap maritime and airspace closures will rise slightly, albeit resulting in only minor logistical and operational disruptions. Further, the missile launches suggest Pyongyang’s increased willingness to conduct a nuclear test (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 28 September 2022), but this will likely have no impact on regional businesses. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Oct 22. Djibouti: Attack underlines rising ethnic tensions and risk of clashes in Djibouti city. On 7 October, an armed splinter group of the Front for the Restoration of Democracy (FRUD) killed seven soldiers in an attack on an army barracks in northwestern Garabtisan village, near the border with Ethiopia. The “Armed FRUD” claims to represent the interests of the Afar community against Djibouti’s other primary community, the Issas and broke with the political wing of FRUD, which is now a member of the ruling coalition, following a peace agreement in 1994. Attacks by the group are rare and the attack is consistent with its established area of operations, in the border regions of northern Djibouti. However, the incident comes amid rising tensions within the Afar community, as the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region spills over into the Afar region, driving displacement and the militarisation of Afar militias. Alongside increasing the threat of attacks in the north, this will raise ethnic tensions within Djibouti city, elevating the risk of outbreaks of violence.
10 Oct 22. Burkina Faso: Election of a new transitional president will elevate threats of domestic unrest, exacerbating instability. On 8 October, coup leader Captain Ibrahim Traore announced that he would convene the National Assembly to appoint and ratify a Transitional Charter, and elect a transitional president on 14-15 October. After Traore was sworn in as president on 5 October, there were allegedly discussions among army generals about replacing him, prompting pro-Traore demonstrations on 6 October. Regardless of the new junta’s denial of internal divisions within the army, the development will likely exacerbate concerns about the junta’s stability, increasing the likelihood of further protests. Jihadist groups will seek to exploit rising instability by increasing attacks. Additionally, ECOWAS will view the process of charter ratification and the newly elected president as key indicators of whether the junta will commit to the two-year transition agreement, raising the prospect of targeted sanctions if revoked. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Oct 22. Malaysia: Snap elections to be held in early November; ruling party likely to strengthen position. On 10 October, Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob announced the dissolution of parliament, calling for general elections to be held in early November. Yaakob’s United Malays National Organization (UMNO) aims to win a majority mandate on its own amid reports of infighting between allies in the ruling alliance. The timing, nearly a year before elections must be held, is to take advantage of the disorganisation within the main rival camps. The decision to call snap elections however has been criticised by the opposition who claim expected heavy monsoons will likely lead to reduced voter turnout. While UMNO is expected to win an election held within the next month, and strengthen its position within parliament, the party’s recent history involving high-profile corruption will undermine investor confidence. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Oct 22. Pakistan: Upcoming long march will cause severe supply chain disruptions, violent clashes likely. On 12 October, local reports revealed that the Interior Ministry (IM) has been allocated around USD 1.8 m to tackle Imran Khan’s “long march”. Khan has not yet confirmed a date but has been promoting the march for weeks, with it likely taking place in the upcoming weeks. Thousands of supporters are expected to march to Islamabad from across the country, choking key highways. The federal government have said they will prevent the march from entering Islamabad, raising the risk of violent clashes between police and protesters. Sources from the IM have said businessmen considered likely to finance Khan’s march are being identified, with potential action to be taken against them, potentially disrupting the operations of local contractors. Roadblocks have already been established in D-Chowk and Zero Point Interchange in the capital, causing minor supply chain disruptions.
12 Oct 22. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Agreement on various peace terms will increase the likelihood of conflict resolution in the medium term. On 11 October, Turkey announced that Azerbaijan and Armenia have reached an agreement on the foundational aspects of a peace treaty. The treaty is reportedly comprised of five key points, including the recognition of each other’s territory and the demarcation of borders. This follows the agreement of both parties to establish a European Union civilian mission on the border last week. The Azerbaijani government has also announced the appointment of a representative to work closely with a similar representative of the Armenian ethnic community of Nagorno-Karabakh to hold negotiations on the security and rights of residents in the area specifically. These developments represent a significant step towards a lasting ceasefire, increasing the likelihood of the implementation of a peace agreement. However, the risks of further border clashes and domestic opposition to concessions in Armenia will threaten to delay agreements into 2023. (Source: Sibylline)n
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