Sponsored by Exensor
www.exensor.com
————————————————————————-
02 Sep 22. U.S. angers China with potential $1.1bn arms sale to Taiwan.
The U.S. State Department has approved a potential $1.1bn sale of military equipment to Taiwan, including 60 anti-ship missiles and 100 air-to-air missiles, with China threatening to take counter measures.
The Pentagon announced the package on Friday in the wake of China’s aggressive military drills around Taiwan following a visit to the island last month by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the highest-ranking U.S. official to travel to Taipei in years.
The sale includes Sidewinder missiles, which can be used for air-to-air and surface-attack missions, at a cost of some $85.6m, Harpoon anti-ship missiles at an estimated $355m cost and support for Taiwan’s surveillance radar program for an estimated $665.4m, the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said.
Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said in a statement the possible arms sale “severely jeopardizes China-U.S. relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”
“China will resolutely take legitimate and necessary counter-measures in light of the development of the situation,” he said.
President Joe Biden’s administration said the package has been under consideration for some time and was developed in consultation with Taiwan and U.S. lawmakers.
“As the PRC continues to increase pressure on Taiwan – including through heightened military air and maritime presence around Taiwan – and engages in attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, we’re providing Taiwan with what it needs to maintain its self-defense capabilities,” Laura Rosenberger, White House senior director for China and Taiwan, said in a statement.
Reuters reported last month that the Biden administration was planning new equipment for Taiwan but that the equipment would sustain Taiwan’s current military systems and fulfill existing orders, not offer new capabilities, despite the heightened tensions that followed Pelosi’s visit.
The Pentagon said the equipment and support announced on Friday would not alter the basic military balance in the region. U.S. officials said they did not reflect any change in policy toward Taiwan.
“These proposed sales are routine cases to support Taiwan’s continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability,” a U.S. Department of State spokesperson said, requesting anonymity.
Taiwan’s defense ministry expressed its thanks, adding that China’s recent “provocative” activities represented a serious threat and the arms sale would help it face China’s military pressure.
“At the same time, it also demonstrates that it will help our country strengthen its overall defense capabilities and jointly maintain the security and peace of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific region,” the ministry said in a statement.
Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, said his organization opposed what he termed a “limited approach” to arms sales to Taiwan.
“As the (China’s) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently demonstrated in its mock blockade, the island faces a range of threats that require a range of capabilities. To deny the island the ability to mount a full defense will, over time, create new gaps in Taiwan’s defenses that the PLA can exploit,” Hammond-Chambers said in a statement.
The order reflects continued U.S. support for Taiwan as Taipei faces pressure from China, which claims Taiwan as its own territory and has never ruled out using force to bring the democratically ruled island under its control.
The sales must be reviewed by Congress, but both Democratic and Republican congressional aides said they do not expect opposition. There have been at least two other visits to Taiwan by members of Congress from both parties since Pelosi’s visit, as well as by governors of U.S. states, all condemned by Beijing.
The principal contractor for the Harpoon missiles is Boeing Co (BA.N). Raytheon (RTX.N) is the principal contractor for both the Sidewinders and the radar program.
Taipei says that as the People’s Republic of China has never ruled the island, it has no right to claim it. (Source: Reuters)
02 Sep 22. Delayed Naming of New Al-Qaeda Chief.
Key Takeaways
- No replacement has been named to take over the core leadership of al-Qaeda following the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri on 31 July. This delay is likely to continue in the coming weeks.
- It is possible that al-Qaeda’s next leader will be chosen from outside its core area of influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Al-Qaeda’s affiliate groups are more focused on waging insurgencies against regional security forces and partaking in banditry for financial gain as opposed to conducting global jihad. Al-Qaeda has not coordinated an attack against a target in the West since 2019. The group’s affiliates are therefore likely to continue operating as usual, despite the absence of a new core leader. While affiliates will likely pledge allegiance to whoever eventually takes over, these pledges are unlikely to bring about any significant changes in these smaller groups’ tactics.
- There is a realistic possibility that Zawahiri’s death will embolden the extremist Islamic State (IS) group to increase its operations in order to establish itself as the dominant jihadist ‘brand’ in regions where its affiliates are active, such as sub-Saharan Africa.
Context
Al-Qaeda has yet to announce a new leader following the death of Zawahiri on 31 July (see Sibylline Alert – 02 August 2022). It is therefore unclear whether the next leader will maintain the status quo by adopting an overarching ‘caretaker’ identity, or reinvigorate the group with fresh impetus. The delay in confirming a new leader will likely continue in the coming days and weeks. The Hittin committee, al-Qaeda’s consultative body made up of veteran members and affiliate heads, will almost certainly want to achieve a consensus to prevent dissent and ensure that the group’s affiliates remain loyal to al-Qaeda’s core.
An affiliate group’s head will possibly be named as al-Qaeda’s new leader
Saif al-Adel is the most likely choice to replace Zawahiri. Adel ran al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan before taking refuge in Iran in 2001, where he still resides according to UN reporting from July 2021. Another possible replacement is Zawahiri’s son-in-law, Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, who is also based in Iran. If both these contenders remain in Iran, it is unclear whether they will be able to influence al-Qaeda’s operations or handle a transition period effectively. However, the strike on Zawahiri highlights the capability and intent of the US to neutralise al-Qaeda leadership figures, especially those residing in Afghanistan. It is therefore unlikely whether either contender will look to relocate from Iran in the coming weeks.
Despite both men being senior Hittin members, neither Adel nor Maghrebi are likely to command the same respect as Zawahiri and his predecessor, Osama bin Laden. Both former leaders spent decades establishing their reputations and developing a global terrorist network after having waged anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Given the lack of an obvious replacement wielding visible influence at the group’s core, al-Qaeda’s next leader will possibly be chosen from outside its traditional area of influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Hittin committee includes the leaders of affiliate groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Somalia-based al-Shabab. If an affiliate leader were to replace Zawahiri, this would shift the geographic centre of al-Qaeda and reaffirm the increasing influence of affiliates regarding the group’s future.
Affiliate groups’ operations are unlikely to change following Zawahiri’s death
Zawahiri and bin Laden were key proponents of attacking targets in the West in retaliation for the influence of the US and its allies over various Muslim-majority countries’ regimes. However, support for this ideology has stalled in recent years. Key al-Qaeda affiliates are more focused on waging insurgencies against local and regional security forces and partaking in banditry for financial gain as opposed to conducting global jihad. Al-Qaeda has not coordinated an attack against a target in the West since a shooting at a naval air base in Florida in December 2019, in which three people were killed. Prior to that, 12 people were killed in an al-Qaeda shooting at the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris in 2015. Coordinated retaliatory attacks by a
Qaeda against targets in the West following Zawahiri’s death are therefore unlikely.
The US assesses al-Shabab to be ‘the largest, wealthiest and most lethal al-Qaeda affiliate in the world.’ On 19 August, al-Shabab gunmen infiltrated the Hayat Hotel in Mogadishu, detonating two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) before opening fire on guests and killing at least 20 people (see Sibylline Alert – 19 August 2022). However, while it supports al-Qaeda senior leadership figures financially and is evidently capable and willing to carry out attacks, the Somalia-based group (in addition to other al-Qaeda affiliates) will continue to prioritise waging local campaigns over co-ordinating and/or financing attacks against targets in the West.
Al-Qaeda’s affiliates are still likely to pledge allegiance to whichever figure takes over, as an interconnected network will highly likely provide a plethora of affiliate organisations with logistical and financial benefits. Nevertheless, pledges of allegiance by affiliates are unlikely to necessitate any changes in these smaller groups’ tactics. Affiliates are likely to prioritise focusing on localised campaigns against regional governments as opposed to plotting, financing and carrying out attacks against targets in Western countries. The threat posed by affiliate groups to staff operating in the vicinity of traditional targets (including security force infrastructure and sites extracting profitable resources) or along key roads will therefore remain.
Rival extremist groups will likely take advantage of al-Qaeda’s leadership vacuum
Egypt’s Al-Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism (AOCE) recently stated that the killing of Zawahiri will possibly spark confusion among al-Qaeda’s ranks. It claimed that the group’s media and propaganda strategies are based around central and visible leadership figures. Indeed, Zawahiri’s killing was celebrated by IS, which often accuses al-Qaeda of abandoning bin Laden’s jihadist vision. There is a realistic possibility that Zawahiri’s death will prompt IS to reassert itself as the leading global jihadist outfit. It is likely to increase its efforts to undermine al-Qaeda with its own sophisticated media operations at a time when al-Qaeda’s core leadership base is likely to be in an ambiguous state.
However, while Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliates are ideologically opposed, they often co-operate on matters which lead to mutual financial gain, such as the managing of smuggling routes. The autonomy these affiliate groups enjoy, separate to their respective umbrella groups’ global cores, means that they are likely to continue co-operating on matters of mutual financial interest. It is also possible that some al-Qaeda affiliates regard being attached to the group’s transnational brand as counterproductive, especially those groups looking simply to dominate local territory as opposed to waging global jihad. Distancing themselves from al-Qaeda’s core will possibly help to prevent alienating local populations, as well as garnering international indifference (if not acceptance).
Forecast
It is unlikely that al-Qaeda will publicly announce its new leader in the coming days or weeks. No single individual wields the same amount of influence as that previously exerted by Zawahiri and bin Laden. Their decades-long command of the group has resulted in a somewhat ambiguous succession plan with no obvious contender. It is also unclear whether Zawahiri’s replacement will hail from its core area of influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or if an affiliate group’s leader will take over. While the latter move would be unprecedented, al-Qaeda in recent years has allowed its global affiliates to plan and carry out attacks independently from its core leadership base.
However, regardless of who replaces Zawahiri and despite the US taking responsibility for the strike, an uptick in attacks by al-Qaeda against targets in the West is unlikely. Nevertheless, although al-Qaeda’s affiliates in the Sahel are not necessarily committed to global jihad, groups such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) do have localised transnational objectives; in addition to ridding Mali of foreign forces, JNIM has aspirations to spread its influence in Burkina Faso and Niger and has in recent months launched cross border attacks further south into Cote d’Ivoire, Benin and Togo. Al-Qaeda’s apparent leadership vacuum will possibly encourage JNIM to operate with even more independence so as to extend its control over trafficking routes.
The lack of attacks coordinated by al-Qaeda’s core against the West in recent years points to a gradual decentralisation of the group’s operations. This complicates our assessment regarding the direction the group will take following the death of Zawahiri. Over the past two decades, al-Qaeda’s core leadership has effectively delegated operational planning to affiliate groups They enjoy autonomy from al-Qaeda’s core, which allows them to expand regionally. An increasing number of autonomous affiliated nodes and hubs (with differing ambitions) will possibly emerge as a result of al-Qaeda’s decentralisation. Intelligence agencies accustomed to countering centralised al-Qaeda operations will find it harder to dismantle these more localised operations. This will increase the risk to businesses operating in areas where affiliated groups operate.
Despite Zawahiri’s death, al-Qaeda-affiliated groups will continue to attempt to expand across their respective regions, threatening business assets concentrated therein. In Mali, recent attacks along sections of the RN6 road near the capital Bamako indicate mounting threats to the overland movement of goods and personnel out of the city. Ultimately, Zawahiri’s death is unlikely to impact al-Qaeda’s affiliates’ operations in the Sahel, including those threatening agribusiness and extractive industries whose assets are largely concentrated in southern Mali. Attacks against villages or along major roads will impact local staff, while greater efforts to extort artisanal miners will increase the threat to the mining sector more broadly.
It is possible that Zawahiri’s death will also embolden IS to increase its operations in order to establish itself as the dominant jihadist ‘brand’. The group has already increased the rate of its attacks at a time when the international community is largely distracted by the war in Ukraine. This rate could increase in the absence of a clear leader steering its extremist rival. IS already poses a credible threat to individuals and businesses and their operations, not only in poorly governed areas of Syria and Iraq but also across remote and conflict-ridden areas of North Africa. A resurgence of activity by IS in Iraq and Syria, amid al-Qaeda’s delay to confirm Zawahiri’s replacement, will possibly embolden its affiliate groups across the world to intensify their rate of attacks against civilian/soft and military targets. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Sep 22. Argentina: Attempted assassination of vice president will increase risk of unrest. On 1 September, an individual attempted to assassinate Vice President Cristina Fernandez outside her residence in the capital Buenos Aires. Protests have taken place both in support of and against Fernandez since 22 August following a request for her to receive a prison sentence and a lifetime ban on holding public office over corruption charges (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 23 August). On 29 August, the capital’s security minister announced that forcible measures will be imposed to ensure future demonstrations do not turn unruly. Since the incident, officials in Buenos Aires have announced measures to prevent pickets outside Fernandez’s residence. However, related demonstrations have been planned for 3 September. Upcoming protests are liable to be dispersed forcibly, increasing bystander risks. The security forces have used tear gas, water cannons and barricades to disperse protesters at previous gatherings. So far, around 20 police officers have reportedly been injured due to clashes. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Sep 22. Angola: UNITA’s challenge of election result unlikely to succeed, raising threat of protests in Luanda. On 1 September, the leading opposition National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) party filed a legal challenge to the Constitutional Court, calling for the annulment of the 24 August election result. Following the announcement of the MPLA’s electoral victory on 29 August, four of the 16 electoral commissioners declined to sign off the final results, expressing doubts over the integrity of the election. However, it is highly unlikely that the court, which must provide its ruling by 8 September, will side with UNITA’s challenge. The court, which previously rejected opposition challenges in 2017, is headed by Laurinda Cordoso, a member of the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola’s (MPLA) central committee. The court’s likely rejection will elevate the threat of protests in Luanda around central landmarks such as the Largo da Independencia and the Constitutional Court. The security forces are likely to use excessive force to quell protests, stifling long-term unrest but significantly elevating threats to bystanders in the immediate term. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Sep 22. Sri Lanka: Former president’s return will increase domestic political tensions, risk of unrest. The former president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who fled Sri Lanka in July, will return to the country between 2 and 3 September. His arrival will heighten domestic political tensions. The opposition is likely to demand that Rajapaksa is tried for crimes, including the alleged misuse of state funds. His arrival will also increase the risk of protests in Colombo. However, these are unlikely to occur on the same scale as the unrest witnessed in July (see Sibylline Alert – Sri Lanka – 20 July 2022). However, if Rajapaksa once again becomes involved in the government’s daily affairs, or is seen as exercising influence over President Ranil Wickremesinghe, significant unrest is possible. Elaborate security measures such as additional checkpoints and road closures will likely be enforced across the capital. This will result in transport and logistical disruption in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Sep 22. Philippines: Abandoned corporate deal highlights continued politicised regulatory scrutiny. On 1 September, Philippine broadcasters ABS-CBN Corporation and TV5 Network announced that they had mutually decided to end a proposed deal for ABS-CBN to purchase a minority stake in TV5. Legislators and the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) raised several potential legal issues with the deal, while also warning of potential probes into the respective companies regarding foreign ownership. The deal would have allowed ABS-CBN to broadcast some of its programmes on free-to-air television once again, following the loss of its franchise license in 2020. ABS-CBN was the country’s largest broadcaster before it lost its license. This was likely prompted by the network’s angering of the former president, Rodrigo Duterte, due to critical coverage. Although Duterte is no longer in power, political factors are once again likely to have driven the scrutiny that rendered the recent deal untenable. The development highlights the political motivations behind deteriorating press freedom and regulatory bodies’ activities in the Philippines. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Sep 22. Ethiopia: Conflict Update. The resumption of fighting around Kobo near the Amhara Region’s northern border with Tigray on 24 August marks the most significant military development since the Ethiopian government and rebel Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) agreed to a humanitarian truce in March. Since then TPLF forces have captured Kobo and continued south towards Weldiya, the capital of Amhara’s North Wollo Zone, with some spill-over fighting into the Afar region’s Yalo state. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s federal armed forces, the ENDF, have conducted numerous airstrikes targeting Tigray’s capital Mekele.
Now fighting has opened up along another front with the Ethiopian government stating on 1 September that TPLF forces had launched an offensive on its positions in Wolkait (Western Tigray) which Amhara regional forces have occupied since shortly after the war began in November 2020. Subsequently, TPLF officials announced that their forces had come under a massive joint offensive by Ethiopian and allied Eritrean forces in the Adyabo area around Sheraro, in northwestern Tigray.
The recent offensive is driven by the stalled peace process and represents an attempt by both sides to force concessions, before a likely return to de-escalation
While both sides have accused the other of breaching the truce and launching offensive operations, reports indicate both sides had been massing troops along their respective front lines in recent weeks in anticipation of a likely resumption of hostilities. This is largely due to continued failure to make progress toward peace talks, sustaining the state of siege around Tigray, significantly undermining humanitarian conditions, and preventing Ethiopia from fully restoring relations with western powers and securing associated financial support. On 17 August, the Ethiopian government’s peace committee proposed rapidly resuming telecommunication and banking services in Tigray but stated that this must be preceded by a formal ceasefire. By contrast, the TPLF demanded the resumption of services before any agreement was reached, with the TPLF having also been demanding withdrawal from West Tigray, which is claimed by both Amhara and Tigray.
As such, both sides likely hope to utilise this latest round of conflict to secure a military advantage to secure a better position in any peace negotiations that eventually emerge. If the Ethiopian armed forces reverse alleged TPLF gains around Kobo, then federal armed forces will likely attempt a push into southern Tigray. This will likely be designed to control the heavily fortified territory the TPLF have established around Alamata, and thereby degrade the TPLF’s offensive and defensive capabilities, increasing pressure on the TPLF to accept government terms or begin negotiations.
By contrast, the TPLF is likely hoping that they can consolidate control of strategic positions to the south of Tigray, mitigating the threat of a future offensive into Tigray, and giving them a position to resist government demands in negotiations. Additionally, if the TPLF can recapture West Tigray, this would secure one of their preconditions for talks and potentially open up a friendly border through which goods could pass from Sudan, increasing their capacity to resist the Ethiopian government’s demands.
If either side succeeds in sustainably securing one of these objectives, efforts will likely be made to again de-escalate, agree to a truce and seek out a route towards peace negotiations. Alternatively, neither side will allow the other to secure a negotiating advantage, leading to months of back-and-forth fighting until exhaustion forces a de-escalation. Regardless it is less likely that either side will seek gains beyond those outlined as a purely military solution to the conflict, as opposed to a negotiated solution appears entirely impossible for both sides, for reasons that will be explored below.
Threats to Addis Ababa are highly limited but conflict could potentially result in the attempted occupation of Tigray, exacerbating Ethiopia’s isolation and further draw-out conflict
Recent developments, such as the TPLF’s advance towards Weldiya or the recent Ethiopian and Eritrean offensive into northwest Tigray have elevated concerns that both sides may be attempting to resolve the conflict militarily. Either through a southern assault towards Addis Ababa by the TPLF or another attempt by the ENDF to occupy Mekele.
The threat to Addis Ababa in particular is very low. Following months of siege, TPLF forces have limited supplies to sustain a prolonged southern offensive. Additionally, once out of the more heavily mountainous areas of northern Amhara, their forces would be highly vulnerable to Ethiopian airstrikes, supplemented by Turkish and Chinese drones. This was a key factor in reversing the TPLF’s southern offensive in 2021, and another attempt would again elevate the threat their forces are surrounded and destroyed.
As such, the majority of the TPLF’s offensive capabilities are likely to be limited to fighting around the northern Amhara and western Afar regions. This will drive population displacement, increasing food insecurity and domestic unrest around Ethiopia, potentially resulting in increased persecution of ethnic Tigrayans and further mass arrests, threatening local staff. The TPLF may attempt a push towards the A1 Highway, Addis Ababa’s primary export-import corridor through Djibouti. However, such offensives have never been successful previously and the same aerial supremacy outlined above renders future success highly unlikely, reducing threats to Addis Ababa’s supply chains.
Equally, it is highly unlikely that the ENDF would attempt to fully re-occupy Tigray, with the offensive in northwest Tigray likely representing an effort to counter TPLF advances in the same region. The federal government is highly aware that the loss of West Tigray would significantly weaken the effectiveness of its siege, undermining its capacity to dictate terms. The re-occupation of Tigray would only result in the emergence of the same guerrilla conflict that emerged after the government occupied Mekele in 2020.
The TPLF would likely refuse to engage in negotiations and a prolonged insurgency would ensue, forcing Ethiopia to expend resources it doesn’t have to pacify the region. Additionally, the occupation would likely result in widespread human rights abuses, driving criticism from the West, disrupting Ethiopia’s efforts to secure IMF funding and re-establish trade agreements with the US, without which Ethiopian debt will continue to mount and the government will be unable to secure its development objectives. However, it remains possible that the government may feel compelled to occupy Tigray. Signs that a change in strategy is taking place would likely include another government offensive westwards from Abala, in the Afar region, towards Mekele.
(Source: Sibylline)
02 Sep 22. Japan Is Pushing For Highest Ever Defense Budget; Eyes Hypersonic Tech, Long-Range Missiles & Drones To Counter China. Japan’s Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada recently iterated that Tokyo had entered a new era of crisis, advising the country to rethink its security approach amid exacerbated military threats from China, Russia, and North Korea.
Against that backdrop, the Asian country is exploring hypersonic technology and upgrading its missile capability.
On August 31, Japan’s Defense Ministry made its largest ever budget request of a whopping 5.6trn yen ($58.7 billion) for the year ending March 2024, in contrast to 5.4trn yen for the current fiscal year.
When additional requests for military equipment are considered, the final budget will top at least 6trn, according to people with knowledge of internal ministerial discussions. These requests will be made at the end of 2022 when Japan will release a new national security strategy and defense guidelines.
The budget request comes after a Japanese government panel finalized a list of research areas eligible for funding support in economic security, including the development of drones and hypersonic technology. Tokyo’s three notable adversaries – China, Russia, and probably even North Korea, possess hypersonic missiles.
The expert government panel approved 27 applications categorized among maritime activities, aerospace, cyberspace, and bio-related fields. The critical technologies include artificial intelligence, robotics, and quantum technology.
The funding will specifically go toward satellite constellation technology, which processes data through a network of smaller satellites. It is pertinent to note that there were reports last year suggesting that the Japanese government had decided to establish a network of satellites for tracking hypersonic missiles.
The situation has changed tremendously since then. Over a month into the invasion, the Russian Defense Ministry revealed that it had used a hypersonic missile ‘Kinzhal’ to hit a target in Ukraine. There are speculations that North Korea, located close to Japan, had also developed hypersonic weapons.
Not just that, as part of training for a blockade of Taiwan following Nancy Pelosi’s visit, China’s military fired five missiles that landed inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Japan’s geographical proximity to Taiwan could jeopardize its security in case of a Chinese invasion.
While the country has chosen to remain pacifist, focusing solely on its territorial defense, the military threats posed by the ‘Big 3’ have given way to a tectonic shift in its military posture.
Japan’s Focus On Military Tech, Better Fire Power
It is no surprise that Tokyo has decided to pay special attention to hypersonic technology, given the threat posed by Chinese and Russian hypersonic missiles. The ministry intends to increase the number of early-warning aircraft and improve the performance of radar site systems to strengthen defense against hypersonic missiles.
According to the sources contacted by a Japan and Korea tracking publication, The Asahi Shimbun, the ministry is also attempting to improve the missile intercept command system known as the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment to run the country’s two-stage missile defense effectively.
The Japanese Defense Ministry has not revealed the purpose behind the satellite constellation it wants to put together. However, it is speculated to be a system for detecting and tracking hypersonic missiles that are otherwise capable of evading missile defense systems like Aegis, used by Japan’s Self Defense Forces.
In January this year, it was revealed that Japan had decided to develop electromagnetic ‘rail guns’ to intercept highly maneuverable hostile hypersonic missiles.
Besides hypersonic technology, the Japanese Defense Ministry has ambitious plans for developing and using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
The expert panel announced that funding would be available for the development of unmanned, autonomous probes for ocean observation. The development of AI-powered cyber security will also receive government backing.
This becomes paramount as there has been enhanced movement and presence of Chinese and Russian vessels in Japan’s waters. Both China and Russia have territorial disputes with Tokyo. Japan announced that PLA and Russian warships were encircling it not long ago, and drones would certainly boost Japan’s surveillance capabilities.
In reaction to escalating regional tensions, the Japanese Defense Ministry also announced its plans to produce longer-range missiles. The ministry declared that it intended to create two different kinds of “standoff” missiles capable of launching attacks from a great distance.
The precise range of the new missiles that have been planned or the range of the existing types was withheld by officials. However, their explanation suggested that the government wanted to fill a gap in Japan’s current arsenal.
Analysts and military observers have long maintained that the Japanese missiles could hit an invading force’s ships or planes after they came within striking distance of Japanese shores but not a missile base on Chinese or North Korean soil that was firing at Japan.
The cabinet will review the expert panel’s suggestions before deciding whether to implement them or not. Tokyo will begin hiring researchers later this year, and investigations are expected to start in March 2023.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government has vowed to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities within five years. After decades in which the amount was typically capped at 1%, his ruling party has proposed raising defense spending to 2% of gross domestic product. (Source: Google/https://eurasiantimes.com/)
31 Aug 22. Ethiopia: Efforts to contest West Tigray likely to result in stalemate, enduring conflict. On 31 August, the government alleged that Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces attacked its positions in Wolkait in West Tigray region, opening up a new front following the resumption of fighting to the south-east of Tigray. West Tigray has been occupied by Amhara special forces since shortly after the start of the conflict in November 2020. Although the territory is claimed by Amhara, Tigray has demanded the withdrawal of Amhara’s forces as a precondition for negotiations. However, the federal government wants to hold West Tigray to deny the TPLF a potentially friendly border with Sudan and to increase the effectiveness of its siege tactics. If the TPLF can remove pro-Amhara forces, this could potentially increase its willingness to engage in talks. However, this is unlikely to happen; TPLF officials reported on 1 September that Ethiopian and Eritrean troops began a counter-offensive against their positions around Shiraro in north-west Tigray, which will likely result in an enduring stalemate. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 22. Iran: Maritime hostilities in the Arabian Gulf will sustain the threat of disruptions to key shipping lanes. On 30 August, the Pentagon reported that an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN) support ship attempted to seize a US military unmanned surface vessel (USV) in the Arabian Gulf late on 29 August. In response, the US Central Command’s 5th Fleet deployed the USS Thunderbolt coastal patrol ship and a helicopter to the location, resulting in the IRGCN vessel “disconnecting the towing line to the USV and departing the area approximately four hours later”. The incident comes as key issues in nuclear negotiations remain unresolved, with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi having threatened to scrap the final text of the deal unless the International Atomic Energy Agency terminates its probe into Iran’s undeclared nuclear sites. Failure to reach a nuclear deal in the short term will maintain regional tensions, sustaining the threat of Iranian tit-for-tat attacks including seizures or destabilising activities targeting US and allied vessels operating in the Arabian Gulf, threatening to disrupt supply chains. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 22. China-Taiwan: Warning shots fired against Chinese drones a new normal and will sustain cross-Strait asymmetric security threats for the foreseeable future. On 30 August, Taiwanese troops fired at a “civilian” Chinese drone with live ammunition for the first time following its intrusion into Taiwanese airspace over the Kinmen Islands. The incident occurred two days after Taiwanese authorities announced they would fire warning shots at intruding Chinese drones, a sign of not only escalating cross-Strait tensions but also of increasing Chinese confidence and willingness to up the ante vis-à-vis Taiwan. On 31 August, a Taiwanese military official vowed Taiwanese forces would exercise their right to “counter-attack” if Chinese drones violated Taiwanese sovereignty, raising the risk of retaliatory kinetic attacks and crisis escalation. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will likely continue to conduct such asymmetric tactics more frequently in the coming months, raising the threat of aerial accidents and possible disruption to business operations in the area, though the impact will likely be minimal. The likelihood of false-flag operations will remain low.(Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 22. South Sudan: Progress on peace agreement, but payment concerns will sustain threats to government stability. On 30 August, nearly 22,000 men and women drawn from President Salva Kiir and rival Vice President Riek Machar’s parties, as well as the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, were integrated into the country’s armed forces. This represents the first batch of a total of 83,000 fighters that are scheduled to graduate into the unified armed forces this year. The unification of the armed forces is a key condition of the 2018 peace agreement and has been heavily delayed due to disputes between rival parties. However, significant challenges remain, sustaining the threat of a resumption of armed conflict. The government is now adding thousands of former rebels to its payroll at a time when civil servants have not been paid for months. This may delay the graduation of future units or drive dissatisfaction within the armed forces. This will sustain threats to government stability, particularly with elections now delayed by two years until December 2024. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 22. Iraq: Potential PM resignation and growing early election calls will sustain threats of violent unrest. On 30 August, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al Kadhimi stated he would “vacate his post” unless a resolution was reached over the ongoing political deadlock which has triggered frequent protests, with the most recent resulting in 28 deaths and hundreds of injuries on 28 August (see Sibylline Alert – 30 August 2022). Earlier on 29 August, in response to escalating unrest, Iraqi President Barham Salih had said that early elections could resolve the current impasse. With protesters withdrawing from the Green Zone, a new electoral round is likely, particularly due to al-Sadr’s withdrawal from politics. However, while Shia Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s dispersal of protesters indicates efforts to de-escalate violence in the short term, his political rhetoric against Iran and its Iraq-based proxies remains inflammatory. This will sustain the likelihood of confrontations between pro- and anti-Iranian political groups in established hotspots including Baghdad and cities in the country’s southern provinces, as demands for a new election strengthen. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 22. There is no military solution to Libya’s crisis of legitimacy.
Statement delivered by Ambassador James Kariuki at the Security Council briefing on Libya.
Thank you President.
I would like to thank USG DiCarlo for her briefing, and Raisedon Zenenga and his team in the United Nations Support Mission in Libya for their continued work in difficult circumstances.
I also thank Ambassador Kamboj for her briefing on the 1970 Committee and I welcome the participation of the representative of Libya in our meeting today.
President, I will make three points.
First, the United Kingdom condemns the violence perpetrated by armed groups in Tripoli on 26 and 27 August. The use of violence by armed groups – whether to acquire control of territory or local resources, or to end political stalemate – is unacceptable. As we’ve just heard, the actions of armed groups this weekend resulted only in innocent civilian casualties and the destruction of civil infrastructure. Our condolences go to the victims and their families.
Such violence is a result of the presence of parallel governments and the misappropriation of state resources. The Libyan parties, and the international community, must acknowledge that there is no military solution to Libya’s crisis of legitimacy. Rather, all Libyan parties must engage constructively with a UN-brokered political process, supported by the wider international community, to agree a path towards free, fair and inclusive elections as soon as possible.
We must also ensure that the resources of the Libyan people are managed in a transparent, responsible and accountable manner. The wishes of the Libyan people must be prioritised ahead of narrow self-interests.
Second, I encourage all Council members to agree to the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General immediately. Increased tension and violence only illustrates the need for the urgent appointment of a Special Representative to lead mediation efforts. I call upon this Council to stand ready to support the Special Representative to deliver an inclusive and comprehensive political process.
Finally, in recent weeks a number of diplomatic missions have faced restrictions on their movements within Libya. The Libyan authorities must allow full freedom of movement and travel within its territory in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. We also emphasise the importance of allowing individuals and organisations delivering activity on behalf of embassies freedom to carry out their work.
President, the United Kingdom reaffirms its readiness to work with Libyan stakeholders, the incoming SRSG, and all international partners to work towards a stable, peaceful and prosperous Libya.
Thank you. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
31 Aug 22. Australian submariners to join Royal Navy crews as UK and Australia deepen defence ties through AUKUS pact.
Royal Australian Navy crews will train on the newly commissioned HMS Anson and other Astute-Class submarines, the Prime Minister has announced today.
- Royal Australian Navy submariners will join UK crews to train on newly commissioned HMS Anson
- Prime Minister and Defence Secretary host new Australian Deputy Prime Minister at Barrow to see commissioning
- Australian visit strengthens international defence ties in light of trilateral AUKUS partnership, working with the US
It came as he and Defence Secretary Ben Wallace emphasised the importance of the deep defence ties between the UK and Australia, following the development of the trilateral AUKUS partnership working with the United States, who were represented today by their Defence Attaché Captain Leland.
Hosting Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles on his first official visit to the UK since the new Australian government came to power, the Prime Minister and Ministers attended the commissioning of the fifth of seven new Astute-Class Royal Navy submarines, HMS Anson.
With naval capability at the centre of the two powers’ future defence relationship, the visit reinforced the priorities of the Integrated Review and significance of the AUKUS partnership – which links the UK, the United States and Australia in promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
The UK and US have already welcomed Royal Australian Navy personnel on its specialised nuclear training courses, and more will follow next year, before Australian submariners go to sea. The training and exchanges mark the beginning of a multigenerational naval partnership between the three AUKUS nations.
The Australia Deputy Prime Minister – who is also Minister for Defence – visited Barrow having yesterday also seen the Type 26 frigate shipbuilding facility in Govan, accompanied by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ben Key.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson, said: “HMS Anson is the perfect example of where levelling up the UK and generating jobs, skills and growth across our country goes hand-in-glove with Global Britain.
From the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, our submarine service is protecting the UK and our allies 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and the deployment of Australian submariners alongside our British crews epitomises the strength of the AUKUS partnership.”
Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, said: “Today is a significant milestone in the UK and Australia’s preparation to confront growing threats to the liberal democratic order, especially in the Indo Pacific.
Not only have we progressed our defence planning but Minister Marles participated in the commissioning of our latest attack submarine, on which will Royal Australian Navy submariners will be embarked as we develop our shared capabilities in the years ahead. Built in a UK shipyard, HMS Anson demonstrates the very best of British industry, sustaining our world-leading sub-surface capabilities and underlining the UK’s readiness to contribute them to shared security, especially with our closest allies Australia and the United States under the AUKUS initiative.”
One of the most sophisticated underwater vessels ever built, HMS Anson represents £1.3 bn of UK investment. Capable of defending the UK’s interests at home and overseas, HMS Anson will be armed with up to 38 Spearfish Heavyweight Torpedoes, and Block V Tomahawk land attack missiles, able to tackle targets at a range of up to 1,000 miles.
Building on commitments made in the Integrated Review, the completion of HMS Anson demonstrates the strength of British industry and its world-leading nuclear technology that will be leveraged to deliver the trilateral AUKUS defence and security partnership between the US, UK and Australia.
First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Ben Key said: “HMS Anson is the cutting edge in submarine design and construction, ensuring operational advantage in the underwater battlespace, the last great stealth domain. Given the world we live in, there is no more important tool in the United Kingdom’s arsenal: silent, unseen, and a key instrument of our global, modern, ready Royal Navy.”
In the last year 17,700 Defence jobs were supported through direct spending with UK industry in the North West. More than 11 years in the making and built in BAE Systems’ Barrow-in-Furness site, more than 10,000 coders, engineers, scientists, submariners and technicians across the UK were involved in HMS Anson’s construction. Powered by a Rolls-Royce nuclear reactor, the boat will be operational for 25 years without refuelling.
At 97 metres long, HMS Anson stands at around the length of two Olympic swimming pools, with 240 kilometres of cabling – enough to stretch from Barrow-In-Furness to its new home in Faslane, Scotland.
HMS Anson will remain in Barrow for the coming weeks while undergoing final checks and rigorous testing to the numerous complex systems that make up a nuclear-powered submarine, before sailing to HM Naval Base Clyde in Faslane to prepare for sea trials.
BAE Systems Chief Executive Charles Woodburn said: “The Astute class submarines are among the finest engineering accomplishments in the world. As the custodian of the UK’s submarine design and build capability, we’re incredibly proud of the role we play in the delivery of this strategic national endeavour.”
The UK has built and operated world-class nuclear-powered submarine capability for over 60 years.
HMS Anson will join four other Astute Class submarines in service with the Royal Navy –HMS Astute, HMS Ambush, HMS Artful and HMS Audacious.
Two further boats – Agamemnon and Agincourt – are in various stages of construction at BAE Systems’ Barrow-In-Furness site as part of £11.2 bn overall investment in the whole Astute-Class programme.
(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
31 Aug 22. Taiwan vows to ‘counter-attack’ if China’s forces enter its territory. Taiwan said on Wednesday it would exercise its right to self defence and “counter-attack” if Chinese armed forces entered its territory, as Beijing increased military activities near the democratic island.
Beijing, which claims Taiwan as its own against strong objections by the government in Taipei, has held military exercises around the island this month in reaction to a visit to Taipei by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi.
Taiwanese defence officials said China’s “high intensity” military patrols near Taiwan continued and Beijing’s intention of making the Taiwan Strait separating the two sides its “inner sea” would become the main source of instability in the region.
“For aircraft and ships that entered our sea and air territory of 12 nautical miles, the national army will exercise right to self-defence and counter attack without exception,” Lin Wen-Huang, deputy chief of the general staff for operations and planning, told reporters at a news briefing.
Taiwan has complained of Chinese drones repeatedly flying close to its small groups of islands near China’s coast.
The military will exercise the same right to “counter-attack” Chinese drones that did not heed warnings to leave its territory after posing threats, Lin added.
Taiwan fired warning shots at a Chinese drone for the first time on Tuesday shortly after President Tsai Ing-wen ordered Taiwan’s military to take “strong countermeasures” against what she termed Chinese provocations.
China’s Foreign Ministry this week dismissed complaints from Taiwan about drone harassment as “not worth fussing about”, prompting Taipei to label Beijing as nothing more than thieves.
In the same briefing, Ma Cheng-Kun, a director from military academy National Defence University, said China might further move to reject passage of foreign naval ships through the strait without its permission.
“After the new military normal status has been consolidated, then the risk of collision will increase if foreign naval ships insist on the rights of navigation and freedom,” he said.
U.S. warships and those from allied nations such as Britain and Canada have routinely sailed through the strait in recent years, including two U.S. Navy warships last week.
Taiwan’s armed forces are well-equipped but dwarfed by China’s. Tsai is overseeing a modernisation programme and has made increasing defence spending a priority.
China has not ruled out using force to bring the island under its control. Taipei rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims, saying that the People’s Republic of China has never ruled the island and that only Taiwan’s people can decide their future. (Source: Reuters)
30 Aug 22. Libya: Military Confrontation. Clashes in Tripoli between armed factions in support of Libya’s rival governments in the east and west have resulted in the death of 32 individuals with 159 others injured. A statement by Dbeibeh’s western-based Government of National Unity reported the clashes were triggered by a pro-Bashagha militia targeting a convoy in Zawiya Street, amid a mobilisation of other groups around Tripoli’s outskirts. Confrontations resulted in one of the most serious escalations of violence in Tripoli over the past two years.
SIGNIFICANCE
- Political polarisation in Libya has significantly increased since the appointment in February of Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha by the House of Representatives to rival Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh’s UN-backed government. The development represents Bashagha’s second attempt to enter Tripoli, after an earlier one in May, underscoring worsening divisions between opposing eastern and western administrations which continue to drive violence and competition between armed factions.
- Today, 30 August, a group known as Bazena Street, Farran and Sidi Mubarak Revolutionaries has given Bashagha 24 hours to evacuate all armed vehicles and fighters from Misrata, east of Tripoli. This follows the mobilisation of forces loyal to Bashagha on 28 August, threatening to shut down the city’s airport and port as well as road towards Tripoli.
- Following the clashes, the National Oil Corporation ordered its employees to work remotely and several businesses also remained closed, highlighting the sustained volatility of the security environment and elevated bystander risks for business staff in Tripoli.
- Clashes resulted in the targeting of six healthcare facilities in Tripoli, including Al-Zawiya Street Hospital, Al-Jalaa Maternity Hospital, Tripoli Dental Services Centre in the Al-Sarim area and the Burns and Cosmetic Hospital. The Health Ministry also announced the transfer of 59 wounded individuals from public hospitals to private clinics, likely underscoring the current capacity pressure on the limited capabilities of public facilities.
FORECAST
The absence of a unified state apparatus will increase the likelihood of violent incidents in the coming days and weeks by armed factions in Tripoli, driving substantial bystander threats to foreign staff and assets. Further actions targeting Tripoli by pro-Bashagha factions remain highly likely in the short term, particularly amid limited political options and stalled UN-mediated talks. Notably, on 29 August, commander Khalifa Haftar issued a statement indicating that his forces would be ready to engage in Tripoli in support of Bashagha, elevating the likelihood of an involvement of Libyan National Army forces. Renewed fighting among rival militias is also likely to take place in other north-western cities, including Misrata.
Oil and gas sector businesses and assets, particularly in the Tripoli area, will remain especially vulnerable to disruption in the event of further violent confrontations. Any assaults against oil and gas facilities, as well as ports, will undermine the stability of production and export levels, already threatened by the volatility of the security environment over the past months (see Sibylline Alert – 23 June 2022). Moreover, the recent flare-up is likely to heighten the security posture of neighbouring countries in the coming weeks, including Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. This is likely to disrupt cross-border overland travel for businesses with further escalations likely to trigger short-notice closures or additional security checkpoints increasing transit times. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 22. Iraq: Insecurity Remains Heightened. On 30 August, Iraq’s Shia Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr publicly demanded the immediate withdrawal of supporters protesting near Baghdad’s international Green Zone. Al-Sadr’s resignation from Iraqi politics in protest at rampant corruption in the Iraqi Government on 28 August triggered large-scale protests near the fortified zone and southern provinces including Basra, resulting in at least 28 deaths and 270 injuries in the past 48 hours.
SIGNIFICANCE
- Recent protests reflect deteriorations in Iraq’s political instability, with protracted deadlock in government formation elevating sectarian tensions. Despite al-Sadr’s gain in parliamentary seats following the October 2021 election, his inability to form a government has been a trigger point for civil unrest in recent weeks, including the storming of parliament by Sadrist supporters on 27 July (see Sibylline Alert – 28 July 2022).
- Rocket attacks and heavy artillery targeted Baghdad’s Green Zone by Shia militias in the past 48 hours, highlighting risks to international embassies and Baghdad International Airport (BGW), amongst other institutions hosting foreign personnel and assets. The US Embassy has denied allegations that it called for an evacuation of its Baghdad-based employees and staff, however, recent events illustrate enhanced bystander risks even for secure locations in the fortified zone.
- The latest developments come amid persistent domestic and international concerns over the growing influence of Iran-backed parties. Al-Sadr failed to form a majority government, providing the opportunity for leaders of the Co-ordination Framework (CF) to negotiate a unity government in the face of opposition from such groups. Sadrist activists have subsequently demanded another round of legislative elections and to dissolve parliament (see Sibylline Alert – 12 October 2021).
- In the aftermath of the unrest, regional governments have issued warnings over the safety of their citizens based in Iraq. Kuwaiti and Turkish officials have warned against any travel to Iraq’s capital, whilst the UAE’s largest airline, Emirates Airlines, suspended all flights to and from Baghdad due to civil unrest in the country as of 30 August. Iran also closed its borders with Iraq but reportedly re-opened them shortly after protesters started to withdraw.
FORECAST
Supporters and protesters are withdrawing from the international Green Zone and surrounding areas following al-Sadr’s public appeal. Subsequently, Iraq’s Joint Operations Command has reportedly already lifted the curfew in Baghdad and surrounding provinces. Whilst al-Sadr’s tone may assist in dispersing crowds and instilling calm in the near term, the threat of counter-protests by Iran-backed militia or sporadic bouts of civil unrest by al-Sadr’s supporters in Baghdad and southern provinces will remain elevated in the coming days and weeks. Whilst security forces will remain on high alert across Baghdad, deteriorations in Iraq’s overall security landscape provides an optimum environment for terrorist organisations, such as Islamic State, to exploit the political vacuum and conduct attacks on soft targets as well as the Iraqi army across the country.
Despite the shift in al-Sadr’s rhetoric away from supporting a “revolution”, recent events will cause further delays in the formation of an Iraqi government as demands for a new election strengthen. Prime Minister al-Kadhimi’s suspension of cabinet sessions on 30 August due to the protests underline the ongoing disruption, with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KUP) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) still required to vote on Iraq’s next president.
Iraq’s protracted government formation stalemate has worsened socio-economic conditions across the country due to the absence of an approved budget, with rising living costs and deepening food insecurity also sustaining the probability of protests throughout several southern and central governorates including Babil, Basra, Dhi Qar, Baghdad and Salah ad Din.
Finally, Baghdad and southern provinces will likely remain at the epicentre of competition for influence between pro- and anti-Iranian political groups. The insistence of dialogue by CF members and al-Sadr’s dispersal of protests indicate efforts to de-escalate violence in the near-term, however, Iranian interference in Iraqi politics and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) support of Iraq-based militia groups will continue to trigger domestic backlash in the long-term.
Sadrists express their frustration over Iran’s use of political proxies to intervene and de-stabilise the country, sustaining Iraq’s position as a theatre for conflict between foreign and domestic geopolitics. Notably, there is a realistic probability that the religious ritual of Arbaeen, celebrated on 16-17 September, when ms of Iranians travel to Iraq’s Karbala city, will represent a flashpoint for sectarian-based unrest in the coming weeks amid heightened anti-Iranian sentiment. Iraq’s socio-economic and political instability threatens to jeopardise the expansion of foreign investment opportunities and the country’s macro-economic outlook. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 22. Ethiopia: Conflict is likely to remain concentrated in northern Amhara, reducing risks to businesses. On 27 August, forces loyal to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) captured Kobo, Amhara region, before advancing southwards on Weldiya, the capital of the North Wollo zone. On 26 August, government forces conducted airstrikes against Mekele, the capital of the Tigray region, allegedly hitting a kindergarten and killing four people, including two children. This latest offensive, which began on 24 August (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 24 August), marks a clear escalation from brief skirmishing. However, fighting will likely remain concentrated in the north of Amhara. Following months of siege warfare, the TPLF is unlikely to have the resources necessary for a prolonged offensive. Additionally, advancing out of the mountainous northern Amhara would leave their forces vulnerable to airstrikes. This renders a successful southern push towards Addis Ababa (where most international firms are based) highly unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 22. Burkina Faso: Attack against mining convoy underlines elevated threat to overland transport. On 26 August, unidentified gunmen killed six people during an attack against five vehicles near the Boungou Gold Mine in the eastern Tapoa province. The victims were reportedly locals who supplied goods to the mine and were not directly employed by the mine. They were attacked after becoming separated from the convoy and its security detail. The attack was likely perpetrated by either al-Qaeda- or IS-aligned jihadists, both of whom are active in eastern Burkina Faso. The incident highlights that vehicles assisting in the ground-based movement of equipment and goods remain highly vulnerable to attack. Moreover, rising jihadist activity across Burkina Faso has elevated the vulnerability of businesses with facilities and operations in rural areas throughout the country. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 22. Angola: MPLA victory amid claims of electoral fraud elevates the threat of protests in Luanda. On 29 August, the National Electoral Commission (CNE) announced that the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) won 51.7 percent of the votes cast in the 24 August general election. This allowed President Joao Lourenco to secure a second term. Some election observers have reported fraud, claiming that the electoral roll included around 2.7 m deceased people and that party delegates at polling stations were unable to access the roll. The opposition National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) leader Adalberto Costa Junior rejected the provisional results last week, citing inconsistencies between the commission’s count and UNITA’s own tally. Although Costa Junior has not yet commented on the final results, he has urged supporters to remain calm. However, protests in Luanda remain possible, particularly around developments relating to UNITA’s likely Constitutional Court challenge, a process that could take several weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 22. Madagascar: Excessive police force during protests underlines threats to bystander safety. On 29 August, the security forces killed 18 protesters and injured 28 others in Fitovinany region’s Ikongo district. Around 500 protesters took to the streets, demanding that the police hand over individuals taken into custody following the suspected kidnapping of an albino child. While the associated death toll is high, the incident is not unusual and does not represent a significant deterioration in the security environment. Vigilantism is common in Madagascar and local communities often demand access to suspects of crimes. Additionally, the police generally lack the training and equipment required to control crowds safely. This increases the likelihood of the police employing excessive force in the event of unrest, and subsequently elevates threats to bystanders located near security facilities and/or protests. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 22. Chile: Protests Likely. On 4 September, the plebiscite to approve or reject the new Constitutional proposal created by the Chilean National Convention will take place, with most polls signalling that a rejection of the text is very likely. Chile’s regulatory framework prohibits the publication of opinion polls from 15 days before the election to avoid disinformation and victory biases. However, these can be privately distributed and consulted.
SIGNIFICANCE
The results would severely increase political violence, unrest risks, and government instability as these would be seen by the left and the vulnerable middle class as a rejection of their 2019 demands and as a failure of President Gabriel Boric.
Three of the main pollsters grant a significant advantage to the “Reject” result in both voter intention and result perception across most regions, classes, and ages. The two regions with nearly 50/50 margins are the Valparaíso Region and the Metropolitan Region, with younger people across the country more likely to vote in favour of the constitutional proposal. However, the national aggregates of most pollsters report a lead of around ten percentage points for the “Reject” option, creating significant tensions within younger sectors of the populations in urban areas who are more likely to vote in favour of the new constitution.
Confrontations between urban middle-class protesters in favour of the proposal and low-income conservative demonstrators were also registered this week, underscoring significant levels of polarisation and moderate escalation possibilities.
FORECAST
A “Reject” result would deal a significant blow to the administration of recently elected President Gabriel Boric, weakening its position from both the right and the left. This dynamic would likely block most legislative initiatives from the administration, providing factions in Congress with a stronger legislative initiative, particularly in terms of how to handle the constitutional reform process.
The key indicator of unrest will likely remain the existence of a consensus mechanism to manage the constitutional reforms if the proposal is rejected, aimed at strengthening the state’s social safety net whilst maintaining the core elements that the right defends. Some of the proposals include a new constitutional convention (supported by some elements on the right as their electoral situation has improved significantly), and a more limited constitutional reform. Protests would likely target governmental institutions and could target private firms as the far-left influence in organised groups of protesters would be significant, creating physical threats for assets and staff in the Metropolitan region, Greater Valparaíso, Antofagasta, and others as protesters would likely engage in public and private property destruction and roadblocks. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 22. UK calls for the end of cluster munitions use around the world. Daniel Craig and FCDO Minister Graham Stuart MP lead the call at an international conference chaired by the UK
Actor and UN Ambassador Daniel Craig and FCDO Minister Graham Stuart MP will today call for the end of cluster munition use around the world at an international conference chaired by the UK.
Cluster bombs continue to kill and maim civilians in conflicts around the world, including Syria, Libya and Ukraine, often leaving their victims with life-changing injuries. Unexploded munitions continue to threaten the lives of civilians for years afterwards, hampering post-conflict reconstruction and development.
The UK currently holds the Presidency of the Convention on Cluster Munitions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an international agreement ratified by 110 countries to end the use of these devastating weapons. This conference will bring together the international community and civil society organisations to work together to rid the world of these weapons, educate communities on the dangers associated with their use and support survivors and their families.
Alongside the Minister, Daniel Craig will open the conference with a video message in his capacity as the United Nations Global Advocate for the Elimination of Mines and Explosive Hazards.
Daniel Craig will say: “Civilians all too often pay the price when these brutal weapons are used. In my work with the United Nations Mine Action Service, I have seen how long after conflicts, damage caused by cluster munitions persists.”
Unbelievably we are still seeing use of cluster munitions today, most recently in Ukraine.
Countries that still use and produce cluster munitions need to stop doing so, they are barbaric weapons used mainly on civilian populations to spread fear and anxiety. It is up to us to do the hard work, to do what we can to support each other and help civilians recover from the devastating impact of these weapons.
Graham Stuart, FCDO Minister responsible for Counter-Proliferation, is expected to say: “Too many innocent civilians have lost their lives to these weapons of war. Under our Presidency, the UK has driven forward work to eliminate them altogether.”
Every step taken under this Convention, makes the world a safer place – but too many states still refuse to give up cluster munitions. We will continue to speak out against these murderous weapons – as we did in March when we condemned their use in the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine.
We did so on behalf of the parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Since the Convention was founded 14 years ago, 110 State Parties have ratified it, 13 States have signed up to its objectives but not yet ratified, and 35 states have cleared their stockpiles of cluster munitions.
The UK is a leading supporter of mine action, and continues to invest heavily in clearance of cluster munitions, anti-personnel mines, and other explosive remnants of war around the world. In June 2022, the UK announced a budget of up to £100m for the third phase of its Global Mine Action Programme tackling the lethal legacy of these weapons. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
29 Aug 22. Russian Efforts to Raise Numbers of Troops ‘Unlikely to Succeed,’ U.S. Official Says. Russia is desperately trying to fill its ranks depleted by its poor showing in its unprovoked war on Ukraine, a senior defense official said speaking on background today.
Russia is seeking to increase the size of its military by 137,000 to 1.15 m. U.S. officials have said that Russia has lost between 60,000 and 80,000 troops in its misguided war on Ukraine.
Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the increase be in place effective in January 2023.
“This effort is unlikely to succeed, as Russia has historically not met personnel and strength targets,” the official said. “In fact, if you look at the Russian armed forces, prior to the invasion, they may have already been 150,000 personnel short of their m personnel goal.”
Prior to the invasion, roughly a quarter of the Russian force were conscripts and the remainder were professional soldiers. Moscow has been trying to use largely professional soldiers as opposed to conscripts in the Ukraine conflict, the official said. Still, there have been news reports of conscripts — hastily equipped, meagerly supplied and badly trained — being placed on the front lines in Ukraine.
Russian leaders have already begun trying to expand recruitment efforts to staff at least one volunteer battalion per federal district, and to raise a new army corps, the senior defense official said. “They’ve done this in part by eliminating the upper age limits for new recruits and also by recruiting prisoners,” she said. “Many of these new recruits have been observed as older, unfit and ill-trained.”
All this suggests to Pentagon officials that “any additional personnel that Russia actually can muster by the end of the year, in fact, may not increase overall Russian combat power,” the official said.
Ukrainian government officials have said they have launched an offensive in and around Kherson to retake the strategic city in the south, and a senior U.S. military official, also speaking on background, said there has been an increase in kinetic activity in and around the city. The official did not want to characterize the actions there as a counter offensive just yet. He said there would be more clarity in the next 24 to 36 hours.
The senior military official noted that Ukrainian forces have been moving into the region for some time. The ratio between Ukrainian and Russian forces “are in much better number in terms of equality or parity in the south than they were initially up along the eastern portion of the battlespace. And again, without knowing all the particulars of what the Ukrainians are doing, … they are students of military doctrine. They understand that conducting an attack takes a greater number of forces than if you were on the defense. So, I think they probably have worked to adjust their numbers.”
Morale is an aspect of combat and news reports on Russian morale in the south indicate that it was already poor when the unprovoked war started. “Now imagine you’re a Russian soldier … a couple of months into it, and you’ve been getting hit pretty hard by artillery and HIMARS,” he said.
Add other capabilities, including Ukrainian air attacks which have become “more and more efficient and effective,” the senior military official said. This has to have an effect on morale and Ukrainian military officials have seen that “and are working to take advantage of it,” he said. (Source: US DoD)
29 Aug 22. Russia forecasts drop in arms export revenue. The head of Russia’s weapons export branch said arms export revenue total in 2022 is likely to total about $10.8bn, which would be roughly 26% lower than reported for 2021.
The forecast follows the Army 2022 defense expo in Moscow, where Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed to expand military cooperation with the country’s allies and expressed a readiness to sell them “the most advanced types of weapons: from firearms, armor and artillery to warplanes and drones.” He didn’t name any country in particular on Aug. 15, but said “Russia sincerely values its historically strong, friendly and trusting relations with countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa.”
Alexander Mikheyev, the director general of Rosoboronexport, said arms exports have accounted for $5.4bn so far this year, and the country expects the remainder of the year to bring in the same amount of revenue.
Meanwhile, Dmitry Shugayev, the head of the government’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, said during the expo that arms exports brought in $14.6bn in revenue for 2021.
Russia is the second-largest arms exporter after the United States, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. India, China, Egypt and Algeria are the top foreign customers of Russian weapons, but India’s imports are declining, according to a report published in March by the think tank.
“Russia’s arms exports fell by 26 percent between 2012-16 and 2017-21, and its share of global arms exports decreased from 24 percent to 19 percent,” the report read. “The overall drop in Russian arms exports between 2012-16 and 2017-21 was almost entirely due to decreases in arms exports to India (-47 percent) and Vietnam (-71 percent).”
The COVID-19 pandemic slowed weapons production while industry tried to implement safety measures as well as resolve logistics problems and production capacity issues. Additionally, Russia has been hit with economic sanctions over its annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and its ongoing invasion of the country.
“Countries that were seeking to acquire Russian equipment were already thinking twice due to the risk of being sanctioned by the U.S. and others,” Tom Waldwyn, a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told Defense News.
“Although it is still too early to tell quite what the long-term impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will be on its defense industry and exports, it seems likely that it will have a significant negative effect,” the think tank analyst said. “In the short term, deliveries of ammunition and spare parts will likely be directed to support the Russian war effort.”
Ultimately, the strength of Russia’s defense-industrial base could depend on action from European nations.
“If European countries are able to reduce their reliance on Russia for energy supplies, this will eventually have a significant impact on Russian government revenues and, in turn, the kind of investment in its defense industry that Russia can afford. Reductions in investment will affect capacity and quality, both in terms of technical capability and personnel,” Waldwyn said. (Source: glstrade.com/Defense News)
29 Aug 22. Belarus claims nuclear weapons mods are completed on its warplanes. As Belarus’s involvement in the Russian war against Ukraine continues to push Minsk towards an even closer military cooperation with Moscow, Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko has announced that Russia upgraded his country’s jets to enable them to carry tactical atomic weapons.
“Putin and I once said in St. Petersburg that we will refit Belarusian Sukhoi aircraft among other things so that they could carry nuclear weapons,” the Belarusian dictator said, according to state-owned news agency BelTA, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin. “Do you think we talk nonsense? Everything is ready,” he said.
Last June, during a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Lukashenko asked Putin to modernize his country’s Sukhoi Su-25s to allow them to carry nuclear weapons. The Belarusian authoritarian leader claimed this would enable the country’s air force to mirror NATO drills. During the same meeting, Russia’s leader said his country will provide nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles to Belarus.
The Belarusian military “has a fairly big number of Su-25 planes. They can be respectively re-equipped,” Putin said at the meeting.
Industry publications estimate Belarus operates 67 Su-25 jets which makes the fighter the most prevalent combat aircraft in the country’s fleet.
Marek Jablonowski, a political scientist from the University of Warsaw, told Defense News the Belarusian regime believes that “flexing its military muscles can secure its survival”, and that it is “showing readiness to trade an even bigger part of its sovereignty in exchange for Moscow’s backing.”
Meanwhile, some analysts believe Minsk will mostly use the alleged upgrade for the purpose of its propaganda directed at the West.
“For Putin, to give Lukashenka nuclear weapons is to strengthen him and his position. Not sure he wants it,” tweeted Hanna Liubakova, Belarusian journalist and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank. “The Russian [A]rmy used other airfields (closer to the Ukrainian border) to station its jets and missile launch systems. Those didn’t and won’t belong to the regime in Minsk.”
There are also technical questions surrounding the purported upgrade. “The Su-25 has significant limitations in this role, and this raises questions about the credibility of Russia’s and Belarus’ announcement,” researchers at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies wrote in a paper last month. “Designed as a close air support aircraft, the Su-25 would probably be limited to deliver a nuclear weapon only in free-fall mode” while having lower survivability than comparable NATO, the analysts wrote.
In February 2022, Minsk organized a referendum which enabled the authorities to modify the constitution’s article describing Belarus as a “nuclear-free zone” and a “neutral” state, enabling Russia to deploy additional nuclear weapons along NATO’s eastern flank. (Source: Defense News)
28 Aug 22. Taliban accuses Pakistan of allowing U.S. drones to use its airspace. The Taliban’s acting defence minister said on Sunday that Pakistan had allowed U.S. drones to use its airspace to access Afghanistan, which Pakistan’s foreign minister denied.
Pakistani authorities have previously denied involvement in or advanced knowledge of a drone strike the United States said it carried out in Kabul in July that killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Afghan Acting Minister of Defence Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob told a news conference in Kabul that American drones had been entering Afghanistan via Pakistan.
“According to our information the drones are entering through Pakistan to Afghanistan, they use Pakistan’s airspace, we ask Pakistan, don’t use your airspace against us,” he said.
A spokesperson for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency declined to comment.
Pakistan’s foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari told Reuters he had made checks after the air strike and had been told that Pakistani airspace was not used. He said he would check again after Sunday’s allegations but expected the position to be the same.
“I really don’t believe that this is a time that I wish to get into a debate with anyone or to have accusations … frankly, I’m focused on the flood relief efforts,” Bhutto-Zardari said in an interview, referring to deadly floods in Pakistan that have left ms of people homeless.
“The Afghan regime has promised not only to its own people, but to the international community, that they will not allow their soil to be used for terrorists,” he said.
Pakistan’s foreign ministry released a statement saying it noted Yaqoob’s comments with “deep concern”.
“In the absence of any evidence, as acknowledged by the Afghan Minister himself, such conjectural allegations are highly regrettable and defy the norms of responsible diplomatic conduct,” the statement said.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said the Taliban “grossly violated” a 2020 agreement on the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces from Afghanistan by hosting and sheltering Zawahiri.
The Taliban said it is investigating the July air strike and that it has not found the al Qaeda leader’s body.
Yaqoob’s comments could exacerbate tension between Afghanistan and its neighbour at a time when the Afghan Taliban is mediating talks between Pakistan and a Pakistani Taliban militant group.
Afghanistan, which is undergoing an acute economic crisis, also relies heavily on trade with Pakistan. (Source: Reuters)
29 Aug 22. Australian defence minister to visit France, Germany, Britain to boost ties. Australia’s defence minister on Sunday said he aims to deepen defence ties with France, Germany and Britain during visits to the European partners this week, saying war in Ukraine has increased the importance of cooperation with likeminded nations.
The trip, from Aug. 29 to Sept. 1, will be Richard Marles’ first since centre-left Labor won a general election in May.
The government said the France stop would help “restore and renew” their bilateral relationship, calling France one of Australia’s “oldest and most capable partners”.
Australia in June reached a 555 m euro ($553 m) settlement with French military shipyard Naval Group over its scrapping of a multi-bn dollar submarine deal last year.
Canberra hoped the settlement would help repair a rift after the previous government ditched the deal in favour of building nuclear-powered submarines with the United States and Britain under a new alliance dubbed AUKUS.
This week’s trip will also see Marles participate in a roundtable with German defence industry representatives, while in Britain he will visit shipyards, the government said.
“Our relationship with the United Kingdom is both historic and mutually beneficial, and is reflected through our continued commitment to AUKUS,” Marles said.
“My visit to Europe comes at a time when the war in Ukraine has shown the importance of increasing cooperation with likeminded partners, both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.”
In June, Marles visited Japan to promote defence cooperation to counterbalance China’s growing military influence in Asia.
Also on Sunday, Foreign Minister Penny Wong said she would travel this week to nearby Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Timor-Leste.
Australia has moved to bolster relations in the Pacific amid growing Chinese influence, including a security pact between China and Solomon Islands in April.
Wong said she would meet PNG counterpart Justin Tkatchenko, recently re-elected Prime Minister James Marape and members of PNG’s new cabinet.
From PNG, Wong will travel on Wednesday to Timor-Leste and meet officials including President Jose Ramos-Horta, Prime Minister Taur Matan Ruak and Foreign Minister Adaljiza Magno.
She said she planned to discuss issues such as Australian support for Timor-Leste’s economic development and its bids to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and World Trade Organization.
“Australia is committed to working together with both Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste in the interests of a stable, resilient and prosperous Indo-Pacific,” Wong said. ($1 = 1.0039 euros) (Source: Reuters)
————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————-